Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 2019-2020
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017
Facts: the parties are the province of camarines sur c/o of the provincial
governor as the donor of the lot to the Cam Sur Teachers Association as
the donee. CASTEA accepted the donation provincial governor Apolonio
Maleniza.
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-
described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other
purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be
constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used
by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with
its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association,
PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or
incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements
thereon in favor of any party and provided, lastly, that the construction of
the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and
voided and of no further force and effect.8
CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law
and complied with the conditions stated in the deed. However, on August
15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the
donated property.9 Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA leased the
property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on September 1,
1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession
of the property on September 1, 1995.
Because of this the deed of donation was revoked due to the violation of
the provision of the agreement, BODEGA being the one in possession is
merely occupying the land by mere tolerance. On March 13, 2008,
petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the
MTC Naga City. It prayed that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property
and surrender to petitioner its peaceful possession. Petitioner also prayed
for the payment of P15,000 a month from October 2007 until Bodega
vacates the land.17
In a Decision18 dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City ruled in
favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and to pay
P15,000 a month as reasonable compensation. The RTC reversed the
MTC due that there was no evidence presented by petitioner. It was
appealed to the CA but it was affirmed by them. Thus, the appeal to the
SC.
Issue: The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and Bodega
has the right to the actual physical possession of the property.
Held: Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. These actions are summary proceedings and
are devised to provide for a particular remedy for a very specific issue.
Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of
actual possession.28 In these actions, courts are asked to ascertain which
between the parties has the right to the possession de facto or physical
possession of the property in question.29 Its purpose is to restore the
aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully establishes his or
her right to possess the property. The essence of an ejectment suit is for
the rightful possessor to lawfully recover the property through lawful
means instead of unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its
current occupant.30 Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry
is a summary proceeding and is an expeditious means to recover
possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts may only
pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining who has the better
right of possession.31 Any ruling involving ownership is not final and
binding. It is merely provisional and does not bar an action between the
same parties regarding the title of the property.32
An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific
circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current
occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully.33 This
possession only became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to
possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere
tolerance.34
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An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key
jurisdictional facts:
(1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4)
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of
possession alleges that the opposing party occupied the subject property
by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance
established.36 Further, the party seeking possession must identify the
source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence
establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega
to present proof of its legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega,
however, failed to heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely
tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using its building
and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that
Bodega vacate the property in November 2007. This presents a clear case
of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.
Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to
recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the
property"54 and attorney's fees and costs. More specifically, recoverable
damages are "those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property."55
In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of P15,000 monthly as
damages. Petitioner argued that considering that the Contract of Lease
between CASTEA and Bodega shows that the monthly rent for the
property is P30,000, the amount of P15,000 which it prays for is fair and
reasonable.56 We agree with the petitioner's position. The amount of rent
in the Contract of Lease is evidence of the fair rental value of the property.
That the petitioner asked for half of this amount as damages is reasonable
given the circumstances.
Santiago vs Northbay Knitting
G.R. No. 217296, October 11, 2017
Facts: The parties are Northbay Knitting filed a complaint for ejectment
against the spouses who are doing business under the name of REA
General Marine Services. NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a
parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of the Dagat-Dagatan Project in
Navotas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092. All
petitioners were simply allowed to occupy said property by NKI and they
were not paying any rent. On March 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to
petitioners asking them to vacate the property within five (5) days from
receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate within the
grace period given. However, despite receipt of said letters, petitioners
refused to vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on April 14, 2009, NKI
filed an ejectment complaint against petitioners. The MeTC ruled in favor
of Northbay and thus appealed to the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of the
Santiago’s and thus appealed to the CA. CA reversed the decision of the
RTC of lack of jurisdiction. Hence the appeal to SC.
Issue: WON the allegations is enough to constitute the cause of action of
an unlawful detainer case.
Held: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint. It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties, neither can it be cured by their silence,
acquiescence, or even express consent.7 In ejectment cases, the
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
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enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.8
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
states the following:
1) possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the same; and
4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.9
Here, as the CA aptly found, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the
allegations required to support a case for unlawful detainer, thereby
vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the case. NKI stated that it is the
absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. M-
38092, and supported by Tax Declaration No. C-002-08822-C and real
property tax receipt for the tax due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the actual
occupants of said property, never paid rent but continued to possess the
property upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of NKI's demand
letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the property.
The statements in the complaint that petitioners' possession of the
property in question was by mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a case
for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding
from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied. A requisite for
a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession
must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful
only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the
possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession
must be established. If, as in the instant case, the claim is that such
possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must
be proved.
An ejectment suit is likewise summary in nature and is not susceptible to
circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the
property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the lower courts and the CA, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole
purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however,
does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive
of the facts found in said case between the same parties but upon a
separate cause of action involving possession.
Regalado vs De la Rama vds De la Peña
G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017
Facts: The Dela Peña’s own two parcel of lands located in Negros
Occidental. Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of
respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took possession of,
and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to
respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents discovered such
illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to
vacate the properties but to no avail. The De la Peña’s filed an action for
recovery of possession of the property with injunction.
Thereafter, petitioner Regalado filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the ground,
among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the Complaint,
the action involved recovery of physical possession of the properties in
dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the
parties had a confrontation before the Barangay; and thus, the case was
one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court
(MTC).
On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had
jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject properties was
44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that the value of the
same is more than P20,000.00. RTC rendered a decision to bring back the
property to the De la Peña’s. The petitioner appealed to the CA, affirmed
the decision of the RTC and thus this appeal to the SC.
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Issue:
1. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE?
2. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER SHOULD RETURN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE TO THE
RESPONDENTS?
HELD: In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of
possession of real property: 1) ejectment (either for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a
year; 2) accion publiciana  or a plenary action for recovery of real right of
possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and,
3)  accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),19 the proper Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has
exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction
of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila).20 On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein in case the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).21
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also
by the assessed value of the property. It follows that in accion publiciana
and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property is a
jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take cognizance of
the action.22
In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the Complaint is one for
ejectment; or b) if the same is deemed an accion publiciana, the RTC still
lacks jurisdiction as the assessed value of the subject properties was not
alleged in the Complaint.
As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must
be made to the averments in the complaint, and the law in force at the
commencement of the action. This is because only the facts alleged in the
complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action, and
the court that can take cognizance of the case.23
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an
accion publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC has
jurisdiction over it.
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot
be presumed or implied, and must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot
also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties; or by the
court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.
Ferrer vs Rabacca
Facts:This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the
Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty,
knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the
Code of Conduct for Government Officials.
The complainants were the President and the Executive Director
of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit an ejectment suit entitled Young
Women’s Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano pending before
MTC Manila Br 25 with Judge Rabaca as Presiding Judge. Judge Rabaca
ruled in favor of YMCA. As such, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for
immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the
immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment."
The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as
basis for its motion. However, respondent Judge denied the motion for
immediate execution on the ground that Notice of Appeal has been timely
filed by counsel for the defendant. Judge Rabaca allegedly advised the
counsel for the plaintiff to file an MR. BUT he denied the MR subsequently.
The Branch Clerk of Cout was then ordered to transmit the records to the
RTC. Complainants filed an administrative complaint against Judge
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Rabaca (alleging refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court
had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and
prejudice). Judge Rabaca filed comment (explaining that he honestly
thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the
provision of Section 9, Rule 41 w/c provides that the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time xxx, that
he had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice.
Complainants filed a reply contending that Judge exhibited his
ignorance of the law and grossly neglected his duties. The complainants
pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in
forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a
notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal
and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to
the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time
of the judgment appealed from.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Rabaca was correct in refusing to execute his
decision in favor of YMCA on the ground that the defendants in the said
case were able to seasonably file an appeal.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE:
NO.
The Court cited Sec. 19 Rule 70 and explained:
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an
appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the
judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise
file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer
for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court
requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent
before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of
the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and
imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104
SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal
dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however failed to file any
supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, more
specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion
for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for
Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an
Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate
the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch
Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This fact
is clear from Judge Rabaca’s Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he
directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the
Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved
for the immediate execution of Judge Rabaca’s decision, the latter still had
jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to
act on the Motion for Execution. The relevant question that we should
resolve however is whether such error is an error of judgment or an error
amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline. It is
basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the
plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory.
DOCTRINE:
Perfection of appeal is different from expiration of time to appeal (sec. 9,
rule 41); The Trial Court retains jurisdiction as long as the records of the
case had not been transmitted to the appellate court.
[G.R. NO. 170916 : April 27, 2007]
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO
RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R.
BENEDICTO, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto
(petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in
Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the
notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674, 3 56944 and
56955 in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the
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Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until
December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly
forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once
inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence
along the road going to petitioners' fishponds, and harvested several tons
of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With
Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And
Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,6 13327 and 1333,8 against
Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC
a complaint for damages against respondent x    x    x
X X X Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 petitioners' complaint for
damages on three grounds - litis pendentia, res
judicata and forum shopping.
RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground of prematurity, it
holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final
determination on the forcible entry cases has been made."
ISSUE: Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for
forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an
action for damages which they claim arose from incidents
occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.
RULING: YES. Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum
justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If it
finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for
the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established,
the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from
either party and award costs as justice requires.
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to
"rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney's fees and
costs.13
XXX
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations
in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages
have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to
do with respondent's alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of
milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and
destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing
religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the
act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the
pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will,
regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to
dismiss petitioners' complaint for damages.21
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has
no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation
of the premises and attorney's fees.22
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for
damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a
final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in
the former.23
Petitioners' filing of an independent action for damages other than those
sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of
their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered
as splitting of a cause of action.
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G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014
AMADA C. ZACARIAS v. VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY,
CYNTHIA ANACAY-GUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL,
JIMMY ROY ISRAEL AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING
AUTHORITY UNDER THEM
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint 4 for Ejectment with
Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed x x x by petitioner x x x against the
above-named respondents x x x After due proceedings, the MCTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint x x x
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the
subject property was unsubstantiated.  It noted that the averments in the
demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the
property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own “Sinumpaang
Salaysay”, are more consistent with an action for forcible entry which
should have been filed within one year from the discovery of the alleged
entry.  Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her
property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse
of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over the case.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint,
petitioner did not state that respondents entered her property through
stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and
acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May
2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by
that time.  It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she
allowed them to stay there for one year. x x x
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory.
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
execution.  At the hearing x x x respondents were given a period of ten
days within which to file their comment x x x respondents’ counsel
appeared x x x informing the court that on the same day they had filed a
petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA x x x
The CA held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer.  Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for
forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one
for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from
the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioners correctly filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer.
RULING: No x x x In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.13   Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.  In
illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or
implied.14cralawlawlibrary
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1)  initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
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(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The xxx complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer
as it does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal
or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by
the petitioner of such lawful possession.  Petitioner’s insistence that she
actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of
their entry into the subject premises is incorrect.  As she had averred, she
discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such possession could
not have been legal from the start as it was  without her knowledge or
consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or implied.  We
stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess.
X X X final and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance”
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible
entry.  Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine.  judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
And for two reasons:  First.  Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor.  Violation of that right authorizes
the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules.  If one
year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court.  Second, if a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of
years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe.  No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a
plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw
him out of the land.  Such a conclusion is unreasonable.  Especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is
but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and
underscoring supplied)
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents.  The
complaint contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any
color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their
house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession
thereof.”  Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected
or how and when dispossession started.  Admittedly, no express contract
existed between the parties.  This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case. 
(ADD) Lastly, petitioner’s argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a
It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.  The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 20   Indeed, a void
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. 21
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE
JESUS
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint 5 for accion publiciana  against
Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo
(Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively,
the respondents), with the MeTC of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land
located in Novaliches, Quezon City xxxThe land has an assessed value of
thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) x x x
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The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not
employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a
year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on
the subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and
permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one
house while Macario occupied the other one.9
x x x The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case 11 against the
respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-
Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents.
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No.
8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No.
772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case. 15
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the
execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the
subject lot. The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the
same.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge
the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with
the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil
liabilities were extinguished x x x
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20
X X X the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses x x x
argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the same parties;
(2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations;
and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the
respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the
course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with
the RTC. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.:
(i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the
MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before
the RTC.
Issue: What court has jurisdiction over the complaint for accion
publiciana?
RULING: x x x Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the
RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction
and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if
the property is located in Metro Manila.
X X X jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value
of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level.
It is synonymous to taxable value. 41
X X X In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint,
the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or
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all of the claims asserted therein. 44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value
of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by
the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.
The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
(ADD) Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of
possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession
on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property.35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue
of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. 36
The cause of action has not prescribed
X X X The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of
benefits under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the
present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
X X X the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. 54
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that
the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to
him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system
and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not
even violent.58
G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018
FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO MAURICE GEORGE
FUERTE v. SPOUSES SILVINO S.ESTOMO AND CONCEPCION C.
ESTOMO
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint 4 for unlawful detainer filed by
Fuerte against respondents spouses Silvino S. Estomo (Silvino) and
Concepcion C. Estomo (Concepcion) (Spouses Estomo). The subject
property is situated at Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1,
Antipolo City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-55253.
Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the subject property in her favor. Upon Co's failure to pay
the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually
obtained ownership of the property. However, the writ of possession was
returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property and
that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only
after the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses
Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter 5 dated December 1,
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 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 2019-2020
2008, she demanded them to vacate and surrender posession of the
subject property and pay the corresponding compensation. The Spouses
Estomo refused to heed to her demands.
X X X The Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed
on the ground that the allegations are insufficient to establish a cause of
action for unlawful detainer. By Fuerte's own allegation, the Spouses
Estomo's entry to the property was unlawful from the beginning. The case
cannot be considered as one for forcible entry since it was never alleged
that their entry was by means of force, intimidation, threat, stealth or
strategy.
MTCC of Antipolo City, Branch 1 dismissed the complaint without
prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the
demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the
spouses x x x
RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte
established the existence of the December 1, 2008 demand letter, which
was sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 5209 of the
Antipolo City Post Office. The notice to vacate the subject property served
through registered mail is a substantial compliance with the modes of
service under Section 2,8 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
X X X The CA found that the complaint failed to describe that the
possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal or tolerated and
became illegal upon termination of lawful possession x x x
ISSUE: Did petitioner successfully file an action for Unlawful Detainer?
RULING: No. At the outset, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action x x x part
Fuerte maintains that it is a hornbook rule that the purchaser of a real
property from a vendor who no longer occupies the said property need not
prove as an essential requisite how and the manner the present possessor
came into occupation. As long as she fulfills the requisite of demand to
vacate, she may bring an action for unlawful detainer against the Spouses
Estomo who defied her demand. X X X
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
states the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of the latter's right
of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate
the property on the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of the court, the complaint must specifically allege the
facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual
allegations, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and
the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case. 17
xxx
A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the requirements for
unlawful detainer. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful
detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful
only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the
possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must
then be established x x x Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an
allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses'
possession on account of an express or implied contract between them.
Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's
indicatiye of her permission to occupy the land.
Moreover, the December 1, 2008 demand letter supports the fact that she
characterized the Spouses Estomo's possession of the subject property as
unlawful from the start, to wit: x x x Nevertheless, since your occupancy of
our client's property is without her consent, permission and approval, it is,
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therefore, unlawful.
(ADD) Fuerte asseverates that the pronouncement of the CA that the
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case "is not a bar for the parties or even
third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of
ownership" merely invites multiplicity of suits. Such dismissal defied
Section 8,24 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. She alleged that the CA should
have remanded the case to the RTC as the appellate court which has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the
complaint to proceed with the case.
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary
action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or
ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful
detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a
reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the
question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion
interdictal), together with forcible entry, are the two forms of ejectment suit
that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to
recover the right of possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to
recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession, make up
the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 25
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has
been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of
public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to
enforce their claimed right ofpossession. 26
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in
this case, will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title
or ownership because between a case for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of
action. Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.27 In fact, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall
in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." Since there is
no identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits.
G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018
THE IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA OF MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, INC. v. LOIDA DELA CRUZ
On March 26, 2007, Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,
Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), represented by Francisco Galvez (Galvez),
filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a Complaint 6 for unlawful detainer
with damages (Complaint) against respondent Dela Cruz, using the name
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" and all persons
claiming rights under her (collectively, respondents). Docketed as Civil
Case No. JL00-891, said Complaint contained the following allegations: x x
x
3. [Petitioner] is the owner of certain parcels of land x x x covered by
Original Certificate of Title [(OCT)] No. 35266 and [the corresponding] Tax
Declaration [(TD)] [No.] 06223 [(subject lot)]. xxx
5. Since 1940, Miguela Gatchalian [Miguela], the late mother of [Galvez]
and her family used to occupy [and] possess and [likewise] built a house of
their own in the concept of an owner [with] uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and
physical possession [on a] certain portion of the [subject lot] as they were
relatives and [long-time] member[s] of [petitioner] and were allowed by the
founder [Rosendo] to occupy the same;
7. [Dela Cruz] used to be a member of the [petitioner] x x x. However,
when [Rosendo] died, x x x the members [became] disorganized x x x.
Since then, members who x x x come and visit the chapel were allowed to
enter the chapel and conduct their meetings and worship therein;
8. Surprisingly[,] sometime [in] 1998, without the knowledge and consent
of all [the] members and officers of [petitioner], [Dela Cruz] xxx formed,
organized[,] and created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST,
"NEW JERUSALEM";
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 Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 2019-2020
9. The organization formed by [Dela Cruz] was used by her as an
instrument in claiming that she is the representative of the said religious
organization and had the right over the [subject lot]. x x x
10. The occupation and possession of [Dela Cruz] over the [subject
lot] of [petitioner] was merely tolerated because they were former
members of [petitioner] x x x
11. On 12 February 2007, a demand was sent to [respondents] to vacate
and surrender the peaceful possession of the chapel and to stop using the
[subject lot] of [petitioner] but the [respondents] failed and refused xxx to
vacate the same x x x. The demand letter was personally served[,] but
[Dela Cruz] refused to sign [the same]. x x x ;
In her Answer,9 Dela Cruz countered with the following averments:
6. x x x [T]he TDs of the [subject lot] x x x already bore the name of ["]New
Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ" as owner thereof, xxx;
12. [She] denies the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint insofar as
she allegedly formed the organization as an instrument to claim the
[subject lot]. However, she admits filing an ejectment case and the
consequent dismissal thereof on appeal. The reason for the dismissal
being that [said] ejectment case has become "moot and academic" by
[therein defendants', including Galvez's, act of] voluntarily vacating the
[subject lot]. Said act of [Galvez] is an indication that he does not have any
right over the [subject lot]. In fact[,] during the proceedings before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa[,] [Galvez] offered to leave the [subject Jot]
provided [that] he would be paid a reasonable sum for the house built
thereon. x x x
14. x x x There was [neither a] demand that came to her attention [nor]
was there an occasion that she refuse[d] to sign [the same]. x x x This is
fatal to the cause of [petitioner or Galvez] and warrants the outright
dismissal of the [C]omplaint;
Issue: Was the case for Unlawful Detainer properly filed?
RULING: No. We start off with, the basic postulate that the present case
was a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages by petitioner against
respondents.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property
was lawful, either by contact with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to
the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate
the property.32
In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by
uniformly holding that Dela Cruz was able to show by convincing evidence
that she is the duly authorized representative of the registered owner of
the disputed property. Quoting the RTC, the CA agreed that it is beyond
doubt or dispute that the disputed property is registered in the name of
"The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc."
and that the sole issue for resolution in the case is which party was
authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed property, viz.:
It is beyond cavil that the disputed property is registered in the name of
"The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc."
as stated in both the reconstituted title 34 attached to the Complaint
submitted by petitioner, as represented by Galvez, as well as in the copy
of the original title35 thereof attached to the Position Paper filed by Dela
Cruz, which as claimed by the latter is in the possession of Obispo
Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc. We note that this name is actually the name of petitioner
verbatim. Moreover, it is indicated in the dorsal portion of the reconstituted
title that Galvez had been authorized to prosecute the action to
reconstitute the title, to wit: x x x
We need not repeatedly belabor the issue in an ejectment case:
x x x The principal issue must be possession  de facto, or actual
possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary
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character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of

possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the
community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve
ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising
in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the
purpose of determining the principal issue of possession. x x x 39

"Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system, is entitled to all the
attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes
possession."40 Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be
decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently
proven."41
XXX

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful, detainer case against respondents. It is an
established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in
continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the
concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father.
Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents
from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment
proceeding.43

In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim

that it merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property.
Indeed, "[w]ith the averment here that the respondent[s'] possession was
by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved,
for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner
should show the overt acts indicative of [its] or [its] predecessor's tolerance
x x x But [it] did not adduce such evidence," 44 as in this case. It is thus
quite evident from the allegations and evidence presented by petitioner
that its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' entry into and
possession of the disputed property, is baseless and unsubstantiated.
Furthermore, while possession is a question of fact which is generally not
allowed to be raised in a Rule 45 petition, the MeTC, RTC, and CA made
no finding in respect to the question of tolerance as discussed above.

14