505 098 1 PDF

505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.
Purchased for use on the IB846B Global Branding, at Warwick Business School.
The Anti-Brand Brand
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
Order reference F382145
This case was prepared by Professor Nirmalya Kumar, Sophie Linguri and
Associate Professor Nader Tavassoli as a basis for classroom discussion rather
than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation.
Copyright © 2005 London Business School. All rights reserved. No

part of this case study may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval London Business
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, School reference
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without written CS-04-006
permission of London Business School.
Distributed by The Case Centre North America Rest of the world

www.thecasecentre.org t +1 781 239 5884 t +44 (0)1234 750903
case centre All rights reserved f +1 781 239 5885
e info.usa@thecasecentre.org
f +44 (0)1234 751125
e info@thecasecentre.org
-2- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Red Bull: The Anti-Brand Brand

In 2004, Red Bull found itself at a crossroad, challenged with defending its
70% worldwide market share of the €2.5 billion energy drinks category that it
had pioneered. After the rapid growth of the 1990s, volume growth for energy
drinks had slowed in Western Europe from 44% in 2000 to 6.5% in 2003.1 The
company was also facing an onslaught of copycat, competitive brands, some of
them promoted by beverage industry giants such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi,
others as private labels by mass retailers such as Asda.
Was Red Bull outgrowing its anti-establishment status? Did it need to

transition to a more traditional marketing approach? As a mature brand, was it
time to use its brand muscle to drive distribution? Should it be more innovative
in its product development? Or, would these activities fundamentally destroy

Red Bull’s anti-brand mystique?

COMPANY BACKGROUND
While travelling in Asia for Blendax toothpastes

(now part of Procter & Gamble) in 1982,
Austrian businessman Dietrich Mateschitz

(pictured in Figure 1) came across Krating

Daeng which means “Red Bull” in Thai. This

was a cheap tonic sold in a brown bottle by TC
Pharmaceuticals and favoured by Thai factory
workers to remain alert during their shifts.
Mateschitz approached the owner of TC
Pharmaceuticals, Chaleo Yoovidhya, and
together with Yoovidhya’s son Chalerm they
agreed to set up a company.
Red Bull GmbH was founded in Austria in 1984. Figure 1: Dietrich Mateschitz
The taste and texture of the product was adapted
from the original Thai formula and it was bottled
in a slender 250-millilitre (8.3 ounces) blue and silver can (see Figure 2). It
was a carbonated fluorescent yellow liquid whose main ingredients were
taurine (an amino-acid), caffeine (about the same as in a cup of coffee),
glucuronolactone (a carbohydrate), Vitamin B and sugar. Red Bull’s retail
price was €2 per can and it sold for up to €6 in bars, much higher than
competing soft drinks. Its claimed benefits were:
To increase physical endurance, improve concentration and reaction
speed, improve vigilance and stimulate the metabolism.2
Initial market research results were far from promising, however:

The thin colour of the new drink was totally unappetizing, the sticky
mouth feel and the taste were deemed ‘disgusting’. And the concept of
‘stimulates mind and body’ was—at best—irrelevant. The verdict by the
research firm: ‘No other product has ever failed this convincingly.’3
-3- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Mateschitz did not see early consumer reactions as a failure, however: “50
percent of our test group was crazy about Red Bull, and 50 percent said it
tasted terrible,” he said, “I thought, Great! You can't beat ambivalence. It's
attention, it's controversy, it's discussion that keeps a product alive.”4
The Austrian FDA was also reluctant to approve the first

energy drink. And when it was approved and launched in
1987—coincidentally, the same year that Howard Schultz
acquired a small Seattle-based coffee shop called
Starbucks—it was at first only sold in Austrian petrol
stations, because bars refused to stock what seemed to
them to be a medicinal product. Mateschitz viewed these
initial first three years “the worst three years of my life.”5
However, soon Austrian clubbers and snowboarders

discovered the drink’s reviving effect and brought it with

them to alcohol-free raves. Rapidly, it also became the
Figure 2: mixer of choice in Austrian ski resorts, and the notorious
Red Bull can vodka-Red Bull combination was born.
In 1992, the product was distributed in Hungary and Slovenia, followed by

Germany and Switzerland in 1994. Red Bull entered the U.S. market in 1997,
testing it in California, and taking five years before the drink was distributed
nationally. By 2003, the US market generated an estimated 40% of Red Bull’s

turnover.
1.6
In 2003, Red Bull’s global sales were €1.26 1.4
billion and around 1.5 billion cans (see Figure 1.2
36 and Exhibit 1 for financial information).7 1.0

0.8
Red Bull was being sold in over 100 markets 0.6
and was the market leader in the USA as well 0.4
as in 12 of the 13 West European markets 0.2
where it was present.8 Mateschitz’s net worth of 0

over €1 billion made him the third richest 1987 89 91 93 95 97 99 2001
Austrian in 2004. Adapted from The Economist (2002) and Various Sources
Figure 3: Cans of Red Bull

Sold (billions), 1987-2001
RED BULL’S SALES & DISTRIBUTION TACTICS

-
Red Bull’s decentralised sales units were responsible for sales, marketing and
distribution in their own area. Its distribution strategy contributed to the
perceived exclusivity of Red Bull. When contacting small distributors, sales
reps insisted that Red Bull be distributed exclusively by a dedicated sales force.
If refused, they set up their own Red Bull warehouse, bought vans, painted
them with the Red Bull logo, and hired their own deliverymen to distribute the
cans of Red Bull.9
In introducing Red Bull to new markets, sales reps followed a selective sales
strategy. They identified five key accounts in their area—hot spots such as
-4- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
clubs and bars popular with the “in-crowd”—where they approached key
individuals including DJs, bar tenders, and other trendsetters. They provided
these accounts with Red Bull as well as branded promotional items to enhance
the brand visibility. If other establishments asked to buy Red Bull, they were at
first refused.10 Sales reps then targeted shops near universities and gyms.
Dealing with individual accounts rather than big retailers had the added
advantage of being fast.
In 2003, an estimated 64% of volume was generated by consumption in bars,

clubs and petrol stations—accounting for 79% of the value due to the price
premium—while retail outlets made up the remaining 36% of volume. Red
Bull was facing strong competition in the retail space, not only from beverage
heavyweights such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi, but also from retailer private
labels.

Recently, Red Bull had started to experiment with the distribution mix. For

example, it had been highly successful in a distribution alliance with Cadbury
Schweppes in Australia, where expanded distribution contributed to a 40% up-
tick in sales between the summer of 2003 and 2004 over its existing core
channels of licensed premises, grocery and convenience stores. The goal of the
partnership was to allow more customers to have access to Red Bull.11 Red
Bull also considered using vending machines as a way to increase sales as well
as reinforce its brand. Vending was an established way that soft drink
manufacturers such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi had expanded sales and enhanced
brand awareness.
BRAND MARKETING AT RED BULL
Red Bull’s logo—two thick-necked crimson bulls

in opposing charge against a yellow sun—was the
epitome of kinetic virility and pugnacity. This
Herculean brand symbol saw a more light-hearted
side in the company’s quirky cartoon character
used since the launch in 1987 and that established
the slogan “Red Bull gives you wings” (Figure
4).12 These cartoons were intended to reinforce
brand identity rather than create awareness. Most
importantly, the Red Bull brand had not been
nurtured using traditional advertising techniques
Figure 4: Red Bull’s such as television, print, radio or billboard ads.
Cartoon character
Instead of traditional advertising, Red Bull relied
on a strategy of word-of-mouth or “buzz” marketing. Red Bull focussed on
getting the word out through various stealth marketing techniques, playing on
associations with energy, danger and youth culture, carefully cultivating its
mystique. Through its sponsorship of youth culture and extreme sports events,
Red Bull developed a cult following among marketing-wary Generation Y-ers,
(18- to 29-year olds) who perceived it as an anti-brand. While it purported to
be a sports drink, it was mostly sold in clubs and bars as an alcohol mixer. It
was the perfect substance for the rave scene in Europe, which emerged in the
late 80s and early 90s, its caffeine doses helping revive clubbers into the early
-5- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
morning hours. Attesting the power of this approach, Red Bull was voted as
one of the top brands in Africa and Europe in 2001 (see Figure 5).
Mateschitz believed in the importance of context for consumption of Red Bull.
Therefore, the marketing focussed on sampling and event sponsorship that
embodies the spirit of Red Bull. Mateschitz invested 35% of turnover in
marketing and sponsorship in events.13 In his words, “we don’t bring the
product to the people, we bring people to the product. We make it available and
those who love our style come to us,”14 adding, “Red Bull isn’t a drink, it’s a
way of life.”15
20%
18%

16%

14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Nokia Ikea Absolute Virgin BMW Orange Red Bull Guiness
Figure 5: 2001 Europe & Africa Top Votes for Brand of the Year16
Sponsorship of Extreme Sports Events & Youth Culture Events

A major part of Red Bull’s marketing was sponsorship of extreme sports
events. Many of these had a flying theme, consistent with the brand’s slogan.
Rather than merely sponsoring events, Red Bull also developed its own
extreme sports events such as BMX biking, kite-boarding, extreme
snowboarding, freeskiing, paragliding and skydiving. Soon the drink became
associated with dangerous, on-the-edge, adrenaline-fuelled activities, such as
the Red Bull King of the Air kiteboarding event in Maui, Big Wave Africa Surf
Competition on the Cape peninsula and the infamous Red Bull Flugtag, where
amateur pilots build their own flying machines and leap off a parapet into
water (see Figure 6, for several examples).
Red Bull also sponsored pop culture events, many of which were participatory.
For example, the Red Bull Music Academy (RMBA) brought together aspiring
musicians and DJs for two weeks to attend workshops and studio sessions, and
listen to guest lecturers. The academy was held in different cities: Berlin in
1998, Dublin in 1999, New York in 2001, London in 2002, Capetown in 2003
and Rome in 2004. These events were well received by the music community:
-6- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
While Red Bull have certainly gained out of dance music and its
attendant youth culture by selling their ‘energy-giving’ drink, RBMA is
possibly the first serious attempt by a multi-national to ‘give something
back’, or at least to cultivate a two-way relationship between culture
and commerce. So why are they doing it?
[…]
“Red Bull get a lot out of it” … “They’ve grown out of the DJ culture
and now they’re putting something back. They’ve built up a network of
people who like them for doing something right. There’s a lot of
frustration with brands doing this kind of thing wrongly, but everyone
here can see there’s a lot of effort put in, and everyone’s enjoyed it so
far. They’re not selling more cans of their product but they are getting
people to write about them in a different way. They’ve created a

dynamic amongst the music industry and built something that’s
generally respected. There’s no hidden agenda – the only way to make a
serious cultural statement has to be without one.”17
Figure 6: Red Bull sponsorship examples
Additional events such as Red Bull BC One Breakdancing competition helped

spread the word about Red Bull with trendsetters in youth culture, giving it its
street credibility. Red Bull also created brand experiences around other art
forms, such as the Red Bull Creative Contest for which entrants created a work
of art from an empty Red Bull can. Well-known contemporary artists such as
Tracey Emin and fashion designer Wayne Hemmingway had been on the
judging panel of the contest. These events showed that Red Bull is willing to
-7- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
invest a lot in making people become believers in the brand through hands-on
experiences.18
Hitting the Streets

Red Bull hired consumer
education teams to drive cars
that were painted blue and silver
with logos on the side and a
giant Red Bull can mounted on
the back (Figure 7). The
vehicles contained fridges
stocked with cans of Red Bull,
which the teams handed out for
free to “those in need of energy,”

at truck stops, office buildings,

gyms and construction sites.
Figure 7: Consumer Education Teams Red Bull also gave cans to DJs
distributing Red Bull to drink while mixing in clubs. It
also left empty cans on tables in
trendy bars and pubs, as well as in garbage cans outside select nightclubs.
Not all of Red Bull’s buzz marketing tactics succeeded. In 1996, it had a
placement in the PlayStation racing game Wipeout 2097 (along with a number
of fictional sponsors), one of the most successful games at the time. Players
who clicked on the Red Bull icon received extra energy and improved reaction
time. This tactic, however, resulted in backlash from many players who
perceived it as intrusive.19
Student Brand Managers
Red Bull launched a programme at
universities whereby student brand managers
were hired to promote the product on campus
(Figure 8). The scheme provided students
with free cases of Red Bull and encouraged
them to throw parties, as well as to raise the
profile of Red Bull in the university press.
In addition, these brand managers reported
back to Red Bull, thus providing them with
market research. The company understood
the value of peer network as target consumers
are easily turned off by a sales approach. Red Figure 8: Recruiting Student
Bull relied on an approach that doesn't look Brand Managers in Italy
20
like a sales pitch. The scheme targets
trendsetters to be brand managers: “individual, non-conformist people, not just
ambitious types looking for work experience.”21
-8- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Consistently Cultivating Brand Mystique

Mateschitz believed mystique was important to the brand identity of Red Bull.
Described as “the Porsche of soft drinks,”22 Red Bull had nicknames like
“liquid cocaine”, “speed-in-a-can.” Mixed with vodka, it became known as
“liquid viagra” purported to have ecstasy-like properties.
Similarly, a rumour that taurine was made from bull's testicles simply added to
its popularity. “The rumours never hurt,” said Mateschitz. He joked, “I always
have to fly to Pamplona to source bull’s testicles.”23 The company addressed
such rumours on its website, possibly helping to reinforce the product
mythology.
The long FDA approval times in many countries and boycotts by concerned

mothers further stirred rumours of the dangers of Red Bull. It was banned in

France and Denmark due to health concerns. This was on the heels of several
deaths in Sweden and Ireland that were purportedly associated with the
consumption of Red Bull (a case in Sweden and the one in Ireland have been
found to be without merit). In 2004, the European Court had upheld the French
ban on Red Bull.
The nicknames, bans, deaths and boycotts, all seemed to lend the drink its
edginess and aura of danger. In the words of Mateschitz: “Without the old high
school teacher telling his students Red Bull is evil – probably even a drug – it
wouldn’t seem as interesting.”24
Red Bull’s strategy was to keep the message fresh, but to keep it consistent
over time. “From the launch in Austria in 1987, we did not change anything.
We have the same communications strategy, the same tone of voice,” said
Mateschitz.25 While regional brand coaches were given flexibility to develop
programmes appropriate for their geographic region, each brand coach was
provided with a brand bible, to ensure that they understood which activities
were true to Red Bull.26 However, in order to keep the brand message fresh,
Red Bull consistently devoted resources to coming up with new ideas to
enhance its brand. In 2002, Mateschitz decided to dedicate two days a week to
brainstorming ideas for promoting Red Bull.27
THE ONSLAUGHT OF NEW COMPETITORS
The success of Red Bull and the growth of the energy drinks category led to an
onslaught of new competitors (see Figure 9 for several examples). For
example, in 2000, 23 new functional energy drinks were introduced in the UK
market alone, but Red Bull was able to hold onto 86% of the market.28 The
high industry margins29 attracted copycats from large companies like
Anheuser-Bush (e.g., 180), Carlsberg (e.g., Battery), Cadbury-Schweppes (e.g.,
Venom), Coca-Cola (e.g., Burn and KMX), and Pepsi (Amp), as well as large
retailers such as Asda (part of the Wal-Mart group) to launch its own Blue
Charge brand of energy drink.
-9- 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
In some cases competitors led local markets, such as Battery which outsold
Red Bull in its native Finnish market. However, even small brands had been
able to establish competitive positions, such as the Austrian company Shark
that held the number two position in Europe.
Figure 9: Examples of competitive products

Figure 9: Examples of competitive products
Many of the competitive brands attempted to cultivate a similar anti-

establishment brand image to Red Bull’s, imitating several of its buzz
marketing techniques. Others, such as the Finnish brand Battery chose a

cutting-edge and futuristic techno look supported by slick television

advertisements. Several brands more narrowly positioned themselves around

the rumoured sexual virility supplied by energy drinks, ranging from cheap
gimmicks like including a free condom with the can to ads featuring naked
models.
Competitive product offerings ranged from pure knock-off brands such as Red
Rhino (centre of Figure 9), visually distinct brands like Battery (second from
right in Figure 9), unusually shaped brands such as Bomba that is in the shape
of a hand grenade (third from right in Figure 9), and larger sizes (e.g. Red
Alert’s 500 ml plastic bottles), to a variety of flavours such as cherry, cranberry
and orange. Brands had also begun to differentiate themselves by ingredients
such as proteins, natural caffeine, and various vitamins. In many cases, brands
also offered a broad product line including carbonated and non-carbonated
versions, a variety of flavours and sizes, and sub-brands with different
ingredients, some even without taurine.
Indirect competition came from sports drinks such as Pepsi’s Gatorade and
Coca-Cola’s Powerade that contained electrolytes but not caffeine or taurine,
as well as from caffeinated water such as Water Joe. Ready-mixed alcoholic
drinks such as Bacardi Breezer and Smirnoff Ice were also considered
competitors.
Did Red Bull feel threatened? On the one hand, Red Bull legally challenged
several competitors over trademark infringements that could lead to brand
confusion (e.g. Red Rhino). On the other hand, Red Bull continued to dominate
Western Europe where the rest of the top 20 brands had a combined share of
17%. Mateschitz’s reaction was accordingly serene: “The market isn’t generic;
it doesn’t exist if we don’t create it. It’s a branded market.”30
- 10 - 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
CAN RED BULL KEEP ITS COOL?
Industry analysts were less optimistic. Now that growth in the energy drinks
market had fallen into the single digits, Red Bull faced a rather different
challenge for growth.
One potential area of growth was in increasing consumption levels. In 2002,
the highest consumption rate of Red Bull had been in Ireland at 11 cans per
person. If a similar usage rate could be achieved in the USA, for example,
where sales only averaged one can per person, then the company could
generate additional annual sales of over two billion cans in the US market
alone.31
Red Bull also faced the ongoing challenge of recruiting a new generation of
16-year old consumers each year as its first generation of consumers aged. It

also hoped that existing consumers would continue to use Red Bull beyond
their student years although probably less intensely.32 This was now more of a
challenge despite its significant investment into marketing activities, as major
competitors were similarly investing.
Some industry analysts felt that Red Bull’s product
development had been complacent in addressing these
challenges. To date, Red Bull had almost exclusively

focussed on its original product, which made it vulnerable
to market variations. Despite realising this—“It makes no

sense to build a company on one product,” said
Mateschitz33—Red Bull was slow in releasing a low
calorie sugar-free version of Red Bull. This had been
produced for years for Mateschitz’s private consumption
but had at first been considered as to “wimpy” for the Red
Bull brand.34 The sugar-free version has not been widely
promoted since its launch in 2003 and the question
remained how a “diet” Red Bull would affect the brand
that till now had been so carefully and consistently
orchestrated (Mateschitz had previously set up a separate
company to launch three new-age health drinks).
The only other drink to carry the bull logo was LunAqua
(Figure 10), water bottled “under the glare of the full Figure 10:
moon,” apparently when the water reached its “highest LunAqua
bioenergetic power.” Originally, this was only sold at the
Full Moon parties the company sponsored. In 2004, a caffeinated and a
caffeine-free version were on the market.
These recent changes signalled that Red Bull was committed to becoming more
innovative: “We have to go for diversification and acquisitions, and we are
investing lots in R&D. We already have concepts and brand formulations for
five years' time,” said Mateschitz.35
The company also faced the challenge to continue to create buzz in new and
different ways. In line with its slogan “Red Bull gives you wings,” it built a
- 11 - 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
huge glass hangar at Salzburg airport, where it houses various exhibits, air
shows, and a collection ancient aircraft, including a DC-6 that once belonged to
Marshal Tito. The hangar also contained an upscale restaurant, Ikarus, that
featured star chefs, as well as the MayDay bar (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: Hangar-7, Ikarus restaurant and the MayDay bar at Salzburg airport

In recent years, there had also been several forays into cinema and television
advertising in mature markets. One campaign featured amateurish footage from
Flugtag and soapbox races. Another consisted of a whimsical series of
cartoons, for example, starring a flirtatious encounter between Adam and Eve.
This seemingly reinforced Red Bull’s rumoured powers as an aphrodisiac.
Another ad seemed to suggest heightened fertility and drew complaints from
regulators. While these ads were non-mainstream and tended to reinforce the
rumours surrounding the brand, some considered them sacrosanct for a
company that was built on a fragile bond of trust between a hero of the anti-
brand establishment and advertising-weary consumers. A mass advertising
approach could undermine Red Bull’s perceived authenticity.
In November 2004, Red Bull bought the Jaguar Formula One team in exchange
for a commitment to invest £63 million into the team for at least two seasons.
motorcycle racing. Reinforcing its sponsorship of the US motorcycle Grand
Prix, Red Bull’s presence in the world of motor racing was an attempt to
broaden the reach of its message.
Not everyone supported these more mainstream marketing tactics, however.
Some feared that if Red Bull became a sort of Austrian Coca-Cola with mass
appeal, its carefully cultivated mystique could “vanish like bubbles in the
brew.” 36 Others were less concerned and felt Red Bull was ready for prime
time.
Mateschitz was well aware of these various challenges and ready to grab the
bull by its horns. "I'm a marketing person," he said. "In the worst case, if it
doesn't work, what have I lost? Pride? Money? All those things can be
replaced. The challenge is to build a mystique."37
- 12 - 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Exhibit 1: Red Bull Financials, 1996-2001 (Euro, Thousand)
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
Operating 686,490 568,600 380,200 196,400 128,000 85,600

revenue
Sales 654,790 551,100 366,400 189,200 123,800 84,800
Profit (loss) 110,900 91,900 43,700 10,310 -1,000 -2,700

before tax
Cash flow 72,990 43,800 31,000 8,200 200 -1,500
Total assets 264,300 201,800 133,600 68,300 58,600 40,100

Shareholders 144,300 91,500 50,400 21,500 14,900 15,900
funds
Current ratio 2.43 3.22 2.4 1.51 1.13 1.3
Profit margin 16.15 16.16 11.49 5.25 -0.78 -3.15
(%)
Return on 76.85 100.44 86.71 47.95 -6.71 -16.98

shareholders
funds (%)
Return on 71.58 60.27 48.78 32.35 -4.26 -13.19
capital
employed (%)
Solvency ratio 54.60 45.34 37.72 31.48 25.43 39.65
(%)
- 13 - 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
Endnotes
1 Zenith International (2004) West Europe Energy Drinks Market Races Towards €2500
million, Press Release, 6 January 2004.
<http://www.zenithinternational.com/pr/pr.cfm?ContentID=105> (Accessed 16 June 2004).
2 Red Bull (2004) Red Bull Website: <http://www.redbull.com> (Accessed 16 June 2004).
3 Wipperfürth, A. (2003) “Speed-in-a-Can: The Red Bull Story,” San Francisco: Plan B.
<www.plan-b.biz/pdf/Speed_In_a_Can.pdf> (Accessed 4 June 2004).
4 Lidsz, F. (2003) “The New Extreme: Austrian Marketing Maverick Dietrich Mateschitz
Found,” SI Adventure Outdoor Sports website.
<http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/siadventure/30/new_extreme> (Accessed 3
September 2004).


6 “Selling energy,” The Economist online, 9 May 2002.
<http://www.economist.com/people/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1120373>
(accessed 2 June 2004).
7 “Austrian Red Bull Sales at 1.261 Bln Euro 2003” (2004) Austrian News Digest, 12 March
2004.
8 Zenith International (2004) West Europe Energy Drinks Market Races Towards €2500
million, Press Release, 6 January 2004.

<http://www.zenithinternational.com/pr/pr.cfm?ContentID=105> (Accessed 16 June 2004).

9 Corts, K.S. and D. Freier (2003) “Judo in Action,” HBS Case 9-703-454, Cambridge:
Harvard Business School Publishing.
10 Hein, K (2001) “Bull's Market - the marketing of Red Bull energy drink,” Brandweek, 28
May 2001.
11 “Bull hitches chocolate lift,” Hospitality Magazine online, 4 July 2003.
<http://www.hospitalitymagazine.com.au/articles/b9/0c017fb9.asp> (Accessed 3 September
2004).
13 “Selling energy,” The Economist online, 9 May 2002.
<http://www.economist.com/people/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1120373> (accessed 2 June
2004).
14 Ibid.
16 Rusch, R. (2002) “Apple Shines: 2001 Brand of the Year Results,” Brand Channel Website,
4 March 2002. <http://www.brandchannel.com/features_effect.asp?id=82> (accessed 16 June
2004)
17 “Red Bull Music Academy,” (2003) IDJ Magazine online, Iss. 33, September 2003.
<http://www.i-dj.co.uk/features/featurespage.php?ID=36&page=2> (accessed 16 June 2004).
19 Ibid.
20 “Students: We shall not be moved,” (2004) Europe Intelligence Wire online.
<http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/news/detail.xhtml?COID=101316&ArticleID=NR2
0040603670.4_3474006fc7c3d0a7> (accessed 4 June 2004).
21 Ibid.
- 14 - 505-098-1
LBS-CS-04-006
22
Chaundy, B. (2001) “Red Bull: Raging Success,” BBC News online,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1437154.htm (accessed 2 June 2004).
23
Wipperfürth, A. (2003) “Speed-in-a-Can: The Red Bull Story,” San Francisco: Plan B.
24
Corts, K.S. and D. Freier (2003) “Judo in Action”, HBS Case 9-703-454, Cambridge:
Harvard Business School Publishing.
25
Jones, A. (2001) “Extreme sports and clubbers fuel energetic rise” FT.com, 22 November
2001 <http://www.ft.com>(accessed 12 April 2002).
26
Wipperfürth, A. (2003) “Speed-in-a-Can: The Red Bull Story,” San Francisco: Plan B.
27
“Selling energy,” The Economist online, 9 May 2002.
http://www.economist.com/people/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1120373
28
Chaundy, B. (2001) “Red Bull: Raging Success,” BBC News online,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1437154.htm> (accessed 2 June 2004).

29
“Sports/energy drinks continue growth,”Just Drinks website, 18 February 2004.
<http://Just-drinks.com> (accessed 2 June 2004).
30
31
Ibid.
32

33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Lidsz, F. (2003) “The New Extreme: Austrian Marketing Maverick Dietrich Mateschitz
Found,” SI Adventure Outdoor Sports website.
<http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/siadventure/30/new_extreme/> (Accessed 3
September 2004).

505 098 1 PDF

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

505 098 1 PDF

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

505-098-1

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Copyright © 2005 London Business School. All rights reserved. No

Distributed by The Case Centre North America Rest of the world

Red Bull: The Anti-Brand Brand

Was Red Bull outgrowing its anti-establishment status? Did it need to

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

While travelling in Asia for Blendax toothpastes

Austrian businessman Dietrich Mateschitz

(pictured in Figure 1) came across Krating

Daeng which means “Red Bull” in Thai. This

Initial market research results were far from promising, however:

The Austrian FDA was also reluctant to approve the first

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

In 1992, the product was distributed in Hungary and Slovenia, followed by

nationally. By 2003, the US market generated an estimated 40% of Red Bull’s

billion and around 1.5 billion cans (see Figure 1.2

36 and Exhibit 1 for financial information).7 1.0

where it was present.8 Mateschitz’s net worth of 0

Figure 3: Cans of Red Bull

RED BULL’S SALES & DISTRIBUTION TACTICS

In 2003, an estimated 64% of volume was generated by consumption in bars,

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

BRAND MARKETING AT RED BULL

Red Bull’s logo—two thick-necked crimson bulls

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

Sponsorship of Extreme Sports Events & Youth Culture Events

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Figure 6: Red Bull sponsorship examples

Additional events such as Red Bull BC One Breakdancing competition helped

Hitting the Streets

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

Consistently Cultivating Brand Mystique

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

THE ONSLAUGHT OF NEW COMPETITORS

Figure 9: Examples of competitive products

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Many of the competitive brands attempted to cultivate a similar anti-

marketing techniques. Others, such as the Finnish brand Battery chose a

cutting-edge and futuristic techno look supported by slick television

advertisements. Several brands more narrowly positioned themselves around

CAN RED BULL KEEP ITS COOL?

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

challenges. To date, Red Bull had almost exclusively

to market variations. Despite realising this—“It makes no

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Exhibit 1: Red Bull Financials, 1996-2001 (Euro, Thousand)

2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996

Operating 686,490 568,600 380,200 196,400 128,000 85,600

Profit (loss) 110,900 91,900 43,700 10,310 -1,000 -2,700

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Return on 76.85 100.44 86.71 47.95 -6.71 -16.98

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org

Taught by Nathan Subramanian, from 27-Apr-2020 to 1-Jul-2020. Order ref F382145.

million, Press Release, 6 January 2004.

<http://www.zenithinternational.com/pr/pr.cfm?ContentID=105> (Accessed 16 June 2004).

Usage permitted only within these parameters otherwise contact info@thecasecentre.org