PANGASINAN v.
ALMAZORA (LACHES) “The law aids the vigilant, not those (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
who slumber on their rights.”
FACTS
A parcel of land registered in the name of AQUILINA MARTINEZ. 1945 -
Aquilina and her grandmother borrowed money from their relative,
CONRADO ALMAZORA. In return, they entrusted the OWNER’S DUPLICATE
COPY of TCT No. T-18729. Conrado and his family remained in the said
property.
1949 - Aquilina died, title of the subject property was transferred to
AURORA MORALES-VIVAR, sole heir.
1972 - Conrado passed away.
1994: Aurora learned that the title of the said property was transferred to
Conrado + sold to Fullway Development Corporation.
1995 - She sent a demand letter for the DELIVERY OF PAYMENT for the
sale.
1996 - Aurora filed complaint for damages. Title was only given for
SAFEKEEPING.
Complaint: ADMITTED that the family of Conrado had been staying on, and
using, the subject property since 1912 with the permission of Aquilina and
Leoncia. AURORA: Through the years, she repeatedly asked Conrado to
return the owner’s copy.
1996 - Respondents: Property was PROPERLY TRANSFERRED to Conrado.+
Barred by PRESCRIPTION.
RTC/CA : There exists a cause of action arising from the FRAUD committed
by CONRADO, as TRUSTEE, against Aurora. CA: Complaint, on its face, did
not show that the action had prescribed.
RTC : Aurora FAILED to prove her right over the subject property. She was
guilty of LACHES. For many years, Aurora slept on her right over the
questioned property and failed to exhaust all means, legal or
administrative, to retrieve what was rightfully hers at the earliest
possible time.
CONRADO was able to transfer the subject property in his name.
“ADJUDICATION AND ABSOLUTE SALE OF A PARCEL OF REGISTERED LAND”
dated January 9, 1949 which was signed by AURORA and her husband.
CA (Aurora substituted by her heirs): DENIED. It took her more than 50
years to act on Conrado’s withholding of the title. The petitioners were
BARRED BY LACHES.
On prescription of actions to recover property obtained by fraud is 10
years. Began from the time the land was registered on JUNE 17, 1965.
The SUIT only commenced on MAY 12, 1996.
RULING
P: Aurora was told only on April 1994. Prescription is not a valid defense to
defeat the title of Aurora.
Section 47 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 states that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
R: Aurora slept on her rights.
LACHES - defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
LACHES IS NOT TO PENALIZE BUT TO AVOID RECOGNIZING A RIGHT
WHEN TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN A CLEARLY INEQUITABLE SITUATION.
ANCHORED ON PUBLIC POLICY.
4 ELEMENTS:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit;
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. ALL WERE PRESENT
AURORA’S SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY
EVIDENCE.
FRAUD WAS NOT PROVEN - Clear and convincing evidence and not merely
by preponderance thereof.
Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land, being
notarized, enjoys the presumption of regularity.
Even on the subject of ownership, petitioners failed to substantiate their
claim. Petitioners had nothing, other than their bare allegations, that they
continuously owned the subject property. For decades, petitioners lacked
the possession and interest to 'recover the subject property. The trial court
even noted that petitioners could not present a single tax declaration
receipt as an indicia of their ownership. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners are certainly not entitled to damages on the basis of their
misplaced claim of ownership over the subject property.
CALTEX v. AGUIRRE (1112-RENUNCIATION OF PRESCRIPTION ALREADY
OBTAINED)
FACTS
DECEMBER 20, 1987 - Collision of M/V DONIA PAZ (passenger vessel) and
MIT VECTOR (chartered by Caltex to transport petroleum products).
“World’s worst peace time maritime disaster”.
1998 - Heirs of victims instituted a CLASS SUIT with the Civil District Court
for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, USA. CONDITIONAL
JUDGMENT: forum non-conveniens
MARCH 06, 2001 - 1,689 claimants filed a civil action for damages for
breach of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with RTC OF CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, BRANCH 28 v. herein petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Bermuda Limited (Steamship).
MARCH 28, 2001 - RTC dismissed the complaint because the CAUSE OF
ACTION had already PRESCRIBED.
PETITIONERS WAIVED THEIR DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION. RTC of
Catbalogan merely NOTED the motion.
Respondents again filed in Louisiana. Court of Louisiana : conditionally
dismissed + ordered them to bring the matter to RTC of Manila.
MAY 6, 2002 and MAY 13, 2002 - Respondents field a Motion for
Intervention and a Complaint in Intervention, respectively.
APRIL 24, 2002 - Petitioners UNCONDITIONALLY WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION of the respondents’ cause of action.
Sulpicio + Steamship filed their Manifestation of No Objection.
RTC of MANILA: RTC of CATBALOGAN already DISMISSED THE CASE.
WAIVERS ARE OF NO MOMENT.
CA AFFIRMED DECISION OF RTC OF MANILA = RES JUDICATA = Barred the
respondents’ motion to intervene and complaint-in-intervention with RTC
of MANILA.
P : Respondents precluded them from filing for the annulment of judgment
or order of the RTC of Catbalogan.
R : When Ps filed their motion for intervention, their dismissal meted out
by the RTC of Catbalogan was already FINAL. They could have filed an
action to nullify the same.
RULING
Ps cannot be permitted to assert their right to WAIVE the defense of
prescription when they had foregone the same through their own
omission.
CASE OF EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION. The respondents brought their claim
on MARCH 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the collision occurred.
Peculiarity: PETITIONERS invoked the WAIVER OF DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION while the respondents, TO WHOM THE CAUSE OF ACTION
BELONG, have acceded to the dismissal of their complaint.
Ps were not SERVED with SUMMONS but their VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION
to the RTC of Catbalogan was evidenced when they filed an MR.
But the petitioners cannot capitalize on the supposed finality of the Order
dated March 28, 2001 to repudiate their submission to the jurisdiction of
the RTC of Catbalogan. It must be emphasized that before the filing of their
motion for reconsideration, the petitioners were not under the RTC of
Catbalogan’s jurisdiction. Thus, although the order was already final and
executory with regard to the respondents; it was not yet, on the part of
the petitioners.
As opposed to the conclusion reached by the CA, the Order dated March
28, 2001 cannot be considered as final and executory with respect to the
petitioners.
It was only on JULY 2, 2001, when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration seeking to overturn the aforementioned order, that they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. On
September 4, 2001, the RTC of Catbalogan noted the petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration on the flawed impression that the defense of
prescription cannot be waived.
SEPTEMBER 4, 2001 ORDER = Ps failure to challenge it = Order became
FINAL on their part.
Neither P nor R resorted to any actin to overturn the orders or RTC of
Catbalogan.
The petitioners should have exhausted the other available legal remedies
under the law after the [RTC of Catbalogan] denied their motion for
reconsideration.
REMEDY: To appeal from the judgment or final order of the court.
Section 9, Rule 37 Rules of Court - Annulment of judgement (extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction/denial of due process).
All that Ps needed to prove was that the RTC had no jurisdiction.
Rule 65 - imputing grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONERS DID NOT BOTHER TO MULL OVER AND CONSIDER THE SAID
LEGAL AVENUES.
The bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners’ execution of
waivers of the defense of prescription, but the effect of finality of an
order or judgment on both parties.
ONLY LOGICAL CONCLUSION : Petitioners abandoned their right to waive
the defense of prescription.
REPUBLIC v. ESPINOSA (1113-OBJECT OF PRESCRIPTION)
FACTS
On March 3, 1999, Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land in Cebu. Espinosa alleged that the
property is (a) disposable, (b) purchased from his mother on 1970 and the
other heirs waived rights thereto and (c) he and his predecessor in interest
has been in possession of the property for more than 30 years.
• Presented Advanced Survey Plan
• Two tax declarations under Isabel’s name.
• Three tax declarations under his name.
Republic opposed applicating claiming that:
(a) CA 141 or Public Land Act has not been complied and Espinosa’s
predecessor-in-interest only possessed the property from June 12, 1945.
(b) The tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest are in character for the length of time required by
law.
MTC granted basing the judgment of compliance under PD 1529. Espinosa
was able to establish ownership and possession over the subject lot which
was considered by DENR as alienable and disposable land of public domain.
CA dismissed petition and affirm the MRC decision on 2000. The CA ruled
that jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that “open, continuous
and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same into private property.”
Did Espinosa prove sufficiently that he had ownership of the public
alienable land by acquisitive prescription?
Held: Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect
title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain based on a
thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that
such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the
thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No.
1073.
The earliest tax declaration in Isabel’s name was for the year 1965
indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed
from the time she first came supposedly into possession. It was incumbent
upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that Isabel’s possession of the
property dated back at least to June 12, 1945.
That in view of the established fact that Isabel’s alleged possession and
occupation started much later, the lower courts should have dismissed
Espinosa’s application outright.
Court held that there must be an official declaration to that effect before
the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription. Accordingly,
there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription.
In the case: Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and
occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this
does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit
allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. To overcome this
presumption, there must be incontrovertible evidence for such. At any
rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the
presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain. A
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify the lands of the public
domain.
Decision: Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to
whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation
and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution
of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing
considerations. Application for registration denied. CA decision reversed
and MTC decision reversed and set aside.
HEIRS OF DELFIN v. NHA (1113-OBJECT OF PRESCRIPTION)
CA 141: A claimant may acquire alienable and disposable land upon
evidence of exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
PD 1529 begins to run only after the promulgation of a law or a
proclamation by the President stating that the land is no longer intended
for public use or the development of national wealth.
FACTS
May 20, 2002 - RTC awarded compensation to Sps. Delfin an Iligan
Property subsequently occupied by NHA.
CA reversed the decision. “Payment of Parcel(s) of land and Improvements
and damages for 28,000 SQM”
Delfin: Bought the land in 1951 from Natingo and Carbonay. They have
been declaring the property in their names for tax purposes since 1952.
1982: NHA forcibly took possession of 10,798 SQMs.
NHA: Property was part of a MILITARY RESERVATION AREA. Proclamation
no. 2151 (actually 2143).
NHA failed to appear during the pre-trial conference. Such indifference =
they had no equitable rights to protect over the disputed property.
CA: DECLARED LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. Delfin sps. Supposedly failed to
establish their possession of the property since June 12, 1945 as required
in Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
HEIRS OF DELFIN: argue that they and their predecessors-in-interest open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Iligan Property for
more than 30 years converted the property from public to private. They
then posit that they acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
NHA: The property was not yet declared private land when they filed their
complaint = cannot rely on Section 14 (2) of PD 1529. Only PUBLICLY
OWNED LANDS which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to
prescription under the said provision.
RULING
The publicly-owned land MUST BE patrimonial or private in character o n
the onset. Possession for 30 years DOES NOT convert in into patrimonial
property. There must be an express declaration.
There was an executive order that the petitioner’s property was no longer
needed for any public or quasi-public purposes. HOWEVER, it is not WHAT
IS REQUIRED. So, REGARDLESS of length of possession = NO TITLE COULD
VEST on them by way or prescription.
Nevertheless, they may claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of CA
141/Public Land Act. Enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of
titles in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public
domain or an interest therein. WHO HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE, AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION and OCCUPATION OF
AGRICULTURAL LANDS of the PUBLIC DOMAIN, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Requisites:
1. Land subject of claim is an agricultural land (PD 2143-
characterized the area as disposable parcel of public land)
2. Open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land
since June 12, 1945.
There is documentary evidence that the Iligan Property was not even
within the area claimed by respondent (letter by Deputy Public Land
Inspector).
THE LAND APPLIED FOR BY DELFIN WAS FIRST ENTERED, OCCUPIED,
POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY HIM SINCE THE JUNE 1945 UP TO
PRESENT.
Surveyed and claimed by the Military Reservation but the portion of which
has been released in favor of the ACTUAL occupants (for agricultural
purposes).
Tax declarations from 1952 BUT Deputy Land Inspector Lucero ATTEST to
a previous finding that they property had already been occupied as early
as June 1945. = compensation for its taking
REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF MALIJAN-JAVIER (1113-OBJECT OF PRESCRIPTION)
NEW CASE
FACTS
Laurena and Iden’s application for registration of land title over a parcel in
Tranca, Talisay, Batangas.
Republic filed an opposition:
(1) Ne[i]ther the applicants nor their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or
earlier;
(2) The tax declarations relied upon by appellees do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by
the appellees; and
(3) The parcel of land applied for is a land of public domain and, as such,
not subject to private appropriation.
Laureana and Iden presented DOCUMENTARY + TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE.
1. Banawa, a resident, testified to the original owners + selling of
land
2. Hernandez, Special Land Investigator I of DENR-CENRO,
conducted the ocular inspection. Land had not been forfeited in
favor of the government for non-payment of taxes. Land was
OUTSIDE the reservation or forest zone.
3. Maglinao, Forester I of DENR-CENRO. Land was within the
alienable and disposable zone.
4. Canarias, Municipal Assessor of Talisay. Property covered by Tax
declarations under the names of Laureana and Cecilio.
RTC - Granted the application for REGISTRATION of TITLE. They were ABLE
to establish that the property was alienable since September 10, 1997 +
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession of the subject property, even PRIOR to June
12, 1945.
REPUBLIC: There should be:
(1) [a] CENRO or [Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office]
Certification; and
(2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records
attached. Respondents failed to attach the SECOND requirement + failed
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession since June
12, 1945.
CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. It gave credence
to the testimony of HERNANDEZ, MAGLINAO.
Annotation of the Survey Plan by DENR Regional Technical Director Romeo
P. Verzosa : “Property was WITHIN an alienable and disposable area.”
RULING
PENRO/CENRO certification is NOT ENOUGH to establish that a land is
alienable and disposable. It should be ACCOMPANIED by an OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION of the DENR secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable
and disposable. + ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION approved by DENR Secretary.
DENR Secretary is the official authorized to approve land classification,
including the release of land from public domain. The applicant has the
BURDERn of proving that the land has been classified as alienable and
disposable.
Section X(1) of DENR Administrative Order no. 1998-24 and Section IX(1)
of DENR Administrative Order no. 2000-11 AFFIRM that the DENR
Secretary is the approving authority for LAND CLASSIFICATION and
RELEASE OF LANDS of the PUBLIC DOMAIN as alienable and disposable.
THE CENRO CERTIFICATION IS ISSUED ONLY TO VERIFY THE DENR
SECRETARY ISSUANCE THROUGH A SURVEY.
Certificates presented are NOT SUFFICIENT to prove that the land sought to
be registered is alienable and disposable. ABSENT the DENR secretary’s
issuance = the LAND REMAINS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
PETITION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE RESPONDENTS IS DENIED.
HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO v. HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO (1118-
Possession in the Concept of an Owner)
FACTS
A parcel of land possessed by MACARIA, administered by HERMOGENES +
paid realty taxes. Hermogenes had 8 children. Ulpiano (ELEANOR,
daughter), Dominic, Teofilo, FELICIANO, Asesclo, Delia, Amelia and
Melinda.
Death of Hermogenes = ALL of his heirs were free to pick and harvest.
Eleanor constructed a house.
2005 - HEIRS OF FELICIANO prohibited them from entering the property +
ejected Eleanor.
Heirs of Hermogenes filed a COMPLAINT for PARTITION, DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF TITLE/DOCUMENTS, DAMAGES. We are CO-OWNERS having
inherited the right thereto from Hermogenes.
Heirs of Feliciano - Feliciano was awarded a FREE PATENT for which the
Original Certificate of Title was ISSUED. + PRESCRIBED after the lapse of
ONE YEAR from its issuance on NOVEMBER 29, 1989.
RTC - Dismissed the complaint of Heirs of Hermogenese for failing to show
that the subject property is owned by Macaria.
CA - Reversed. RTC failed to determine FIRST if the subject property is
indeed CO-OWNED by the Ps and Rs.
FELICIANO’s application for FREE PATENT:
- He ACKNOWLEDGED the source of his claim over the subject
property was HERMOGENES’ possession of the real property in
peaceful, open, continuous, adverse manner, in the concept of
an owner since 1944.
- Did not extinguish the FACT of CO-OWNERSHIP.
RTC should have conducted the appropriate proceedings for partition.
RULING
Feliciano merely TACKED the of the subject property from Hermogenes. =
An IMPLICIT recognition of that Feliciano merely co-owns the subject
property with the other heirs of Hermogenes.
Heirs of Feliciano FAILED to show evidence that Feliciano solely owns the
subject property.
A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each
other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference
that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to
possession of the property.
Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner
as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and
each co- owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.
For Prescription to run against a co-owner, REQUISITES:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE = Open/Clear repudiation of trust
+ action to demand partition among co-owners would prescribe in 10
years. BUT, it ONLY APPLIES WHEN THE PLAINTIFF is not in possession of
the property.
THEREFORE, the action does not prescribe. It was only in 2005, when they
were forced to vacate the land, when the heirs of HERMOGENES ceased to
be in ACTUAL POSSESSION of the land.
NO COLLATERAL ATTACK on the title of Feliciano. On the premise that
they are co-owners, they can VALIDLY seek the partition of the property in
co-ownership and the conveyance to them of their respective shares.
FELICIANO’S REGISTRATION IN HIS NAME = CREATION OF IMPLIED TRUST
= FELICIANO WAS CONSIDERED A TRUSTEE OF THE UNDIVIDED SHARE OF
THE OTHER HEIRS OF HERMOGENES = FELICIANO CANNOT BE PERMITTED
TO REPUDIATE THE TRUST BY RELYING ON REGISTRATION.
"A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him
by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration."
ABALOS V. HEIRS OF TORIO (1119-POSSESSION BY MERE TOLERANCE)
FACTS
VICENTE TORIO died leaving a parcel of land measuring 2,950 SQMs.
Jaime and the Salazar sps. were ALLOWED to STAY and BUILD their
respective homes in the subject land even after the death of Vicente Torio.
1985 - Respondents asked Jaime + Salazar sps. to VACATE the subject lot.
Jaime and the Salazar sps : Rs cause of action is barred by prescription.
They, and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual, continuous,
and peaceful possession of the subject lot as OWNERS since time
immemorial.
MTC: In favor of Heirs of Torio and against Jaime and the Salazar sps.
RTC (2005): In favor of Jaime and the Salazar sps, they have acquired the
property through PRESCRIPTION.
CA (2006) : Reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N the possession is by MERE TOLERANCE of Heirs of Torio or IN
THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
RULING
On intervenors : they did not appeal the MTC decision. judgment became
final and executory.
Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription: Requires possession in good faith, just
title for 10 years.
Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription: Requires uninterrupted adverse
possession for 30 years.
Good Faith - reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is
received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Just title - when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.
PETITIONERS ACKNOWLEDGED OWNERSHIP BY VICENTE TORIO. 1984 tax
declaration of Jaime “admitting that Jaime’s house was built ON THE LAND
of Vicente”. This was never disputed by petitioners.
Ps possession COULD NOT be deemed as possession in good faith = x
ordinary acquisitive prescription.
Possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how
long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
IF it became adverse possession, it still falls short of the 30-year
requirement in extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Tax Declaration in
1974, so, 30th year would be in 2004.
1996 : Complaint filed = effective interruption of the possession.
 1. Jaime and Sps. Salazar HAVE NOT INHERITED the disputed land
2. Land was VALIDLY sold to Marcos Torio, who assigned the same
to his son, VICENTE (father of respondents). Established by a
Notarized Deed of sale = presumption of regularity.
SUPAPO v. DE JESUS (1126-RECORDED TITLES AS TO 3rd PERSONS)
Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an
ordinary civil proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal right
to possess, independently of title.
FACTS
Spouses SUPAPO filed a complaint for ACCION PUBLICIANA against
respondents. To compel Rs to VACATE a piece of land, with an assessed
value of 39,980.00, in Novaliches.
Sps. Supapo did not RESIDE in the subject lot. They visited twice a year. In
1992, they saw TWO houses built on their land occupied by Sps. De Jesus
and Macario.
Sps. Supapo demanded that they immediately vacate the lot. Brought the
dispute to Lupong Tagapamahala but failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement.
PD 772 “Anti-Squatting Law” Sps. Supapo filed a criminal case against
them.
RA 8368 “An Act repealing PD 772” was enacted = dismissal of the case.
RTC granted the motion for execution of respondents’ civil liability + prayer
for Rs to vacate the property.
CA : Repeal of PD 772 extinguished the criminal and civil liabilities of
respondents.
METC jurisdiction in cases where the only issue is possession, if the action
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within ONE year from the
time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, RTC has jurisdiction.
Supapo: Jurisdiction depends on the assessed value of the property.
ACCION PUBLICIANA - To determine who has a better right of possession.
It is an EJECTMENT SUIT filed after the expiration of one-year from the
ACCRUAL of the cause of action from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty. (Only POSSESSION, not OWNERSHIP). The
adjudication is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession BUT they
based their BETTER RIGHT on a CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP.
RA 7961 - Jurisdiction of RTC over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is PLENARY. However, RA 7691 divested the RTC a portion of
it and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Courts the EXCLUSIVE and ORIGINAL jurisdiction to hear
actions where the assessed value DOES NOT EXCEED 20k or 50k, if property
is located in Metro Manila.
Assessed Value = Fair Market Value x Assessment Level (synonymous to
taxable value)
The complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
39,980 assessed value = MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction
over the complaint for accion publiciana.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED
Certificate to file action issued on NOVEMBER 25, 1992
Sps. Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on MARCH 7, 2008, or
more than 10 years after the Certificate to file an Action was issued on
NOVEMBER 25, 1992. But, action is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE since the LAND IS
REGISTERED AND TITLED UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM.
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE + TORRENS TITLE = ENTITLED TO POSSESSION (A
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF OWNERSHIP)
RIGHT TO EJECT ANY PERSON ILLEGALLY OCCUPYING THEIR PROPERTY IS
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE (as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated)
ON LACHES
Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny
the Sps. Supapo’s petition. Acts of Supapo negate the allegation of laches
(brought dispute, initiated criminal complaint, filed accion publiciana)
Res Judicata is not present in this case
LAUSA v. QUILATON (1126-RECORDED TITLES AS TO 3rd PERSONS)
FACTS
Petitioners are cousins of respondents, except Rosita who acquired the
rights to the property.
They are all GRANDCHILDREN of ALEJANDRO TUGOT ( possessed Lot No.
557 since September 13, 1915).
Lot no. 557 was bought by the government through Act no. 1120 for
distribution to its occupants. ANTONIO had initially been Lot no. 557’s
beneficiary, but subsequently assigned his rights to ALEJANDRO.
Alejandro possessed Lot no. 557 until his death.
1993 - Mauricia Quilaton (Rs mother and Ps aunt-in-law) claimed to own
TCT no. 571, which covers Lot No. 557. RTC granted petition. Mauricia
donated Lot no. 557 to her children. (TCT 571 was cancelled).
Mauricia’s children filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners.
RTC’s Ruling:
1. TCT No. 571 was a forgery and declared it and all titles originating from it
as void ab initio.
2. Mauricia’s previous acts show that she acknowledged Alejandro’s
ownership over Lot No. 557.
3. She exercised dull acts of ownership over Lot No. 557 only in 1994, after
she had filed a petition for issuance of new owner’s duplicate.
4. Failed to present evidence showing how she acquired the title of Lot No.
557. And as Alejandro’s heirs both the petitioners and respondents are
entitled to share.
5. Lopez’ TCT is null and void and could not claim the defense of a
purchaser in good faith.
CA’s Reversal of RTC Ruling
TCT No 571 is valid as the existence of the copy in the Register of Deeds
and was issued in a regular manner. Failed to disprove the presumption of
regularity. There is no showing that indeed the title was fraudulently
issued.
Have the petitioners acquired ownership and possession of Lot No. 557
by acquisitive prescription?
Issue 1: CA erred that Alejandro Owned Lot 357 not 557 CA based its
conclusion on several tax documents in the name of Alejandro Tugot
indicating such. It overlooked the evidences:
1. Testimony of the Assessor’s Office that he issued a certification of
correction from 357 to 557.
2. The Lot 357 is covered by another address in the city’s base map by a
certain Antonio Yap.
3. The Deed of Donation recognizes Alejandro as the owner of Lot 557.
4. Court approved subdivision plan.
Issue 2: CA erred on Failure to Prove Fabricated TCT It overlooked the
evidence that the petitioners presented the fabricated title. The signatures
where checked and all these pieces of evidence by preponderance of such
prove that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title.
1. There are discrepancies and different area was covered by the
‘originated’ title
2. 571 had discrepancies with 570 and 572, it used an old form and was
signed by a different Acting Register of Deeds. Differences in the signature.
The allegation that she brought from Antonio is negated by the content of
the ‘originate’ title, TCT 16534 which covered a different property.
Issue 3: CA erred rely on fake title to deny prescription Ca concluded that it
cannot prescribe for it was under the Torrens system. Still, the lot cannot
be acquired through prescription but for a different reason.
The Deed of Assignment between Antonio to Alejandro was cancelled
three months after execution, thus it could have not vested Antonio’s
rights over Lot No. 557. Thus, it reverted to its original status as a subject
of conditional sale between Bureau of Lands and Antonio upon full
payment.
Innocent purchasers in good faith may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and neither the law nor the courts can
oblige them to go behind the certificate and investigate again the true
condition of the property.
In the case: Lopez made the following admission that she did an actual
inspection and accordingly found that Rodrigo did not reside on Lot No.
557-A. The ejectment case was also filed five months after the mortgage
contract, she would have found Filadelfa residing in it not Rodrigo and such
fact should have prompted her to check the validity of the title. Held: No
decision on ownership. They have resided since 1915 but it cannot be
ignored that the evidence showing none of them can rightfully own Lot
557 especially acquisitive prescription cannot operate for the and that
the TCT they had was fake.
Direct investigation for the Land Management Bureau and to the
Ombudsman on how the fake TCT ended up in the Register of Deeds for
determination of Liability. TCTs are declared null and claim for recognition
of ownership is denied.
RULING
Republic V. CA and santos
- st jude enterprises subdivided the subject lot
- The subdivision was later found to have expanded and enlarged
the lot by 1.4k sqm
- St jude sold lots to the private respondents
- RTC. There is no fraud in submission of the subdivision plan,
also since the subdivided lots were under the torrens system, it
is absolute and irrevocable. Because the plan was subjected to
investigation, study, and verification by the Land registration
commission, the increase in area is their fault, the government
is therefore in estoppel
- CA agreed
SC: there is estoppel against the government. Generally the state cannot
be put in estoppel, but it refers to acts and msitakes of its officials
esspecially those whicha re irregular. The circumstances are absent in this
case. For nearly 20 years from the issuance of st jude titles to
respondents in 1985 up to the filing of the complaint , petitioners failed
to correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of st jude.
This is tantamout to laches. Even the owner of adjuoing lots said that
there is no overlapping, no neighbors ever complained. Furthermore,
respondents bought the “expanded” lots in good faith, it is only fair and
reasonable to apply the equitable principle of ESTOPPEL by laches against
the government to avoid an injustice
Fudalan v. Ocial
- Action for declaration of validity of partition, and sale, recovery
of ownership and possession by ocial against flavio and
cristobal
- Baldomera, wife of flavio intervened as 3rd party plaintiff
against third party defendants fuderanans, the predecessors in
interest of ocial
- Ocial alleged that heirs of JUANA FUDERANAN executed
extrajudicial settlement among heirs with deed of absolute sale,
caused the planting of trees in the land.
- In october 2001, they claimed the landowner’s share of mango
produce from bolongita
- That they caused the placing of no trespassing sign in one of the
mango trees
- That they caused the processing of the deed of extra judicial
settlement
- They also alleged that the fudalans planted ubi on the portion
of the land and claimed mango produce from bolongita
- Fudalans claim ownership of the property, since they purchased
it from the fuderanans on november 4, 1983 evidenced by a
private document in a blue paper
- Baldomera intervened agents fuderanans asking for quiting of
title and nullification of the deed of extra judicial settlement,
alleging that the property was owned by her parents.
- RTC: affirmed the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and
recoggnizing the right of the fuderanans to sell the land to
spouses ocial. And that the blue paper was not actual payment
of land but was given to toribio and juana fuderanan as a
consideration for them to prepare the deed of sale for the land
in their favor
- CA: denied motion for failure to file briefs within period
SC: CA is correct. But even on merits, petition must fail. There is no
evidence showing that the title to the subject property was indeed
transferred from juana to her parents, she enver denied that the tax
declaration of the property was still in the name of juana fuderanan,
thus, for lack of JUST TITLE< she could not have acquired the property by
ordinary prescripotion. The court finds the blue paper as a compromise
agreement, no right can arise from it. Likewise, there was no mention of
the predecessor parents of Baldomera as one of the administrators,
hence they wre never in possession of the land. It was onbly in 1994,
when flavio fgudalan came to be na,med as administrator after execution
of the blue paper, it was only then that the fudalans stateted paying
taxes there o as shown by the numerous receipts submitted. . The thirty
year period (for extra ordinary prescription) woukld only be completed in
2024, records reveal that in november 2001, there is interruption when
ocial filed a complaint before the barangay captain of tanganan.
Andres vs. sta. Lucia
- Complaint for easement of right of way
- Petitioners were de denied access from subject property to the
nearest public road, because of SL’s perimeter fence.
- RTC: petitioners and Liza’s allegation that they were in
possession of the property for more than 50 years was not
denied by respondent, they, having acquired such property
through extraordinary prescription, are entilted to demand an
easement of right of way.
- CA: petitioners failed to establish asserted ownership and
posession of the subject property, therefore they cannot
demand easement.
The property is still an unregistereed public agricultural land, there is no
proof that the state has declared that the land is no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth. Hence, the
petitioners has no standing to ask for easment.
Maybank vs. oscar
- respondents obtained loan from the bank secured by an RE-
Mortgage. After payment of the loan, repondents obtained
another loan, which they failed to settle
- In april 1998, respondente recieved FINAL DEMAND LETTER
- Maybank foreclosed the property, and was sold to the highest
bidder
- Respodnents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity and
ivalidity of the foreclosure of real estate
- RTC. Maybank’s right to foreclose reckoned from the time the
indebtedness became due and payable on 11, 1984 had already
prescribed. Rtc declared the foreclosure void
- CA affirmed, saying that the right to foreclose is barred by
prescription, since it should be reckoned from march 11, 1984
when second loan became past due, also that maybank failed to
present evidence of any timely extra judicial demand or written
acknowledgment by the debtors of their debt
SC: Maybank’s right to foreclose the REM accrued only after the lapse of
the period indicated in its FINAL DEMAND LETTER, i.e.: after the lapse of
five days from the receipt of the final demand letter dated march 4, 1998.
It is oinly when the demand to pay is unnecessary or when required, such
demand is made and subsequently refused that the mrogagor can be
considered in default, and the mortgagee obtains the right ot file an
action to colelct the debt or foreclose the mortage
Bentir V. Leanda
- Complaint for reformation of instrument
- Leyte gulf traders inc entered into contract of lease for 20 years,
lease was extended 4 more years
- May 5, 1989, petitioner bentir sold leased premises to pomada
spouses
- Respondent alleged right of first refusal, hence the case
- Rtc said action prescribed since it has already been more than
10 years since the inception of contract in may 5 1968.
- Case was re raffled, and judge reversed the order of dismissal
and issued an order enjoining petitioners to desist from
occupying the property
- The CA on certiorari, denied petition. Ca agreed with the rtc
that the 10 year prescriptive period should be reckoned not
from 1968 by from the alleged 6 year extension of lease in 1988
Has the action prescribed?
Respondent corporation had 10 years from 1968, when the contract of
lease was executed, to file an action for reformation , it only did so on
may 15, 1992. The prescriptive period is counted from the date of the
original contract.
Republic V. Banez
- complaint for specific performance, recovery of possession, and
damages against respondents banez
- Banez offered to sale parcel of land to Cellophil Resources Corp.
- A contract was executed giving CRC the option to purchase
property
- 400k price
- Co-owners (respondents) take staeps that the CRC
portion be bought under the operation of RA 496
- Absolute deed of sale are to be executed in favor of
CRC. And payment shall be amde by CRC only upon
rpesentation yb the co owners to CRC of certificates,
clearances, etc..
- Cash advances were amde totaling 217k deducted from 400k
- After payment, crc constructed sevaral improvements
- Respondents executed SPA in favor of Hojilla specifically to put
the (provision 2) of the contract in action.
- CRC stopped operations, DBP took over the operation, and
entrusted CRC equity to APT
- APT became PMO
- Respondents rented the staff houses petitioner built, and
prohibited petitioner from entering the compound
- RTC: action prescribed under 1144, which bars action filed
beyond 10 years upon execution of the written contract. The
letters were not demands for rspondents to comply, and does
not interrupt
- CA: affired RTC ruling, further adding that the “demand” letters
simply called the attention of Hojiullay to return the properties
and unlock the gates. Also, the principle that prescription does
not run agains the state is not applicable since, the property is
patrimonial
Can we consider the correspndence between Hojilla and the petitioners as
effective interruption?
Ruling:
Hojilla’s letters updating the petitioner of the status of the
property dated 15 august 1984 effectively tolled the prescription. This is a
written acknoeldgement of debt or obligation, which interrupts the running
of the prescriptive period. The letter of the petitioner 29 may 1991 and 24
oct 1991 which demands the return of the properties, discontinue
construction, repair, demolition etc. is a demand to enforce respondent’s
obligation under par 7 of the contract. These are demand letters and thus
interrupts the period under 1155 c.c. 6 july 1999 letter demanding the
surrender of possession of the property also interrupts the period.
It is true that Hojilla is neither the proper party to execute the
contract nor top receive the demand letters on behalf of respondents.
However, because there is an express authority granted upon hojilla to
represent respondents as evidenced by the SPA, hojilla’s actions bind
respondents. Evidenc eon record shows that hojilla adminsitered and/or
managed the subjet property, he was also acting as an agent with regards
to respndent’s other obligation through the 15 august letter. Having
recieved several demand letters, hojilla continuously represented himself
as the duly authorized agent of respondents. Assuming that hojilla
exceeded his authority, respondents are stil solidarily liable since they
allowed hojilla to act as though he had full powers by impliedly ratifying
hojilla’s action - thorugha ction by omission. Under the principle that the
principal is bound by tha acts of his agent with the apparent authority
which he knowingly permits the agent to assume or which he holds the
agent out to the public as possessing. They knowingly permitted hojilla to
represent them, and petitioenrs were misled into believing hojilla’s
authority. The prescription was first tolled on 15 august 1984 (hojilla
letters), the demand letter of 29 may 1991, tolled the prescription again,
which ends on may 2001. Hence the complaint filed april 10, 2000 was
timely.
Ainza V. Padua
- complaint for partition of real property, annulment of titles
- A sale was made by eugenia to concepcion, without the former’s
husband antonio’s consent
- No deed of absolute sale was executed to evidence the
transaction but cash payment was received by respondent . And
delivery of property was made through the attorney in fact and
daughter of concepcion.
- Antonio requested natividad (daughter of concepcion) to vacate
the property, but the latter refused, claiming that concepcion
owned the property
- Antonio thus filed for ejectment suit, and a civilc ase for partition
of rel property and annulment of titles withd amages
- Antonio admits that concepcion offered to buy 1/3rd of the
property, and paid 100k over the course of several months, for
which she signed a receipt./
- RTC: upheld that the sale was consummated, since the contract
was fully executed
- CA: reversed the decision, declaring the sale NULL AND VOID,
citing the requirement of written consent of Antonio for the sale
to be VALID
RULING
There was a perfected contract. But the contract is VOIDABLE not
“invalid”. Antonio and Eugenia was married before the effectivity of the
Family Code, hence, the Civil Code applies as to vested rights. Under the
Civil COde, contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the
wife whens uch consent is required are annullable at her instance during
the marriage and within ten years from the stransaction questioned. The
voidable contract of Gimena was subejct to annulment by her husband
only during the marriage as he was the victim who had an interest in the
contract. The contract of sale between E and C being ORAL,. The action toa
nnul thes ame must be commenced within 6 years fromt he time the right
of actiona ccrued. Eugenia sold the property in April 1987, hence, antonio
should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before april 1993. Noa
ctionw as commenced by antonio to annul the sale. His right to seek
annulment was extinguished by prescription. Even if the 10 year
prescriptive period under 173, c.c. Applies. Antonio’s action iss till barred
by prescription.
Montero V. Times Transportation
- case for illegal dismissal
- TCCI employed 21 petitioners
- Petitioners are members of TEUnion
- March 1997, they went on strike
- Lab Sec issued return to work order march 10 1997
- Company adopted retrenchment program effective oct 1, 1997
- 16 days later, the union went on another strike, but ttci
reiterated the return to work order
- When disregarded, ttci served notices of termination (october 26,
1997)
- The complaint for illegal dismissal was filled before the Labor
Arbiter on June to July 2002
- The LA dismissed on ground of precription for Montero, Ravina,
Cabello, Genaro, Madera, Gaano, Arsenio, Donato, and Estilong
- For the others, LA found that the case was timely filed, saying the
pendency of the cases has worked in favor of the complainants
to whom.
- NLRC said that prescription cannot be done on a selective basis,
saying the prescription has set in
- The CA sustained the decision of the NLRC . Further saying that
although the commencement of an actions tops the running of
the prescriptive period, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment
by plaintiff leaves the parties exactly in the same posision as
though no action had been commenced at all.
Ruling:
October 26, 1997 and November 24 1997 appear to be the dates
when petitioners’ employment were terminated. The complaints already
prescribed. Petitioners’ argument that the period during which their cases
were pending should be deducted from the prescription is without merit.
The court finds that the complaint prescribed due to petitioners’
withdrawal of the labor case. Hence, while filing of the case could have
interrupted the running of the four year prescriptive period, the voluntary
withdrawal for the petitioners effectively cancelled the tolling of the
prescriptive period within which to file their illegal dismissal case, leaving
them in exactly the same position as though no labor case had been filed at
all. The running of the prescriptive period not having been inturrupted by
the filing of the (labor case), the petitioner’s cause of action had already
prescribed in four years after their cession.
VIRTUCIO V ALEGARBES
Facts:
- Case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership
- Respondent filed for homestead ptent for 24 hectar land
- Patent was approved January 1949
- Under public land subdivision the land was subdivided into three
- 139 given to Custodio and 140 was given to Virtucio (petitioner)
- Respondent asked that the entire 24 hectare land be given to him
- Director of lands denied protest, and 138 was given to
(respondent)
- RTC favored petitioner ordering respondent to vacate lot 140
- CA reversed saying that alegarbes (respondent) acquired lot 140
by prescription being in open, continuous possession of over 30
years
Ruling
Only a judicial summons can effectively toll the thirty year period of
acquisitive prescription. Mere notice of adverse claim does not consittute
an effective interruption of possession, obtaining a torrens title in one’s
name cannot defeat another’s right of ownership acquired through
acquisitve prescription. A protest field before an administrative agency (in
this case the director of lands) and even a decision coming from it does not
toll the running of the period. Here, it was only on 1997 when petitioner
filed the case before the RTC. Respondent therefore acquired lot 140 ipso
jure, being in continuous and exclusive possession of the land for 30 years,
which is an alienable public land. Respondent applied for the patent 1949,
and the complaint was only filed in 1997, he has been in possession of
property for 48 years.