EMINENT DOMAIN; deprivation of use
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioners vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS
G.R. No. 194190 January 25, 2017
Facts: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an
action for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave. (also known as Sucat
Road) in what was then the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila. This action was
brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in the
expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just compensation for the
expropriated areas be set to P12,000.00 per square meter.
On January 27, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a "Most
Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as Defendants-
Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded from the expropriation
case despite having properties affected by the road widening project. After a hearing on
this Motion, the Regional Trial Court allowed the Llamas Spouses to file their Answer-
in-Intervention.
The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. In it, they
claimed that a total area of 298 square meters was taken from them during the road
widening project.
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing
the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and
Improvements." On December 9, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways
filed its Comment/Opposition to the Llamas Spouses' Motion. On May 29, 1996, the
Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment of the value of the lots of
the defendants in the expropriation case. After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling,
the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of
Execution.
The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses filed a Joint
Manifestation and Motion seeking to suspend the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions. In
an August 8, 2005 hearing, the Department of Public Works and Highways manifested
that the non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their continued failure
to comply with their undertaking. On the same date, the Llamas Spouses filed a
Manifestation seeking the payment of their claims. The Department of Public Works
and Highways then filed a Comment/Opposition. On October 8, 2007, the Regional
Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just
compensation. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. In the Order dated May
19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for
Reconsideration. The Llamas Spouses then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public Works and Highways to pay
the Llamas Spouses just compensation for a total of 237 square meters across three
(3) lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of
Appeals added that the amount due to the Llamas Spouses was subject to 12%
interest per annum from the time of the taking.
Issue: Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and
Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The
same 1991 Decision was not the end of litigation relating to the widening of Katipunan
Road. The owner and developer of White Plains Subdivision, Quezon City
Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC), went on to file motions for
reconsideration. The second of these motions was granted in this Court's July 27, 1994
Resolution. This Resolution expressly discarded the compulsion underscored by the
Department of Public Works and Highways, and the dispositive portion of the 1991
White Plains Decision was modified accordingly. As this Court recounted in its 1998
Decision in White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains
Decision's allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers to cede subdivision road
lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an "illegal
taking." It did away with any preference for government's capacity to compel cession
and, instead, emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and developers' freedom
in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads.
The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots
covered by TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or that their
transfer has otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only theorizes that they
have been automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected.
Precisely, we are resolving this expropriation controversy only now.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of
Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their
private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents as the
government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed October
14, 2010 Decision of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104178 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 223334 Danilo Bartolata, represented by his Attorney-in-fact Rebecca R.
Pilot and/or Dionisio P. Pilot vs. Republic of the Philippines, Department of
Public Works and Highways, Department of Transportation and Communications,
and Toll Regulatory Board
Facts: Petitioner Danilo Bartolata acquired ownership over a 400 square meter parcel
of land by virtue of an Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner was the
sole bidder for the property during a public auction for the 400 square meter lot.
Respondents acquired 223 square meters of petitioner’s property for the development
of the Metro Manila Skyway Project. The parties agreed that in exchange for the
acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised value of the
property an aggregate of ₱12,265,000 for the entire affected area. Subsequently,
respondents appropriated ₱1,480,000 in favor of petitioner as partial payment.
Since the date of initial payment, petitioner had, on numerous occasions, demanded
from respondents the balance of Php 10,785,000.00, but the latter refused to settle
their outstanding obligation. This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum of
money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondents then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(CA 141), the government is entitled to an easement of right of way not exceeding 60
EMINENT DOMAIN; deprivation of use
meters in width, without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of
improvements existing. Consequently, respondents prayed, by way of counterclaim,
that the ₱1,480,000 partial payment made to petitioner for the acquisition of the latter’s
property, which was well within the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the
government.
The RTC dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that petitioner is not under obligation to return the initial
payment made. The RTC considered the fact that respondents effectively entered into
a contract of sale with petitioner for the acquisition of the piece of land to be used for
the Metro Manila Skyway Project, which contract of sale was consummated by
respondents’ partial payment. It cannot then be said that petitioner was illegally paid
when he transacted with the government in good faith and when he relied on
respondents’ representations that he is entitled to just compensation. The Court of
Appeals (CA) held that petitioner is not entitled to any form of compensation.
Consequently, the CA ordered him to return the ₱1,480,000 partial payment made, lest
he be unjustly enriched by respondents’ use of the legal easement that under the law
should have been free of charge.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should return the initial payment made by respondents
in the amount of ₱1,480,000.
Ruling: No. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of
₱1,480,000 from petitioner.
Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the
government’s enforcement of its right of way. Consequently, petitioner has no right to
collect just compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent
the ₱1,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall
be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment.
“Solutio indebiti” arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who
has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received
through mistake. As defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, the concept has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through
mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no right to demand
it.
As discussed above, petitioner was never entitled to collect and receive just
compensation for the government’s enforcement of its right of way, including the
₱1,480,000 payment made by respondents. For its part, the government erroneously
made payment to petitioner because of its failure to discover earlier on that the portion
of the property acquired was subject to a statutory lien in its favor, which it could have
easily learned of upon perusal of petitioner’s Order of Award. These circumstances
satisfy the requirements for solutio indebiti to apply.
Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly
delivered is now barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid
one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one
to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of
estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case.
In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid ₱1,480,000 when respondents
appropriated the amount in his favor. However, because of respondents’ representation
that the amount was a mere down payment for just compensation, petitioner never
objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to
be paid in full for the value of the taken property thereafter. As the events unfolded,
respondents did not make good their guarantee. Instead, they would claim for the
recovery of the wrongful payment after almost twelve (12) years as a counterclaim.
Indubitably, respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering from petitioner the
amount initially paid.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
FACTS: Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230
KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, its lines have to pass the lands belonging to
respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez
and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of
way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial
court’s ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed
provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover
the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of
determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed
three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the
defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive
evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their
appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. The
lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of
P10.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way
easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'. Napocor filed a motion
for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by
adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land
traversed by its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a
simple right-of-way easemen transmits no rights, except that of the easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title
or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the
use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons,
the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
EMINENT DOMAIN; deprivation of use
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be
the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated
has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its
character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
compensation.

Phil. Press Institute vs. COMELEC

244 SCRA 272

Fundamental Powers of the State

FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution no. 2772 directing newspapers

to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public issue and their platforms of government. The
Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of

newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution 2772 unconstitutional and void on gthe ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the res[ondent Comelec, the
Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
and credible election.

ISSUE: Wheteher or not Comemlec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in
expropriation cases. Moreover, the element for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers are not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In such case at
bench, there is no showing of exixtence of national emergency to take private property
of newspapers or magazine publishers.

Note:
Violation of art. III, sec. 9 of the Phil. Constitution:
“Sec.9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”