EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in
the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled
“Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males
and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it
also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of
Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court
that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists
bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged
Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of
the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1
applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel
is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be
provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
PEOPLE VS AMADO HERNANDEZ (99 PHIL 515)
1. What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused of
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-
one (31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. They were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which was actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the government
of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga
Hapon), they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder,
etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of the
crime committed required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by
the government against Hernandez has been successfully imposed with other arrested
communist leaders and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Contention of the Accused:
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by the
CFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime
of rebellion as means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Such common
offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified
in Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for
the application of Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two
crimes.
*** HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion cannot be complexed with common
crimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and in
furtherance thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no legal
basis for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. ***
NUÑEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982
Facts: The petitioner was accused of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused and all
public officials in several cases before such respondent Court. Thereafter, upon being
arraigned, petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.
This was denied by respondent court. A motion for reconsideration was filed the next
day but it met the same fate. Petitioner then filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the validity of the Presidential Decree which created the Sandiganbayan. It is
the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post
facto clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree 1486 is violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution and is therefore
unconstitutional
Ruling:
No, Presidential Decree 1486 is not violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. The court ruled that to assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. In addition, the Constitution specifically
makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, in response to a
problem namely, dishonesty in the public service. The general guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses
must give way to the specific provision.
The court further ruled that the contention that PD 1486 is contrary to the ex
post facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that
petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise; and therefore cannot
be sustained. Admittedly, under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to
the Court of Appeals, the review coming from the Supreme Court. The test as to
whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan:
"from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the
time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital
for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. The omission of
the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the petitioner of a
right vital to the protection of his liberty.
Furthermore, the argument based on denial of due process cannot also be
sustained. He was not deprived of due process. In criminal proceedings then, due
process is satisfied if the accused is informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is
not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being
imposed in accordance with a valid law. According to Justice Cardozo, justice though
due to the accused is also due to the accuser. The Court then ruled that the petitioner
has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The
petition is dismissed.
Gallardo vs People GR 142030 21 April  2005
Facts: Public Health Workers of Davao del Sur filed letter-complaint for alleged refusal
to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of their
salaries by the Municipality of Bansalan headed by Mayor Arturo Gallardo with the
Ombudsman. Probable cause was found and information was filed stating that Gallardo
caused undue injury to PHW workers. Gallardo requested for reinvestigation. This was
granted by Sandiganbayan, However Ombudsman Desierto recommended his
disapproval. Petitioner filed motion to quash on the ground that they were not accorded
equal protection of the law.  They contend that similar cases were dismissed by
Desierto previously ans should be accorded the same to the case at bar.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Issue: Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto violated equal protection right of the
petitioners on the ground of not uniformly deciding similar cases?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The equal protection clause requires that the law
operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the
classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be
treated differently from another. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he
believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On
the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against
petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only
exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of
his office.
G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009
DAVID TIU v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: The case stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by
Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand,
David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes. Upon motion
of Pasion, the two criminal cases were consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC
of Pasay City.
After trial, MeTC rendered judgment dismissing both charges on ground of insufficiency
of evidence.
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC. Afterwards, Tiu,
through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC
of Pasay City rendered a decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC and
ordered the case to be remanded in the MeTC. Postanes moved for reconsideration,
which was denied by the RTC.
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order),
challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision
and affirmed the dismissal of the two cases. In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of
Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the
government does not have.
Issue: Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.
Held: Yes. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not
filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant,
through his counsel.
Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal
proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals. Tiu, the offended party in the
criminal case is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
before the Supreme Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before the Court. On this ground alone, the SC
says the petition must fail.
However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or
acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in the criminal case against
Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC
had jurisdiction over the criminal case (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-
guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed the Criminal Case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
Clearly, for the court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision,
just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional
proscription not to put any person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is
a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School
to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the
matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.
RULING: NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner
by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.
Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full
protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure
to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to
local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and
justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a
bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their
respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED
IN PART.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922.  April 21, 1998]
           
FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite
standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg.
881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
media of communication or information during the period of election. Petitioner claims Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and
authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost conditions:
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time. Duration of contract  12 months

ISSUES: Position  Chief Officer

(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws. Basic monthly salary  US$1,400.00
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Hours of work  48.0 hours per week
                                                      
RULING:
            Overtime  US$700.00 per month
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are Vacation leave with pay  7.00 days per month
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept
them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property
up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had
is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of
served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is
for that common good.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount
of US$26,442.73.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case
was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant
[petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the
complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his
computation on the salary period of three months only — rather than the entire
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment
contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of
US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month +
US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-
sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from
US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the
award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed,
and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his
cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in
accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting
unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract
of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s
award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under
the contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance
of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
 Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
 Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner
by reason of his illegal dismissal
 Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis
in the computation of his monetary award
 
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner
was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of
US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of
petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of
the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total
of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in
addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the
entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal
protection and denies them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this
was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the
earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15,
1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract.
Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are
deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter
of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne
by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for
it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform
rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion
of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated
rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on
their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts
have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or
for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other
category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short
of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of
illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it
is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis
in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have
been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas
overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular
eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on
designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the
contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the
seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month.
GARCIA vs DRILON
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
Equal Protection
Doctrine: the VAWC law is constitutional because there is a substantial distinction
between men and women as well as children
FACTS:R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further
acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law
enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as
being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondent (wife and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank
manager. He callously boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises
and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom
he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt
suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital,
petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7)
days. He even told his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was
afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from
him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived
her of access to full information about their businesses.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his
firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner Respondent
JESUS C. GARCIA THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to
wives/women and not to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men
against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and
other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal
violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an
abused wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 is uncostitutional for violating the equal protection clause?
NO
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is
instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.