PBM Employees vs PBM
The debasement of the human being
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is 55 a As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
5 Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969,
they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the 60
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
10 because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that
the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an 65
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
15 demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is70
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
20 Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on75
March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed
25 the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the
CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
80
Issue:
30 Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
35 criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and
as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity
40 as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
45 Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension
of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was100
stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
50 thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss
can be repaired or adequately compensated.
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. To regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer,
as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation
of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the
more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of
one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in
their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693,
31 July 1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the
City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form
in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
85 with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to
his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his
signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3)
90 provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their
duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes
and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as
a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class
95 motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old
from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to
lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty
a of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5
July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its
member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the
mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
 faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said
5 Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the submission of the memoranda,
55
ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance
4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
10
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) 60
valid and/or constitutional.
15
Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit
20 and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
25 the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended
to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal
and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the
freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
30 house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It
is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being
35 devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
40 and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.  the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn
Title of the Case:
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et. al., petitioners,
45 vs.
The Honorable EDGARDO PARAS, et. al., respondents
G.R. No. & Date:
L-42571-72. July 25, 1983
50
Ponente:
FERNANDO, J.
Doctrine/Topic:
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles of Bills; Subject shall
be expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and
is cabarets in Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a
prohibition and closure ordinance which was based on Republic Act
No. 938 as amended (but was originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
65 3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS."
70 4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets…
and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction.”
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not
75 merely the power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit."
6. The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as
Republic Act No. 938.
7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null
80 and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the
petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as
without judicial hearing; and (3)That under Presidential Decree No. 189
85 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259 the power to license and
regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism.
8. The respondent Judge issued a restraining order on November 7,
1975. Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the
90 constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing
the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit the exercise of a45
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
5 occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
HELD 50
A. Decision:
 The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation
10 of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business. 55
 The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court
dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullified.
 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is
60
15 declared void and unconstitutional.
B. Rationale:
 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by
65
the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
20 prohibited.
 A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the70
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night
clubs subject to appropriate regulations.
25  It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of
the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to75
prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid of support in law. Additionally, the title was not in
any way altered, as the exact wording was followed. The power
30 granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
80
 There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject85
35 which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and90
40 Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance
is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power
is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.
 A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
55
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
5 unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance
of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
60
life, liberty and property.
10
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
65
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
15 of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only
must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly 70
oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
20 accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
75
be arbitrarily invaded.
25
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
80
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the
30 social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the
means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive. 85
35 The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social
ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the 90
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
40 Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila. 95
45 The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to
the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. 100
50 If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social
ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of
its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory”
taking occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government
regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three
(3) months from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer
to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive to “wind up business
operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business
will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A
zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome”
property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such
property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended
for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such
principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police
powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
 Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is
5 to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a
rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does
not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.”
10
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
65
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments
15 without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
20
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for
the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
25 hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant
case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
30 The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment
does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory
35 as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession
exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
40 to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers95
local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.
45
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
100
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code
still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
50 establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
55 property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not
be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the
community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
60
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted
the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for
an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to
the general law.
70
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
75 detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not
to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
80
General Powers and Attributes of Local Governments: Police Power
GR No. 122846 – January 20, 2009
White Light Corporations v. City of Manila
TINGA, J.
85
Mayor Lim of Manila passed an ordinance which prohibited hotels, motels and other lodging
establishments from offering short time admission (stay for less than 12 hours) and wash up
rates (stay for only 3 hours), providing for a fine and imprisonment for violation of said
ordinance. Affected businesses filed a complaint to have the ordinance annulled, on the
90 ground that it was unconstitutional. The Court held in favor of the petitioners, ruling that the
ordinance failed the strict scrutiny test and was thus violative of substantial due process and
unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE
Although the goal of regulating public morals falls under the purview of police power, it does
not automatically justify any and all means of achieving this goal. The means must still align
with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and specifically due process. If the restriction
involves one restricting liberty, the Government must satisfy the strict scrutiny test:
the burden is on them to show that a) there is compelling State interest for the restriction; b)
that the means is necessary to address that compelling state interest, and c) that there is no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose that is less intrusive.
FACTS
 1. Mayor Alfredo Lim passed an Ordinance which penalized hotels, motels, lodging establishments that offer short time stays.
houses, pension houses and similar establishments that offer short time admission b. Police power is limited only by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
(stay for less than 12-hours) and “wash-up” rates (stay for only 3 hours). Any violation method, which what the Ordinance satisfied.
would result to either P5, 000 or imprisonment for less than 1 year or both. 40 c. The adverse effects to such establishments is justified by the well-being of its
5 2. Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory constituents.
relief: d. As ruled in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,
a. Praying for an injunction/TRO be issued, and liberty is regulated by the law.
b. praying to have the Ordinace be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
They alleged that PD 259 authorized them to charge customers on a short- 45 ISSUE with HOLDING
10 time basis and to charge them for wash-up rates. 1. WON the Ordinance is constitutional. NO.
3. White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and a. Test of a valid ordinance as laid in several cases including City of Manila:
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene in support of MTDC’s i. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
petition on the ground that the Ordinance affected their business interests as they ii. must not be unfair or oppressive;
operate several drive-in hotels and motels in Manila. 50 iii. must not be partial or discriminatory;
15 4. The petitioners agreed to submit the case for judgment since it was a based on a purely iv. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
legal question. v. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
5. RTC declared the Ordinance null and void because vi. must not be unreasonable.
a. it was against personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution b. The purpose of the ordinance is to regulate public morals. The ban is rooted
b. it went against encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to need 55 in the police power as conferred on LGU’s by the Local Government Code.
20 investment. Brief discussion on police power:
c. The Ordinance was similar to another Ordinance annulled in another case 1, i. No exact definition but it highlights its comprehensiveness and its
wherein what it sought to prevent could easily be circumvented (i.e. flexibility to meet different conditions.
Preventing illicit relationships festering in the motels/hotels could easily be ii. It is based on the necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
consummated by paying for a 12-hour stay). 60 protect itself and its people.
25 6. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC, which the latter treated as a iii. Although the goal of regulating public morals falls under the purview
petition for certiorari and referred it to CA. of police power, it does not automatically justify any and all means of
7. The City argued that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power under achieving this goal.
Section 458(4)(iv) of the Local Government Code 2 and Art. 3, Sec. 18(kk) of the 1. The means must still align with the Constitution, the Bill of
Reivsed Manila Charter3. 65 Rights, and specifically due process.
30 8. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates right to c. Due process evades a precise definition.
privacy and the freedom of movement. Furthermore, it is an invalid exercise of i. The purpose of due process is to prevent arbitrary government
police power because it was unreasonable and oppressive interference in their encroachment against the life, liberty, and property of individuals
business. ii. Two kinds of due process:
9. CA reversed RTC’s decision and found it to be constitutional for the following reasons:70 1. Procedural: procedures government must follow before it
35 a. The Ordinance didn’t violate the right to privacy or freedom to movement deprives a person of life, liberty or property.
because it only penalizes a small group – the owners or operators of 2. Substantive: inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
1 Ynot vs IAC, G.R. No, L-74457, March 20, 1987 liberty or property
75 3. Test:
2 Section 458(4)(iv) of the Local Government Code: “To regulate the establishment, operation
and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.” Test Source/Case Means End Application
5 3 Art. 3, Sec. 18(kk) of the Reivsed Manila Charter: “to enact all ordinances it may deem  Freedom of the
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the mind
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city US v.
Strict  Liberty
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers Carolene Necessary Compelling
and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall Scrutiny  Restricting the
Products
10 not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and political
imprisonment for a single offense.” process
 40  The Government must show that no other alternative for
Intermediat Craig v.  Gender the accomplishment of the purpose that is less intrusive.
Substantial Important
e Scrutiny Boren  Legitimacy  There must be a reasonable relation between the
purpose of the measure and the means for its
US v. accomplishment because such measure will be struck
Rational  Economic
Carolene Reasonable Legitimate 45 down if it arbitrarily intrudes into private rights.
Basis legislation
Products o Urban decay as seen in the rampant prostitution, drug use, and
adultery, should not be used to prevent legitimate businesses from
offering a legitimate product.
 The Ordinance did not distinguish between the places
50 frequented by people doing illicit activities and those doing
5 legitimate actions.
 What the Ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited,
so why not apply those laws instead?
 There are other less intrusive ways in curbing prostitution
55 and drug use – active police work or strict enforcement of
10 laws regulating prostitution.
o Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest.
o The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among
60 citizens deserve the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that
15 such measures don’t trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.
 Discussion on Liberty
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
o Not a list of what may be done or not be done
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
o Atmosphere of freedom where they don’t feel labored under a Big 65 REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
Brother as they interact with each other, their society, and nature, in REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
20 a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing pronouncement as to costs.
harm or injury to others
o Right to exist and to be free from arbitrary servitude or restraint SO ORDERED
70
o The spirit behind the Ordinance is to curtail sexual behavior since OTHER NOTES
these establishments are notorious for venues for prostitution, 2. WoN petitioners have standing to plead for protection of their patrons’ equal protection
25 adultery, and fornications. rights
o Despite the veracity of such, legitimate sexual behavior, which is  Petitioners were arguing that their business is being unlawfully interfered by the
constitutionally protected, will be curtailed as well. 75 Ordinance and that it infringed on their clients’ right to equal protection.
o The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose  According to the Court, they have standing. The third party standing and the
overbreadth doctrine applies.
claim to privacy and interference demands respect. o In Powers v. Ohio, the US SC outlined the criteria to invoke such
30 o There are other legitimate activities that may be affected by the standing:
Ordinance and that cannot be discounted. 80  Petitioner must have suffered an injury-in-fact, giving him a
 Applying the Test to the Ordinance: sufficient concrete interest in the outcome of the issue at hand.
o The Court did not use the rational basis test in this case because the  Petitioner must have a close relation to the the third party.
 There is a hindrance between the third party and his ability to
ordinance did not just prejudice the property or business of the
protect his interests.
35 petitioners, but the constitutional rights of their patrons as well. They
85 o In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are allowed to
would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to raise the rights of third parties.
lodging establishments. o This doctrine applies when a statue restrains constitutionally guaranteed
o This thus constitutes a restriction on the fundamental right to liberty, rights.
which must pass the strict scrutiny test. o The petitioners here are alleging that the Ordinance intrudes on their right
90 to liberty of their clients, therefore the overbreadth doctrine applies.
DIGESTER: Lulu Querido (Updated by Xave Libardo)