Propaganda and Charicature

Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War
Author(s): Eberhard Demm

Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 163-192
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260806
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Eberhard Demm
Propaganda and Caricature in the First World W
The first world war was the first total war in modern history.' It w
waged not only against the enemy's armies, but also against
civilian population, and on all fronts -military, economic and
propagandistic. How could this happen?
The road to total war began with the French Revolution. Wherea
the rulers of the eighteenth century employed mercenaries, and t
normal civilian was only aware of the war if fighting took place n
his home, in revolutionary France the whole nation was called
arms: 'Allons enfants de la patrie ... '. From then on, wars could no
be waged without the consent and the readiness of the people who h
to enlist and to produce the arms. Thus it was necessary to beat no
only the enemy on the military front, but also to demoralize
population by means of propaganda, bombs and economic sanctions
Once the technical means were available -and this was alre
largely the case in the first world war - unlimited warfare w
possible.
Total war involves another aspect, as explained in 1937 by the anti-
democratic German jurist, Carl Schmitt: 'War can be total in the
sense of the utmost effort and the utmost employment of all available
means.'2 General Erich Ludendorff and the nationalist writer Erich
Junger expressed similar views.3 Such a war led to 'total politics'
(Ludendorff), which completely supervised the population through
control of the press and the economy. The prerequisite of such a
policy is the 'total state' which 'intervenes in all areas, all spheres of
human existence, which no longer acknowledges any private sphere'.4
Such a state organized society and the economy and directed them
toward one single end: the complete mobilization of all forces for war.
It was a preliminary version of the totalitarian state, as was
established in Germany from 1933, and it is interesting to note that
Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi),
Vol. 28 (1993), 163-192.
164 Journal of Contemporary History
Carl Schmitt, staunch supporter of the national socialists, and Erich

Ludendorff, first world war general and one-time political ally of
Adolf Hitler, made an intensive study of the problems of total war
and the total state. Nearly all the features of totalitarianism already
existed in embryo in the German state of the first world war:
monopoly of the press and the arms industry, a state-controlled
economy, the all-pervasive police and military, the abrogation of
certain rights of man, state ideology ('Ideas of 1914'), and incessant
indoctrination of the population. Control of news was not total
because newspapers from neutral countries were allowed in, and the
modern totalitarian party did not yet exist, although the 'German
Fatherland Party', founded in 1917, can be considered as a precursor
of the NSDAP. It was thus natural that the totalitarian state of the
Third Reich was organized by the generation which had fought at
front in the first world war.5
Total war and the total state did not exist in 1914, but develo
gradually during the war. There was, however, in Germany
organism which practised a 'total policy': the army. Military servic
in the Prussian army not only provided military instruction, but
another important aim: to annihilate the personality of the recruit,
reduce his human dignity to a minimum and to transform him in
small cog in the huge military machine. As Heinrich Mann wrote i
his novel Der Untertan, a brilliant analysis of Wilhelminian society
'The recruit was rapidly and irrevocably reduced to a louse, t
component, a piece of raw material which was moulded by
enormous will.' The army was the 'school of the nation', the citizen
total object, according to the military in the German Empire
followed, therefore, that such an 'education' of society was car
out not by civilians, but by the military, whose most effect
instrument was no longer military service, but an all-embraci
propaganda, with which it aimed to brain-wash the whole nation.
The legal basis for this procedure was the state of war declared
Kaiser Wilhelm on 31 July 1914, after which the Stellvertrete
Generalkommandos (commanders of the army corps) assumed
functions of the civilian administration. One of their main tasks w
the control of public life. As freedom of opinion was limited by t
state of war, the military had the right to censor the press.6 The
ordination of press policy was carried out by Section III B of
General Staff under Major, later Colonel Walter Nicolai; the p
office was directed by Major Erhard Deutelmoser. This departm
organized daily press conferences and also the censorship office. T
Demm: Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War 165
final decision on censorship, however, was taken by the local military

commanders.7
What was suppressed by the censors? Any information which could
be useful to the enemy, and all news which could distress the people
for instance, discussion of the war and its consequences, its cost, and
so on. Unfavourable news about the situation at the front was passed
over in silence, delayed or toned down. All this was relatively tame. A
really aggressive propaganda campaign, in the sense of a systematic
brainwashing of public opinion, started in summer 1917 under th
3rd High Command, when General Ludendorff, under the forma
direction of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, assumed control
In a letter of 31 July, Ludendorff said that the population had become
pessimistic and desperate and that only an effective propagand
campaign could re-establish confidence.8 The press office was enlarged
to a huge propaganda machine which employed hundreds of officers
and countless writers, painters, caricaturists, photographers and
technicians. Numerous propaganda events were organized under the
name of Vaterldndischer Unterricht (patriotic instruction), with the
help of specialized news officers and the 'intellectual leaders' of the
people: priests, professors, teachers, etc.9
While the military controlled propaganda in Germany, th
Zentralstelle fur Auslandsdienst (Central Office for Propaganda
Abroad) of the Office of Foreign Affairs directed German propagand
abroad. In 1916 another propaganda office was established, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Hans von Haeften, which was formally part of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but came under the command o
Bureau III B of the General Staff. From 1917 they were answerabl
only to the Supreme Command.'?
The Allies also had propaganda departments. In France, censor-
ship was organized by the Ministry of War, which gave detailed
instructions in its circular letters of 6 February and 15 March.' The
British press office was famous for its effectiveness. In the beginning i
was a relatively small organization which concentrated on the
London press. Its guidelines were developed in informal talk
between government officials and editors.12 Under the Defence of the
Realm Act, no information could be published which might be useful
to the enemy. In Britain, too, unfavourable news was passed over in
silence or delayed. British propaganda succeeded better than its
German counterpart to win neutrals over to its cause; it also aimed its
appeal at German soldiers. With the nomination of the English press
magnate Lord Alfred Northcliffe as Director of Propaganda in
Enemy Countries in February 1918, Allied propaganda activities

against Germany were stepped up considerably: it has been claimed
that during summer and autumn 1918, more than 100,000 leaflets per
day were dropped over German lines.13 This propaganda campaign is
believed to have played a part in hastening the collapse of the
Austrian front in Italy as well as in the German retreat of summer
1918, but its significance has probably been exaggerated.'4
What was the role of cartoonists in German and Allied propaganda?

Like all other media workers, they were, of course, bound by the
restrictions of military censorship and obliged to observe the
propaganda guidelines laid down by the press bureaus. Every edition
had to be submitted to the censor before publication and if the censor
objected, the cartoon had to be modified. Thus, when, on the
occasion of the papal peace offer, a caricature of the Pope was not
accepted, the cartoonists presented the cartoon again but this time
without the Pope in order to obtain approval.'5 In some cases, there
was systematic co-operation between a cartoon magazine and an
official press office. For instance, in summer 1917 the Zentralstellefiir
Auslandsdienst of the German Office of Foreign Affairs discussed with
Heine and Gulbransson the compilation of special cartoon albums to
be used as propaganda in neutral countries. In these albums the
cartoonists closely followed the suggestions of the Office of Foreign
Affairs.16 This arrangement led to complete harmony between censors
and cartoonists in Germany, whereas in France caricatures were
sometimes banned by the censor and in neutral countries cartoonists
were occasionally put on trial.'7
When cartoonists became propaganda agents, their traditional role
radically changed. Before the war they were social critics who sharply
attacked the authoritarian structures in the government, the army,
the church, and in society as a whole.'8 Of course, not all cartoon
magazines were as aggressive as Simplicissimus, which was especially
hated by the Junker, the Catholic Church and the military. It was
denounced by deputies of the Catholic Centre Party as a 'nuisance to
the state and society, to morality, morals, and good taste ... which on
every issue totally shatters authority and abases the monarchy and
the government'.'9 Between 1903 and 1907 alone the paper was
confiscated twenty-seven times. The cartoonists frequently had to
appear in court, and at least one of them, Ludwig Thoma, had to
spend six weeks in the Stadelheim prison on a charge of lese- majeste.20
When war broke out, the cartoonists faced a dilemma. Should they
continue to antagonize society and criticize the government at a time
when Germany was fighting for her existence? At a meeting with his
colleagues, the editor-in-chief of Simplicissimus, Ludwig Thoma,
proposed that the paper cease publication, because during the war all
satirical opposition to the government had to stop. But Thomas
Theodor Heine refused and said that satirists now had a new task: to
behave as good patriots and to support Germany's war policy.21 Th
the cartoonists joined the propaganda war and enlisted in a
Gedankendienst mit der Waffe, as Thomas Mann put it.22 They a
united behind the government, in the spirit of the famous words of
Kaiser Wilhelm II: 'Ich kenne keine Parteien mehr, ich kenne nur
Deutsche'.
Similar developments took place in other countries. In Germ
Burgfrieden was declared; in France the Union sacree was proc
Class struggle and internal strife were now supposed to cea
every citizen was called upon to do his or her bit to prot
fatherland in its hour of danger and need. Political caricatu
took on a new function: its task was to mobilize the population
morally and intellectually for the war, explain setbacks, c
belief in the superiority of the fatherland and proclaim the h
final victory.23
This abrupt change surprised quite a few people, and the mi
especially, too often mercilessly ridiculed, remained sceptical i
beginning, the commander of the first army corps in Bavaria
the medical authorities to prohibit the reading of Simplicissim
milityary hospitals, arguing that this paper, well known
mockery of the army and now posing in national colours
unsuitable for soldiers.24 Ludwig Thoma protested vigorous
Fritz Blaich, one of the paper's cartoonists who had volun
enlisted as an army doctor, resigned from the service.25 But fin
postive influence of Simplicissimus was appreciated and the au
ties showed their goodwill: the Bavarian Ministry of Tran
cancelled its ban on the sale of Simplicissimus at railway statio
and criminal proceedings on the grounds of lese-majeste agains
caricaturist Olaf Gulbransson were suspended because 'the
magazine Simplicissimus had adopted a patriotic attitude si
outbreak of the war.27 Only the Catholic clergy did not under
that times had changed and as late as 18 August 1925 a ce
Dr Winter complained, in the name of the clergy of the deane
Bonn, to the commander in Bavaria about the cartoon ma
Simplicissimus and Jugend: 'The Pope, the Kaiser and army officers
are made into caricatures ... poisoning the minds of young people
who desire freedom' and asked that they be prohibited. In reply,
the officers explained that the cartoonists were controlled by cen-
sorship and that their published cartoons were thus officially
approved.28
This change of attitude on the part of the cartoonists is interesting
from their biographical point of view. How can we explain the change
in someone like Ludwig Thoma, who, a few months before the war,
had fulminated against the country's armament programme and
against the myth of popular wars and who now enlisted as a medical
officer and asked his friend Theodor Heuss to introduce a patriotic
note into his left-wing, cosmpolitan periodical, Maerz?29 A close
examination of their social background shows that, despite their
often radical cartoons, Thoma and his colleagues Heine and
Gulbransson were no fanatic revolutionaries, but bourgeois liber
who wanted to reform the Empire though not to turn it upside dow
or destroy it. They were popularizers of liberal ideas, but accepted t
social and political system of the Empire as such. Many years after th
war Thoma wrote in his memoirs:
I believe today what I have always believed, that one could have refor
the old society in such a way as to ensure the happiness and the great-
ness of Germany. The fight for them [the reforms] did not have to be g
up on 1 August 1914, but it had to be interrupted, and it was our duty to
silent.30
Thoma and his friends belonged to the liberal tradition, but they
were also German nationalists. Some of Heine's early cartoons,
for instance 'Kolonialmachte' of 1904 or 'Ein Tag aus der Kindheit
des serbischen Kronprinzen' of 1909, attested t"ese national-
istic tendencies, and the often parochial natic, ' of Thoma
was well known.31 Thoma wrote in his memoirs: 'l wvas never in
my nature to feel international or to do justice to our most perniciou
enemies.'32 Censorship and propaganda offices did not need to impo
their views on the cartoonists; they shared them and decided to pu
their pens and brushes at the service of their country and to fight
against the enemy in their own way. The following examples w
chosen neither for their artistic quality nor for the fame of t
cartoonists, but as representative examples of the most importa
propaganda targets.33
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One of the most important aims was to prove the superiority of one's
own nation in a war which was conceived not only as a battle of arms
but also as a war of ideologies. The German economist Werner
Sombart termed it a 'Glaubenskrieg'. 34 Indeed, like the wars of the
Reformation or the Christian Crusades, the first world war was
viewed as a conflict between two different cultures.35 According to this
view, military successes would also decide the quality of the respective
social and political organization of the belligerent nations. Thus, the
German historian Hermann Oncken in 1915 summarized the military
successes achieved by the Central Powers: 'While the institutions and
supra-individual forces of Germany hold good, the entire complex of
political ideas of the English has beeen shattered.'36
This war of cultures was fought out in particular between Germany
and the Western powers. The French, British and Italians considered
Germany a veritable bulwark of militarism, slavery and 'Kaiserism',
and went on a crusade in the name of civilization and democracy.37
According to the French philosopher Emile Boutroux, the French
concept of freedom had come down from the Greeks, whereas the
Germans, allied with Turkey, had inherited the Oriental form of
despotism.38 The Germans, for their part, could not really condemn
liberty and democracy, and embarked upon a strategy which Thomas
Mann employed in characteristic fashion in his Betrachtungen eines
Unpolitischen: they heaped calumny on Western democracy as the
outdated 'parliamentarism of the lawyers' and as a 'plutocracy' which
only led to useless quarrels and which falsified the genuine will of the
people.39
Yet what political ideas could Germany offer? The French were
fighting for the principles of 1789 - liberty, equality, brotherhood.
The Russians wished to unite all Slavic peoples under the banner of
Panslavism, and would soon proclaim the communist mission of the
liberation of the proletariat. The English fought on behalf of the
freedom of the small nations, and had officially entered the war in
order to defend Belgium, unjustly attacked by Germany.
Germany did not have any such mission - a significant short-
coming in such an ideological war.40 Thus, German intellectuals and
academics - helped by sympathetic neutrals like the Swedes Rudolf
Kjellen and Gustav Steffen, and the English ideologue of race,
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who had moved to Germany many
years before - endeavoured to forge a specifically German ideology
which they could then juxtapose to Western principles. These were
the 'ideas of 1914', the new ideas of a 'young German people', which
would replace the time-worn notions of the French Revolution.

Liberty became so-called 'German freedom', 'devotion to the
community'; other salient values in this code were 'order', 'per-
formance of duty' and 'discipline'.41 The German cartoons of the time
often depict England, and sometimes France as well, as old and sick,
doomed according to this organicist theory; the future was to belong
to the 'young' and vigorous German people, to its 'new' principles of
1914.42
In this war of propaganda, it was a definite advantage for Germany
that the Western crusaders for democracy were allied with the most
reactionary power on the continent, tsarist Russia - a country which
beat her peasants with cudgels to force them to fight for 'civil-
ization'.43 In the German parlance of that day, Zivilisation had a
decidedly negative connotation. The old German dichotomy between
Kultur and Zivilisation had taken on a new critical meaning at the end
of the nineteenth century. The cultural pessimists contrasted
Zivilisation - as a negative expression of 'mechanical' industrial-
ization, urbanization and capitalism -with Kultur, bound up in
particular with aesthetic values. They argued that German Kultur had
a special mission in Europe.
In this war, Kultur became a propaganda weapon in the hands of
the cartoonists. German Kultur was presented as a superior value. In
German cartoons, the Allies perpetrate their war crimes in the name
of 'civilization'.44 Western cartoonists, meanwhile, took extreme
pleasure in comparing German pretensions regarding Kultur with the
real (or invented) war crimes committed by German soldiers in the
occupied territories.45 The Germans were marching all over Europe
with the battle cry 'Kultur or death!', telling people: 'If we shoot you,
it is only for your own good.'46 The German cartoonists defended
themselves in a very simple and convincing manner: they countered
the reproaches against the German 'barbarians' with positive images
in which German soldiers are depicted giving food to the elderly or
playing with children.47 When the French and British used black
troops from their colonies on the Western Front, the German
cartoonists were swift to react: they depicted the blacks as cannibals
-or even monkeys-fighting for Western civilization, and showed
French women pregnant with bastard Negro children.48 This attack
was skilfully countered by French cartoonists: in one cartoon, when a
Negro soldier takes out his knife, he says to a trembling German
prisoner: 'Don't worry, Mohammed never eats pigs' - a play upon
words, because in French 'cochon' means both 'pig' and 'filthy wretch'.49
The polarization between Germany and the Western powers

occasionally took on ridiculous dimensions. There was a move to
stamp out foreign influence in the German language and German
fashion, and the response of the English cartoonists to this was
especially humorous.50 Curious analogous aberrations appeared in
England and France as well. A serious proposal was made to the
Academie fran9aise to eliminate the German letter 'K' from the
French alphabet; cubism was denounced as German decadence
the cubist collections confiscated as enemy goods, and the En
Royal Family tried to obliterate its German origins, changin
name from 'Sachsen-Coburg and Gotha' to 'Windsor'.51
The Allies adopted a new slogan during the war: the right of s
determination. No people should any longer live under fore
domination. The realization of this principle would spel
disintegration of Germany's most important ally, the multi-nati
state of Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, Germany promised
alien peoples of Russia - the Poles, Ukrainians, the people o
Baltic nations, Georgians, etc. - a new freedom, but one that
'German' in its ultimate form: they would enjoy political autono
in domestic affairs, yet would remain bound to the Ger
superpower in military, political and economic matters. In
polemical discussion about who could best protect the freedom of
small peoples, the German liberal imperialists - liberal politic
right-wing social democrats, industrialists, banking and governm
circles -tried to find an ethical basis for German imperialis
England, due to her alliance with tsarist Russia, had lost all credib
and could no longer claim to protect the rights of small nations. T
Germany could now, according to this view, assume the rol
political liberator of the small nations of Europe. These would en
freedom and political influence as members of a supranational bo
under German domination: 'Mitteleuropa'.52 This project was
tified by quoting slogans culled from the writings of the Ge
philosopher Fichte, such as the 'world mission of German free
and 'Germany's emancipatory task'.53
In the battle of the cartoonists which developed in 1917 over t
question, the Germans attempted to show how England, as a colon
power in Asia and Africa, as well as in Ireland, had violated the r
to self-determination of smaller nations and how she continu
oppress them by her blockade of and intervention in Greece.54 A
advantage for Germany was the decision by the Bolsheviks as ear
December 1917 to make public the secret treaties which the ts
regime had concluded with the Western powers, and which blatantly
violated the right of self-determination. Italy was supposed to be
given German and Slavic territories from Austria, and England and
France would divide up among themselves the Arab territories of the
Ottoman Empire.55 The Allied cartoonists responded by prophesying
that the German 'liberation' of the alien peoples of Russia would only
lead them into a new slavery.56
The proclamation of the 'independent' Polish kingdom in Nov-
ember 1916 by the Central Powers had a special importance in this
context. The German cartoonists cited this as an example of the
liberation of a country from the Russian yoke; for the Allied
cartoonists, Poland was once again in chains.57 According to them,
the whole enterprise had only one purpose: to use the Poles as cannon
fodder for the German armies, as a cartoon in the magazine Punch
put it.58 This was what the German High Commmand really had in
mind, but their objective was not realized, because of the awkward
way they dealt with the Poles.59
The war of the cartoonists was not limited to the discussion of
ideological principles. Very important was their use of personal
- kings, politicians, generals - who represented the destiny
politics of the enemy countries. Through this 'personification',
could be directed against a concrete person, depicted as ridiculou
horrid, and then, by transfer of emotion, against the coun
such.60
The cartoons of the enemy coalition always differentiated between
the principal enemy- England or Germany- and their respective
allies, who appear as totally oppressed. For example, the French
Prime Minister Clemenceau is depicted as a jumping jack, chained to
England, while Austria's Emperor Francis Joseph must listen like an
obedient hound to his German master's voice.61 Sometimes even the
themes are similar: England or Germany are portrayed sitting in a
cart being pulled by their respective allies.62 Thus, the hope is alluded
to that some day those who are now allies will understand their fate
and leave their 'master' in the lurch. Rarely do the German cartoons
polemicize against France. This corresponds to the general line of
German war propaganda which considered France as a valorous
enemy and did not even rule out an accord with this country.63 In a
caricature titled 'Secret Love', Germany woos the French Marianne,
to the fury of England and Russia.64
One example of very subtle manipulation is the German cartoon
'Vierbund- Vierverband':65 the Central Powers (Germany, Austria,
Turkey and Bulgaria) are contrasted with the most important Allies
(England, France, Russia and Italy). The Central Powers, of course,
are depicted much more positively: calmly and confidently, they sit
around a table, obviously in complete harmony, whereas the Allies
are quarrelling violently. The Russians and French reproach the
English Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, while the Italian King
Vittorio Emmanuele III sits to one side, aloof.
A critical reader will probably regard this comparision as very
biased, but he still runs the risk of being massively manipulated, since
this caricature can be viewed from another angle. By using the
number 'four' - four Allies, four Central Powers - the cartoonist is
attempting to convince the reader that both coalitions are of 'equal'
value. Yet this was obviously not the case - the Allies were by far the
superior- numerically, financially and economically. In the French
cartoon which appeared in Le Rire, the coalition of the Central
Powers is depicted in a more realistic way: Austria as an old, sick man,
Turkey as an invalid.66
The principal symbol of Germany in the Allied cartoons is not the
traditional German 'Michel', who is far too peaceful, but rather
Kaiser Wilhelm II, a figure popular with cartoonists even before the
war. The caricatures associate the Kaiser with impressive negative
symbols which demonstrate the Manichean tone of the propaganda:
in apocalyptic visions, he is surrounded by death and the devil; exile
in St Helena or the gallows await him, or he is shown as a butcher or a
beggar after the war.67
The German cartoonists responded in similar fashion. Grand
Duke Nikolai Nikolajevitch, the Supreme Commander of the
Russian Armies, wades in blood like Macbeth; the guillotine awaits
the French President Poincare, and the revolutionaries are already
preparing the bullets for the Russian Tsar Nicolas II.68 It is interesting
how early such visions appear in the press: on 30 August 1914,
General Hunger joins the Allied Council of War; in October 1914,
Germany is threatened by famine and revolution.69 Such prophecies
could easily impress people and suggest that the enemy would soon be
defeated.70
Another important symbol is Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg,
the famous victor of the battle of Tannenberg over the Russians in
autumn 1914 and Commander-in-Chief of the German armies from
1916. He was very popular with the German cartoonists, wh
thought of him as a kind of father-figure guaranteeing final Ger
victory. The cartoonists on the Allied side, of course, tried to des
his charisma, depicting him with scars on his head and as a monster.71
England was regarded as the main enemy of the Central Powers.
Even before the war, anti-British sentiments had been widespread in
Germany,72 and Britain's unexpected entry into the war, coupled with
the English blockade, which led to supply problems in Germany,
heightened the hatred of'perfidious Albion'. Some Germans replaced
the greeting 'Guten Tag' by 'Gott strafe England' (God punish
England), and the now forgotten writer Ernst Lissauer penned a
popular 'song of hate' against England.
The typical representation of the British in German caricatures is
the figure of the shopkeeper: 'War is a business like any other', says
the English Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey coldly, with two piles
of skulls lying in front of him on the counter.73 According to Alfred
Weber, the English had initiated and fought the entire war in order to
destroy German trade, and the caricatures reflected this view.74 The
economist Werner Sombart, in a propaganda pamphlet, contrasted
Englishmen and Germans as 'merchants vs heroes', attributing to the
British all the negative qualities. His arguments derived from the anti-
capitalist arsenal of the socialists as well as from critiques by German
cultural pessimists, in whose eyes capitalism and industry were
negative.75
Even before their entry into the conflict, the English and Americans
had been depicted as unscrupulous 'plutocrats', ready to sacrifice
everything for money. The Statue of Liberty is choked by American
high finance, and Woodrow Wilson wants to make a profit on the
war, despite all his talk of peace.76 This attack against hypocrisy was
significant, since Wilson was a highly skilled master of propaganda,
and there was a danger that the German people might be taken in by
his appeals for peace.77 On the other hand, the Allied cartoonists
reproached Wilson with being ready to put up with anything and to
accept, with enormous patience, all violations of American interests
at the hands of German submarine warfare.78.
Another charge levelled against the Anglo-Saxons by the Germans
was that of 'cant', which the German philosopher Max Scheler
defined as the 'equivalent of a lie with good conscience'.79 This
implied that the English had a tendency to smooth over their
imperialistic interests with fancy-sounding words and moralistic
pronouncements. In one caricature, they are depicted laying mines in
order to destroy German ships, not forgetting to decorate them with
Christmas trees.80 A literary symbol of this 'cant' was the figure of
Dorian Grey in the famous novel by Oscar Wilde: Grey's immoral
way of life does not leave any visible marks on his beautiful face, and
deforms only the features on his hidden portrait.8' The common
surname shared by Dorian Grey and English Foreign Minister,
Sir Edward Grey, was soon exploited by cartoonists to their
advantage.82
In Allied caricatures, the German soldier is portrayed as an
incendiary and murderer, who commits all sorts of atrocities.
Appalling drawings of burning houses, raped women and mutilated
children are very typical.83 The underlying reason behind this was that
throughout the war, German troops had occupied large areas of
France, Belgium and Russia; Belgium and Lithuania especially were
very badly treated: heavy requisitions and contributions were
exacted, and deportations were frequent. On the other hand, Allied
commissions 'proved' alleged German atrocities with the aid of
scientific-looking documents which were, of course, far from objec-
tive.84 In contrast, there were no foreign soldiers on German soil,
apart from a small area in Alsace, and so it was difficult for German
cartoonists to retaliate in the same way.85 They could only point to the
presence of Cossacks in Galicia and Eastern Prussia at the start of the
war, and were obliged to limit their polemic to a purely defensive
strategy by presenting the positive actions of German soldiers. Such
caricatures appeared particularly in those papers destined for the
occupied areas, such as the Gazette des Ardennes.86 Thus the Germans
reacted in a purely defensive manner, and Allied propaganda proved
much more successful. Not only did it inspire hatred of the enemy in
their own fighting men, it also succeeded in enflaming public opinion
against Germany in the neutral countries. Here the Allies could also
rely on a number of journalists and cartoonists, such as the Dutch
cartoonist Louis Raemakers, whose caricatures were considered to be
one of the most dangerous weapons against Germany. In 1935, a
German author wrote: 'The cartoons of Raemakers had more
propaganda value than several volumes of English p
pamphlets put together.'87 The English distributed millions
of Raemakers's cartoons all over the world, and the cart
not only well paid, but awarded prestigious English an
medals for his efforts.88
The Allied soldiers in German cartoons are often depicted
incompetent or ridiculous. That was relatively easy when it
cartoons featuring the Italians, who were indeed often som
than heroes; Russians were portrayed as illiterate drunkard
method of denigration in German cartoons was not as ineff
was later claimed. Sigmund Freud had written in his Der Witz und
seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten: 'By showing the enemy as small,
low, despicable, comic, ridiculous, we give ourselves the enjoyment of
a victory.'9 Another source of fun for German cartoons was the use
by the English and Russians of female volunteers.91 In reality, only the
Russians had such troops; for instance, the famous 'battalion of
death' under Major Botchkareva, which, during the October
Revolution, defended the Winter Palace against the Bolsheviks. In
the British forces, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps employed
approximately 40,000 women but only as workers in communica-
tions, such as telephone operators, typists and orderlies.
The losses in the war were enormous: ten million killed in action,
two million of them German. There were not enough young men to
replace them, and cartoons show the desperate measures taken to
cope with this problem, though on the side of the enemy, of course:
prisoners, babies, old men and invalids are sent to the front as a last
resort.92
Submarine warfare posed a special problem. At the beginning of
the war, the English with their superior fleet had set up a blockade
against the Central Powers, and the Germans had retaliated with
submarine warfare. But there was a serious problem: a submarine
could not surface and identify a ship, because it would run the risk of
being sunk itself. Yet if it torpedoed a ship without positive
identification, American passengers might be killed, as had occurred
in the sinking of the Lusitania and the Sussex. The American
government had protested angrily over these incidents. The Germans
changed their tactics several times, but decided, due to the severe food
shortage caused by the English blockade, to reintroduce unlimited
submarine warfare in January 1917.93
Three months later, Washington declared war on Germany. The
comparison of a German and a French cartoon of submarine warfare
clearly shows the dilemma posed by such warfare: in the German
cartoon, a heavily armed ship cannot be torpedoed because American
passengers are on board; these passengers are being used as
protection against a possible torpedo attack. In the French cartoon, a
harmless passenger ship can be sunk because Americans are not on
board. In reality, of course, a submarine commander could not know
for sure who was indeed on board.94
In one of the most famous French cartoons, designed by Forain
one soldier says to another: 'Let us hope they will hold out.' 'Who
'The civilians of course.'95 The home front was indeed one of the
major problems, especially the question of food supply. The priorities

of war production, the bureaucratic control of the economy, the
blockade and submarine warfare had led to food shortages in all the
belligerent countries. War had led to profiteering, and speculation
aggravated these problems. Here the cartoonists had an important
function. It was their job to shift the responsibility for these problems
from the real culprits - government and bureaucracy - to various
scapegoats (such as war profiteers or the enemy); the people could
then direct their hatred against these scapegoats without calling into
question the entire political system. On occasion, the hunger suffered
by the civilian population is depicted - but in the enemy's country, in
order to make starvation on the home front seem more bearable.
When the number of dishes allowed in France in a restaurant was
limited to two per person a day, the cartoonists show a situatio
Germany where people do not even get that much to eat, a
living on herrings and water. While Germans starve, the cartoo
depicts the culprit- John Bull, who is now starving as well b
of the effect of German submarine warfare.96 In his memoirs,
German ambassador to the US, Johann Heinrich Count Berns
expressed regret that German propaganda had not sufficie
exploited the theme of the suffering endured by women and ch
as a result of the English hunger blockade.97
The cartoonists not only fought the enemy abroad - they
fought the enemy at home: pacifists, socialists, spies, pessimist
the like. In all the warring countries, cartoonists worked f
continuation of the war until the final 'knock-out' of the en
'jusqu'au bout', 'bis zum bitteren Ende'. Pacifists and sociali
therefore, had to be subjected to ridicule. In the US and Italy, pa
were naturally very active before these countries joined the wa
thus formed a special target for the cartoonists' barbs. One
greatest obstacles on the way to peace is depicted in a small carto
the French paper La Baionnette: a pacifist states that he wants p
on the basis of the status quo before the war, but the war invalid
'OK, then give me back my lost leg'.98 As compensation for all
losses, the people wished something in return; it was difficult to
that they had suffered all those years for nothing. The Indepen
Social Democrats in Germany (USDP), the Italian Socialists an
British UDC (Union of Democratic Control) were seen as paci
and were therefore accused of high treason and collaboration wit
enemy.99 The German socialist Karl Liebknecht, an uncomprom
enemy of the war and the only deputy in the Reichstag in Sept
1914 to vote against the war budget, is seen in a Simplicissimus

cartoon comforting the beaten Russian supreme commander, Grand
Duke Nikolai Nikolajevitch: 'Don't despair, Nikolai, you can still
count on me' - a masterpiece of brainwashing: the revolutionary
Liebknecht portrayed as an ally of the hated tsarism.'00 The strikers
were also singled out as a target by the cartoonists. In all warring
countries, they were condemned and accused of aiding and abetting
the enemy.?10
There were those in England who tried to shirk military service
before it was made compulsory in January 1916, and they were
derided by both English and German cartoonists. There is a
magnificent German cartoon in which a recruit in an Englis
recruiting office is promised a wonderful life as a soldier: in six month
he will be a general, earn a lot of money and eat very well; moreover
'Gretchen' is waiting for him in Cologne. Despite all these promises,
however, the only person who comes to the recruitment office the
whole week is the cleaning woman.102 When conscription was
introduced in England, quite a few men still feigned illness in order to
avoid being enlisted. Other countries encountered similar prob-
lems.103
Another element was the struggle against spies and foreign
minorities, especially German minorities. In Russia and England,
genuine pogroms were organized against the German minority,
which even before the war had been regarded as a potential fifth
column.04 French cartoonists approved of this treatment, though
their German counterparts, of course, condemned it. Only the
German-Americans were truly active in this respect; with the help of
their many newspapers and societies, they tried to prevent Washing-
ton from declaring war against Germany. The German spy network
was not as well organized as was believed. For instance, the German
government was not informed about the mutinies on the French front
in 1917, a complete failure of the intelligence system.l05 There were
even some French cartoonists who derided the exaggerated fear of
German spies in France. In one marvellous cartoon, a wife says to her
husband: 'Can you imagine, our German nanny - that was General
von Kluck!' And her husband responds: 'Shocking! Imagine that, I
deceived you with her!'106
German propaganda in the first world war was severely criticized
after the end of the war. The former soldier Adolf Hitler regarded it as
insufficient and 'psychologically erroneous', and in Mein Kampfhe
wrote that its success had been nil.107 Hitler criticized the principle of
making the enemy look ridiculous and considered Allied propa-

ganda, which tried to provoke hatred against the enemy by horror
stories and drawings, as superior. General Ludendorff even consid-
ered Allied propaganda to have been partially responsible for the
German defeat in the war - possibly to excuse his own military
failures.108 Many agreed with Hitler and Ludendorff.109 Today
numerous scholars take a different view.108 Certainly, German
cartoonists were less effective abroad than their Allied counterparts,
but their fight against the enemy within proved highly successful.
After all, the German people had held out for four long years, despite
great suffering and deprivation; this was due, at least in part, to the
effect of propaganda and cartoons."' Simplicissimus in particular
developed a very subtle method of indoctrination aimed at influen-
cing the subconscious.12
Hitler himself is a good example of the profound impact of German
propaganda in the first world war. Throughout his life, he held the
Americans in very low esteem. Albert Speer, his architect and, during
the war, Minister of Armaments, recalls Hitler making the following
remarks in the 1930s:
The Americans had not played a very prominent part in the war of 1914-18, he
thought, and moreover had not made any great sacrifices of blood. They would
certainly not withstand a great trial by fire, for their fighting qualities were
low.113
Even in 1942, after the Americans had launched their successful

landing in North Africa, Hitler described the United States as a
country 'which did not have the necessary morale in order to win the
fight for the new world order'.14 One can venture the hypothesis that
his negative opinion of the Americans derived in part from his first
world war impressions based on German propaganda and cartoon
caricatures. Hitler's ridiculing of Wilson as an 'apostle of peace"'5
and his scoffing at American military abilities, as late as 1942 when
they had effected their brilliant landing in North Africa, corresponds
precisely to the line taken by German propaganda in the first world
war. As British propaganda's main aim at that time was to elicit
American reinforcements, German cartoonists did their utmost to
minimize and ridicule the American soldier. In their cartoons,
Americans send tin soldiers, an incompetent regiment of billionaires
and cowboys riding on sea horses."6 Again and again, German
propaganda attempted to inculcate in the German soldier the notion
that Americans were incapable of intervening in any decisive way in

the conflict.
A propaganda war, waged also in the arena of political carica-
ture, can only be won if its message penetrates the unconscious.
In this regard, German cartoonists were certainly as successful as
their Allied counterparts, at least as far as the home front was
concerned.
Notes
1. Carl Schmitt, 'Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat (1937)', in idem,
Positionen und Begriffe im Kampfmit Weimar, Genf, Versailles 1923-1939 (Hamburg
1940), 235-9; cf. Gary L. Ulmen, 'Return of the Foe', in Telos, 72 (1987), Special Issue:
Carl Schmitt, Enemy or Foe?, 187-93.
2. Schmitt, op. cit., 233.
3. Erich Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg (Munich 1935); Ernst Jiinger, Die totale
Mobilmachung (Berlin 1931).
4. Carl Schmitt, Weiterentwicklung des totalen Staates in Deutschland (Munich
1933), 187.
5. See on the concept of totalitarianism: Karl Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre
(Tubingen 1959), and the articles in Totalitarismus (Darmstadt 1988). The relation
betweeen the development of the total state in the first world war and totalitarianism
would merit further investigation.
6. Wilhelm Deist (ed.), Militdr und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-1918
(Dusseldorf 1970), introduction, XXXIff; Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Pressepolitik im
Ersten Weltkrieg (Dusseldorf 1968), 75.
7. Deist, op. cit., ILff.
8. Ibid., vol. II, no. 332, 846f.
9. Ibid., VIIIff., no. 347, 913.
10. Koszyk, op. cit., 28.
11. Laurent Gervereau, 'La Propagande par l'image en France 1914-1918.
Themes et modes de representation' in Images de 1917 (Paris 1987), 98.
12. Alice G. Marquis, 'Words as Weapons. Propaganda in Britain and Germany
during the First World War' in Journal of Contemporary History, 13 (July 1978), 476.
13. Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the First World War (New York
1927, reprint 1938), 184.
14. G. G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire
(Stanford 1938); M. L. Sanders and Philipp M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the
First World War, 1914-1918 (London 1982), IX, 227ff.
15. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munich (BHST), K6nigliches Kriegsminis-
terium, no. 13970, Jugend-Verlag, contains numerous letters belonging to Jugend's
editor's office, 29 August 1917: cartoon of the Pope: letter of 29 August 1917, note of
Ministry of War, cf. Jugend, no. 35, 1917.
16. The documents are to be found in the Zentrale Staatsarchiv Potsdam,

Zentralstelle fur Auslandsdienst, no. 103; cf. Hellmuth Weber, 'Die politisch
Karikatur im Dienst der imperialistischen Kriegsfiihrung 1914-1918' in
Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universitdt Halle, 30 (1981), 79f.
17. In Switzerland Pierre Chatillon was condemned by a military tribunal for his
cartoon portraying Kaiser Wilhelm II as a butcher; cf. John Grand-Carteret
Caricatures et Images de Guerre, Kaiser, Kronprinz et Cie., vol. 1 (Paris 1916
64.
18. Ann Taylor Allen, Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany. Kladderadatsch
and Simplicissimus 1890-1914 (Lexington 1984), 9ff.
19. Speech of the deputy of the Centre Party, Lerno, 14 January 1904, Stenograph.
Bericht uber die Verh. der bayer. Kammer der Abgeordneten, 84th session, no. 428.
20. Taylor Allen, op. cit., 41.
21. Eugen Roth, Simplicissimus, Ein Riickblick auf die satirische Zeitschrift
(Hannover 1955), 42f.
22. Thomas Mann, Autobiographisches, ed. by Hans Biirgin (Frankfut/Main
1968), 242.
23. Koszyk, op. cit., 75.
24. BHST, Kriegsarchiv, Stellvertr. Generalkommando, 1. Armeekorps, no. 1706,
13.11.1914: 'Es bedarf wohl keines besonderen Hinweises, dass dieses Blatt, das sich an
Verhohnung und Verspottung der Armee vor Kriegsausbruch nicht genug tun konnte
und erst jetzt sich ein nationales Mantelchen umgehangt hat, die denkbar
ungeeignetste Lektiire fur unsere Soldaten ist.'
25. BHST, Kriegsarchiv, Stellvertr. Generalkommando, 1. Armeekorps, letter of
Ludwig Thoma of 18 December 1914 and letter of Blaich of 18 December 1914, ibid.,
no. 1711.
26. BHST, Kriegsarchiv, letter of 19 September 1914; Staatsministerium

Justiz, Uberwachung der Presse, no. 17354: 'Mit Riicksicht auf die seit Ausbru
Kriegs geanderte Haltung der Wochenschrift "Simplicissimus" wird, einem Ge
des Verlags entsprechend, das mit Entschliessung vom 29. September 1
ausgesprochene Verbot des Verkaufs der genannten Wochenschrift in den Bahn
[.... .] aufgehoben'; Weber, op. cit., 75, cites a similar letter of the Bavarian Ministr
the Interior.
27. BHST, Staatsministerium der Justiz, Uberwachung der Presse, letter of

Ministry of Justice to the King of Bavaria; letter of the public prosecutor of the
county court to Olaf Gulbransson, 25 February 1915, no. 17354. This procedur
been started on 23 June 1914 because of a cartoon where the King of Bavaria
deputation of school teachers: 'Ja, meine Herren, wenns Ihnen schlecht geht, w
betteln S'denn net? Die Hochwiirdigen Herren Kapuziner betteln ja aa!'
28. BHST, Kriegsarchiv, Stellv. Generalkommando, 1. Armeekorps, no. 1
'Papst, Kaiser und Offiziere werden zu Karikaturen gemacht [.. .] ein wahres Gi
die freiheitsdiirstende Jugend.' And when a Baron von Reinacker asked
commander in Bavaria to ban advertisements in the cartoon magazines
pornographic books like Apulejus's The Golden Donkey (!) or The Kamasutr
Bavarian Ministry of War instructed the commander not to waste time w
advertisements. Reinacker persisted, supported by the president of police in Berlin
the advertisements were not banned. Cf. letter of von Reinacker, 12 December
letter of War Ministry, 23 December 1915; letter of president of police in Berl
January 1917, contained in file no. 1760.
29. Letter from Ludwig Thoma to Theodor Heuss, 29 November 1914, in Ludwig
Thoma, Ein Leben in Briefen (Muenchen 1963), 275, 286. Helmut Ahrens, Ludwig
Thomas, sein Leben, sein Werk, seine Zeit (Pfaffenhofen 1983), 455ff; Peter Haage,
Ludwig Thoma. Mit Nagelstiefeln durchs Kaiserreich (Muenchen 1975), 179.
30. Ludwig Thoma, Erinnerungen (Muenchen and Zurich 1980, 3rd edition), 212.
31. Lothar Lang (ed.), Thomas Theodor Heine (Muenchen 1970), 126.
32. Thoma, op. cit., 212.
33. For a more detailed analysis of the war cartoons cf. Eberhard Demm, Der
Erste Weltkrieg in der internationalen Karikatur (Hannover 1988); Eberhard Demm
and Tilman Koops, Karikaturen aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Eine Ausstellung des
Bundesarchivs (Koblenz 1990).
34. Werner Sombart, Haendler und Helden (Berlin 1915), 3; Klaus Schwabe,
Wissenschaft und Kriegsmoral (Goettingen 1969), 34ff.
35. Ernst Troeltsch, 'Der Kulturkrieg' in Deutsche Reden in schewerer Zeit, vol. 3
(Berlin 1915), 209-49; Herman Luebbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland (Basel
1969), 229.
36. Herman Oncken, 'Das Ergebnis des ersten Kriegsjahres' in Frankfurter
Zeitung, 1 August 1915, morning edition. Cf. also Alfred Weber, 'Das
Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Voelker und der Friede' in Preussische Jahrbuecher,
(1918), 60; Eberhard Demm, Ein Liberaler in Kaiserreich und Republik. Der polit
Weg Alfed Webers bis 1920 (Boppard 1990), 157.
37. See several French appeals in Hermann Kellermann, Krieg der Geist
(Weimar 1915) and Hans Thimme, Weltkrieg ohne Waffen (Berlin 1932); Ernst Lav
Kultur et Civilisation (Paris 1915); anon., La civilisation latine contre la barb
allemande (Paris 1915).
38. Kenneth E. Silver, Espirit de Corps. The Art of the Parisian Avant-Garde
the First World War 1914-1925 (Princeton 1982), 180.
39. Thomas Mann, 'Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918)' in Hans Buer
(ed.), Politische Schriften und Reden (Frankfurt 1968), cf. Eberhard Demm, 'Tho
und Alfred Weber im Ersten Weltkreig' in Etudes Germaniques, 37 (1982), 40.
40. Ludwig Dehio, 'Gedanken ueber die deutsche Sendung 1900-1918' in id
Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich 1955), 71ff.
41. Eberhard Demm, 'Les themes de la propagande allemande en 1914' in Guer
mondiales et conflits contemporains, 150 (1988), 3-17; idem, 'Les idees de 1789 et
idees de 1914. La Revolution francaise dans la propagande allemande' in La recept
de la Revolution francaise dans les pays de langue allemande, Annales litterair
l'Universit& de Besancon (Paris 1987), 152-61.
42. P.H., 'Ein Wiedersehen' in Ulk, 40 (1915); Th. Th. Heine, 'Das greise Eng
in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 41, 12 January 1915, 535; Malo, 'Zittre Deutschlan
Lustige Blaetter, no. 140 (1917), 4.
43. Erler, 'In Russland' in Jugend, no. 46 (1914), 1288.
44. Franz Wacik, 'Au nom de la civilisation' in Muskete, 3 September 191
Kraska, 'Kunst als Deckung' in Ulk, no. 40 (1914).
45. R. Florie, 'Herr Professor' in Cri de Paris, 25 (October 1914).
46. 'Nouvelle Armee du Salut' in Europe antiprussienne, 20 February 1915 (rep
of an American cartoon).
47. Christoph, 'Kultur und Barbarismus' in Kladderadatsch, no. 41 (1915).
48. E.O. Petersen, 'Frankreichs Kulturpioniere' in Simplicissimus, vol. 20, 4 M
1915, 53; E. Thoeny, 'Was Zivilisation ist, habe ich euch erklaert ... ', ibid., vo
no. 19, 8 August 1916, 235; K. Arnold, 'C'est la Guerre', ibid., vol. 19, no. 27, 5
October 1915, 315; Hans Strohofer, 'Ein Gutes hat der Krieg gehabt, er hat die Grande
Nation vor dem Aussterben bewahrt' in Muskete, 8 October 1914, 14.
49. Bouet, 'Ti pas avior peur, imbecile' in La Baionnette, 28 September 1916, 186;
Mariak, 'C'tendu, m'zami.. .', ibid., 619.
50. August Hajdak, 'Berlin, Willkommen, deutsche Mode' in Ulk, vol. 45, no. 6, 11
February 1916; F. Reynolds, 'Fashions in the new Germany' in Punch's Almanack
1917.
51. See the cartoon by L. Raven-Hill, 'A good riddance' in Punch, 27 June 1917;
Silver, Espirit de Corps, op. cit., 9f.
52. Fritz Fischer, Grif nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen
Deutschlands 1914-1918 (Diisseldorf 1967). There were numerous publications on
'Mitteleuropa', the most famous being Mitteleuropa by the liberal politician, Friedric
Naumann (Berlin 1915). Especially interesting in its polemic against Great Britain is
the memorandum of Kurt Hahn, the specialist on British affairs, in the Zentrale fue
Auslandsdienst edition under the title 'Die Denkschrift Kurt Hahns ueber den
ethischen Imperialismus' in Demm, Ein Liberaler in Kaiserreich und Repu
344-76.
53. Ernest Troeltsch, 'Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratien' in Die d
Freiheit (Gotha 1917), 108; idem, 'Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit' in
Rundschau, 27 (1916), 72; Franz Oppenheimer, 'Sozialismus oder Liberalismu
29 (1918), 1131.
54. A. Johnson, 'Das Elend der kleinen V6lker' in Kladderadatsch, 7 (1
page; W. Krain, 'Humor in der Weltgeschichte' ibid., vol. 69, 7 May 1916; A.
ibid., no. 9, 1918.
55. See cartoon by A. Wellner, 'Das stolze Albion' in Lustige Bldtter,
(1917).
56. Eksergian, 'The liberator' in Cartoon's Magazine, vol. 14, August 1918, 246,
afterwards: St. Louis Globe-Democrat; Mergin, 'Le droit des peuples' in Ruy Bias, 10
March 1918.
57. H.G.J., 'Befreiung Polens' in Der Wahre Jakob, 17 September 1915,

idem, ibid., 24 November 1916, no. 792: 'Wie die Entente und die Mittelmachte s
Befreiung Polens vorstellen'; Edward, 'A Varsovie' in Cri de Paris, 14 January
58. B. Partridge, 'Independence of Poland' in Punch, 15 November 1916, 349
59. Werner Conze, Polnische Nation und deutsche Politik im Ersten Welt
(Cologne and Graz 1958), 233ff; Heinz Lemke, Allianz und Rivalitaet. Die
Mittelmaechte und Polen im Ersten Weltkrieg bis zur Februarrevolution (Berlin 1970)
60. Terence H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (New York 1962),
72ff.; Oliver Thomson, Mass Persuasion in History (Edinburgh 1977), 19.
61. Bahr, 'Clemenceau, l'homme enchaine' in Kladderadatsch, 6 January 1918
Merger, 'La voix de son maitre' in Ruy Bias, 18 July 1915.
62. L. Ravenhill, 'The God in the cart' in Punch, 6 January 19L5, 3; 'Der neue
Geschaeftsfuehrer' in Simplicissimus, vol. 22 (1917/18), 504.
63. Siegfried Hartwagner, 'Der Kampfder deutschen Karikatur gegen England im
Weltkrieg 1914-1918', doctoral dissertation (Berlin 1942), 161; Schwabe, Wissenschaf
und Kriegsmoral, op. cit., 31.
64. Der Wahre Jakob, 3 September 1915, 8780.
65. 'Blix' in Simplicissimus, vol. 20, 30 November 1915, 420.
66. Rodiguet, 'Et moi aussi, j'ai des alli6s' in Le Rire, 5 December 1914.
67. Edmund J. Sullivan, The Kaiser's Garland (London 1915), 27, 43, 85; A.
Roubille, 'A la droite du diable' in Le Rire, 25 November 1916, no. 106; B. Partridge,
'Wilful Murder' in Punch, 19 May 1915, 391; Castro, 'Geographie' in Cri de Paris, 29
July 1917; P. Chatillon, 'L'envoye de Dieu' in L'Europe antiprussienne, 22 December
1914; 'La fine dei tre re' in Asino, no. 24, 24 January 1915, 8.
68. Th. Th. Heine, 'Macbeth-Nikolajewitsch' in Simplicissimus, vol. 20, no. 4, 27
April 1915, 37; 'Spuk am hellen Mittag' in Der Wahre Jakob, 18 August 1916, 785; R.
Hermann, 'Bleigiessen in St Petersburg' in Muskete, 31 December 1914, 107.
69. 'Demain en Allemagne' in Ruy Bias, 30 August 1914; D'Ostoya, 'Les
chatiments', ibid., 4 October 1914.
70. Thomas, Mass Persuasion in History, op. cit., 21.
71. 'Hindenburg' in Meggendorfer Blaetter, 11 March 1915; George Hecht, War in
Cartoons. A History of the War in 100 Cartoons by 27 of the Most Prominent American
Cartoonists (New York 1919), 131; Hindenburg, 'Moloch allemand' in Le Petit
Journal, 29 August 1915.
72. Pauline Anderson, The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-
1902 (2nd ed., New York 1969).
73. O. Gulbransson, 'Hueter des Voelkerrechts' in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 20,
18 August 1914, 328.
74. Alfred Weber, 'Gedanken ueber die deutsche Sendung' in Neue Rundschau, 26
(1915), 1450; 'Sir Edward Grey, die englische Harpye' in Der Wahre Jakob, November
1914, 8509; Blix, 'Das englische Gold' in Simplicissimus, vol. 20, no. 16, 20 July 1915,
181.
75. Werner Sombart, Haendler und Helden (Muenchen and Leipzig 1915).
76. Rosenburg, 'In Great Danger' in Cartoon's Magazine, April 1917, vol. 11, 573,
after: Chicagoer Abendpost; Blix, 'Von Mammons Gnaden' in Simplicissimus, vol. 22,
27 March 1917, 680; G. Brandt, 'Aus Wilsons Rede vom amerikanischen Danksa-
gungstage' in Kladderadatsch, no. 51, 19 December 1915; A. Johnson, 'Wilsons
Friedenspfeife' in Kladderadatsch, 24 January 1917.
77. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, op. cit., 58.
78. B. Thomas, 'Freedom of the Seas' in Cartoon's Magazine, vol. 8, December
1915, 945, after: London Opinion; B. Partridge, 'Job's Discomforter' in Punch, 16
February 1916, 121.
79. Max Scheler, Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg (Leipzig 1915),
385ff.
80. Blix, 'Cant' in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 38, 22 December 1914, 501.
81. Scheler, Der Genius des Krieges, op. cit., 396.
82. R. Herrmann, 'Dorian Grey's Bildnis' in Muskete, 4 February 1915.
83. Gervereau, La Propaganda par l'image en France, op. cit., 106f.
84. Trevor Wilson, 'Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in
Belgium 1914-15' in Journal of Contemporary History, 14, 3 (July 1979), 369-83. On
Lithuania, cf. C. Rivas (= Yvonne Pouvreau), La Lituanie sous lejoug allemand 1915-
1918 (Lausanne 1918); Gerd Linde, Deutsche Politik in Litauen im Ersten Weltkrieg
(Wiesbaden 1964), 28ff; Eberhard Demm, 'Friedrich von der Ropp und die litauische
Frage 1916-1919' in Zeitschriftfuer Osforschung, 33 (1984), 28f.
85. Hermann Wanderscheck, Weltkrieg und Propaganda (Berlin 1935), 17.
86. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the First World War, op. cit., 162.
87. Ibid., 171.
88. Hartwagner, 'Der Kampf der deutschen Karikatur', op. cit., 157ff.
89. 'Eintreffen der russischen Motorbatterien' in Muskete, 15 October 1914, 23; E.

Thoeny, 'Mithueter der Kultur' in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 38, 22 December 1914,
509; E. Wilke, 'Kriegsrat' in Jugend, no. 17 (1917), 340.
90. Sigmund Freud, Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten (1905),
Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6 (London 1940), 112. Modern research has corroborated
Freud's insights, cf. various articles in Jacob Levine (ed.), Motivation in Humour (New
York 1969), especially John Doris and Ella Fierman, 'Humor and Anxiety', ibid., 31-
7.
91. B. Gestwicki, 'Englische Weibertruppen' in Lustige Blaetter, no. 33 (1915), 3;

'Das Weiberregiment', ibid., no. 31 (1915), 4.
92. P.H., 'Kitchener's schwere Jungen' in Ulk, no. 4 (1915); A. Johnson,
'Frankreichs letztes Aufgebot' in Kladderadatsch, no. 2 (1915); 'Englische Dienstpflicht'
in Lustige Blaetter, no. 20 (1918), 8-9; W.K. Haselden, Daily Mirror Reflections, vol. 8
(London 1915), 18: Willie's Reinforcements.
93. See for a detailed discussion of this question from the German point of view,
Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, vol. 2, edited by Willibald Gutsche (Berlin 1970),
555ff.
94. 'Grandjouan' in Le Rire, 31 July 1915; A. Johnson, 'Englischer

Handelsdreadnought' in Kladderadatsch, no. 21, 23 May 1915.
95. Jean Louis Forain, 'Pourvu qu'ils tiennent ...' in L'Opinion, 9 January 1
96. Gus. P., 'Cri du Coeur' in La Baionnette, 15 March 1917, 168f.; L. Bahr, 'J
Bulls Hungerkrieg' in Kladderadatsch, vol. 71, no. 11, 17 March 1918.
97. Johann Heinrich Count Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New Y
1920), 53.
98. La Baionnette, 1916, 487.
99. Th. Th. Heine, 'Friedensapostel' in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 16, 20 July
1915, 182; F.H. Townsend, 'Stage Manager' in Punch, 20 June 1917, 399; Nirsol, 'La
nuova Triplice Italiana' in Numero, no. 41, 4 October 1914; O. Avesi, 'Voluntary
Handicap' in Passing Show, 17 November 1917, 275; Th. Th. Heine, 'Haase und
genossen' in Simplicissimus, vol. 21, no. 2, 11 April 1916, 19.
100. W. Schulz, 'Der tapfere Liebknecht' in Simplicissimus, vol. 20, no. 15, 172; cf.
Weber, 'Die politische Karikatur', op. cit., 76.
101. 'For Services Rendered' in Punch, 23 May 1917, 337; Th. Th. Heine, 'Im
Dienste Englands' in Simplicissimus, vol. 22 (1917/18), 92.
102. J. Bahr, 'Im englischen Werbebureau' in Lustige Blaetter, no. 47 (1915), 10.
103. A. Saint-Ogan, 'Ils ont tous la meme maladie' in L'Anti-Boche, 11 December
1915; 'Drueckeberger' in Simplicissimus, vol. 19, no. 42, 19 January 1915.
104. Jean Pelissier, L'Europe sous la menace allemande en 1914. Une enquete d' avant-
guerre (Paris 1916), IIIff.
105. Guy Pedroncini, Les mutineries de 1917 (Paris 1967, reprint 1983).
106. P. Iribe, 'Trahison' in La Baionnette, 6 July 1916, 432.
107. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 23rd ed., vol. 1 (Muenchen 1933), 204.
108. Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories, vol. 1, 349, 360ff.
109. Wanderscheck, Weltkrieg und Propaganda, op. cit., 15; Lasswell, Propaganda
Technique in the First World War, op. cit., 32, 198ff.; Hartwagner, 'Der Kampf
der deutschen Karikatur', op. cit., 145; Marquis, 'Words as Weapons', op. cit.,
478.
110. See the critical discussion in Sanders and Taylor, 'British Propaganda', op. cit.,
ix, 208ff.
111. Roland N. Stromberg, Redemption by War. The Intellectuals and 1914 (Kansas
University Press 1982), 103.
112. See above.
113. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York 1970), 145. I was not
consult Adolf Hitler, Schriften, Reden, Anordnungen, vol. I, 1925-1926, vol
1928, edited by Barbel Dusik (Munich 1992).
114. Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgesprdche im Fiihrerhauptquartier 19
edited by Andreas Hillgruber (Munich 1968), 13.5.1942, 137.
115. Axel Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm. Entstehung und Entw
1919-1939 (Stuttgart 1970), 131ff.; Albert Speer, Erinnerungen (1969).
116. L. Bahr, 'Tin Soldiers' in Kladderadatsch, 14 July 1918, W. Trier,
Yorker Milliardaer-Regiment' in Lustige Blaetter, 1918, vol. 1, no. 4, 5;
'Zittere, Deutschland' in Jugend, no. 9 (1917), 179; see also 'Truppen nach E
Kladderadatsch, no. 6 (1918). The cartoon 'Tin Soldiers' is of 14 July 19
already more than 500,000 US soldiers were fighting on the Western Front.
Eberhard Demm
is a Professor in the Department of German
at the University of Lyon. He is the author
of Der Erste Weltkrieg in der internationalen
Karikatur (Hannover 1988); Ein Liberaler in
Kaiserreich und Republik - Der politische
Weg Alfred Webers bis 1920 (Boppard 1990)
Spanische Kolonialpaldste in Mexiko
(Cologne 1991); and, with Tilman Koops, of
Karikaturen aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Eine
Ausstellung des Bundesarchivs Koblenz
(Koblenz 1990).

Propaganda and Charicature

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Propaganda and Caricature in the First World War

Author(s): Eberhard Demm

Propaganda and Caricature in the First World W

Carl Schmitt, staunch supporter of the national socialists, and Erich

final decision on censorship, however, was taken by the local military

Enemy Countries in February 1918, Allied propaganda activities

What was the role of cartoonists in German and Allied propaganda?

ert 'rilg ift eia Oej ft t

:W:::Sta m ti5: iX: iL f i j--

* aS: C:: * _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

would replace the time-worn notions of the French Revolution.

The polarization between Germany and the Western powers

major problems, especially the question of food supply. The priorities

1914 to vote against the war budget, is seen in a Simplicissimus

making the enemy look ridiculous and considered Allied propa-

Even in 1942, after the Americans had launched their successful

that Americans were incapable of intervening in any decisive way in

16. The documents are to be found in the Zentrale Staatsarchiv Potsdam,

26. BHST, Kriegsarchiv, letter of 19 September 1914; Staatsministerium

27. BHST, Staatsministerium der Justiz, Uberwachung der Presse, letter of

57. H.G.J., 'Befreiung Polens' in Der Wahre Jakob, 17 September 1915,

89. 'Eintreffen der russischen Motorbatterien' in Muskete, 15 October 1914, 23; E.

91. B. Gestwicki, 'Englische Weibertruppen' in Lustige Blaetter, no. 33 (1915), 3;

94. 'Grandjouan' in Le Rire, 31 July 1915; A. Johnson, 'Englischer

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