National Art Education Association

Research and Anti-Research Motives in Art Education

Author(s): Arthur Efland and David Templeton
Source: Art Education, Vol. 19, No. 9 (Dec., 1966), pp. 18-19
Published by: National Art Education Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3190841 .
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RESEARCHAND
ANTI-RESEARCH
MOTIVES
IN ART EDUCATION
ARTHUREFLANDand DAVID TEMPLETON
THE PRESENT DECADEhas been one of controversy in
art education and promises to bring about many trans-
formations in both theory and practice. Some arguments
contribute more heat than light, more emotion than
reason, more exhortation than examination. Sometimes
the heated, emotional, exhortative denunciations are
directed at those doing research as was the case in Carl
Larson's recent article, "Search and Research," which
appeared in the March 1966 issue of ART EDUCATION.
Lest silence be taken for acquiescence, his arguments do
indeed call for a reply. However, this must not be con-
strued as a defense of research. For such a defense
would bring honor to the alternativeposition-not doing
research-and that would lend credence to ignorance.
Not only must serious research continue, but it must
expand its scope of concerns in order that today's prob-
lems do not become tomorrow's crises.
It would be wrong to suggest that research is exempt
from criticism. The quarrel with Larson is not that he
chose to criticize research. That he failed to do so and
the manner in which he made the attempt are causes for
concern. The moment Larsonused the words "Art Edu-
cation"-the first two words of his article-his subjective
tirade was doomed to failure. If he had elected to talk
of art and only art, in terms of the artist and his art
form, then the target of his outburst might not have
been so badly missed. Yet, to talk of the field or profes-
sion of art EDUCATIONis to talk of teachers and
students, humans working with humans. It is not revela-
tory to point out that much of what is known of humans
is the result of research. To deny the latter fact is to
deny all well organized thought of man and his relation-
ships with his fellow man. Yet, in spite of his concern
for humans, Larson has not examined the relevance of
research in terms of the goals it has pursued, the ade-
quacy of the knowledge claims it has made, or the lack
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of such claims. His arguments might have directed atten-
tion toward goals and problems currently neglected.
Unfortunately,"Searchand Research"suggests that its
author does not know the difference between the
MOTIVESand the PURPOSES of inquiry. In lucid fashion,
Kaplan differentiates between the two: " . . . MOTIVES
concern the relation between the scientific activity and
the whole stream of conduct of which it is a part; PUR-
POSESrelate the activities of inquiry to the particular
scientific problems which they are intended to solve." 1
Larson addressed himself to neither of these. Instead,
he alluded to fearful situations, more imagined than real,
and impugned the concerns of those who choose to
pursue a professional direction different from his own.
The only scrutiny he gives "motives" is found in his
melodramatic identification of heros and villains. The
heros are the "artist-teachers"who, in Larson'swords,
deal with the ". . . highest and most vital form of
research; the ongoing search for the artist as artist and
the artist as educator," while the villains are the research
people who ". . . are attempting to gain prestige by
arrogating to themselves the bubbling, gurgling, and
whirring of the science laboratory and the computer
center. . . ." One is hard-pressed to accept such state-
ments as factual claims or even provocative metaphor;
for at no time does he point to a particularsituation or
person.
The only attempt at defining research which we can
find in Larson's article is: "Philosophically, it is not a
question of to researchor not to research,but of seeking
new and better ways, while preserving in good repair
that which has already proven worthy to the service of
this profession." When he allows that, "one might object
that this roughly described definition of research is too
vague . . . ," we do indeed object, because it does
not define research at all. It is not a definition on two
counts. First,to seek "new and better ways" [of teaching
art, presumably] implies a decision on the part of per-
sons-not research and computers. Research findings
only aid people in making choices. Second, research
does not decide what to preserve and what not to
preserve. Research identifies variables as they exist (the
"is," not the "ought"). With the aid of these descrip-
tions, people decide what is worth keeping, rejecting,
doing, pursuing, and changing.
The assertion was made that research is simply a
means used by some to obtain prestige, promotion, or
other forms of aggrandizement-a shortcut to glory.
Such arguments, aside from their irrelevance, waste time
in needless diatribe and distract from issues which are
more important. For when one reads a factual claim in
a research report, it matters little what the personal
motives of the researcher have been. What does matter
is the research purpose, and one checks the claims to
see if they have consequences, to see if they are sup-
ported by the facts that have been generated in the
research.
The glory argument happens to be functionally invalid
as the following illustration will make clear. A
researcher who has become aware of a problem begins
by seeking answers in the existing literature, but, if
answers are not forthcoming, he designs means whereby
such answers might be educed. In order to obtain the
financing and the time to carry out his inquiries, he
generally prepares a written proposal. He must obtain
the consent of his institution which must agree to
release him from academic duties, and he must submit
the proposal to a funding agency such as the U.S.
Office of Education. If he fails to receive funding, his
prior efforts have come to naught. There is no glory
to be had; but if he is successful, he must sign a binding
contract. Not only must the work be done, but it must
be done on time and for not one cent more than what
the contract provides.
Perhaps a more serious objection to Larson's argu-
ments concerns the manner in which he alludes to
issues without really bringing them into the open. For
example, the allusion to "an unfortunate, if not tragic
situation" that apparently is developing in art education.
I presume the remarkwas prompted by the Templeton
article, "FromParanoiato Myopia," in ARTEDUCATION,
December 1964. Somehow, Larsonsaw the author advo-
cating a course of action that he found threatening.
Presumably, his reaction was to Templeton's sober
notion that educational researchersmight have something
to learn from the scientist. Why does this inspire fear?
Larson does not say. Anything that has to do with
science is automatically equated with the negation of
romance, mystery, and art.
In another instance he referred to an issue aired in
Philipson'sbook, AESTHETICS TODAY.2We can infer that
the book contained a strong argument condemning the
use of psychology in the solution of problems in philo-
sophical aesthetics. This may be an interesting point-
it might even be true-but on what grounds is this a
plausible argument for condemning research in art edu-
cation? Research in art education does not exist pri-
marily to solve aesthetic problems. To seek justification
in the argument between aestheticians and psychologists
is not only misleading, it does not serve his argument.
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On one hand Larsoncondemns research as a negative
force, but in the same breath he turns to the artist-
teachers and says they do "the highest and most vital
form of research." He does not identify the object of
their inquiries nor how their pursuits will necessarily
advance the status of art education. When he condemns
research, he seems to point to some far-off place where
a handful of researchersengage in inquiries with Olym-
pian indifference to the rest of the profession. He dis-
tinguishes them as separate from the artist-teacher, the
professional educator, and the classroom teacher. Are
not many of these researchersalso teachers and artists?
Are not many of them engaged in teacher-education,
painting, print-making and the like? And, even if this
were not so, what difference does it make? Do we
condemn the critic and the historian because they do
not as a rule engage in studio work?
There is one way to resolve this argument. First, it is
necessary to eliminate one serious flaw in the description
of research that is implied in the faulty analogy drawn
by Larson. He says, for example, ". . . the researchers
must be free from direction as the pure artist before
his canvas. . . ." But this does not hold for two reasons.
First, the artist does not have complete freedom before
his canvas. He is limited by what his materials allow
him to do, by the personal criticism that he imposes
upon himself, and by the criticism that he accepts from
others. Second, the researcher must work within the
constraints imposed by scientific method which calls
for objective procedures and rigorous controls. If the
research is philosophical in nature, it must be guided
by the rules of logical discourse.
These constraints are the source of an ethical dimen-
sion governing research which far outweighs the chance
for error caused by research inspired by false motives.
When one accepts these limits, one cannot make irre-
sponsible claims or cavalier prescriptions. One must
present evidence, and such evidence must stand the
test of criticism. If we are disappointed in Larson's
article, it is because he could have used his talents to
generate criticism where it might have been useful.
The fear of science is unwarranted as it applies to
research in art education, but it is a fear many people
feel. When Thomas Munro advocated the possibility of
using science in aesthetics, his critics often expressed the
view that "science must mechanize and deaden what
it penetrates. . . ."3 To what extent is this fear real
or fancied in art education? It behooves Larson to do
some research on research. I contend he cannot demon-
strate the causes of his fears on philosophical or empiri-
cal grounds, thus making the whole point of his
complaint difficult to fathom.
Arthur Eflandand David Templeton are with the School
of Art at Ohio State University.
FOOTNOTES:
1. Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1964.
2. Philipson, M. Aesthetics Today. New York: Meridian
Paperbacks, 1964.
3. Munro, Thomas. Toward Science in Aesthetics. New
York: Ronald Press, 1956.
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