Remedial Law Cases

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ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. V. NAVARRO

APRIL 30, 1987
 Curative Statute
FACTS:
Private respondent Emiliano C. Beneza was employed by Atlas Fertilizer

Corporation as a sales supervisor.
Atlas advised the Emiliano of his impending termination on the grounds of

inefficiency and loss of trust and confidence. He was given the option to resign or
wait for the termination order. Emiliano filed his resignation letter.
On January 8, 1979, Atlas sent to the Emiliano a memorandum giving the

latter seventy-two (72) hours to explain why he should not be terminated on the
grounds of acts inimical to the interest of the former.
On January 22, 1979, the Emiliano filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
a complaint against Atlas for injunction with damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The complaint urged the court to
prevent his termination on the ground, among others, that any termination would
be unlawful because he had already tendered his resignation. Atlas filed his
answer.
At the time Emiliano filed his complaint, the applicable law was Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1367 wherein it is provided that no Labor Arbiters shall
entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. It was therefore proper that
Emiliano filed his complaint with the Regional Trial court. P. D. 1367 provides as
follows:
Section 1.
The Labor Arbiter shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear

and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
a) Unfair labor practice cases;

b) Unresolved cases in collective bargaining,
including those which involve wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of
employment; and
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c) All other cases arising from employer-employee

relations duly indorsed by the Regional Directors
in accordance with the provisions of this code;
Provided, that the Regional Directors shall not
indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain
claims for moral or other forms of damages.
However, on May 1, 1980, during the pendency of his case, Presidential

Decree No, 1691 was promulgated. It amended the above-quoted provisions as
follows:
The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
workers, whether a agricultural cultural or non-agricultural:
a) Unfair labor practice cases:

b) All money claims of workers, including those
based on non-payment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claim s for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits;
c) All other claims arising from employer- employee-
relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.
As can be observed, claims for damages, such as the claim of Emiliano

should not anymore be filed with the Regional Trial Courts, but with the Labor
Arbiters.
On November 29, 1982, the Atlas filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint. The motion to dismiss cited the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1691.
An opposition was filed by Emiliano on the ground that at the time

Presidential Decree No. 1691 was approved, this case had already been filed
with the trial court. He maintained that jurisdiction, once acquired by a court
over a case, remains with it until the full termination of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed.

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HELD (Dry Run):
The case should be dismissed. As a rule, once jurisdiction is acquired by a

court over a case, it remains with it until the full termination of the case. One of
the exceptions to such a rule, however, is when a subsequent statute, as in the
case of P. D. No. 1691, is a curative one which will be given retroactive effect.
Considering that P. D. No. 1691 provides that money claims of workers are
within the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and not within that of the regular courts,
the case should be dismissed.
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:
The case should be dismissed. P. D. No. 1367, the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the action, shall not apply. Instead, P. D. No. 1691 which
only took effect during the pendency of the action and which provides that all
money claims by workers including damages shall be within the jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters, shall apply. The reason is that P. D. No. 1691 is a curative
statute which must be given retroactive effect.
P.D. 1691 is a curative statute which corrected the lack of jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter at the start of the proceedings and, therefore, should be given a
retrospective application to the pending proceedings. P.D. 1691 merely restored a
jurisdiction earlier vested in Labor Arbiters before the enactment of P.D. 1367. It
was intended to correct a situation where two tribunals would have jurisdiction
over separate issues arising from the same labor conflict. The precise purpose of
the amendment was to hopefully settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction
between regular courts and labor agencies. To deprive the Labor Arbiters of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases would mean duplicity of suits,
splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by
two tribunals on one and the same claim.
CHAVEZ V. ROMULO
JUNE 9, 2004
 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
FACTS:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech

before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all
public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief,
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respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms

Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, Ebdane issued guidelines on the same

month stating that persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license,
special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their
firearms outside of residence.
Petitioner Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has

been issued, filed before the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition and
injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the said guidelines in the
implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence.
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
HELD (Dry Run):
The petition should not be dismissed. While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
is an established policy, it is not an iron-clad dictum. When the Supreme Court is
being confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications such
as in the instant case where the petition involves the citizen’s right to bear arms,
the Supreme Court will entertain direct resort to it.
COMELEC V. QUIJANO-PADILLA
SEPTEMBER 18, 2002

 Mandamus
FACTS:
The Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as
the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and
computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds
therefor in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters.
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Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections promulgated a resolution

approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project
(VRIS). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May
2004 Elections. The COMELEC then issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for
the supply and installations of information technology equipment for the project.
After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of
P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared
the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued a
resolution approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn,
immediately accepted the same.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by

Congress for the COMELEC’s modernization project was only One (1) Billion
Pesos.
Meanwhile, on February 2, 2001, Alfredo L. Benipayo was appointed as the

new chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as new
commissioners. Chairman Benipayo, through public statements, announced that
the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside.
PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for mandamus,
prohibition and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order,
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction against
the COMELEC.
PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein its rights under the accepted bid
proposal. Its petition alleged that notwithstanding the COMELEC’s issuance of
a Notice of Award and its subsequent acceptance thereof, the COMELEC still
refused to formalize the contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial,
the COMELEC be directed to review and finalize the formal contract and to
implement the VRIS Project.
The COMELEC on its part, specifically denied the existence of a perfected

contract and asserted that even if there was one, the same is null and void for
lack of proper appropriation. It labeled the contract as illegal and against public
policy.
When the Judge Quijano-Padilla rendered judgment against the COMELEC,

the latter filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
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a.) Whether or not there was a breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
considering that the COMELEC made a direct resort to the Supreme Court.
b.) Whether or not a petition for mandamus is the appropriate remedy for
PHOTOKINA.
HELD (Dry Run):
a.) There was no breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum. The Supreme Court on several
instances when confronted with cases of national interest and of serious
implications never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the case. The present case is of similar import. It is in the
interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled
without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case, involves the
disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our country’s election
process, a project that has long been overdue.
b.) Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy for PHOTOKINA, for such
remedy does not lie to enforce contractual obligations. Moreover, mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and
not when it is doubtful as in the present case where the contract relied upon by
PHOTOKINA is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected
but also because the same is illegal and against public policy.
FURTHER DISCUSSION:
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce
the performance of contractual obligations. Mandamus is not the proper
recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with
PHOTOKINA. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law and
not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed
is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-
defined, clear and certain. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by
PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being
disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is
illegal and against public policy.
DE BALLESTEROS V. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN

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NOVEMBER 24, 2010
 Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction/Exceptions
FACTS:
Lucia De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of

Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages against her children and
the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City.
The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCI’s
counsel filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already been
closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. Consequently, the lawyers
of PDIC took over the case of RBCI.
RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-
Iriga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI stated that
pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the "New
Central Bank Act," the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order dated
August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the
liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128 fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court. The RTC-Iriga issued an order
granting the Motion to Dismiss.
Lucia contended that the RTC erred in dismissing the case because it had
jurisdiction over the civil case under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
According to her, since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the
case it should continue exercising such jurisdiction until the final termination of
the case. She further argued that in the case of Aruego, Jr. v. CA, the jurisdiction
of a court once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of
the case.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is applicable in the present case?
HELD (Dry Run):

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No. The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is not without exceptions. One of

the exceptions is when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Section
30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court
shall have jurisdiction over all claims against the bank under liquidation. The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible,
should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank.
The Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. It states that

when a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not
affected by a new legislation transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to
another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA 211). Once jurisdiction is vested,
the same is retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v. Court of Appeals,
263 SCRA 323).
Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is not without

exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is
curative in character (Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro,
149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the
liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the
adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. In Manalo v. Court of
Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court says:
“The requirement that all claims against the bank be

pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central
Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the
insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and
orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the
proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and
arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one
court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the
insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the
Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citing
Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA
482 [1988]).”
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Lucia contended that jurisdiction already attached when the civil case was
filed with, and jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the
liquidation case before the RTC-Makati. This contention is untenable. The time of
the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the execution that will obviously
prejudice the other depositors and creditors.
In the Morfe case, it was held that after the Monetary Board has declared
that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board
becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors,
including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in
trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot
obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or
otherwise.
Thus, to allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a

possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of
RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would
defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.
DELA CRUZ V. MOYA

APRIL 27, 1988
 Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter
FACTS:
General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 provides that military tribunals
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official
duty.
In 1979, while in the performance of his official duty, Dela Cruz, a member of
the Armed Forces, shot Cabilto. On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao in an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the criminal case.
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HELD (Dry Run):
The Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The law in force at that time of the filing of the information, on August
2, 1979, was General Order No. 59 which provides that military tribunals
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official
duty. Since Dela Cruz was a member of the Armed Forces and that he was in the
performance of his official duty when he shot Cabilto, the Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the criminal case, but the military
tribunals.
FURTHER DISCUSSION:
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court
hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the
court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void.
FLORES V. MALLARE-PHILIPPS
SEPTEMBER 24, 1986
 Totality Rule
FACTS:
Remedio Flores filed a complaint against Ignacio Binongcal and Fernando

Calion before the Regional Trial Court.
The first cause of action was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which the latter purchased
on credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981.
The second cause of action was against Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which
he purchased on credit from Flores on several occasions from March, 1981 to
January, 1982.
Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against his client was only
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P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner
in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that
of the other defendant. Counsel for Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Should the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Regional Trial
Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos (the law then in force). In the present case,
the claim of Flores against either of the two defendants is less than that amount
cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Totality rule does not apply because it
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions
and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6
of Rule 3.
The jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to

Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
The application of the totality rule is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
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“All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or

arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders
as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.”
HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK V. ACUŇA

AUGUST 31, 2006
FACTS:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and
Loan Bank, his (Alberto’s) wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe
and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from the bank nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy
with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not
have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
The bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply
with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint
does not contain any averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
The RTC issued an order denying the Motion to Dismiss as well as an order
denying the motion for reconsideration of the bank.
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Hence, the bank filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the aforestated two orders of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD (Dry Run):
The petition should not be granted, for the instant Petition for Certiorari
should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it
because the bank failed to show that the redress it desired cannot be obtained in
the Court of Appeals, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify its
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not

exclusive. It is shared by the Supreme Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in
some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
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forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and
compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:
a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms;

b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on
bail in extradition proceedings;
c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’
registration list;
d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence
of a public office; and
e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the
Office of the President which modified the approval of the
conversion to agro-industrial area.
In the present case, the bank failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as

to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason
why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this
basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN
MAY 6, 2005
 Review Of Ombudsman’s Resolutions
FACTS:
Zenaida F. Lanting filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-

complaint charging Vice-Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr., Emmanuel Sison, Secretary to
the City Council, and Charito Rumbo, Human Resource Management Officer III
with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
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Petitioner characterized respondents’ acts as unlawful, odious and

"despicable criminal activities" and prayed that the Office of the Ombudsman
proceed with the preliminary investigation with dispatch."
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the

respondents.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the

ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the assailed
Ombudsman’s Resolution. The CA said:
“Petition for certiorari and mandamus could not be given due course by this
court for lack of concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over the subject
matter of the petition for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and mandamus
against the Office of the Ombudsman for dismissing petitioner’s criminal
complaint for anti-graft and falsification of public documents. Except in
administrative cases, as ruled in Fabian vs. Desierto (295 SCRA 470), the
Congress, in Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14, 2 nd par., designated only the
Supreme Court as the appellate authority in Ombudsman decisions in criminal
cases. Under the said law, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is original and
exclusive.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and
mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
HELD (Dry Run):
The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition, for it is the
Supreme Court that has the sole authority to review Ombudsman’s resolutions in
criminal cases.
Petitioner’s complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman is for

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative
complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege administrative offenses, such
as dishonesty or misconduct on the part of respondents.
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It bears stressing that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint describe

respondents’ actuations as "willful, felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable
criminal activities." Considering that petitioner’s complaint is criminal in nature,
this Court has the sole authority to review the Ombudsman’s Resolutions on
pure question of law as expressly mandated in Section 14, 2 nd paragraph of R.A.
6770.
In Fabian vs. Desierto, we held that only appeals from the decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure)."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals, did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over petitioner’s criminal action. Jurisdiction lies
with this Court.
MIDGELY V. FERANDOS
MAY 13, 1975
 Action Quasi In Rem
FACTS:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish citizen, was allegedly the owner of properties
and rights in mining claims located in Cebu. When Alvaro Sr. died, he was
survived by his two legitimate children Sofia Pastor de Midgely and Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. He was also survived by one claiming to be his illegitimate child
Lewelyn Barlito Quemada. Quemada is a resident of the Philippines.
The properties and rights in mining claims located in Cebu were supposedly
held in trust by his son, Alvaro Pastor, Jr., and his daughter-in-law, Maria Elena
Achaval-Pastor (wife of Alvaro, Jr.).
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. in his supposed holographic will, devised to Lewelyn Barlito
Quemada thirty percent of his forty-two percent share in certain mining claims
and real properties. The alleged will was presented for probate and Quemada
was appointed special administrator of the decedent's estate.
As such administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., Quemada filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint against the spouses Alvaro Pastor,
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Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (and others not mentioned here) to settle the
question of ownership over certain real properties and the rights in some mining
claims, to obtain an accounting and payment of the royalties and income thereof
and for the payment of damages amounting to P25,000. Quemada's theory is
that those properties and income belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.
Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons through the Department

of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected
the service of the summons by registered mail upon Pastor, Jr. spouses and
Sofia Midgely at their respective address in Barcelona and Alicante, Spain.
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Midgely, in their respective letters to the
Philippine Embassy acknowledged the service of summons. The Minister-
Counselor of the Embassy forwarded those letters to the Clerk of Court and
apprised him of the manner the summons was served.
Sofia Midgely filed a motion to dismiss on ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person. The trial court denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the trial court was correct.
HELD (Dry Run):
The denial by the trial court of Sofia’s motion to dismiss was correct. The
object of the action filed by Quemada against Sofia is to reach and dispose of
their properties or of some interest therein; hence, an action quasi in rem. In an
action quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is
not necessary and the service of summons is required only for purposes of due
process. The requirement of due process has been complied with when the third
mode of extraterritorial service of summons has been made on Sofia who is a
nonresident defendant. Hence, the motion was correctly denied.
Quemada's action against her may be regarded as a quasi in rem action

where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary
and where service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with
the requirement of due process (Perkins vs. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Banco Español-
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254).
18
An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is
to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a nonresident

defendant like Sofia, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does

not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or
in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or
in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Under Rule 14, extraterritorial service of summons is proper –
1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;

2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent;
3. when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines, and
4. when defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the
Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines in three ways:
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for

such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, and
19
(3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.
That third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially

complied with in this case.
In the civil case filed by Quemada, the subject matter of the action for
reconveyance consists of properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. which are located in
Cebu. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties. She has been
receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the extraterritorial service of
summons upon her was proper. As already noted, the action against her is quasi
in rem.
PEOPLE V. LAGON
MAY 18, 1990
FACTS:
Libertad Lagon, in April 1975, allegedly issued a check as payment for goods
she purchased knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same
check. The check subsequently bounced.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, the law in force at that time, judges of city
courts shall have jurisdiction to try parties charged with an offense in which the
penalty does not exceed prision correccional. The felony Libertad allegedly
committed, therefore, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the City Court of
Roxas City, for the penalty provided by law at that time was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
On October 22, 1975, P. D. No. 818 took effect which increased the penalty
for the offense allegedly committed by Libertad. The new law provides that the
penalty for such offense is prision mayor in its medium period.
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas
City, charging Libertad with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.
20
In an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information
upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was
beyond the court's authority to impose. According to the City Court, jurisdiction of
a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission
of the crime.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the City Court proper?
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal was proper. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. By the time the
information was filed on July 7, 1976, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's jurisdiction to impose.
FURTHER DISCUSSION:
The dismissal was proper. Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is

determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not
by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the
alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was
vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information
was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already
been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose.
The real question raised by the People is: would application of the above-
settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying the new law to the
present case in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.
No. The issue here is one of jurisdiction. In criminal prosecutions, the

jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the
offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented
at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the
violation charged in the complaint. Should the criminal information be refiled in
the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not
21
impose that more onerous penalty upon Lagon (assuming the evidence shows
that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial
Court would remain vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the
date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty
originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas
City.
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, in the
following terms:
In criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not

determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co
Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the
law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis
of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330).
TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
APRIL 15, 1968

 Laches
FACTS:
On June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court
of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00.
On July 19, 1948, barely one month after the effectivity of Judiciary Act of
1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil case in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
22
and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00 (note that in view of
the effectivity of the Judiciary Act, the CFI here was without jurisdiction over the
subject matter).
As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing
of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
(Surety).
After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and upon
motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond.
The Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also
the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its
liability, if any, under the bond in question”. The Court denied this motion on the
ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety
to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against
the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion
of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to
answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the
motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing. As the Court denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of
denial. Not one of the assignment of errors by the Surety raises the question of
lack of jurisdiction.
On December 11, 1962, the Court of Appeals decided the case affirming the
order of the Court of First Instance.
On January 8, 1963, five days after the Surety received notice of the decision,
it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of
23
January 10 of the same year. Two days later, the Surety filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging that the Court of First Instance therefore had no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion of the Surety should be granted on the ground that
the CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
HELD (Dry Run):
The motion of the Surety should not be granted. Considering that it was
almost fifteen years before the Surety raised the question of lack of jurisdiction,
the Surety is barred by laches from invoking such plea. A party can not invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, question that same jurisdiction. It is not
because the judgment or order of the CFI was valid as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.
The motion of the Surety should not be granted. True is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Surety is barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything
done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court
were to sanction such conduct on its part, it would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
24
A party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
RUSSEL V. VESTIL
March 17, 1999
 Action Which is Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation
FACTS:
Spouses Casimero and Caesaria Tautho owned a parcel of land containing an

area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. Upon the death of said spouses,
the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private
respondents. The lot had remained undivided.
Petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF

HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF
PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late
spouses. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as
the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs.
25
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated

"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and hence,

within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
The action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and hence, within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The main purpose of petitioners in filing
the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of
nullity of the document above-described.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts.
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also
26
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or

conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME V. NLRC

SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

 Appeals from the NLRC
FACTS:
Aricayos worked as Operations Manager of St. Martin Funeral Home. He is

the uncle of Amelita, the owner of St. Martin. After almost one year in his
employment, he was dismissed by Amelita for allegedly misappropriating
P38,000.
Aricayos filed a complaint and based on the position papers of the parties,
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of St. Martin declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his
(Labor Arbiter’s) office had no jurisdiction over the case.
Not satisfied with the said decision, Aricayos appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and St. Martin.
The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
St. Martin then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC
in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present
petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition challenging the resolutions of the NLRC was
properly filed with the Supreme Court.
HELD (Dry Run):
The petition was not properly filed. Appeals from the NLRC should be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy
of courts.
27
The Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it
has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.
There is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to the Supreme

Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand
the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings. The
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions. There is undeniably an imperative
need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional
protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to

supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
SOLICITOR GENERAL V. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

DECEMBER 11, 1991
 Power of the Supreme Court to Suspend Procedural Rules
FACTS:
In the Gonong case promulgated by the Supreme Court, it held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission.
The judgment in that case became final and executory.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter, Rodolfo Malapira complained to the Supreme Court that when he

was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated
by a traffic enforcer in Quezon City.
28
Another letter was received by the Supreme Court from Stephen L. Monsanto,
complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license for an alleged traffic
violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also

for confiscation of his driver's license by the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Supreme Court, this time from
Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front
license plate by the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and
the confiscation of his driver's license
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No.
11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and
impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment

by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11. The
ordinance appears to be in conflict with the decision of the
Court in Gonong case. To clarify these matters, the Court
resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Solicitor General to submit, COMMENTS on such sanctions in
light of the said decision.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. The Solicitor General also filed a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11.
The Authority stressed the validity of the ordinance and pointed out that the
ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action
challenging its validity. The Authority contended that the petition of the Solicitor
General should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy
before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of Ordinance No. 11 may be attacked collaterally.

29
HELD (Dry Run):
The validity of Ordinance No. 11 may be attacked collaterally. While it is true

that it is a settled principle that the validity of a law or an act can be challenged
only in a direct action, such rule may be relaxed by the Supreme Court under
exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy where there
is a failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding and the
necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive
issues raised. Such settled principle may disregarded by the Supreme Court in
resolving the present case because it has the power to suspend procedural rules
in the interest of substantial justice.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not
collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not
inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances,
such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a
great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the
questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are
illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be
stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated
a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police
would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top."
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem
squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the
complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its
inaction, allow them to fester.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules,

which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is
because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding
against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of
the public, the important substantive issues raised.
The Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules
30
concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." In proper cases,

procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May
9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition
of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
(Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

JANUARY 24, 1992
 Art. 185 of the Family Code is Remedial in Nature
FACTS:
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason, then six
(6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4)
months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. At the time of her
filing of the petition, the law in force was the Child and Youth Welfare Code
where it was not required that the spouses should jointly adopt. The trial court
rendered judgment in her favor.
31
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the case was
pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209 or the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, specifically
under Art. 185 thereof, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
The Republic contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by Zenaida without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the
spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 185 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect.
HELD (Dry Run):
No. Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. While it is true that
procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the
sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as
to future actions, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment.
1. When Zenaida filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
2. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains
it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance.
BARANGAY PIAPI V. TALIP

September 7, 2005
32
 Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for
reconveyance and damages.

The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open possession for more than 30 years
of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao
del Sur. It has a market value of P15,000.00.
The following are the pertinent allegations in petitioners’ complaint:

2. Plaintiffs by themselves and/or thru their predecessors-
in-interest have been in actual possession, in the concept of an
owner, in good faith and in a manner that is open, peaceful,
uninterrupted, public, adverse and continuous, for more than
30 years, the following described parcel of land, viz:

2a. The market value of the above-described land is
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

5. Defendant or his predecessor-in-interest has
never been in possession, of the land in suit and except for the
year 1998, has not paid taxes thereon nor declared the same
for taxation purposes – a clear index that defendant’s title over
the same is not genuine.

6. Defendant, in procuring title to the land in suit
did so by fraud, mistake and/or misrepresentation, hence, he
holds the title for the benefit and in trust of the landowner –
that is, herein plaintiffs.

7. Defendant is by law under obligation to reconvey
the land in suit in favor of herein plaintiffs, x xx.”
Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on

the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that the
assessed value of the land is only P6,030.00. Respondent, citing Section 33
(3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, maintains that the case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.

33
In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged that

jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed value of the
property is P41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and
Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar,
Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.

On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction correct?
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was correct. The nature
of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff. In
the present case, the plaintiff alleged that the market value or the estimated
value of the property was P15,000. Under the Rules, in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of real property, where the assessed value thereof
does not exceed P20,000, jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Municipal
Trial Courts. The petitioner’s allegation as to the assessed value of the property
in its opposition to the motion to dismiss cannot be taken into account, as it was
not made in the complaint.
Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous to Huguete vs.
Embudo. There, petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment of a deed of
sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, we ruled that“the nature of an
action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by
the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate
objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof.”

Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well
as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
34

It can easily be discerned that petitioners’ complaint involves title to, or
possession of, real property. However, they failed to allege therein the
assessed value of the subject property. Instead, what they stated is the
market value of the land at P15,000.00.

Section 19 (2) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended provides:

“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.– Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest thereon, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.”

The Rule requires that “the assessed valueof the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant.” It bears
reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners’ complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in
real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However,
they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is P15,000.00.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. V. VELEZ

November 29, 2001
 Independent Civil Action
FACTS:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa against Carmen
Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the
amount of P608,532.46.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen
35
Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages. In time,
petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a
pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts. Thereafter,
the trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal proper?
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal was not proper. The civil case, which was an independent civil
action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution.
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the
social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated
through indemnity which is civil in nature.
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is
the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an
offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and
indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became
effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action."
36
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that —
"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action."
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
"The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases

provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action."
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to

independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and

undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules
of procedure.
37
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to
its filing.
DOMAGAS V. JENSEN
January 17, 2005
 Action Quasi-In Rem

 Action in Personam
 Summons
FACTS:
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for

forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
She alleged that sometime in January, 1999, the respondent, by means of force,
strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a
portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, the
petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the
boundary line.
The records show that respondent Vivian Jensen, before and after her
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Her residence was located at No. 572 Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. On February 17, 1999, prior to the filing by
Domagas of the complaint, Jensen left the Philippines and went to Norway. She
leased her house to Eduardo Gonzales.
Thus, the summons and the complaint were not served personally on the
respondent. The Sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons. He went to
Jensen’s house and served the summons to Oscar Layno, Jensen’s brother, who
happened to be there at the time of the service in order to collect rental payments
from Eduardo Gonzales.
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latter’s behalf
to vacate the disputed area.
38
The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of

execution was issued on September 27, 1999.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in
Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the
complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC
never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
ISSUE:
Rule on the judgment rendered by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
HELD (Dry Run):
The judgment rendered by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan is null and void,
for the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
there being no valid service of summons.
When resorting to a substituted service of summons by leaving copies of the

summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion, the residence where the summons was served must be the actual
residence of the defendant at the time of the service and the person to whom the
same was served must be residing therein. In the present case, there can be no
valid service of summons as the place where the summons was served was not
anymore the dwelling house of Jensen and the person the summons was served,
Jensen’s brother, was not residing therein.
The ruling of the CA, that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry is an
action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is
a real action and one in personam.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
39
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly

upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the
propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate
court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in
which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status,
ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate
on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The
judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject

to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building in force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
40
Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a writ
of preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction:
Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant

preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry

or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of
the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.
If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for the plaintiff, it shall then
render judgment in his or her favor, thus:
Sec. 17. Judgment. – If, after trial, the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum
justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and
costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall
render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a
counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for
the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires.
From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very
nature and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real
action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,
for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of
reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.
As gleaned from the averments of the petitioner’s complaint in the MTC, she
sought a writ of a preliminary injunction from the MTC and prayed that the said
writ be made permanent. Under its decision, the MTC ordered the defendant
41
therein (the respondent in this case), to vacate the property and pay a "monthly
rental" of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff therein (the petitioner in this case).
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the
summons and complaint by the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the petitioner asserts
that since her action of forcible entry against the respondent in Civil Case No.
879 was in personam, summons may be served on the respondent, by
substituted service, through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner avers that Oscar Layno, a
person of suitable age and discretion, was residing in the house of the
respondent on April 5, 1999. She avers that the fact that the house was leased
to and occupied by Eduardo Gonzales was of no moment. Moreover, the Sheriff
is presumed to have performed his duty of properly serving the summons on the
respondent by substituted service.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after
her marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was
in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons
and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
42
SEC. 7.Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and
any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered
ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy:
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the

service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character
and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation
was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with
the requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or
"residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not
sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or
place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the
place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of

summons reads:
43
Respectfully returned to the court of origin the herein summons

and enclosures in the above-entitled case, the undersigned
caused the service on April 5, 1999.
Defendant Vivian Layno Jensen is out of the country as per

information from her brother Oscar Layno, however, copy of
summons and enclosures was received by her brother Oscar
Layno on April 5, 1999 as evidenced by his signature
appearing in the original summons.
Calasiao, Pangasinan, April 6, 1999.
As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999,
the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that
of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to
ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned
out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that
Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service
of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered
to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place
at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence,
the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such,
the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
DECENA V. PIQUERO
March 31, 2005
 Joinder of Causes of Action

 Action in Rem
 Venue
FACTS:
The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a
parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque, Metro
Manila (now Parañaque City).
44
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses

Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in
which the former sold the property to the latter for the price of P940,250.00
payable in six (6) installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took
possession of the property.
On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a
Complaint against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession
and damages. The petitioners alleged therein that the first two checks drawn
and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were
dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite
demands therefor.
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in

their favor, thus:
a. The sale/Memorandum of Agreement be declared null and void, rescinded

and with no further force and effect;
b. Defendants, and all persons claiming right under them, be ordered to
immediately vacate the subject property and turnover its possession to the
plaintiffs;
c. Defendants, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
1. P10,000.00 – monthly, starting 01 October 1997 until complete
turnover of the subject property to the plaintiffs, as reasonable
compensation for its continued unlawful use and occupation by the
defendants;
2. P200,000.00 – moral damages;
3. P200,000.00 – exemplary damages;
4. P250,000.00 – attorney’s fees and litigation – related expenses; and
5. the costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter
alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter
of the action.
On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the
petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of
the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been
brought in the RTC of Parañaque City, where the property subject matter of the
action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the
petitioners resided. The respondents posited that the said court had no
45
jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action because it was located
in Parañaque City.
In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and
attorney’s fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed
in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second
cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action,
the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for
damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order granting the motion and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal by the trial court proper?
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal by the trial court was proper. The action of the petitioners for
the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof and the
latter’s failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners,
and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real action. As such, the action
should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely,
in Parañaque City.
The sole issue is whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored
on whether Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the petitioners is
applicable in this case.
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in one

pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the
rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
46
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which is Section 5(c)
which reads:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. -- …
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; …
Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:
(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls

within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the other
falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of
action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the
courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal
action may be joined either in the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the real property is located or where the parties
reside.
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal

right of the other which causes the latter injury. The essential elements of a
cause of action are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect one’s right; and (3) an act
or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right. A cause of action
should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of
action is to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer
47
for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling. A party may
have two or more causes of action against another party.
A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of

action in a complaint. The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in
particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action
are alleged. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the
main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is
present. Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on
the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts
and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief; or
whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged
for enforcement or adjudication.
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of

remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not
indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be
an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than
one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations of the complaint show one
primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though
other matters are incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods,
elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth. Where
two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of
action.
After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c),
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners,
as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one cause of action against the
respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the
first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over
to the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house
constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The claim for damages for
reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and occupation of the
property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by
the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not
independent or separate causes of action.
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the
respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the premises subject
of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a
48
real action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where
the property is located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or

possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their
complaint in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court
acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. V. LIM

October 5, 2007
 The Court May Not Motu Proprio Dismiss a Case on the Ground of
Improper Venue
FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a contract of sale between
Universal Robina Corporation, petitioner, and Albert Lim, respondent. Pursuant
to the contract, petitioner sold to respondent grocery products in the total amount
of P808,059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle
his obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands.

Thus, on May 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, a complaint against respondent for a sum of money.

On June 22, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint
motu proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, thus:

The case is misplaced with respect to jurisdiction and
venue. There is not even a remote connection by the parties to
Quezon City, where this Regional Trial Court sits, the plaintiff
corporation has principal office at Pasig City and the defendant
is, as provided in the complaint, from Laoag City.

49
Wherefore, premises considered, this case is hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice for improper venue and for lack
of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue.
HELD (Dry Run):
The trial court may not dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata
and prescription, but not in case of improper venue.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in

the place of his or her residence or the place where the defendant resides.
However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place
where neither of them resides.

Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances
when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses

and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
50
or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of

limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the
motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not
dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one
of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the
basis of the pleadings.
In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial

court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue,
thus:

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue
is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of
the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well
as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section
4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held
and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a
special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived.

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court
to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious
resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of
justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of
procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to
be heard on his cause.

In Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, the Court
likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue, thus:

Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may
only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in
this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu
proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or
a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the
51
objection or affirmative defense of improper venue,

before dismissing the petition.

In the instant case, respondent, despite proper service of summons, failed
to file an answer and was thus declared in default by the trial court. Verily,
having been declared in default, he lost his standing in court and his right to
adduce evidence and present his defense, including his right to question the
propriety of the venue of the action.
FORTUNE MOTORS, INC. V. CA

October 16, 1989/ Paras
 Real Action
FACTS:
On March 29,1982 up to January 6,1984, private respondent Metropolitan

Bank extended various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the total sum of
P32,500,000.00 (according to the borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the
Bank) which loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune building
and lot in Makati, Rizal.
Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the

petitioner was not able to pay the loan which became due.
For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served, posted, and
published, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for the price of
P47,899,264.91 to mortgagee Bank as the highest bidder.
The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the
one-year redemption period to expire on October 24, 1985.
On October 21, 1985, three days before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature
because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the publication of the notice
of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price for which the
property was sold was "shockingly low".
Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly
laid in Manila for the realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in
Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
52
The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging that its action
"is a personal action" and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings" so that it may have a new one year period to redeem.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate mortgage
extrajudicial foreclosure sale a real action?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a

conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an
action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of
the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the place where the property or part thereof lies.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as

indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. (Comments on the Rules of
Court by Moran, Vol. 1, p. 122)
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or
for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property,
must be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674,1949;
Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957)
Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court).
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the
true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton,
et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real

action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez,
94 Phil. 760,1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from

an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Munoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil.
737,1950)
53
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his
claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action
for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did
not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4)
which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana,
121 SCRA 336, [1983]).
Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by then

Court of Appeals Associate Justice now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the pertinent portion reads: "Since an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property
sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real
action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property
or part thereof lies."
ZOLETA V. ROMILLO
February 15, 1982
 Venue
 Personal Action
FACTS:
Efren Zoleta, the plaintiff and the petitioner in this case, is a resident of B.F.
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila while the defendant is a domestic corporation
with principal office address at Paseo de Roxas, Makati.
Zoleta acquired a car financed by the defendant corporation. Zoleta executed

and delivered to the defendant a promissory note which was secured by a
chattel mortgage over the said motor vehicle.
It was expressly stipulated in the Deed of Chattel Mortgage and the

Promissory Note that the parties agreed that actions arising- from the, same
'shall be brought to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila.
In absolute good faith and honesty, plaintiff complied with the terms and
condition of the said promissory note and chattel mortgage. The last installment
54
due was paid last October 15, 1980. On November 2, 1980, plaintiff was deeply
embarrassed to receive a notice of unpaid installment due from defendant.
Perplexed and upset, plaintiff readily relayed the same to a personnel of the
defendant who promised to rectify or correct everything. On November 11, 1980,
defendant sent a telegram demanding payment again of an alleged debt.
Thus, Zoleta filed a complaint against the private respondent, Filinvest Credit
Corporation (FILINVEST), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City.
On December 12, 1980, FILINVEST filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on

the ground of improper venue. It invoked the terms of the promissory note and
the chattel mortgage.
ISSUE:
If you were the judge, will you grant the motion?
HELD (Dry Run):
If I were the judge, I will grant the motion.
It is true that by written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may
be changed from one province to another. But by his complaint, the plaintiff is
not suing on the promissory note nor on the chattel mortgage. He is suing for
damages because of the tortious act of the private-respondent who sent him a
dunning telegram for a debt which had already long been fully paid.
Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Zoleta resides in B. F. Homes in
Paranaque, while FILINVEST has its offices at Paseo de Roxas in Makati.
Accordingly, the venue was properly laid in the court presided by the respondent
judge.
HEIRS OF PAGOBO V. CA
October 16, 1997
Ruling:
It must be pointed out that the new Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
relaxes further the rule on amendment of pleadings. Refusal to allow
amendments other than those which may be made as a matter of right under
Section 2, may be based only on the ground that the motion was made with
intent to delay. The other ground, viz., the amendment substantially alters the
55
original cause of action or defense, has been dropped from the Rule. This simply
means then that amendments may substantially alter the cause of action or
defense.
JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA
February 23, 1989/ Regalado, J.
 Cause of Action
FACTS:
Perez is the owner of a cargo truck conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. Villa was the driver thereof. Joseph,
with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying
the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela.
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding
towards Manila, Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same
direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by Sioson
and Pagarigan, then driven by Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck
which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the
cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As
a result, petitioner Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Joseph filed a complaint for damages against respondent Perez, as owner of

the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Sioson and Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the
pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the
pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
Joseph, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading
Pagarigan and a certain Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Joseph
apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was,
whether Patrocinio Perez or Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up
truck, whether Sioson or Pagarigan.
Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants
for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay Joseph's claim,
and therein impleaded cross-defendant Cardeno as additional alternative
defendant.
56
On September 27, 1974, defendants Villanueva, Cardeno, Sioson and

Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason
thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from liability the
following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, Villanueva, Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance

Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Perez' claim for damages to her
cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a motion to

exonerate them in the instant case, alleging that Cardeno and Villanueva
already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging
further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P
1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her opposition to such motion. Aside from
such opposition, she filed a counter motion to dismiss. The so-called counter
motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan inured to her (Perez) benefit, considering that
all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing

the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Petitioner
contended that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim
executed by petitioner in favor of Insurance Corporation of the Philippines,
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of Perez; ergo, it
likewise erred in dismissing the case.
ISSUES:
How many are the causes of action embodied in Joseph’s complaint?
HELD (Dry Run):
There is only one cause of action embodied in Joseph’s complaint. The

singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. In the case at bar, there is no question that the
petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different
respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
57
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of
action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of
contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission

committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is
true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same
time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and
distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there
is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one
cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner
against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the
respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment.
It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the

trial court hold respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the
allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary
debtors. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them
to be so liable. There is thus no question that the respondents herein are
solidarily liable to petitioner.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment
and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties
during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment made by the other
respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both
58
incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either

by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-
trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.
MARISCAL V. CA
July 22, 1999
 Litis Pendentia
 A Counterclaim Partakes of the Nature of a Complaint and/or a Cause
of Action Against the Plaintiff
FACTS:
Private respondent Bella C. Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner

Rogelio Mariscal before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for the annulment of
their marriage contracted on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 20983.
Two (2) days later, or on 31 March 1993, Rogelio Mariscal filed his own
complaint against Bella C. Catalan before the Regional Trial Court of Digos
(Davao del Sur) seeking likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the
ground that he was forced to marry her at gunpoint and that they had no valid
license. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2996. Mariscal likewise
prayed for moral damages of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000.00,
attorney's fees of P50,000.00 including P2,000.00 monthly retainer starting 31
March 1993 and another P2,000.00 as court appearance fee, and litigation
expenses of P20,000.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2996.
In view of Civil Case No. 20983 which she earlier instituted in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Catalan moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2996
invoking litis pendencia, citing Civil Case No. 20983 pending before the RTC of
Iloilo which involved the same parties and the same cause of action. But the
RTC of Digos denied the motion to dismiss.
On appeal Catalan, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC of Digos and
dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia. Marical is now before the
Supreme Court questioning the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
59
Was the dismissal by the CA of the case before the RTC of Digos on ground of
litis pendentia correct?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. For litis pendencia to be invoked as ground for the abatement of an

action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
The first two (2) requisites are present. The parties involved in RTC-Iloilo are
the very same protagonists in RTC-Digos. The actions in both fora are based on
the same facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought.
The last requisite is likewise present. In his answer to the complaint before
the RTC of Iloilo, he raised the issue of force, violence, intimidation, threats and
strategy. In his complaint before the RTC of Digos, he raised the same issues for
the dissolution of his marriage to Cataclan. Hence, any decision promulgated by
the RTC of Iloilo will necessarily constitute res judicata on the case before the
RTC of Digos.
The petition is devoid of merit. It is not infrequent that this Court is given the
opportunity to discuss litis pendencia as ground for the dismissal of an action
which has become unnecessary and vexatious. In Victronics Computers, Inc. v.
RTC-Br. 63, Makati, we said -
It is a rule that for litis pendencia to be invoked as ground

for the abatement or dismissal of an action, the concurrence of
the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the
two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
It is quite evident that the first two (2) requisites are present. The parties
involved in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo) are the very same protagonists in
60
Civil Case No. 2996 (RTC-Digos). The actions in both fora are based on the same
set of facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought, more
particularly, the ultimate dissolution of their marriage.
The third requisite is the bone of contention. Mariscal contends that there can
be no res judicata between the two (2) simultaneous civil actions because of the
different grounds for the nullification of their marriage respectively invoked by
them. According to him, the judgment in one case will not abate the second
because the basis for annulment in the former would not have even been
traversed or passed upon in the latter. Thus Mariscal pleads -
Indeed, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal to declare the nullity of or

annul the marriage would mean only that herein private
respondent shall have failed to prove her claims in Civil Case
No. 20983 that there was no marriage license and that the
petitioner deceitfully failed to disclose a prior marriage.
However, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal would not constitute a ruling
on whether the petitioner himself had been forced into the
marriage through force, duress, intimidation, and threats, since
these grounds are pleaded in Civil Case No. 2996 before the
RTC-Davao del Sur.
Respondent CA's error, therefore, was essentially its failure

to consider the consequences of the various possible judgments
that could be rendered by the two trial courts in the two civil
cases below. The possible judgments in one of the civil cases
below will not necessarily bar the other.
Petitioner Mariscal does not convince. In litis pendencia what is essential is

the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. In his effort to have
the case resolved in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and
in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the two (2) actions which
is simply the nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties on 4 April
1988. Interestingly, in his answer submitted in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo),
Mariscal prayed -
WHEREFORE it is prayed that the above-entitled case be

dismissed; and/or, in the alternative, that the alleged marriage
contracts (Annexes "A" and "B") be declared void from the
beginning for having been performed illegally and under
force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy.
61
By including such prayer in his answer, Mariscal has raised the issue of
"force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy" before the RTC-Iloilo, the very
same set forth in the RTC-Digos. Hence, he cannot now deny that the issues as
well as arguments raised before the two (2) trial courts are identical. Any
decision or ruling promulgated in Civil Case No. 20983 by the RTC of Iloilo will
necessarily constitute res judicata on Civil Case No. 2996 pending before the
RTC of Digos and vice-versa.
More. In addition to specific denials, affirmative and special defenses wherein

Mariscal questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC of Iloilo over the nature of the
action and that there was pending between the same parties for the same cause
Civil Case No. 2996 in the RTC of Digos, he also presented a compulsory
counterclaim in his answer. Therein he alleged that by reason of the complaint
filed by Catalan in gross and evident bad faith, malice and harassment, he
suffered anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation, mental torture and
sleepless nights thus entitling him to moral damages of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of P500,000.00 as well as attorney's fees of 35% of the
amount of damages and value of the property or money involved but in no case
less than P500,000.00, plus initial litigation costs of P30,000.00.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action

against the plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim
and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be
splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. Indeed the Court is
puzzled no end why Mariscal literally shied away from the RTC of Iloilo where
he could have just as well ventilated his affirmative and special defenses and
litigated his compulsory counterclaim in that court and thus avoided this
duplicity of suits which is the matrix upon which litis pendencia is laid.
A supervening development further dramatizes the puerile, if not needless,

efforts of Mariscal to derail the action pending before the RTC of Iloilo. In her
Rejoinder, Bella Catalan informed the Court that on 2 October 1996 the RTC of
Iloilo through Judge David A. Alfeche rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20983
nullifying her marriage to Mariscal on the ground that it was bigamous. Catalan
was awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages
and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Her claim for reimbursement of
US$32,000.00 was however rejected as the evidence presented in support
thereof was considered hearsay. With this turn of events, any subsequent ruling
by the RTC of Digos (were it allowed to proceed) which deviates from the ruling
of the RTC of Iloilo, a co-equal and coordinate court, could only lead to absurd, if
not chaotic, consequences.
62
Indeed, this case underscores the importance of res judicata or bar by prior
judgment as a stabilizing factor in our judicial system. It forecloses not only
matters squarely raised and litigated but all such matters which could have
been raised in the litigation but were not.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILS. V. SAMSON

November 28, 1975
 Real Action
 Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
On July 16, 1965, petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,

hereafter to be referred to as PICOP, filed with the respondent Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Sur a verified complaint for injunction and damages
against respondents Jose Samson and Benjamin Barrera, alleging therein,
among others that PICOP is the licensee of a pulpwood and timber concession;
that respondents herein were discovered and verified to have unlawfully
entered, trespassed and encroached deep into portions of plaintiff's pulpwood
and timber concession in two areas at Pamintigan, Mabtay, Malix within the
province of Surigao del Sur; and that without any title or notice whatsoever felled
trees standing thereon and took them away in gross violation of plaintiff's rights;
that defendants-respondents have unlawfully logged over a total area of 857
hectares and felled and took away logs with a total volume of 958.60 cubic
meters from plaintiff's concession; that because of the continuous unlawful
logging operations of defendants inside plaintiff's pulpwood and timber
concession, plaintiff as of May 31, 1965, suffered damages amounting to
P10,600.00, more or less; and that despite demands that they vacate plaintiff's
pulpwood and timber concession and stop their operations, defendants have
continued and are continuing their unlawful encroachment and trespass and
their spurious logging operations on , the plaintiff's concession. Plaintiff,
therefore, prayed inter alia that defendants be restrained from carrying on their
illegal logging operations by the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
furthermore, that they pay for damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Samson and Barrera filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that venue is
improperly laid, defendants' contention being that the action was personal and,
63
therefore, should have been filed either in the province of Agusan or Rizal, the
places of residence of the parties therein.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue?
ISSUE:
Was the trial court right in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground of
improper venue?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. PICOP is interested primarily in recovering its rights to the concession

over the land, to have defendants Samson and Barrera vacate the same, to
desist from further encroaching on their concession rights and to stop their illegal
logging operations in the concession areas. Clearly, therefore, the action is real
and in accordance with the Rules of Court, the same must be brought in the
locality where the land is situated.
The question whether or not venue has been properly laid depends to a great
extent on the kind of action (real or personal) presented by the Complaint. It is
defendants' contention, affirmed by the trial court, that the action at bar is
personal.
The contention has no merit. A personal action is one that is founded on

privity of contract (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1970 ed., p.
110). The facts of the case as borne out by the record reveal that no contract is
here involved. From a reading of the Complaint petitioner PICOP is interested
primarily in recovering its rights to the concession over the land, to have
defendants Samson and Barrera vacate the same, to desist from further
encroaching on their concession rights and to stop their illegal logging operations
in the concession areas. Clearly, therefore, the action is real and in accordance
with the Rules of Court, Section 2, Rule 4, the same must be brought in the
This ruling on venue was laid down in the early case of Cayetano de la Cruz
vs. El Seminario de la Archdioceses de Manila et al., 1 where it was held:
64
If the action is founded on privity of contract between the

parties, then the action whether debt or covenant, is transitory.
But if there is no privity of contract and the action is founded
on privity of estate only, such a covenant that runs with the
land in the hands of the remote grantees, then the action is
local and must be brought in the country wherein the land lies.
From an analysis of the complaint and other pleadings filed by petitioner, We

find that the main complaint in this case is for recovery of possession. The claim
for damages is of no material consequence as it is only an incident to the
principal claim. As well slated by this Court: 2
In other words, the respondent Lim sought to establish an

interest in the Hacienda de Leon that ran with the land and
one that must be respected by the purchaser, even if the latter
was not party to the original lease contract. That being the
case, whether the standing crop is or is not immovable property
is not relevant, for venue is determined by the nature of the
principal claim. It is apparent that the plaintiff is primarily
interested in establishing his right to recover possession of the
crop. Hence, his action is real and must be brought in the
Petitioner was only cognizant of the lack of jurisdiction of Courts of First

Instance to issue injunction writs to control acts outside of their provinces or
districts; hence it acted right in filing its action in Surigao del Sur rather than in
the province of Agusan or Rizal. The courts of Rizal or Agusan could not have
issued the writ of injunction consistent with the rules, Sec. 2, Rule 58, , and the
Judiciary Act, Section 44 (h) , for such writs cannot effectively reach acts being
perpetrated outside of their districts or, in particular, in Surigao del Sur. It is now
settled that a Court of First Instance cannot restrain or enjoin acts being
perpetrated or will be perpetrated outside of its territorial boundaries.
In Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Autobus Co., et al., this Court held — .
The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to control or

restrain acts by means of a writ of injunction is limited to act
being committed or about to be committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces and districts.
Cudiamat, et al vs. Torres (L-24225, February 22, 1968) reiterates this rule,
viz:
65
The preliminary injunction that maybe granted by a CFI

under said Section 2 is, in its application, co-extensive with the
territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the
said court sits. Consequently, a Court of First Instance may not
issue a writ of preliminary injunction which will be enforced
outside the territorial boundaries of its province and district.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION V. TENSUAN

December 10, 1993
 Venue
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a commercial

banking corporation with principal office at Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner
Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It appears from
the allegations of the Bank's complaint that respondent Circle Financial Co.
(hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through its representatives,
obtained several loans aggregating P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. Respondent
Circle, for value received, delivered to petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes,
each of which contained the stipulation that:
I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the

courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of
this promissory note.
On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations under the promissory
notes.
A motion to dismiss was filed and averred that the venue of the action was
improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from
the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only. Respondents called the
trial court's attention to the stipulation contained in the promissory note.
ISSUE:
If you were the judge, will you grant the motion?
HELD (Dry Run:

66
If I were the judge, I will not grant the motion. A careful reading of the terms
of the stipulation — "I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory
note" — shows that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in
Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or ordinary import of the
stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there
is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts.
Thus, the petitioner, having its principal office at Makati, Metro Manila, properly
instituted the complaint at the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement, may

change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to another. We have
many times sustained the validity and enforceability of contractual stipulations
concerning venue, it is, of course, the tenor of their agreement which is of critical
relevance. The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the
parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such words
are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the will of the contracting
parties.
Petitioner Bank contends that the stipulation contained in the promissory

notes is merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to the tribunals to
which the parties may resort. Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation
set out in the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions
arising out of those notes to the courts of Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the
other courts recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted under the
Rules of Court. Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the place
where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, Metropolitan Manila.
Private respondents, in opposition, aver that the words used in the stipulation
here involved are clear and unambiguous. A promise to submit to the jurisdiction
of a specific court, without an express reservation of the right to resort to one or
more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the Rules of Court, is an
agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place, i.e.,
Valenzuela, to the exclusion of other competent courts.
A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation — "I/We hereby expressly

submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may
arise out of this promissory note" — shows that the stipulation does not require
the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or
ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring,
suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in
other competent courts.
Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably received
judicial approval and we have declared that either of the parties is authorized to
67
lay venue of an action in the court named in the stipulation. The stipulation here
does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect, or option to have resort
to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation
here merely operated to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect recourse to
the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals
envisaged by the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and
Bulacan.
In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be distinguished

from stipulations which purport to require or compel the parties to lay venue of
an action in a specified place, and in that particular place only. The latter
type of venue stipulation must clearly indicate, through qualifying and restrictive
words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from
the operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, and that they intended
contractually to designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other court
also competent and accessible to the parties under the ordinary rules on the
venue of actions. Stipulations of this exclusionary nature may, under certain
circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as contrary to public policy
and, accordingly, not judicially enforceable.
In practice, the task, as noted earlier, of this Court when confronted with
issues of this kind is always basically that of contract interpretation. In the case
at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., "must," "only" or
"exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the
parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory
notes to the courts of Valenzuela only. Private respondents suggest that the use
of words "any legal action" expressed a supposed agreement to bar actions
before any court other than a Valenzuela court. We do not agree, for we see no
necessary or customary connection between the words "any legal action" and an
intent strictly to limit permissible venue to the Valenzuela courts. Intent so to
establish an inflexible restriction of otherwise permissible venue to one single
place is not lightly to be presumed or inferred from stipulations which, like that
here before us, include no qualifying or exclusionary terms. Express reservation
of the right to elect venue under the ordinary rules was, accordingly,
unnecessary in the case at bar.
Such is the thrust of the great bulk of the case law of this Court where this
issue was directly raised and discussed.
In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, the stipulation on venue there involved

read:
The parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila

68
The Court, in upholding that stipulation and ruling that venue had been
properly laid in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (the place of
defendant's residence), speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, said:
. . . An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The

parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does
not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely
consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that
clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file
suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only
or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or
transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they
may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in
the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4.
Renuntiatio non praesumitir.
In Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, the stipulation on venue provided that:
All legal actions arising out of this contract . . . may be

brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts
in the City of Manila.
This Court read the above stipulation as merely permissive, relying upon and
reinforcing Polytrade:
. . . the venue in personal actions is fixed for the

convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote
the ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the interests of
justice may be served by confining the situs of the action to
Manila, considering that the residences or offices of all the
parties, including the situs of the acts sought to be restrained
or required to be done, are all within the territorial jurisdiction
of Rizal.
While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the

jurisdiction of the Manila courts, there is nothing in the
language used . . . which clearly shows that the intention of the
parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila
only. Such agreements should be construed reasonably and
should not be applied in such a manner that it would work
more to the inconvenience of the parties without promoting the
ends of justice.
69
In Lamis Enterprises v. Lagamon, the promissory note sued on had the

following stipulation:
In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the courts

of Davao City.
The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Tagum,
Davao. The Supreme Court rejected the defense of improper venue and held:
. . . it is alleged that the proper venue for Civil Case No.

1395 should be Davao City where the plaintiff resides and as
stipulated in the promissory note dated February 26, 1979 and
in the chattel mortgage dated February 27, 1979. However, the
respondent judge found that Maningo has not only legal
residence but also physical and actual residence in Busaon,
Tagum, Davao and we are not inclined to disturb this finding.
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the
venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue
agreed upon by the parties. The stipulation did not deprive
Maningo of his right to pursue remedy in the court specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Courts,
Renuntiatio non praesumitir.
In Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, the clause on venue read:

21
The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to

in Section 12.01 [Article XII of the Agreement] shall be in the
City of Manila.
The initial action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet. This Court took the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade
doctrine:
. . . In any event, it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine

that stipulations in a contract, which specify a definite place for
the institution of an action arising in connection therewith, do
not, as a rule, supersede the general rules on the matter set out
in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, but should be construed merely
as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue
to the specified place.
We note, finally, that no one of the private respondents has claimed to have
been put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result of the institution of the
70
action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and touches more upon the
convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance or merits of the
case.
AGUSTIN V. DELA FUENTE

AUGUST 31, 1949
 Prohibition
POINT
Prohibition is a preventive remedy.
QUESTION: What was the need of the City of Manila?

ANSWER: It was in need of a central market so that the vendors and peddlers
causing nuisance in crowded places be transferred therein.
QUESTION: What happened next?

ANSWER: The mayor recommended to the municipal board the conversion of
certain buildings on Osmeña Parkinto such a market and setting aside of the
sum of P52,500 to cover the costs of remodeling the buildings. The board passed
the corresponding ordinance, funds were released, and the remodeling was
completed on July 1, 1948 using that sum of P52,500.
QUESTION: Notwithstanding the fact that the project was completed, did
somebody tried to oppose the conversion of the buildings for market purposes?
ANSWER: Yes, the majority of the same municipal board which passed the
ordinance filed an action to prohibit the mayor from converting the said buildings
for market purposes. They filed the action on July 9, 1948.
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the Supreme Court?

ANSWER: The following was the ruling of the Supreme Court:
“Prohibition is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some

act about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. If the thing be already done, the writ of prohibition cannot undo
it.”
Question: Will the petition for prohibition prosper?
No, the petition will not prosper. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and the
function thereof is to restrain the doing of some act about to be done. Considering
that the buildings were already been converted for market purposes and
therefore, has already been accomplished, the writ of prohibition cannot undo it.
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION

71
August 28, 1969
 Interpleader
Question: Who is Beltran?

ANSWER: Beltran was the purchaser of a housing unit from PHHC by way of
installments.
Question: What was the role of PHHC in the case?

ANSWER: Of course, PHHC was the seller. But this seller has standing
obligations with the GSIS that it failed to pay. When that obligations fell due, it
transferred the management, administration and ownership of its properties to
GSIS including the unit sold on installment to Beltran in order to pay the
aforesaid obligations. However, the newly appointed manager of PHHC has
opposed the agreements entered into by the PHHC to the GSIS.
Question: Upon such transfer, what did Beltran do?

ANSWER: He, together with other purchasers of housing units from PHHC, filed
an action for interpleader to compel PHHC and GSIS to interplead and to litigate
their conflicting claims among themselves, for they (Beltran and others) did not
know to whom the payment should be made.
Question: What did the GSIS do?

ANSWER: It filed a motion to dismiss.
Question: What happened during the hearing of the motion and during the
proceedings?
ANSWER: Both PHHC and GSIS manifested that they agreed that Beltran and
others will still pay to PHHC and that their conflict had nothing to do with the
purchasers Beltran and others.
Question: What was the decision of the Supreme Court in this case? ANSWER:
The special civil action of interpleader will not lie.
Question: Why did the special civil action for interpleader will not lie? ANSWER:
Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. The Rules of
Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
"who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant
corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims
are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in

his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
72
claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who
have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or
payment of the obligation. (BELTRAN V. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING
CORPORATION)
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. (BELTRAN V.
PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION)
ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG
SEPTEMBER 30, 1949
 Mandamus
POINT
PROHIBITION AND NOT MANDAMUS, IS THE REMEDY WHERE A MOTION TO

DISMISS IS WRONGFULLY DENIED
QUESTION: Was there a civil action for the recovery of real property located in
Negros Oriental?
ANSWER: Yes, there was and the defendant therein was Enriquez.
QUESTION: But where such civil action was filed?

ANSWER: It was filed in Cebu.
QUESTION: What was the action taken by Enriquez?

ANSWER: Before filing his answer, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue. That motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Macadaeg.
QUESTION: What was the subsequent action taken by Enriquez?

ANSWER: The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action.
QUESTION: Is petition for mandamus the proper remedy?

ANSWER: While the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the
motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is
not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case
where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to
dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in
such case is prohibition, and that remedy is available in the present case
73
because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not
appealable.
ESTRERA V. CA
AUGUST 16, 2006
 Special Civil Action for Certiorari Under Rule 65
POINT NO. 1:
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI (RULE 65) IS NOT DESIGNED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
QUESTION: Was there a petition filed by Estrera before the CA?

ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA in the petition for certiorari filed by
Estrera?
ANSWER: It dismissed the petition.
QUESTION: Due to such dismissal by the CA, what did Estrera do?
ANSWER: He went to the Supreme Court. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Below were the contents of his petition:
The Honorable Court of Appeals:

A.) FAILED SERIOUSLY TO APPRECIATE THE FACT
THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
INCORPORATED TO THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-
G.R. SP NO. 67944 WAS DEEMED IN SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
3, PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE. HENCE, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION.

B.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT
THAT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF
THE SAME RULES SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

74
C.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 WAS A
REVIVAL OF THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP
NO. 67944 WHICH IT EARLIER DISMISSED;

D.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING THE
PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 AS A
NEW PETITION AND IN FINDING THAT THE SAME WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME;

E.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN
PETITIONER AND UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL GUILTY OF
FORUM SHOPPING AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF
FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) EACH OR TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF
THREE (3) MONTHS IN CASE OF FAILURE THEREOF,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

F.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND
CONSIDER THE PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFIED HEREIN
PETITIONER IN FILING THE PETITION WITHOUT FILING
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND

G.) FAILING TO DECIDE THE PETITION ON ITS
MERITS.
QUESTION: From the assigned errors in the petition, can the writ of certiorari be
availed of by Estrera?
ANSWER: As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted assignment of errors in the

petition, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning the
correctness of the CA’s rulings. Hence, since the issues involved do not affect
the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot be availed of by petitioner.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the
75
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province
of a special civil action for certiorari.
POINT NO. 2
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
NOTICE OF THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
QUESTION: Was there a petition filed by Estrera before the CA?

ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA in the petition for certiorari filed by
Estrera?
ANSWER: It dismissed the petition. The notice of dismissal was received by
Estrera on January 22, 2002.
QUESTION: Due to such dismissal by the CA, what did Estrera do?
ANSWER: He went to the Supreme Court. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court July 31, 2002.

ANSWER: It is too late for Estrera to question the CA resolution through the
present petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari should be filed within 60
days from notice of the questioned resolution. Since petitioner received said CA
Resolution on January 22, 2002, the last day for filing a petition for certiorari to
question the same was on March 23, 2002. The present petition was filed only
on July 31, 2002, thus, filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari.
POINT NO. 3
THE ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT FOR FORUM SHOPPING IS NOT WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
QUESTION: Did Estrera file a petition for certiorari before the CA?
ANSWER: Yes, he filed a petition, but the same was dismissed due to a
procedural defect.
QUESTION: Did he file a motion for reconsideration for such dismissal?

ANSWER: No. Instead, he filed another petition for certiorari, correcting the
aforesaid procedural defect, but this time failed to mention in his certification
against non-forum shopping that he already filed before the same court a similar
petition (the first petition which was earlier dismissed).
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA?

76
ANSWER: The CA dismissed the petition and found Estrera guilty of forum
shopping and sentenced to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos. In case of his
failure to pay such a fine, he shall suffer imprisonment of three months.
QUESTION: What did Estrella do?

ANSWER: He assailed the said ruling. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the Supreme Court.

ANSWER: The issue of the propriety of finding petitioner guilty of contempt for
forum shopping is not within the province of a special action for certiorari. Issues
merely questioning the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the
jurisdiction of the court rendering it, are not proper for a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s remedy to question the CA’s finding of contempt should have been to
appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
LUMANLAW V. PERALTA
FEBRUARY 13, 2006
 Mandamus
QUESTION: What happened in this case?

ANSWER: Lumanlaw was apprehended by the police for illegal possession of
(0.011) grams of shabu.
QUESTION: Were there postponements of his arraignment?

ANSWER: Yes, it was postponed fourteen (14) times without justifiable reasons
for a period of one year and 9 months.
QUESTION: What action was taken by Lumanlaw?

ANSWER: He filed a petition for mandamus so that the information against him
be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his right to speedy trial.
QUESTION: Should the petition be granted?

ANSWER:
It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the

exercise of discretion when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that
can be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest
injustice. In view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the
arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ of
mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration
of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that his arraignment be held but,
ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of the
violation of his right to speedy trial.
77
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution. Besides, it has long been
established in this jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the
accused to compel a dismissal of the case.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

JULY 4, 1990
 Special Civil Action for Certiorari
QUESTION: Was there a pre-trial before the Regional Trial Court?

QUESTION: Yes, there was such a pre-trial.
QUESTION: When the counsel for the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), one
of the parties to the case, failed to appear, what did the court do?
ANSWER: The judge rendered a judgment in default against the company.
QUESTION: What was the action taken by the Manila Electric Company?
ANSWER: On June 1, 1988, or on the 14th day, after receipt of the Decision,
MERALCO filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Lift Order of Default and to
Vacate Judgment by Default.
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the RTC?

ANSWER: The RTC denied the MR.
QUESTION: Did the Manila Electric Company filed an appeal from the said
judgment in default and denial of the MR?
ANSWER: No. It allowed to lapse the period to file an appeal and when the
period had lapsed, it filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the RTC
subsequently dismissed.

ANSWER: The Manila Electric Company filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order of dismissal of its petition for relief
from judgment and the judgment by default rendered by the RTC.
QUESTION: Was the remedy availed of by the Manila Electric Company correct?
ANSWER: No. This was how the Supreme Court disposed of the case:
While the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of in the alternative
situation where an appeal would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, this is on the theoretical assumption that the right to appeal is still
78
available in the case. If, however, the remedy by appeal had already been lost
and the loss was occasioned by petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies, certiorari cannot lie as a substitute or a tool to shield the petitioner
from the adverse consequences of such neglect or error. The two remedies are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident

that petitioner had ample opportunities to appeal the default judgment rendered
against it by the court a quo, to wit, after the default judgment itself was
rendered and, later, after its motion to lift the order of default and to vacate the
default judgment was denied by the trial court. It nevertheless deliberately
allowed the period for appeal to pass without interposing one. Worse, despite the
then availability of the remaining period for appeal from the denial of its motion
to lift the order of default and to vacate the default judgment, it opted to wait
and subsequently file a petition for relief from the judgment which by then was
final and executory, with the added misfortune that said petition could not claim
any procedural validity both technically and on the merits.
OLLADA VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
 Action for Declaratory Relief
FACTS:
Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the

examination given by the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice
his profession. On July 22, 1952, his name was placed in the rolls of certified
public accountants authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the
office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December, 1955, by reason of a
requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to
an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their
clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous
accreditation was nullified.
Assailing said accreditation requirement on the ground that it was (a) an

unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of
the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully
restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's trade, Ollada, for himself and allegedly
79
on behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for Declaratory Relief in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify said accreditation requirement.
He has also alleged that by virtue of the violation of his right and that of
numerous CPAs, he has suffered serious injury in that the questioned
requirement which is collaterally attacked by this action (in the honest belief of
the petitioner that the same) is an unlawful restraint of the fee pursuit and
practice of petitioner's profession as a CPA; and also that the action of the
respondent Central Bank of the Philippines complained of, is also an unlawful
invasion into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy as the sole
body vested by our laws to lay down rules and regulations for the practice of
public accountancy in the Philippines.
HELD:
On the question of when a special civil action of this nature would prosper,
we have already held that the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the
present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the
petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself,
respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury —
all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the action was, therefore,
proper in the light of our ruling in De Borja vs. Villadolid, 47 O.G. (5) p. 2315, and
Samson vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-3439, July 31, 1951, where we held that an action
for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a
breach — which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action
for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the
means of other existing forms of action or proceeding (1 C.J.S. 1027-1028).
REGALADO V. GO
FEBRUARY 6, 2007
 Contempt
FACTS:
80
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter by Antonio
S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI). The Labor Arbiter ruled that
respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment.
On appeal to the NLRC, EHSI, employed the legal services of Atty. Regalado
as its counsel.
The NLRC rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and

declaring that respondent Go’s separation from employment was legal.
Aggrieved, Antonio Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision setting aside the ruling of the
NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI guilty of
illegal dismissal.
On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but
prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to
settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of
the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the
same day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.
The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for
EHSI, Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence and without the
knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer.
After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, Go, through
counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the
same motion, Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made
to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go
without the knowledge of his counsel
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution adjudging Atty. Regalado guilty of

indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. As declared by
the Court of Appeals, even granting arguendo that Atty. Regalado did not
participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless under the obligation
to restrain her clients from doing acts that she herself was prohibited to perform
as mandated by Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. However,
instead of preventing her clients from negotiating with respondent Go who was
unassisted by his counsel, Atty. Regalado actively participated in the
consummation of the compromise agreement by dealing directly with respondent
Go and allowing him to sign the Release Waiver and Quitclaim without his
lawyer. Rule on the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
81
It is true that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under
paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
“(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;”
However, the proceedings were conducted not in accordance with law.
Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect
contempt should be commenced, thus:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt

may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. (Examinee’s
clarification: motu proprio by the court by an order OR motu proprio by the court
by any other formal charge.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal
action for joint hearing and decision.
As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect
contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or
(2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with.
In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by

respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was based on
the aforesaid Motion that the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated 19
November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she
should not be cited for contempt.
82
Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the

catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty.
Regalado. It was Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the
alleged misbehavior committed by Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on
the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated
at all.
FURTHER DISCUSSION:
It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet, this Court ruled that the contempt
proceedings was considered commenced by the court motu proprio even if the
show cause order came after the filing of the motions to cite for contempt filed by
the adverse party. The Decision thus reads:
Thus, independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, it was

the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No
verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt are initiated in
this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not affect the procedure
adopted.
It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For
Contempt Of Court, dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading they prayed that Union
Bank be declared in indirect contempt of court for its disobedience to the Pasay
MTC’s Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order dated May 9, 2000 specifically
directed Union Bank to "return immediately to the defendants the replevied
motor vehicle." However, the Tamondong Spouses’ unverified motion dated May
17, 2000 cannot invalidate the contempt proceedings because these proceedings
were initiated by respondent judge motu proprio in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This above-cited case, however, has no application in the case at bar for the
factual milieu of the cases are different from each other. In Leonidas, there was
an order of the court that was utterly violated by Union Bank. Thus, even in the
absence of the motion of spouses Tamondong to cite Union Bank in contempt, the
court a quo on its own can verily initiate the action. In the present case, the
appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalado’s
misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former.
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

October 5, 2005
 Petition for Declaratory Relief

83
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of

Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for
the United States. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation
of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
HELD:
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute
(the right of Cipriano is affected by par. 2 of Art. 26, Family Code), executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
84
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
1. there must be a justiciable controversy;

2. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
4. that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained
a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.
The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the
State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy.
The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.
SAWMILL VS. TAMBUNTING

OCT. 16, 1950
 Action for Interpleader
Question: Was there a vacant lot in Quiapo, Manila?

ANSWER: Yes, there was such a vacant lot.
Question: Who owns the lot?

ANSWER: It was formerly owned by Manuel Tambunting, but he allegedly sold it
to Angel de Leon.
Question: Now that de Leon became the owner, what happened next? ANSWER:
de Leon leased the same property to Manuel including the apartments
constructed thereon.
Question: What did Manuel do?

ANSWER: He subleased the property against the will of de Leon. One of the
subleases was Oriental Sawmill.
Question: What did de Leon do?

ANSWER: He filed an action to eject Manuel but the latter interposed ownership.
85
Question: What was the problem of Oriental Sawmill?

ANSWER: Since both Manuel and Angel de Leon claimed rental payments,
Oriental Sawmill did not know to whom payment shall be made.
Question: What should Oriental Sawmill do?

ANSWER: File an action for interpleader.
Question: Is an action for interpleader proper in this case?

ANSWER: Yes. See below how the facts precisely apply to the requisites for
interpleader.
Question: Analyze with the requisites for interpleader whether the action in the
present case will prosper.
ANSWER: The action will prosper. See the analysis below:
Requisite No. 1. Plaintiff claims no interest in the subject matter or his claim is
not disputed
Here, the subject matter was the lot and the plaintiff Oriental
Sawmill has no interest thereon.
Requisite No. 2. Two or more claimants asserting conflicting claims against the
plaintiff
There were two claimants asserting conflicting claims against
the plaintiff. They are Manuel and Angel. They have
conflicting claims and the claims were against the plaintiff.
Requisite No. 3. The subject matter must be one and the same
There was only one subject matter and that is the rent.
Requisite No. 4. Person in possession or obliged files a complaint.
Here, Oriental Sawmill was the one obliged to pay the rent
and it filed the complaint.
Requisite No. 5. The parties to be interpleaded must make effective claims.
Manuel and Angel both have effective claims.
Requisite No. 6. Payment of docket and other lawful fees.
TOLENTINO V. THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY

September 28, 1951
86
 Action for Declaratory Relief
Question: Who was Ferguson and Hausamann?

ANSWER: They were certified public accountants under the trade name "Fleming
and Williamson”. They were some of the defendants.
Question: Was there any law which authorized accountants to use a trade name
to the exclusion of others?
ANSWER: Yes. Section 16-A of Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession under a trade name.
Question: Since there was such a law, what was the concern of the plaintiff
Tolentino?
ANSWER: According to Toletino, the law is unconstitutional on the ground that it
excludes persons engaged in other callings and professions from adopting or
acquiring or using a trade name.
Question: What then the plaintiff did?

ANSWER: The plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief for the purpose of
testing the constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3105,
otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342.
Question: What can we find from the action filed by the plaintiff?
ANSWER: It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own
personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging
to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case. He does not
claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or
prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the
defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of
said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to
defraud the public.
Question: State the requisites of an action for declaratory relief so that we can
determine whether from the foregoing facts, the action of the plaintiff will
prosper.
ANSWER:
In order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be
predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
87
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
Question: What are the requisites for justiciability as stated in the first requisite
above?
ANSWER: There must be –
(1) real parties in interest

(2) asserting adverse claims and
(3) presenting a ripe issue.
Question: Based on the above requisites, will the action of the plaintiff prosper?
ANSWER: No.
Firstly, requisite No. 1 is not present, that is, there is no justiciable controversy.
There is no real party in interest because the plaintiff Tolentino brought the
plaintiff not for himself, but for others. He did not also claim having suffered from
the implementation of the law.
Secondly, requisite No. 2 is lacking, that is, the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse. In the present case, it cannot be said that
the plaintiff has an adverse interest for the reason that he brought the action not
for himself. For the same reason, the application of requisite No. 3 is also
lacking.
OŇATE V. ABROGAR
FEB. 23, 1995
 Writ of Preliminary Attachment
FACTS:
Before the summons and the complaint were served on the petitioners Oñate
and Econ Holdings Corporation on January 9, 1992, the deputy sheriff had
already served on January 3, 1992 notices of garnishment on the PNB Head
office and on all its Metro Manila branches. In addition he made other levies
before the service of summons on petitioners, to wit:
On January 6, 1992, he levied on attachment Oñate's condominium unit.

88
On January 8, 1992, he attached Oñate's lot, consisting of 1,256 square

meters, at the Ayala-Alabang Subdivision, Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT
No. 112673.
He made several levies, which indicates a predisposition to serve the writ of

attachment in anticipation of the eventual acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over petitioners.
Petitioners maintain that the attachment of their properties was void because
the trial court had not at that time acquired jurisdiction over them and that the
subsequent service of summons on them did not cure the invalidity of the levy.
Rule on the contention.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners is correct. While the petition for a writ of
preliminary attachment may be granted and the writ itself issued before the
defendant is summoned, the writ of attachment cannot be implemented until
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained.
1. It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment

practically involves three stages; first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two
stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should first be obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is
required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any
manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.
2. The attachment of properties before the service of summons on the defendant

is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction over the defendant.
At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously
with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. As the
properties of the petitioners were attached by the sheriff before he had served
the summons on them, the levies made must be considered void.
3. Nor can the attachment of petitioners' properties before the service of

summons on them was made be justified and the ground that unless the writ
was then enforced, petitioners would be alerted and might dispose of their
properties before summons could be served on them.
89
4. It is indeed true that proceedings for the issuance of a writ of attachment are
generally ex parte. In Mindanao Savings and Loans Ass'n v. Court of Appeals
it was held that no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of
attachment because this "would defeat the objective of the remedy [because]
the time which such hearing would take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment
issues." It is not, however, notice to defendant that is sought to be avoided
but the "time which such hearing would take" because of the possibility that
defendant may delay the hearing to be able to dispose of his properties. On
the contrary there may in fact be a need for a hearing before the writ is
issued as where the issue of fraudulent disposal of property is raised. It is
not true that there should be no hearing lest a defendant learns of the
application for attachment and he remove's his properties before the writ can
be enforced. On the other hand, to authorize the attachment of property even
before jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the
service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. It is
entirely possible that the defendant may not know of the filing of a case
against him and consequently may not be able to take steps to protect his
interests.
RODULFA V. ALFONSO
February 28, 1946
 Writ of Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
On Sept. 19, 1945, Alejandro Rodulfa filed a complaint against Pablo del
Moral before the CFI of Pangasinan for reconveyance to him of 15 parcels of
land. In his complaint, he claimed that in 1924, by means of fictitious
documents, he conveyed to the defendant that 15 parcels of land. He claimed
that he also authorized Pablo to register the said lands in the latter’s name. Such
conveyance was subject to the condition that Pablo would return and reconvey
said properties to him after 20 years. Alejandro also admitted that Pablo had
been in the possession of the land for that entire 20 years.
On the other hand, Pablo claimed to have acquired since 1924 by purchase
some of the lands in question from Alejandro and the rest from other parties in
good faith and for valuable consideration.
90
About two months from the filing of the complaint and without waiting for the
final determination of the civil case he filed, Alejandro entered the properties in
question by means of threat and intimidation.
Due to the actuations of the Alejandro, Pablo filed a motion praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the former to desist and
refrain from molesting, retarding, or otherwise disturbing his possession of the
said parcels of land. After he filed the required bond of P5,000, the judge
forthwith issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Alejandro’s offer to file a
counter-bond was denied by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Rule on issuance of the writ and the denial of the offer to file a counter-bond.
ANSWER:
The writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued. Alejandro himself

admitted that Pablo had been in the possession of the properties in question for
the period of 20 years and that the same were registered under the latter’s
name. Pablo should be respected in his possession until Alejandro established
his ownership over the said properties. Injunction, as a rule, will not be granted
to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into
that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.
The offer of Alejandro to file a counter-bond was properly denied by the trial
court in its sound judicial discretion, for his right and interest, if any, in the
property in question were amply protected by the bond executed by Pablo for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Since Alejandro was himself a
wrongdoer, the denial was necessary for the preservation of the status quo.
1. The rule that a court should not, by any means of a preliminary injunction,
transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, is
more particularly applicable where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership in himself. (Gordillo and Martinez vs.
Del Rosario, 39 Phil., 829.)
2. Where a person other than the owner from time to time unlawfully enters
upon land and commits depredations thereon, as by cutting wood or bamboo,
the true owner, having possession, can maintain an action to quiet title and
enjoin the intruder from the repetition of such trespass in the future. The
91
circumstance that the trespasser in such case also pretends to ownership of

the same lands is immaterial. (Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil., 280.)
3. The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (Examinee: In
this case the last actual peaceable uncontested status was the time when
Alejandro had not yet entered the properties) (Fredericks vs. Huber, 180 Pa.,
572; 37 Atl., 90.)
4. In cases involving the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the exercise

of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not generally be interfered
with; and the refusal of the trial court to permit the plaintiff in this case to file
a counter-bond cannot be considered as an abuse of sound judicial discretion,
bearing in mind particularly the admission made by the plaintiff himself that
sometime in 1945, or thereabouts, he occupied and took possession of all or
some of the lands in question, without waiting for the final decision of the
competent courts in said civil case No. 8930. It is a general principle in equity
jurisprudence that "he who comes to equity must come with clean hands."
(North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664.)
URIARTE V. CFI
MAY 29, 1970
 Wrong Venue is a Waivable Procedural Defect
POINT
WRONG VENUE IS A WAIVABLE PROCEDURAL DEFECT
QUESTION: Who was Don Juan?

ANSWER: He was the deceased in this case. He was a non-resident.
QUESTION: But did the deceased Don Juan left properties in the Philippines?
ANSWER: Yes, he left considerable properties in the Philippines.
QUESTION: Under the law, therefore, which court has jurisdiction over the
settlement of his estate?
ANSWER: Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that since he was an
inhabitant of a foreign country at the time of his death, the Regional Trial Court
of any province in which he had estate, shall have jurisdiction over the
settlement of his estate.
QUESTION: Did Don Juan has properties in the province of Negros and in the
City of Manila?
92
ANSWER: Yes. That is why the estate of Don Juan may be settled in the
Regional Trial Court of either Negros or the City of Manila.

ANSWER: Vicente Uriarte filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein,
inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir. This was an
intestate proceeding.
QUESTION: Aside from Vicente, was there anybody who commenced special
proceedings?
ANSWER: Yes. It was Juan Zamacona. On August 28, 1962.
He commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Don Juan.
On the same date he filed before the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the ground that the deceased Don Juan had left a last will, there was
no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings.
ANSWER: Vicente Uriarte, on April 15, 1963, filed with the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene
and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date.
QUESTION: Rule on the special proceeding in the Manila Court.

ANSWER:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely

a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that Vicente has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew
of the existence of the alleged will in the Philippines when Juan Zamacona filed
a motion to dismiss in Negros Court. Notwithstanding said knowledge, it was
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal
and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier. To allow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
SANDOVAL V. SANTIAGO
MAY 30, 1949
93
 Jurisdiction of the Probate Court
POINT
THE PROBATE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION FROM THE MOMENT THE
PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE IS FILED WITH
SAID COURT. IT CANNOT BE DIVESTED OF SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE HEIRS BY SIMPLY
ENTERING INTO AN EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION OF THE ESTATE
QUESTION: Was Luz Sandoval designated as executrix in will and codicil of the
deceased Daniel Marquez?
ANSWER: Yes, she was.
QUESTION: What did Sandoval do?

ANSWER: She instituted a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance for
the probate of such will and codicil.
QUESTION: Were the will and codicil allowed?

ANSWER: Yes. The will and codicil were allowed and Sandoval was appointed
on August 16, 1946, executrix in accordance with the will. (Take note that even
though she was appointed as executrix, it does not mean that she was already
qualified as such.)
QUESTION: What was happened on October 5, 1946? (almost 2 months after

Sandoval was appointed as executrix)
ANSWER: Before Sandoval was qualified as executrix, the three heirs instituted
in the will all age made an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of the
deceased on October 5, 1946 and entered into the possession of their respective
share without the authority and approval of the court.
QUESTION: In 1947, the CFI judge required Sandoval to qualify as executrix and
to file a bond. What was the response of Sandoval?
ANSWER: Sandoval informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for
her to qualify because the heirs had already made an extrajudicial partition in
accordance with the will as shown by the copy the copy of said partition which
she submitted to the court.
QUESTION: What was the response of the judge?

ANSWER: In view of the answer of Sandoval, the respondent judge ordered her
to qualify as executrix within forty-eight hours and declared the extrajudicial
agreement of partition entered into by the heirs null and void, on the ground that
the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be
terminated judicially.
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QUESTION: Was the judge correct?
ANSWER: Yes, the judge was correct. The heirs of the deceased Marquez could
not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the
mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among
themselves.
QUESTION: But would it make a difference if the extrajudicial settlement was

made with the approval of the court?
ANSWER: The following answer was quoted in the present case from the case of
McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21 Phil., 211:
If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the deceased was submitted
to the court and approved by the respondent judge after verifying that it does not
prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate proceedings pending in
the court would have been legally thereby terminated. An extrajudicial partition
of the estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a judicial partition after its
approval by the court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of the estate by
the filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will; but as the
testate proceeding is terminated in such case without the necessary publication
of notices to creditors and other persons interested in the estate required in a
regular judicial administration, the effect of such judicial partition would be the
same as if it had been effected extrajudicially without the intervention of the
court.
JAO V. CA
MAY 29, 2002
POINT
IF THE DECEDENT IS AN INHABITANT OF THE PHILIPPINES AT

THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, WHETHER A CITIZEN OR AN ALIEN,
HIS WILL SHALL BE PROVED, OR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
GRANTED, AND HIS ESTATE SETTLED, IN THE CFI IN THE
PROVINCE IN WHICH HE RESIDES
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH
QUESTION: Who were the deceased in this case?

ANSWER: The spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao. They have two sons, namely,
Rodolfo and Perico.
QUESTION: What happened after the spouses died?

ANSWER: Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
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QUESTION: Did Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition?

ANSWER: Yes. He moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon
City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to
run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old
age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City,
solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization.
QUESTION: Did Perico filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by
Rodolfo?
ANSWER: Yes. Perico countered in his opposition that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the
death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the
said document.
QUESTION: State the ruling of the Supreme Court.

ANSWER: The Philippine Supreme Court ruled in this way:
The estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of

administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death and in the present case, in RTC of
Quezon City.
The decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was
Rodolfo himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind,
this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, Rodolfo recognized his
deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before Rodolfo and Perico quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of
their parents’ death.
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
96
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of

First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
QUESTION: In the present case, Rodolfo invokes the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, where it was held that the situs of settlement
proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence
or domicile at the time of death. How did the Supreme Court reason out on
that?
ANSWER: The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at

bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process
of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was
then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he
was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could
move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that
Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence
in Quezon City was just temporary.
ALIMPOOS V. CA
JULY 30, 1981
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan,
by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal
Case, which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The place allegedly robbed belonged to Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos.
Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal
requirements for the issuance thereof, the accused, then detained, and his wife
instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. Named as defendants
were the Spouses Alimpoos, the two arresting policemen, the Municipal Judge,
and the Chief of Police.
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The complaint prayed for the following:

1. That the accused be released from detention
2. Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Spouses Alimpoos

and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding
with the Criminal Case
3. Damages.
QUESTIONS:
Was the complaint defective? Reason.
ANSWER:
Yes, the complaint was defective. Mosquito should have limited his complaint
against the Chief of Police, the person having him in alleged custody, for Sec. 3,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that the application for the writ shall set
forth the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or
restrained. There is no mention in the Rule that the municipal judge issuing
arrest be joined as defendants. He should not have named also as defendants
the Spouses Alimpoos since the proceedings by habeas corpus is in no sense a
suit between private parties.
Moreover, the accused’s allegation as to damages was out of place. An

application for the writ cannot contain a prayer for damages. The sole function of
the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment and ordinarily, it cannot
properly be used for any other purpose.
BERNARTE V. CA
October 18, 1996
 Habeas Corpus
RULING:
The writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court extends "to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." The function of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. In all petitions
for habeas corpus, the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention — from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such a
98
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our
Constitution has been satisfied.
However, once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
His remedy then is the quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ were becomes more
unavailing when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release.
Thus, in Velasco v. Court of Appeals, the Court said:
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may

bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among
such supervening events is the issuance of judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person . . . . . Another is the
filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of
liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section
4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . .
an offense in the Philippines."
It may also be said that filing his motion for bail, Larkins
admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily
submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero (41
SCRA 235, 240 [1971]), this Court stated:
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to

the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail
with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's
jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him.
The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is

recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of
bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving
or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
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FERIA V. CA
FEBRUARY 15, 2000
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
Norberto Feria has been under detention by reason of his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
After some years of detention, it was discovered that the entire records of the
case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. Upon further inquiries,
the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall.
Norberto Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus

with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City
Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground
that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of
his constitutional right to due process.
ISSUES:
1. Was the remedy resorted to by Norberto proper?

2. If not, what is the proper remedy?
HELD (Dry Run):
a) The remedy resorted to by Norberto was not proper. The mere loss or
destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the
accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the
release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus.
b) The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records (which is as

much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense).
1. Norberto’s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule

102 of the Rules of Court which provides that –
"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears

that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
100
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or

order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."
2. In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused

was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to
the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records
of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost.
Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:
The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding
the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s
release."
3. Norberto’s invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152

(1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein
was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations
against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that
their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the
pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In
this case, the records were lost after Norberto, by his own admission, was
already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged.
MARQUEZ V. CA
DEC. 29, 1998
 Reconveyance
QUESTION: Who were the spouses here in the present case? Did they own a
property?
ANSWER: They were Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez. Yes, they
owned a property described in TCT No. 47572
101
QUESTION: But Felicidad died, wasn’t it?

ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: After Felicidad died, what happened next?

ANSWER:
In 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto

himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572.
In June 16, 1982, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and on the same date, TCT No.
33350 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
QUESTION: Did he donate the property afterwards?

ANSWER: On December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as
the house constructed thereon to three of his children, namely: (1) petitioner
Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen to the exclusion of his other children.
QUESTION: His children, other than the donees, filed a complaint on May 31,
1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial
court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the
advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents. Did
their action already prescribed?
ANSWER:
No. It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or

constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start
to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred
the action.
NUGUID V. NUGUID
JUNE 23, 1966
 Jurisdiction of the Probate Court
POINT
GENERAL RULE: JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IS LIMITED TO THE

EXAMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF A WILL
102
ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS (THIS CASE): IF THE CASE WHERE TO BE

REMANDED FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL, IT WILL RESULT TO WASTE OF TIME,
EFFORT, EXPENSE, PLUS ADDED ANXIETY.
QUESTION: Who is Rosario Nuguid?

ANSWER: She was the testator in the present case. She was single until her
death and left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. During her lifetime, she
made a will and instituted therein her sister Remedios Nuguid as her sole
universal heir.
QUESTION: Please continue the story.

ANSWER: Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid some 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
QUESTION: Was there an opposition?

ANSWER: Yes. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to
the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who
are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were
illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CFI of Rizal?

ANSWER: Since there was preterition, the CFI held that the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid.
QUESTION: On appeal, what procedural aspect engaged the attention of the

Supreme Court?
ANSWER:
The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to
an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

ANSWER:
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
103
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce
us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.
PAREDES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
JANUARY 28, 1991
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, applied for a free patent for a parcel of land, His application
was favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison.
On October 28, 1986, a former vice-mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
filed with the Tanodbayan, a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with
having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence,
persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office
in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.
On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case
to a fiscal for preliminary investigation.
Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the

preliminary investigation of the case. However, the summons did not reach
Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for proof of service of the
summons on the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. The fiscal issued a resolution
finding a prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by
the accused.
On August 28,1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the

Sandiganbayan and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife. She alleged that the
warrant for her husband's arrest was void because the preliminary investigation
was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had
already prescribed.
104
ISSUES:
a) Should the writ of habeas corpus be allowed?

b) How would you rule on the claim of the wife of Attorney Paredes that the
crime had already prescribed?
ANSWERS (Dry Run):
a) No, the writ should not be allowed because an information has already
been filed against Atty. Paredes. The writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. The absence
of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case
nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
b) The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should

be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a
proper ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the
arraignment of the accused (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; People vs. Castro, L-6407, July 29, 1954) for whether the crime may
still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not
in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.
1. The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid
because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged
has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs.
Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30,
1969). The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the
court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of
right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information,
should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
2. Thus did we rule in Ilagan vs.Enrile, 139 SCRA 349. If the detained
attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the
Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules,
or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus
would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the
basis of the Information filed against the accused.
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TUNG CHIN HUI V. RODRIGUEZ

APRIL 2, 2001
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
Tung Chin Hui, a "Taiwanese national," 6 arrived in this country. A few days
later, he was arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the BID Board of Commissioners
issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November 25, 1998, finding him
guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese
authorities.
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal.
ISSUE:
Can the writ be issued?
ANSWER:
No. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in which the Bureau
of Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of undocumented aliens,
specifically those found guilty of illegally entering the Philippines with the use of
tampered and previously cancelled passports, as in the instant case.
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding

the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to
106
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued.
VELASCO V. CA
JULY 7, 1995
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of
the crime of rape allegedly committed against her.
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, NBI Special Investigators

Resurreccion and Erum, proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati on 21
November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified
by Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the
NBI.
The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994. On the
same date, Larkins, through his counsel, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein
he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong.
The trial court denied the aforesaid motion.
On 6 December 1994, Larkins, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the

Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based on the
alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion was also denied by the
trial court.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag,

filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus.
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, holding that:
From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the

immediate release of Larkins from his present confinement on the ground
that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on
the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for
107
rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court (warrantless arrest).
The NBI and the People insist that the respondent court erred in granting the
petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the
crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further
claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Rule on the contentions of the parties.
ANSWER:
The NBI and the People were correct. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal,
supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the filing of a
complaint or information, as in the instant case, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of
the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available.
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
1. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his
release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial
process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing
of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case.
2. Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, where petitioners Macario Herce and
Celso Almadovar claimed to have been illegally detained for more than one
year without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the
petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and
confined by reason thereof.
3. In Cruz vs. Montoya, this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
having become academic because the information for estafa against the party
whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a
108
warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have
originally infected his detention had been cured.
4. In Umil vs. Ramos this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule
102, held that the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court.
109
FEBRUARY 2011 AND BEYOND
PEOPLE V. PANGILINAN
November 14, 2011/ Peralta, J.
 Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation

against an Accused
FACTS:
AAA testified that she was born on January 20, 1988. She had lived with her
Aunt BBB, first cousin of her father, and her husband, herein appellant, since
she was two years old until July 27, 2001. At around 10 p.m. of July 27, 2001,
while her aunt was working in Angeles, Pampanga, appellant arrived and
ordered her to cook chicken adobo which she did. Suddenly, appellant
approached her and pointed a samurai at her. Appellant then kissed her neck
and mashed her breast. It was not the first time that appellant did that to her.
AAA further testified that she remembered three incidents wherein appellant
abused her. The first time was when appellant kissed her and touched her
private parts. The second time was when appellant pointed a samurai at her,
took her to a room and removed her clothes and kissed her on her lips and
touched her private organ. He then laid on top of her and tried to insert his penis
to her private organ. His organ touched her vagina; that she felt pain in her
vagina but there was no blood. And the third time was when appellant kissed
110
her and mashed her breast. She did not tell her aunt of appellant's sexual
molestations, because he threatened to kill her and her aunt.
The prosecution filed two (2) Informations charging appellant of the crimes of
Rape and Child Sexual Abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610. The
Information charging him of sexual abuse reads:
Criminal Case No. 11769
That on or about 1995 up to about June 2001, at Barangay

Apsayan, Municipality of Gerona, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor subjected to
sexual abuse.
That accused is the stepfather of AAA, who was born on

January 29, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
ISSUE:
May the appellant be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. The Information in Criminal Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse is void for
being violative of appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. A reading of the allegations in the above-
quoted Information would show the insufficiency of the averments of the acts
alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the essential
facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law. Thus,
appellant cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information.
In this case, appellant was charged under two separate Informations for rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610, respectively. However, we find the Information in Criminal
Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse to be void for being violative of appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides:

111
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.  The complaint or

information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
A reading of the allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the

insufficiency of the averments of the acts alleged to have been committed by
appellant. It does not contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a
statement of a conclusion of law. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of sexual
abuse under such Information.
In People v. Dela Cruz, wherein the Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R
read:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of

Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on
his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter,
JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
We dismissed the case after finding the Information to be void and made the
following ratiocinations:
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be

convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the
information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information

do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite
which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No.
7610 has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it
does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense,
or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the
same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure.
Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
112
The allegation in the information that accused-

appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her"
is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8, for these are
conclusions of law, not facts. The information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being
violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative
that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet
its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LTD. V. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED

MINING COMPANY
November 28, 2011/ Leonardo-De Castro, J.
 Action in Personam
 Extraterritorial Service of Summons
 Voluntary Appearance
FACTS:
On August 30, 2005, respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM
Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan
and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon plaintiff’s motion, the
trial court authorized plaintiff’s counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter
office to effect service of summons on the defendant.
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and
improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action
and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by
estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
113
On November 29, 2005, petitioner filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to
take the deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner)
before the Philippine Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve
Interrogatories on respondent.
On December 9, 2005, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUE:
1. Was there a valid service of summons?
2. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. There was no valid service of summons. The action filed by Lepanto

Consolidated Mining Company is an action in personam because it is lodged
against a person based on personal liability. Since it is an action in personam
and the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the
Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over its person.
The extraterritorial service of summons resorted to by the plaintiff applies

only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not in the present case where
the action is in personam.
2. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
because although there was no valid service of summons, it voluntarily appeared
in court. By seeking affirmative reliefs when it filed the Motion for Leave to take
a deposition and the Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories, the defendant
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Whether petitioner is a real party in interest
Respondent argues that the present Petition should be dismissed on the

ground that petitioner no longer existed as a corporation at the time said Petition
was filed on February 1, 2007. Respondent points out that as of the date of the
filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM
Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Thus, according to respondent, the
present Petition was not filed by a real party in interest, citing our ruling in
Philips Export B.V. v. Court of Appeals, wherein we held:
A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the very

existence of a corporation (American Steel Foundries vs.
114
Robertson, 269 US 372, 70 L ed 317, 46 S Ct 160; Lauman vs.

Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa 42; First National Bank vs.
Huntington Distilling Co., 40 W Va 530, 23 SE 792). Its name is
one of its attributes, an element of its existence, and essential
to its identity (6 Fletcher [Perm Ed], pp. 3-4). The general rule
as to corporations is that each corporation must have a name
by which it is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts. The
name of a corporation in this respect designates the corporation
in the same manner as the name of an individual designates
the person (Cincinnati Cooperage Co. vs. Bate, 96 Ky 356, 26
SW 538; Newport Mechanics Mfg. Co. vs. Starbird, 10 NH 123);
and the right to use its corporate name is as much a part of the
corporate franchise as any other privilege granted (Federal
Secur. Co. vs. Federal Secur.Corp., 129 Or 375, 276 P 1100, 66
ALR 934; Paulino vs. Portuguese Beneficial Association, 18 RI
165, 26 A 36).
In its Memorandum before this Court, petitioner started to refer to itself as

Investec Australia Limited (formerly "NM Rothschild & Sons [Australia] Limited")
and captioned said Memorandum accordingly. Petitioner claims that NM
Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation under the
laws of Australia under said new name. It presented before us documents
evidencing the process in the Australian Securities & Investment Commission on
the change of petitioner’s company name from NM Rothschild and Sons
(Australia) Limited to Investec Australia Limited.
We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name

satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the
ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest.
While we stand by our pronouncement in Philips Export on the importance of the
corporate name to the very existence of corporations and the significance thereof
in the corporation’s right to sue, we shall not go so far as to dismiss a case filed
by the proper party using its former name when adequate identification is
presented. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
There is no doubt in our minds that the party who filed the present Petition,
having presented sufficient evidence of its identity and being represented by the
same counsel as that of the defendant in the case sought to be dismissed, is the
entity that will be benefited if this Court grants the dismissal prayed for.
Jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on
account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner
through the DFA, with respondent’s counsel personally bringing the summons
and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia.
115
In the pleadings filed by the parties before this Court, the parties entered into
a lengthy debate as to whether or not petitioner is doing business in the
Philippines. However, such discussion is completely irrelevant in the case at bar,
for two reasons. Firstly, since the Complaint was filed on August 30, 2005, the
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure govern the service of summons.
Section 12, Rule 14 of said rules provides:
Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no
such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect,
or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Secondly, the service of summons to petitioner through the DFA by the

conveyance of the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney,
Australia was clearly made not through the above-quoted Section 12, but
pursuant to Section 15 of the same rule which provides:
Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. – When the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Respondent argues that extraterritorial service of summons upon foreign

private juridical entities is not proscribed under the Rules of Court, and is in fact
within the authority of the trial court to adopt, in accordance with Section 6, Rule
135:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. – When by law

jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
116
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which

appears comformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with
the service of summons on a defendant which does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, while Rule 135 (which is in Part V of the Rules of Court
entitled Legal Ethics) concerns the general powers and duties of courts and
judicial officers.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates
to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out
of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte

Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation that:
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies

only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an
action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem,

Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance,
extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may
be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On
the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case
117
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring

jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court.
In Domagas v. Jensen, we held that:
The aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person
and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right
to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.
It is likewise settled that "an action in personam is lodged against a person

based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation."
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging
Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in
which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under a
contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering
into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the
plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in
which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the
defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily
appears in court.
In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held to

have voluntarily appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was
actually afforded, specific reliefs from the trial court. Respondent points out that
while petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was still pending, petitioner prayed for and
was able to avail of modes of discovery against respondent, such as written
interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of
documents.
118
Petitioner counters that under this Court’s ruling in the leading case of La
Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, a party may file a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time raise
affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, without waiving its objection
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.
It appears, however, that petitioner misunderstood our ruling in La Naval. A

close reading of La Naval reveals that the Court intended a distinction between
the raising of affirmative defenses in an Answer (which would not amount to
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court) and the prayer for affirmative reliefs
(which would be considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court):
In the same manner that a plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action
in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule
8, of the Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even
hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except
for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to
mean that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his
objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person, all other possible defenses. It
thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure
to so raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of course, we
refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be
asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer.
In order to conform to the ruling in La Naval, which was decided by this Court
in 1994, the former Section 23, Rule 14 concerning voluntary appearance was
amended to include a second sentence in its equivalent provision in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant's

voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
The new second sentence, it can be observed, merely mentions other grounds
in a Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. This clearly refers to affirmative defenses, rather than affirmative
reliefs.
Thus, while mindful of our ruling in La Naval and the new Section 20, Rule
20, this Court, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in a court is
tantamount to voluntary appearance therein. Thus, in Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, wherein defendants filed a "Motion for
Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
119
Court" subsequent to their filing of a "Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction),"

we held:
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary

appearance dissipate when the respondents' motion for
inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief:
inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the
case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than
dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the
active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount
to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.
In view of the above, we therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative

reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently,
the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss
on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
LUCAS V. LUCAS
June 6, 2011
 Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation is An Action In Rem

 Motion for DNA Testing
FACTS:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish

Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing) before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated
that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy, migrated to Manila from Davao and
stayed with a certain "Ate Belen" who worked in a prominent nightspot in
Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an
intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant
and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name
of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.

120
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,

respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection
to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with
copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent
the State in the case.
The respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested

inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2)
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served
on him as respondent.
ISSUE:
In a petition to establish illegitimate filiation, is it necessary to serve

summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the

simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case.
We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary,
in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons
jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioner’s
action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal

liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person;
while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.
A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status
of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of
entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is

necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
121
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a

prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the

simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for

the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure
to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide
the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is
determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his
opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in
the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to
the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been

adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation
was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption
which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as
defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petition—
classified as an action in rem—the notice requirement for an adversarial
proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the
giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section

1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain,
concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases
his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2)
the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.
122
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the
allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner’s personal
knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be
determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his
evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the

question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether
those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no

other. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but
their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to
deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial
to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be
ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural

aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented
their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity case—is
therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering
that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has
just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In
light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
123
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for
the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
"prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e.,
the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible
sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as
evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure
that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public."
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court

may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to

the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce

new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
124
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana eloquently explained —
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the
case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find
that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect

the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA

testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example,
consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.
RODRIGUEZ V. ARROYO
November 15, 2011/ Sereno, J.
125
EN BANC
 Writ of Amparo
 Writ of Habeas Data
FACTS:
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay

Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle, when four men forcibly took him and forced
him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of
whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons
arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car,
while the others rode on the tricycle.
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat
on his back and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of
Sta. Teresita. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then
entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. Rodriguez later on learned
that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit
him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded
him, but did not allow him to sleep.
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez,
blindfolded him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the
soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his
blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the
interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was
detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a
papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he
refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought
them to Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked
him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier
pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he
remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to
the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical
interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades.
He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.
126
Examinee’s Note: The mauling and maltreatment of continued. The

facts are long. We go to the point where he was able to reach his
house.
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18

September 2010.
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the

International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and
issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen
Hazel Robles, noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the
Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
Thereafter, the writ of amparo and habeas data were issued in favor of
Rodriguez. After the writs have been granted, interim reliefs were also prayed
for.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
ISSUE:
Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
HELD (Dry Run):
The interim reliefs may not be granted because the writ of amparo and
habeas data have already been issued in favor of Rodriguez. Those provisional
reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be
granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. Since the petitioner was
granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary
protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents
from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas
data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life,
127
liberty and security. The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming
prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007, and the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that

provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a

person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy – the proceedings
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of
criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are
proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the
database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its
deletion, destruction or rectification.
Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a
temporary protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only
available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime

before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any
of the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or
the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family
be protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and securing
their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or
128
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection

may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private

institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply

with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the
court, justice or judge.
(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to
permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object
or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be

inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security

or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice
or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is

necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged
to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons

authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place
and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The
order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
129
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or

photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national

security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which
case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to

protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to

other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
We held in Yano v. Sanchez that "these provisional reliefs are intended to

assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final
adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the
privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of
the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of
amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of
the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is
subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil

or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go
as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President

does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s
tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the
search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted

for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
130
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by

the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself
for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting
President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make
it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and
civil cases may already be filed against him.
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, we reiterated that the

presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s
incumbency:
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former
President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself
from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo,

Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity,
the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for
human rights abuses. This doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases
not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be

used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to
address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
131
Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility

in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as
commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the

following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the

accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be
or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to

prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily

possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international

tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may
nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a
more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge.
Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven
through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or
accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
We do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for

each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s general
averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show
that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or
security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
Responsibility or accountability of respondents
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in
this Court’s ruling in Razon, to wit:
132
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful
examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence
adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and
security.
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION V. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
August 31, 2011/ Bersamin, J.
 Indirect Contempt
FACTS:
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising

respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that
a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer
required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in
accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).
For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO
213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994.
In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-

Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order. On November 29, 2001,
however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld
the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4,
2001.
DMAP appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 152914), but the Court denied
DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to:
133
(a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days; and
(b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of
P202.00.
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the

occasion of which DMAP publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, which is
reproduced as follows:
SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM
20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE
1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court

was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue
DMAP presented.
Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial

(like the amount of filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of
receipt of court resolution)
> Some technical matters that could cause denial
- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.
> Legal issue DMAP presented
- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated
- MC 153
- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.
WHAT TO EXPECT?
1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI
WHAT TO DO?
1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:
- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on

merits of the case
- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of
reasonableness of freight is not under their jurisdiction but with
MARINA
134
- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic)

as there is a pending case filed before MARINA.
- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for
resolution
2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved

by MARINA
3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping

service may not suffer
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and
baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" to the effect that the
Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead
the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month
only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." They averred that the
respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy
the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!"
ISSUE:
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or

amount to indirect contempt of court?
HELD:
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of

a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience
to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising
of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be
specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a
judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power
by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their
presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and
135
their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power
to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of
willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no
process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.
The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the
presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is
not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their
authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute;
such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There
is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt
punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate
presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions
of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the
presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be
punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by
requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and
is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under
oath of other persons.
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the
first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed
outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all
the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an
opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and
sentence imposed.
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for
contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to
the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that
result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding
hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of
findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings

and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with,
136
and out-of-court contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is

drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise
of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the
ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of
in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further
proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt committed
directly under its eye or within its view. But there must be adequate facts to
support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise
of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is
needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason for the
extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that
the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing
with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its
active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action.
They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A
criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to
be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party
therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or
criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil
is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in
which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for
the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where
the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and
to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the
criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings
protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience
to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
137
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts

may be punished for indirect contempt:
a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;
b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,

order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the

processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and

acting as such without authority;
f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in

the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to

prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent
into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect.

There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be
considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show
on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good
faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in
some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and
in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be
138
his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the

court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment
serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of
court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of
the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Utterances in Sea Transport Update, Not Contemptuous
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of
the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect
contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.
The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the
Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners
as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents
to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain the
charge of indirect contempt.
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea

Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme
Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
presented", or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading "Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months."
Contrary to the petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" and as indicative that
"the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners" or that "the point that
respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the decision, for it was
based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!’", we find the
phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No.
152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the resolutions. The
unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAP’s members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going
back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.
We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other
person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the
criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have
no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has
long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In
re: Almacen:
139
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the
fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it
is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public
consumption.
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and

expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-
recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer
of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is

expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen."
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it

shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport
Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power
to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court,
not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
140
BULAWAN V. AQUENDE
June 22, 2011/ Carpio, J.
 Petition for Annulment of Judgment

 Indispensable Parties
FACTS:
Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages

against Lourdes Yap and the Register of Deeds before the trial court. Bulawan
claimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 having bought
the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco, who
claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged
that Yap claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of
TCT No. 40292 in Yap’s name.
In her Answer, Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No. 1634-A of
Psd-187165, which she claimed is the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No.
1634. Yap also mentioned that, in Civil Case No. 5064, the trial court already
declared that Psd-153847 was simulated by the Yaptengco brothers and that
their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was void. The trial court likewise adjudged Yap
Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap also stated that Lot No.
1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the Aquende family.
On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. The trial
court’s 26 November 1996 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Bulawan) and against the
defendant (Yap) declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner and
possessor of the property in question, particularly designated
as Lot 1634-B of Plan Psd-153847.
Subdivision Plan Psd-187165 for Lot 1634 Albay Cadastre

as well as TCT No. 40292 in the name of Yap over Lot 1634-A
of Plan Psd-187165 are hereby declared null and void and the
Register of Deeds of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to cancel as
well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant to said
Plan Psd-187165.
Yap appealed. On 20 July 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed Yap’s

appeal.
On 7 February 2002, the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision became

final and executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution.
141
In a letter dated 24 July 2002, the Register of Deeds informed Aquende of

the trial court’s writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No.
40067 so that a memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title.
Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property
having received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any adverse
claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.
Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the

Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due
process of law. Aquende argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan
conveniently failed to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in
his name and, thus, prevented him from participating in the proceedings and
protecting his title. Aquende also alleged that Bulawan was in collusion with
Judge Vladimir B. Brusola who, despite knowledge of the earlier decision in Civil
Case No. 5064 on the ownership of Lot No. 1634-B and Aquende’s interest over
the property, ruled in favor of Bulawan. Aquende added that he is an
indispensable party and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person because he was not impleaded as a party in the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende. The 26 November 2007

Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated November 26, 1996 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
40067 registered in the name of petitioner Emerson B. Aquende
is hereby ordered REINSTATED.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for annulment of judgment the proper remedy for Aquende?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled

on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court. In present case, there was extrinsic fraud because Aquende was
prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial court failed to
implead him as a party. The petition for annulment of judgment, therefore, is the
proper remedy.
Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the Proper Remedy

142
Bulawan argues that the Court of Appeals erred in granting Aquende’s

petition for annulment of judgment in the absence of extrinsic fraud and the
existence of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Bulawan adds that the
Court of Appeals erred because it annulled a decision which had already been
considered and affirmed by another division of the Court of Appeals. According
to Bulawan, the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision is already final and
had been fully executed.
In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the

grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court. On the other hand, lack of
jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the judgment or
final order and resolution are void. Where the questioned judgment is annulled,
either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be
set aside and considered void.
In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was
extrinsic fraud because he was prevented from protecting his title when
Bulawan and the trial court failed to implead him as a party. Aquende also
maintained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and,
therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision is not binding on him. In its 26
November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found merit in Aquende’s petition
and declared that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who
was adversely affected by its 26 November 1996 Decision. We find no error in
the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an
action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be
annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance of
Aquende’s petition for annulment of judgment and overturned the trial court’s 26
November 1996 Decision even if another division of the Court of Appeals had
already affirmed it and it had already been executed.
The Court also notes that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
26 November 1996 Decision, it had not been given the occasion to rule on the
issue of Aquende being an indispensable party and, if in the affirmative,
whether the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over his person. This
question had not been raised before the trial court and earlier proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.
143
Aquende is a Proper Party to Sue for the Annulment of the Judgment
Bulawan argues that Aquende was not an indispensable party in Civil Case
No. 9040 because the lot Aquende claims ownership of is different from the
subject matter of the case. Bulawan clarifies that she claims ownership of Lot
No. 1634-B of Psd-153847, while Aquende claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B
of Psd-187165. Bulawan argues that even if Aquende will be affected by the trial
court’s 26 November 1996 Decision, this will not make him an indispensable
party.
Contrary to Bulawan’s argument, it appears that Aquende’s Lot No. 1634-B of

Psd-187165 and Bulawan’s Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 actually refer to the
same Lot No. 1634-B originally owned by Yap Chin Cun. Both Aquende and
Bulawan trace their ownership of the property to Yap Chin Cun. Aquende
maintains that he purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun, while Bulawan
claims to have purchased the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who alleged
that they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. However, as the Court of
Appeals declared, the title of the Yaptengco brothers over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-
153847 had already been cancelled and they were forever enjoined not to
disturb the right of ownership and possession of Yap Chin Cun.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as

parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, we said:
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence
being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap and the
Register of Deeds should have prompted the trial court to inquire further
whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The
trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or
to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties
is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court, respectively.
However, even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file
a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is
144
that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable

judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented Aquende
from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting his title over
his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November
1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property
without due process.
Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound
by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in
which he is a stranger. In National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, we said:
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never

made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no
man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial
court’s decision decreed that "(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale
or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of
this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or
assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are
hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer
certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is
likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such
TCTs." Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as
he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from
Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the
height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be
nullified without being given the opportunity to present
any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of
the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. Clearly,
the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its
dispositive portion is concerned.
Likewise, Aquende was never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the
trial court ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of
title issued pursuant to Psd-187165, including Aquende’s TCT No. 40067.
Aquende was adversely affected by such judgment as his title was cancelled
without giving him the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his ownership
of the property.
145
CALUBAQUIB V. REPUBLIC
June 22, 2011/ Del Castillo, J.
 Summary Judgment
FACTS:
On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No.

80, which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay
Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation
expressly stated that it was being issued "subject to private rights, if any there
be."
Accordingly, the respondent Republic obtained an Original Certificate of Title

No. 13562 over the property.
On January 16, 1995, respondent filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao a

complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners alleging that sometime in
1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy
and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property)
thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite
repeated demands to do so. Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be
ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time
that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is
restored to possession.
Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the
subject property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992. They
maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib, have
been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early
1900s. Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the
area as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children
acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document
entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonio’s children applied for a homestead patent
but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. Nevertheless, these
children continued cultivating the subject property.
Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17,
1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly
occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation. Petitioners cite
as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military
reservation site "private rights, if any there be." Petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against them.
Given the trial court’s opinion that the basic facts of the case were
undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary
judgment. Neither party filed the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two
146
occasions its objection to a summary judgment. It explained that summary

judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and vital factual issue,
which is the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property. It argued
that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus:
The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to

raise any issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in
order. Let this case be submitted for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004
Decision dismissing petitioners’ claim of possession of the subject property in
the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80
recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military
reservation, petitioners’ position could "not be sustained, as there was no right of
[petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government."
ISSUE:
Rule on the propriety of rendering a summary judgment.
HELD (Dry Run):
It was improper for the trial court to render summary judgment.
Neither of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment and the trial court
did not conduct a hearing. The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on
such motion are important because these enable the court to determine if the
parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion
are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding
that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to
the action.
Moreover, the conclusion reached by the trial court, that the petitioners’
defense of acquisitive prescription and the ultimate facts they pleaded in their
Answer to the effect that they are in open and continuous possession of the
property since 1900s cannot be proven, is baseless and premature. No reason
was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during
trial.
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the
defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not
147
tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A deeper understanding of summary judgments is
found in Viajar v. Estenzo:
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or

promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be
an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of
them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a

summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a
scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a
motion for summary judgment by one party supported by
affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with
notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the
motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other
documents. In spite of its expediting character, relief by
summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with
the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation
of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact,
or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and
any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved
against the movant.
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence
of a genuine issue of fact, "as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim." "[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by
its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party
tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to
prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the
sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact
that their answers are not under oath anyway."
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under
oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted
148
with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if
the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is
proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine."
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a
matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the
action. The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and
conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the
summary judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with
neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed
an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary
judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact.
Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted
in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary
judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial
court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections.
Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary

judgment.
More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial,

the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an
assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and
that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous
possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This
assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given
why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower
courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense
and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.
It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary
judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment
based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of
petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and
prove their defense.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC

June 28, 2011/ Bersamin, J.
EN BANC
149
 Second Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS:
We hereby consider and resolve:– (a) the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which
is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April
29, 2011 (Motion For Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12,
2011 be reconsidered and set aside; and (b) the respondents’ Motion for Entry
of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
(Examinee’s Note for Quick Understanding of the Facts: Attached to the

Motion for Leave to file a Motion for Reconsideration is the Motion for
Reconsideration itself. That Motion for Reconsideration is dated April 29, 2011.
What it sought to reconsider is the resolution of the Court dated April 12.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011 will
prosper.
HELD (Dry Run):
The Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011 will not prosper. As its
prayer for relief shows, it seeks the reconsideration of the resolution of April 12,
2011. In turn, the resolution of April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners’ Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 15 February
2011. Clearly, it is really a second motion for reconsideration in relation to the
resolution dated February 15, 2011. Another indicium of its being a second
motion for reconsideration is the fact that it raises the same issues.
A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for

extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been
first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. Having no
such persuasive reasons being presented by the petitioners, the Motion for
Reconsideration will not prosper.
After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for

Reconsideration and grant the Motion for Entry of Judgment.
As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the

reconsideration, reversal, or setting aside of the resolution of April 12, 2011. In
turn, the resolution of April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners’ Ad Cautelam Motion
150
for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011). Clearly,

the Motion for Reconsideration is really a second motion for reconsideration in
relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011.
Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact
that the Motion for Reconsideration raises issues entirely identical to those the
petitioners already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of
the Decision dated 15 February 2011).
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration,

cannot be entertained. As to that, Section 2 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is
unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only
after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for
reconsideration be entertained. The restrictive policy against a second motion
for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court

shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and
any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is
not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or
by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second

motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration
"can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes
final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration" even renders the denial of
the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of
April 12, 2011 bears out, the ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by
the Court’s express declaration. Consequently, the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration is immediately warranted.
Finally, considering that the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration merely

rehashes the issues previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011), the Court,
having already passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss
the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy.
151
Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of

the 16 Cityhood Laws now absolutely warrants the granting of
respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment.
ANDERSON V. HO
January 7, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.
 Certification Against Forum Shopping
FACTS:
Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho

before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The MeTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. On appeal the RTC also
favored the dismissal of the case.
Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court, Anderson’s counsel, Atty. Rommel V. Oliva, filed a Motion for Extension
of Time of 15 days from May 20, 2005 or until June 4, 2005 within which to file
a petition allegedly due to the revisions required in the initial draft and on
account of heavy pressure of work. This was granted by the CA in a Minute
Resolution dated May 31, 2005.
Subsequently, said counsel sought another extension of 15 days or until June

19, 2005, this time claiming that the petition had already been finalized and
sent to Anderson in Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as well as sign the
certification and verification portion thereof. However, as of the last day of the
extended period on June 4, 2005, the petition has not yet been sent back, hence,
the additional extension being sought. In the interest of justice, the CA once
again granted the said motion for extension.
On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva was finally able to file the Petition for Review
but the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him
on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so. Hence, the
CA issued a Resolution on July 14, 2005, viz:
The Court resolves to DISMISS herein Petition for Review as the

certification against forum shopping was executed not by the
152
petitioner herself but by her counsel without attaching

therewith any special authority to sign on her behalf.
Anderson filed a Motion for Reconsideration. During its pendency, she also
filed a Manifestation to which was attached an Affidavit and a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing her counsel to cause the preparation and filing of the
Petition for Review and to sign and execute the verification and certification
against forum shopping on her behalf.
She explained in the Affidavit that at the time the petition was filed, her
health condition hindered her from going to the proper authority to execute the
necessary SPA so she just verbally instructed her lawyer to draft the petition
and cause the filing of the same. Nevertheless, upon learning of the dismissal of
her case, she returned to the Philippines even against her doctor’s advice and
executed an SPA in favor of her counsel. She thus prayed that the subsequently
submitted documents be considered in resolving her pending Motion for
Reconsideration.
The CA, however, remained unswayed and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Decide on the denial by the Court of Appeals.
HELD (Dry Run):
The denial by the Court of Appeals of the petition is correct. The certification
against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf. In this case, Atty. Oliva filed the petition
without a written authorization from his client. The dismissal, therefore, is
proper.
No justifiable reason exists in this case as to relax the rule on

certification against forum shopping.
The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it
imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural
153
requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has
been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the

guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate
of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows:
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance

therewith or a defect therein, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’
or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons’.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be

executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however,
for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a
peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action." "Obviously, it
is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether
she actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case." Per the above
guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable
or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record
to sign on her behalf. "A certification which had been signed by counsel without
the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the
dismissal of the petition."
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s
Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping
attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to
do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later
submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing
of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must
be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its
subsequent correction. And while it is true that in some cases the Court
considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it "did so only
154
on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while

avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping."
Unlike in Donato and the other cases cited by Anderson, no sufficient and
justifiable grounds exist in this case as to relax the rules on certification against
forum shopping.
In Donato, the CA dismissed therein petitioner’s Petition for Review on the

ground, among others, that the certification against forum shopping was signed
by his counsel. In filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner submitted a
certification duly signed by himself. However, the CA ruled that his subsequent
compliance did not cure the defect of the instant petition and denied his Motion
for Reconsideration. When the case reached this Court, it was held, viz:
The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against
forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Court’s attention to the
physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South
Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. where he needs to personally
accomplish and sign the verification.
We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to
have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to
travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington,
D.C., U.S.A. in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for
him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary
period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to
personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
While at first blush Donato appears to be similar with the case at bench, a
deeper and meticulous comparison of the two cases reveals essential
differences. In Donato, the Court held that it was impossible for the petition to
have been prepared and sent to the therein petitioner in the USA; for him to
155
travel from Virginia to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington D.C.; and
for the petition to be sent back to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary
period. The same could not, however, be said in this case. It must be
remembered that on top of the 15-day reglementary period to file the petition,
Atty. Oliva sought and was granted a total extension of 30 days to file the same.
Hence, Anderson had a total of 45 days to comply with the requirements of a
Petition for Review as against the 15 days afforded to the petitioner in Donato.
To this Court, the said period is more than enough time for Anderson to execute
an SPA before the nearest Philippine Consulate, which again unlike in Donato,
was located in the same state where Anderson was (Hawaii), and thereafter to
send it to the Philippines. Anent her allegation that her health condition at that
time hindered her from going to the proper authorities to execute an SPA, the
same deserves scant consideration as no medical certificate was submitted to
support this. "Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must
prove his allegations."
Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the

proper certificate of non-forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in
Donato. Notably in this case, the SPA was submitted two months after the filing
of Anderson’s Motion for Reconsideration. It took that long because instead of
executing an SPA before the proper authorities in Hawaii and sending the same
to the Philippines, Anderson still waited until she came back to the country and
only then did she execute one.
SPOUSES DACUDAO V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

January 8, 2013/ Bersamin, J.
EN BANC
 Hierarchy of Courts
 Special Civil Action for Certiorari
 Preliminary Investigation
 Petition for Prohibition
 Petition for Mandamus
 Equal Protection Clause
 Right to the Speedy Disposition of Cases
FACTS:
Petitioners - residents of Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso
G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
156
(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their
written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et
al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice

(DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors,
Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under

Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket
section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of
Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution
to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated
February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles,

Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective
offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro
City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009,
should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at
Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for
proper disposition.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel
of the DOJ.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the

Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182.
They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the
rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
157
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No.
182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of

Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Supreme Court?
HELD (Dry Run):
No, the petitioners did not properly bring their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Supreme Court for the reason that
such a direct resort disregards the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although, as
regards these remedies, the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, such rule does not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum without tendering
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of

substance and merit, is dismissed.
Hierarchy of Courts
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming

directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify
the direct filing of the petition.
158
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,

Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard
of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the

hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that
are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus
leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court
may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to
the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v.
Suelto:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must

so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
159
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict
adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency
on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the
Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the
highest tribunal, viz:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari

(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is
also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with
the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
160
applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the

expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction,
would have had to be filed with it.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration

for the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will
not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more
strict observance thereof.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only
judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances.
As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance.
Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in
Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall

be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it

relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a

municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
161
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court
was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
Special Civil Action for Certiorari
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. "The sole office of the writ of certiorari,"
according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes

the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start
with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of
Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to
162
ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the

preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
Preliminary Investigation
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting
as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial
body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of
the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments
of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file
163
a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or

whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or
resolutions.
Petition for Prohibition
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However,

we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what
manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed
issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of
jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings

of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified

true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Petition for Mandamus
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy
available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
164
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court." The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough,
the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was
what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of
Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of

its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court has extended the
presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative

agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law
and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until
they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court.
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the
Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate
of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof" as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution
Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I,
Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it

became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and
invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that
DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance
of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed
165
issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in
any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them
by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners
and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all
those responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state
prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and
comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby,
the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Equal Protection Clause
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in

DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional
guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,

2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases

for syndicated estafa were filed with your office against
officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the
distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your
Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued
by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the
records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the
Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct

preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy
Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to
file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to
prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of

the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.
166
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance
between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group
resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted
by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been
filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO
No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de
Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification
taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption
upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause
them some inconvenience.
Right to the Speedy Disposition of Cases
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would
be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a
flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of
their cases."
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado, the Court has clarified that although the
Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy
disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account.
There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when,
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and
vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of
Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means
of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive
investigation of the cases.
167
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more
cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and
other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and
subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. In fine, we see neither undue
delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of
their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only
future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being
investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions

exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182
constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of

Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes
and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end,
the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional,
provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the
discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct
offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their
objectives, policies and functions.
168
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the
bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any
person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected
should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
DIONA V. BALANGUE
 Petition for Annulment of Judgments
FACTS:
Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six

months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter
property located in Valenzuela. When the debt became due, respondents failed to
pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint
praying, among others, that respondents be ordered:
(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March
1991 until the full obligation is paid.
Respondents failed to file an answer and for such reason, they were declared
in default. In a decision dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s
complaint. It ordered the respondents to pay petitioners the sum of FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan
obligation plus interest at 5% per month reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the
same is fully paid.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that

respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former
counsel of the RTC’s Decision on November 13, 2000. On March 16, 2001, the
RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17,
2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved
for the public auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an
auction sale conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in
the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor
and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.
169
Respondents filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale

with Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting
petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and of their right to due process.
ISSUE:
Will the petition of the respondents prosper?
HELD (Dry Run):
The petition of the respondents will prosper. While under Section 2, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes
lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. The grant of 5%
monthly interest in favor of the petitioners is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest they sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process. It
is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated

their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final

judgment rule; grounds therefor
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a

remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without
fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that
it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s
own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of
finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once
a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid
to rest."
170
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to
annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a
final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest
sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief
without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is

improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process
of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence
presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not
feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9
of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered

against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it
cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow
himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded
171
a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No
doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to
safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily
issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of
due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of
relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard
thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported
both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any provision on
interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that
respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest.
Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award
of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due
process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not
informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They
were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was
seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by

petitioner’s general prayer for other reliefs and remedies just and equitable
under the premises. To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what
has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence,
and covered by the party’s cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the
awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and
proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v.
Yasuma, this Court held:
In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of

Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses
Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case
of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3%
interest per month or 36% interest per annum as excessive and
unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably
reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12%
interest per annum.
172
It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for,
as alleged in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from
their just and valid obligation." Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence
should never be construed as waiver to contest patently erroneous award which
already transgresses their right to due process, as well as applicable
jurisprudence.
Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of

his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for
relief, etc. through their own fault.
Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the

client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A
recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in
their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of
their client’s property without due process of law. In which case, the courts must
step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the

cause of his client was already present even from the beginning. It should be
recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an
Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence
was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly
interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000. A simple
reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it
awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what
is being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very
patent. It also defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the
counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention and
compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But
he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of
jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest
would result to his clients’ deprivation of property without due process of law.
Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an
appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later
that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the
attention of the RTC when respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to
Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC
173
candidly admitted that it "made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to

pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very different from
what was prayed for by the plaintiff."
"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law." Judging from how respondents’ former
counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly
negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their
property without due process of law.
In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the
gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing
such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their
former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would
amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. Here, "respondents are
plain and ordinary people who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and
technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon
and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may
lawfully warrant and require."
As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents’ principal obligation was

only P45,000.00. Due to their former counsel’s gross negligence in handling their
cause, coupled with the RTC’s erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5%
monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still owe petitioner a
large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:
If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will

not only end up losing their property but will additionally owe private respondent
the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had, in the
meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we cannot, in good
conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.
Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of

immutability of judgment. Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the
RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest. Amazingly, she
wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court cannot allow this
injustice to happen.
174
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC.

January 7, 2013
 Preliminary Injunctive Writ
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 156, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 12

December 2002, imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.
The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the sound
development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines." In Executive
Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions
(collectively, Southwing), we found EO 156 a valid executive issuance
enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by virtue of its
status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227.
Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation

engaged in the importation of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri,
Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government in the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan (trial court) to declare invalid EO 156, impleading
petitioner public officials as respondents. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1)
having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been
superseded by Executive Order No. 418, issued by President Arroyo on 4 April
2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent
sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of
EO 156.
ISSUE:
Should a preliminary injunctive relief be granted to the respondent?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. A preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing
of the applicant’s "clear legal right" being violated or under threat of violation by
the defendant. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. In the present case, it cannot be said
that the respondent has clear legal right against the operation of EO 156, as
such order was upheld by the Supreme Court in the previous case of Executive
Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.
175
We hold that it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant preliminary
injunctive relief to respondent.
Respondent Without Clear Legal Right to Import Used Motor Vehicles
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary

injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s
"clear legal right" being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.
"Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right "clearly
founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the
validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the
applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming
the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural
barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time,
restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is
rendered against them.
Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal

cause of action to invalidate EO 156. Respondent’s attack on EO 156, however,
comes on the heels of Southwing where we passed upon and found EO 156
legally sound, albeit overextended in application. We found EO 156 a valid police
power measure addressing an "urgent national concern":
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the

domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The
deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the
influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national
concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In
the exercise of delegated police power, the executive can
therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles.
The narrow ambit of this review precludes us from passing upon the merits of
the constitutional and administrative issues respondent raised to attack EO 156.
Nevertheless, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever legal right
respondent may possess vis à vis the operation of EO 156, we find such legal
right to be doubtful by force of the Southwing precedent. Until reversed or
modified by this Court, Southwing makes conclusive the presumption of EO
176
156’s validity. Our holding is bolstered by respondent’s failure to remove its case
from the confines of such ruling.
In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the "grave

and irremediable" financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result
of EO 156’s enforcement, finding such prejudice "inequitable." 21 No doubt, by
importing used motor vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156,
respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was self-imposed.
Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for injunctive
relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque
injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain
damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.
Nor does our ruling in Filipino Metals furnish doctrinal support for respondent.
We sustained the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in that
case to enjoin the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8800 (RA 8800) delegating to
a cabinet member the power to adopt measures to address prejudicial
importations in contravention of relevant international agreements. We grounded
our ruling on the fact that the petitioners, which principally argued that RA 8800
violates Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution (limiting Congress’ delegation
of the power to fix trade quotas to the President), "have established a strong case
for the unconstitutionality of RA 8800." In short, the petitioners in Filipino Metals
discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity accorded to RA
8800, warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in their favor.
Southwing forecloses a similar finding for respondent.
Lastly, we find no merit in respondent’s submission that EO 418 repealed EO

156, removing the legal bar to its importation of used motor vehicles. The
question of whether EO 418 repealed EO 156 was already settled in our
Resolution dated 22 August 2006 denying reconsideration of our ruling in
Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used motor vehicles via
the Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory presently advanced by respondent.
We rejected the proffered construction of the two issuances:
The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the

import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of
the executive department to prohibit the importation of said
vehicle. x x x There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which
expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of
the President in this case, is presumed to know the existing
laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
177
specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to

add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
not to repeal previous administrative issuances.
E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the

importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No.
418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import
duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes
the importation ban.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY V. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION
January 9, 2013/ Brion, J.
 Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under

Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
FACTS:
Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of

money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 80.
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank checks. These checks were all crossed,
and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager, in 1998.
Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City.
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint (against

Metrobank), AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with
SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC claimed that in case
it is true that Chua received those checks from SHCI, the latter never credited the
same to the account of the AMC.
178
In its answer to the third-party complaint, Metrobank admitted that it

deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly
done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. According to Metrobank, Chua
then gave the assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks
carried AMC’s consent. Chua also submitted documents showing his position
and interest in AMC. These documents, as well as AMC’s admission in its
answer that it allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative free hand, show
that it knew of Chua’s arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chua’s records
show that the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot
therefore now claim that it did not receive these proceeds.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party

complaint against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate should reimburse
Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed
against it by AMC.
ISSUE:
Rule on the motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint filed by

Metrobank.
HELD (Dry Run):
The motion should be denied.
Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate is one that is based on quasi-

contract which embodies the concept of solutio indebiti. Solutio indebiti has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered
through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no
right to demand it. In the instant case, Metrobank, in effect, delivered through
mistake the amount to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware and the latter
has no right to demand it. A claim based on quasi-contract against a deceased
person should be filed as a claim in the settlement of his estate.
Metrobank, therefore, should not be allowed to file such claim in an ordinary

civil action in the RTC of Quezon City.
In F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc.,

Online Networks International, Inc. similarly assailed F.A.T. Kee Computer
179
Systems, Inc.’s failure to attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the
RTC proceedings, and claimed this omission to be a violation of Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court that warranted the petition’s dismissal. The Court held
that the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms
part of the records of the case. Thus, there was no incurable omission that
warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.
The Court significantly pointed out in F.A.T. Kee that the requirement in
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule
whose violation would automatically lead to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules
of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court
provides that the Supreme Court "may require or allow the filing of such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within
such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate"; and "[i]f
the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of
the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days
from notice." These provisions are in keeping with the overriding standard that
procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their objective and to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding.
Under this guiding principle, we do not see Metrobank’s omission to be a fatal

one that should warrant the petition’s outright dismissal. To be sure, the
omission to submit the adverse party’s pleadings in a petition before the Court is
not a commendable practice as it may lead to an unduly biased narration of
facts and arguments that masks the real issues before the Court. Such skewed
presentation could lead to the waste of the Court’s time in sifting through the
maze of the parties’ narrations of facts and arguments and is a danger the Rules
of Court seeks to avoid.
Our examination of Metrobank’s petition shows that it contains AMC’s

opposition to its motion to admit fourth-party complaint among its annexes. The
rest of the pleadings have been subsequently submitted as attachments in
Metrobank’s Reply. A reading of these pleadings shows that their arguments are
the same as those stated in the orders of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Thus, even if Metrobank’s petition did not contain some of AMC’s pleadings, the
Court still had the benefit of a clear narration of facts and arguments according
to both parties’ perspectives. In this broader view, the mischief that the Rules of
Court seeks to avoid has not really been present. If at all, the omission is not a
grievous one that the spirit of liberality cannot address.
180
The main issue poses to us two essential points that must be addressed.
First, are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule
86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobank’s claim against
the Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract?
Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule

86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
In Maclan v. Garcia, Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben
Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia
acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner. He set up the defense that
this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of
his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from
law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the
settlement of the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).
The Court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent
as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v.
O’Brien, it explained that the term "implied contracts," as used in our remedial
law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-
contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term
quasi-contract is included in the concept "implied contracts" as used in the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts
should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract
Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate
as one based on quasi-contract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that
the law creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a
person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil Code provides an enumeration of
quasi-contracts, but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides examples.
According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the

quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154
embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is delivered
through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter
to return what has been received through mistake.
181
Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered
through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no
right to demand it.
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should

reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber
and Hardware’s account upon Chua’s instructions.
This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a

manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber
and Hardware’s account; because of Chua’s control over AMC’s operations,
Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no
right to demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its account;
despite Chua’s control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two
entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot
be deposited in the account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on
the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to
return the amount of these checks to Metrobank.
The Court notes, however, that its description of Metrobank’s fourth-party

complaint as a claim closely analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the
validity of the lower courts’ orders denying it. It is not an adjudication
determining the liability of Chua’s estate against Metrobank. The appropriate
trial court should still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against
Chua’s estate based on quasi-contract.
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within

the claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent

nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in
the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not

filed, barred; exceptions. – All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
182
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,

and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice.
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over

general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply
because it impleaded Chua’s estate for reimbursement in the same transaction
upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the
conclusion of the CA, to wit:
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section

11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily
shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions
while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims
against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11,
Rule 6.
We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of
lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be
filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules
provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
merely apply suppletorily.
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the
resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution.
Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on
quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both
belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
NPC V. ZABALA
183
 Eminent Domain
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff National Power Corporation filed a complaint

for Eminent Domain against defendants Spouses Zabala before the Regional
Trial Court, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that: defendants Spouses Zabala own
parcels of land located in Balanga City, Bataan; and it urgently needed an
easement of right of way over the affected areas for its transmission lines.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision, ruling that Napocor
has the lawful authority to take for public purpose and upon payment of just
compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. The RTC likewise ruled
that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their
property, they are entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it
fixed the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. The dispositive portion
of the RTC’s Partial Decision reads:
Accordingly, Napocor is hereby ordered to pay defendant

Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon the amount of Php
150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square meters taken
from the latter’s property, as the just compensation fixed and
recommended by the commissioners determined as of the date
of the taking of the property.
Napocor appealed to the CA. It argued that the Commissioners’ reports upon
which the RTC based the just compensation are not supported by documentary
evidence. Necessarily, therefore, the just compensation pegged by the RTC at
P150.00 per square meter also lacked basis. Napocor likewise imputed error on
the part of the RTC in not applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395
which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market
value of the property traversed by its transmission lines.
Napocor contends that under Section 3A of RA No. 6395, it is not required to

pay the full market value of the property when the principal purpose for which it
is actually devoted will not be impaired by its transmission lines. It is enough for
Napocor to pay easement fee which, under the aforementioned law, should not
exceed 10% of the market value of the affected property. Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395
provides:
Sec. 3A. In acquiring private property or private property

rights through expropriation proceedings where the land or
portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines, only
a right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the
principal purpose for which such land is actually devoted will
not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof
184
will be needed for the projects or works, such land or portion

thereof as necessary shall be acquired.
ISSUE:
Napocor argued that in computing just compensation, the RTC should apply
Sec. 3A of RA 6395. Is the argument meritorious?
HELD (Dry Run):
No, the argument is not meritorious. Determination of just compensation in

eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes, such as RA 6395, may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation. It may
not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount.
Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances, fixing or providing fix

the method of computing just compensation are tantamount to impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Thus they are not binding on courts and,
at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.
Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the

courts to determine just compensation.
In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the market value
of the affected property, Napocor relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395.
Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's
gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the
word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be
tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is
guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As
such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts
from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation
has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government." Thus, we have consistently ruled that
statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing
just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. In National Power Corporation v.
Bagui, where the same petitioner also invoked the provisions of Section 3A of RA
No. 6395, we held that:
185
Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is

not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized
that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount.
This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao, National Power Corporation

v. Tuazon and National Power Corporation v. Saludares and continues to be the
controlling doctrine. Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it
is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only and not
the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. But we
uniformly held in those cases that since the high-tension electric current passing
through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of
the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to
recompense them for the full market value of their property.
The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed by the RTC is not
supported by evidence.
It has likewise been our consistent ruling that just compensation cannot be
arrived at arbitrarily. Several factors must be considered, such as, but not
limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of
the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by
documentary evidence.
In the case before us, it appears that the Commissioners’ November 28, 1997
Report/Recommendation is not supported by any documentary evidence. There
is nothing therein which would show that before arriving at the recommended
just compensation of P150.00, the Commissioners considered documents
relevant and pertinent thereto. Their Report/Recommendation simply states that
on November 17, 1997, the Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection; that
they interviewed persons in the locality; that the adjacent properties have
market value of P150.00 per square meter; and, that the property of Nobel
Philippine which is farther from the Roman Expressway is being sold for
P200.00 per square meter. No documentary evidence whatsoever was presented
to support their report that indeed the market value of the adjacent properties
are P150.00 and that of Nobel Philippine is P200.00.
In Republic v. Santos, we ruled that a commissioners’ land valuation which is

not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court.
186
The same ruling was arrived at in National Power Corporation v. Diato-

Bernal, where we overturned the ruling of the trial court and the CA adopting the
findings of the commissioners sans supporting documentary evidence therefor.
Thus:
It is evident that the above conclusions are highly

speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First,
the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots
were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative
documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area
concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings
and commercial establishments. The report also failed to
elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and
convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondent’s
property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings
alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.
Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may accept or
reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners’ report which is merely
advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report or
set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In the case before us,
however, in spite of the insufficient and flawed reports of the Commissioners
and Napocor’s objections thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the same. It
shrugged off Napocor’s protestations and limited itself to the reports submitted
by the Commissioners. It neither considered nor required the submission of
additional evidence to support the recommended P150.00 per square meter just
compensation.
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed

based on the fair value of the subject property at the time of its taking or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the
eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just compensation should be
based on the fair market value of spouses Zabala’s property at the time of the
filing of Napocor’s Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
ORPIANO V. SPOUSES TOMAS

 Forum Shopping
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their

conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City.
187
In 1979, a Decision was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court (JDRC) of Quezon City declaring Estrella an absent/absentee
spouse and granting Alejandro the authority to sell the lot.
In 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses

Antonio and Myrna Tomas (the Tomas spouses) for P12,170,283.00. That very
same day, a new title – TCT No. N-152326 – was issued in the name of the
Tomas spouses despite the fact that the purchase price has not been paid in full.
On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed Civil Case No. Q-96-29261 (the collection
case) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 226 (the collection
court), seeking collection of the balance of the price in the amount of
P4,314,100.00 supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages.
During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His heirs,
Estrella included, were substituted in his stead in the collection case. Estrella
moved to amend the Complaint to one for rescission/annulment of sale and
cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She next moved to be
dropped as party plaintiff but was again rebuffed.
On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed Civil Case No. Q-05-56216 (the annulment
case) for annulment of the March 1996 sale and cancellation of TCT No. N-
152326, with damages, against the Tomas spouses and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City which was impleaded as a nominal party. The case was raffled to
Branch 97 of the Quezon City RTC (the annulment court). In her Complaint,
Estrella claimed that the 1979 declaration of her absence and accompanying
authority to sell the lot were obtained by Alejandro through misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit, adding that the May 1979 JDRC Decision was not published
as required by law and by the domestic relations court. Thus, the declaration of
absence and Alejandro’s authority to sell the lot are null and void.
Correspondingly, the ensuing sale to the Tomas spouses should be voided, and
TCT No. N-152326 cancelled.
In their Answer to the annulment Complaint, the Tomas spouses prayed for
the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping, arguing that the filing of
the annulment case was prompted by the denial of Estrella’s motion initiated in
the collection case to amend the Complaint to one for annulment of sale. The
annulment case is Estrella’s attempt at securing a remedy which she could not
obtain in the collection case. The Tomas spouses added that the dismissal of the
annulment case would preclude the possibility that the two courts might render
conflicting decisions.
188
ISSUE:
Whether there is forum shopping.
HELD:
There is forum shopping. The filing by Estrella of the annulment case

produces the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to
preclude. If the collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the
annulment case, proceeds to finality, not only there is a possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered; an unfair situation might arise where after having
paid the balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation
of the TCT and return of the property could be decreed by the annulment court.
Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse

judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil
action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. It is expressly prohibited
because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration
of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the
rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and
may also constitute direct contempt.
Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to
trifle with judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the
annulment case, still the said case should be dismissed because it produces the
same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If the
collection case is not dismissed and it, together with the annulment case,
proceeds to finality, not only do we have a possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered; an unfair situation, as envisioned by the Tomas spouses, might
arise where after having paid the balance of the price as ordered by the
collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and return of the property could be
decreed by the annulment court. Besides, allowing the two cases to remain
pending makes litigation simply a game of chance where parties may hedge their
position by betting on both sides of the case, or by filing several cases involving
the same issue, subject matter, and parties, in the hope of securing victory in at
least one of them. But, as is already well known, the "trek to justice is not a
game of chance or skill but rather a quest for truth.
189
Moreover, allowing Estrella to proceed with the annulment case while the
collection case is still pending is like saying that she may accept the deed of sale
and question it at the same time. For this is the necessary import of the two
pending cases: joining as plaintiff in the collection case implies approval of the
deed, while suing to declare it null and void in the annulment court entails a
denunciation thereof. This may not be done. "A person cannot accept and reject
the same instrument" at the same time. It must be remembered that "the absence
of the consent of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale."
The Court realizes the quandary that Estrella — motivated by the solitary
desire to protect her conjugal share in the lot from what she believes was
Alejandro’s undue interference in disposing the same without her knowledge
and consent — finds herself in. While raring to file the annulment case, she has
to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because she was by necessity
substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandro’s heir; but the collection court
nonetheless blocked all her attempts toward such end. The collection court failed
to comprehend her predicament, her need to be dropped as party to the collection
case in order to pursue the annulment of the sale.
As plaintiff in the collection case, Estrella – though merely succeeding to

Alejandro’s rights – was an indispensable party, or one without whom no final
determination can be had in the collection case. Strictly, she may not be dropped
from the case. However, because of her dual identity, first as heir and second as
owner of her conjugal share, she has been placed in the unique position where
she has to succeed to her husband’s rights, even as she must protect her
separate conjugal share from Alejandro’s perceived undue disposition. She may
not seek to amend the cause of action in the collection case to one for annulment
of sale, because this adversely affects the interests of her co-heirs, which is
precisely to obtain payment of the supposed balance of the sale price.
Nor may Estrella simultaneously maintain the two actions in both capacities,
as heir in the collection case and as separate owner of her conjugal share in the
annulment case. This may not be done, because, as was earlier on declared, this
amounts to simultaneously accepting and rejecting the same deed of sale. Nor is
it possible to prosecute the annulment case simultaneously with the collection
case, on the premise that what is merely being annulled is the sale by Alejandro
of Estrella’s conjugal share. To repeat, the absence of the consent of one spouse
to a sale renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
190
Undoubtedly, Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a

measure of protecting her conjugal share. There thus exists a just cause for her
to be dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so that she may institute
and maintain the annulment case without violating the rule against forum
shopping. Unless this is done, she stands to lose her share in the conjugal
property. But the issue of whether the sale should be annulled is a different
matter altogether.
Under the Rules, parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the collection court to
have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment case by dropping her as a
party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect her
conjugal share, but also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being
adversely affected by her conflicting actions in the same case. By seeking to be
dropped from the collection case, Estrella was foregoing collection of her share in
the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does not imply a waiver
in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.
While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her – amending
the Complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party – she committed a
mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after these remedies
were denied her by the collection court without first questioning or addressing
the propriety of these denials. While she may have been frustrated by the
collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to
appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a
petition for certiorari or otherwise question the trial court’s denial of her motion to
be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary.
Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of
certiorari.
In fine, we reiterate that considerations of expediency cannot justify a resort

to procedural shortcuts. The end does not justify the means; a meritorious case
cannot overshadow the condition that the means employed to pursue it must be
in keeping with the Rules.
PADALHIN V. LAVIŇA
November 14, 2012/ Reyes, J.
191
 Verification
 Certification Against Forum Shopping
RULING:
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has

read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records. A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on “information and belief” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff

or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b)
if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not

be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
192
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and

deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(Italics ours)
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to

expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Time and again, this
Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification of non-
forum shopping under the Rules of Court. Verification is required to secure an
assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or
are true and correct and not merely speculative. The attestation on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the
lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the
filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar
to the current petition.
The circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not qualify to exempt

compliance with the rules and justify our exercise of leniency. The verification
and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant petition was not
signed personally by the petitioners themselves. Even if we were to admit as
valid the SPA executed in Norman’s (petitioner’s son) favor allowing him to sign
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant
petition, still, his authority is wanting. Petitioner Annie did not participate in the
execution of the said SPA. In the pleadings filed with us, there is nary an
explanation regarding the foregoing omissions. The petitioner spouses took
procedural rules for granted and simply assumed that the Court will accord them
leniency. It bears stressing that procedural rules are crafted towards the orderly
administration of justice and they cannot be haphazardly ignored at the
convenience of the party litigants.
Laviña also seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of being
supposedly anchored on factual and not legal issues. The case of Vda. De
Formoso v. Philippine National Bank is emphatic on what issues can be resolved
in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure,
to wit:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question
193
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a

certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of
the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. The
substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled
to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is
a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari.
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent
to subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA.
Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and substantial
evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s
favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s
counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed by Laviña before
the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are not a trier of facts.
Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not legal in
character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
LADAGA V. MAPAGU
November 13, 2012/ Perlas-Bernabe, J.
EN BANC
 Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in

what is alleged to be the Order of Battle of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry
Division which is a list containing the names of organizations and personalities
in Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City, supposedly connected to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's
Army (NPA). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order
194
of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or

extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security.
Petition of Atty. Lilibeth Ladaga
The petitioner, ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA, first came to know of the

existence of the Order of Battle List from an undisclosed source on May 21,
2009. This was after the PowerPoint presentation made public by Bayan Muna
Party-List Representative Satur Ocampo (Representative Ocampo) on May 18,
2009 during the conclusion of the International Solidarity Mission (ISM)
conducted by various organizations. The entries in the OB bear reference to her
person.
In her Affidavit, Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life,
liberty and security by narrating that since 2007, suspicious-looking persons
have been visiting her Davao City law office during her absence, posing either as
members of the military or falsely claiming to be clients inquiring on the status of
their cases.
Petition of Atty. Angela Trinidad
On the other hand, Davao City Councilor ATTY. ANGELA TRINIDAD, delivered
a privilege speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Davao City on May 19, 2009 to demand the removal of her name from said OB
List. Subsequently, the Davao City Council ordered a formal investigation into
the existence of the alleged OB List. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), for
its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the matter, having
been presented a copy of the PowerPoint presentation during its public hearing in
Davao City on May 22, 2009.
According to her, in the course of the performance of her duties and functions
as a lawyer, as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao, as well
as, of Bayan Muna, she has not committed any act against national security that
would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. In her Affidavit, she
recounted that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men on a
motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went about her day going to different places.
She also recalled that on June 23, 2008, while she was away from home, three
unidentified men tried to barge into their house and later left on board a plate-
less, stainless “owner type vehicle.” Both incidents were duly reported to the
police.
195
Petition of Atty. Carlos Isagani Zarate
Meanwhile, Secretary General of the Union of Peoples' Lawyers in Mindanao

(UPLM) and Davao City Coordinator of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG),
ATTY. CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE was informed sometime in May 2009 that
his name was also among those included in the OB List made public by
Representative Ocampo at a forum concerning human rights violations in
Southern Mindanao. In Atty. Zarate's petition, he alleged that:
5. On May 19, 2009, during a press conference marking the

conclusion of an International Solidarity Mission (ISM) –
attended by both local and international delegates and
organized to investigate alleged human rights violations in
Southern Mindanao by state's forces – Bayan Muna Party-list
Representative Satur Ocampo revealed the existence of a
“watch list,” officially known in military parlance as “Order of
Battle” prepared by the intelligence arm of Philippine Army's
10th ID, headed by respondent Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu;
6. The said “Order of Battle” was contained in a

[PowerPoint] presentation marked “SECRET” and captioned
“3rd Quarter 2007 OB Validation Result”; it was supposedly
prepared by the “JCICC ‘Agila’” under the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the 10th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army;
7. The said [PowerPoint] presentation (which Representative

Ocampo said was “leaked” by a “conscientious soldier”),
revealed the names of organizations and personalities in
Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City, supposedly
“connected” to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA);
8. The name of the herein petitioner was listed in the

categories of “human rights” and “Broad Alliance”
Asserting that the inclusion of his name in the OB List was due to his
advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer, Atty. Zarate vehemently
and categorically denied that he was fronting for, or connected with, the CPP-
NPA.
196
In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB List is really a military
hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three victims
of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List,
to wit: Celso B. Pojas, who was assassinated in May 2008 purportedly because
he was Secretary General of the Farmers Association of Davao City and
Spokesperson of the Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP), which
organizations were identified as communist fronts in the subject OB List; Lodenio
S. Monzon, who was a victim of a shooting incident in April 2009 due to his
supposed connection to the known activist party-list group Bayan Muna as
Coordinator in the Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental; and Dr. Rogelio
Peñera, who was shot to death in June 2009 allegedly because he was a
member of RX Against Erap (RAGE), a sectoral group also identified in the OB
List.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents' inconsistent statements and

obvious prevarication sufficiently prove their authorship of the subject OB List.
Supposedly sourced from their own Press Releases, respondents have been
quoted in several newspapers as saying: 1) that the “10th ID has its Order of
Battle, and, it is not for public consumption”; 2) that the Order of Battle “requires
thorough confirmation and validation from different law enforcement agencies,
and from various sectors and stakeholders who are the ones providing the
information about the people and organizations that may in one way or the
other, wittingly or unwittingly, become involved in the CPP's grand design”; and
3) that an “order of battle does not target individuals; it is mainly an assessment
of the general threat to national security”.
On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Application for a Production Order,
docketed as Special Proceeding Nos. 004-09, 005-09 and 006-09. On June 22,
2009, the RTC issued separate Writs of Amparo in each of the three (3) cases,
directing respondents to file a verified written return within seventy-two (72)
hours and setting the case for summary hearing on June 29, 2009.
The RTC, however, rejected petitioners' arguments in the September 22, 2009
Order, hence, these petitions for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in not granting the privilege of the writ of amparo?
HELD:
197
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making
powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking
the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent
punishment of the perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously
held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address
violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a
remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or
uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every petition for
the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of
fact on the following matters:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent

responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,

personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to

determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or
omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general
prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
198
The sole and common issue presented in these petitions is whether the
totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence

Required. – The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
SEC. 18. Judgment. – The court shall render judgment

within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere
imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability
against the person charged. The summary nature of amparo proceedings, as
well as, the use of substantial evidence as standard of proof shows the intent of
the framers of the rule to address situations of enforced disappearance and
extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with what is akin to administrative
proceedings.
Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment
of amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties that
beset amparo petitioners, arising as they normally would from the fact that the
State itself, through its own agents, is involved in the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing that it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus, in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of relaxed
admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to meet the required
amount of proof showing the State's direct or indirect involvement in the
purported violations and found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases “to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality” and “to consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.” Put simply, evidence is not to
be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the rules for as long as it
satisfies “the most basic test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.”
199
As emphasized by Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) during the

deliberations on this case, in cases of enforced disappearance, the evidence that
would directly establish a violation of the right to life, liberty and security is
indubitably in the State’s possession. The same is not equally true in cases
where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this case) a threatened violation of
his/her rights since the facts, circumstances and the link between these that
create an actual threat to his/her life are measurably within the ability of the
amparo petitioner to prove. These include, among others, the alleged documented
human rights violations by the military in Mindanao; documentary and/or
testimonial evidence on the military’s counter-insurgency operations;
corroborative evidence to support the allegations on the presence of suspicious
men; and presumptive evidence linking the deaths of Celso Pojas, Ludenio
Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera to their political affiliation and the similarity of
their situation to those of petitioners. A mere inclusion of one’s name in the OB
List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the burden to establish actual
threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence.
The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are the real
source of the OB List is unquestionably hearsay evidence because, except for the
fact that he himself received the OB List from an unnamed source merely
described as “a conscientious soldier,” he had no personal knowledge
concerning its preparation. But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate
measure of flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the hearsay testimony of
Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of
those adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting the
existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle, the affidavits of petitioners
attesting to the threatening visits and tailing of their vehicles by menacing
strangers, as well as the violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to
the conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be adequately
proven.
Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of
known activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera to the
inclusion of the latter's names or the names of their militant organizations in the
subject OB List. Petitioner Atty. Librado-Trinidad even attributed the alleged
tailing of her vehicle by motorcycle-riding men and the attempted entry by
suspicious men into her home to the inclusion of her name in the OB List. The
RTC, however, correctly dismissed both arguments, holding that the existence of
the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities, thus:
200
“Anent petitioner's revelation that sometime in 2008, a number of unidentified

men attempted to forcibly enter the premises of her dwelling and that at one
occasion, the vehicle she was riding was tailed by motorcycle-riding men, the
same could not led [sic] to the conclusion that indeed, those incidents were
related to the existence of the “OB List.” There appears not even an iota of
evidence upon which the same assumption can be anchored on. This Court
likewise sees no direct relation between the violent deaths of Celso Pojas,
Ludenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera and the subject “OB List.” There is no
evidence pointing to the claim that they were killed because their names or the
organizations they were involved in were mentioned in the same “OB List.” More
importantly, there is no official finding by the proper authorities that their deaths
were precipitated by their involvement in organizations sympathetic to, or
connected with, the Communist Party of the Philippines, or its military arm, the
New People's Army. Lastly, and more telling, the existence of the subject “OB
List” has not been adequately proven, as discussed heretofore, hence, reference
to the same finds no basis.”
The Court holds that the imputed pattern of targeting militants for execution
by way of systematically identifying and listing them in an Order of Battle
cannot be inferred simply from the Press Releases admitting the existence of a
military document known as an Order of Battle and the fact that activists Celso
Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera have become supposed victims of
extralegal killings. The adduced evidence tends to bear strongly against the
proposition because, except for Celso Pojas, the names of the supposed victims of
extrajudicial killings are manifestly absent in the subject OB List and the
supposed connection of the victims to the militant groups explicitly identified in
the OB List is nothing short of nebulous.
Moreover, while respondents may have admitted through various statements

to the media that the military has its own Order of Battle, such an admission is
not equivalent to proof that the subject OB List, which was publicly disclosed by
Representative Ocampo by way of a PowerPoint presentation, is one and the
same with the Order of Battle that the military has in its keeping. And, assuming
that the Press Releases do amount to an admission not only of the existence but
also the authenticity of the subject OB List, the inclusion of petitioners' names
therein does not, by itself, constitute an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty
and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.
In the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the Court ruled that a
person's right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from fear” and that any
201
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong. The term
“any threat,” however, cannot be taken to mean every conceivable threat in the
mind that may cause one to fear for his life, liberty or security. The Court
explicated therein that “[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.”
Certainly, given the uniqueness of individual psychological mindsets, perceptions
of what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security must
be actual, and not merely one of supposition or with the likelihood of happening.
And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as
opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying that the threshold
requirement of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings has also been met.
Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas,
Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peñera without corroborative evidence from
which it can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were,
in fact, on account of their militant affiliations or that their violent fates had been
actually planned out by the military through its Order of Battle. The Court may
be more yielding to the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence and logical
inferences, but substantial evidence is still the rule to warrant a finding that the
State has violated, is violating, or is threatening to violate, amparo petitioners'
right to life, liberty or security. No substantial evidence of an actual threat to
petitioners' life, liberty and security has been shown to exist in this case. For,
even if the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners' names
therein, can be properly inferred from the totality of the evidence presented, still,
no link has been sufficiently established to relate the subject OB List either to the
threatening visits received by petitioners from unknown men or to the violent
deaths of the three (3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which
could strongly suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of military involvement,
the inclusion of one's name in an Order of Battle would eventually result to
enforced disappearance and murder of those persons tagged therein as
militants.
202
Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court

ruled in the cases of Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's failure to
establish by substantial evidence the involvement of government forces in the
alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct
of further investigation where it appears that the government did not observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duty to investigate the
complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance. The Court directed
further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest efforts of police
investigators were effectively putting petitioner's right to security in danger with
the delay in identifying and apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court
found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue
with extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and
disappearance of a known activist because not only did the police investigators
conduct an incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed their
ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate
with the authorities. In both of these cases, the incidents of abduction and
torture were undisputed and they provided the evidentiary support for the
finding that the right to security was violated and the necessity for further
investigation into such violation. Unlike Roxas and Razon, Jr., however, the
present petitions do not involve actual cases of abduction or disappearance that
can be the basis of an investigation. Petitioners would insist that respondents be
investigated and directed to produce the Order of Battle that they have admitted
to be in their safekeeping and justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein.
However, without substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' rights to
life, liberty and security that consists more than just the inclusion of their names
in an OB List, an order for further investigation into, or production of, the
military's Order of Battle, would have no concrete basis.
NARCISO V. GARCIA
November 21, 2012/ Abad, J.
 Default
 Motion to Dismiss
Ruling:
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a defending party may be
declared in default upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
defending party, and proof of failure to file an answer within the time allowed for
it. Thus:
203
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party

fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending
party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default.
Here, however, defendant Narciso filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff Garcia’s

complaint against her before filing an answer. Section 1, Rule 16 allows her this
remedy. Thus:
SEC. 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion
to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx
As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the

running of the period during which the rules required her to file her answer was
deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss, therefore,
she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under Section 4, Rule 16
within which to file the same but in no case less than five days, computed from
her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to dismiss. Thus:
SEC. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion is denied, the movant

shall file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed
by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his
motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed
from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is
ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the
period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the
amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.
But apart from opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked
the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer, altogether
disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the case.
Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcia’s prayer and simultaneously
denied Narciso’s motion to dismiss and declared her in default, it committed
serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court denied her
motion to dismiss. She still had at least five days within which to file her answer
to the complaint.
204
What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of
such a motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied it
does Narciso become bound to file her answer to Garcia’s complaint. And only if
she did not do so was Garcia entitled to have her declared in default.
SUNTAY V. SUNTAY
(Emilio Suntay III v. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay)
October 10, 2012/ Perez, J.
 Appointment of a Co-Administrator of the Estate of a Decedent
FACTS:
The decedent Cristina Suntay died intestate in 1990. Cristina was survived
by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only
child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren,
Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel
Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were
involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and
void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and

Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio
II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The court granted their prayer for
one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in
court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and
anxiety.
205
More than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
In 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico,
opposed the petition pointing out, among others, that Isabel had no right of
representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of
the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that

Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a
void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9

November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the subject estate.
On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court. It decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s
estate.
Isabel filed a motion for reconsideration.

206
In that motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
ISSUE:
Should the Supreme Court reconsider its decision?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes, the Supreme Court should reconsider its decision by excluding Emilio III
as a co-administrator and favoring the sole administratorship of Isabel. Given
Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest “next of kin,” the appointment of Emilio III
as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right, but a
matter which belongs to the sound discretion of the court and depends on the
facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. Since it turned out that Emilio
III has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has a long-standing
animosity with Isabel, it appears that he is an unsuitable co-administrator. The
administratorship, therefore, should pertain solely to Isabel.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a

decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration

granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
207
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the

principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to

serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in

the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in
the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the

estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This
is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In
all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the

administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s
interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the
decedent’s estate. Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a
decedent which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the

appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co
administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section
6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of
administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In
addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
which say that “when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed,
the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone.”
208
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one

administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. We
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or
the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment.
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in

Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-
administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied
and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;
and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of

special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of
the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special
interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix designated in
the instrument who should not be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus,
we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the
non-compulsory heirs of the decedent consisting of an instituted heir (Matias)
and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the
management of the decedent’s estate.
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that

“inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that
she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the
administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her
proprietary interests.”
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.

Ventura where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a
distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the
category being preferred, thus:
209
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased

Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel
Ventura. The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of
kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest
of kin is to be preferred.’”
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated
preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we maintained that the order of preference

in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as
special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the decedent’s
estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable.
Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for
appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual, we see another story with a running theme of heirs

squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the
probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he
had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one of
the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court pointed
to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate in
the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of
Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
210
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v.

Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for
the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but
also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate.
Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative
when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left
entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which
are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the
appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as
the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to
be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal.
Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to
appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion
in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special

Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her
appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in
Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not
per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this
fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to
"overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and
lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the

decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion that
inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that
she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the
administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her
proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special
administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals
211
where we held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of
kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the
naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the
deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must
be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda.

de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral
circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand
for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory

character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes

the order of preference in the issuance of letters of
administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse,
the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to
be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any
valid and sufficient reason therefor.
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, we

expounded on the legal contemplation of a “next of kin,” thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment

of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When
the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who
are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's
property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In
resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the
212
decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass

upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in
a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
Angeles.
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals, we took into consideration the size of, and
benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators
may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable

interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the
Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate
and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed
co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the
foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to

be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration
thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in
the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
nearest “next of kin,” the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the
same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the
sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this

case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in
the estate of Cristina. These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of
the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the

one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
213
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of

some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in
the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s
estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s
estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage
and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s

demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable
administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s
appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked
after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court

for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories he
filed therewith properties of the estate including several parcels
of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,
paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against

Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which
adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and
which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave
any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to
succeed to her estate.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel
have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical,
nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s
estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other
witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged
214
from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate
to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately
interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a

preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point
out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of
the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, we mapped out as among the
allowable participation of “any interested persons” or “any persons interested in
the estate” in either testate or intestate proceedings:
4. Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested

in the estate of the deceased “to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest
therein;”
5. Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and

place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account “to persons interested;”
6. Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give

notice “to the persons interested” before it may hear and grant
a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1, Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in

the estate” to petition for an order for the distribution of the
residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found
in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor

or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an
order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
215
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise

incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed,
the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act
with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint:

we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not
yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the
decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels

us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will
administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be
settled. Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue
remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is

premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows
who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate
had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding
has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is
liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is

made. – x x x. If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
216
and decided as in ordinary cases. No distribution shall

be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
NEYPES V. CA
September 14, 2005/ Corona, J.
EN BANC
 Fresh Period Rule or the Neypes Doctrine
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Faustino, Victoriano, Obania and Cabacungan

filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land before the Regional
Trial Court against the heirs of del Mundo.

The heirs of del Mundo filed a motion to dismiss based on prescription. This
motion was denied because, according to the trial court, there were factual
matters that could be determined only after trial.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve
the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without
waiting for the trial proper.

In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,

1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing
the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it
was filed eight days late.
ISSUE:
Rule on the denial of the notice of appeal.

217
HELD (Dry Run):
The denial of the notice of appeal is not correct. From the receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for reconsideration, a litigant has a fresh period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court. In
the present case, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and received
the order of denial thereof on July 22, 1998. Accordingly, they have fifteen (15)
days therefrom to file their notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Since
they filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 and paid the fees on August 3,
1998, such notice was seasonably filed and the denial, therefore, is not correct.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period
to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, as amended,
provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus
cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from
the notice of judgment appealed from.

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one
that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
218
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence

presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the “final order,”
not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they
received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July
22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for
a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998)
remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration . In this manner, the trial court which rendered
the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve
219
cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment
(March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of “final order” appealed from (July 22,
1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of
only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days,
as already discussed.
RODRIGUEZ V. PEOPLE
October 24, 2012/ Velasco, Jr., J.
 Application of Neypes Doctrine in Criminal Cases
FACTS:
After promulgation of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-206499 convicting

him for unfair competition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the
RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. On
January 19, 2009, petitioner received the RTC Order denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Fourteen (14) days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for
reconsideration, or on February 2, 2009, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal.
Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time
under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Before the RTC, the CA and now before the Supreme Court, petitioner was
unwavering in his assertion of the applicability of the “fresh period rule” as laid
down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
220
Did the petitioner seasonably file his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. Applying the “fresh period rule” as laid down in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, petitioner has a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
order denying his motion for reconsideration. Since he received such order on
January 19, 2009, he has fifteen (15) days therefrom within which to file his
notice of appeal. Since he filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, such
notice was seasonably filed.
The fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases. If litigants in civil cases
have greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period rule,” with
more reason that the same leeway be granted to those in criminal cases which
involve the accused’s sacrosanct right to liberty.
The rationale of the “fresh period rule” is:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford

litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall
also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
Neypes elucidates that the “fresh period rule” applies to appeals under Rule
40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTC) and Rule 41 (appeals
from the RTCs to the CA or this Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the RTCs to the
CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA); and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to this Court). A scrutiny of the said rules, however, reveals
that the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes need NOT apply to Rules 42,
43 and 45 as there is no interruption in the 15- day reglementary period to
appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that the appellant or petitioner is
221
accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award,
judgment, final order or resolution or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed.
The pivotal question is whether the “fresh period rule” is applicable to

appeals from conviction in criminal cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122 which
pertinently provides:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken

within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or
from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the “fresh period rule” to
criminal cases, the issue was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad, which
expanded the scope of the doctrine in Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of
conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the Court held in Yu:
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases,

the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Were we to strictly interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster
and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case—a situation that gives
undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a
situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where
liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and
unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized
with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in
law— Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.
Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may
be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason
222
should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on
appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at
stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty
cannot be overstated.
It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal
cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment of
conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial
court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such
denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal. Verily, the application of
the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be
accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted
a fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of
their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous
that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those
of civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases—under the spirit
and rationale in Neypes—greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh
period rule,” with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal
cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected
by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”
Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner seasonably

filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from January 19, 2009, the date of receipt of the RTC Order
denying his motion for reconsideration.
SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP. V. YAP

September 5, 2012/ Reyes, J.
 Neypes Doctrine
 Pre-Trial
FACTS:
PDCP Bank foreclosed the mortgage constituted on two real estate properties
owned by petitioner Suico. PDCP Bank emerged as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale of the properties.
223
The petitioner’s failure to redeem the foreclosed properties within the period
allowed by law resulted in the consolidation of ownership in favor of PDCP
Bank. The enforcement of a writ of possession obtained by PDCP Bank from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaue City, Branch 28, was however enjoined by
an injunctive writ obtained by the petitioner on January 17, 1995 from the RTC,
Mandaue City, Branch 56, where she filed on December 9, 1994 an action for
specific performance, injunction and damages to prevent PDCP Bank from selling
and taking possession of the foreclosed properties.
Petitioner alleged in said action for specific performance that she had an
agreement with PDCP Bank to intentionally default in her payments so that the
mortgaged properties could be foreclosed and purchased during public auction
by the bank. After consolidation of title in the bank’s name, PDCP Bank,
allegedly, was to allow petitioner to purchase the properties for P 5,000,000.00
through a recommended buyer. Petitioner then claimed that PDCP Bank
increased the properties’ selling price, thereby preventing her recommended
buyers from purchasing them.
During the case’s (action for specific performance filed by petitioner Suico)
scheduled pre-trial conference on September 6, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel
asked for a resetting to allow him more time to prepare the required pre-trial
brief. This was opposed by the bank, which filed a motion for the case’s
dismissal later granted by Judge Yap in its order that reads in part:
Although the Court notes that plaintiff Elizabeth Suico is in

court, the fact that there is no pre-trial brief submitted by
plaintiffs militates against their cause this morning. Under
Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, in the
penultimate paragraph thereof, it is quite expressly provided
that failure to file pre-trial brief has the same effect as failure to
appear in the pre-trial.
FINDING the motion of defendant PDCP to be meritorious,

the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, with pre-trial brief attached, was

denied by the trial court in its Order dated February 21, 2003.
A copy of the order was received by the petitioner’s counsel on March 21,
2003.
224
Unsatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the petitioners filed on April 4, 2003
their notice of appeal. The RTC, however, refused to give due course to the
appeal via its Order dated May 15, 2003 given the following findings:
A review of the records of the case shows that the Order

dismissing the Complaint was received by plaintiffs through
counsel on September 17, 2002. On that date, the 15-day
prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration on October 1,
2002, and their filing of the motion interrupted the
reglementary period to appeal. By that time however, 14 days
had already elapsed; thus, from their receipt of the order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, they had only one (1)
day left within which to file a notice of appeal. On March 21,
2003, plaintiff received the Order denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, they had only one (1) day left, or
until March 22, 2003 to file a notice of appeal. However, they
were able to do so only on April 4, 2003, or thirteen (13) days
late.
ISSUES:
Do you agree that the notice of appeal was not seasonably filed?
HELD (Dry Run):
No, I do not agree that the notice of appeal was not seasonably filed.
Applying the fresh period rule, petitioner Suico has fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the order denying his motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of
appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Since she received the Order on March
21, 2003, she has fifteen (15) days therefrom to file a notice of appeal.
Considering that such notice was filed on April 4, 2003, it was seasonably filed.
Fresh Period Rule
A party is given a "fresh period" of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the court’s
resolution on a motion for reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prescribes the period to appeal from
judgments or final orders of RTCs, as follows:
225
Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be

taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion

for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals decided by this Court on September 14, 2005,

we ruled that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court
and to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Said "fresh period rule" also aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform. It eradicates the confusion as to
when the fifteen (15)-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of
notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from.
Thus, in similar cases decided by this Court after Neypes, the fresh period
rule was applied, thereby allowing appellants who had filed with the trial court
a motion for reconsideration the full fifteen (15)-day period from receipt of the
resolution resolving the motion within which to file a notice of appeal. Among
these cases is Sumiran v. Damaso, wherein we reiterated our ruling in Makati
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes and De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat to explain
that the rule can be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity:
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in

Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the
Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural
rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15
days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted.
226
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc.
v. Reyes, to wit:
"Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,

promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present Petition
was already before us.
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who

availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration
are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that motion.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same

principle of "fresh period rule", expostulating that procedural
law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to
administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
the retroactive application of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is
irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the
appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined
and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon
its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of
violating anyone else’s rights."
The retroactivity of the Neypes ruling was further explained in our Resolution
dated June 25, 2008 in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, wherein
we held:
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule

announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no
vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing.
227
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and

categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
retroactive effect.
Given the foregoing rules, the petitioner’s notice of appeal was timely filed on
April 4, 2003, since it was filed within the fifteen (15)-day period from her receipt
on March 21, 2003 of the RTC’s order denying her motion for reconsideration of
the case’s dismissal.
On Failure to File Pre-Trial Brief
Failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court
constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal of an action.
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of the
parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The effect of their failure to do
so is provided in Section 5 of Rule 18, particularly:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the

plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Under Section 6, Rule 18, the failure to file a pre-trial brief when required by
law produces the same effect as failure to attend the pre-trial, to wit:
Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties shall file with the court
and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall
ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the
date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall
contain, among others:
xxxx
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as
failure to appear at the pre-trial.
228
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court clearly had a valid basis when it
ordered the dismissal of the petitioner’s action. Still, petitioner assails the trial
court’s dismissal of her case, invoking a liberal interpretation of the rules.
Instructive on this point are the guidelines we applied in Bank of the

Philippine Islands v. Dando, wherein we cited the reasons that may provide a
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules,
namely: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. Upon review, we have determined that these grounds do not concur in
this action.
A review of the factual antecedents indicate that the dismissal of the action
for specific performance has not caused any injustice to petitioner, barring any
special or compelling circumstances that would warrant a relaxation of the rules.
The alleged agreement between PDCP Bank and petitioner on the purchase by
the latter’s recommended buyers of the foreclosed properties at a specified
amount deserves scant consideration for being unsupported by sufficient proof
especially since said supposed agreement was vehemently denied by the bank.
What the records merely adequately establish is petitioner’s failure to satisfy her
obligation to the bank, leading to the foreclosure of the mortgage constituted to
secure it, the sale of the foreclosed properties and the failure of petitioner to
make a timely redemption thereof.
When petitioner failed to pay the balance of the secured loan and thereafter
failed to redeem the mortgaged properties, title to the property had already been
transferred to PDCP Bank, which had the right to possess the property based on
its right of ownership as purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale.
In affirming the dismissal of petitioner’s case for her disregard of the rules on
pre-trial, we emphasize this Court’s ruling in Durban Apartments Corporation v.
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation on the importance and the nature of a
pre-trial, to wit:
Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is

mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this
day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated,
and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some
courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose
229
save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting

the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully,
to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial is not thus put to full
use. Hence, it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief
objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition
of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity,
because the objective is attainable, and with not much
difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively
handled.
Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial,

the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to
appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party
"fails to appear at a pre-trial conference, (he) may be non-suited
or considered as in default." The obligation "to appear" denotes
not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical
presentation by a party of one’s self, but connotes as
importantly, preparedness to go into the different subjects
assigned by law to a pre-trial.
In addition to the foregoing, this Court finds no cogent reason to liberally

apply the rules considering that petitioner and her counsel had not offered
sufficient justification for their failure to file the required pre-trial brief. As held
by this Court in Lapid v. Judge Laurea, concomitant to a liberal application of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. Members of the bar are
reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather
than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed
to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper
and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
The failure to file the pre-trial brief is then attributable to the fault or
negligence of petitioner’s counsel. The settled rule is that the negligence of a
counsel binds his clients.
ANG V. ANG
August 22, 2012/ Reyes, J.
230
 Venue of Personal Actions

 Real Party in Interest
FACTS:
Spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of

Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and
Nancy Ang (petitioners). The respondents executed a promissory note in favor of
the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the said amount, with
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However,
despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
In 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California,
executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney in favor of Attorney Atty.
Aceron for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On
September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint
for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the
respondents.
The respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
petitioners on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE:
Rule on the motion to dismiss.
HELD (Dry Run):
The motion to dismiss should be granted. In a personal action where the

plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the case may only be filed in the court
of the place where the defendant resides. There can be no election as to the
venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the
Philippines. Since the defendants in the present case reside in Bacolod City, the
case should have been filed in that place and not in Quezon City.
The petitioners’ complaint should have been filed in the RTC of Bacolod
City, the court of the place where the respondents reside, and not in RTC
of Quezon City.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is
231
the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s
caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the

respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a
contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides,
or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found.
The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action
has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in
such case may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant
resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., this Court held
that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the
plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may
only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be

brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary
party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province
where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no
residence in the Philippine Islands. Only one of the parties to
the action resides here. There can be, therefore, no election by
plaintiff as to the place of trial. It must be in the province where
the defendant resides.
Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the
respondents reside in Bacolod City. Applying the foregoing principles, the
petitioners’ complaint against the respondents may only be filed in the RTC of
Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The
petitioners, being residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the
choice as to the venue of the filing of their complaint.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set
aside the orders of the RTC of Quezon City and consequently dismissed the
petitioners’ complaint against the respondents on the ground of improper venue.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal
civil actions is fixed by the Rules of Court to attain the greatest convenience
possible to the litigants and their witnesses by affording them maximum
232
accessibility to the courts. And even as the regulation of venue is primarily for
the convenience of the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is
given to him, it should not be construed to unduly deprive a resident defendant
of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his
residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the complaint.
Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-
fact of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in
interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any
judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-
in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the
respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated
into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in
interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal

capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below against the
respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners –
the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case
below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-
fact is not a real party in interest.
233
The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support

their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a party in interest in the case below
is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is

allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his
own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may
sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that
the representative is likewise deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule
simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by
a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of the case.
Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on

venue as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section 3 of the same Rule.
On this score, the CA aptly observed that:
As may be unerringly gleaned from the foregoing provisions,

there is nothing therein that expressly allows, much less
implies that an action may be filed in the city or municipality
where either a representative or an attorney-in-fact of a real
party in interest resides. Sec. 3 of Rule 3 merely provides that
the name or names of the person or persons being represented
must be included in the title of the case and such person or
persons shall be considered the real party in interest. In other
words, the principal remains the true party to the case and not
the representative. Under the plain meaning rule, or verba
legis, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.
234
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on venue, like the other
procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of
justice or the impartial and even-handed determination of every action and
proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint or
petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice.
He may be impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a
particular court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.
REPUBLIC V. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC.

 Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition Under Rule 65
FACTS:
The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking
expropriation of certain properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges,
Inc. (St. Vincent).
Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging

that the subject land originated from a free patent title and should be
adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation.
The Republic filed a motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation. It

was granted by the trial court per Order dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the
Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of the subject
property, with "no pronouncement as to just compensation" since the subject
property originated from a free patent.
Thereafter, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16,
2005 by entering the subject portion of St. Vincent’s property. Aggrieved, the
latter demanded upon the Republic and its agents to immediately vacate, and
remove any and all equipment or structures they introduced on its property.
Due to St. Vincent’s refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic
filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied
by the lower court in its Order dated November 25, 2006. The lower court,
however, modified its Order dated August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to
immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic
235
moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court per Order dated
January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of
fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its
Resolution dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible
period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for
certiorari.
On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the
Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for
being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation dated July 1, 2009
pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of substantial
justice.
On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the
Republic’s petition for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of
time inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. Under the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Sec. 4, Rule

65 of the Rules of Court, may an extension of time to file the petition still be
granted?
2. Should the CA admit the petition of the Republic?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. Yes. The deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65
petition absolutely prohibited. If absolute proscription were intended, the deleted
portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an
extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express
prohibition, motions for extension may be allowed, subject to the Court’s sound
discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
236
2. Yes, the Ca should admit the Republic’s petition, it being an exceptional

and meritorious case. The reason is that public interest is involved because of
the fact that the petition pertains to an expropriation of private property for public
use.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to

discuss the relationship between its respective rulings in Laguna Metts
Corporation and Domdom with respect to the application of the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be

filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it

relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted

except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen
(15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be

filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial
is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
237
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of

said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal

trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it
shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the
court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or
an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with
and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a

municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held

that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or

phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is
presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there
had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the
law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be
given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper

courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the
paragraph providing for such authority would have been
preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the
amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65
simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the
60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-

SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends
of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file
238
petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such

motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must
be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:
On the People’s argument that a motion for extension of time

to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same
rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the
following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for
extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except

for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen
(15) days."
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No.

07-7-12-SC, reads:
xxxx
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended

Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the
previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such
pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the
deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state
that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted."
Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed,
subject to the Court’s sound discretion. The present petition
may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension
sought and, at all events, given its merits.
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading

of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts
Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand,
relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to
the Court’s sound discretion.
239
Labao v. Flores subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict
application of the rule, viz:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60
days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to
be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights
of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
xxxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict

observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-
extendible, only that there are certain exceptional circumstances, which may call
for its non-observance. Even more recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court, taking into consideration Laguna
Metts Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced
under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard
strong public interest" and affirmed the extension granted by the CA to the
240
respondent Power One Corporation due to the exceptional nature of the case and
the strong public interest involved.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the

reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the
use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or
even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an
extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead,
we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party
to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of
discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order
to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that
could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their
case.
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we

ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65
petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription
were intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to
specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of
the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Court’s sound discretion, and only under exceptional and
meritorious cases.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M.

No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public
interest. x x x:
The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases

in which relaxing the procedural rules would serve substantial
justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x
Consequently, in order to protect strong public interest, this
Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the
amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65
petition. Considering that the imminent power crisis is an
exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein
should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits.
Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the substantive
rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition
241
before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We

therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the
CA when it granted respondent Power One’s Motion for
Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in

Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must
be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to
the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to
Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.
Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to
its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per
Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest involved,
i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no
undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.
LIM V. CO
August 23, 2012/ Del Castillo, J.
 Civil Liability Ex Delicto

 Independent Civil Liability
FACTS:
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing

plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers
and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state
the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the
plant.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal authorities covering

50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
Co, in turn, sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of
P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million.
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC
on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold
back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
242
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with
Co, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt who explained that the plant implemented a price
increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference
or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained
that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations.
The criminal case
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed

against Co before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The accusatory portion
thereof reads:
On or about between the months of February and April

1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily
Lim, with grave abuse of confidence, with unfaithfulness,
received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of
P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement,
under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to said
Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit the said amount of P2,300,800.00
[sic] and despite demands, the accused failed and refused to
return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim in
the amount of P2,380,800.00.
Contrary to Law.
Thereafter, the RTC of Pasig City rendered its Order acquitting Co of the
estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and
prosecuted were not established by the prosecution’s evidence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to

Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under
the present information for insufficiency of evidence.
243
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned,

however, set this case for the reception of his evidence on the
matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the
morning.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also
relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered holding the accused CHARLIE CO not civilly liable to
the private complainant Lily Lim.
Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second
Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case
were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement
Center, and FRCC. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396,
asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and
damages, Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case and Lim’s appeal in the
civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138. He maintained that the
two actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for her inability to
withdraw the bags of cement, and should be dismissed on the ground of lis
pendens and forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance
and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case for estafa?
HELD (Dry Run):

244
No, Lim did not commit forum shopping.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
to secure a favorable judgment.
There can be no forum shopping in the present case, because although there
was only a single act by Co that allegedly caused damage to Lim, the two
actions are based on different causes of action. The civil aspect of the estafa
case arose from criminal offense, while the complaint for specific performance
and damages is a civil action arising from contractual obligation and tortious
conduct.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender - (1) civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code
(such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently
from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in
cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The
civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist."
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the
criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31
and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
245
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not

arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical

injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types
of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v.
Isip:
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of

action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action
filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains
separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on
the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action
based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the
offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action
based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the
dismissal of the estafa cases against the offender did not
amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is
the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the
offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the
offender], they are, however, based on different causes of
action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa
criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
246
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the

criminal action.
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources
of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the
resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve
different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of
each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted
together with the criminal action.
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in
the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for
tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges
that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that she
bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after
full payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC
corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be
honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then
maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her
under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his
co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their
agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag and to the wording of the
withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal
authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the
sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing
allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’ contractual
obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that
the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that
their breach has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were
committed in such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals,
good customs and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute
tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the
Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from
contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the
civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different
causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
247
independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication,
subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. V. CA

August 22, 2012/ Perez, J.
 Service of Judgments, Final Orders, or Resolutions

 Once a Judgment Becomes Final, the Prevailing Party is Entitled as a
Matter of Right to a Writ of Execution.
 Residual Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Manila rendered a decision in Philippine
Ports Authority v. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc., (Civil Case
No. 87-42747) ordering MINTERBRO to pay PPA the sum of Thirty Six Million Five
Hundred Eighty Five Thousand Nine Hundred One Pesos and Eighteen Centavos
(P36,585,901.18), as government’s ten percent (10%) share in MINTERBRO’s
gross income from its port-related services.
Aggrieved, MINTERBRO assailed the RTC decision before the Court of

Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 November 2002, affirmed
in toto the RTC decision.
On even date, copies of the said Decision were sent via registered mail to the
parties’ respective counsels along with the Notice of the Decision stating that:
Please take notice that on November 21, 2002, a DECISION,

copy hereto attached, was rendered by the TENTH DIVISION of
the Court of Appeals in the above-entitled case, the original
copy of which is on file with this Office.
You are hereby required to inform this Court, within five (5)
days from receipt hereof, of the date when you received this
notice and a copy of the DECISION.
While the PPA filed "Compliance" manifesting its receipt of the decision,
MINTERBRO failed to do the same, constraining the Court of Appeals to send a
letter-tracer to the Postmaster of Pasig City.
248
In reply, the Postmaster of Pasig City - Central Post Office advised the Court
of Appeals that registered letter No. 6270-B was received by Virgie Cabrera
(Cabrera) at the stated address on 4 December 2002.
Counted from that date, 4 December 2002, the Court of Appeals Decision
became final and executory on 20 December 2002 or 15 days after Cabrera’s
receipt of the decision. The decision was, thus, recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. Copies of the Entry of Judgment were sent to the parties’ counsels,
with MINTERBRO’s copy having been addressed to Atty. Rafael Dizon (Atty.
Dizon), 6/F Padilla Building, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Commercial Center, Pasig
City.
Atty. Dizon, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Declaration of Finality

and to Set Aside Entry of Judgment. Atty. Dizon argued that he did not receive
the 21 November 2002 Court of Appeals Decision, and, hence, "considering the
fact that the Decision rendered by this Honorable Court [Court of Appeals] has
not been served on the defendant-appellant, it is without doubt that the
reglementary period to appeal has not commenced and therefore, the aforesaid
decision has not become final." Atty. Dizon added that since the Court of Appeals
decision has not yet become final, the issuance by the Division Clerk of Court of
the Entry of Judgment was premature.
The Court of Appeals, however, in a Resolution dated 21 April 2004, denied

Atty. Dizon’s motion and re-affirmed the finality of the questioned decision.
MINTERBRO assailed the 21 April 2004 Resolution via petition for review on
certiorari before this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 163286.
Meanwhile, the PPA, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment, filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted by the RTC of Manila, Br. 14.
This not withstanding, the RTC later held in abeyance the execution of judgment,
per motion of MINTERBRO. The RTC Order, penned by Judge Cesar M. Solis,
dated 26 February 2004, ratiocinated that:
Admittedly, the case now pending before the Court of

Appeals questioning the finality of judgment before the Court of
Appeals (sic) in this case warrants the stay of the execution.
Indeed, to execute the judgment at this stage would certainly
result in grave injustice if and when the Court of Appeals
would grant the defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
Declaration of Finality and to Set Aside Entry of Judgment.
249
Besides, to implement the Decision at this juncture, pending

the resolution of the incident before the appellate court would
render the adjudication of issue therein, moot and academic.
While the Court of Appeals did not issue any restraining order
to prevent this Court from taking any action with regard to its
Order granting plaintiff’s Motion for Execution, it is deemed
proper upon this Court to refrain from enforcing the Decision.
Due respect to the latter court and practical and ethical
considerations should prompt this court to wait for the final
determination of the Motion now pending with the Court of
Appeals.
The PPA’s Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order was denied,
constraining PPA to file a second motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
again denied in an Order dated 17 September 2004. Noticeably, though, this
order purportedly reiterating its earlier resolution, held the execution in abeyance
"until after the Petition for Review of the defendant shall have been resolved by
the Supreme Court," in stark contrast with the tone of the Order dated 26
February 2004 holding in abeyance only "until after the Petition for Review of the
defendant shall have been resolved by the Court of Appeals."
Hence, PPA filed a petition for certiorari, via Rule 65, assailing the RTC
Orders, holding in abeyance the execution of judgment, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 166025.
While G.R. Nos. 163286 and 166025 were pending before this Court,
MINTERBRO filed with the RTC, again, with the sala of Judge Cesar M. Solis, a
Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order to compel the PPA to renew its port
operator’s permit, which Judge Cesar M. Solis granted in an Order dated 20
June 2005 despite PPA’s opposition:
WHEREFORE, let a Status Quo Ante Order be issued

against plaintiff Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to (1) CEASE
and DESIST from imposing certain requirements in
consideration of defendant Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Service, Inc.’s application for renewal/issuance of its COR/PTO
permits, and to (2) Act Immediately upon the said defendant’s
pending application without necessarily considering the
existence of such disputed account, should it be warranted by
the other circumstances, subject to the satisfaction of the
250
monetary requirement as determined finally by the competent

authority.
This prompted the PPA to seek this Court’s direct intervention through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, now docketed as G.R. No. 170269.
ISSUES:
G.R. No. 163286
1. Whether the Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 November 2002 had

become final and executory.
G.R. No. 166025
2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in

excess of jurisdiction when it refused to implement/execute its 28 August 1990
Decision which had already become final and executory, in the absence of an
injunction or temporary restraining order from higher courts?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 November 2002 had become final
and executory. Such decision was served on Atty. Dizon, petitioner’s counsel,
through his employee, Virgie Cabrera, on December 4, 2002. Counted from that
date, the Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on 20 December
2002 or 15 days after Cabrera’s receipt of the decision.
2. Yes, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Once a judgment

becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a Writ of
Execution. Thus, the PPA is entitled to a Writ of Execution despite the pendency
of the case filed by MINTERBRO before the Court of Appeals questioning the
finality of the judgment.
The service of judgment serves as the reckoning point to determine

whether a decision had been appealed within the reglementary period or
has already become final.
The threshold issue that must be resolved first is whether the Court of
Appeals Decision dated 21 November 2002 was properly served on
251
MINTERBRO’s counsel in accordance with service of judgment under Sections 9

and 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which require that:
Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. —

Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either
personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also
by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
Section 10. Completeness of service. — Personal service is

complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is
complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail
is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five
(5) days from the date he received the first notice of the
postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
The first point is crucial for the service of judgment serves as the reckoning
point to determine whether a decision was appealed within the reglementary
period, because otherwise, i.e., in the absence of an appeal or if the appeal was
made beyond the reglementary period, the decision would, as a consequence,
become final.
Atty. Dizon contends that he was not properly served with the Court of
Appeals decision since Cabrera who received the decision was not connected
with his office. She was a front desk receptionist at the Prestige Tower
Condominium, where Atty. Dizon was holding his office, as shown by the
affidavits executed by Cabrera and the Prestige Tower’s management. Atty.
Dizon rhetorically argued: "Who is this Virgie Cabrera? Is she an employee of the
counsel of record of the petitioner? Is she authorized to receive a copy of a
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay PPA the amount of P36,585,901.18?"
To him, the decision, as the rules dictate, if served by way of registered mail,
must be actually received by the addressee or any person in his office,
otherwise, service cannot be considered complete. Because no valid service was
made, the period to appeal did not prescribe and the decision has not yet
attained finality.
There is no dispute that as dictated by the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 13,
Section 10 thereof, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by
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the addressee, or five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the
postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
The purpose of the afore-quoted rule on service is to make sure that the party
being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same
so that such party can take steps to protect the interests, i.e., enable to file an
appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
Atty. Dizon, however, has forgotten that it was his elementary responsibility
to have informed the Court of Appeals of his change of address from 6/F Padilla
Building, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Commercial Center, Pasig City, to Suite 402,
Prestige Tower, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The records show
that Atty. Dizon only informed the Court of Appeals of his change of address on
12 November 2003. This was almost one year after the entry of judgment was
made on 20 December 2002.
It did not escape us that Atty. Dizon filed on 29 August 2003 a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Declaration of Finality and to Set Aside Entry of
Judgment, months prior to his filing of change of address. The said motion
conspicuously bore his old address at Padilla Building, the same address where
the postmaster delivered the Court of Appeals decision where it was received by
Cabrera. Atty. Dizon’s reason therefore, that Cabrera is not his employee but
that of Prestige Tower Condominium does not persuade us, because, as certified
by the postmaster, Cabrera received the letter on 4 December 2002 or a year
before Atty. Dizon’s change of address, and while his office address was at the
Padilla Building. On that particular date, therefore, his office at the Prestige
Tower Condominium was yet nonexistent. At the very least, if it were true that
he already moved to his new address, he should have indicated his new
address in his motion for reconsideration. But even then, still, the responsibility
was with Atty. Dizon to inform the Court of Appeals of such change.
As between the claim of non-receipt of notices of registered mail by a party

and the assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices, which assertion is
fortified by the presumption that the official duty has been regularly performed,
the choice is not difficult to make. As shown in the records, the postmaster
included in his certification the manner, date and the recipient of the delivery, a
criterion for the proper service of judgment which this Court enunciated in Santos
v. Court of Appeals, viz:
Clearly then, proof should always be available to the post

office not only of whether or not the notices of registered mail
have been reported delivered by the letter carrier but also of
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how or to whom and when such delivery has been made.

Consequently, it cannot be too much to expect that when the
post office makes a certification regarding delivery of registered
mail, such certification should include the data not only as to
whether or not the corresponding notices were issued or sent
but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery thereof
was made.
An examination of the postmaster’s certification shows that:
x x x registered letter No. 6270-B was received by Virgie

Cabrera on 4 December 2002.
This certification, the form of which came from the Supreme Court, and which
only needs to be filled-up by the postmaster, to the mind of this Court, satisfies
the requirement stated in Santos.
Atty. Dizon has no one to blame but himself for allowing his client to lose the
multi-million case because of his negligence to appeal the same within the
reglementary period. Losing a case on account of a counsel’s negligence is a
bitter pill to swallow for the litigant. But then, the Court is duty-bound to observe
its rules and procedures. And, in the observance thereof, for the orderly
administration of justice, it cannot countenance the negligence and ineptitude of
lawyers who wantonly jeopardize the interests of their clients. On his part, a
lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a

matter of right to a writ of execution.
As a matter of law, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is

entitled as a matter of right to a Writ of Execution as mandated by Section 1,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. —

Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.
The rule is clear that it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to
issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory.
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Hence, this Court holds that the RTC abused its discretion when it held in
abeyance the issuance of the writ of execution of the judgment in Civil Case No.
87-42747 entitled Philippine Ports Authority v. Mindanao Terminal and
Brokerage Services, Inc., notwithstanding the fact that the same had already
become final and executory ─ this notwithstanding that MINTERBRO filed before
this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It did not
escape this Court that the RTC Order dated 26 February 2004, holding in
abeyance the writ of execution was only "until after the Petition for Review of the
defendant shall have been resolved by the Court of Appeals." After the Court of
Appeals, however, decided and held that its decision was already final and
executory, the RTC issued another Order dated 17 September 2004, which in the
guise of reiterating the 24 February 2004 order, changed its tone to the effect of
holding in abeyance "until after the Petition for Review of the defendants hall
have been resolved by the Supreme Court with Finality." It is a basic rule that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not by itself interrupt the course of the
proceedings. It is necessary to avail of either a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction to be issued by a higher court against a public
respondent so that it may, during the pendency of the petition, refrain from
further proceedings.
This was the Court’s ruling in Peza v. Hon. Alikpala, where this Court ruled
that:
It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil

action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower Court, does not interrupt the course of the latter
when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
In Balintawak Construction Supply Corp. v. Valenzuela, this Court held that:
It is basic that once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing

party is entitled as a matter of right to a Writ of Execution, and
the issuance thereof is the Court's ministerial duty, compellable
by Mandamus. In fact, it has been fittingly said that "an
execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is very aptly
called the life of the law." Petitioner, therefore, as the prevailing
party was entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the
judgment x x x in its favor that had become final and executory.
This Court, likewise, rules that Judge Cesar M. Solis, the presiding judge of
the cases in controversy, gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the PPA
to act immediately on MINTERBRO’s application for renewal of the latter’s
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Certificate of Registration/Permit to Operate (COR/PTO) when its prior

registration expired, and for PPA to cease and desist from imposing certain
requirements in consideration of MINTERBRO’s application for renewal of said
COR/PTO.
It is noteworthy that Civil Case No. 87-42747, the principal case in

controversy was already appealed to and decided by the Court of Appeals,
which decision, in fact, had, by the records, already become final and executory,
and has been consequently entered in the book of judgments. The only issue that
remained in litigation was whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of PPA is no longer appealable. On
that issue, we did not grant any temporary restraining order.
Notably, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case from the time
MINTERBRO perfected its appeal of the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals.
From that time on, the RTC was divested of any authority over the substantive
issues of the case. This is clear from the reading of Section 8, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal: effect thereof. –
(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the
payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the
appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition, the
Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal
of the appeal.
While Judge Cesar M. Solis anchors his action in citing the same afore-quoted
provision "that the RTC may issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,"
the same is applicable only "before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the
petition," as mandated by the very same provision cited by Judge Cesar M. Solis.
This was the Court’s pronouncement in Atty. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,
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where this Court held that "this residual jurisdiction of the trial court (referring to
Section 8[a] par. 3, Rule 42, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure) is available at a
stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the
case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal." At the time that Judge Cesar M. Solis issued his Status Quo Ante Order
of 20 June 2005, even the Court of Appeals has lost jurisdiction over the issue of
finality of decision. This Court has by then taken over.
DE MESA V. ACERO
(Spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa v. Spouses Claudio and Ma. Rufina
Acero)
January 16, 2012/ Reyes, J.
 Forum-Shopping
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land which was formerly covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) and registered under Araceli’s name.
Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of
P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As
payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation
payable to Claudio.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the
account from which it was drawn had already been closed.
Thus, Claudio filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The RTC rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioners but ordering them to
pay Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied
upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on
public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate
of sale was issued to him.
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Claudio then leased the subject property to the petitioners for a monthly rent
of P5,500.00. However, the petitioners defaulted in the payment of the rent.
Their total accountabilities to Claudio amounted to P170,500.00.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale over the subject
property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-
221755 (M) in his favor.
Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma.
Rufina Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners. In their defense, the petitioners
claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject property. The
petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful
owners of the subject property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses
Acero’s complaint and ordering the petitioners and Juanito to vacate the subject
property.
The petitioners appealed the MTC’s July 22, 1999 Decision to the RTC.
In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the
respondents a complaint to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) and other documents
with damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners
asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied
upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping.
HELD:
The petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping. The elements of forum-

shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
There is no identity of issues in the ejectment case and in the action to cancel
TCT No. T-221755 (M). The primordial issue in the ejectment case is who among
the contending parties has a better right of possession over the subject property
while ownership is the core issue in an action to cancel a Torrens title. Moreover,
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a decision in an ejectment case is not res judicata in an annulment of title case

and vice-versa given the provisional and inconclusive nature of the determination
of the issue of ownership in the former.
There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one

forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another
forum through means other than an appeal or certiorari. Forum-shopping exists
when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The
elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case and
in the action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Verily, the primordial issue in the
ejectment case is who among the contending parties has a better right of
possession over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in an
action to cancel a Torrens title.
It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over the subject
property in the ejectment case. However, the resolution thereof is only
provisional as the same is solely for the purpose of determining who among the
parties therein has a better right of possession over the subject property.
Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action

between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it
be conclusive as to the facts therein. This issue is far from being novel and there
is no reason to depart from this Court’s previous pronouncements. In Malabanan
v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., this Court had previously clarified that a
decision in an ejectment case is not res judicata in an annulment of title case
and vice-versa given the provisional and inconclusive nature of the determination
of the issue of ownership in the former.
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present,

namely: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the other.
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Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and
ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with
same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be
inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in
the annulment case, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases
iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building
nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the
same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is
the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining
who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment

would abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the
filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is
so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly
deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing
claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.
OTERO V. TAN
 A Defendant Who Was Declared in Default May Nevertheless Appeal

from the Judgment by Default, Albeit on Limited Grounds
 Proof of Private Document
FACTS:
A Complaint for collection of sum of money and damages was filed by Roger
Tan with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City
against Roberto Otero. Tan alleged that on several occasions from February
2000 to May 2001, Otero purchased on credit petroleum products from his Petron
outlet in Valencia City, Bukidnon in the aggregate amount of P270,818.01.
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Despite receipt of the summons and a copy of the said complaint, which per
the records of the case below were served through his wife, Otero failed to file
his answer.
Tan filed a motion with the MTCC to declare Otero in default for his failure to
file his answer. the MTCC issued an order declaring him in default. Tan was
then allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Tan adduced in evidence the testimonies of Rosemarie Doblado and Zita

Sara, his employees in his Petron outlet who attended Otero when the latter
made purchases of petroleum products now the subject of the action below. He
likewise presented various statements of account showing the petroleum
products which Otero purchased from his establishment.
The RTC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Otero then filed a petition for review with the CA asserting that both the RTC
and the MTCC erred in giving credence to the pieces of evidence presented by
Tan in support of his complaint. Otero explained that the statements of account,
which Tan adduced during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, were
prepared by a certain Betache who was not presented as a witness by Tan.
Otero avers that the genuineness and due execution of the said statements of
account, being private documents, must first be established lest the said
documents be rendered inadmissible in evidence. Thus, Otero asserts, the MTCC
and the RTC should not have admitted in evidence the said statements of
account as Tan failed to establish the genuineness and due execution of the
same.
ISSUE:
May Otero, having been declared in default by the MTCC, still raise in the
Court of Appeals the failure of Tan to authenticate the statements of account?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. By challenging the admissibility of the statements of account presented

by Tan, Otero is essentially arguing that the former failed to prove the material
allegations in the complaint. That is allowed to be raised in the Court of Appeals.
Under the rules, a defending party who was declared in default and who
exercised his right to appeal from the judgment by default may rely on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint.
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A defendant who fails to file an answer loses his standing in court
The effect of a defendant’s failure to file an answer within the time allowed
therefor is primarily governed by Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails

to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall,
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending
party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit
evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court.
A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the
court in default. Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party
litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the consequence of an order of default.
A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings,
and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his
pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to or refute
evidence or motions filed against him.
A defendant who was declared in default may nevertheless appeal from

the judgment by default, albeit on limited grounds.
Nonetheless, the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in court for
having been declared in default does not mean that he is left sans any recourse
whatsoever. In Lina v. CA, et al., this Court enumerated the remedies available
to party who has been declared in default, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he
may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
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c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from
the judgment by default. However, the grounds that may be raised in such an
appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, the failure of the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary
to law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from
that prayed for. In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the
pieces of evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte
presentation of his evidence.
A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising any
other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since, otherwise, he
would then be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had
lost after he was declared in default. Indeed, he is proscribed in the appellate
tribunal from adducing any evidence to bolster his defense against the plaintiff’s
claim. Thus, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
this Court explained that:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default

loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence
and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to
appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment
on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is
excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party
declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or
reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence
submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were
otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to
adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when
he was declared in default, and which he failed to have
vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of
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the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted

by it only in the Court of Appeals.
Here, Otero, in his appeal from the judgment by default, asserted that Tan
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint. He contends that the
lower courts should not have given credence to the statements of account that
were presented by Tan as the same were not authenticated. He points out that
Betache, the person who appears to have prepared the said statements of
account, was not presented by Tan as a witness during the ex parte
presentation of his evidence with the MTCC to identify and authenticate the
same. Accordingly, the said statements of account are mere hearsay and should
not have been admitted by the lower tribunals as evidence.
Thus, essentially, Otero asserts that Tan failed to prove the material
allegations of his complaint since the statements of account which he presented
are inadmissible in evidence. While the RTC and the CA, in resolving Otero’s
appeal from the default judgment of the MTCC, were only required to examine
the pieces of evidence that were presented by Tan, the CA erred in brushing
aside Otero’s arguments with respect to the admissibility of the said statements
of account on the ground that the latter had already waived any defense or
objection which he may have against Tan’s claim.
Contrary to the CA’s disquisition, it is not accurate to state that having been
declared in default by the MTCC, Otero is already deemed to have waived any
and all defenses which he may have against Tan’s claim.
While it may be said that by defaulting, the defendant leaves himself at the
mercy of the court, the rules nevertheless see to it that any judgment against him
must be in accordance with the evidence required by law. The evidence of the
plaintiff, presented in the defendant’s absence, cannot be admitted if it is
basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to
object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered
against him. If the same should prove insufficient to justify a judgment for the
plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if a favorable judgment is
justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed
for in the complaint.
Thus, in SSS v. Hon. Chaves, this Court emphasized that:
We must stress, however, that a judgment of default

against the petitioner who failed to appear during pre-trial or,
for that matter, any defendant who failed to file an answer,
264
does not imply a waiver of all of their rights, except their right
to be heard and to present evidence to support their
allegations. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to request
presentation of evidence every time the other party is declared
in default. If it were so, a decision would then automatically be
rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly to the
tenor of his prayer. The law also gives the defaulting parties
some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the
default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their
allegations in the complaint.
The statements of account presented by Tan were merely hearsay as the

genuineness and due execution of the same were not
established.
Anent the admissibility of the statements of account presented by Tan, this

Court rules that the same should not have been admitted in evidence by the
lower tribunals.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the authenticity and
due execution of a private document, before it is received in evidence by the
court, must be established. Thus:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that

which it is claimed to be.
A private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a

private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence
in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only
265
in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within
the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness
and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document
is not being offered as genuine.
The statements of account which Tan adduced in evidence before the MTCC
indubitably are private documents. Considering that these documents do not fall
among the aforementioned exceptions, the MTCC could not admit the same as
evidence against Otero without the required authentication thereof pursuant to
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. During authentication in court, a
witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine
and has been duly executed, or that the document is neither spurious nor
counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress.
Here, Tan, during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, did not present
anyone who testified that the said statements of account were genuine and were
duly executed or that the same were neither spurious or counterfeit or executed
by mistake or under duress. Betache, the one who prepared the said statements
of account, was not presented by Tan as a witness during the ex parte
presentation of his evidence with the MTCC.
Considering that Tan failed to authenticate the aforesaid statements of

account, the said documents should not have been admitted in evidence against
Otero. It was thus error for the lower tribunals to have considered the same in
assessing the merits of Tan’s Complaint.
The Material Allegations of the Complaint
In view of the inadmissibility of the statements of account presented by Tan,

the remaining question that should be settled is whether the pieces of evidence
adduced by Tan during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, excluding the
said statements of account, sufficiently prove the material allegations of his
complaint against Otero.
We rule in the affirmative.
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on
the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. This rule holds true especially when the latter has had
266
no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say,

the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so much as has been
alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule
133.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the said statements of account, this

Court finds that Tan was still able to prove by a preponderance of evidence the
material allegations of his complaint against Otero.
First, the statements of account adduced by Tan during the ex parte

presentation of his evidence are just summaries of Otero's unpaid obligations,
the absence of which do not necessarily disprove the latter's liability.
Second, aside from the statements of account, Tan likewise adduced in

evidence the testimonies of his employees in his Petron outlet who testified that
Otero, on various occasions, indeed purchased on credit petroleum products from
the former and that he failed to pay for the same. It bears stressing that the
MTCC, the RTC and the CA all gave credence to the said testimonial evidence
presented by Tan and, accordingly, unanimously found that Otero still has
unpaid outstanding obligation in favor of Tan in the amount of P270,818.01.
Well-established is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and
will generally not be reviewed on appeal.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC.

August 15, 2012/ Brion, J.
 Authority of the MeTC to Interpret Contracts in an Unlawful Detainer

Action
 Venue
FACTS:
Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos,

Bulacan, known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall.
Sometime in 2002, Union Bank, as seller, and respondent Maunlad Homes,

Inc. (Maunlad Homes), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell involving the
Maunlad Shopping Mall. The contract set the purchase price at P151 million, P2.4
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million of which was to be paid by Maunlad Homes as down payment payable

on or before July 5, 2002, with the balance to be amortized over the succeeding
180-month period. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes
to take possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements
thereon. In the event of rescission due to failure to pay or to comply with the
terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the
property and must voluntarily turn possession over to Union Bank.
When Maunlad Homes failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank
sent the former a Notice of Rescission of Contract dated February 5, 2003,
demanding payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt;
otherwise, it shall consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad
Homes failed to comply. Hence, on November 19, 2003, Union Bank sent
Maunlad Homes a letter demanding payment of the rentals due and requiring
that the subject property be vacated and its possession turned over to the bank.
When Maunlad Homes continued to refuse, Union Bank instituted an ejectment
suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, on
February 19, 2004. Maunlad Homes resisted the suit by claiming, among others,
that it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of
the property under the terms of the contract. By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad
Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property.
The MeTC dismissed Union Bank’s ejectment complaint. It found that Union
Bank’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract and that both parties
are claiming a better right to possess the property based on their respective
claims of ownership of the property. The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action
to resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it
had no jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the MeTC in its decision. The
RTC declared that the case involved a determination of the rights of the parties
under the contract. Additionally, the RTC noted that the property is located in
Malolos, Bulacan, but the ejectment suit was filed by Union Bank in Makati City,
based on the contract stipulation that "the venue of all suits and actions arising
out or in connection with the Contract to Sell shall be in Makati City." The RTC
ruled that the proper venue for the ejectment action is in Malolos, Bulacan.
ISSUE:
1. Is the MeTC allowed in the instant case to interpret and enforce the
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant?
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2. Rule on the claim of Maunlad Homes that the action should have been filed
in Malolos, Bulacan.
HELD (Dry Run):
1. Yes. Interpretation of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
is inevitable because it is the contract that initially granted the defendant the
right to possess the property; it is this same contract that the plaintiff
subsequently claims was violated, terminating the defendant’s right to possess.
The MeTC’s ruling on the rights of the parties based on its interpretation of their
contract is, of course, not conclusive, but is merely provisional.
2. The claim of Maunlad Homes that the action should have been filed in
Malolos, Bulacan is not meritorious. While the Rules of Court provides that
ejectment actions shall be filed in the municipal trial court of the municipality or
city wherein the real property involved is situated, the same Rule provides that
the rule shall not apply where the parties have validly agreed in writing before
the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Since the parties in this
case provided in the contract that the venue of all suits and actions arising out or
in connection with the Contract to Sell shall be in Makati City, the ejectment suit
was correctly filed by the bank in Makati City.
The authority of the MeTC to interpret contracts in an unlawful detainer

action
In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, the Court is guided by the
settled doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the
action pleaded by the litigant through the allegations in his complaint.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one

who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession
of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
expiration or termination of the right to possess. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the action must be filed "within one (1) year after the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession." Thus, to fall within the jurisdiction of
the MeTC, the complaint must allege that –
269
1. the defendant originally had lawful possession of the

property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
2. eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property

became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to
defendant of the expiration or the termination of the
defendant’s right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the

property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding

of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
Contrary to the findings of the lower courts, all four requirements were
alleged in Union Bank’s Complaint.
Union Bank alleged that Maunlad Homes "maintained possession of the

subject properties" pursuant to the Contract to Sell. Maunlad Homes, however,
"failed to faithfully comply with the terms of payment," prompting Union Bank to
"rescind the Contract to Sell in a Notice of Rescission dated February 5, 2003."
When Maunlad Homes "refused to turn over and vacate the subject premises,"
Union Bank sent another Demand Letter on November 19, 2003 to Maunlad
Homes requiring it (1) "to pay the equivalent rentals-in-arrears as of October
2003 in the amount of P15,554,777.01 and monthly thereafter until the premises
are fully vacated and turned over" to Union Bank, and (2) to vacate the property
peacefully and turn over possession to Union Bank. As the demand went
unheeded, Union Bank instituted an action for unlawful detainer before the
MeTC on February 19, 2004, within one year from the date of the last demand.
These allegations clearly demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer
and vested the MeTC jurisdiction over Union Bank’s action.
Maunlad Homes denied Union Bank’s claim that its possession of the
property had become unlawful. It argued that its failure to make payments did
not terminate its right to possess the property because it already acquired
ownership when Union Bank failed to reserve ownership of the property under
the contract. Despite Maunlad Homes’ claim of ownership of the property, the
Court rules that the MeTC retained its jurisdiction over the action; a defendant
may not divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the
property. Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant
270
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." Section
18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states that "the judgment shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building."
The authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the issue of

ownership to determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to interpret
and enforce the contract or agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.
To deny the MeTC jurisdiction over a complaint merely because the issue of
possession requires the interpretation of a contract will effectively rule out
unlawful detainer as a remedy. As stated, in an action for unlawful detainer, the
defendant’s right to possess the property may be by virtue of a contract, express
or implied; corollarily, the termination of the defendant’s right to possess would
be governed by the terms of the same contract. Interpretation of the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant is inevitable because it is the contract
that initially granted the defendant the right to possess the property; it is this
same contract that the plaintiff subsequently claims was violated or
extinguished, terminating the defendant’s right to possess. We ruled in Sps.
Refugia v. CA that –
where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a

determination of the validity and interpretation of the document
of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these
issues.
The MeTC’s ruling on the rights of the parties based on its interpretation of
their contract is, of course, not conclusive, but is merely provisional and is
binding only with respect to the issue of possession.
Thus, despite the CA’s opinion that Union Bank’s "case involves a
determination of the rights of the parties under the Contract to Sell," it is not
precluded from resolving this issue. Having acquired jurisdiction over Union
Bank’s action, the MeTC can resolve the conflicting claims of the parties based
on the facts presented and proved.
The propriety of filing the unlawful detainer action in Makati City

pursuant to the venue stipulation in the contract
271
Maunlad Homes questioned the venue of Union Bank’s unlawful detainer

action which was filed in Makati City while the contested property is located in
Malolos, Bulacan. Citing Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, Maunlad Homes
claimed that the unlawful detainer action should have been filed with the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city where the real property involved is
situated. Union Bank, on the other hand, justified the filing of the complaint with
the MeTC of Makati City on the venue stipulation in the contract which states
that "the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this
Contract to Sell shall be at Makati City."
While Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court states that ejectment actions
shall be filed in "the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the
real property involved is situated," Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the
rule shall not apply "where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof." Precisely, in this case, the
parties provided for a different venue. In Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda, etc., et
al., the Court upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract providing for a
venue for ejectment actions other than that stated in the Rules of Court. Since the
unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully
filed the complaint with the MeTC of Makati City.
GAMBOA V. CHAN
July 24, 2012/ Sereno, J.
EN BANC
 Writ of Habeas Data
FACTS:
Petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

Meanwhile, respondent P/SSUPT. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent P/SUPT. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and
Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Administrative Order No. 275, “Creating an Independent Commission to Address
the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country.” The body, which was
later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
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them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report
entitled “A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against
Private Armies’ Report to the President” (the Report).
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,
and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit
of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her
to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program

the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE:
Should Gamboa be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data?
HELD (Dry Run):
Gamboa should not be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
The privilege of the writ is granted when there is an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee that violated or threatened the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In the present case, there cannot
be an unlawful act or omission on the part of the PNP because it was deputized
by the Zeñarosa Commission to supply intelligence regarding PAGs. The fact that
273
there was no communication to Gamboa when the PNP released information to

the Zeñarosa Commission constitutes an act that is inherent to intelligence
gathering and investigation. Moreover, Gamboa was unable to prove that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and police surveillance.
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of

habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to
privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy
that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize
the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been

recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, thus
enunciated:
There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:

“Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right
to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.” As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis “the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: “The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state.
274
In Ople v. Torres, this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of
the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right
of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various

provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the

same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those

employed in the public and private sectors, to form
275
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not

contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a

witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our

laws. The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a
person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the
violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is
an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code.
The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize
the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right
to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn.
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be

protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks, this Court underscored that the right to privacy is
not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim

respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not
an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons
affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of
the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that
the right of the people to access information on matters of
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public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of

ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that
the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis
relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in
this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public
who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this
purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed
with the assailed legislative investigation.
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although
considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb
to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to

protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy

available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies
277
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and

other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of
A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence
of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it
with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and
records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist
the commission in the performance of its functions.
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;
(b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public
safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. Pursuant to the state interest of
dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the
Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted
their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary
to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened
her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to
forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created
for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to
request assistance from the latter.
278
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence gathering and investigation.
Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system,
which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and
to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards
were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to

make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during
specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the
discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,
resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence. However, to accord the
right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality.
Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered
to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the
freedom from “unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
ordinary sensibilities.”
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but

emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion
that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
279
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
GO V. PEOPLE
JULY 18, 2012/ Perlas-Bernabe, J.
 Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness
FACTS:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman

from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in
order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates
were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the
private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia
Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not
make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
ISSUE:
If you were the judge, will you grant the motion filed by the prosecutor?
HELD (Dry Run):
If I were the judge, I will not grant the motion. The Rules of Court provides
that when it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick
or infirm to appear at the trial, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Thus, Li Luen Ping may only be
examined before the MeTC where the case is pending and not in Laos,
Cambodia. To do otherwise would not only deprive the accused of their right to
attend the proceedings, but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to
observe the prosecution witness' deportment.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution

Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119
280
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open

court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to
the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face
to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through
his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of

conditional examination of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v.
Risos explicitly states that –
As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide

for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by
a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.”
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official,
commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state
or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly
of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision
reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. –

When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as
directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
281
served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an

examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at

no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly
nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with
approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of

advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119
of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides
that he should be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the
language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require
the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated
by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of
deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick
or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the
import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that
–
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the

testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly

applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the
deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be
deemed allowable also under the circumstances. However, the suggested
282
suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an

unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in
the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of
civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In
effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to
criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that
Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.”
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights

of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and
overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to
the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of
witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their

constitutional rights to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that
petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent
witness and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same
manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face

confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and
the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the
absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo, the Court
noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:
“The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to

appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
283
party the opportunity of cross examination. “The opponent”,

according to an eminent authority, “demands confrontation, not
for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being
gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination
which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting
of questions and obtaining immediate answers.” There is also
the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it
enables the judge as trier of facts “to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced
upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally
that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance,
manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the
weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the
witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and
memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal
clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge
if the witness testifies orally in court.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to

criminal proceedings and to have a two-fold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an
opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as
sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the
deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb that the
taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery
procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which
needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the
spirit of the law.
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the
factual settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought to
take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular
agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all
residents of the United States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify
in court. The trial court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and
ordered the deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we
sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited
ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be
proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the
evidence for the defense.
284
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119
cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process.
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when
it upheld the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li
Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where the case is
pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.
HEIRS OF OCHOA V. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION

July 16, 2012/ Del Castillo, J.
 The requirement of authentication of documentary evidence applies

only to a private document.
FACTS:
Jose Marcial Ochoa died while onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G &
S. Thereafter, his heirs filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig
City.
The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision but with the
modifications that the awards for loss of income in the amount of P6,537,244.96
be deleted and that moral damages be reduced to P200,000.00. The deletion
was ordered on the ground that the income certificate issued by Jose Marcial’s
employer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is
self-serving, unreliable and biased, and that the same was not supported by
competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipts.
It was argued that the USAID Certification used as basis in computing the
award for loss of income is inadmissible in evidence because it was not properly
authenticated and identified in court by the signatory thereof.
ISSUE:
Rule on the argument that the USAID Certification is inadmissible in evidence

because it was not properly authenticated.
285
HELD (Dry Run):
The argument that the USAID Certification is inadmissible in evidence

because it was not properly authenticated is devoid of merit. A USAID
certification does not require authentication to be admissible, because it is a
public document. It is issued by USAID, a principal United States agency that
extends assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape
poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. A written official act of an official
body of a foreign country is a public document pursuant to the Rules of Court
and does not require authentication.
The requirement of authentication of documentary evidence applies only to a

private document.
It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received in

evidence, its due execution and authenticity must first be proved. However, it
must be remembered that this requirement of authentication only pertains to
private documents and “does not apply to public documents, these being
admissible without further proof of their due execution or genuineness. Two
reasons may be advanced in support of this rule, namely: said documents have
been executed in the proper registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine
until the contrary is shown by clear and convincing proof; and, second, because
public documents are authenticated by the official signature and seals which
they bear and of which seals, courts may take judicial notice.” Hence, in a case,
the Court held that in the presentation of public documents as evidence, due
execution and authenticity thereof are already presumed.
The subject USAID Certification is a public document, hence, does not require
authentication.
It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the subject USAID

Certification is a private or public document before this Court can rule upon the
correctness of its admission and consequent use as basis for the award of loss
of income in these cases.
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as either public
or private, viz:
286
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of their

presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private. Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Paragraph (a) of the above-quoted provision classifies the written official acts,
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country,
as public documents. As mentioned in our March 9, 2011 Decision, USAID is the
principal United States agency that extends assistance to countries recovering
from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms and
that it is an independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign
policy guidance from the Secretary of State of the United States.
A further research on said agency shows that it was created through

Executive Order 1097319 by President John F. Kennedy on November 3, 1961
pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It is headed by an Administrator
and Deputy Administrator, both appointed by the President of the Unites States
and confirmed by its Senate. From these, there can be no doubt that the USAID
is an official government agency of a foreign country, the United States.
Hence, Cruz, as USAID’s Chief of the Human Resources Division in the

Philippines, is actually a public officer. Apparently, Cruz’s issuance of the subject
USAID Certification was made in the performance of his official functions, he
having charge of all employee files and information as such officer. In view of
these, it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public document pursuant to
paragraph (a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, and consistent
with our above discussion, the authenticity and due execution of said
Certification are already presumed.
Moreover, as a public document issued in the performance of a duty by a

public officer, the subject USAID Certification is prima facie evidence of the facts
287
stated therein. And, there being no clear and sufficient evidence presented by G
& S to overcome these presumptions, the RTC is correct when it admitted in
evidence the said document. The USAID Certification could very well be used as
basis for the award for loss of income to the heirs.
SPOUSES MENDIOLA V. CA
July 18, 2012/ Bersamin, J.
 Appeal from an Order Denying a Motion for Reconsideration

 Res Judicata
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) entered into an agreement for the
distribution of Shell petroleum products by Pacific Management & Development,
a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola.
To secure Pacific’s performance of its obligations under the agreement,

petitioners executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their real
estate and its improvements, located in Parañaque, Rizal.
Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence

extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The mortgaged realty had been sold to
Tabangao Realty, Inc. After application of the proceeds of the sale to the
obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of P170,228.00 (representing the foreclosure
expenses equivalent of 25% of the amount claimed plus interest) remained. The
deficiency was not paid by Ramon.
Thus, on September 2, 1987, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the
deficiency (Manila case). In his answer with counterclaim, Ramon asserted that
the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact
and in law.
On March 22, 1988, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to

annul the extrajudicial foreclosure (Makati case). As defendants in the Makati
case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal.
Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in
favor of Shell. As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed, but the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Undaunted, he next appealed to the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 122795), which denied his petition for review, and
upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Supreme Court
became final and executory as borne out by the entry of judgment issued on
June 10, 1996.
288
Nonetheless, on February 3, 1998, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati case.
It declared null and void the Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and the
Certificate of Sale issued to Tabangao.
Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision. On October 5, 1999,

however, the Makati RTC denied Shell’s motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint
notice of appeal. The appeal was docketed in the CA as C.A.- G.R. No. 65764.
Instead of filing their appellees’ brief, petitioners submitted a motion to

dismiss appeal, mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
prohibited an appeal of the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an appeal may be taken from the denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of February 3, 1998.
HELD (Dry Run):
An appeal may be taken from the denial of the motion for reconsideration of
the decision of February 3, 1998. An order denying a motion for reconsideration
filed against a judgment is a final order from which an appeal may be taken.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the present Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court now allows an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
Appeal from an Order Denying a Motion for Reconsideration
It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly limited an appeal to a judgment or final order, and
proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order denying a motion for new trial
or reconsideration, among others, viz:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken

from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion
seeking relief from judgment;
c) An interlocutory order;
289
d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
f) An order of execution;
g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65.
The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration in the list of issuances of a trial court not subject to appeal was
by reason of such order not being the final order terminating the proceedings in
the trial court.
This nature of the order is reflected in Section 9 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which declares that such order denying a motion for new trial
or reconsideration is not appealable, “the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.”
In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo

Mores and Virginia Lopez, the Court further expounded:
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for

reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is
logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not
putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the
same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the
damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the
decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion
for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a
trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its
judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order
to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in
the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.
In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., however, the Court has interpreted the
proscription against appealing the order denying a motion for reconsideration to
290
refer only to a motion for reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not
to a motion for reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order, to wit:
This Court finds that the proscription against appealing from

an order denying a motion for reconsideration refers to an
interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of

appeal from an interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay,
useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by
the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The
appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final
judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an
error of the court on appeal. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end
to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter
therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do
other than to execute the order.
In Apuyan v. Haldeman, too, the Court categorized an order denying the

motion for reconsideration as the final resolution of the issues a trial court earlier
passed upon and decided, and accordingly held that the notice of appeal filed
against the order of denial was deemed to refer to the decision subject of the
motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, where the decisive issue was

whether or not the appeal was taken within the reglementary period, with
petitioners contending that they had timely filed their notice of appeal based on
their submission that the period of appeal should be reckoned from July 22,
1998, the day they had received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration (of the order dismissing their complaint), instead of on
March 3, 1998, the day they had received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint, the Court, citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. and
Apuyan v. Haldeman, ruled that the receipt by petitioners of the denial of their
motion for reconsideration filed against the dismissal of their complaint, which
was a final order, started the reckoning point for the filing of their appeal, to wit:
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal

shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
291
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely

motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15

days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action. As already mentioned, petitioners argue that
the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration
should be construed as the “final order,” not the February 12, 1998
order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their
copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22,
1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the “final order,” receipt of

which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
– the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July
1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial

court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final
order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of

Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we again considered the order
denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
292
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view

that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
As the aftermath of these rulings, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC to approve certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the
Rules of Court effective on December 27, 2007. Among the amendments was the
delisting of an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
from the enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure of what are not appealable. The amended rule now reads:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken

from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion

seeking relief from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party

may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule
65.
Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangao’s appeal, albeit

seemingly directed only at the October 5, 1999 denial of their motion for
reconsideration, was proper. Thus, we sustain the CA’s denial for being in
accord with the rules and pertinent precedents. We further point out that for
petitioners to insist that the appeal was limited only to the assailed resolution of
October 5, 1999 was objectively erroneous, because Shell and Tabangao
expressly indicated in their appellant’s brief that their appeal was directed at
both the February 3, 1998 decision and the October 5, 1999 resolution.
Makati case is barred and should be dismissed on ground of res judicata

293
Shell and Tabangao’s insistence has merit. The Makati case should have
been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the
decision in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed on the
ground of being barred by res judicata.
In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that

the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and
in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action had been made in
bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his
rights. His pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in
the Makati case - that of annulment of the foreclosure sale - was identical to the
compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila case.
Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim

as follows:
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory

counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction
of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of
the amount.
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is

necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
(c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and
nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his
answer shall be contained therein. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim not set up shall be barred.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are

the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective
294
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by
the parties and the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness
is the logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the
counterclaim.
Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective

claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by
the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and
legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim
is compulsory.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned.
The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose
out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to
secure the payment of petitioners’ credit purchases under the distributorship
agreement with Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency
was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there
would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not
validly foreclosed the mortgage.
As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial

foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the
Makati RTC could not have missed the logical relation between the two actions.
We hold, therefore, that the Makati case was already barred by res judicata.
Hence, its immediate dismissal is warranted.
Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the
second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shell’s
complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered on May 31, 1990
on the merits already became final and executory. Hence, the first, second and
third elements were present.
Anent the fourth element, the Makati RTC concluded that the Manila case and
the Makati case had no identity as to their causes of action, explaining that the
former was a personal action involving the collection of a sum of money, but the
latter was a real action affecting the validity of the foreclosure sale.
The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the
causes of action was patently unsound. The identity of causes of action does not
mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily escape the operation of
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res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence
will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Petitioners’ Makati case and Shell’s Manila case undeniably required the
production of the same evidence. In fact, Shell’s counsel faced a dilemma upon
being required by the Makati RTC to present the original copies of certain
documents because the documents had been made part of the records of the
Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila RTC’s
judgment. Also, both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure
of the mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial
foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shell’s right to recover the
deficiency.
Apparently, the Makati RTC had the erroneous impression that the Manila
RTC did not have jurisdiction over the complaint of petitioners because the
property involved was situated within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
Thereby, the Makati RTC confused venue of a real action with jurisdiction. Its
confusion was puzzling, considering that it was well aware of the distinction
between venue and jurisdiction, and certainly knew that venue in civil actions
was not jurisdictional and might even be waived by the parties. To be clear,
venue related only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of
the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the
place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. In contrast,
jurisdiction refers to the power to hear and determine a cause, and is conferred
by law and not by the parties.
By virtue of the concurrence of the elements of res judicata, the immediate

dismissal of the Makati case would have been authorized under Section 1, Rule
9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses

The rule expressly mandated the Makati RTC to dismiss the case motu
proprio once the pleadings or the evidence on record indicated the pendency of
the Manila case, or, later on, disclosed that the judgment in the Manila case had
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meanwhile become final and executory. Yet, we are appalled by the Makati
RTC's flagrant disregard of the mandate.
NAVIA V. PARDICO
EN BANC
 Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation arrived at the house of Lolita Lapore located at Lot 9, Block 54, Grand
Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle
awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw
Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian
Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision.
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of
the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were
unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security
office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled
“Ikaw na naman?” and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy,
but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on
different parts of his body. Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said,
“Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.”
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her
husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together
with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to
the police.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City against Navia, Dio and
Buising.
ISSUE:
Will the petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia prosper?
HELD (Dry Run):

No, the petition will not prosper. One of the indispensable elements for the
protective writ of amparo to issue is government participation. In the instant case,
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petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam,
Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work
for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to
some covert police, military or governmental operation.
Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest
the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”
Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not
dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners’
security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto
established Ben’s inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and
security.
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben’s disappearance as
alleged in Virginia’s petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted
before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress. Then, the budding
jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined
enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted
principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced
disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851 on December 11, 2009.
Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
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(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest,

detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his
Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, “the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what
an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is.” Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s
reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851.
Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a menacing
attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given
the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, “Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben,” cannot
be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition,
there is nothing on record which would support petitioners’ assertion that they
released Ben on the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita
sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook
without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered
are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never
identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.
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But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not

enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The
petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or
implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie
against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do
not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed
above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of
State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary
case of a missing person.
LOZADA V. ARROYO
April 24, 2012/ Sereno, J.
EN BANC
 Writ of Amparo
 Subpoena
FACTS:
Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Philippine Forest Corporation (PFC), a government-owned- and -controlled
corporation under the DENR. Petitioner Violeta Lozada is his wife, while
petitioner Arturo Lozada is his brother.
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by
a transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National
Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), a Chinese manufacturer
of telecommunications equipment. Former National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri sought the services of Lozada as an
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unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the course
of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction
involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the
Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which
it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January
2008.
On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada
left the country for a purported official trip to London, as announced by then
DENR Secretary Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza). In the Petition, Lozada alleged that
his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then
Executive Assistant Undersecretary Manuel Gaite. Consequently, the Senate
issued an Order dated 30 January 2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b)
ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
to implement the Order and make a return thereon.
While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be
allowed to go back to the Philippines. Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada
informed his family that he was returning from Hong Kong on 5 February 2008
on board Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on
the same day.
In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft,
several men held his arms and took his bag. Although he allegedly insisted on
meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just follow them,
especially when he overheard from their handheld radio: "[H]wag kayong
dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado."
Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to

call up his brother, petitioner Arturo, and inform him of his situation. The men
thereafter led him through the departure area of the airport and into a car
waiting for them. They made him sit alone at the back of the vehicle, while a
man, whom he later discovered to be respondent Valeroso, took the passenger
seat and was always in contact with other individuals. Lozada observed that
other cars tailed their vehicle.
Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people
from the government, and that the former was going to confer with "ES and
Ma’[a]m." Lozada surmised that these individuals referred to ES Ermita and
former President Arroyo, respectively. Sec. Atienza also purportedly instructed
Lozada to pacify his wife, petitioner Violeta, who was making public statements
asking for her husband’s return.
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The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the
direction of Laguna. Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated
letter requesting police protection.
Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were
allegedly compelled to deny his request on account of unidentified security risks.
Eventually, however, the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis, Quezon City.
The group stopped at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain individuals,
who turned out to be Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista) and Colonel Paul
Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the Police Special Protection Office (PSPO). At the
restaurant, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a prepared
affidavit.
After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him
in a hotel for a night, but he suggested that they take him to La Salle Green Hills
instead. The men acquiesced.
Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his
sister, Carmen Lozada (Carmen). He observed that the perimeter was guarded
by policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening not only his
security, but also that of his family and the De La Salle brothers.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides

rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security.
Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both
preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial

killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this
remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right
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to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain

grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer
imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute
the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically

to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of
this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted
in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal
sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than
the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on
the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed
CA decision and the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court denies the
Petition.
Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to
establish their claims by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The use of
this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing amparo situations.
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already
ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the
existence of a continuing threat. Thus, this Court held in its Resolution in Razon
v. Tagitis:
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual

settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem
in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they
escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still
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nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years

after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation
subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat
to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since
the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were
still at large and had not been held accountable, the former
were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept
captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct
violation of their right to security of person.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed
to meet the threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence
and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the
veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually
transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with
the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived
of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time
he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted
himself to the custody of respondents:
Lozada was one of the first few passengers to get off the
plane because he was instructed by Secretary Atienza, through
a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008, while he was
still in Hong Kong, to proceed directly to the Bureau of
Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could
be facilitated in going out of the airport without any hassle from
the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada]
stated that he wanted to get away from the Senate people.
[Lozada] even went to the men’s room of the airport, after he
was allegedly "grabbed", where he made a call to his brother
Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not prevented from
making said call, and was simply advised by the person who
met him at the tube to (sic) "sir, bilisan mo na". When they
proceeded out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard
from the radio track down, "wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong
mga taga Senado", so they took a detour and went up to the
departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and
proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty Free Shop and
then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding
the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said
detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the
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arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through

immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped.
This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada]
struggled or made an outcry for help when he was allegedly
"grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. [Lozada] even testified
that nobody held him, and they were not hostile to him nor
shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the
reason why [Lozada] was fetched at the airport was to help
him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain
him at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony, pursuant to
the Order of the Senate on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada]
clearly knew this because at that time, it was still his decision
not to testify before the Senate. He agreed with that plan.
The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec.
Atienza to avoid the Senate personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him
at the airport were there to aid him in such objective. Surely, the actions of
Lozada evinced knowledge and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who
claims to have been forcibly abducted.
However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the

vehicle and driving him around, without disclosing the exact purpose thereof,
appear to be beyond what he had consented to and requested from Sec. Atienza.
These men neither informed him of where he was being transported nor provided
him complete liberty to contact his family members to assure them of his safety.
These acts demonstrated that he lacked absolute control over the situation, as
well as an effective capacity to challenge their instructions.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally

restrained, so much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated,
the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently
rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not
Lozada was deprived of his liberty from the point when he was led inside the
vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to the time he was taken to La Salle
Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family continue to suffer
various threats from respondents remain unproven. The CA correctly found as
follows:
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio

that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can neither be
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construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security.

Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of
media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten
somebody’s life, liberty and security.
He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of

armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the De La Salle
premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged
threats of armed men around him at places where he went to.
Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence
at all, as having originated from any of the respondents.
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance

camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect
threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that
these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-
serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed
or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose of
threatening his right to life, liberty and security.
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend,

i.e., wherever he goes, there is a bomb threat. There were bomb
threats in the places where he went to like in [the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines], Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol.
However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to
ascertain where the bomb threats emanated. Plainly, there is
no evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the
respondents or done upon their instigation.
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the

Secretary of Justice that he was put on the watch list of the
Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and
security. This alleged threat is again unsupported by evidence,
as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the
Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the
official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not one of the respondents in the amparo petition,
and there is no showing in the record that it was the
respondents who ordered the same for the purpose of
threatening him.
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[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases

against him and his family as threat to his life, liberty and
security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he does
not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents
ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said
purported cases are to be determined based on their own
merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo
petition filed against the respondents. (Emphasis supplied.)
Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras, ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must
first appear that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie
relevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to

testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records,
things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The
Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the

ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it
concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with
him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or
things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum

may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following
requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject
of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must
be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified
(test of definiteness).
In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of
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the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to
the issues of the case. The court a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner

to Neri and Abalos are not relevant to the instant Amparo
Petition where the issue involved is whether or not Lozada’s
right to life, liberty and security was threatened or continues to
be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the
respondents. Evidence, to be relevant, must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver "Jaime"
are not respondents in this Amparo Petition and the vague
allegations averred in the Motion with respect to them do not
pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind, petitioner appears to
be embarking on a "fishing expedition". Petitioner should
present the aggrieved party [Lozada], who has been regularly
attending the hearings, to prove the allegations in the Amparo
Petition, instead of dragging the names of other people into the
picture. We have repeatedly reminded the parties, in the course
of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not
involve the investigation of the ZTE-[NBN] contract. Petitioner
should focus on the fact in issue and not embroil this Court into
said ZTE-NBN contract, which is now being investigated by the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Office of the
Ombudsman.
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with
respect to the ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the events that transpired on 5-6
February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly received.
Although the present action is rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said
government transaction, the testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless
not prima facie relevant to the main issue of whether there was an unlawful act
or omission on the part of respondents that violated the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying
the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
MACASAET V. CO
308
 Personal Service of Summons and Substituted Service of Summons

 Jurisdiction in Personam
 Distinctions Between an Action in Personam and an Action In Rem or
Quasi in Rem
FACTS:
A retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued
AbanteTonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A.
Macasaet;its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano;its Circulation Manager Isaias
Albano;its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its
Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an
allegedly libelous article Petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of
AbanteTonite. The suit, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course
issued summons to be served on each defendant, Including AbanteTonite, at
their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF
Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros,
Manila.
In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to
the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address
were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the
summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in
his sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2000, to wit:
SHERIFF’S RETURN
This is to certify that on September 18, 2000, I caused the service of

summons together with copies of complaint and its annexes attached thereto,
upon the following:
1. Defendant Allen A. Macasaet, President/Publisher of

defendant Abante Tonite, at Monica Publishing Corporation,
Rooms 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana
corner A. Soriano Streets, Intramuros, Manila, thru his
secretary Lu-Ann Quijano, a person of sufficient age and
discretion working therein, who signed to acknowledge receipt
thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally
upon said defendant were made, but the same were ineffectual
309
and unavailing on the ground that per information of Ms.

Quijano said defendant is always out and not available, thus,
substituted service was applied;
2. Defendant Nicolas V. Quijano, at the same address, thru

his wife Lu-Ann Quijano, who signed to acknowledge receipt
thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally
upon said defendant were made, but the same were ineffectual
and unavailing on the ground that per information of (sic) his
wife said defendant is always out and not available, thus,
substituted service was applied;
3. Defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang,

Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, at the same address, thru Rene
Esleta, Editorial Assistant of defendant AbanteTonite, a person
of sufficient age and discretion working therein who signed to
acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said
summons personally upon said defendants were made, but the
same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that per
information of (sic) Mr. Esleta said defendants is (sic) always
roving outside and gathering news, thus, substituted service
was applied.
Original copy of summons is therefore, respectfully returned

duly served.
Manila, September 22, 2000.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special
appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons
because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They
contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons
personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant
by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be
impleaded as a party in a civil action.
At the hearing of petitioners’ motion to dismiss, Medina testified that he had

gone to the office address of petitioners in the morning of September 18, 2000 to
personally serve the summons on each defendant; that petitioners were out of
the office at the time; that he had returned in the afternoon of the same day to
310
again attempt to serve on each defendant personally but his attempt had still
proved futile because all of petitioners were still out of the office; that some
competent persons working in petitioners’ office had informed him that Macasaet
and Quijano were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang,
Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to gather news; and that he had then
resorted to substituted service upon realizing the impossibility of his finding
petitioners in person within a reasonable time.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners. While the rules
are strict in insisting on personal service, they do not cling to such strictness
should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. Sheriff
Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person
at their office address, the first in the morning and the second in the afternoon of
same date. After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his
second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the
office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be
futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that govern.
Moreover, petitioners’ had actually received the summonses served through

their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the trial
court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.
Jurisdiction in Personam
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the

court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of
due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in
rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an
action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of
the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process.
311
Distinctions Between an Action in Personam and an Action In Rem or

Quasi in Rem
The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on

the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly
delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the
prop[er]ty to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate
court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in
which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought
against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge
of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to
the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined
in the action.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of
312
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but
when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance,
extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or
due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him
or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the
defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper
service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees,
the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the defendant.
The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under
seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action;
a direction that the defendant answers within the time fixed by the Rules of
Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take
judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. To be attached to
the original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy of the complaint
(and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an

action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons
fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant; and(b) to afford to the defendant the
opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the former, when
jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper
service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act
313
inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him,
like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the
summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the
claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other words, compliance
with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due
process as it is of jurisdiction.
Personal Service of Summons and Substituted Service of Summons
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be
effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service
consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or,
if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule
on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of
the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned.
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The
latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the
summons on the defendant is made through his substitute.
It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service

must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other
than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. This is because
substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is
extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to.
Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts
failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return.
Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt personal service
as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant
either expressly or impliedly. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice
attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office
314
address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the
afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano
were “always out and not available” and the other petitioners were “always
roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those present in
the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of
petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day,
he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable
time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was
not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on
the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service
on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances
already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules,
not their letter, that governs.
In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer

was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses
served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings
in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and
a pre trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of
discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary
appearance in the action.
Nor can we sustain petitioners’ contention that Abante Tonite could not be
sued as a defendant due to its not being either a natural or a juridical person. In
rejecting their contention, the CA categorized Abante Tonite as a corporation by
estoppel as the result of its having represented itself to the reading public as a
corporation despite its not being incorporated. Thereby, the CA concluded that
the RTC' did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the non-incorporation
or Abante Tonite with the Securities and Exchange Commission was of no
consequence, for, otherwise, whoever of the public who would suffer any
damage from the publication or articles in the pages of its tabloids would he left
without recourse. We cannot disagree with the CA, considering that the editorial
box of the daily tabloid disclosed that although Monica Publishing Corporation
had published the tabloid on a daily basis, nothing in the box indicated that
Monica Publishing Corporation had owned Abante Tonite.
REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING INC. V. GUEVARRA

315
June 19, 2013/ Abad, J.
 Reckoning of the Extended Period for the Filing of a Pleading that

Ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or Legal Holiday
FACTS:
Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc. hired Guevarra to work as master

of MV NOL SHEDAR. In the course of his work on board, Reinier Shipping sent
him Notice, relieving him of command of the vessel upon the insistence of its
charterers and owners. As a result, Guevarra filed a case for illegal dismissal
and damages against Reinier Shipping.
The Labor Arbiter found that Reinier Shipping denied Guevarra his right to
due process since it did not give him the opportunity to be heard.
Reinier Shipping appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

but on February 22, 2002, the latter affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
The due date to file a petition for special civil action of certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA) fell on July 26, 2002, a Friday, but Reinier Shipping
succeeded in obtaining an extension of 15 days, which period counted from July
26 began to run on July 27, a Saturday, and fell due on August 10, a Saturday.
Reinier Shipping filed its petition on the following Monday, August 12, 2002.
On November 11, 2002 the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out
of time. The CA ruled that Reinier Shipping violated Supreme Court’s A.M. 00-2-
14-SC. Since August 10, 2002, the last day of the extended period, fell on a
Saturday, automatic deferment to the next working day did not apply and
Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10, a Saturday,
considering that the court is closed on Saturdays.
ISSUE:
Decide on the dismissal by the Court of Appeals.
HELD (Dry Run):
The Court of Appeals should give due course to the petition, for the reason
that Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, which states that if the last day of
the period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the time shall not
316
run until the next working day, still applies. Thus, the rule gives Reinier
Shipping up to Monday, the next working day, within which to file its petition.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying A. M. 00-2-14-SC in the present case.

Such rule provides that in case the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or
holiday, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the expiration of the
period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.
A.M. 00-2-14-SC clarifies the application of Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of

Court when the last day on which a pleading is due falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday and the original period is extended. The clarification
states:
Whereas, the aforecited provision applies in the matter of

filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of
the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is

extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately
following where the last day of the period is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for extension of
time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the
next working day and not from the original expiration of the
period;
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of

the Bench and the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22
speaks only of “the last day of the period” so that when a party
seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date
ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer
applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading
should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday
or legal holiday.
Reinier Shipping’s last day for filing its petition fell on July 26, a Friday. It
asked for a 15-day extension before the period lapsed and this was granted. As
it happened, 15 days from July 26 fell on August 10, a Saturday. The CA held
317
that Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition before August 10 (Saturday)
or at the latest on August 9 (Friday) since, in an extended period, the fact that
the extended due date (August 10) falls on a Saturday is to be “disregarded.”
Reinier Shipping has no right to move the extended due date to the next working
day even if such due date fell on a Saturday. Since the courts were closed on
August 10 (Saturday), Reinier Shipping should have filed its petition, according
to the CA, not later than Friday, August 9.
But this is obviously wrong since it would mean compelling Reinier Shipping
to file its petition one day short of the 15-day extension granted it. That would
unjustly deprive it of the full benefit of that extension. Since its new due date fell
on a Saturday when courts are close, however, the clear language of Section 1,
Rule 21, applies. This gives Reinier Shipping up to Monday (August 12), the next
working day, within which to file its petition.
The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where

the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such
clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim that "the period of
extension" in such a case "is to be reckoned from the next working day and not
from the original expiration of the period." The correct rule, according to the
clarification, is that"[ a]ny extension of time to file the required pleading should x
x x be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said
due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday."
For example, if a pleading is due on July 10 and this happens to be a

Saturday, the time for filing it shall not run, applying Section 1 of Rule 21, on
July 10 (Saturday) nor on July 11 (Sunday) but will resume to run on the next
working day, which is July 12 (Monday). The pleading will then be due on the
latter date. If the period is extended by 10 days, such 10 days will be counted,
not from July 12 (Monday) but from the original due date, July 10 (Saturday)
"regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday." Consequently, the new
due date will be 10 days from July 10 or precisely on July 20. As stated above,
the situation of Reinier Shipping is different.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals'
Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP 71861 dated November 11, 2002 and January 23,
2003 and DIRECTS it to give due course to petitioner Reinier Pacific International
Shipping, Inc.'s petition before it. SO ORDERED.
ABRIGO V. FLORES
318
 Supervening Event as an Exception to the Execution of a Final and

Immutable Judgment
FACTS:
Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in
Laguna and inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia (Faylona) from
their deceased parents. It appears that after Francisco’s death, his widow and
Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the
same lot was assigned to Francisco’s heirs while the eastern half thereof to
Gaudencia.
There was, however, no actual ground partition of the lot up to and after
Gaudencia’s death. It thus result that both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia
owned in common the land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by
Gaudencia herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in actual possession of
the entire area, encroached and built improvements on portions of the western
half. In the case of the petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage
and poultry pens extended to the western half.
Such was the state of things when, on July 22 1988, in the Regional Trial
Court at San Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco
Faylona, among whom are the private respondents, desiring to terminate their
co-ownership with the heirs of Gaudencia, filed their complaint for judicial
partition in this case, which complaint was docketed a quo as Civil Case No. SP-
3048.
In a decision dated November 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment for
the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a
way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while the
eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia whose heirs were further required to pay
rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and occupancy of portions on the western
half.
The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision
promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.- G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the
decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate
proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of
judgment on June 3, 1996.
319
On March 19, 1998, or even before the respondent court could act on private
respondents’ motion for demolition, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution
on Motion for Demolition, this time alleging that they have become one of the co-
owners of the western half to the extent of 53.75 square meters thereof,
purportedly because one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona –
Jimmy Flores – who was co-plaintiff of the private respondents in the case, sold
to them his share in the western half.
ISSUE:
Did the sale by Flores of his ¼ share in the western portion of the 402-square
meter lot constitute a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final
judgment against petitioners inequitable?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. Although a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter

of right of a final and immutable judgment, it must directly affect the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of
the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable
and it must be established by competent evidence. In the present case, however,
the sale by Flores of his supposed ¼ share did not modify or alter the judgment
regarding the partition of the property in litis and the petitioners had not
adduced evidence of the transactions in the face of the respondents.
The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision
promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.- G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the
decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate
proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of
judgment on June 3, 1996.
Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment.
The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA,
followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties were entitled to its
execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution should issue to enforce the
dispositions therein.
320
The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his ¼
share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale
dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution
inequitable is devoid of merit.
Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a

matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening
event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would
be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the
western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of
Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the ¼ portion supposedly
subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally
impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by
the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of
substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the
suspension.
Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property
in litis their demand for the segregration of the ¼ share of Jimmy Flores.
Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper court a
proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to
them by Jimmy Flores.
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an

exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment
rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or
substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render
the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of
facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new
circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including
matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because
such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In that event, the interested
321
party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to
harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a
supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by
competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the
conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.
Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed ¼ share in the
western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or
alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also
regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduced
evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including Jimmy Flores,
having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale itself.
DOMINGO V. COLINA
June 17, 2013/ Peralta, J.
 Civil Liability
FACTS:
In an Information, petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in

Cities (MTCC), Davao City, with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
The case proceeded to trial. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense
filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The MTCC, on October 25, 2001, issued an Order
granting the demurrer to evidence holding that:
Taking into consideration the observations of this court that

the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records
of this case failed to prove element[s] nos. 2 and 3 of the crime
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against the
accused Lucille Domingo per information in this case, this court
finds and so holds that the demurrer to the evidence adduced
in court by the prosecution in the records of this case filed by
accused Lucille Domingo through her counsel with this court is
well taken. Accordingly, it is granted. Correspondingly, this
case is hereby ordered dismissed.
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The MTCC dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2) the check is
applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check knows at the
time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment.
The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and In The Alternative To Reopen the
Civil Aspect of the Case. The prosecution contended that even assuming that
petitioner did not receive valuable consideration for her bounced check, she is
nonetheless liable to respondent for the face value of the check as an
accommodation party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her check.
On November 23, 2001, the MTCC issued another Order denying the
prosecution's Motion. The MTCC held, thus:
After a thorough reevaluation of the evidence adduced in

court by the prosecution in the records of this case in the light
of the arguments proffered by the accused in support of her
demurrer to the evidence adduced in court by the prosecution
in the records of this case and of the factual and legal basis of
this court in arriving at its conclusion in ordering the dismissal
of this case vis-a-vis the arguments interposed by the
prosecution in its motion for reconsideration of the order issued
by this court, dated October 25, 2001, as diluted by the
comments of accused Lucille Domingo, through her counsel, of
the herein stated motion for reconsideration of the prosecution,
this court finds no cogent reason to justify the reconsideration
of the herein stated order. Correspondingly, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this court dated October 25,
2001 is denied. Correlatively, the alternate prayer of the
private complainant, through her counsel, to reopen the civil
aspect of this case is likewise denied. At any rate, although the
herein mentioned order did not categorically state that the
accused's act from which his civil liability in favor of the private
complainant may arise does not exist in this case, in effect, the
observations and ratiocinations stated by this court in support
of its finding that the evidence adduced in court by the
prosecution in the records of this case failed to prove all the
elements of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
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22, speaks for itself. In deference to the desire of the

prosecution, let it be stated herein that the act from which the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant
may arise, does not exist in this case.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court rule that the act from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and
November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or determination. While it
subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that “the act from which the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does
not exist in this case,” the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual
circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would
warrant such ruling.
Moreover, pronouncement of the MTCC as to the prosecution's failure to prove

the second and third elements of the offense charged, it can be deduced that the
prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and fourth elements,
i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is dishonored by
the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. That fact leads to the logical
conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists.
The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same Rules
states that:
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In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether

the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine
if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and
November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or determination. The
Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting petitioner in its Order dated October
25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. While it
subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that “the act from which the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does
not exist in this case,” the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual
circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would
warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution
failed to prove all the elements of the offense charged, then the act from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations
and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion.
However, after a careful review of the abovementioned Orders, the Court finds
nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to
arrive at its conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil
liability might arise did not exist.
On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of
the criminal case against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. As may be
recalled, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2) the
check is applied on account or for value and (3) the person issuing the check
knows at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment. This
only means, therefore, that the trial court did not convict petitioner of the offense
charged, since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of
evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense charged does not mean
that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which is
proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence.
Moreover, from the above pronouncement of the MTCC as to the prosecution's
failure to prove the second and third elements of the offense charged, it can be
deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the first and
fourth elements, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check and (4) the check is
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dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that
petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was
subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion
that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists. On the basis
of the foregoing, the RTC correctly entertained respondent's appeal of the civil
aspect of the case.
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. V. CA

June 19, 2013/ Perez, J.
 Interlocutory Orders
 Aspects of Jurisdiction
 Indispensable Party
 Misjoinder of Party
 Substitution
FACTS:
On December 24, 1997, Boston Equity Resources, Inc. filed a complaint for
sum of money against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent
Lolita Toledo, then the defendant in that case, filed an answer but on 7 May
1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she
alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo
(Manuel), is already dead. The death certificate of Manuel states “13 July 1995”
as the date of death.
The trial of the case then proceeded. Boston Equity presented its evidence
and its exhibits were thereafter admitted. On 24 September 2004, counsel for
Lolita was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, Lolita instead filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise
denied on the ground that “defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is
now barred by estoppel by laches” since respondent failed to raise the issue
despite several chances to do so.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in
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denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of
evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case.
ISSUES:
1. Should the Court of Appeals grant the writ of certiorari filed by Lolita
Toledo?
2. One of the grounds of Lolita in her motion to dismiss was that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction on Manuel because it was already dead when
the complaint was filed. The trial court denied such motion relying on the ground,
among others, that Lolita’s attack on jurisdiction was barred by laches, since
she failed to raise such issue despite several chances to do so. Do you agree
with this argument of the trial court?
3. The trial proceeded without the estate of Manuel Toledo being impleaded.
Was that estate an indispensable party?
4. Manuel had died prior to the institution of the civil action by Boston Equity.
Should the case be dismissed against him or should there be a substitution? In
case the dismissal of the case as against him is proper, would such dismissal
have the effect of dismissing the case against Lolita?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. No, for the reason that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of
the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done
by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits. Moreover, assuming
that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying Lolita’s motion to dismiss because it was filed out of time.
2. No. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as
a result of estoppel by laches is not the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but jurisdiction over the subject matter. In the present case, what
Lolita was questioning was the court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this
case.
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3. No. An indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a

determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete or equitable. In the present case, there can be such an effective and
complete determination of the case because Boston Equity may collect the entire
amount of the obligation from Lolita only even in the absence of the estate of
Manuel, the liability of Lolita and Manuel being solidary.
4. The case should be dismissed against Manuel in view of the fact that, as to
him, there was no service of summons and only a natural, or juridical person, or
an entity authorized by law may be a party in a civil action. There should not be
a substitution, because there was no one to be substituted considering that he
was already dead at the time of the institution of the action.
However, such dismissal does not render the action dismissible as against
Lolita, considering that she was validly served with summons and the case
against her may proceed independently.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in
favor of respondent. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a
motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case and
still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on
the merits. Therefore, “the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered.”
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. On

Higher Education:
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every

controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve
persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have
no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to
correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts.
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Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. It,
in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondent’s
motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED
HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the
outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the
express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this
provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the
filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
On whether or not respondent is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the

trial court
1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss

questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her
amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s
jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down
in the case of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. petitioner claimed that
respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars
her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the
proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the

concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of
the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing
which is the subject of the litigation.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a

result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam,
the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the
then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in
the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. In subsequent cases citing the ruling
of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals, the issue for consideration was the authority of the regional
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trial court to hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and damages
involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding
Judge, MTC, Legaspi City, petitioners argued that the respondent municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of
ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga, accused-
appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which she was charged,
falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts and the
then courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the court of first instance,
to which she had appealed the municipal court's conviction, should be deemed
null and void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction
of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on
estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt
an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the
trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel.
Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case.
Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are
pertinent herein.
The Rules of Court provide:
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses

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RULE 15
MOTIONS
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of

Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the “objection on jurisdictional grounds

which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived subject, however, to the principle of
estoppel by laches.”
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is
not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule
9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed
in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first
sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping

pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that “issue on jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal” and
that, therefore, respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and
is, consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the
question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant
Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to
dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since “lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which
can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.”
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service

of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
Toledo
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In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired
by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he
receives summons. “Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the
action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person.”
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely
because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his
wife was filed in the trial court.
The issues presented in this case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba
v. Vda. de Te. In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio
Sereno was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering the payment of
his monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the possession of Sereno’s
employer was levied upon by a sheriff of the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and
his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A complaint for recovery
of motor vehicle and damages, with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente
lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno, the NLRC sheriff and the
NLRC by the registered owner of the truck. After his motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, petitioner Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on, however,
he filed an omnibus motion to dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants, in view of the fact that Sereno
was already dead when the complaint for recovery of possession was filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that of
Sarsaba, one of the issues submitted for resolution in both cases is similar:
whether or not a case, where one of the named defendants was already dead at
the time of its filing, should be dismissed so that the claim may be pursued
instead in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
defendant. The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed, as did respondent
herein, that since one of the defendants died before summons was served on
him, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint against all the
defendants and the claim should be filed against the estate of the deceased
defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. This is
exactly the same prayer made by respondent herein in her motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this wise:
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We cannot countenance petitioner’s argument that the

complaint against the other defendants should have been
dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno. The court’s failure to acquire
jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for
Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can
petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to
reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the
defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno’s person will
not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against the
other defendants, considering that they have been served with
copies of the summons and complaints and have long
submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the
other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to
raise all possible defenses and objections personal to them in
their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the
complaint against Sereno only.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is no basis for dismissing the

complaint against respondent herein. Thus, as already emphasized above, the
trial court correctly denied her motion to dismiss.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. –

Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or

subject matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has
not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but “an interest of
such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting [that] interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
333
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered
that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete or equitable.”
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action

before it may properly proceed.
On the other hand, a “person is not an indispensable party if his interest in

the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between
him or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest
in the subject matter of the action.” It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her presence will
avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is
solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and
respondent’s husband, on the other, states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally (in

solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC.
the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
(P1,400,000.00)]
The provisions and stipulations of the contract were then followed by the
respective signatures of respondent as “MAKER” and her husband as “CO
MAKER.” Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may collect
the entire amount of the obligation from respondent only. The aforementioned
provision states: “The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed
against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.” In other
words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be
satisfied by respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel.
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Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s

complaint for sum of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent,

held that the claim of petitioner should have been filed against the estate of
Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The
aforementioned provisions provide:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not

filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and judgment for money against the decedent, must
be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise, they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the

obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the
claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only
debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover
contribution from the other debtor.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-quoted

provisions. In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the
precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which latter
provision has been retained in the present Rules of Court without any revisions,
the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama,
et. al., held:
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from

whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that
where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and
one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved
against the estate of the latter, the decedent’s liability being
absolute and primary. It is evident from the foregoing that
Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the creditor
desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly
nothing in the said provision making compliance with such
procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action
335
against the surviving solidary debtors, should the creditor

choose to demand payment from the latter, could be
entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would
deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action
against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil
Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one
of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditor’s filing of
an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead
of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of
Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion where the Supreme Court pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules

of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said
provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in
case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate
of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth
that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether
to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary
debtor.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is

the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the
creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.” The choice is
undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against
whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of
the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without
necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as
against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the
estate of the deceased solidary debtor. For to require the
creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition
precedent for any collection action against the surviving
debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights
provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
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As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the

Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of
the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under
the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed
against the estate of [the deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this
provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right under the New Civil
Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary
debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle,
which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive
law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise
stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot
be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the
former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party

and the case can proceed as against respondent only. That petitioner opted to
collect from respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its
opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss asserting that the case, as against
her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of
Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as party defendant is a misjoinder of

party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that “[n]either misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.”
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined

party must have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or
against the misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case, therefore,
the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in
fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time
the collection case was filed by petitioner.
This being the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not
obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped
from the case. Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de
337
Te, whose facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be
followed herein. There, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it
resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Sereno in this
wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court

has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno
since there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as
Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the
summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its
annexes, could be served upon him. However, the failure to
effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein, does not render the action DISMISSIBLE,
considering that the three (3) other defendants, were validly
served with summons and the case with respect to the
answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it
recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have
previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was
denied by the Court. Hence, only the case against Patricio
Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a
claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with
respect to the three (3) other accused [sic] will proceed.
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed. In addition, the

dismissal of the case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, which states that: [o]nly natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” Applying this
provision of law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante, held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. In order to

maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have
an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person
in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an
artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in
the name of such a person. The rule is no different as regards
party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he
institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party
defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in
personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no
jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party
defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable
338
of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that
the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a
question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and
not one of procedure.
The original complaint of petitioner named the “estate of

Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia
Ventura” as the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
same on the ground that the defendant as named in the
complaint had no legal personality. We agree. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the
same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued
and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an

entity authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because
a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a
party to a civil action. Since the proper course of action against the wrongful
inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the dismissal of the case as against
him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his
heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during
the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted

for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or

representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
339
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect,
there was no party to be substituted.
MASLAG V. MONZON
 Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts

 Two Modes of Appealing an RTC Decision or Resolution on Issues of
Fact and Law
FACTS:
In 1998, Maslag filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property against

Monzon. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court. After trial, the
MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property.
Monzon appealed to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After going over the MTC records and the parties’ respective memoranda,
the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, through Acting Presiding Judge Cabato, issued
its October 22, 2003 Order, declaring
the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action. It further held that
it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial;

lack of jurisdiction. –
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court

without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial
Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance
with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission
of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest
of justice.
On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera, the new judge, issued a Resolution
reversing the MTC Decision. The fallo reads as follows:
340
WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from the Municipal

Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet is set aside. Maslag is
ordered to turn over the possession land she presently occupies
to Monzon.
Maslag filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution.
Maslag assailed the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution for reversing the MTC’s
factual findings and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted.
Monzon moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper
remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its
ISSUES:
1. Which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed by
Maslag?
2. What are the two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on
issues of fact and law? State how each of them is done.
3. What is the proper mode of appeal that should be resorted to by Maslag?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. The Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case filed by Maslag. In cases involving title to real property located outside
Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos, the Municipal Trial Courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Based on the
Declaration of Real Property, the disputed land in Benguet has an assessed
value of P12,400 only. Hence, the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction.
2. The two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact

and law are ordinary appeal under Rule 41 and petition for review under Rule
42.
Ordinary appeal under Rule 41 is applicable in cases where the RTC

exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC.
341
Petition for review under Rule 42 is applicable in cases when the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a
Petition for Review with the CA.
3. The proper mode of appeal that should be resorted to by Maslag is petition

for review under Rule 42, because the MTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction.
There is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and
review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, since the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, With regard to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order, the
same should be disregarded for it produces no effect.
In her Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity

of OCT, petitioner claimed that she and her father had been in open, continuous,
notorious and exclusive possession of the disputed property since the 1940’s.
She averred:
7. Sometime in the year 1987, Elizabeth Monzon, the owner

of the adjacent parcel of land being occupied by plaintiff
[Maslag], informed the plaintiff that the respective parcels of
land being claimed by them can now be titled. A suggestion
was, thereafter made, that those who were interested to have
their lands titled, will contribute to a common fund for the
surveying and subsequent titling of the land;
8. Since plaintiff had, for so long, yearned for a title to the

land she occupies, she contributed to the amount being
requested by Elizabeth Monzon;
9. A subdivision survey was made and in the survey, the

respective areas of the plaintiff and the defendants were
defined and delimited – all for purposes of titling.
10. But alas, despite the assurance of subdivided titles,

when the title was finally issued by the Registry of Deeds, the
same was only in the name of Elizabeth Monzon and WILLIAM
GESTON. The name of Darma Maslag was fraudulently,
deliberately and in bad faith omitted. Thus, the title to the
342
property, to the extent of 18,295 square meters, was titled

solely in the name of ELIZABETH MONZON.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion

of the property which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzon’s title.
Her primary relief was to recover ownership of real property. Indubitably,
petitioner’s complaint involves title to real property. An action “involving title to
real property,” on the other hand, was defined as an action where “the plaintiff’s
cause of action is based on a claim that [she] owns such property or that [she]
has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same.” Under the present state of the law, in cases involving
title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC
or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. Pertinent
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7691, provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where the [assessed] value [of the property] exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
343
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real

Property dated November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioner’s
Exhibit “A”, showing that the disputed property has an assessed value of
P12,400 only. Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction
of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1)
of BP 129 in determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in
pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive jurisdiction. This
brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an

improper appeal:
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of

Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law
shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable
by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead
of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a
Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of

fact and law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where
the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases
where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done
by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between
these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in
the Order or Decision being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have
taken cognizance of the case and review the court a quo’s Judgment except in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Besides, the new RTC Judge who penned the May 4, 2004 Resolution, Judge
Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal despite the October 22,
2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, “This is an appeal from the
Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad Benguet”
344
and then proceeded to discuss the merits of the “appeal.” In the dispositive
portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTC’s findings and conclusions and
remanded residual issues for trial with the MTC.
Thus, in fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the
proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the RTC’s earlier
October 22, 2003 Order, the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect
(other than to confuse the parties whether the RTC was invested with original or
appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by law and it is “not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.” Neither would
the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode
of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually did, petitioner
resorts to arguing for what the RTC should have done. She maintains that the
RTC should have issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction
because it had earlier ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the cause of
action.
Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only statutes can confer

jurisdiction. Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been
repeatedly held that “any judgment, order or resolution issued without
[jurisdiction] is void and cannot be given any effect.” By parity of reasoning, an
order issued by a court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot
likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be
countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and
the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner
could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the proper mode of
appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is the type of
jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution.
Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction
was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction
the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the RTC
should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves
345
the merits of the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of
appeal was improper to begin with.
DIO V. CA
June 26, 2013/ Perlas-Bernabe, J.
 Determination of Probable Cause by the Public Prosecutor During a

 Determination of Probable Cause by the Judge to Ascertain Whether a
Warrant of Arrest Should be Issued
 Immediate Dismissal of the Case by the Judge if the Evidence on
Record Clearly Fails to Establish Probable Cause
FACTS:
In 2001, petitioner Virginia Dio, the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd.
(HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale, was introduced to
Desmond, the CEO of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the
authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV
China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI.
After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS

Equities, decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.006 in SBMEI’s Ocean
Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the
Subic Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live
performances of false-killer whales and sea lions.
In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a
capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be
used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on
investment. Desmond even presented a Business Plan, indicating that: (a) Ocean
Adventure’s “attendance will rise from 271,192 in 2001 to just over 386,728 in
2006, with revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00 million to US$7,290,000.00
million in the same time frame”; (b) early investors are expected to reap an
annual return of 23% in 2001, rising to 51% in 2006”; and (c) “fully priced shares
would yield a 19% return in 2001, rising to 42% in 2006.”
In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another

US$1,000,000.0016 in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach
Hotel Project (Miracle Beach), which involved the development of a resort owned
by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment
346
would be used to settle SBMEI’s P40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro

Investment Corporation and for the construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas.
However, when the corresponding subscription agreement was presented to

Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a clause stating that the “funds in the
Subscription Bank Account” were also to be used for the “[f]unding of Ocean
Adventure’s Negative Cash Flow not exceeding [US$200,000.00].” This was in
conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of Westdale’s investment in Miracle
Beach.
She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the company’s books
and financial statements – specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals
and its non-disclosure of the true amount of JV China’s investment – which
prompted her to call for an audit investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered
that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain disbursements
from Westdale’s special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures
(special account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the operating
expenses of Ocean Adventure.
She filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints (subject criminal
complaints) for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article 315(1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a)27 of the RPC,
both against Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor’s Office.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution

dated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against Desmond for the
abovementioned crimes.
In view of the foregoing, corresponding criminal informations were filed with

the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The accusatory portions thereof read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 516-200433
That in or about and sometime in early 2001, in Olongapo

City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, being the officer of Subic Bay
Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI), acting as a syndicate and by
means of deceit, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud H.S. EQUITIES LIMITED, represented in
347
this case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following

manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which he made
to said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio to the effect that he had the
expertise and qualifications, as well as the resources,
influence, credit and business transaction with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and other financing institutions
to ensure the viability of the Subic Bay Marine Exploration
Ocean Adventure Project (SBMEOA), which he represented to
be a qualified and legally existing investment enterprise with
capacity to solicit investment from the general public, by
submitting documents for the purpose, which representations
he knew to be false and fraudulent and the supporting
documents are similarly spurious and were only made in order
to induce said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio to invest and deliver
as in fact she invested and delivered a total amount of One
Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand US Dollars
($1,150,000.00) to the said accused on the strength of said
manifestations and representations and supporting documents,
and said accused, once in possession of the said amount,
misapplied, converted and misappropriated the same to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
H.S. Equities Limited in the amount of US $1,150,000.00 or
Php57,500,000.00 Pesos, the dollar computed at the rate of
Php 50.00 to [US]$1.00 which was the prevailing rate of
exchange of a dollar to peso at the time of the commission of
the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 515-200434
That in or about and sometime during the period from June

2002 to July 2002, in Olongapo City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Westdale Assets, Limited represented in
this case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following
manner to wit: the said accused received in trust and for
administration from the said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio the
amount of One Million US Dollars ($1,000,000.00) under the
348
express obligation of using the same to pay the loan facility of

the Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI) with First Metro
Investment Corporation and to fund the construction and
development of the Miracle Beach Project but the said accused,
once in possession of the said amount, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent to defraud, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same for his own use and
benefit by devoting it to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon and despite repeated demands made upon him to
account for and to return the said amount, he failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Westdale Assets, Limited in the amount of
US $1,000,000.00 or its equivalent to FIFTY MILLION (Php
50,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, the dollar being
computed at the rate of Php50.00 to $ 1.00 which was the
prevailing rate of exchange at the commission of the offense, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Aggrieved, Desmond filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable

Cause.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause
exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not
all present, to wit:
First, the element of misrepresentation or deceit found in

par. 2 (a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is absent. It
must be emphasized that the promises allegedly made to the
complainant by the accused that her company’s investment will
significantly increase, clearly appeared in the SBMEI’s printed
business plan. Verily, this is SBMEI’s representation or “come
on” to would-be investors and not a personal assurance of the
accused. The fact that accused was the company’s Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors is of
no moment in the absence of any evidence to show that
accused personally prepared the business plan thereby making
349
the alleged “rosy picture” his own personal enticements to the

complainant. Therefore, there being a dearth of evidence
pointing to the accused as author of the SBMEI’s business
plan, any misrepresentation or deceit committed cannot be
personally attributed to him.
Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence

that the accused personally assured the complainant about his
so-called power, influence and credit with the SBMA and other
financial institutions that would supposedly insure the viability
and profitability of the project. Note that nowhere in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the private complainant are there specific
factual allegations that would show that the accused had
personal business meetings with the SBMA and said financial
institutions. As to how and in what manner and scope accused
exercised such alleged power, influence and credit over these
juridical entities remain a bare and self-serving averment in the
absence of any factual detail or account.
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid [sic] that accused was the one

who personally valuated the marine mammals contributed by
JV China Incorporated to the Subic Bay Marine Exploration,
Inc. as capital amounting to US$3.724 Million. Evidence clearly
point to an independent valuation done by a third party namely
Beijing Landa Aquarium that valued the marine mammals
under the Buy-Out Agreement dated September 9, 1998.
Needless to state, the onus is on complainant to controvert this
valuation. Again, however, no adequate proof was adduced
along this line.
Second, the element of personal misappropriation by the

accused under par. 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
is likewise not present. While it may be conceded that there
was money utilized to pay salaries of expatriates and staff as
well as the cost of utilities amounting to US$72,272.00
complainant failed to show that said money was taken from
her companies’ investments in SBMEI. It must be pointed out
that other than complainant’s bare allegation, there was no
document presented categorically stating that the investment of
complainant’s companies were earmark for a particular
payment or project. Hence, when the investment entered
350
SBMEI’s financial coffers, the same presumably were co-

mingled with other monies of the corporation.
Moreover and more revealing, is the fact that again there

was no showing that it was accused who personally caused
the payment of these expenses allegedly in violation of the
objective of the investment. It must be noted that SBMEI is a
corporation and not a single proprietorship. Being a
corporation, expenses paid of such a kind as utilities and
salaries are not authorized personally and solely by the
President nor the Chief Executive Officer nor even by the
Chairman of the Board for that matter. These are corporate
acts that are passed through board resolutions. Hence, these
corporate acts can in no way be considered personal acts of the
accused. Yet, he was singled out among all 5 members of the
Board of Directors who presumably, in the ordinary course of
business, approved by resolution the payments of such utilities
and salaries. Consequently, there is again insufficiency of
evidence that the accused alone caused the payment of these
salaries and utilities for the sole purpose of pocketing the
money thereby using the same for personal gain.
Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases
against him:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the subject motion for

judicial determination of probable cause is favorably granted.
There being no probable cause, the cases against the accused
must be dismissed as they are hereby DISMISSED.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal by the RTC of the informations on the ground of lack of

probable cause correct?
HELD (Dry Run):
No, the dismissal by the RTC of the informations is not correct. The judge’s
dismissal of a case must be done only in clear cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause. On the contrary, if the evidence
351
on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed, the judge should not dismiss the case. In this case, certain essential
facts – namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false representations that
induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond
utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach Project for
purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted. As such, it
cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) and 315(1)(b) of the RPC had already been established, thereby
rendering the RTC’s immediate dismissal of the case highly improper.
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.
The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation,

where he is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists
for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy
himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If
the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused
immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate
attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence
without a full-blown trial.
In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court emphasized the settled distinction

between an executive and a judicial determination of probable cause, viz:
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be

distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
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probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first

kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is
part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of
the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation and must
himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and supporting documents whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This
prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that “no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”
While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the

limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately
dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause,
viz:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the

Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it

must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear
cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause –
that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
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facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than
not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of
action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may
either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately
dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he
doubts the existence of probable cause.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate
dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of
probable cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain
essential facts – namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false
representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether
or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach
Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon – remain controverted.
As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa
under Article 315(2)(a)57 and 315(1)(b)58 of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTC’s immediate dismissal of the case highly
improper. Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that
when a perceived gap in the evidence leads to a "neither this nor that"
conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a doubtful
dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately
after the filing of the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to
establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the evidence presented
and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be expected
that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would ·have
already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the
accused, the objective of a previously-conducted preliminary investigation being
merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly
established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its
discretion, by ruling to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004.
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Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial where the parties
could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their
respective claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can
properly resolve the factual disputes therein.
PIA V. GERVACIO
June 5, 2013/ Reyes, J.
 Appeals from Decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in

Administrative Disciplinary Cases should be Taken to the CA under
the Provisions of Rule 43
 Implementation of the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman
FACTS:
The petition stems from a complaint filed in December 2001 by respondent Dr.
Roman Dannug, in his capacity as Dean of the College of Economics, Finance
and Politics of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), against Pia
who was then a professor at PUP. Dannug claimed that Pia was directly selling
to her students a book entitled “Organization Development Research Papers” at
a price of P120.00 per copy, in violation of Section 3, Article X of the Code of
Ethics for Professional Teachers, which reads:
No teacher shall act, directly or indirectly, as agents of, or

be financially interested in any commercial venture, the
business of which is to furnish textbooks and other printed
matter, stationery, athletic goods, school uniforms, and other
materials, in the purchase and disposal of which the teacher’s
official influence can be exercised.
Pia’s act was also claimed to be violative of several memoranda issued by

PUP officials against the sale of books, articles or any items by any faculty
member directly to their students. Furthermore, the books were believed to be
overpriced at P120.00 each, being mere bound machine copies of reports and
research papers that were submitted by Pia’s former students.
The Office of the Ombudsman declared Pia guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months without pay. She filed a motion for reconsideration from the decision but
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it was denied by the Ombudsman. On February 18, 2003, she received such
order of denial.
On February 24, 2003, she filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review. It was granted by the CA. On March
20, 2003, she filed her petition.
Meanwhile, before she could file her petition before the Court of Appeals,
respondents Dannug and Dr. Carague implemented the penalty of suspension
that was imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Did Pia file her petition with the Court of Appeals on time?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. The applicable rules in the present case are the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court which provides for a reglementary period of 15 days from
receipt of the order appealed from.
In the present case, Pia received a copy of the Ombudsman’s denial of her
motion for reconsideration on February 18, 2003. Thus, to file her petition, she
has until March 5, 2003. She filed with the CA her motion for extension of time
on February 24, 2003, a date which was within that allowed 15-day period.
Since that motion was granted, she has, from the expiration of the original period
ending March 5, 2003, until March 20, 2003 to file her petition. Since she filed it
on March 20, 2003, it was not filed out of time.
Reglementary period for petitions for review with the CA
In the assailed CA decision, the appellate court declared that the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman was already final and executory at the time that
the petition for review was filed by Pia. It explained:
In Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, the Court declared unconstitutional the provisions

in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989, that mandates a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We then declared
categorically that “appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
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administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the [CA] under the

provisions of Rule 43.”
The Court agrees with Pia. As the Court explained in Dimagiba v. Espartero,
“considering that the Fabian ruling stated that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
should be the proper mode of appeal from an Ombudsman decision in
administrative cases, and Section 4 of Rule 43 provides for a reglementary
period of 15 days from receipt of the order appealed from, a motion for extension
of time to file petition within the 15-day period is considered timely filed.”
Between the 10-day period under R.A. No. 6770 and Section 4 of Rule 43, the
latter shall apply.
In the present case, Pia filed with the CA her motion for extension of time
within the allowed 15-day period. She received a copy of the Ombudsman’s
order on February 18, 2003, then filed her motion on February 24, 2003. Equally
important is the fact that her petition for review was filed within the period
asked for in her motion, which was 15 days from the expiration of the original
period ending March 5, 2003, or until March 20, 2003.
On the finding that Pia is Guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an

individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman
are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due
respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore,
only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review
evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA have sufficiently identified
Pia’s act that constitutes Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It
is significant that she readily admitted having directly sold copies of the
book/compilation “Organization Development Research Papers” to her students,
an act that is proscribed among PUP faculty members, by the submission of a
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certification from her students claiming that they were not forced to buy copies of
the book.
In asking for the complaint’s dismissal, Pia argues that she was not covered
by the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers which was cited by the Office of
the Ombudsman to support the decision rendered against her. She contends that
the Code only applies to teachers in educational institutions at the pre-school,
primary, elementary and secondary levels, but not to professors in the tertiary
level.
Our review of the CA decision indicates that such argument has already been
sustained by the appellate court. Nonetheless, the finding of Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service remains justified given the standards that are
required from Pia as a faculty member in a state-run university. The appellate
court correctly explained:
We sustain the petitioner’s contention that she is not

covered under R.A. No. 7836 (The Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994) relative to the definition of
“teachers” therein. As we have earlier stated, the culpability of
the petitioner is anchored on her irregular and unjustifiable act
being complained of, in violation of an existing regulation of a
state-run university (the PUP, in this case) where she is
currently employed. Additionally, the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
In Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, we explained that acts may constitute

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish the
image and integrity of his/her public office. The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) enunciates, inter
alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Section 4(c) of the Code commands that
“[public officials and employees] shall at all times respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.”
In affirming the finding that the act imputed upon Pia amounts to Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, we take into account her moral
ascendancy over her students. Dannug’s complaint also indicates that the
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book/compilation was overpriced, and that the students’ refusal to buy the
book/compilation could result in their failure in the subject. In addition, Pia was
found to have directly violated memoranda issued by officials of PUP. It then
appeared that she allowed her personal interests to adversely affect the proper
performance of her official functions, to the disadvantage of her students and in
patent violation of a policy in the state-run university where she was teaching.
Pia’s argument that she was not properly charged with the offense for which
she was found guilty of committing still does not warrant her exoneration from
the offense.
In Avenido, we emphasized that the designation of the offense or offenses

with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and
one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance of the
allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one’s guilt. Citing the case
of Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, we held in Avenido that the charge
against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have been committed by Pia
amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and that she
has been afforded a full opportunity to present her side and refute the act
imputed against her, the Court finds no cogent reason to nullify the ruling made
by the CA on Pia’s guilt.
Implementation of the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman
The Court also finds no irregularity in Dannug and Carague’s implementation

of the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman, notwithstanding the fact that Pia
then still had the remedy of an appeal before the CA.
To support her stance that the Office of the Ombudsman’s order of

suspension should not have been executed while her period to appeal has not
yet lapsed, Pia cites the cases of Tuzon v. CA, Lapid v. CA and Lopez v. CA.
Given, however, subsequent jurisprudence on the matter, Pia’s argument is
misplaced.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory even

pending appeal.
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In the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was
whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from
office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid
v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to
Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH,
which clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory
even pending appeal.
Clearly from the foregoing, Pia's complaint against Carague and Dannug's
immediate implementation of the penalty of suspension imposed by the Office of
the Ombudsman deserves no merit.
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. V. MENDOZA

June 19, 2013/ Carpio, J.
 Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
Petitioner Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. (Sime Darby) employed Jesus B.

Mendoza (Mendoza) as sales manager.
In 1987, Sime Darby bought a Class “A” club share in Alabang Country Club
(ACC). The share, however, was placed under the name of Mendoza in trust for
Sime Darby since the By-Laws of ACC state that only natural persons may own
a club share. As part of the arrangement, Mendoza endorsed the Club Share
Certificate in blank and executed a Deed of Assignment, also in blank, and
handed over the documents to Sime Darby. From the time of purchase in 1987,
Sime Darby paid for the monthly dues and other assessments on the club share.
When Mendoza retired in April 1995, Sime Darby fully paid Mendoza his
separation pay amounting to more than P3,000,000. Nine years later, or
sometime in July 2004, Sime Darby found an interested buyer of the club share
for P1,101,363.64. Before the sale could push through, the broker required Sime
Darby to secure an authorization to sell from Mendoza since the club share was
still registered in Mendoza’s name. However, Mendoza refused to sign the
required authority to sell or special power of attorney unless Sime Darby paid
him the amount of P300,000, claiming that this represented his unpaid
separation benefits. As a result, the sale did not push through and Sime Darby
was compelled to return the payment to the prospective buyer.
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On 13 September 2005, Sime Darby filed a complaint for damages with writ
of preliminary injunction against Mendoza with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. Sime Darby claimed that it was the practice of the company to
extend to its senior managers and executives the privilege of using and enjoying
the facilities of various club memberships. Sime Darby added that during
Mendoza’s employment with the company until his retirement in April 1995,
Sime Darby regularly paid for the monthly dues and other assessments on the
ACC Class “A” club share.
Further, Sime Darby alleged that despite having retired from Sime Darby for
less than 10 years and long after the employment contract of Mendoza with the
company has been severed, Mendoza resumed using the facilities and privileges
of ACC, to the damage and prejudice of Sime Darby. Thus, Sime Darby prayed
that a restraining order be issued, pending the hearing on the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, enjoining Mendoza from availing of the club’s facilities
and privileges as if he is the owner of the club share.
Mendoza filed an Answer alleging ownership of the club share. Mendoza

stated that Sime Darby purchased the Class “A” club share and placed it under
his name as part of his employee benefits and bonus for past exemplary service.
Mendoza admitted endorsing in blank the stock certificate covering the club
share and signing a blank assignment of rights only for the purpose of securing
Sime Darby’s right of first refusal in case he decides to sell the club share.
ISSUE:
Is Sime Darby entitled to injunctive relief against Mendoza?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes, Sime Darby is entitled to injunctive relief against Mendoza. To be entitled

thereto, the following requisites must be established: (1) an unmistakable right to
be protected, (2) a violation of that right, and (3) there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
All the requisites are present in this case. The ownership of Sime Darby over
the subject share is clear as it bought the same in 1987 and continuously paid
the monthly billings up to the time that Mendoza retired from the service. Such
ownership is further bolstered by Mendoza’s signing of the stock certificate in
blank as well as the deed of assignment and placing the said certificate under
the possession of Sime Darby. With Mendoza’s continued use of the subject
share despite that he is not anymore connected with Sime Darby, and with the
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latter’s demand upon the former to desist from making use of the club facilities
having been ignored, there was a violation of that right. Hence, plaintiff is
entitled to its prayer for injunction.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the grounds for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, states:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A

preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and

the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or
in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the

act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening

or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In Medina v. Greenfield Development Corp., we held that the purpose of a

preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury
to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, Sime Darby has the
burden of establishing the following requisites:
1. a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be

protected;
2. a violation of that right;
3. that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
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In the present case, petitioner Sime Darby has sufficiently established its
right over the subject club share. Sime Darby presented evidence that it acquired
the Class “A” club share of ACC in 1987 through a Deed of Sale. Being a
corporation which is expressly disallowed by ACC’s By-Laws to acquire and
register the club share under its name, Sime Darby had the share registered
under the name of respondent Mendoza, Sime Darby’s former sales manager,
under a trust arrangement. Such fact was clearly proved when in the application
form dated 17 July 1987 of the ACC for the purchase of the club share, Sime
Darby placed its name in full as the owner of the share and Mendoza as the
assignee of the club share. Also, in connection with the application for
membership, Sime Darby sent a letter dated 17 September 1987 addressed to
ACC confirming that “Mendoza, as Sime Darby’s Sales Manager, is entitled to
club membership benefit of the Company.”
Even during the trial, at Mendoza’s cross-examination, Mendoza identified his

signature over the printed words “name of assignee” as his own and when
confronted with his Reply-Affidavit, he did not refute Sime Darby’s ownership of
the club share as well as Sime Darby’s payment of the monthly billings from the
time the share was purchased. Further, Mendoza admitted signing the club
share certificate and the assignment of rights, both in blank, and turning it over
to Sime Darby. Clearly, these circumstances show that there existed a trust
relationship between the parties.
While the share was bought by Sime Darby and placed under the name of
Mendoza, his title is only limited to the usufruct, or the use and enjoyment of the
club’s facilities and privileges while employed with the company. In Thomson v.
Court of Appeals, we held that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the
purchase price of a property in the name of another, because of the presumption
that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest for himself. While Sime
Darby paid for the purchase price of the club share, Mendoza was given the legal
title. Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. The burden then
shifts to the transferee to show otherwise.
Mendoza, as the transferee, claimed that he only signed the assignment of

rights in blank in order to give Sime Darby the right of first refusal in case he
decides to sell the share later on. A right of first refusal, in this case, would
mean that Sime Darby has a right to match the purchase price offer of
Mendoza’s prospective buyer of the club share and Sime Darby may buy back
the share at that price. However, Mendoza’s contention of the right of first
refusal is a self serving statement. He did not present any document to show
that there was such an agreement between him and the company, not even an
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acknowledgment from Sime Darby that it actually intended the club share to be
given to him as a reward for his performance and past service.
In fact, the circumstances which occurred after the purchase of the club share
point to the opposite. First, Mendoza signed the share certificate and assignment
of rights both in blank. Second, Mendoza turned over possession of the
documents to Sime Darby. Third, from the time the share was purchased in 1987
until 1995, Sime Darby paid for the monthly bills pertaining to the share. Last,
since 1987, the monthly bills were regularly sent to Sime Darby’s business
address until Mendoza requested in August 2004, long after he retired from the
employ of the company, that such bills be forwarded to his personal address
starting September 2004.
It can be gathered then that Sime Darby did not intend to give up its
beneficial interest and right over the share. The company merely wanted
Mendoza to hold the share in trust since Sime Darby, as a corporation, cannot
register a club share in its own name under the rules of the ACC. At the same
time, Mendoza, as a senior manager of the company, was extended the privilege
of availing a club membership, as generously practiced by Sime Darby.
However, Mendoza violated Sime Darby’s beneficial interest and right over
the club share after he was informed by Atty. Ronald E. Javier of Sime Darby’s
plan to sell the share to an interested buyer. Mendoza refused to give an
authorization to sell the club share unless he was paid P300,000 allegedly
representing his unpaid retirement benefit. In August 2004, Mendoza tried to
appropriate the club share and demanded from ACC that he be recognized as
the true owner of the share as the named member in the stock certificate as well
as in the annual report issued by ACC. Despite being informed by Sime Darby to
stop using the facilities and privileges of the club share, Mendoza continued to
do so. Thus, in order to prevent further damage and prejudice to itself, Sime
Darby properly sought injunction in this case.
As correctly observed by the RTC in its Decision dated 30 April 2007:
In order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the following requisites

must be present: (a) invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable, and (c)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right
and its actual or threatened violations.
364
All the elements are present in the instant case. Plaintiff bought the subject
share in 1987. As the purchaser of the share, it has interest and right over it.
There is a presumption that the share was bought for the use of the defendant
while the latter is still connected with the plaintiff. This is because when the
share was registered under the name of defendant, the latter signed the stock
certificate in blank as well as the deed of assignment and placed the certificate
under the possession of the plaintiff. Hence, plaintiff did not intend to relinquish
its interest and right over the subject, rather it intended to have the share held in
trust by defendant, until a new grantee is named. This can be inferred from
plaintiff’s witness’ testimony that plaintiff required the defendant to sign the
said documents so that the plaintiff can be assured that its ownership of the
property is properly documented. Thirdly, plaintiff’s payments of monthly billings
of the subject share bolster defendant possession in trust rather than his
ownership over the share. With this, the right of plaintiff over the share is clear
and unmistakable. With defendant’s continued use of the subject share despite
that he is not anymore connected with plaintiff, and with plaintiff’s demand
upon the defendant to desist from making use of the club facilities having [been]
ignored, clearly defendant violated plaintiff’s right over the use and enjoyment
thereof. Hence, plaintiff is entitled to its prayer for injunction.
ALEJANDRO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

April 3, 2013/ Brion, J.
 No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the

decision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of
the Ombudsman
 The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative

cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies
 The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions
FACTS:
Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report that the Mico Car Wash, owned
by Alfredo Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using
it to operate its car wash business in Binondo, Manila. Thus, in coordination
with PNP-CIDG, it conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.
365
During the operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICO’s car-wash boys
indeed had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP
CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and confiscated the containers used in getting
water. At this point, the petitioner Franklin Alejandro, Alfredo’s father and the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay 293, Binondo, Manila, interfered with the PNP
CIDG’s operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers.
This intervention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the
apprehended car-wash boys to escape.
An administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman against petitioner Franklin Alejandro.
In its decision, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman denied.
The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. In its decision dated February 21, 2006, the CA dismissed
the petition for premature filing. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to exhaust
proper administrative remedies because he did not appeal the Deputy
Ombudsman’s decision to the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Does the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies require a

request for reconsideration from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman to the
Ombudsman for the purpose of a Rule 43 review?
2. It was argued that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the

administrative complaint against Alejandro, but the Sangguniang Bayan. Decide.
HELD (Dry Run):
1. No, because the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and
he was acting for and in behalf of the Ombudsman.
2. The argument is not meritorious. Under the law, the Ombudsman and the
Sangguniang Bayan exercise concurrent jurisdiction over erring local elective
officials. But since the complaint against Alejandro was initially filed with the
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Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the

exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of

the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the Ombudsman
We disagree with the CA’s application of the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies which states that when there is a procedure for
administrative review, appeal, or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the
errors committed in the administrative forum.
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari may be filed in all other
cases where the penalty imposed is not one involving public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one
(1) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct
itself in certain cases. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all
administrative remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case
at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on
the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It
is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman
Act and the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline
elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved
in cases decided by this Court. In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, we pointed out that
“there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.” The two laws may be
367
reconciled by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction

of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission

of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases.
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying

positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as we
held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public
officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more

disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which
opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a
Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14.
Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, as follows:
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. –

A verified complaint against any erring local elective official
shall be prepared as follows:
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be

filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
368
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions
Section 15 of RA 6770 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give

the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. This
provision covers the entire range of administrative activities attendant to
administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority to receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of
procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place
under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose
the corresponding penalty.
These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely
recommendatory. We held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio that:
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to

provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can
effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to
punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of
impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can
preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation
when the case so warrants.
HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO V. SOLIMAN

April 10, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Prosperidad, Maria Carmen, Mario Lazaro, Joy Catalina, Pinky

Perpetua and Lazaro, Jr. are the heirs of Lazaro Gallardo (Lazaro).
369
Lazaro and Prosperidad are the registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel

of land in Balingcanaway, Tarlac. The land was placed under the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27, and respondent Porferio Soliman (Porferio) was
instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee thereof.
On June 2, 1995, petitioners filed a Complaint for cancellation of Deed of

Transfer and Emancipation Patent against respondent Porferio before the Office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). It appears that a
Kasunduan dated December 10, 1985 and a notarized Deed of Transfer were
executed by Lazaro and Porferio. Under said deeds, Porferio, as sole farmer
beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of the whole of the land in his
favor, obliged himself to pay the petitioners 999 cavans of palay in 15 equal
yearly amortizations under the government’s Direct Payment Scheme pursuant to
PD 27. However, Porferio failed to pay the amortizations.
The case reached the DARAB which ruled against the petitioners.
Petitioners went up to the CA by Petition for Review. The Petition for Review
assailed the DARAB Decision.
On May 21, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing

petitioners’ Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six
petitioners. Petitioners Mario Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. did
not sign, and no special power of attorney to sign in their favor accompanied the
Petition. The CA held that the certification against forum shopping must be
executed and signed by all of the petitioners, or else it is insufficient.
ISSUE:
Do you agree with the resolution of the Court of Appeals?
HELD (Dry Run):
I do not agree with the resolution of the Court of Appeals. When all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule. The rules on forum shopping
were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective.
370
In Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr., the Court ruled that –
‘The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum

shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case
and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on
forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate
the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The
rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is
because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed
with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus,
under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed
the rule requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.
In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v.

Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association, it
was held that the signature of only one of the
petitioners in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complied with rules because all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense.
The same leniency was applied by the Court in

Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner
who executed the certification of non-forum shopping
was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners
with whom he shares a common interest.
In the instant case, petitioners share a common

interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively
claim a right not to be dispossessed of the subject lot by
virtue of their and their deceased parents’ construction
371
of a family home and occupation thereof for more than

10 years. The commonality of their stance to defend
their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave
petitioners authority to inform the Court of Appeals in
behalf of the other petitioners that they have not
commenced any action or claim involving the same
issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no
other pending action or claim in another court or
tribunal involving the same issues.’
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a

common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a
common cause of action raising the same arguments in support
thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo
Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners
when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in
another court or tribunal involving the same issue. Thus, the
Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed
constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules.
Similarly, in Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

the Court held that:
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by

all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke
a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one
of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
The same position was taken in Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing,
where the Court held that “where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who
share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only
one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of non forum
shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.”
The same situation obtains in this case. Petitioners are all heirs of the
deceased Lazaro. As such, they undoubtedly share a common interest in the
land, as well as common claims and defenses, as against respondents.
372
In Medado, the Court held further:
Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a

formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that
the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
It was therefore error for the CA to have dismissed the Petition for Review.
BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. V. VILLAREAL

April 10, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.
 Rule 42
FACTS:
Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized

and existing domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to-wear (RTW)
merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one
of Boardwalk’s distributors of RTW merchandise.
Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against Villareal covering

a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter’s alleged failure to pay a car loan
obtained from the former. The case was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila. On May 30, 2005, the MeTC rendered its Decision favoring
Boardwalk.
Villareal thus appealed to the Manila RTC, which court issued a Decision
reversing the MeTC Decision.
Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC. Boardwalk received the order of denial on January 19, 2007.
373
On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk through counsel filed with the Manila RTC a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying that it be granted
30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review. It paid the docket
and other legal fees therefor at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC.
On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail its Petition for Review with
the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition.
In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that Boardwalk erred in
filing its Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees therefor with the RTC.
It should have done so with the CA as required by Section 1 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk’s erroneous filing and
payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for Extension was filed, and the
subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus
late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42.
The CA added that Boardwalk’s prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion
for Extension was irregular, because the maximum period that may be granted is
only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 days
should only be granted for the most compelling reason which is not obtaining in
the present case. Moreover, it held that Boardwalk’s Petition for Review failed to
include a board resolution or secretary’s certificate showing that its claimed
representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo (Lo), was authorized to sign the Petition or
represent Boardwalk in the proceedings, which thus rendered defective the
Verification and Certification against forum-shopping.
Finally, the CA faulted Boardwalk for its failure to attach to its Petition copies
of the Complaint, Answer, position papers, memoranda and other relevant
pleadings, as required in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright
dismissal of its Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
Rule on the dismissal by the Court of Appeals.
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal by the Court of Appeals is correct, because Boardwalk failed to

comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
374
Firstly, no special power of attorney or board resolution was attached to the

Petition showing that Lo was authorized to sign such petition. Since Boardwalk
is a juridical entity, it must be shown that the person signing in its behalf is duly
authorized. Secondly, Boardwalk erroneously paid the docket fees and other
lawful fees with the RTC and not with the CA as required under Rule 42. Thirdly,
its petition was filed out of time. Having received the denial of the RTC of its
motion for reconsideration on January 19, 2007, it should have filed the petition
15 days therefrom and not on March 7, 2007. Finally, Boardwalk failed to attach
to the Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the
record.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due

process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. This being so, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules
of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this
strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate
the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled
by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater
fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.
In this case, petitioner must comply with the following requirements laid
down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring

to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees. The petition shall be filed and served
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Upon proper motion, the Court of Appeals may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
375
Sec. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be

accompanied by copies of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a

certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom.
In addition, the Rules also require that the Petition must be verified or
accompanied by an affidavit by which the affiant attests under oath that he “has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.”
And finally, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance “with any of

the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.” Records show that
petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules.
The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and Certification against

forum shopping. Copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions of
the record must likewise be attached to the Petition
The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and
Certification against forum shopping. If the petitioner is a juridical entity, as in
this case, it must be shown that the person signing in behalf of the corporation is
duly authorized to represent said corporation. In this case, no special power of
attorney or board resolution was attached to the Petition showing that Lo was
authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings. In
addition, petitioner failed to attach to the Petition copies of the relevant pleadings
and other material portions of the record.
376
Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently submitting a board

resolution showing Lo’s authority to sign and act on behalf of Boardwalk, as
well as copies of the relevant pleadings. Now, it prays that the Court consider
these as substantial compliance with the Rules.
Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the
Rules. However, in this case, petitioner committed multiple violations of the Rules
which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be shown
below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the
reglementary period and paying the docket and other lawful fees before the
proper court. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that payment of the
docket fees and other lawful fees should be made to the clerk of the CA. A plain
reading of the Rules leaves no room for interpretation; it is categorical and
explicit. It was thus grave error on the part of the petitioner to have
misinterpreted the same and consequently mistakenly remitted its payment to
the RTC clerk. Petitioner’s subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the
docket fees and other lawful fees did not cure the defect. The payment to the CA
was late; it was done long after the reglementary period to file an appeal had
lapsed. It must be stressed that the payment of the docket fees and other lawful
fees must be done within 15 days from receipt of notice of decision sought to be
reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration. In this case, petitioner
remitted the payment to the CA clerk long after the lapse of the reglementary
period.
The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15-days
extension, or a total of 30-days extension is allowed only for the most compelling
reason.
Petitioner sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its Petition for
Review with the CA. This is not allowed. Section 1 of Rule 42 allows an
extension of only 15 days. “No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason. Petitioner never cited any compelling reason. Thus, even
on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15-day reprieve from
February 3, 2007, or the expiration of its original reglementary period, it still
failed to file its Petition for Review on or before the February 19, 2007 due date.
Records show that the Petition was actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way
377
beyond the allowable February 19, 2007 deadline. The appellate court thus
correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside.
Petitioner’s appeal is not deemed perfected.
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed

perfected as to the petitioner “[u]pon the timely filing of a petition for review and
the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees.” Undisputably,
petitioner’s appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the
Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court
which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition
because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the RTC’s
Decision had long become final and executory.
To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it
must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal
within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays.
Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by
law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has
the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the
prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his
favor.
True it is that in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed the governing
periods of appeal in order to serve substantial justice. But this we have done
only in exceptional cases. Sadly, the instant case is definitely not one of them.
At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner’s right of appeal is a

mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a strict observance of the periods of
appeal, which requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional. Nor
may the negligence of Boardwalk’s former counsel be invoked to excuse it from
the adverse effects of the appellate court’s pronouncement. His negligence or
mistake proceeded from carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of
procedure. This does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate
and excuse Boardwalk from compliance with the Rules. Boardwalk's request for
the Court to review its case on the merits should be denied as well. The import of
the Court's foregoing pronouncements necessarily renders the RTC judgment
final and unassailable; it became final and executory after the period to appeal
expired without Boardwalk perfecting an appeal.
378
AMPATUAN, JR. V. DE LIMA

April 3, 2013/ Bersamin, J.
 State Witness
 Mandamus
FACTS:
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009,
when 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of
Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province.
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera
constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors

charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the
Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag,
both dated December 7, 2009. On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC
issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the
Prosecution witnesses.
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard
Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request
twice more on October 22, 2010 and November 2, 2010. By her letter dated
November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for

mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel the DOJ Secretary to charge
Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the
QC RTC.
ISSUE:
379
1. Does the inclusion of Dalandag in the Witness Protection Program justifies

his exclusion as an accused and his nonindictment for his complicity in the
Maguindanao Massacre?
2. May DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima be compelled by writ of mandamus to

charge Dalandag as an accused despite the latter’s admission to the Witness
Protection Program?
HELD (Dry Run):
1. Yes. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also
operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in
the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify.
2. No. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. In the present case, it
cannot be said that the DOJ Secretary unlawfully neglected the inclusion of the
Dalandag in the criminal information, as she cannot do so, for by specific
mandate of R. A. No. 6981, the admission by a person as a state witness
operates as an acquittal and that person cannot anymore be included in the
information.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the

Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that
are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public prosecutors are solely
responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a
respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not criminal cases should be filed in court. Consistent with the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound
judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively
to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial
review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor
380
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his
discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.”
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors
committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be
indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is notable in this regard that
petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of
individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag
be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his
own admissions in his sworn declarations.
However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors
whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
which requires that “the complaint or information shall be against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant
in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may

become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval
of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act). These modes are intended to encourage a person who has
witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and
testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by
protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each
other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial
court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be
witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its
case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the
381
discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by
Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely:
a. there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused

whose discharge
b. is requested;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
d. the testimony of said accused can be substantially

corroborated in its material points;
e. said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has

participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined
in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the
Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave

felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its

material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

382
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving

moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court

in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the
Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act
shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State
Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the
requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an
accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section
17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a

state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the
criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused
and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails
or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, which
has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the
rules for that purpose exist. While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge
or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may be utilized
as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such
discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due
regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must
be an absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions of and the information
provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious – the public prosecutor
should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which of
the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a
state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in
his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of
the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like.
383
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for
the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for
him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission
as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal,
and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information
except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is
granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile
charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him
of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order
the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the

Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the
absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal
charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were
met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the
Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness
Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to
appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his
participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated
as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with
the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now
charged for the crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the
act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal
or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or
discretion. As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on
the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way,
i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary
of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available
as petitioner's recourse.
384
CHU V. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION

April 1, 2013/ Peralta, J.
 Substituted Service of Summons
FACTS:
Mach Asia filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu City for sum of money,
replevin, attorney’s fees and damages against the Chu. Subsequently, the RTC
issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy
equipments. Sheriff Cortes proceeded at Chu’s given address for the purpose of
serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond.
However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon him, since the
latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having
the summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a
security guard of Chu.
Chu failed to file any responsive pleading. As a consequence, the RTC issued
an Order declaring him in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present
its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision against Chu.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Chu?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. At the outset, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons. In

case of such substituted service, there should be a report in the return indicating
that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one
with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons. In the present case, it was not shown that
the security guard who received the summons in behalf of Chu was authorized
and possessed a relation of confidence that the latter would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Jurisdiction,
therefore, over the person of Chu was not acquired.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
385
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, summons

should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot
be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service
may be resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report

indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf
was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that
the latter would actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility of prompt
personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find
the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and
in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective.
In the case at bar, the Sheriff’s Return provides:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu
City, the Summons and writ issued in the above-entitled case with the following
information, to wit:
1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of

replevin and bond was received on December 7, 1999, by
Rolando Bonayon, a security guard on defendant Sixto Chu at
his given address who received and signed receipt thereof.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons
in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence
that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of
386
service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be
considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due

process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them
is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding
upon him for being null and void.
ENCINAS V. AGUSTIN
April 11, 2013/ Sereno, C. J.
EN BANC
 Forum-Shopping
 Applicability of Res Judicata
FACTS:
Respondents PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang were then both holding
positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at
around 9:00 p.m., petitioner Encinas– who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of
Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos
(P5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and
transferred to far-flung areas.
Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000,

in the house of a certain “Myrna,” respondents came up short and managed to
give only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to
come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the
balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents
Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with the

Bureau of Fire Protection a letter-complaint on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer
of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990.
387
On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents

likewise filed with the Civil Service Commission their Joint Affidavit/Complaint
(CSCRO Complaint). Petitioner Encinas was formally charged with the offenses
of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.
On July 5, 2005, the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP issued a
Resolution dated 05 July 2005, recommending that the administrative complaint
against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The IAS ruled that
the reassignment of respondents was within the ambit of authority of the head of
office. Thus, said reassignment may have been ordered as long as the exigencies
of the service so required.
Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two
allegedly identical Complaints in violation of the rules on forum-shopping. He
explains that dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service—charges included in the CSCRO Complaint—were charges
that were equivalent to the BFP Complaint, the subject of which was his alleged
violation of R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of personnel.
ISSUE:
Are the respondents guilty of forum-shopping?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. One of
the requisites of litis pendentia is that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
In the present case, the dismissal of the Complaint with the BFP did not
constitute res judicata in relation to the Complaint before the Civil Service
Commission. The reason is that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to proceedings that are purely
administrative in nature such as the one conducted by the BFP.
388
Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping exists when

the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another.
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same

interests in both actions;
2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and
3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of
the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or

decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays down the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or
collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other
actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it

determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;”or when the judgment is
rendered “after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”
389
In this case, there is no “judgment on the merits” in contemplation of the

definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05
July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in
nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and

evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented;
and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The
exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of
the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In Bedol v.
Commission on Elections, this Court declared:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the

other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion
in a judicial nature. The Court has laid down the test for
determining whether an administrative body is exercising
judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies
390
the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the

rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose
of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it,
and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the
conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact
finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the
purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was sufficient
ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense against
petitioner. To recall, the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states:
The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority, CSC

Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission ruled as follows:
“That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of

the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of
the service so require but subject to the condition that there will
be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on Bongbong
vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held [sic]
that “on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to
the exigencies of the service require”. x x x In view of the
documents on record, the undersigned investigator finds no
sufficient ground to warrant the filing of appropriate
administrative offense against the respondent. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this office (IAS) most respectfully
recommends that the administrative complaint against C/INSP
CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at

determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed
with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public
prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether
391
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime
has been committed.
The ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals is analogously

applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was
definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is

very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-
judicial body has been defined as “an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making.”
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary

investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano, in which this

Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers’
jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of
documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties.
This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals,

Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary
392
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi

judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of
parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court.” [This] is
not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a
criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s]
or resolutions” on determination of probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts

preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial
powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to
require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power is
distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power
and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties.
Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor
apart from the court.
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of

a preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence
presented, further action should be taken through the filing of a criminal
complaint in court.
Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact
finding function to determine whether, based on the facts and the evidence
presented, further administrative action—in the form of a formal charge—should
be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the
rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint
cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, forum-shopping is unavailing in this
case.
HEIRS OF MESINA V. HEIRS OF FIAN

April 8, 2013/ Velasco, Jr., J.
393
 Failure to State a Cause of Action

 Non-Joinder of an Indispensable Party
 Verification
FACTS:
The late spouses Mesina, during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Fian
two parcels of land on installment.
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs, claiming ownership of the
parcels of land and taking possession of them––refused to acknowledge the
payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the
spouses Mesina.
Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed away. Notwithstanding repeated

demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession
over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, namely: Norman, Victor, Maria and
Lorna. Thus, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna,
filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte against the Heirs of Fian, naming only
Theresa as the representative of the Heirs of Fian.
The case, entitled Heirs of Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina,
represented by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by
Theresa Fian Yray, was docketed as Civil Case No. B-05-08-20.
Thereafter, or on September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to

Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and
that the case should be dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, which state in part:
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. –

Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action.
Section 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the

party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
She claims that the “Heirs of Mesina” could not be considered as a juridical
person or entity authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the “Heirs of
Fian” be made as defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added
394
that since the names of all the heirs of the late spouses Mesina and spouses
Fian were not individually named, the complaint is infirmed, warranting its
dismissal.
Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the RTC, on November 22, 2005,
granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal by the RTC of the case for failure to state a cause of action
proper? If such dismissal was not proper and if you were the judge, what would
you do?
HELD (Dry Run):
The dismissal by the RTC was not proper. A complaint does not state a cause
of action if it does not aver the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative
obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said right. As it can be seen, the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does
not fall under any of the aforesaid elements. Hence, the dismissal is not proper.
Since the dismissal was not proper, if I were judge, I would direct Norman to
implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable
time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of
the complaint. The reason is that the infirmity lies not in the failure to state a
cause of action, but on a non-joinder of an indispensable party.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A

complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.
By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it

can be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under
395
any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause
of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party.
Non-joinder means the “failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or
in this case an indispensable party] into a lawsuit.” An indispensable party, on
the other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be
had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. As
such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable
parties who were not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and
not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company,

Inc. v. Tinghil is instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of
the courts in cases of non-joinder of indispensable parties, viz:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for

the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding
and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned.
If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the
complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is
improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman
Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a
reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean
dismissal of the complaint.
Anent the issue on defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of

Court provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
396
The alleged defective verification states that:
I, NORMAN S. MESINA, legal age, married, Filipino, and a

resident of Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say that:
2. The allegations herein are true and correct to the best of

our knowledge;
Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the phrase
“or based on authentic records,” as indicated under the second paragraph of
Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted, was omitted.
We do not agree.
That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase “or based on
authentic records” does not make the verification defective. Notably, the
provision used the disjunctive word “or.” The word “or” is a disjunctive article
indicating an alternative. As such, “personal knowledge” and “authentic records”
need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately.
Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a

formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in
the case at hand, “the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.”
SANDOVAL SHIPYARDS, INC. V. PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE

ACADEMY
 The Supreme Court Will Not Review Findings of Fact of the Lower
Courts; Exceptions
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Merchant Marine Academy entered into a Ship

Building Contract with the petitioner Sandoval Shipyards, Inc.
397
The contract states that the petitioner would construct two units of 9.10-meter
lifeboats to be used as training boats for the students of respondent. These
lifeboats should have 45-HP Gray Marine diesel engines and should be delivered
within 45 working days from the date of the contract-signing. For its part,
respondent paid the price.
On 10 August 1995, Angel Rosario (Rosario), a faculty member of respondent

who claimed to have been verbally authorized by its president, allegedly
received the lifeboats at the Philippine Navy Wharf in good order and condition.
In November 1995, respondent sent an inspection team to where the two

lifeboats were docked to check whether the plans and work specifications had
been complied with. The team found that the petitioner had installed surplus
Japan-made Isuzu C-240 diesel engines instead of the agreed 45-HP Gray
Marine diesel engines; that for the electric starting systems of the engines, there
was no manual which was necessary in case the systems failed; and that the
construction of the engine compartment was not in conformity with the approved
plan.
Despite repeated demands from respondent, petitioner refused to deliver the

lifeboats that would comply with the agreed plans and specifications. As a
result, respondent filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages
against the petitioner before the RTC.
The RTC in its Decision dated 10 April 2006 held that although the caption of
the Complaint was “Rescission of Contract with Damages,” the allegations in the
body were for breach of contract. Petitioner was found to have violated the
contract by installing surplus diesel engines, contrary to the agreed plan and
specifications. Thus, petitioner was made liable for actual damages in the
amount of P1,516,680 and was awarded a penalty of one percent of the total
contract price for every day of delay. Petitioner won before the CA and thereafter
filed a petition before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner rehashed the arguments it posited with the CA with the additional
contention that the judge who wrote the Decision was not present during the trial
and did not have the advantage of firsthand assessment of the testimonies of
the witnesses.
ISSUE:
398
Whether a factual review by the Supreme Court is warranted, considering

that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the judge who
received the evidence of the parties.
HELD (Dry Run):
The factual review by the Supreme Court is not warranted. In a Rule 45

Petition, parties may only raise questions of law, because as a rule, the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision
was different from the one who received the evidence cannot be carved as an
exception to such a rule.
In a Rule 45 Petition, parties may only raise questions of law, because this
Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, this court will not review findings of fact of
lower courts, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from the
one who received the evidence is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual
review of the case. Petitioners cannot carve out an exception when there is none.
399
We have already addressed this matter in Decasa v. CA, from which we

quote:
We have held in several cases that the fact that the judge
who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the
judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case
does not render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge
who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the
testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to
overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses. It may be true that the trial judge who conducted
the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth
or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The efficacy of a
decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the
trial. That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily
render him less competent in assessing the credibility of
witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes
of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their
conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation
of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
procedural due process of law.
Whether the case is for rescission and not damages/breach of contract;
Petitioners also claim that the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s substitution of
respondent’s cause of action from rescission to breach of contract. Had it not
done so, then it would have merely ordered mutual restoration of what each of
them received – the two lifeboats in exchange for P1,516.680.
The RTC did not substitute the cause of action. A cause of action is an act or
omission which violates the rights of another. In the Complaint before the RTC,
the respondent alleged that petitioners failed to comply with their obligation
under the Ship Building Contract. Such failure or breach of respondent’s
contractual rights is the cause of action. Rescission or damages are part of the
reliefs. Hence, it was but proper for the RTC to first make a determination of
400
whether there was indeed a breach of contract on the part of petitioners; second,
if there was a breach, whether it would warrant rescission and/or damages.
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioners violated the terms of the
contract by installing surplus diesel engines, contrary to the agreed plans and
specifications, and by failing to deliver the lifeboats within the agreed time. The
breach was found to be substantial and sufficient to warrant a rescission of the
contract. Rescission entails a mutual restitution of benefits received. An injured
party who has chosen rescission is also entitled to the payment of damages. The
factual circumstances, however, rendered mutual restitution impossible. Both the
RTC and the CA found that petitioners delivered the lifeboats to Rosario.
Although he was an engineer of respondent, it never authorized him to receive
the lifeboats from petitioners. Hence, as the delivery to Rosario was invalid, it
was as if respondent never received the lifeboats. As it never received the object
of the contract, it cannot return the object. Unfortunately, the same thing cannot
be said of petitioners. They admit that they received a total amount of
P1,516,680 from respondent as payment for the construction of the lifeboats. For
this reason, they should return the same amount to respondent.
Whether failure to attend mediation proceedings warrants a dismissal of the

case.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their assertion that the trial court should
have dismissed the Complaint for respondent’s failure to attend the mediation
session. In Chan Kent v. Micarez, in which the trial court dismissed the case for
failure of the plaintiff and her counsel to attend the mediation proceedings, this
Court held:
To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation

as part of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally
attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance,
however, of a party may be excused only when the
representative, who appears in his behalf, has been duly
authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to
submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. To ensure the
attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA
specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose
upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which
includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of
the action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
The respective lawyers of the parties may attend the
401
proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to cooperate

with the mediator for the successful amicable settlement of
disputes so as to effectively reduce docket congestion.
Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of

Civil Case No. 13 2007, the Court finds this sanction too severe
to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is
devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules
on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that
the absence of petitioner's representative during mediation
proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate
delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack
of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible
amicable settlement of the case.
Here, there was no finding that the absence of respondent was in willful or
flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation, that the absence was intended to
effect a delay in litigation, or that respondent lacked interest in a possible
amicable settlement of the case. In fact, the CA found that all efforts had been
exerted by the parties to amicably settle the case during the pretrial.
REPUBLIC V. TATAD
 Findings of Ownership in an Expropriation Proceedings
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed a Complaint

against several defendants, including respondents spouses Genato, for the
expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the EDSA-
Quezon Avenue Flyover.
Spouses Genato are the registered owners of a piece of land covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-11603 and having an area of 460
square meters.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter Dated

reporting that the subject property was government land and that the transfer
certificate of title of spouses Genato is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it
402
encroached or overlapped on a government property. As a result, petitioner filed

an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the proceedings to an
area conforming to the findings of the DPWH.
On 18 July 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the

subject property “declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to
conflicting claims.”
In an Order dated 10 December 2002, the RTC admitted petitioner’s Amended

Complaint, deferred the release to respondents the amount of eighteen million
four hundred thousand pesos (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank, equivalent to
the current zonal valuation of the land, and declared the property as the subject
of conflicting claims.
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property
actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections
saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted
a collateral attack on the validity of their TCT No. RT-11603.
Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued on 12 July 2005 an
Order as follows:
WHEFEFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the

issue of the validity of the TCT No. 11603 (383648) can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and
not in this instant proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff is barred
from presenting evidence as they constitute collateral attack on
the validity of the title to the subject lot in violation of Sec. 48 of
P. D. 1529.
On 4 August 2005, petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

but the motion was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 17 November 2005.
ISSUE:
Decide on whether the petitioner is barred from presenting evidence to assail

the validity of respondents’ title under TCT No. RT-11603.
HELD (Dry Run):

403
The petitioner is not barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of
respondent’s title under TCT No. RT-11603. Such attempt of the petitioner to
present evidence cannot be characterized as an attack to the spouses Genato’s
Torrens Title, because the objective of the case is to appropriate private property,
and the contest on their title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom
should be rightly compensated. Findings of ownership in an expropriation
proceeding have their sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just
compensation and are not construed as final and binding on the parties.
Contention of the Petitioner Republic
Petitioner argues that under Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the
ownership of a property to be expropriated is uncertain, the court in the same
expropriation proceeding is also given authority to make a proper adjudication of
the matter.
Section 9 of Rule 67 reads:
SECTION 9. Uncertain Ownership. Conflicting Claims. — If

the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any
sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be
paid to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff
can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or
purpose if entry has already been made.
This view is allegedly supported by Republic v. Court of First Instance of

Pampanga, presided formerly by Judge L. Pasicolan in which the trial court
hearing the expropriation proceeding was also allowed to resolve the issue of
ownership.
Petitioner further argues that the original Complaint was amended “precisely
to reflect the fact that herein private respondents, albeit ostensibly appearing as
registered owners, are to be considered as mere claimants of one of the
properties subject of the expropriation.” This is the reason why the RTC issued
an Order declaring the property subject of conflicting claims.
404
Moreover, this being an in rem proceeding, “plaintiff Republic of the

Philippines seeks the relief, both in the original and amended complaints, to
transfer to plaintiff the titles to said parcels of land together with their
improvements free from all liens and encumbrances. For this particular purpose,
the expropriation suit is essentially a direct proceeding.”
Contention of Spouses Genato
Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke Section 48 of P. D. 1529, viz:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack. —

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
It is their contention that by allowing petitioner to present adversarial

evidence, the court is in effect allowing respondents’ Torrens title to be
collaterally attacked – an action prohibited by P. D. 1529.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
We rule that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its

ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who
is entitled to just compensation.
Proper interpretation of Section 9, Rule 67
Proceeding from the principle of jus regalia, the right to eminent domain has
always been considered as a fundamental state power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is described as the State’s inherent power that need not be
granted even by the Constitution, and as the government's right to appropriate,
in the nature of compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State’s right to eminent domain, is

proscribed by the restraints of public use and just compensation. It is governed
by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents procedural guidelines for the
court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation rightly paid
to the private owners.
405
Indeed, this Court first had the occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the
case of Republic. In addressing the issue of “whether or not the court that hears
the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding,
the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned,” the Court answered
in the affirmative:
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that hears the
expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the
issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be resolved in the
affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge
the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section
9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the

ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any
sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be
paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged
in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment
shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter
upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if
entry has already been made.
In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons
claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the
commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction
thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising
the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership
of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.
Such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be

construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for
expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking
title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right
to compensation for the taking. If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases
in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to
determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains
open to challenge through proper actions.
406
Inapplicability of Section 48, P. D. 1529
Verily, our interpretation of Sec. 9, Rule 67 does not run counter to Section 48
of P.D. 1529. Under Sec. 48, collateral attacks on a Torrens title are prohibited.
We have explained the concept in Oño v. Lim, to wit:
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when

its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack
is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof.
In several instances, we have considered an Answer

praying for the cancellation of the plaintiff's Torrens title as a
form of a collateral attack. We have afforded the similar
treatment in a petition questioning the validity of a deed of sale
for a registered land and in a reformation of a deed of sale to
include areas registered under the name of another party.
Here, the attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as

an "attack." It must be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate
private property, and the contest on private respondents' title arose only as an
incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.
Contrary to petitioner's allegations, the Complaint and Amended Complaint

cannot also be considered as a direct attack. The amendment merely limited the
coverage of the expropriation proceedings to the uncontested portion of the
subject property. The RTC's Order declaring the property as subject of conflicting
claims is a recognition that there are varying claimants to the sums to be
awarded as just compensation. This serves as an authority for the court to
conduct a limited inquiry on the property's ownership.
WHEREFORE, This case is REMANDED to the RTC to hear the issue of

ownership for the purpose of just compensation.
SANDOVAL V. CAILIPAN
407
March 4, 2013/ Perlas-Bernabe, J.
 Remedies of Appeal and Certiorari are Mutually Exclusive and Not

Alternative or Successive
FACTS:
Petitioner Irene Sandoval instituted a complaint for damages before the RTC,
claiming that she was prejudiced by the false, baseless and malicious libel case
filed against her by respondent Jose Cailipan. Subsequently, the case was set
for pre-trial, during which respondents’ counsel, Atty. Sardido, failed to appear
as well as file a pre-trial brief despite due notice, while petitioner and her
counsel appeared and made such submission. In view of these lapses, petitioner
prayed that respondents be declared in default which was granted by the RTC
in its October 20, 2010 Order.
Aggrieved, Atty. Sardido filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for

Reconsideration seeking the reversal of the Order. On November 10, 2010, the
RTC issued an Order denying respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
On January 11, 2011, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 Orders.
On even date, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
On January 22, 2011, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, while
its initially filed certiorari petition was still pending resolution before the same
appellate court. In this relation, they subsequently filed on February 2, 2011 an
Amended Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam and a Joint Notice of Appeal Ad
Cautelam (Amended Notices of Appeal), clarifying therein that they were not
abandoning their petition for certiorari.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated September 30, 2011, the CA granted their petition
grounded on the impropriety of the order of default. Thus, for these reasons, the
CA set aside the RTC’s October 20, 2010 and November 10, 2010 Orders and
directed the remand of the case to the RTC to allow the respondents to present
their evidence.
ISSUES:
408
Did the appeal of the respondent render the petition for certiorari superfluous
and mandate its dismissal?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes. Certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a
special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal
lies.
It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually

exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily
cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal
proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of
the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
Corollary thereto, an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari

superfluous and mandates its dismissal. As held in Enriquez v. Rivera:
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute

for an appeal, for relief through a special action like certiorari
may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The
exception to this rule is conceded only "where public welfare
and the advancement of public policy so dictate, and the
broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders
complained of were found to be completely null and void, or
that appeal was not considered the appropriate remedy, such
as in appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or
appointments of receiver." (Fernando v. Vasquez, L- 26417, 30
January 1970; 31 SCRA 288). For example, certiorari maybe
available where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual (Romero
Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L-29659, 30 July 1971; 40 SCRA 172).
None of the exceptional circumstances have been shown to be present in this

case; hence the general rule applies in its entirety. Appeal renders superfluous a
pending petition for certiorari, and mandates its dismissal. In the light of the
clear language of Rule 65 (1), this is the only reasonable reconciliation that can
be effected between the two concurrent actions: the appeal has to be prosecuted,
but at the cost of the petition for certiorari, for the petition has lost its raison
409
d'etre. To persevere in the pursuit of the writ would be to engage in an enterprise

which is unnecessary, tautological and frowned upon by the law.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is clear that

respondents’ January 11, 2011 petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous
by their January 22, 2011 appeal.
Although respondents did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on
January 11, 2011 – as they only received the RTC’s Decision three days after
the said date and therefore could not have availed of the remedy of an appeal at
that time – the Court observes that respondents should have (a) withdrawn their
certiorari petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated therein in
their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CA’s Twenty-First Division of
the Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on
January 22, 2011. Prudence should have guided them to pursue either course of
action considering the well-entrenched conflict between the remedies of an
appeal and a petition for certiorari, of which they should have been well aware
of.
Unfortunately, their omission resulted in the CA’s issuance of the September

30, 2011 Decision and February 1, 2012 Resolution in the certiorari case which
set aside the assailed interlocutory orders, notwithstanding the supervening
rendition of a decision on the main case, thus creating an evident procedural
impasse.
It should be noted that respondents’ petition for certiorari had long become
moot by the RTC’s January 11, 2011 Decision. In particular, the grant of the
petition for certiorari on mere incidental matters of the proceedings would not
accord any practical relief to respondents because a decision had already been
rendered on the main case and therefore, may be elevated on appeal. Lest it be
misunderstood, a case becomes moot when no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon its merits. As a rule, courts will not determine a moot question in a
case in which no practical relief can be granted.
In view of the above-discussed considerations and considering the fact that

respondents’ petition for certiorari cannot anymore be dismissed, the Court is
constrained to set aside the September 30, 2011 Decision and February 1, 2012
Resolution of the CA. Consequently, this course of action will allow the CA
Division where the appeal of the main case is pending to appropriately pass
upon the merits of the RTC’s January 11, 2011 Decision including all assailed
irregularities in the proceedings such as the validity of the default orders. To rule
410
otherwise would only serve to perpetuate the procedural errors already

committed in this case.
CLARIDAD V. ESTEBAN
March 20, 2013/ Bersamin, J.
 Review of the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution on the Determination

of Probable Cause
FACTS:
This is about the death of Chase Claridad whose lifeless but bloodied body
was discovered at Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last
seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour
before the discovery of his lifeless body.
Chase’ mother (petitioner in this case) filed a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City. However, it dismissed the complaint. The
OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial
evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder. The
petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal, but the OCP denied the
motion on December 15, 2008.
On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint. After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the Secretary of
Justice, the petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Was the remedy resorted to by the petitioner to review the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice proper?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to
review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers,
agencies or bodies. In the present case, however, the Secretary of Justice was
not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of
411
the Office of the City Prosecutor on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of
Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the
crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was
probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
Review of the Secretary of Justice’s Resolution on the Determination of Probable

Cause
The petitioner assailed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in

the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a grave
mistake that immediately called for the outright dismissal of the petition. The
filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice’s
resolution on the determination of probable cause was an improper remedy.
Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to

review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers,
agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the
matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing
a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on
the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe
that the respondents were guilty thereof.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s
determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari.
That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-
judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a
court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner
to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have

no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the
412
Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department

of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere
with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.
A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of

Court, is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by
the trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as
may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The role and object of
preliminary investigation were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious,
and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation
of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the State from useless and expensive prosecutions."
In Arula vs. Espino, the Court rendered the three purposes of a preliminary
investigation, to wit: (1) to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the
connection of the accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature
and character of the crime charged against him, and, if there is probable cause
for believing him guilty, that the State may take the necessary steps to bring him
to trial; (2) to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of
the State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable. The
officer conducting the examination investigates or inquires into facts concerning
the commission of a crime with the end in view of determining whether an
information may be prepared against the accused.
The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion
of the public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the
complaint of an offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal
413
information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded

belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than
evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.
A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that

establishes the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent because the determination of existence of a probable
cause is the function of the public prosecutor. Generally, the public prosecutor is
afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the
Department of Justice the ample latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not
reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of
probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. By way of
exception, however, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in the
preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the public prosecutor has exercised his
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Moreover, the trial court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the public prosecutor’s
findings, the courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, to determine whether the public prosecutor’s findings
are supported by the facts, and by the law.
REPUBLIC V. HEIRS OF CECILIO

March 6, 2013/ Perez, J.
 Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General

 A Petition for Review Under Rule 43 is the Prescribed Mode for Appeal
from a Decision Rendered by the Office of the President
414
FACTS:
Cecilio and Moises Cuizon wrote PEZA, offering said agency the priority to
buy their two parcels of land situated in Mactan Economic Zone. PEZA declined
the offer on the ground that those properties are owned by the government.
Meanwhile, Cecilio and Moises died leaving their heirs.
In the face of PEZA’s insistence on the government’s ownership of the

properties as well as its refusal to heed their claim for just compensation for the
use of the land, respondents heirs of Cecilio and Moises Cuizon brought the
matter to the attention of the Office of the President.
The Office of the President directed PEZA to file its Comment. Thereafter, the
Office of the President rendered a decision directing PEZA to recognize
respondents’ rights over the subject parcels and to negotiate for the just
compensation claimed by the latter. PEZA’s motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied for lack of merit.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in representation of PEZA, filed with
the CA a motion for an extension of fifteen days within which to file a petition for
review under Rule 43. Instead of the OSG, however, it was the lawyers from
PEZA’s Legal Affairs Group who filed the Rule 43 petition for review. Served with
a copy thereof, respondents moved for the denial of the petition on the ground,
among others, that PEZA’s lawyers failed to secure authorization from the OSG
as the "principal law officer and legal defender of the government." In its reply,
however, PEZA asserted, that as members of its Legal Affairs Group, its lawyers
were constrained to do so on account of the different position taken by the
handling OSG lawyers.
ISSUE:
If you were the counsel for the respondent, how would you oppose the
petition filed the lawyers of PEZA?
HELD:
If I were the counsel for the respondent, I would move for the denial of the
petition, because such petition should have been filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the principal law officer and legal defender of the government,
or that PEZA lawyers should have been deputized by the Office of the Solicitor
General for the purpose.
415
As correctly ruled by the CA, the OSG, as principal law officer and legal
defender of the government, possesses the unequivocal mandate to appear for
and in its behalf in legal proceedings. Described as an "independent and
autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice" under Sec. 34, Book IV,
Title III, Chapter 12, Executive Order 292, the OSG, with the Solicitor General at
its helm, is vested with the following powers and functions, among others, to wit:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the

Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the
President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent
government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the

Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
8) Deputize legal officers of government departments,

bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts, and
exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers
with respect to such cases."
Unlike a practicing lawyer who can decline employment, it has been ruled
that the Solicitor General cannot refuse to perform his duty to represent the
government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just
and valid reason. Resolving a challenge against the Solicitor General’s
withdrawal of his appearance from cases involving the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court traced the statutory
origins and transformation of the OSG and concluded that the performance of its
416
vested functions and duties is mandatory and compellable by mandamus. The

Court ratiocinated that, "sound management policies require that the
government's approach to legal problems and policies formulated on legal issues
be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency." Finding that that the
Solicitor General’s withdrawal of his appearance was "beyond the scope of his
authority in the management of a case," the Court enunciated that the
enjoinment of the former’s duty is not an interference with his discretion in
handling the case but a directive to prevent the failure of justice.
Considering that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the rule is settled that actions filed in
the name of the latter not initiated by the OSG are susceptible to summary
dismissal. Extended to include actions filed in the name of agencies or
instrumentalities of the government, the rule admits of an exception under
Section 35 (8) Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code which
empowers the OSG to "deputize legal officers of government departments,
bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought
before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers
with respect to such cases." In Civil Service Commission v. Asensi, the Court
clarified, however, that this exception should be strictly construed and is subject
to the following conditions precedent: "First, there must be an express
authorization by the Office of the Solicitor General, naming therein the legal
officers who are being deputized. Second, the cases must involve the respective
offices of the deputized legal officers. And finally, despite such deputization, the
OSG should retain supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to
the cases."
Another exception is also recognized when the OSG takes a position different
from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent. As an independent office,
after all, the OSG is "not shackled by the cause of its client agency" and has, for
its primordial concern, the "best interest of the government" which, in its
perception, can run counter to its client agency’s position in certain instances.
The exception is traced to the following pronouncements handed down by this
Court in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, to wit:
In the discharge of this task, the Solicitor General must see

to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within
the limits set by law. When confronted with a situation where
one government office takes an adverse position against
another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor
417
General should not refrain from performing his duty as the

lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present
to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a
client's position. In such an instance the government office
adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor
General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear
in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
While the OSG primarily invokes the second of the above-discussed

exceptions in seeking the reversal of the CA’s 30 October 2009 Decision, the
record shows that it was said office which filed on 1 April 2009 a motion for
extension of time within which to file a Rule 43 petition for review on behalf of
PEZA. On the last day of the period of extension sought by the OSG, however, it
was the lawyers from PEZA’s Legal Affairs Group who, without being deputized
to do so, eventually filed the petition for review assailing the 14 October 2008
Decision in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081. Confronted with respondents’ challenge of
the unexplained change of representation and prayer for dismissal of the
petition, PEZA filed a 7 September 2009 reply, claiming that its lawyers had
authority to represent the agency under its organizational chart. Without any
elaboration, PEZA also alleged for the first time that the OSG’s non-participation
in the case was attributable to the "different position taken by the handling OSG
lawyers."
Given the lack of authorization from the OSG and the absence of a specific
provision in PEZA’s Charter authorizing the agency’s representation by lawyers
from its Legal Affairs Group, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for rejecting
PEZA’s bare assertion of the contrary stand supposedly taken by the handling
OSG lawyers. Even in cases of disagreement with its client agency, it cannot be
over-emphasized that it is still incumbent upon the OSG to present to the Court
the position that will legally uphold the best interests of the Government. In the
Orbos case which the OSG now cites as justification for PEZA’s filing of its own
petition before the CA, the Court significantly stated that it "appreciates the
participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued
fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from appearing before
this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be
advised of his position just as well."
After signifying its intention to file a Rule 43 petition for review with its filing
of a motion for extension of time to file the same, however, the OSG did not
418
advise the CA of its alleged difference in opinion with PEZA. It was only after the
CA had rendered the herein assailed 30 October 2009 decision and with PEZA’s
motion for reconsideration therefom already pending that, on 18 January 2010,
the OSG filed its manifestation to the effect that it actually agreed with the
substance of the petition filed by PEZA’s lawyers. The OSG belatedly clarified
that it was of the belief that a Rule 43 petition for review was not the proper
remedy from the 14 October 2008 decision in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081. On the
theory that said decision was not "based on a prior decision/order/resolution of
an administrative agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions," the OSG
maintained that a mere administrative clarification was, instead, proper under
the circumstances.
Considering that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the prescribed mode
for appeal from a decision rendered by the Office of the President, the OSG’s
stand is, to say the least, incomprehensible. Aside from the fact that
respondents’ 20 September 2006 letter was clearly treated by said office as an
appeal, the record shows that PEZA actively participated in the proceedings
conducted in connection therewith by complying with the directive to file its
comment and by filing its motion for reconsideration of the 14 October 2008
Decision rendered in the case. While it may be true that PEZA was not exercising
a quasi-judicial function in rejecting the Cuizons’ offer to sell the subject lots and
claim of just compensation, it cannot be gainsaid that the Office of the President
was exercising a quasi-judicial function when it rendered its decision. Having
initially filed a motion for extension of time within which to file a Rule 43 petition
on behalf of PEZA, the least that the OSG could have done was to immediately
inform the CA of its supposed change of position for the same to be properly
considered by the Court.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that the dismissal of PEZA’s petition was
specifically characterized by the CA to be without prejudice. Contrasted from a
dismissal with prejudice which disallows and bars the filing of a complaint or
initiatory pleading, a dismissal without prejudice - while by no means any less
final - plainly indicates that the re-filing of the petition is not barred. While it is
true that the petition for review under Rule 43 is required to be filed "within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or
of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo," we find that the
OSG, in the interest of substantial justice, may be granted a fresh period of
fifteen ( 15) days within which to re-file the petition before the CA.
GUZMAN V. MONTEALTO
March 13, 2013/ Brion, J.
419
 When the RTC Issued its Decisions and Orders in the Exercise of its
Appellate Jurisdiction, the Proper Remedy Therefrom is a Rule 42
Petition for Review
FACTS:
Petitioner Isabel Guzman filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Tuguegarao City a complaint for ejectment against her children, respondents
Aniano and Primitiva. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The respondents appealed to the RTC of Tuguegarao City which ruled in their
favor.
On June 16, 2005, the petitioner received a copy of the RTC decision. On June
30, 2005, the petitioner filed her first motion for reconsideration. In its July 6,
2005 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of
the required notice of hearing.
On July 14, 2005, the petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration. In
its July 15, 2005 order, the RTC denied the second motion for reconsideration for
having been filed out of time.
On July 20, 2005, the petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration. In its
July 22, 2005 order, the RTC denied the third motion for reconsideration with
finality.
On August 8, 2005, the petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with
the CA, alleging that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Do you agree with the remedy resorted to by the petitioner? Explain.
HELD (Dry Run):
I do not agree with the remedy resorted to by the petitioner. When the RTC
issued its decision and orders in the present case, it did so in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction and under the rules, the proper remedy therefrom is a Rule
42 petition for review and not petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
420
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy for the
petitioner. The proper remedy is filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, because when the RTC issued its decision and orders, it did so in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
The petitioner’s resort to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to assail the RTC
decision and orders is misplaced. When the RTC issued its decision and orders,
it did so in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; the proper remedy therefrom
is a Rule 42 petition for review. Instead, the petitioner filed a second motion for
reconsideration and thereby lost her right to appeal; a second motion for
reconsideration being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner’s subsequent motions for reconsideration should be
considered as mere scraps of paper, not having been filed at all, and unable to
toll the reglementary period for an appeal.
The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary that
once a decision becomes final and executory, it is "immutable and unalterable,
and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land." Thus, the RTC decision, even if
allegedly erroneous, can no longer be modified.
Apparently, to resurrect her lost appeal, the petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for deciding the case
against her. Certiorari, by its very nature, is proper only when appeal is not
available to the aggrieved party; the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. It cannot substitute for a lost
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse.
No grave abuse of discretion
In any case, even granting that the petition can be properly filed under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, we hold that it was bound to fail.
It should be noted that as a legal recourse, certiorari is a limited form of

review. It is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion, not errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the lower courts act within
their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will
421
amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for

review.
In this case, the imputed errors pertained to the RTC’s appreciation of matters
not raised as errors on appeal, specifically, the transfer of rights and subsequent
unilateral revocation, and the strictly enforced rule on notice of hearing. These
matters involve only the RTC’s appreciation of facts and its application of the
law; the errors raised do not involve the RTC’s jurisdiction, but merely amount to
a claim of erroneous exercise of judgment.
Besides, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction in considering the matter of the
petitioner’s transfer of rights, even if it had not been raised as an error. Under
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the RTC is mandated to decide the
appeal based on the entire record of the MTC proceedings and such pleadings
submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Nonetheless, even without this
provision, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, or is closely
related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the
question raised by error properly assigned is dependent. The matter of the
petitioner’s transfer of rights, which was in the records of the case, was the
basis for the RTC’s decision.
A final point
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provided an

expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of
property. Title is not involved, hence, it is a special civil action with a special
procedure. The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question of
entitlement to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession
de facto. Thus, any ruling on the question of ownership is only provisional, made
solely for the purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
Accordingly, any ruling on the validity of the petitioner’s transfer of rights is
provisional and should be resolved in a proper proceeding.
INDOYON V. CA
March 12, 2013/ Sereno, CJ
 Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule 45

422
 Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
FACTS:
Petitioner Indoyon was the municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Lingig,

Surigao del Sur, with Salary Grade 24. Upon examination of his cash and
accounts, the Commission on Audit discovered that petitioner had incurred a
cash shortage in the amount of P1,222,648.42.
The Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of serious

dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
To enjoin the implementation of the Ombudsman’s Decision, petitioner filed a

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
CA. In a Resolution, the Petition was dismissed on the ground that it suffered not
just one technical infirmity, but several technical infirmities that violated various
circulars and issuances of this Court.
Thirty-five (35) days after notice of the Resolution, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Rule 43 Petition for Review on Certiorari on
the ground of noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court
circulars.
HELD:
This Petition invokes the liberality of the Court and considerations of

substantial justice in seeking to overturn the Resolutions of the CA. For
noncompliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court circulars, the Petition
filed by petitioner with the CA was properly dismissed. And yet, in the instant
Petition, he once again ignores the Rules of Court and a circular issued by this
Court.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to question
the CA’s judgment, final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition
for review on certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
423
notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from; or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment.
By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner therefore
clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy. Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90,
an appeal taken to this Court or to the CA by a wrong or an inappropriate mode
merits outright dismissal. On this score alone, the instant Petition may be
dismissed.
In Ybanez v. Court of Appeals, we have said that the Court cannot tolerate
this ignorance of the law on appeals. It has in fact reproached litigants who have
sought to delegate to this Court the task of determining under which rule their
petitions should fall. In the cited case, we emphasized that paragraph 4(e) of
Supreme Court Circular 2-90 specifically warns litigants’ counsels to follow to
the letter the requisites prescribed by law on appeals. This provision reads:
Duty of counsel. — It is therefore incumbent upon every

attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order
promulgated against his client to make sure of the nature of the
errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or law;
then upon such basis to ascertain carefully which Court has
appellate jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously the
requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his
client’s cause.
The inexcusability of this disregard for the rules becomes even more glaring,
considering that petitioner has previously shown grave indifference to technical
rules before the CA. As already explained above, the assailed CA Resolution
properly dismissed his Petition for failure to comply with procedural rules. He
should have learned his lesson from that experience instead of repeating the
same disregard for the rules before this Court.
We reiterate that under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, the filing of an improper
remedy of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper
remedy should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
merits the outright dismissal of a Petition such as this one.
We remind petitioner, as we have consistently reminded countless other

litigants, that the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic potion that will
automatically compel this Court to set aside technical rules. This principle is
424
especially true when a litigant, as in the present case, shows a predilection for
utterly disregarding the Rules.
In any event, even if we were to be liberal and overlook our own Circular 2-90,
we rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
dismissing, for technical infirmities, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner under Rule 43.
At the outset, we emphasize that a writ of certiorari is an extraordinary

prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. To warrant the
issuance thereof, the abuse of discretion must have been so gross or grave, as
when there was such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power was done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse
must have been committed in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Applying the above definition to the instant case, we find that there is no
basis to ask this Court to hold the CA guilty of grave abuse of discretion when
the latter was simply implementing the rules that we ourselves have set forth in
several circulars. We quote hereunder the pertinent part of the assailed CA
Resolution:
However, the Petition suffers from several infirmities rendering the

Petition fatally defective.
First, no Affidavit of Service was attached to the Petition, in violation

of Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 1-88 and 19-91, and of
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. They respectively read:
Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 1-88:
(2) Form and Service of petition
A petition file (under) Rule 45, or under Rule 65, or in a

motion for extension may be denied outright if it is not
clearly legible, or there is no proof of service on the
lower court, tribunal, or office concerned and on the
adverse party in accordance with Section 3, 5 and 10 of
Rule 13, attached to the petition or motion for extension
when filed.
425
Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 19-91:
Effective September 15, 1991, henceforth, a petition or

motion for extension filed before this Court shall be
dismissed/ denied outright if there is no such proof of
service in accordance with Sections 3 and 5 in relation
to Section 10 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court attached
to the petition/motion when filed.
Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court:
Proof of personal service shall consist of a written

admission of the party served, or the official return of
the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of
this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt
issued by the mailing office. The registry return card
shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by
the postmaster to the addressee.
Second, The office of the Ombudsman is impleaded as nominal

party in the Petition for Review, which is not in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, stating as follows:
Sec. 6, Rule 43
SEC. 6 Contents of the Petition.-The petition for review

shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents.
Last, the Court of Origin, as well as the Case Number and the Title
of the action are not indicated in the Caption of the Petition. This is
in contravention of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, which
requires that:
426
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91:
1. Caption of petition or complaint. The caption of the

petition or complaint must include the docket number of
the case in the lower court of quasi-judicial agency
whose order or judgment is sought to be reviewed.
3. Penalties.
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the

summary dismissal of the, multiple petition or
complaint.
There is no question that the CA was simply applying the rules laid down by
this Court. In fact, petitioner does not question the proper application of the
technical rules by the CA. It is precisely for this reason that he is merely invoking
the liberal application of those rules. We also note that not only one but several
rules have not been complied with.
We emphasize that an appeal is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial

discretion. Thus, an appeal may be availed of only in the manner provided by
law and the rules. Failure to follow procedural rules merits the dismissal of the
case, especially when the rules themselves expressly say so, as in the instant
case. While the Court, in certain cases, applies the policy of liberal construction,
this policy may be invoked only in situations in which there is some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not when the application of the policy
results in the utter disregard of procedural rules, as in this case. We dread to
think of what message may be sent to the lower courts if the highest Court of the
land finds fault with them for properly applying the rules. That action will surely
demoralize them. More seriously, by rendering for naught the rules that this
Court itself has set, it would be undermining its own authority over the lower
courts.
Finally, we note that for a proper invocation of the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, one of the essential requisites is that there
be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
As already discussed earlier, the proper remedy of petitioner should have

been to file a petition for review on certiorari. We cannot help but suspect that his
failure to avail himself of that remedy within the reglementary period of 15 days
was the reason he filed, instead, the present special civil action. A special civil
427
action provides for a longer period of 60 days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order or resolution. We note that the instant Petition was filed 35 days
after that notice, by which time petitioner had therefore lost his appeal under
Rule 45. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we dismissed a Rule
65 Petition on the ground that the proper remedy for the petitioner therein should
have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In that case, we
stressed how we had time and again reminded members of the bench and the
bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Thus, certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal.
LIGOT V. REPUBLIC
March 6, 2013/ Brion, J.
 Petition for Review on Certiorari Under Rule 45

 Freeze Order
 Probable Cause to Support the Issuance of a Freeze Order
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering

Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze
order with the CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of the
petitioners, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as amended
(otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). This application
was based on a letter of the Office of the Ombudsman to the AMLC,
recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his
family for possible violation of RA No. 9160.
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the Complaint it

filed against the Ligots.
The Ombudsman’s Complaint
a. Lt. Gen. Ligot and immediate family
The Ombudsman’s complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot

served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years
and 2 months. He and Mrs. Ligot have four children.
428
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets,

Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as of December 31, 2003,
he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight
Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos
(P3,848,003.00). Aside from these declared assets, the
Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and
his family had other properties and bank accounts, not
declared in his SALN, amounting to at least Fifty Four Million
One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos
(P54,001,217.00).
Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot’s main source of income

was his salary as an officer of the AFP, and given his wife and
children’s lack of any other substantial sources of income, the
Ombudsman declared the assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot’s
name, as well as those in his wife’s and children’s names, to
be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth, pursuant to the
provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor
of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for
the Proceedings Therefor).
b. Edgardo Tecson Yambao
The Ombudsman’s investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligot’s

younger brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao. The records of the
Social Security System (SSS) revealed that Yambao had been
employed in the private sector from 1977 to 1994. Based on his
contributions to the SSS, Yambao did not have a substantial
salary during his employment. While Yambao had an
investment with Mabelline Foods, Inc., the Ombudsman noted
that this company only had a net income of P5,062.96 in 2002
and P693.67 in 2003. Moreover, the certification from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that Yambao had no record
of any annual Individual Income
Despite Yambao’s lack of substantial income, the records show

that he has real properties and vehicles registered in his name,
amounting to Eight Million Seven Hundred Sixty Three
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P8,763,550.00), which he
acquired from 1993 onwards. The Office of the Ombudsman
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further observed that in the documents it examined, Yambao

declared three of the Ligots’ addresses as his own.
From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that

Yambao acted as a dummy and/or nominee of the Ligot
spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambao’s name
actually belong to the Ligot family.
The Court of Appeals granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution,
ruling that probable cause existed that an unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense had been committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family,
including Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are related to the
unlawful activity or money laundering offense. Accordingly, the CA issued a
freeze order against the Ligots’ and Yambao’s various bank accounts, web
accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and
vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of
law enforcement authorities and the government’s efforts to recover the proceeds
of the Ligots’ unlawful activities would be frustrated.
Finding merit in the Republic’s arguments, the CA granted the motion in its
September 20, 2005 resolution, extending the freeze order until after all the
appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been terminated.
On September 28, 2005, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze
order, principally arguing that there was no evidence to support the extension of
the freeze order. They further argued that the extension not only deprived them
of their property without due process; it also punished them before their guilt
could be proven. The appellate court subsequently denied this motion in its
January 4, 2006 resolution.
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, the "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil

Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or
Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money
Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended" (Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases) took effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended
for a maximum period of six months.
On January 31, 2006, the Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s
January 4, 2006 resolution, insisting that the freeze order should be lifted
430
considering: (a) no predicate crime has been proven to support the freeze order’s
issuance; (b) the freeze order expired six months after it was issued on July 5,
2005; and (c) the freeze order is provisional in character and not intended to
supplant a case for money laundering. When the CA denied this motion in its
resolution dated January 12, 2007, the Ligots filed with the Supreme Court the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
What is the proper remedy to assail a freeze order?
HELD:
The proper remedy to assail a freeze order issued by the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy
available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or

ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or
final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA
resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their
properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a

review of their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of
probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month limit
to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA,
which fall outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari
petitions. As held in People v. Court of Appeals:
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow

in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is
431
not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its

competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of
the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the
appeal by a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors
of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence
of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the
exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, considering the issue of due process squarely brought before us in

the face of an apparent conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended,
and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this Court finds it
imperative to relax the application of the rules of procedure and resolve this case
on the merits in the interest of justice.
b. Applicability of 6-month extension period under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture

Cases
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15,
2005. Section 59 provides that it shall "apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases
or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20,
2005 resolution extending the freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the
extended freeze order on September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA only acted
upon this motion on January 4, 2006, when it issued a resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion

was actually a motion for reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the
assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots’ motion for reconsideration was still
432
pending resolution at the time the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect
on December 15, 2005, the Rule unquestionably applies to the present case.
Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a freeze order
The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended by RA No. 9194, which states:
Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. – The

Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and
after determination that probable cause exists that any
monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a
freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze
order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended
by the court.
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the
issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the
determination of probable cause by the CA. The probable cause required for the
issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required for the
institution of a criminal action, and the latter was not an issue before the CA nor
is it an issue before us in this case.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze
order refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a
money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and
that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought
to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense."
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the
CA’s statutorily-guided determination’s focus is not on the probable commission
of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman
has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or
other monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of
the illegal activities enumerated under RA No. 9160, as amended. Otherwise
stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an
unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal
point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended.
433
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and
Section 28 (allowing a separate petition for the issuance of a freeze order to
proceed independently) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are only consistent
with the very purpose of the freeze order, which specifically is to give the
government the necessary time to prepare its case and to file the appropriate
charges without having to worry about the possible dissipation of the assets that
are in any way related to the suspected illegal activity. Thus, contrary to the
Ligots’ claim, a freeze order is not dependent on a separate criminal charge,
much less does it depend on a conviction.
That a freeze order can be issued upon the AMLC’s ex parte application
further emphasizes the law’s consideration of how critical time is in these
proceedings. As we previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., "to make such
freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder
would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order
could be issued."
It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would justify
the issuance and the extension of the freeze order has likewise been established
in this case.
From the ex parte application and the Ombudsman’s complaint, we glean that
Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that his income came from his salary as an officer
of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that the bank accounts,
investments and properties in the name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount
to more than Fifty-Four Million Pesos (P54,000,000.00). Since these assets are
grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligot’s income, as well as the lack of any
evidence that the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly found that
probable cause exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. On the other
hand, the AMLC’s verified allegations in its ex parte application, based on the
complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the CA’s finding that
probable cause exists that the monetary instruments subject of the freeze order
are related to, or are the product of, an unlawful activity.
b. A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots now
assert that its effectiveness ceased after January 25, 2006 (or six months after
July 25, 2005 when the original freeze order first expired), pursuant to Section
53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC). This section
states:
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Section 53. Freeze order. –
(b) Extension. – On motion of the petitioner filed before the

expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order, the
court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not
exceeding six months.
We find merit in this claim.
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the CA to

prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to
be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of
RA No. 9160, as amended. The primary objective of a freeze order is to
temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way
related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner
from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is pre-
emptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property
and thwarting the State’s effort in building its case and eventually filing civil
forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended,

from the point of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is
silent on the maximum period of time that the freeze order can be extended by
the CA. The final sentence of Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001 provides, "the freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless
extended by the court." In contrast, Section 55 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases qualifies the grant of extension "for a period not exceeding six months" "for
good cause" shown.
We observe on this point that nothing in the law grants the owner of the
"frozen" property any substantive right to demand that the freeze order be lifted,
except by implication, i.e., if he can show that no probable cause exists or if the
20-day period has already lapsed without any extension being requested from
and granted by the CA. Notably, the Senate deliberations on RA No. 9160 even
suggest the intent on the part of our legislators to make the freeze order effective
until the termination of the case, when necessary.
The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Court’s own
power under the Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in all courts." Pursuant to this
power, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting the effectivity of an
extended freeze order to six months – to otherwise leave the grant of the
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extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which may extend a freeze order
indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time – carries serious implications
on an individual’s substantive right to due process. This right demands that no
person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any governmental action
that amounts to a denial. The right to due process, under these terms, requires a
limitation or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the
governmental action.
The Ligots’ case perfectly illustrates the inequity that would result from giving
the CA the power to extend freeze orders without limitations. As narrated above,
the CA, via its September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the freeze order over the
Ligots’ various bank accounts and personal properties "until after all the
appropriate proceedings and/or investigations being conducted are terminated."
By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars the Ligots from using any of
the property covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture
proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been adjudged
not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of committing. These periods of
extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order which is
intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and criminal trial courts can very
well handle the disposition of properties related to a forfeiture case or to a crime
charged and need not rely on the interim relief that the appellate court issued as
a guarantee against loss of property while the government is preparing its full
case. The term of the CA’s extension, too, borders on inflicting a punishment to
the Ligots, in violation of their constitutionally protected right to be presumed
innocent, because the unreasonable denial of their property comes before final
conviction.
In more concrete terms, the freeze order over the Ligots’ properties has been
in effect since 2005, while the civil forfeiture case – per the Republic’s
manifestation – was filed only in 2011 and the forfeiture case under RA No.
1379 – per the petitioners’ manifestation – was filed only in 2012. This means
that the Ligots have not been able to access the properties subject of the freeze
order for six years or so simply on the basis of the existence of probable cause to
issue a freeze order, which was intended mainly as an interim preemptive
remedy.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a

temporary effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual
forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy - which means, the remedy is an
adjunct of or an incident to the main action – of asking for the issuance of an
asset preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is precisely
436
available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a preservatory and preemptive

remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the law’s silence on the freeze order’s period of
effectivity compelled this Court to issue the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases.
Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum allowable extension on the freeze
order’s effectivity at six months. In doing so, the Court sought to balance the
State’s interest in going after suspected money launderers with an individual’s
constitutionally-protected right not to be deprived of his property without due
process of law, as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
To our mind, the six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the
government to act against the suspected money launderer and to file the
appropriate forfeiture case against him, and is a reasonable period as well that
recognizes the property owner’s right to due process. In this case, the period of
inaction of six years, under the circumstances, already far exceeded what is
reasonable.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a due
process concern, we do not say that the six-month period is an inflexible rule that
would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze order upon its expiration in all
instances. An inflexible rule may lend itself to abuse - to the prejudice of the
State’s legitimate interests - where the property owner would simply file
numerous suits, questioning the freeze order during the six-month extension
period, to prevent the timely filing of a money laundering or civil forfeiture case
within this period. With the limited resources that our government prosecutors
and investigators have at their disposal, the end-result of an inflexible rule is not
difficult to see.
We observe, too, that the factual complexities and intricacies of the case and
other matters that may be beyond the government’s prosecutory agencies’
control may contribute to their inability to file the corresponding civil forfeiture
case before the lapse of six months. Given these considerations, it is only proper
to strike a balance between the individual’s right to due process and the
government’s interest in curbing criminality, particularly money laundering and
the predicate crimes underlying it.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA

for a period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period,
ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against
the property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset
preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information. Otherwise,
437
the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy his property without
any legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely necessary
for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file
the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain
the reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the
period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to the
resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind of motion for
extension with reasonable dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any
explanation why it took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order) before
a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order for only a period of six
months. All the Republic could proffer is its temporal argument on the
inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases; in effect, it glossed over the
squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these circumstances, we cannot but
conclude that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month
period violated the Ligot’s right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be
reversed.
We clarify that our conclusion applies only to the CA ruling and does not
affect the proceedings and whatever order or resolution the RTC may have
issued in the presently pending civil cases for forfeiture. We make this
clarification to ensure that we can now fully conclude and terminate this CA
aspect of the case.
As our last point, we commend the fervor of the CA in assisting the State’s
efforts to prosecute corrupt public officials. We remind the appellate court though
that the government’s anti-corruption drive cannot be done at the expense of
cherished fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. So long as we
continue to be guided by the Constitution and the rule of law, the Court cannot
allow the justification of governmental action on the basis of the noblest
objectives alone. As so oft-repeated, the end does not justify the means. Of
primordial importance is that the means employed must be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will certainly not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
SPOUSES NERIO V. ARCAYAN

March 12, 2013/ Sereno, J.
EN BANC
438
 Writ Of Amparo
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner

Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17
March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin
raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After
the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a
conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the
invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead,
send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the
letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a
receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid,
the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain
to receive their letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment cases,
false accusations, and possible violence from respondents – gravely threatened
their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of
amparo.
Thus, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE:
Should a Writ of Amparo be issued?
HELD (Dry Run):
No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. In the present case, it cannot be said that such right to life,
liberty, or security of the petitioner is violated or threatened with violation by the
acts of the respondent.
Firstly, it was proven by the respondents that a roving patrol was conducted,
not on the ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on another area. Secondly, the
barangay captain’s act of sending invitation letters to petitioners and failure to
sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their
constitutional right to life, liberty or security. And lastly, the petitioners’
439
allegations of more harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence

from the respondents are grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the grounds that may
be relied upon in a petition therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a

remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by

substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following
allegations: first, that respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner
based on information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana; second, that
respondent barangay captain sent them invitation letters without stating the
purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay captain refused to
receive petitioners’ letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the
possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence
from respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the
writ.
On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners’

ampalaya farm was sufficiently controverted by respondents.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was
conducted, not on the ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally
called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot possessed by David Quintana.
440
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm,
petitioner Rey Pador himself admitted that they had done so with his permission,
as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto

Alimorin. I greeted him good morning. He told me that there are
reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya
farm and that there is already a raid.
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to

search the ampalaya farm for marijuana plants.
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners’
permission, we cannot grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a
trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was
merely a violation of petitioners’ property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, we
ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that
are purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response

to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to
life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm
is an insufficient ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find that the barangay

captain’s act of sending invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the
receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their constitutional
right to life, liberty or security. The records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan
sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the records are
bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference
through the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to
refuse to attend the conference, as they have in fact done in this case.
441
The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following these events, they can
anticipate more harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from
respondents – is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on pure
speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation does not warrant the
consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an

extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be
diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on
the basis of unsubstantiated allegations."
PADLAN V. DINGLASAN
March 20, 2013/ Peralta, J.
 Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts
 Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of a Case is Conferred by Law

and Determined by the Allegations in the Complaint
FACTS:
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land, with
an aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s
mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura regarding the sale of the said
property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the
owner’s copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then
subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot No. 625-O,
under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo.
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and
her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers.
Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna, who later caused the issuance of TCT
No. 134932 for the subject property under her name. A few months later, Lorna
sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT No. 134932
was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.
442
After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to

surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused. Thus, in 1999,
respondents were then forced to file a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
137466. It was alleged in the complaint that the value of the property was
P4,000.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Rule on the motion.
HELD (Dry Run):
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction only if the value of the property exceeds P20,000
for civil actions outside Metro Manila. Since the present case was filed in Bataan,
a place outside Metro Manila, and since the value of the property was merely
P4,000, as alleged in the complaint, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.
Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the

"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
443
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall
be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any
further with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on
the above-quoted provisions.
However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action,
an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
444
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations
in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Respondents’ Complaint narrates that they are the duly registered owners of
Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which was covered by TCT No. T-105602.
Without their knowledge and consent, the land was divided into several lots
under their names through the fraudulent manipulations of Maura. One of the
lots was Lot 625-K, which was covered by TCT No. 134785. On April 26, 1990,
Maura sold the subject lot to Lorna. By virtue of the fictitious sale, TCT No.
134785 was cancelled and TCT No. 134932 was issued in the name of Lorna.
Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner for a consideration in
the amount of P4,000.00. TCT No. 134932 was later cancelled and TCT No.
137466 was issued in the name of petitioner. Despite demands from the
respondents, petitioner refused to surrender possession of the subject property.
Respondents were thus constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and incur
expenses for litigation. Respondents prayed for the RTC (a) to declare TCT No.
137466 null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which was originally issued and
registered in the name of the respondents; and (b) to order petitioner to pay
attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00,
plus cost of suit.
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of
action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal
rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the
property itself." "Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the
document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the
government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or
interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.
In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in
their complaint can be granted, the issue of who between the two contending
parties has the valid title to the subject lot must first be determined before a
445
determination of who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title

covering the property in question.
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent jurisdiction
shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the
lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and
enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is
the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lot.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the
case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value
alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the
amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show
the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’
counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the
property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the
Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to

real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the
Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and
not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC
are null and void.
THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC. V. MASWENG

February 27, 2013/ Leonardo-de Castro, J.
 TRO and Preliminary Injunction against Government Infrastructure

Projects
 Doctrine of Stare Decisis
FACTS:
446
Private respondents Elizabeth, Judith, Helen, Magdalena, spouses

Ampaguey, and spouses Panayo, claiming that their parents inherited from their
ancestors several parcels of land in what is now known as the Busol Watershed
Reservation, filed before the NCIP a Petition for Injunction, with an application for
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Baguio District Engineer’s Office, the Office of the
City Architect and Parks Superintendent, and petitioners The Baguio Regreening
Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force from fencing the Busol Watershed
Reservation.
In their Petition before the NCIP, private respondents claim that they are
members of the Ibaloi and Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors’
ownership of the properties now known as the Busol Watershed Reservation
was allegedly expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by Governor
General Leonard Wood. As owners of said properties, their ancestors paid the
realty taxes thereon. The fencing project of petitioners would allegedly impede
their access to and from their residences, farmlands and water sources, and
dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and ceremonies are usually
held.
On October 21, 2002, NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng

issued a TRO which shall be effective for a period of twenty (20) days.
Thereafter, he issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
May Atty. Masweng, the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer, issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against a government project?
HELD (Dry Run):
Yes, because Atty. Masweng is neither a judge nor a court which, as a rule,
is prohibited under the law to issue restraining orders and injunctions against
government infrastructure projects.
TRO and Preliminary Injunction against Government Infrastructure

Projects
The governing law as regards the prohibition to issue restraining orders and
injunctions against government infrastructure projects is Republic Act No. 8975,
447
which modified Presidential Decree No. 1818, the law cited by the parties, upon
its effectivity on November 26, 2000. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides:
Section 9. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, including

Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and Republic Act No. 7160,
as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
Thus, in GV Diversified International, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,14 we

ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1818 have been effectively superseded by
Republic Act No. 8975. The prohibition is thus now delineated in Section 3 of
said latter law, which provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining

Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of
its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit
or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-

of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the

national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution,

implementation, operation of any such contract or
project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such

contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful

activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply to all cases, disputes or controversies

instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
448
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders

involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall
file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract
is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under the existing laws.
Should a judge violate the preceding section, Republic Act No. 8975 provides
the following penalty:
Section 6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and

criminal liabilities he or she may incur under existing laws,
any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in
violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the prohibition covers only judges,
and does not apply to the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic
Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605 and
Presidential Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts. Accordingly,
we cannot nullify the assailed Orders on the ground of violation of said laws.
The Court’s Previous Decision in G.R. No. 180206
On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 180206,
a suit which involved several of the parties in the case at bar. In G.R. No.
180206, the City Mayor of Baguio City issued three Demolition Orders with
respect to allegedly illegal structures constructed by private respondents therein
on a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation.
Private respondents filed a Petition for Injunction with the NCIP. Atty.
Masweng issued two temporary restraining orders directing the City Government
of Baguio to refrain from enforcing said Demolition Orders and subsequently
449
granted private respondents’ application for a preliminary injunction. The Court

of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary
restraining orders and the writ of preliminary injunction. This Court then upheld
the jurisdiction of the NCIP on the basis of the allegations in private respondents’
Petition for Injunction.
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced
that private respondents were entitled to the relief granted by the Commission.
Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but
does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. Since it is required before the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of
a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the
petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same
arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against
the fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus
being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that different
writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1) that
Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs
of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that
Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents
have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other
hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction, particularly
the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their
ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject
matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of
injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the
principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. The Court explained the
principle of stare decisis in Ting v. Velez-Ting:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts

to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
450
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the

principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
We have also previously held that "under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same."
The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No.
180206 as regards private respondents' ancestral land claim should therefore be
considered provisional, as they are based merely on the allegations in the
complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in a full-blown proceeding on
the merits by the proper tribunal. Private respondents are therefore not barred
from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding,
despite the denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for.
VDA. DE FIGURACION V. GERILLA

February 13, 2013/ Reyes, J.
 Issues not Raised Before the Courts a Quo Cannot be Raised for the
First Time in a Petition Filed under Rule 45
FACTS:
Agripina and Carolina were half-sisters and were the co-owners of a parcel
of land. They inherited such property from Eulalio, their father.
Carolina’s daughters were Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
In 1961, Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of the lot
in favor of her niece, Emilia.
Soon thereafter, Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication

adjudicating unto herself the entire lot as the sole and exclusive heir of their
deceased parent, Eulalio. On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said lot in favor of Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn
immediately caused the cancellation of the OCT thereof and the issuance of TCT
No. 42244 in their names.
In 1971, Emilia built a house on the eastern half of the property.

451
In 1994, Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia
who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of the property.
During pre-trial conference, the issue was simplified into whether or not
Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of the lot. The petitioners’ supporting
theory for this issue was that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Agripina was
rendered ineffective by the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and
Hilaria.
On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by

questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed of Quitclaim. They
claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner
required by law.
ISSUE:
Rule on the new theory raised by the petitioners.
HELD (Dry Run):
The new theory raised by the petitioners before the Court of Appeals should
not be given due course, for such theory was not raised during the trial.
Defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change
the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the
adverse party.
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first
time in a petition filed under Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the
petitioners before the RTC and the CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC, the parties agreed to limit the issue with
regard to the lot as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the
eastern half portion of the lot. The petitioners’ supporting theory for this issue
was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961 was rendered
ineffective by the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria."
On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by
452
questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed of Quitclaim. They

claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner
required by law.
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic

procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly
adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal.  Whether or

not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court
below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question
of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and
which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not
pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a
party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court
had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues
and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie
this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity
to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done
had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory,
this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the
supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of
fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already
adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners
themselves have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several
certifications in support of their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact
are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of
facts.
453
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by
the petitioners involving the nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For
their failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners are now
barred by estoppel from imploring an examination of the same.
DE LIMA V. GATDULA
February 19, 2013/ Leonen, J.
EN BANC
 Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of

Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary De Lima,

Director Rojas and Deputy Director Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to
cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula]
in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued

summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for
hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining
whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases.
In an Order, Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules
of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March

2012 even without a Return nor an Answer. He ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the
period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that
the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.
454
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of

the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With
Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ
of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The
appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
ISSUE:
Decide on the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by De Lima, et al.
HELD (Dry Run):
The Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by De Lima, et al. is not the proper
remedy, because the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. That decision pertained to the
issuance of the writ under Section 6, not the judgment under Section 18. The
"Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary
protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the
decision.
It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the
writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule.
Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at
this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of
Amparo to put its procedures in the proper context.
455
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy

to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in
the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure
was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition
to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation of the
facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant
circumstances detailed". After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the
Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the
petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to
life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful.
On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear
before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection
and interim reliefs are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying
the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they
had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to
state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner,
location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the
suspected offenders before a competent court. Clearly these matters are
important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that
will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine
the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return
456
is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will
render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision.
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant
the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The
judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must
be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the
actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their
purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the
threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by
the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be
terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary
remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be
the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the
"Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to issue the

Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to

effect the service of the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious
manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon
the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the
government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision"
is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary
protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the
decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before
final judgment is rendered.
457
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the
RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return

that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the
Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order
dated 2 March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo],

the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not
inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of

the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of

summons, the defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are

required to file their Answer ten (days) from receipt of this
Order.
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the
Court has devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary

procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.

458
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total
amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by

law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both,
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to
the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues
could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu

of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A
memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party
litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for
decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on

the Writ of Amparo.
459
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In
the body of its decision, the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ

and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within

ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied."
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the

actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the
entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the
evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.
It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to
the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise
out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as
tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory
order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari,
on the other hand, is prohibited.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. SANDOVAL

February 18, 2013/ Bersamin, J.
460
 Separate Trial
 Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,

accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr.,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants.
The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the

Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties subject of
the action were two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 266423 and TCT No.
266588 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City registered in the names of
Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.
On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint
in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. It appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two
parcels of land as the registered owner by virtue of TCT No. N-201383 and TCT
No. N-201384 issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian
Bank was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City.
When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence

against the original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian
Bank.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It ruled that:
1) The Republic is entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank (Metrobank);

and
2) The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian Bank’s

(Metrobank’s) alleged bad faith in acquiring the properties.
ISSUE:
Is the Republic entitled to a separate trial against the Metrobank?
HELD (Dry Run):

461
1. The Republic is not entitled to a separate trial against the Metrobank.

Under the Rules of Court, the court may order a separate trial of any claim or of
any separate issue in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice.
In the present case, the issue relevant to Metrobank was not complicated. In
that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience.
Moreover, the cause of action against Metrobank was necessarily connected with
the cause of action against the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan
resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the
evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties would be
thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic
without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The
outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank. Indeed, to hold a
separate trial in this case would not be in furtherance of convenience and would
not avoid prejudice.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of

convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any
party.
The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a

separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against
Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants.
Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the
issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum
in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense,
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."
462
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are
extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in
the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate
trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will
give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the
separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the
exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated.
In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience.
And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily
connected with the cause of action against the original defendants. Should the
Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on
the basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties
would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the
Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its
side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.
The representation by the Republic in its comment to the petition of

Metrobank, that the latter "merely seeks to be afforded the opportunity to
confront the witnesses and documentary exhibits," and that it will "still be
granted said right during the conduct of the separate trial, if proper grounds are
presented therefor," unfairly dismisses the objective possibility of leaving the
opportunity to confront the witnesses and documentary exhibits to be given to
Metrobank in the separate trial as already too late. The properties, though
already registered in the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile declared
liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the
deprivation of its properties without due process of law. Only a joint trial with
the original defendants could afford to Metrobank the equal and efficient
opportunity to confront and to contest all the evidence bearing on its ownership
of the properties. Hence, the disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to
Metrobank would far outweigh any good or benefit that the Republic would
seemingly stand to gain from the separation of trials.
We must safeguard Metrobank’s right to be heard in the defense of its

registered ownership of the properties, for that is what our Constitution requires
us to do. Hence, the grant by the Sandiganbayan of the Republic’s motion for
separate trial, not being in furtherance of convenience or would not avoid
prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the Constitution, the law and
463
jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and, therefore, a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter

involving Metrobank
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and
Republic Act No. 8249, vests the Sandiganbayan with original exclusive
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued in 1986 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino.
Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-

gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses their relatives, subordinates, and close
associates, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten wealth includes
assets and properties in the form of estates and real properties in the Philippines
and abroad. Executive Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A pertain to the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative to the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies.
The amended complaint filed by the Republic to implead Asian Bank prays
for reversion, reconveyance, reconstitution, accounting and damages. In other
words, the Republic would recover ill-gotten wealth, by virtue of which the
properties in question came under sequestration and are now, for that reason, in
custodia legis.
Although the Republic has not imputed any responsibility to Asian Bank for
the illegal accumulation of wealth by the original defendants, or has not averred
that Asian Bank was a business associate, dummy, nominee, or agent of the
Marcoses, the allegation in its amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 that
Asian Bank acted with bad faith for ignoring the sequestration of the properties
as ill-gotten wealth has made the cause of action against Asian Bank incidental
or necessarily connected to the cause of action against the original defendants.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the
claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has ruled in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,34 that "the Sandiganbayan has original
and exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental
to, or related to such cases." The Court made a similar pronouncement
464
sustaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Republic of the Philippines

(PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), to wit:
We cannot possibly sustain such a puerile stand. Peña itself

already dealt with the matter when it stated that under Section
2 of Executive Order No. 14, all cases of the Commission
regarding alleged ill-gotten properties of former President
Marcos and his relatives, subordinates, cronies, nominees and
so forth, whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, "and
all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive
and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court."
SERRANO V. AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC.

February 11, 2013/ Velasco, Jr. J.
 Principle of “Bar by Prior Judgment”
FACTS:
Petitioner Nerie Serrano was hired by respondent Ambassador Hotel, Inc.

(AHI) as an accountant.
Serrano had filed a complaint against AHI and/or Yolanda Chan, AHI’s
President, for the nonpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, separation pay,
retirement benefits, and damages before the labor arbiter.
Finding that AHI failed to discharge the burden to prove that Serrano had
been paid her salaries and other monetary benefits inclusive of her retirement
pay, Labor Arbiter Franco ruled for Serrano.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the labor arbiter’s Decision by deleting the
award representing Serrano’s retirement pay, thereby reducing the award to
only PhP 324,680.40.
Petitioner Serrano and respondents AHI and Chan interposed separate

petitions for certiorari assailing the NLRC Decision, after their respective motions
for reconsideration were denied. At the CA, Serrano’s petition docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 100569, entitled Nerie Serrano v. National Labor Relations
465
Commission (Third Division), Ambassador Hotel, Inc. and Yolanda Chan, was
raffled to the CA’s Special Eighth (8th) Division, while that of respondents AHI
and Chan’s, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100612, entitled Ambassador Hotel,
Inc. and Yolanda Chan in her capacity as President of Ambassador Hotel, Inc. v.
NLRC and Nerie C. Serrano, went to the CA’s Special Fourth (4th) Division.
On November 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100569, the appellate court’s

Special 8th Division issued a Decision reversing the NLRC’s Decision and
reinstating and affirming the labor arbiter’s Decision.
In its August 24, 2009 Resolution, the former CA Special 8th Division denied
respondents’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, respondents Chan and AHI filed
before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 15, 2009,
docketed as G.R. No. 189313, praying that the November 4, 2008 and August
24, 2009 Decision and Resolution of the CA Special 8th Division be annulled and
set aside.
In a Resolution dated December 16, 2009, this Court dismissed respondents’

petition. In its March 17, 2010 Resolution, the Court denied with finality
respondents Chan and AHI’s motion for reconsideration. On May 14, 2010, the
Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 189313 became final and executory, thereby
effectively reinstating with finality the Decision of the labor arbiter.
Meanwhile, in their petition for certiorari under consideration by the appellate

court’s Special 4th Division, respondents AHI and Chan argued against
Serrano’s entitlement to any monetary award. Sustaining for the most part the
respondents’ arguments, the CA Special 4th Division issued the presently
assailed Decision dated March 26, 2010, which affirms with
modification the NLRC Decision.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, she now comes to
this Court via the instant petition praying, in the main, that the Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100612 of the Special 4th Division be declared without legal effect
for effectively contradicting a final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R.
No. 189313.
ISSUE:
Will the present petition of Serrano before the Supreme Court prosper?
HELD (Dry Run):

466
Yes. The ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 189313 affirming in essence
the Decision of the labor arbiter is conclusive on Serrano and respondents Chan
and AHI on the matter of the former’s entitlement or non-entitlement to the
benefits thus awarded. As a necessary corollary, it was a grave error on the part
of the Court of Appeals to render a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 100612 that runs
counter to the final ruling in G.R. No. 189313. Said CA Decision offends the
principle of res judicata––a basic postulate to the end that controversies and
issues once decided on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction shall
remain in repose.
This Court’s December 16, 2009 Resolution and March 17, 2010 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration with finality in G.R. No. 189313 should
have immediately written finis to the controversy between the parties regarding
the benefits of petitioner Serrano. The appellate court’s Special 4th Division
ought to have immediately dismissed respondents’ certiorari petition docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 100612 in view of this Court’s final pronouncements in G.R. No.
189313. The principle of "bar by prior judgment," one of the two concepts
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata, the other being labeled as
"conclusiveness of judgment," demands such action. Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on the effect of a former judgment is clear:
SEC. 47. Effect of final judgments or final orders. – The effect of

a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:
(b) The judgment or final order is, with respect to the

matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity.
By the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit."
To apply this doctrine in the form of a "bar by prior judgment," there must be
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action as between the first case
467
where the first judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred. All these requisites are present in the case at bar:
First, the parties in both G.R. No. 189313 and CA-G.R. SP

No. 100612, which is the subject of Our present review, are
petitioner Serrano and respondents Chan and AHI.
Second, G.R. No. 189313 and CA-G.R. SP No. 100612 both

deal with the same subject matter: Serrano’s entitlement to
monetary benefits under the pertinent labor laws as an
employee of respondents AHI and Chan.
Lastly, both G.R. No. 189313 and CA-G.R. SP No. 100612

originated from one and the same complaint lodged before the
labor arbiter where Serrano alleged the nonpayment of her
salaries, 13th month pay, and retirement benefits as the cause
of action.
Our ruling in G.R. No. 189313 affirming in essence the Decision of the labor
arbiter that granted Serrano’s claimed unpaid salary, 13th month pay, and
retirement benefits, among others, is, therefore, conclusive on Serrano and
respondents Chan and AHI on the matter of the former’s entitlement or non-
entitlement to the benefits thus awarded. As a necessary corollary, it was a
grave error on the part of the appellate court to render a decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100612 that runs counter to the final ruling in G.R. No. 189313. Said CA
Decision offends the principle of res judicata––a basic postulate to the end that
controversies and issues once decided on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction shall remain in repose. As it were, the decision in G.R. No. 189313,
the prior judgment, constitutes in context an absolute bar to any subsequent
action not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat
Serrano’s demand or claim but also as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered.
It need not be stressed that a final judgment may no longer be modified in

any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law. In Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, We explained that this principle of
the immutability of final judgments is an important aspect of the administration
of justice as it ensures an end to litigations:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a

judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect,
468
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to

be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at
the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to
naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.
This precept has been reiterated, time and again, in countless cases. Hence,
to ensure against judicial confusion and the seeming conflict in the judiciary’s
decisions, courts must be constantly vigilant in extending their judicial gaze to
cases related to the matters submitted for their resolution. Certainly, to ignore
the concept of judicial notice and disregard a finding previously made by this
Court and/or by a court of equal rank in a related case on the same issue, as
here, is ridiculous and illogical. Not only will it add to the clogged dockets of the
courts, but worse, it will cause the cruel and unnecessary repeated vexation of a
person on the same cause that could have otherwise been avoided by the simple
expedience of consolidating the cases.
The Court has observed that in some instances, two separate petitions
brought before it arose from two (2) conflicting decisions rendered by two (2)
divisions of the CA when said decisions arose from one case or actually involve
the same parties and cause of action or common questions of facts or law. This is
a bane to the efficient, effective and expeditious administration of justice which
should be addressed at the earliest possible time.
CHAN V. CHAN
July 24, 2013/ Abad, J.
 Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communication

469
 Objection
 Offer of Evidence
FACTS:
Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the RTC of Makati City,
a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny
Chan. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him
to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny
resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim

Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined
at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse.” Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the
RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical
City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered
by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the
opposition and denied Josielene’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of Josielene’s motion is correct.
HELD:
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the

hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present
in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a
nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking
the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
470
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or

obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a

physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot
in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the
patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis
of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could
be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired
between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his
own health at great risk.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they
are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the
patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after
the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally

must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral

examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within

three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
471
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be

specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination
at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a

subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production
of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon

motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in
his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such
terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation:
he documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are
not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician
“cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined”
regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
472
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior
consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition
before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in
fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he
should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records.
Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in

evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence
by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired
into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that
Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act
contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into
the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
hospital records would again be premature. For all of the above reasons, the CA
and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in
court of Johnny’s hospital records.
MANGILA V. PANGILINAN
July 13, 2013/ Bersamin, J.
Note: The authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary
investigations was removed effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to
A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
473
 Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others
with syndicated estafa were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto
Princesa City.
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan,

Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the
complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the
warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City
for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing
rules.
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at

the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
Claiming that the preliminary investigation conducted by the judge was not
yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest and that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of
probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas
corpus to obtain her release from detention.
In its resolution, the CA denied the petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Rule on the denial by the CA.
HELD (Dry Run):
The denial by the Court of Appeals was correct. The Rules of Court provides
that if a person, whose liberty was restrained, is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, the writ shall not be allowed. In the present
case, the investigating judge that issued the warrant of arrest was then
empowered to issue such warrant during the preliminary investigation should he
finds that a probable cause exists.
Moreover, the petitioners are not without another remedy. He could have
brought the alleged irregularity attending the issuance of the warrant of arrest to
474
the attention of the City Prosecutor. The writ of habeas corpus could not be used
as a substitute for another available remedy.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the Court discoursed on the nature of the

special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a

special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the
enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire
into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into
the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule
applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution
and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a
case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor

intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error
that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order
are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the
regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it
was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of
error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities
not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the
course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and
not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is
under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
475
habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not

illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a

proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of
having the person of restraint presented before the judge in
order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and
his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who
holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority.
Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and
the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has
authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may
be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled
thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a “palladium

of liberty,” is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge.
It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made
by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act
of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the
only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against
Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations
involving “all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.”
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary
investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and
476
that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and
MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective
on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order
lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be
inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice
Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to

have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a
court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under
lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the
party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process,
does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court by which it was issued and the validity of the process
upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx(Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.

— If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge

Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the
warrant of arrest because of its having been issued without an exhaustive
examination of the complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath;
without a prior finding of probable cause; and without consideration of the
necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were
477
enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus. Mangila fails to
persuade.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining
Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila and her cohorts.
If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayon’s evidence sufficient for

finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding the Court
justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the
Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary
investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the
proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding.
Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights.
Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the
warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider
the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due
to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that
consideration was presumed.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but
was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the power to
order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found
against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper
recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct
access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following
Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate
action. We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not
be used as a substitute for another available remedy.
HEIRS OF YPON V. RICAFORTE

July 8, 2013/ Perlas-Bernabe, J.
 Determination of Heirship
FACTS:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E.
478
Ypon” (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving
behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of

Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates
of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637
and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral
relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as

evidenced by: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960;
and (d) a passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (b) the case is not prosecuted
by the real parties-in- interest.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that
while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in
a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this
did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact
that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract
between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c)
a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.
ISSUE:
Rule on the July 27, 2011 Order of the RTC.
HELD:
The Order of the RTC dismissing the case is correct, but the ground it relied
upon to the effect that the complaint failed to state a cause of action is
misplaced. The case should have been dismissed on the ground that a
determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession.
479
The rule is that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. Thus, ruling therein of
the RTC as regards the heirship of Gaudiosio is devoid of any legal effect.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a

right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can
be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses
that may be averred by the defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true,
would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule
that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs
must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are

the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
480
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the

establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled

that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This
doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes

Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay
v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case,
was for the recovery of property. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for

the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality,
as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,
and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,

appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether

the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.
Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of

heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this
light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship
which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
PEOPLE V. ODTUHAN
July 17, 2013/ Peralta, J.
481
 Sufficiency of Material Averments in an Information
FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993,

respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon. Sometime in August 1994, he filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999, the
RTC of Pasig City granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On April 15, 2005,
respondent was indicted in an Information for Bigamy.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on the ground that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash should be granted.
HELD:
The motion to quash should not be granted.
A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the

validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency
on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information. It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in
an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be

considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.
482
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows

the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it
contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent
is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally
dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a
second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to

Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage
license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged
in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he
contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because
matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full
blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to
shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent.

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1

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. V. NAVARRO

Private respondent Emiliano C. Beneza was employed by Atlas Fertilizer

Atlas advised the Emiliano of his impending termination on the grounds of

On January 8, 1979, Atlas sent to the Emiliano a memorandum giving the

The Labor Arbiter shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear

a) Unfair labor practice cases;

c) All other cases arising from employer-employee

However, on May 1, 1980, during the pendency of his case, Presidential

The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive

a) Unfair labor practice cases:

As can be observed, claims for damages, such as the claim of Emiliano

An opposition was filed by Emiliano on the ground that at the time

Whether or not the case should be dismissed.

HELD (Dry Run):

The case should be dismissed. As a rule, once jurisdiction is acquired by a

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech

respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms

Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, Ebdane issued guidelines on the same

Petitioner Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

HELD (Dry Run):

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections promulgated a resolution

However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by

Meanwhile, on February 2, 2001, Alfredo L. Benipayo was appointed as the

The COMELEC on its part, specifically denied the existence of a perfected

When the Judge Quijano-Padilla rendered judgment against the COMELEC,

HELD (Dry Run):

DE BALLESTEROS V. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN

NOVEMBER 24, 2010

 Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction/Exceptions

Lucia De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of

Is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is applicable in the present case?

HELD (Dry Run):

No. The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is not without exceptions. One of

The Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. It states that

Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is not without

“The requirement that all claims against the bank be

Thus, to allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a

DELA CRUZ V. MOYA

 Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

HELD (Dry Run):

Remedio Flores filed a complaint against Ignacio Binongcal and Fernando

Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

Should the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?

HELD (Dry Run):

The jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to

“All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or

HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK V. ACUŇA

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD (Dry Run):

The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not

a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms;

In the present case, the bank failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as

 Review Of Ombudsman’s Resolutions

Zenaida F. Lanting filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-

Petitioner characterized respondents’ acts as unlawful, odious and

The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the