Agents, Structures and International Relations

autonomous and independent of external structural influences. When

applied to the state, this fact alone should lead us to treat with suspi-
cion artificial boundaries separating inside from outside, or dividing the
world into artificial levels.103
As structured entities organisations also have a habitus. Another term
for this might be an organisational culture. The habitus, although an
informal controlling mechanism, is nonetheless a powerful one. An
organisational culture might be considered to be the ethos, or spirit,
that pervades an organisation. The habitus can be a powerful determi-
nant of how individuals carry out their roles within organisations. In
extreme instances the organisational culture may actually work against
the organisation achieving some, or all, of its functional ends. The British
Metropolitan Police Force, for example, has the aim of ensuring justice
is served. In order to help achieve this end it also has a set of regula-
tions relating to behavioural patterns concerning racist behaviour. The
MacPherson report, however, shows how the culture of the Metropoli-
tan Police was racist even though the organisation expressly forbids
such behaviour.104
The conflation of social groups and organisations underpins many
of the attempts to ascribe agency, and responsibility, to organisations,
and even at times to institutions. But can organisations have intentions?
Wendt clearly believes they can, as does much of the discipline even in its
more instrumental mode. If an organisation is said to have intentions, as
Wendt claims, it must have a complex web of attitudes about the world.
These attitudes are not rudimentary beliefs, but rather only exist as com-
ponents in complex networks of belief. Thus, for example, in order for an
entity to hold a series of beliefs about engaging in war requires that the
same entity also hold beliefs about what war is, as well as beliefs about
strategy, enemies, destruction, death, conquest and a whole range of
other complex phenomena. And the relationship between these beliefs
is complex and understandable only through reflective reasoning. This
requires that an entity with such interrelated beliefs would be capable
of high-level thought and would also be in possession of a language in
which to do this thinking. Moreover, such an entity’s thought process
would also include planning for its future on the basis of its past. Hence
memory is also an integral aspect of social activity. All of this seems to
be integral to the ‘state-as-agent’ thesis. However, when placed within
the distinction between social groups and organisations we can see just

103 Walker (1993). 104 Wight (2004).

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