Together in Orbit The Origins of International Cooperation in The Space Station

TOGETHER IN ORBIT
The Origins of International

Participation in the Space Station
John M. Logsdon
NASA History Division
Office of Policy and Plans
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546
Monographs in Aerospace History #11
NP-1998-10-244-HQ November 1998
TOGETHER IN ORBIT
John M. Logsdon
NASA Headquarters

November 1998
i
Foreword
FROM VIRTUALLY THE BEGINNING of the twentieth interest to many people, particularly as the initial
century, those interested in the human exploration launches of space station elements draw near and
of space have viewed as central to that endeavor the process of assembling and then beginning to
the building of an Earth-orbital space station that use the International Space Station is imminent.
would serve as the jumping-off point to the Moon
and the planets. Always, space exploration sup Logsdon has made revisions to the text as it stood
porters believed, a permanently occupied space in 1991, adding a concluding analysis that brings the
station was a necessary outpost in the new frontier study to the present, inserting recent publications into
of space. The more technically minded recognized the footnotes, and fixing a few grammatical or lin
that once humans had achieved Earth orbit about guistic infelicities. It seemed especially appropriate to
250 miles above the surface—the presumed loca recognize that the partnership begun in 1984 and
tion of any space station—the vast majority of the described in this account had been augmented by the
atmosphere and the gravity well would have been 1993 invitation to Russia from the original partners to
conquered, and then human beings were about join them in the station enterprise, but other than that
halfway to anywhere they might want to go. Logsdon let the study stand.
Space station advocates also recognized that the This is the eleventh in a series of monographs
scientific and technological challenge of building prepared under the auspices of the NASA History
an Earth-orbital space station was daunting and Division. The Monographs in Aerospace History
that pooling the resources of many of the spacefar series is designed to make available a wide variety
ing nations of the world would maximize the prob of investigations relative to the history of aeronau
abilities of success. Thus, when the space station tics and space. These publications are intended to
project was born in the in the mid-1980s, it almost be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively
immediately became an international program. short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive
This monograph describes the process of concep format to allow timely and broad dissemination to
tualizing the international partnership and crafting researchers in aerospace history. Suggestions for
its contours. additional publications in the Monographs in
Aerospace History series are welcome.
This study was completed by John M. Logsdon
of George Washington University in late 1991, but Roger D. Launius
it was not published in a form suitable for wide cir Chief Historian
culation. With the January 29, 1998, signing cere
mony for the revised international agreements that National Aeronautics and
brought the Russian Federation into the space sta Space Administration
tion partnership, it occurred to Dr. Logsdon that a June 24, 1998
full account of the origins of international involve
ment in the space station program might be of
iii
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Origins of the U.S. Invitation to Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Laying the Foundation for International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Space Station Task Force and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
The Allies Are Interested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Mission Requirements Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Making the Space Station International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Resistance to International Involvement Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
The Space Station Decision Process and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Adding the International Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Extending the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
The Partners Accept the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Early Agreement Sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Europe Charts Its Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
Developing Political Support for Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Japan Determined Not to “Miss the Boat” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Canada Sets Its Space Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Monographs in Aerospace History

v
Acknowledgments
THIS STUDY TOOK a long time to complete, for a Pedersen read the manuscript and provided helpful
variety of justifiable and not so reasons. Along the comments.
way, the number of people who have helped has
become very large, and I am sure that I will fail to Individuals from U.S. station partners who went
give due credit and thanks to all who deserve it. out of their way to be helpful include George van
Reeth, Ian Pryke, Gabriel Lafferanderie, and Jean
The study was carried out under contract to the Arets of the European Space Agency; Mac Evans,
NASA History Division, using funds provided by Karl Doetsch, and Bill Cockburn of Canada; and
the Office of Space Station. Robert Freitag and Masanori Nagatomo, Shinichi Nakayama, and
Terence Finn, of the latter office, recognized the Yasahiro Kawasaki of Japan. Of course, the study
historical significance of the space station program would not have been possible without the willing
and were willing to support outside, independent ness of many in the United States and overseas to
scholars to track the evolution of the program in take time for an interview.
near to real time. They also supported the creation
of a Space Station Historical Archive; its manager, At George Washington University, Henry
Adam Gruen, and his assistants did a superlative Hitchcock provided valuable research assistance as
job of assembling documents and other materials he pushed to complete his own dissertation on the
from the early days of the program, from which I space station project. Lois Berdaus and Paul
have drawn extensively in preparing this study. McDonnell typed early drafts of the study until I final
Freitag and Finn also read several drafts of the ly learned to use a word processor (and spell check!).
study and provided their on-the-spot perspectives
on how events unfolded. Overseeing the space sta Underpinning this whole effort is an attitude with
tion historical effort and this study until she moved in NASA that what the agency does is of lasting sig
to the Administrator’s office was NASA Historian nificance, is paid for by public funds, and should be
Sylvia Fries, who provided gentle but firm guid open for scrutiny by outsiders such as me. Colleagues
ance and insightful comments on early drafts of the from abroad are amazed at the openness and acces
study. Roger Launius was Sylvia’s successor as sibility of U.S. government officials and the willing
Director of the History Division, and he was ness of government agencies to open all but their
understanding as I pushed to finish the study. most sensitive files to external examination, if the pur
pose for doing so is valid. NASA has been a model
Of the many others within NASA who helped within the government in this respect, at least as far as
me locate documents, provided essential correc my experience is concerned.
tive comments as I went along, and encouraged
me to get the job done, I owe particular thanks to When I prepared the manuscript for publication in
Peggy Finarelli. She trusted me enough to provide this monograph series, Kerry Murray, a graduate
access to material not often available to an outside research assistant at the Space Policy Institute, mas
scholar, and then worked with me to make sure tered the modern technology of a scanner so that
that I had not inadvertently violated her trust. Dick there was no need to retype major portions of the
Barnes provided extensive insights and comments manuscript, and she otherwise was of great assistance
and, with Peggy, was instrumental in opening in getting the document ready for publication. She
NASA files for my use. Al Condes worked with me has my thanks.
on document access, and Lyn Wigbels and Ken
vi Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station
I am grateful for the assistance offered by all The time when the space station experiment in
those mentioned above and by others who international cooperation can be tested in practice
contributed to this study. It goes without saying that is fast approaching. It certainly has been a long
I alone am responsible for all errors of fact and time in coming!
interpretation in this work and that the conclusions
and findings are mine and do not necessarily John M. Logsdon
reflect the views of the National Aeronautics and March 1998
Space Administration or George Washington
University.

Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 1
Introduction
ON JANUARY 25, 1984, in his annual State of the connotation, but properly interpreted it means an
Union address to a joint session of Congress, attempt to project—to propagate—a positive mes
President Ronald Reagan announced that “tonight, sage. The message sent to the world by the willing
I am directing NASA to develop a permanently ness of the United States to share the exploration of
manned space station and to do it within the space with others is that of an open, dynamic, pio
decade.” A few moments later, he added: “We want neering society, eager to share its capabilities and
our friends to help us meet these challenges and achievements with others. When that message was
share in their benefits. NASA will invite other coun supplemented by the demonstration of technologi
tries to participate so we can strengthen peace, cal and organizational skill that was Project
build prosperity, and expand freedom for all who Apollo, the space program clearly was a powerful
share our goals.” 1 Just over a year later, during the means of validating the U.S. claim to world lead
April–June 1985 period, Canada, Japan, and ership.
Europe accepted in principle the U.S. invitation to
participate in the space station program. Thus was Using the space program as an instrument of U.S.
initiated the most extensive experiment in interna foreign policy was relatively easy when only the
tional technical cooperation ever undertaken. United States and the Soviet Union possessed the
capability to put humans and their machines into
This essay is a history and analysis of the steps orbit and beyond, particularly when the Soviet
leading to the origins of the space station partner Union had a space program characterized by secre
ship between the United States and its closest cy and by limited contact with countries other than
allies. It traces the process that led to the decision its socialist allies. In the aftermath of the initial lunar
to invite other countries to participate in the pro landing, however, the United States recognized that
ject and their reasons for accepting that invitation. other countries were seeking their own means of
Not covered in this account are the difficult nego access to space and that the Cold War competition
tiations during the 1984–1988 period that led first between the United States and the Soviet Union
to an initial set of agreements that allowed the might be replaced by an era of détente. Faced with
prospective partners to work together during the these emerging realities, during the 1969–1972
early stages of the space station program and then period, the United States consciously changed its
to the final set of agreements creating the original approach to space cooperation from one that
space station partnership. Also, the 1993 invitation stressed data exchange, working together on scien
to the Russian Federation to join the original part tific projects and providing launch services for the
ners is not discussed, nor are the subsequent nego scientific satellites of other countries, to one that
tiations to revise the 1988 agreements. involved direct foreign participation in the human
spaceflight program.
International cooperation has been a hallmark
of the U.S. civilian space program since its incep For the Soviet Union, this meant the highly sym
tion. It is fair to view that program not only as one bolic Apollo-Soyuz Test Project that led to a 1975
pressing the frontiers of science and technology “handshake in space.” For traditional U.S. allies
but also as an extremely important tool of U.S. pro around the world, this meant an invitation to coop
paganda; the cooperative aspects of the program erate with the United States in the development of
were an important part of its propaganda aspects. post-Apollo systems for human spaceflight.2 For rea
The term propaganda has a somewhat negative sons described in detail in Chapter 2, this invitation
2 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station
resulted in Canada developing an essential hard States that established the basic design of what would
ware element for the Space Shuttle—the Remote be developed and, more or less on a “take it or leave
Manipulator System—and Europe building a labo it” basis, told its potential partners what an acceptable
ratory for use in the Shuttle’s payload bay— contribution might be. As their confidence in their
Spacelab. These cooperative engagements were own capabilities increased during the 1970s, largely
very different in character from any that had taken as the result of their success in the post-Apollo
place before. They raised concerns about whether coopera-tion, this attitude was becoming unaccept
Europe and Canada had the technological capabil able to Europe and Canada. If they were to be
ities to build sophisticated, highly reliable involved with the United States in future expensive
“human-rated” hardware, or whether the United and challenging hardware development projects, it
States would have to provide them access to sensi would have to be on a more equitable basis.
tive or proprietary technology for them to be suc
cessful in their projects. A contrary concern was This then was the context in which the United
whether the U.S. invitation would stimulate its States took the initiative as the 1980s began to discuss
partners to develop indigenous technological with Europe, Canada, and Japan (which had not been
capabilities that then would be competitive with able to participate in the post-Apollo program) possi
those possessed by the United States. Clearly, this ble cooperation in the “next logical step” in the devel
was a form of cooperation qualitatively different opment of space—the creation of a human outpost in
from that involving a foreign scientist participating Earth orbit, a space station. Once again, a major
in an experiment flown aboard a U.S. spacecraft! space undertaking was being put forth as a tool of
U.S. policy—a policy that for more than two decades
During the 1970s, both the United States and its had used the space program to demonstrate what was
partners went through a sometimes difficult period of best about American society. As the following pages
learning to work together in developing new hard suggest, embodying that objective and the recogni
ware for use by humans in space. The United States tion of U.S. leadership that accompanies it in a stable,
still was by far the dominant partner in the post- harmonious space station partnership has proven no
Apollo cooperative relationship. It was the United easy task.

Origins of the U.S.

Invitation to Cooperate
Background had so changed the possibilities for international

WHILE THE HIGHLY VISIBLE personal endorsement by participation that there was no basis for Japanese
President Reagan of foreign participation in the U.S. involvement. Canada was eager to be involved.
space station program may have come as a surprise to Several years of discussions led to an agreement that
many in the United States and in potentially collabo Canada would provide the Remote Manipulator
rating countries, the notion that the United States System for the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle had turned
would welcome some form of international coopera out to be the only element of NASA’s ambitious
tion in the program certainly was not unexpected. post-Apollo plans for human spaceflight that was
During 1982 and 1983, as NASA had tried to lay the approved by the Nixon administration.6
basis within the U.S. government for approval of its
space station proposal, possible international involve Negotiations between the United States and
ment had been a subject of extensive discussion both Europe on post-Apollo cooperation proved con
within the United States and between the United tentious and left many in Europe ultimately unsat
States and its potential partners. That discussion itself isfied with the bargain struck.7 Once it had been
built on a record of cooperation that extended back established, by 1971, that the Space Shuttle was
to the early years of the U.S. civilian space program the only major NASA project for the 1970s likely
in the late 1950s.3 to receive funding, NASA and European space
leaders agreed that Europe would examine three
The 1958 Space Act had set as one of NASA’s options for involvement in the Shuttle program:
objectives “cooperation by the United States with
other nations and groups of nations.”4 NASA’s coop 1. Teaming between European and U.S. indus
erative activities were limited primarily to space sci try to develop specific parts of the Shuttle
ence programs during the 1950s and 1960s, but as a orbiter—for example, the tail and payload
post-Apollo program was being planned during the bay doors
1969–1971 period, there was a decision to broaden
the basis of cooperation to include involvement in the 2. European development of an orbital transfer
development of hardware, particularly systems relat vehicle, known as the “Tug,” to move payloads
ed to the human spaceflight program.5 from the Shuttle payload bay to other orbits
NASA asked Europe, Canada, and Japan in late 3. A Research and Applications Module, also
1969 to consider ways of participating in its pro called the “sortie can,” to provide additional
posed post-Apollo program, which at that point was pressurized and unpressurized volume within
centered on an orbiting space station and a totally the Shuttle payload bay for experimentation
reusable launch vehicle called the Space Shuttle.
Japan was just initiating its own general-purpose During the 1971–1973 period, Europe spent
space agency (although it had had an active space approximately $20 million on studies of these
science program for a decade). It took Japan some alternatives; by 1972, Tug development had
time to decide whether it wanted to respond to the emerged as the preferred European contribution.
U.S. invitation, particularly because its own space
capabilities were at such an early stage of develop As the European studies progressed, however,
ment. By the time that a response to the U.S. invita the U.S. position with respect to the level and kind
tion was agreed on within Japan, the United States of European participation it wanted crystallized.
“NASA’s View: The Next Logical Step”—In 1982, with the successful completion of the four Space Shuttle orbiter flight tests, NASA
began planning activity to define a possible space station. The station was viewed as the next logical step in space. It built on the
nation’s past experience in space and provided, for the first time, the capability for permanent use of the space environment.
(NASA photo 83-H-368).
First, the Nixon administration’s interest in cooperat non-U.S. involvement with these highly classified
ing was later interpreted by the White House as an satellites was not welcome to the national security
interest in European involvement in the use of space community.
rather than in joint engineering projects. Second,
NASA found that the European aerospace industry The U.S. government thus found itself in the posi
lagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S. tion of having to walk back from the European per
industry. Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of joint ception of the cooperative possibilities in post-Apollo
development of technology, speculating that the activities that had been encouraged by the way the
United States might stand to lose more than it would United States and Europe had proceeded to define
gain. Third, NASA also decided that it did not want to that cooperation.8 By the time the U.S. position had
depend on other countries for critical items on the been clarified in 1972, all Europe was offered, more
Space Shuttle so that the Shuttle could fly indepen or less on a “take it or leave it” basis, was the devel
dent of foreign activities. Fourth, NASA decided that, opment of the Research and Applications Module.
for safety reasons, it did not want to fly a Tug using liq (The module was renamed Spacelab in 1973.)9
uid propellants, the only type Europe was studying.
Moreover, there was real concern that Europe did not Some in Europe, particularly in France, were
have all the technology to develop a Tug. skeptical of the wisdom of close collaboration with
Furthermore, the Tug was to be used to lift national the United States on expensive projects, preferring
security satellites to higher orbits, and the notion of to concentrate on developing European capabilities
for independent action. However, other countries, led The U.S.-European agreement on the Spacelab
by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, had project became a source of tension between the
become eager to become involved in developing partners. At the time it was negotiated, NASA was
hardware qualified for human spaceflight, thereby projecting fifty or more Space Shuttle flights a year,
gaining skills in systems engineering and quality con at a cost per flight of less than $10 million; many
trol. After hard negotiations within Europe, a “package of these flights were expected to require Spacelab
deal” was agreed to in which funds were made avail use. Thus the thought was that about six sets of
able to develop a French-supported European launch Spacelab hardware would be needed. Europe
vehicle (Ariane), to participate in the U.S. post-Apollo agreed in 1973 to develop the first Spacelab at its
program through Spacelab development, and to own expense and then transfer ownership to
develop a maritime communications satellite of pri NASA; NASA agreed to purchase any additional
mary interest to the United Kingdom. As part of the Spacelabs required, with a minimum of one such
package deal, a new cooperative organization, the purchase guaranteed.
European Space Agency (ESA), was created to pool
the technical and financial resources of European By the time Spacelab was ready for use, its
countries and to manage Ariane and Spacelab devel development costs had risen to almost $1 billion,
opment and other cooperative projects.10 rather than the approximately $250 million
This designer’s conception shows some of the applications of an advanced Space Operations Center, which was studied by Boeing
Aerospace Company for NASA. This advanced version of the “spaceport” shows the Space Shuttle unloading some of the modules that
would comprise the system, including living and command control quarters; warehouses for food, water, and hydrazine; and service areas
containing batteries and other necessary supplies. Other areas of this advanced concept include hangars for spacecraft, solar panels to pro
vide power for the station, and construction equipment to handle large structures. The large structure containing several antenna reflectors
is a communications platform that is about to be assembled to an Orbital Transfer Vehicle for a flight to a higher orbit in space.

originally estimated. Projections of Space Shuttle had been most directly involved, by and large, found
usage had dramatically shrunk, and the United the experience programmatically productive and per
States decided to purchase only the one additional sonally rewarding. Also, Canada successfully com
Spacelab it was obligated to buy, at a cost of $128 pleted its contribution to the Space Shuttle and in the
million. Any chance for Europe to recoup some of process earned the confidence of NASA engineers at
its development costs through Spacelab produc the Johnson Space Center, some of whom were skep
tion thus vanished. The agreement provided for tical about the wisdom of non-U.S. involvement in
one joint U.S.-ESA Spacelab mission at no launch America’s human spaceflight efforts. Japan, forced to
cost to ESA. After that, ESA would have to pay sit on the sidelines during Shuttle development, was
launch costs for any Spacelab missions it wanted determined not to be left out of the next major coop
to undertake. By the early 1980s, the combined erative opportunity. As NASA began to explore the
costs of preparing the experiments for a Spacelab possibility of international involvement in the space
mission and paying Shuttle launch fees exceeded station, there was a basis of positive experience and
ESA’s resources, and the agency was left in a posi expectations among potential partners from which to
tion of not being able to afford the use of the sys proceed.
tem it had developed. (Germany undertook two
Spacelab missions of its own—one in October
1985 and the second in April 1993.) Laying the Foundation for International
Cooperation13
The U.S.-European interaction in the post- The proposal to make a space station the central
Apollo period has been described in some detail project in NASA’s post-Apollo program had been
because it provided much of the context for U.S.- decisively rejected by the Nixon administration
European discussions on potential space station during the 1969–1970 period. The concept that
cooperation.11 In hindsight, some top European some kind of crewed orbital facility was an essen
space officials described themselves as “stupid” in tial element of any plan for extensive space devel
accepting the U.S. terms for involvement in its opment did not die, however; during the 1970s,
post-Apollo program, attributing their weakness to NASA sponsored a number of advanced studies of
an early 1970s lack of confidence in European possible space station missions and configura-
capabilities and to a belief that only through tions.14 By early 1981, as the new administration of
cooperation with the United States could those President Ronald Reagan took office, NASA’s two
capabilities be improved.12 Thus, according to this major human spaceflight centers—the Johnson
analysis, Europe was willing to pursue cooperation Space Center in Houston, Texas, and the Marshall
on almost any terms, no matter how one-sided. By Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama—had
contrast, in the early 1980s, with the completion of each developed a preferred space station concept.
Spacelab and the successful development of the The two concepts were very different in approach.
Ariane booster, Europe approached possible space The Marshall station began with a modest, human-
station cooperation with a strong sense of its own tended platform that would gradually evolve into a
capabilities and a determination to accept only an permanently occupied facility; its primary mission
arrangement that recognized its position as a major was as a research laboratory. The Johnson concept
spacefaring actor. was a large facility primarily intended to support
space operations, such as in-orbit construction,
It is clear that Europe received substantial bene fueling of spacecraft, and the preparation for
fits from its post-Apollo cooperation with the human missions to the Moon and Mars. The two
United States. In particular, Europe gained experi centers were traditional rivals within the decentral
ence in the systems-level management of complex ized NASA organization, and each was pushing
space projects—an experience that was quickly NASA Headquarters to adopt its own approach to
applied to other European projects such as Ariane. the agency’s next major project.
The upgrading of Europe’s management, technical,
and human systems know-how obtained from the Space Shuttle development was phasing down in
Spacelab experience was an important positive 1981; the first flight of the Shuttle was scheduled for
factor as the United States assessed possible inter April. If NASA was to maintain its identity as an engi
national participation in the space station program. neering organization responsible for developing large
and complex hardware systems, particularly for
Another positive byproduct of the post-Apollo human missions, it was clear that the agency needed
cooperation between the United States and Europe to get a new post-Shuttle project approved soon.
and between the United States and Canada was a
set of personal and organizational relationships It was in this context that the Reagan adminis
biased toward continued cooperation. Those who tration choices as NASA Administrator and Deputy
Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark, space station, particularly with Europe, as a produc
respectively, appeared before a Senate confirma tive continuation of the relationship established dur
tion hearing on June 17, 1981. Beggs had served ing the 1970s.
briefly in NASA in the late 1960s and then had
become under secretary of the Department of Kenneth Pedersen, the Director of NASA’s Office of
Transportation; during the late 1970s, he had risen International Affairs, was another advocate of interna
to a senior position with General Dynamics, a tional cooperation. Unlike Freitag, Pedersen was not
major aerospace corporation. Mark had been a long-time NASA employee; he had come to the
director of NASA’s Ames Research Center in the space agency in 1979 from his position as head of
early 1970s and had served as under secretary and policy analysis and evaluation at the Nuclear
then secretary of the Air Force during the Carter Regulatory Commission. Pedersen’s position, as the
administration. Both were intimately familiar with policy-level advisor on international affairs to the
space policy and program issues. They had actual NASA Administrator and as NASA representative in
ly been selected for their NASA positions in mid- discussions of international space matters with the
March, and shortly thereafter Beggs had obtained White House and other executive branch agencies,
Mark’s agreement that “we would try to persuade gave him and his staff a different perspective than that
the new administration to adopt the construction held by people such as Freitag, who was working on
of a permanently manned orbiting space station as international programmatic and technical issues in
the next major goal in space.”15 Beggs and Mark one of the line offices of the agency. While Freitag
announced that intent to the senators at their con and his associates were enthusiastic advocates of
firmation hearing. cooperation within and outside NASA, Pedersen had
to take a more cautious approach. He was fully aware
It would take some time to develop the case for of the skepticism about the benefit-risk ratio of large-
the space station and to convince Ronald Reagan scale international technological interactions that was
to approve the project.16 Before they could con widespread among key members of both the career
centrate on station advocacy, Beggs and Mark had national security community and the new Reagan
to bring the Space Shuttle into what could be char administration.
acterized as operational status. They also had to
fend off, as best they could, 1981 attempts by the If there was skepticism and even opposition
new director of the Office of Management and within the space agency about the value of inter
Budget (OMB) to make major cuts in NASA’s exist national involvement in NASA’s major programs, it
ing budget.17 Thus, even though the two top NASA resided primarily in the field center people who
officials had publicly strongly endorsed the station had to deal with the added managerial complexity
as “the next logical step” in space, the station pro inevitably introduced by such involvement. While
gram took some time to pick up momentum, many at the Marshall Space Flight Center who had
although early planning activities began almost been involved with cooperation in the Spacelab
immediately. An initial Space Station Conference program were receptive to international involve
was scheduled for November 1981 to inform indi ment in the space station, staff at the Johnson
viduals throughout NASA and the U.S. government Space Center tended to be more dubious about the
of NASA’s thinking to date and to lay the basis for wisdom of intimate international partnerships.
the more intensive planning effort that all knew
was required. When NASA convened the initial agencywide
workshop on space station planning in November
From the start, the possibility of international 1981, international involvement was a prominent
involvement in any station program that might be pro agenda item, and the report of the workshop
posed was part of that planning. As mentioned earli noted that:
er, a bias toward international involvement in its
activities had been part of the NASA culture since the There appears to be substantial foreign interest in
organization’s inception. To those in charge of plan NASA’s future plans for its manned space
ning for the space station program, it was inconceiv activities. In some cases, this interest derives from
able that the United States would go forward with a existing contributions to NASA’s Space
major effort in space and not include some form of Transportation System [STS]. Extending this
international cooperation. Typical of those who held cooperation by participating in a NASA space
this perspective was Robert Freitag, Deputy Director station seems a logical step to some countries
of the Advanced Program Office in the Office of and space agencies.
Manned Space Flight, who had been one of the pri
mary architects of NASA-European post-Apollo coop NASA can derive significant benefits from
eration and saw international cooperation in the international participation in its programs if they
are properly structured and controlled. These For this purpose, NASA’s international affairs chief
benefits may include economic cost sharing, Kenneth Pedersen convened a meeting at the Johnson
access to unique or otherwise valuable expertise, Space Center on January 13, 1982. Pedersen called
and improvements in the linking of foreign this meeting on his own authority, although he
programs to STS utilization. informed NASA Administrator Beggs that he was
doing so. Pedersen had been one of the first senior
The subject of potential international NASA staff members to work closely with Beggs
participation in a U.S. space station program after he had been selected to head NASA. Beggs
must be approached carefully and proceed under attended the Paris Air Show in June 1981 as NASA
clear assumptions and guidelines. A fundamental Administrator-designate, and he and Pedersen met
ground rule should be that planning for a space with representatives of other countries to discuss
station will be conducted as if the entire project NASA’s future. These meetings and frequent one-
is to be developed as a wholly U.S. effort. on-one discussions made it clear to Pedersen that
Planning should proceed, however, on the basis Beggs was an internationalist in orientation and,
that it does not foreclose international based on his experience with international cooper
cooperation. Potential foreign participants should ation and co-production of the General Dynamics
be encouraged to fund and undertake parallel F-16 fighter, understood the value to the United
studies of space station requirements and States of involving allies in major U.S. programs.21
concepts which could benefit NASA in its design While there had been no formal decision by Beggs
of the space station. Procedures should be to begin the process of soliciting international par
developed to facilitate controlled exchanges of ticipation in the space station, Pedersen in early
study results. All potential partners should be 1982 felt on safe grounds in calling together repre
clearly informed that such exchanges during sentatives of potential partners from Europe,
Phase A do not represent a commitment on the Canada, and Japan for a status report on space sta
part of NASA to foreign involvement in the actual tion planning and a discussion of the approach that
development of the station.18 NASA would take to assessing potential interna
tional involvement.
These 1981 perspectives guided NASA’s approach
to possible international involvement in the station NASA’s international partners during the preced
over the subsequent several years. Indeed, those with ing two decades had been critical of the organiza
in NASA responsible for technical-level liaison with tion for deciding by itself on the objectives and
Europe for some time had been discussing with their design of projects and only then inviting foreign
European colleagues the possibility of a U.S. space involvement, on terms largely dictated by NASA.
station program and of European involvement in it.19 Pedersen’s major point at the January meeting was
The approach articulated at the November confer that there would be a shift in NASA’s approach;
ence reflected those discussions. potential partners were being invited to become
involved at a very early stage in program definition,
Another agenda item at the workshop was poten so that their inputs could help influence NASA’s
tial Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in the choices and they could understand from the start
space station. The support of the national security options for their participation. This approach, he
community had been essential to gaining White stressed, had risks as well as benefits. Pedersen told
House approval for the Space Shuttle, but a fair the foreign representatives at this and subsequent
degree of tension in the NASA-DOD relationship had meetings: “[T]his is going to be for you an exciting
risen in the decade since. However, the workshop and a frustrating process: exciting because I think
report noted that “the climate for initiating major new you will see just how a program like this gets put
NASA/DOD space endeavors is improving.” The together from the nuts and bolts stage; frustrating
report also recognized that “national security interests because you’re going to suffer the stops and starts
may have considerable impact on the feasibility or and uncertainties that all programs like this go
nature of international participation in a Space Station through in the early stages.”22 As long as this situa
program.”20 NASA hoped to find a way to reconcile tion was understood, said Pedersen, NASA was
both DOD involvement and international participa eager, under the guidelines articulated at the
tion, and thereby keep two influential November 1981 meeting, to have its foreign coun
constituencies involved as it attempted to gain politi terparts begin to study possible ways of becoming
cal support for its plans. involved as NASA’s station plans took form.23
Once a general approach to international involve Not only its potential partners, but also NASA,
ment in station planning had been developed, the were taking some risks in this new approach. Since
next step was to inform potential partners what it was. its inception, NASA had structured its international
cooperative programs under a set of guidelines that ters in defining the organization’s next major pro
provided the agency almost total control over the ject. Named to head the task force was John
character of those activities. Key to those guide Hodge, a British-born veteran of the Mercury,
lines were the notions of cooperative projects Gemini, and Apollo programs who had spent the
being undertaken only when they were clearly of previous decade working for the Department of
mutual interest, no exchange of funds or unwar Transportation. Hodge had been working with the
ranted transfer of technology, “clean” technologi informal task force members since he had returned
cal interfaces, and NASA as overall project manag to NASA; he had already indicated that he was a
er. While these guidelines were not explicitly mod strong proponent of international cooperation in
ified as station planning began in earnest, the very the station program.
fact of involving non-U.S. entities in that planning
implied that other changes in the NASA approach While the task force had the responsibility for
to international cooperation were possible. To a planning the programmatic aspects of the space
slight but perceptible degree, NASA was recogniz station, NASA’s Office of International Affairs was
ing the need to share with others control over in charge of developing the policies to guide dis
shaping potential partnerships. cussions of international participation in the pro
gram. A May 25, 1982, briefing for NASA
Headquarters officials captured the state of think
Space Station Task Force and International ing on international involvement in the space sta
Cooperation tion. Pedersen identified four “key questions to be
In February 1982, NASA Associate Deputy answered”:
Administrator Philip Culbertson created an infor
mal task force on the space station. This task force • Can such a major project as a space station
was organized around a nucleus of people from be undertaken on an international basis and
the Advanced Programs Office of the Office of still be effectively managed?
Manned Space Flight, in addition to several indi
viduals from elsewhere in NASA. Administrator • Don’t major international space projects just
Beggs on May 20, 1982, formalized the existence result in technology leakage abroad?
of the Space Station Task Force. A major purpose
for creating the task force was to make space sta • Is international involvement consistent with pos
tion planning an agencywide process operating in sible U.S. military utilization of the space station?
direct contact with NASA’s most senior manage
ment, thereby both minimizing the Marshall- • What are the quids pro quo for foreign con
Johnson rivalry that had previously pervaded the tributions to a space station?24
planning process and involving other NASA cen
This 1982 artist’s conception depicts a

mature space station configuration, which
includes two solar panels to provide
power; several modules for command,
habitation, and experimental activity; a
Shuttle-sized unpressurized rack for the
storage of payloads; advanced remote
manipulator systems for the assembly of
large structures and the servicing/storage
of satellites and instruments; and a dock-
ing/utility hub that might serve in addition
as a “safe haven” in case of emergency.
Attached to the station in this picture is a

During the early days of task force operations, Department of Defense offices informed, and
Hodge created a number of informal working had begun to brief the export control com
groups. Most addressed technical issues, but two munity on NASA’s planning. He noted that
had as their focus more programmatic concerns. “other agencies such as [the Office of
One was a “Program Planning Working Group” Science and Technology Policy], OMB,
and was chaired by Robert Freitag. The other was DOD, NSC [the National Security Council],
the “International Cooperation Working Group.” It and ACDA [the Arms Control and
also was initially chaired by Freitag, but was soon Disarmament Agency] are probably interest
taken over by Robert Lottmann, although Freitag ed in the international aspects as well as the
stayed closely involved. These working groups had programmatic ones,” and he suggested that
as members not only individuals from the task the Space Station Task Force include those
force, but also people from other offices at NASA aspects in its briefings to these organizations.
Headquarters and from various field centers.
Throughout the period covered in this study, the 2. Foreign Reaction to Military Involvement.
International Cooperation Working Group brought Pedersen noted that “this is an important
together people at the working levels of NASA to issue, since the interest and debate over the
discuss international cooperation issues. militarization of space is at an all-time high.”
He thought that it was important for NASA
Freitag and Lottmann used the working groups as “to be fairly straight forward at all times on
tools for articulating the benefits of cooperation to the probability and level of DOD involve
working-level skeptics throughout the agency. They ment expected. . . . We should be working
stressed that the additional financial contribution to accommodate both civil and military uses
from potential partners would enhance the scope of within the basic design of the space station,
the station and that the possibility of international so that one does not make the other impos
cooperation would increase support for the program sible.”
overall in the administration and Congress. They also
argued that learning to work together on long-term 3. Technology Transfer. Pedersen noted that
complex projects could form the basis for coopera historically NASA’s cooperative programs
tion on even more ambitious programs in the future. had been structured carefully to avoid
unwarranted technology transfer, particular
A series of interactions with potential partners ly by avoiding relationships between U.S.
during May and June 1982 had emphasized to and foreign industry that could lead to such
John Hodge the high international interest in sta transfers. He thought that “if we carefully
tion involvement. In a July 30 memorandum to choose the cooperative arrangements—for
Kenneth Pedersen, Hodge noted that “internation example, we might make sure that they are
al interest in our space station planning activity is discrete hardware pieces with minimal inter-
now relatively high. Recent actions by ESA, faces—we can minimize the potential for
Canada, and Japan suggest that this interest will be technology transfer.”26 But Pedersen also
pursued. . . .” Hodge laid out a series of questions noted “growing interest” in the Reagan
that had to be addressed to develop a task force administration in the topic of technology
approach to international cooperation, and he transfer.27 He saw “evidence of closer appli
asked Pedersen for his ideas on them.25 cation of existing export guidelines and
review of appropriate future steps in stanch
Pedersen’s response was a fourteen-page, single- ing the flow of advanced technology,” and
spaced strategy memorandum. In it, he highlighted he recognized the need for NASA to “main
many of the issues that NASA would have to tain close and continuing contacts with the
address in crafting its approach to space station export control community.”28
cooperation. Among them were:
Pedersen also noted in his memorandum that
1. When to Involve Other U.S. Government foreign involvement in the station program would
Agencies Interested in International Affairs. be certain to broaden the project’s base of support
Pedersen noted that “NASA is responsible within both the administration and Congress.
for making sure that all U.S. Government
agencies or portion thereof that have foreign
policy responsibilities are kept informed of The Allies Are Interested
activities.” In carrying out this responsibility, Even before the formal kickoff of the Space
reported Pedersen, NASA was already keep Station Task Force’s international activities at a
ing relevant State Department and September 13, 1982, “International Orientation
These briefing slides show the space station program elements and the complex as envisioned for 1990. (NASA photo).
Briefing,” a substantial amount of non-U.S. plan understanding noted that “ESA will fund, manage,
ning related to the space station had begun. NASA and conduct a second study with parallel
had adopted a strategy for its own planning efforts European contracts, to investigate the European
of not preparing any particular station design until architectural and implementation implications of
both the missions such a station would carry out those requirements identified in the first study,”33
and the capabilities needed to implement those and Japan and Canada began to study potential
missions were identified.29 In January, Pedersen, in hardware contributions as well as mission require
response to foreign inquiries about how best to ments. In addition, both France and a German-
proceed, had suggested to potential station part Italian team were studying, independent of ESA,
ners that they adopt a similar approach. future hardware concepts for a European manned
program that could also form the basis for U.S.-
The response was not long in coming. On May 1, European cooperation. This was understandable,
1982, Japan announced its intent to establish a noted Pedersen in his August strategy memoran
Space Station Task Force reporting to the top-level dum to John Hodge, because of “‘political reali
Space Activities Commission as its link to the NASA ties’; they have to justify spending their resources
station planning effort; that task force would involve on a space station not only on potential space sta
other Japanese organizations as well as the Japanese tion utilization but on potential industrial return as
National Space Development Agency (NASDA) in well.” Nevertheless, urged Pedersen, “we must not
putting together a plan for Japanese involvement in let the emphasis on requirements get lost.”34
the station.30 A mission requirement study was its ini
tial activity.31 Top-level endorsement of the Japanese
effort was provided during a June 1982 meeting in Mission Requirements Studies
Washington between NASA Administrator Beggs In August 1982, NASA awarded eight contracts
and Minister Nakagawa of Japan’s Science and to U.S. aerospace firms to conduct independent but
Technology Agency. parallel requirements analysis studies. NASA’s plan
was to combine the results of these eight studies
On June 17, NASA Administrator Beggs met in and those being carried out by potential partners to
Paris with ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard. help make the case that a station was justified.
Among the products of the meeting was an under
standing that “ESA will fund, manage, and conduct Pedersen addressed the September 13
a first study entitled ‘European Utilization Aspects “International Orientation Briefing” at NASA
of a U.S. Manned Space Station.’ This study will be Headquarters both on NASA’s general approach to
requirements-oriented.”32 Canada’s National space station cooperation and its plans for interac
Research Council also initiated a government- tions during mission requirements studies. With
industry study of possible Canadian missions that respect to the former, he noted that the general
could be carried out aboard a station, but it did not principles that had guided NASA’s international
get under way until several months later. activities in the past, appropriately modified,
would apply to the station situation. With respect
NASA was not totally successful in keeping for to the schedule for the mission analysis studies,
eign attention focused on station missions rather Pedersen noted that “the mid-term contractors’
than on station hardware. The June NASA-ESA summaries would be closed reviews. They will be
conducted individually with each contractor maintain Headquarters control over the international
because NASA does not want the studies to conta dimensions of the program.
minate one another.” For this reason, he said, “the
reviews will be restricted to NASA personnel.” Several aspects of NASA’s posture at this time
However, immediately following these reviews, were troubling to potential partners, particularly in
NASA would invite “foreign space agency repre Europe. The principles for cooperation spelled out
sentatives” to hear a NASA summary of the U.S. by Pedersen seemed to reflect the same “NASA as
mid-term results and to present a mid-term status managing partner” approach that had been tradi
report on their own studies. The final review of the tional. Europe believed that its accomplishments
U.S. studies in February and March 1983 would be during the 1970s had earned it a larger voice in
open, said Pedersen, and he invited the foreign future cooperative undertakings. The exclusion of
study teams to attend and to present their final representatives of foreign industry from direct deal
results at the same time. Final written reports ings with NASA and the prohibition against visits
would be exchanged among all study contractors, to field centers to discuss station planning were
U.S. and foreign, in April. In adopting this annoying. NASA’s European representative,
approach, NASA was hoping to keep not only U.S. Richard Barnes, who was sensitive to foreign per
but also foreign study teams isolated from each ceptions, cabled a cautionary message to Pedersen
other in the early stages of their efforts. In that way, in early September 1982:
the thinking went, NASA and the sponsoring non-
U.S. space agencies would get the benefit of the The history of the post-Apollo U.S./European
independent ideas of all contractors, rather than dialogue, as well as more recent experience,
have the various U.S. and non-U.S. study teams suggests that there will be many occasions when
unduly influence one another.35 a NASA action, taken for legitimate internal
programmatic reasons, will be perceived by some
Pedersen also announced that NASA would wel Europeans as “evidence” of NASA lack of interest
come at any time visits of foreign space agency in European involvement. And of course those
representatives to NASA Headquarters (but not to who want to see European space programs
NASA field centers) to discuss space station plan proceed in a direction independent of the U.S.
ning. He characterized as “premature” any discus are already looking for such evidence. Let’s give
sion on potential foreign hardware contributions them as little opportunity as possible.38
and modes of cooperation beyond the Phase A
planning period.36 However, the undertone of skepticism in Europe
regarding NASA’s seriousness about desiring signif
There were several reasons for NASA deciding to icant space station cooperation was not pervasive,
deal only with representatives of foreign govern nor did it extend to other potential U.S. partners.
ments, and not individuals from non-U.S. industry.37 During the rest of 1982 and early 1983, parallel
For one thing, it was industrial contacts that were mission requirements studies went on in the
perceived as the most likely source of technology United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. In addi
transfer. Also, from the start of station planning, tion, the general concept for the space station—
NASA wanted to discourage the notion of interna known as “distributed architecture”—emerging
tional teaming during the design and development from studies by NASA and its contractors was par
phases of the program. In the post-Apollo period, ticularly congenial to international cooperation. In
U.S. and European industries had teamed to study this concept, the space station would not be a sin
cooperative possibilities. While such transnational gle, large facility, but rather a complex of modules,
industrial teams, with each firm funded by its own trusses, and platforms to carry out various space
government, ultimately did not emerge in the post- station missions. This made it easier for a foreign
Apollo period, NASA believed that this could have partner to contribute a separate space station ele
limited its flexibility in structuring the post-Apollo ment that met the criterion of a “clean interface”
cooperation. While European contractors were with other aspects of the station.
selected by ESA in large part to fulfill the requirement
that national contributions to ESA be returned to that A major public symposium was held in mid
nation in approximately the same proportion, NASA 1983 to review the status of space station plan
may not have wanted to select the U.S. partner of a ning. This symposium, organized by the American
particular European firm as its contractor. The prohi Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics for the
bition against foreign visits to NASA centers, even by Space Station Task Force, brought together mem
government representatives, was intended to keep bers of the NASA planning groups, DOD, interest
NASA’s possible partners from getting involved in ed U.S. and foreign industrialists, the press, and
intercenter conflicts over station concepts and to representatives from Congress and foreign space
agencies. The main purpose of the symposium was While his assessment of the status of interna
to get everyone interested in the station program tional involvement was positive, Pedersen also
exposed to the most up-to-date information. In his added a caution. He noted that “NASA has been
keynote address, Administrator Beggs noted that the aware throughout this space station study that we
purpose of developing a space station “is, of course, do not have an approved program. . . . Thus we
to maintain our leadership.” But such leadership have not wanted to create unnecessary and unwar
would be through cooperation, he suggested, saying ranted expectations that would come back to
that “the space station lends itself uniquely to haunt us. . . . We at NASA and the countries that
international cooperation. If we can attract that have been working with us have tried to be as open
international cooperation, then other nations will be and candid with one another as we could in terms
cooperating with us in the resources that they of the state of play, the current situation with
spend, rather than competing with us.”39 respect to the decision-making process, and what
we believed a realistic schedule would be.”41
Summarizing NASA’s view of the international
dimensions of space station planning to date, In mid-1983, this caveat was quite in order.
Kenneth Pedersen noted that: President Reagan in April had directed his top pol-
icy-making body for space, the Senior Interagency
[W]e all recognize that the very scope and Group (Space), to prepare over the summer a rec
complexity of the space station process tends to ommendation on whether he should approve the
suggest that foreign participation, if it takes place, space station program and include funding for it in
is going to entail fairly sizeable financial and the fiscal year 1985 budget.42 NASA had found few
political commitments on their part. . . . I believe allies within the U.S. government in support of the
that when and if the time comes that we have the station; the interagency process was not producing
opportunity to proceed “full steam ahead” with the hoped-for endorsement of the station. The issue
the space station, they and their countries are of potential international cooperation in a space
going to be in a better position as a result of this station was not being addressed at the top levels of
[early involvement in NASA’s planning] activity the U.S. government; the focus was on the more
to know what their interests are, to know what fundamental policy issue of whether there would
their level of participation might be, and in what be a space station program at all.
areas that participation might be most mutually
beneficial.40

Making the
Space Station International
Resistance to International Involvement late 1982 by appealing to higher level officials in the
Surfaces State Department and DOD. Talking points prepared
By mid-1983, it had become clear to those leading for a meeting with DOD noted:
NASA’s effort to gain support for the space station
among other government agencies that the potential • There is no need to transfer any sensitive
for international involvement was not a strong selling technology at this point. . . . We are not
point. From the start, Pedersen and others had recog funding sensitive technology such as design
nized that the possibility of technology transfer associ details, fabrication or procurement
ated with such involvement would be of concern to information.
the national security community and to administration
appointees at DOD. However, they were surprised to • In the RFP [Request for Proposals for the
discover that the individuals within the Department of mission requirements studies], even though
State overseeing the foreign policy aspects of science we did not envision sensitive technology
and technology were not enthusiastic about the poten transfer, we wanted to make it clear that the
tial of international cooperation in the space station NASA contract award did not constitute
program to serve broader, foreign policy objectives. approval for any technology transfer. We
stated in the RFP that U.S. companies must
The technology transfer issue first surfaced in terms follow normal export control procedures.
of 1982 requests by U.S. firms carrying out the space
station mission requirements studies to exchange • . . . We understand that several U.S. proposals to
information with their European counterparts. exchange basic mission needs and general
Approval of these requests required the issuance of a systems information have not yet been approved
Technical Data Exchange Agreement under the provi despite more than four months of review.
sions of the Munitions Control Act, which was admin
istered by the Department of State. DOD was also • Some concerns have been expressed within
closely involved in the approval process. DOD that consideration of these concerns
now is “premature”:
To lay the basis for the anticipated approval of – The U.S. has no commitment to a space
these requests and to make sure that concerned station program;
offices within DOD and the State Department were – The U.S. has no policy regarding
aware of the overall context of planning for interna international involvement in a space
tional involvement in the space station program, station program;
Robert Freitag briefed officials from DOD’s Office of – Approval would be a “blank check” for
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and technology transfer.44
Engineering and the State Department’s Office of
Oceans, Environment, and International Science and NASA believed that the reason for DOD concern
Technology in mid-1982. The reception to the brief was that there had been a change in the individuals
ings was reported to be “very good,” at least in terms controlling the approval process. Apparently, the
of a willingness to listen to what NASA had to say.43 export licenses had been recommended for
approval by the Under Secretary of Defense for
However, approval for the data exchanges was not Research and Technology, Richard DeLauer, but that
forthcoming. NASA tried to push the process along in recommendation had been rescinded as new
At this meeting of the White House Cabinet Council of Commerce and Trade on December 1, 1983, approval of space station
development was the major agenda item. Key personnel in attendance are: Budget Director David Stockman (second from left),
Vice President George Bush (fourth from left), Science Advisor George Keyworth (center), President Ronald Reagan (second from
right), Secretary of Commerce Malcom Baldridge (third from right), Presidential Advisor Ed Meese (fourth from right), and Gil Rye of
the National Security Council (near door). (White House photo C18695-11).
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard issuance of export licenses. NASA wrote to the
Perle and his deputy, Stephen Bryen, had been suc eight mission requirements contractors on
cessful in wresting export control responsibility December 14, noting that “consideration of these
away from DeLauer.45 Both Perle and Bryen were cases within the export control community has
known as “hard-liners” on technology transfer; become an extended process—the principal con
having them involved in approving international cern being that since a space station program has
involvement in the space station did not bode well. not yet been given a new start, it would be prema
ture to have any formal arrangements with foreign
On November 3, 1982, NASA appealed for help industry.” Given this situation, NASA suggested
to the Under Secretary of State for Security that “in the short time remaining until the final
Assistance and Science and Technology, William report is due in February 1983, we suggest that you
Schneider, making essentially the same points as restrict your contacts with foreign sources to infor
had been made to DOD.46 What the space agency mation which does not require a license.”48
discovered in these and other interactions with the
State Department was that neither Schneider nor The recognition that plans for international
the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, cooperation could be torpedoed by the opposition
and International Science and Technology, James of people such as Bryen, Schneider, and Malone
Malone, were supporters of the space station pro was sobering to the advocates of such cooperation,
gram or of international cooperation in it, and they and particularly to Kenneth Pedersen and his top
shared Perle’s and Bryen’s concerns regarding tech staff person on the space station, Margaret (Peggy)
nology transfer.47 Finarelli. Finarelli had joined NASA in 1981 after
Ultimately, DOD’s reservations blocked the tours of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the of the station at this early point were not success
Carter administration’s White House Office of ful; his advisors thought such a decision was pre
Science and Technology Policy. She was thus very mature. Thus, Reagan’s July 4 speech at the Shuttle
sensitive to the concerns of the national security com landing said only that “we must look aggressively
munity and their potential for posing an insuperable to the future by . . . establishing a more permanent
barrier to NASA’s plans. Her sensitivities were viewed presence in space.”52 The station per se was not
as excessive by long-time advocates of cooperation mentioned.
within NASA, and this became a source of some ten
sion between the Space Station Task Force and the Perhaps the most important feature of the new
Office of International Affairs as the station decision National Space Policy announced on July 4 was
process unfolded in 1983.49 the transfer of leadership responsibility for devel
oping space policy within the Reagan administra
The April–December 1983 period was recog tion from the Office of Science and Technology
nized as critical by both advocates of the space sta Policy to the National Security Council. The policy
tion overall and those who wanted the station to be directive established a Senior Interagency Group
international. Recognizing that strong advocacy of (SIG) on Space, chaired by the Assistant to the
the latter could jeopardize getting approval to go President for National Security Affairs, “to provide
ahead with the station at all, during this period, a forum to all Federal agencies for their policy
those heading NASA’s interactions with the White views, to review and advise on proposed changes
House and other agencies chose not to emphasize to national space policy, and to provide for order
the international potentials of the program. This ly and rapid referral of space policy issues to the
approach troubled some of the members of the President for decisions as necessary.”53 The space
Space Station Task Force, but it was seen as a tac station became one of the early items on the SIG
tical necessity by Beggs, Pedersen, and Finarelli.50 (Space) agenda.
Responsible for space policy matters within the

The Space Station Decision Process and National Security Council staff at this time was Gil
International Cooperation Rye, an Air Force colonel who had worked on
NASA’s first attempt to gain President Reagan’s space issues within the Pentagon before being
approval for the space station had come in mid detailed to the White House. While still at the
1982. An interagency study of space policy, which Pentagon, Rye had been the Air Force representa
began in late 1981 under the leadership of the tive at the NASA space station planning workshop
White House Office of Science and Technology in November 1981, and by 1982, he had become
Policy, was nearing completion, and Ronald personally convinced that it was in the U.S. nation
Reagan was being asked to approve a new state al interest to develop a space station. This view was
ment of national space policy. In addition, Reagan at variance with the Air Force position, which was
had agreed to attend the landing of the fourth very skeptical of the value of humans in space and
Space Shuttle mission in California on July 4; this which was centered on making the NASA Shuttle
would provide an occasion for a presidential state responsive to DOD requirements before any major
ment on space policy. In attempting to convince new NASA initiatives were begun. Having Rye as
the White House to announce station approval as an ally in the White House proved invaluable to
part of its new space policy on the occasion of the NASA during the 1982–1984 period, both in get
Shuttle landing, NASA Administrator Beggs wrote ting Reagan’s approval for the space station and in
Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese in late May. His making international participation a major feature
case for the station stressed its use as both a labo- of the station initiative.
rato-ry and an operations base. He noted the chal
lenge to U.S. space leadership from Soviet, Following its inability to gain an early space
European, and Japanese accomplishments. He station endorsement by the White House, NASA
argued that a major new project was needed to decided to wait until 1983 for its next attempt at
maintain the human spaceflight development skills program approval. A dual strategy was devised.
of NASA and its industrial partners. As a final argu NASA would work through the prescribed SIG
ment, Beggs noted that “the space station could (Space) process to attempt to gain the support of
also have major foreign policy advantages for the other government agencies for the station project,
U.S. Both the European Space Agency and the while at the same time NASA’s leadership would
Japanese are interested in participating in its devel try to reach the President Reagan and his top
opment and would contribute substantial funding advisors directly to convince them of the merits of
if they are given a significant role.”51 the undertaking.54 Meanwhile, the Space Station
NASA’s attempts to gain Reagan’s endorsement Task Force would continue its programmatic liai-
son activities with potential partners, so that there chair of SIG (Space), sign the terms of reference.
was a basis for collaborative action should a sta
tion program with international involvement be The directive by Reagan that set the guidelines for
approved. the formal SIG (Space) study of the space station,
signed on April 11, 1983, called out “the foreign
In support of this strategy, the task force formed policy implications, including arms control implica
a unit called the Concept Development Group. Its tions, of a manned Space Station” as one of five pol
task was to integrate the results of field center stud icy issues for examination; international cooperation
ies, the eight industry studies of space station was not explicitly mentioned.57 A few days earlier,
requirements, and any input from potential inter James Beggs had met with Reagan in a session
national partners. The chair of the group was arranged by Rye. The purpose to alert President
Luther Powell of the Marshall Space Flight Center, Reagan of issues involved in the decision on whether
who had had extensive experience in cooperation to develop a station. The briefing prepared for
with Europe during the Spacelab program. Reagan noted that the space station “provides broad
International representatives participated in the opportunity for international cooperation,” but this
activities of the Concept Development Group and was only one of seven benefits identified as flowing
were involved in many of the studies of require from the station program.58
ments and of systems and subsystems carried out
during 1982 and 1983. As the study process proceeded in the late
spring, it became clear that the Hodge interagency
In the fall of 1982, SIG (Space) formed a working group had become bogged down in technical
group on the space station. This group was chaired by details and multiple options and was unlikely to
NASA’s John Hodge, and it consisted of representa produce a policy paper suitable for SIG (Space)
tives from the State Department, DOD, the consideration. Recognizing this, Gil Rye created a
Department of Commerce, the CIA, and the Arms smaller group to develop such a paper.59 The NASA
Control and Disarmament Agency. Individuals from member of the group was Peggy Finarelli. She con
the Office of Management and Budget and the Office tinued the approach of downplaying the interna
of Science and Technology Policy participated as tional aspects of the program; her approach was
observers. That group first met in October 1982, and not totally appreciated by Hodge and others in the
it laid out a schedule that called for a report to SIG Space Station Task Force, who also may have resent
(Space) on policy options for the space station no later ed her taking over the NASA lead in White House
than November 1983.55 deliberations on the station. While Robert Freitag
may have been the most influential of the veteran
It did not take long to discover that there was NASA staffers in pushing for making the space sta
substantial skepticism among some members of tion international and Kenneth Pedersen was the
the working group regarding the wisdom of inter conceptualizer of NASA’s approach to station coop
national participation in the station; this skepticism eration, Finarelli’s tactical efforts over the May
reflected the general attitudes of those at the poli 1983–January 1984 period were crucial to creating
cy level in DOD and the State Department. The the domestic basis for the station partnership.60
discussion at the group’s second meeting on
November 22 turned to the issue of State In August, the SIG (Space) process resulted in an
Department approval of exchanges of require options paper for President Reagan on the station
ments data between U.S. and European firms car program; however, the opponents of the program
rying out mission analysis studies (as discussed would not agree to sending the paper forward for
earlier). The State Department representative noted presidential decision. Given Reagan’s aversion to
that approval was being delayed even though addressing nonconsensus recommendations, this
“there do not appear to be any objections to the effectively blocked a presidential decision. In par
merits of the cases,” but because “DOD has a con ticular, vigorous opposition by Secretary of
cern which it has not yet resolved regarding the Defense Caspar Weinberger made it clear that
broad policy issue of whether there should be DOD not only would not participate in the station,
international participation in a Space Station.”56 but also would actively oppose allocating substan
tial budget resources to a NASA station aimed at
Most of the SIG (Space) working group’s time civilian uses. The schedule for SIG deliberations
between October 1982 and April 1983 was spent in had been accelerated to reach a recommendation
developing the specific terms of reference for its in time for fiscal year 1985 budget submissions in
study. Once that agreement was reached, Rye decid September, but after a meeting of SIG on August
ed to elevate the political pressure behind the study 12, it became evident that a positive recommenda
request by having President Reagan, rather than the tion to Reagan to proceed with the station was not
likely to emerge from the group. national participation with the announcement of sta
tion approval.
Given this situation, Rye decided to seek other
means of gaining presidential approval. During the NASA was ready to seize that opportunity.
September–November 1983 period, NASA’s assess Pedersen and Hodge had met as long ago as July
ment of the prospects for gaining White House per 1983 to identify the policy issues that had to be
mission to move ahead with its highest priority addressed for NASA to proceed with international
project were very pessimistic, even through the participation, once presidential approval for the sta
agency had included start-up funds for the project in tion program was obtained. In a follow-up memo
its fiscal year 1985 budget submission.61 randum, Pedersen had noted the major issues:
Ultimately, NASA’s second approach to gaining 1. What space station “components” are not
space station approval—convincing Reagan and his eligible for cooperation?
advisors of the merits of the program—bore fruit. Still,

international considerations did not play a visible Discussion . . . NASA still needs to decide
role. President Reagan, through an October 4 whether certain elements, while requiring a clean
National Security Council memorandum, requested interface, may still be elements which the U.S.
NASA to identify its priorities in meeting the goal of should build.
space leadership that had been set in the 1982
National Space Policy statement. In his reply, James 2. Foreign Involvement in Phase B
Beggs said that he was “absolutely convinced that a
space station is the next bold step in space. . . . It is Discussion . . . Should NASA undertake Phase
an essential piece of our long range plan to reap the B’s on all space station elements, while foreign
full commercial and scientific benefits of space.” space agencies fund independent parallel Phase
Nowhere in the response were the benefits of inter B studies on space station elements in which
national cooperation mentioned.62 they have a particular interest? Should NASA
entertain Joint Phase B studies?. . . At what point
Reagan’s decision to approve the space station was does NASA begin to drive individual countries to
finally made in early December. Wanting to involve a particular ele-ments, or should we encourage
broader range of agencies in the discussions than just multiple approaches by all so that natural “fits”
the members of SIG (Space), thereby outflanking sta fall out?
tion opponents in that body, Rye and another station
supporter on the White House staff, Cabinet Secretary 3. Guidelines for international participation
Craig Fuller, scheduled a December 1 meeting of the
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade to discuss Discussion . . . To what extent do we want to
the station in Reagan’s presence. The model of the establish de facto minimum contributions (either
space station that NASA prepared for the meeting did in terms of funding or in elements)?
not show any foreign contributions to the project.
4. Study Agreements, MOUs, and Quids Pro Quo
The meeting went well, and a few days later, NASA
learned that President Reagan had given his blessing Discussion . . . Phase B study agreements would
to the station. However, the issue of whether the be desirable from the viewpoint of our partners
space station should be an international effort was not and NASA for several reasons: a) they would
addressed. provide the framework for information exchange
and industry-to-industry relationships; and b)
they could strengthen foreign space agencies’
Adding the International Element position . . . for funding and support.
Although Reagan approved the space station in
early December, the question of how that approval . . . One major element that must be reviewed
would be announced was not decided at that time. now are potential quids pro quo that NASA will
Within a few weeks, however, White House political want to offer in exchange for hardware
advisors concluded that the station was the kind of contributions. NASA’s experience with the [Space
long-range initiative that fit into the Reagan’s plans for Transportation System] program suggests some
his State of the Union address scheduled for late very good examples that would be appropriate to
January. Suggestions on what he should say about the a space station: NASA commitment to buy
station were solicited by the White House speech additional hardware, preferred access to the
writing office, and Rye, Finarelli, and others saw an space station on a variety of uses, reduced (or
opportunity to link a presidential invitation for inter no) costs for utilization, and opportunities for
flight of foreign personnel. Of course, formulas itals to extend the presidential invitation in person.
for these would have to be worked out so that The text of the invitation as it was to appear in the
the benefits match the size of the contributions. State of the Union address was hurriedly drafted on
. . . In addition, I think NASA should consider the evening of January 18 and approved by the
international cooperation on the operation of the meeting participants the next day. There were no
space station, as NASA and ESA have agreed to interagency meetings or policy papers devoted to
do on the Space Telescope, and consider how the cooperative proposal, nor any formal assess
that should be factored into the equation. ment of the risks associated with international
cooperation. This was a decision made by top pol
5. Technology Transfer and DOD Concerns icy officials, not a ratification of staff proposals. The
issue of international participation was not sepa
Discussion . . . Prior to Phase B, NASA needs to rately raised with President Reagan; his approval
develop a set of ground rules for both came in the form of overall approval of the speech
Headquarters and the Centers on information text.64
exchange with our foreign partners. These will
not only be useful for reference for NASA Before he made the State of the Union speech,
employees, but will also demonstrate to the Reagan sent a personal message to Chancellor
export control community that NASA is aware of Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany,
the current technology transfer concerns, and President Francois Mitterrand of France, Prime
doing something about them.63 Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom,
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi of Italy, Prime
At some point in the fall of 1983, the foreign Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, and Prime
policy potential of the space station had come to Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada:
the attention of individuals in the Office of the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Bureau During my State of the Union address this
of European and Canadian Affairs of the State Wednesday, January 25, I will be announcing the
Department. There was more receptivity to that United States’ intention to proceed with
potential among these individuals than there had development of a manned Space Station
been from the science and technology elements of program. It is my hope that we can work together
the State Department. As plans for announcing the on this project. To develop this cooperative effort
space station in the 1984 State of the Union I have asked James M. Beggs, the Administrator
address moved forward, Finarelli at NASA and of the National Aeronautics and Space
State Department officials Thomas Niles and Administration (NASA), to act as my personal
Arnold Kanter were actively discussing the benefits emissary and meet with senior officials of your
of station cooperation in the context of broader for government in the near future.65
eign policy concerns.
Thus when Ronald Reagan went before Congress on
These discussions, and the recognition that the January 25, 1984, and invited other countries to par
issue of international cooperation had to be ticipate in the space station project he had just
addressed in some way before approval of the announced, that presidential invitation came as no sur
space station program was announced by prise to the leaders of those countries that the United
President Reagan, led to a January 18 meeting con States hoped to engage in the station partnership.
vened by the chair of SIG (Space), Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs Robert
McFarlane, and his deputy, Admiral John Extending the Invitation
Poindexter. Attending the meeting were NASA The first step in arranging the trip of Administrator
Administrator James Beggs, Under Secretary of Beggs was to develop “terms of reference” to guide
State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleberger, him in his meetings. These guidelines were drafted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle, NASA and circulated for comment by the National
and CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates. This high- Security Council to other agencies that were mem
level group not only decided to solicit internation bers of SIG (Space). The staffs of those agencies,
al participation in the space station; they also which had been bypassed in the rapid process of
chose to have the invitation to participate come approving President Reagan’s invitation, used this
from President Reagan as he announced his opportunity to make sure that they would be
approval of the station program in the State of the involved in preparing a “report on approaches to
Union address seven days later. The top-level international cooperation” for Reagan’s approval
group decided that Beggs, acting as the Reagan’s after the Beggs trip was completed.66
personal emissary, would travel to key foreign cap The approved terms of reference for the Beggs trip
were issued by the President’s Special Assistant for of a permanently manned space station, with
National Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane, who was emphasis on expected capabilities, modular
also chairman of SIG (Space). McFarlane wrote Beggs design, anticipated availability, and relationship
on February 25, saying that “the President would like with the President’s overall civil and
for you to travel as soon as possible to appropriate for- commercial space program.
eign capitals as his personal emissary and meet with
senior officials to discuss potential international • Assess the extent of foreign interest in program
cooperation” in the space station, with the objective participation. The assessment should include the
being “to agree upon a framework for collaboration level of overall interest, the expected benefits to
on this program which could be announced at the be achieved, and the foreign resource
London Summit in June 1984.”67 The idea of includ contributions that might be forthcoming.
ing station cooperation as an agenda item on the
annual seven-nation economic summit had come • During the discussions with foreign officials,
from Peggy Finarelli and Thomas Niles and had been the Administrator should avoid making specific
embraced by those within the State Department commitments regarding international
responsible for summit planning.68 cooperation until other U.S. government
agencies have had the opportunity to review
The terms of reference for the trip specified that in the implications.69
his discussions with foreign officials, Beggs should:
• Explain NASA’s current plans for development
President Ronald Reagan announcing the decision to build a space station during the January 25, 1984, “State of the Union
Address,” while Vice President George Bush and House Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill look on. (NASA photo).

The original plans for the Beggs trip called for the Keidanren, the influential federation of
use of commercial airlines. Vice President George Japanese industries.)
Bush, who had offered quiet support for the interna
tional initiative all along, suggested to the NASA • Ottawa—with the minister of state for science
Administrator that he request the use of one of the Air and technology, the science advisor, and the
Force planes available to the White House; Bush indi president of the National Research Council
cated that he would support such a request.70
Accordingly, on February 19, Beggs wrote White One issue in every discussion was the size and cost
House Chief of Staff James Baker requesting the use of of the contribution for which NASA was hoping.
a government airplane, arguing that it was “justified Beggs had asked Ken Pedersen in January for an esti
and appropriate” because of “the President’s direct mate of what a reasonable expectation might be.
instruction, the extremely tight timetable, and the Pedersen’s response noted that Europe had con
importance which space station has assumed here tributed approximately 12 percent of the costs of
and abroad as a central feature of this developing the Space Transportation System and that
Administration’s leadership program.”71 it was “reasonable to expect similar percentage con
tributions from these countries to Space Station.” He
The plane was provided by the White House, and noted that the German estimate for a potential space
Beggs and an entourage that included Gil Rye from station contribution was $1.5 billion and that Canada
the National Security Council staff, Phil Culbertson, was considering a station contribution that “would
John Hodge, Ken Pedersen, Peggy Finarelli, and Lyn cost roughly the same” as the $100 million Canada
Wigbels from NASA, and Mark Platt and Michael had spent on the Space Shuttle remote manipulator
Michalik from the State Department left Washington system. Pedersen thought that “it is probably not real
on March 3. They traveled to London, Bonn, Rome, istic” to expect Japan’s contribution to be half that of
and Paris and flew directly from Paris to Tokyo, return Europe, but he noted that the pressurized module that
ing to Washington on March 13. After a few days Japan was considering “would cost Japan at least
home, the group visited Ottawa. At each stop, Beggs $500 million to develop given their current lack of
formally reiterated Reagan’s invitation to consider related [research and development] experience.”72
participation in the U.S. space station program, and
he tried to respond to questions and concerns. Upon his return from Europe and Japan, Beggs
wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz on March
At every stop, Beggs and his group met with space 16, which summarized his assessment of the trip to
officials and with the highest ranking nonspace offi date. He told the Shultz that:
cials available, as follows:
The reaction so far to the President’s call for
• London—with the minister of state for industry international cooperation has been both strongly
and information technology and the science positive and openly appreciative. It has been
advisor (Prime Minister Thatcher and the for positive in the sense that our principal Allies are
eign secretary were meeting outside of London moving quickly, or have already moved, to take
with French President Mitterrand) political decisions to participate. And their
reactions clearly show appreciation for the major
• Bonn—with the minister for research and tech foreign policy benefits that will flow from open
nology and the under secretary of the foreign and collaborative cooperation on such a bold,
ministry (Prime Minister Kohl and the foreign visible and imaginative project.73
minister were in Washington)
On the basis of the March trips, NASA judged
• Rome—with Prime Minister Craxi, the sci that Italy, Germany, and Japan had in essence
ence minister, and the head of the National already made the political decision, at least in
Research Council. principle, to participate and that France was also
likely, after tough bargaining, to be involved. The
• Paris—with President Mitterrand, the foreign reception in Great Britain had been the coolest on
minister, and the minister of industry and the trip, and the uncertainty of an upcoming
research (Beggs also met with ESA executives national election made it impossible for Canada to
and addressed a meeting of that agency’s indicate its commitment to cooperation. It seemed
political governing board, the ESA Council.) as if European cooperation would be organized
through ESA, rather than on the basis of bilateral
• Tokyo—with Prime Minister Nakasone, the relationships between the United States and spe
foreign minister, and the minister for science cific European countries.74
and technology (Beggs also spoke to the
After his round of visits to foreign capitals was In person and in writing, the United States had
over, James Beggs wrote a letter to each country he now extended an invitation for international partici
had visited to summarize his understandings, clar pation in the space station. Such cooperation had
ify issues that had been raised, and lay out the next been escalated from a possibility discussed among
steps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position that: space agencies to a highly visible initiative of the
U.S. president. In the months ahead, the United
President Reagan has committed the U.S. to States would discover whether a framework for
building an $8B fully functional space station to accepting that invitation could be developed.
be operational by the early 1990s, but has also set
the stage for working together to develop a more
expansive international space station with even
greater benefits and capabilities for all to use.
Thus, we are inviting your Government to take a
close look at our plans and concepts and then,
based on your long-term interests and goals, share
with us your ideas for cooperation that will
expand the capabilities of the space station.75

The Partners
Accept the Invitation
Introduction kicking a proposal of the magnitude of the space

In the first months of 1984, the hope of the station up to the Head of State/Government level,
United States was that its invitation to participate through the Summit process, is often the best
in the space station program would be quickly way to get a decision.77
accepted, at least in principle, by political leaders
in Europe, Japan, and Canada. It was also hoped At a January 30 planning meeting for the
that detailed negotiations on the terms and condi London Economic Summit, President Reagan
tions of that participation could then commence, approved the notion of asking other summit partic
leading to the signing of initial cooperative agree ipants to issue a statement indicating their intent to
ments by the end of 1984. The terms of reference participate in the space station program. The head
for the trip of James Beggs directed him to seek of summit preparations in the United States was H.
agreement on “a framework for collaboration” on Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for
the space station, “which could be announced at Economic Affairs. He and his colleagues in the
the London summit” in June 1984.76 Such early other six summit countries were known as
agreement was not feasible, however; it took until “Sherpas.” The Sherpas met on February 17–19; all
the first months of 1985 for the political foundation seemed open to the idea of having the summit
for the station partnership to be established. This partners declare that they “agree in principle to
section describes the steps that led to European, cooperate in the development of an international
Japanese, and Canadian acceptance of the U.S. space station, demonstrating that free nations will
invitation to consider engaging themselves with continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes
the space station program. and for the benefit of mankind.”78
The results of the NASA Administrator’s rapid

Early Agreement Sought trip, however, suggested that much work would
The idea of including the station invitation as an have to be done if any agreement were to be
agenda item for the London Economic summit reached in time for the summit. Beggs wrote Wallis
arose out of conversations between NASA’s Peggy that he had come to understand during his trip
Finarelli and Thomas Niles of the State that: “the Summit declaration is . . . extremely
Department’s Bureau of European-Canadian important to NASA’s counterpart technical agen
Affairs, after the basic decision to invite interna cies in these other countries. To them it represents
tional participation in the station had already been the political underpinnings necessary to proceed—
taken. Niles remembers that: analogous to the President’s State of the Union
guidance to us.”79
Having seen this proposal, my colleagues and I
in the State Department who were responsible In addition to time needed for each potential
for the Department’s participation in planning for partner to develop domestic political support for
the Summit concluded that this was an participation in the space station program, two
appropriate initiative. We based this conclusion issues of concern emerged at almost every stop on
on the obvious need for initiatives in connection the Beggs trip. While not insurmountable obstacles
with the Summit, the fact that the Summit to collaboration, they suggested that tough negoti
participants were the obvious choices to join ations would be required before final commitment
with us in the space station, and the reality that to international participation could be obtained.
One was technology transfer. In his follow-up let As a followup to the Beggs trip and in prepara
ter to those he had met on his trip, Beggs recog tion for the summit, Gil Rye, Peggy Finarelli, and
nized that “technology transfer has been an Robert Freitag made an April trip to Europe, meet
increasing concern on all our parts in the past few ing with both space agency officials and summit
years, and we will need to work together to make Sherpas. Their discussions reinforced the sense that
sure we are protecting our mutual technology some in Europe would be cautious about making a
bases in this partnership.”80 The other issue of gen commitment to cooperation at the summit. They
eral concern was the extent of U.S. military also found that the smaller member states of ESA,
involvement in the space station. Here, the U.S. which were not part of the summit process, were
position had been carefully crafted to reflect both concerned about a summit declaration that could
anticipated foreign sensitivities and to be accept commit them to additional contributions to ESA.
able within the U.S. government. Beggs told poten There was limited enthusiasm for the station pro
tial partners that: posal in some of these states, both because their
industries did not see the prospect for significant
The U.S. space station program is a civil program business in the undertaking and because finance
which will be funded entirely out of NASA’s ministries, almost always opposed to increasing
budget, with no national security funds used. . . . space budgets, had more influence than space
The space station that the President directed advocates in smaller ESA member countries.
NASA to build is a civil space station. Of course,
like the shuttle, the space station will be The potential for international participation in
available to users. If there are any national the U.S. space station was a “talking point” on
security users, like national and international President Reagan’s agenda for his private meetings
users, they will be able to use the facility. As with each of the other six leaders at the London
provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, all Economic Summit, which took place June 7–9; the
activity on the space station will be limited to issue was not discussed during the formal plenary
peaceful, nonaggressive functions.81 sessions of the summit leaders. However, as they
emerged from one of those meetings, the seven
Beggs also reported that “our principal allies are leaders encountered a large model of the station
moving quickly, or have already moved, to take that (unlike the model that NASA had brought to
political decisions to participate.”82 This may have the White House the preceding December) includ
overstated the situation somewhat. On one hand, ed representations of potential foreign contribu
having the invitation to participate come from the tions; this was a carefully staged opportunity for
U.S. President and be extended to other heads of President Reagan to discuss his invitation to partic
government had changed the stakes. The preceding ipate. NASA’s Langley Research Center had pre
two years of discussions at the technical level, and pared the detailed station model, which the U.S.
the biases toward collaboration that had emerged summit delegation (including Gil Rye and Peggy
from those discussions, were transformed into an Finarelli) had carried to London; twenty to thirty
issue high on the policy agenda. No ally wanted to minutes of lively discussion and a “photo opportu
be in a position, without compelling reasons, to nity” ensued as the summit leaders gathered
refuse President Reagan’s public invitation. On the around the model.
other hand, all three potential partners—Japan,
Canada, and Europe—were in the midst of their The summit communiqué was cautious in its lan
own internal debates over the future direction of guage, saying (in its final substantive paragraph) that:
their space efforts. Accepting the U.S. invitation,
even in principle, implied that a significant share of We believe that manned space stations are the
their space budgets over the coming decade would kind of programme that provides a stimulus for
have to be channeled into a partnership with the technological development leading to
United States. Beggs had made it clear that the U.S. strengthened economies and improved quality of
desire was for significant contributions to the sta life. Such stations are being launched in the
tion, roughly equivalent to 10 to 20 percent of the framework of national or international
partners’ overall space budgets for the next decade. programmes. In that context each of our
Whatever their leanings toward accepting Ronald countries will consider carefully the generous
Reagan’s invitation, in few of the potential partners and thoughtful invitation received from the
had there yet been enough discussion to make their President of the United States to participate in
leaders willing to make a firm political commitment the development of such a station by the United
to collaboration of that character and scope.83 States. We welcome the intention of the United
States to report at the next Summit on
international participation in their programme.84
The London Economic Summit of June 7–9, 1984, during which the space station was a major topic of discussion. Left to right:
President Reagan (United States), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), Foreign Minister Graf von Lambsdorf
(Germany), and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan). (NASA photo).
While this statement was less of an endorsement been engaging in informal discussions with the
than had been proposed to the summit Sherpas in United States regarding possible space station coop
February, the noncommittal language of the com eration since January 1982. However, as they made
muniqué accurately reflected the state of affairs in their own space plans, they certainly had not been
June 1984.85 Even so, it was an endorsement of the able to count on the station gaining the early and
station concept and thanked Ronald Reagan for his unambiguous approval of the Reagan administration
invitation. The inclusion of station cooperation on that was communicated by including approval of
the agenda for the 1985 summit was particularly the program in Reagan’s State of the Union message.
significant. It was intended to encourage speedy President Reagan’s approval of the station and his
decision-making in Europe, Japan, and Canada, invitation to participate changed the context in a
because any delays or breakdowns in discussions major way. Europe and its major countries active in
over acceptance of President Reagan’s invitation space—France, West Germany, Great Britain, and
would have to be reported back to the summit Italy—as well as other potential U.S. partners were
leaders at their next get-together. Although more making their own plans and decisions based on
time would be needed to find ways in which the their own interests, and the role of large-scale col
U.S. invitation and the separate space goals and laboration with the United States had to be evaluat
ambitions of Europe, Japan, and Canada could be ed in terms of those interests. As one close observer
combined in ways acceptable to all partners, there of the European space scene remarked (and his
was now a deadline to provide a focus for deliber remarks were in many ways applicable to Japan and
ations around the world. Canada as well):
Even creating an initial agreement to work togeth The dilemma which faces countries of Europe as
er in seeking such a melding of interests, capabili America’s space station program begins to get
ties, and programs would require separate negotia underway concerns chiefly priorities, both
tions between the United States and each of its national and European. To maintain Europe’s
potential partners. Europe, Japan, and Canada had existing space programs and take on a new space
station activity would require a major increase in gram was part of these considerations from the start.
space-related expenditures and thus a reappraisal Indeed, as long ago as 1976, being aware of early
of national priorities. U.S. space station studies, the ESA Council (the
organization’s “Board of Directors” composed of
To some, it might appear that the U.S. would be representatives from its member states) had resolved
called upon to provide guarantees and accept that ESA should “examine the questions connected
dependence in excess of what Europe’s share of with a possible participation by Europe in the Space
the common burden will be worth. But the Station programme.”88
imbalance is the other way: Any substantial
European involvement in a U.S.-led space station In February 1982, NASA Administrator James
program would absorb so much of the space Beggs and ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard
budget that Europe would forfeit the ability to discussed potential NASA-ESA cooperation on the
create a similar but independent capability.86 station program; each directed their head of
advanced planning (Ivan Bekey for NASA and
The invitation by Reagan to participate in the Jacques Collet for ESA) to work together as station
space station program had been a true leadership planning gained momentum.89 Based on this guid
initiative; it was now up to the potential partners as ance, a detailed plan for NASA-ESA coordination
to whether they chose to follow the U.S. lead. and joint activity regarding station planning was
quickly developed; Europe was thus given the
opportunity to be involved in the station program
Europe Charts Its Future in Space87 almost from its inception.90 By June 1982, ESA and
Much had changed in Europe since the post- NASA had agreed on an approach in which ESA
Apollo agreement to develop Spacelab as part of would carry out two sets of space station–related
the U.S. Space Transportation System. European studies. One, to be called “European Utilization
commitment to the German- and Italian-led Aspects of a U.S. Manned Space Station,” would
Spacelab program had been part of a “package be conducted in parallel to U.S. mission require
deal” among countries interested in space. Other ments studies; other ESA studies would investigate
elements of that deal were multilateral funding of the architectural and implementation implications
a French-led program to develop an independent of European requirements—that is, what hardware
launcher for Europe, Ariane, and a British-led pro made sense for Europe to contribute to a station
gram to develop a maritime communications satel program. In September 1982, ESA awarded the
lite. In addition, eleven European nations had contract for the utilization study to the German
agreed to create a single organization to manage aerospace research establishment, DFVLR, and ini
programs in science, applications, and infrastruc tiated four contracts with European industry
ture development. By the time the U.S. invitation regarding potential hardware contributions.
for space station participation was extended,
Spacelab had had a successful first flight aboard These initial steps in European consideration of
the Space Shuttle. Ariane was in service and suc station participation were taken in anticipation of
cessfully launching both government and commer ESA member-state approval of a “Space
cial payloads, and the maritime satellite was in Transportation Systems Long-Term Preparatory
operation, serving as the initial basis for the Programme” (STSLTPP) that would provide the over
INMARSAT organization. ESA had developed into all context for charting Europe’s future plans in the
an effective means of combining the resources of area of launch and in-orbit systems. The STSLTPP
member states to support programs that not one of had been approved in principle by the ESA Council
them was able to carry out on a unilateral basis; in June 1982.91 It was intended to provide member
ESA programs combined with national efforts had states “the elements necessary for making decisions
led to the emergence of a vigorous space industri on the selection of a long-term policy and on the
al base in Europe. start of new programmes” to follow Ariane and
Spacelab. Among the options to be analyzed by the
STSLTPP were “investigation and preparation of the
ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option necessary decision elements on: maintaining in
Considerations of future programs were very Europe an independent launch capability, develop
much on the European agenda in the early 1980s, as ing a European in-orbit infrastructure, and pursuing
the efforts begun on the basis of the 1973 package transatlantic cooperation through participation in
deal approached completion and European indus the future United States space station programme.”
try, national space agencies, and ESA assessed ways One of the three “themes” to be investigated was
of building on past achievements. The possibility of how to “provide Europe with a capability of carry
European involvement in a U.S. space station pro ing out orbital operations (including return to Earth)
by means of in-orbit infrastructures developed inde Thus, the main task is to convince our European
pendently or by cooperation with NASA in the partners of the value of those expenses. However,
future U.S. space station activities.”92 in order to succeed, France will first have to
resolve its own contradictions: Some of us still
While staff members of ESA may have wel believe that the space exploitation will be a
comed the possibility of continued cooperation reality by the end of the century without any
with the United States, their attitude was not uni human presence, which is counter to the future
versally shared in Europe. It proved difficult to get outlook on both the American and Soviet sides.
member-state commitment to the STSLTPP, in large As long as such opinions carry weight in France,
part because of skepticism in some countries it will certainly be difficult to claim to be able to
regarding the wisdom of continuing intimate coop influence ESA’s decisions.94
eration with the United States. NASA European
Representative Richard Barnes reported in Not all early thinking about space station cooper
December 1982 that the ESA Council had “again ation was carried out within the ESA framework.
deferred, this time for a month, the deadline for Another focus for considering potential European
member states adherence to the . . . STSLTPP contributions to the U.S. space station emerged
which includes funding for Ariane 5 and Space from studies carried out by Germany and Italy.
Station studies. So far only Sweden, Belgium, Interest within the two countries in using Spacelab
Denmark, and Germany have formally signed up, hardware as the basis for future programs dated
with Germany the only strong supporter of Space back to the late 1970s. Advocates of continued
Station studies.”93 cooperation with the United States, particularly
within Germany, sought an approach that would
In the weeks following the December ESA Council preserve the option of cooperation, either through
meeting, advocates of at least examining cooperation ESA or outside of it. In 1983, the German firm,
were able to gather the support needed for carrying MBB/ERNO, and the Italian firm, Aeritalia, under
out the STSLTPP. France agreed to support the study the respective supervision of DFVLR and the Italian
program on December 22, Italy on January 6, 1983, CNR (the national research agency in charge of the
and the United Kingdom on January 14. With the four Italian space plan), began intense studies of the use,
major ESA members signed on, study efforts were either in conjunction with the U.S. space station or
able to go forward during 1983 and 1984. as an independent European-controlled orbital
Commenting on the adoption of the program, the complex, of an orbital infrastructure consisting of
leading French newspaper, Le Figaro, noted: Spacelab-derived pressurized modules, unmanned
platforms, support modules, and service vehicles.
The old continent is preparing its space activity for The name given to this orbital complex was
the next century: we will undoubtedly have then Columbus; the program was “viewed by some
our space-men, orbital infrastructure and maybe, countries as a German/Italian effort to secure the
also a mini-shuttle to fly on our own. At least that’s lead role in Europe’s space station development.”95
what ESA—who is initiating an important
engineering program in this regard and has already The French space agency, Centre Nationale
signed the first industrial study contract—thinks. d’Études Spatiales (CNES), and the French aero
Hopefully, we will know between now and 1985. space industry also were studying future space
At the same time we will know who will influence efforts in the early 1980s. One focus of attention
this long-term policy: Germany who favors was a new high-thrust rocket engine, designated
complete cooperation with NASA, or France, more HM60, designed to use liquid hydrogen and liquid
favorable to independent solutions. oxygen as fuels; such an engine would be used to
develop a new generation of the Ariane launcher,
At the moment, two philosophies are possible. On designated Ariane 5. In other studies, attention was
the one hand, the one of German industrialists given to an automated or human-tended space sta
that consider that Europe should work in full tion concept called Solaris and to a small winged
cooperation with the U.S. . . . From there, spaceplane called Hermes. As NASA began space
however, opinions diverge: The French, in fact, station studies in 1982, CNES set up its own exam
would like to keep a certain “independence” as ination of station mission requirements. The goals
far as manned flights are concerned and thus of this study were to allow CNES “to determine
conduct studies in such a manner as to preserve independently its interest in cooperating with
the means to equip Europe with a complete NASA on a future space station; but also to deter
[Space Transportation System] to embark men. The mine whether it is in their best interest to cooper
problem is, one can imagine, that it would be very ate through ESA or directly with NASA.”96 Although
expensive. . . . the French government had traditionally been
A late 1984 graphic on the rationale for building the space station. (NASA photo HQ S84-2032A(3)).
skeptical of the importance of human spaceflight engine. These proposals were approved in princi
activities, this attitude shifted 180 degrees follow ple by the ESA Council on June 28, 1984. ESA was
ing President Francois Mitterrand’s decision to authorized to attempt to gain member-state finan
accept a Soviet invitation to fly a Frenchman cial commitments for preparatory studies, prior to
aboard the Soviet Salyut space station. That flight a final decision to proceed, on the development of
took place in June 1982. France from this time on the large cryogenic HM60 engine and on a “space
increasingly argued that independent European station related programme based on the proposal
capabilities in all areas of space activities, includ by the German and Italian delegations . . . this pro
ing human access to orbit, were essential; the term gramme will be defined with a view to ensure pro
“autonomy” was used to describe this ability to act gressively the European autonomy in the field of
without dependence on others. The appropriate manned space station compatible with the future
balance between European autonomy and inti European launching systems.” The Columbus
mate engagement with the United States became a preparatory programme would also include “con
major issue in the 1983–1985 debate over sideration of the invitation received from the
European space policy. President of the U.S.”98
In 1984, Germany and Italy proposed to their The ESA staff spent the remainder of 1984 incor
ESA partners that Columbus be considered as an porating the Columbus program and plans for a new
optional program97 to be carried out within the ESA European launcher into an overall long-range
framework; France did the same for the HM60 European space plan. (They were also working
closely with the NASA space station planners to stay and ambitious programme for the next ten years,
abreast of U.S. activity, now that the space station derived from a shared vision of Europe’s future in
had received President Reagan’s approval.) Other space.”100
inputs into this plan came from the results of the
STSLTPP and from the planning activities of other
offices within ESA concerned with science and Developing Political Support for Station
applications programs. That long-range plan was Cooperation
ready for initial consideration by ESA member coun In fact, the elements of such a consensus had
tries in November. The introduction to the plan been emerging in Europe during 1984. The June
noted the need to find the right balance between: ESA Council decision to approve the HM60 and
Columbus preparatory programs had foreshad
1. Science and applications—between cultural owed a new “package deal” to guide Europe’s next
and economic rewards decade in space. While studies sponsored by ESA
and national space agencies defined possible hard
2. Payloads and launchers/in-orbit infrastruc- ware elements of the next generation of European
ture—between ends and means space capabilities and of potential European con
tributions to the U.S. space station, political-level
3. Launcher development and manned space discussions among the leading European coun-
flight—between major technological tries—particularly France, Germany, the United
avenues, that of propulsion and that of Kingdom, and Italy—were leading to agreement
human-in-orbit on how those elements could be combined in an
acceptable fashion. A key to these discussions, in
4. Manned space systems and automated space addition to agreement on the hardware elements to
systems—between humans and robots be included, was developing an understanding on
how various ESA member states would distribute
5. ESA program and national program— among themselves the costs, and the proportional
between centralized and decentralized industrial involvement, in the various elements of
activities the ESA plan.
6. Purely European program and cooperative The major difference of view that had to be
ones, in particular with the United States— resolved in these discussions was between the
between achieving space autonomy and long-standing French preference for an emphasis
undertaking large-scale programs and their on improved launch systems and for an approach
operation that stressed European autonomy and the German
and Italian preference for both continued develop
The ESA executive alerted member states that ment of human spaceflight capability and continued
“the present scope of the overall ESA programme close cooperation with the United States in that
will have to be enlarged, making it necessary to development. Another consideration was the British
increase the funding at an average rate of 12 per preference for ESA to undertake applications pro
cent a year over 5 years.”99 grams that produced tangible benefits, rather than
research or exploration-oriented activities. For most of
The plan recommended that Europe develop a the smaller ESA member states, a primary concern
new launcher, Ariane 5, based on the HM60 was a program with enough diversity and breadth to
engine, to become operational by the end of 1995. allow meaningful opportunities for their scientific and
It noted that the U.S. space station was a “major industrial participation. These differing preferences
step in space capability which Europe cannot had been accommodated in the 1973 package deal
afford to ignore” and recommended “until about that had guided European space activities for a
1995, to improve through cooperation with NASA decade; during 1984, the political support for a simi
the existing European manned flight operations.” lar combination grew. The need to respond to the U.S.
To this end, the plan proposed approval of the invitation to participate in its space station program
Columbus program, “involving cooperation with certainly accelerated the process of agreement and
the U.S. in the development, operation and uti shaped its content, but the desire for a new European
lization of an international space station, subject to commitment to its future in space was an equally
negotiation with NASA of satisfactory terms and influential stimulus.
conditions for such cooperation.” In conclusion,
the ESA plan suggested that “the most urgent task A meeting of the ESA Council, at which each
ahead is for Member States to reach a broad con member state would be represented by its cabinet
sensus, within the ESA forum, on a well-balanced minister responsible for space activities, was sched-
uled for the end of January 1985. This was the first Italy agreed to allocate to Britain and to British
European space meeting at the ministerial level Aerospace the lead role in the platform aspects of
since the 1973 gathering that had created ESA and the Columbus program, and this provided the
approved the Ariane and Spacelab programs. The incentive the British government needed to go
purpose of the January 1985 meeting was to con along with the proposed ESA long-range plan and
sider the long-range plan proposed by ESA. In the European participation in the U.S. space station
course of putting together that plan, there had program. Even so, some degree of skepticism
been close consultation among the ESA Director about the appropriate priority of space activities
General101 and senior members of the ESA execu overall and of ESA programs in particular lingered
tive staff and policy-level officials within the gov among some in the Thatcher government and the
ernments of ESA member states. The European British bureaucracy, although Thatcher herself was
aerospace industrial organization, Eurospace, had visibly enthusiastic about the station program,
put together a proposed long-term European once she had been briefed on it in preparation for
space program that reflected the views of its the London Economic Summit. In fact, at the sum
industry members; it was in essence the same as mit meeting, it was Thatcher who had taken the
the proposed ESA long-range plan, suggesting that lead in the discussion as the seven leaders gath
European industry was ready to lend its support to ered around the space station model.104
the ESA proposals.102 The major unresolved ques
tion as 1984 drew to a close was whether those To build a broader base of support for the space
proposals would receive the political and finan station program within Britain, the U.K.
cial support needed to move ahead. Ultimately, it Department of Trade and Industry, under whose
was up to the individual ESA member states—and auspices the space program operated, organized
particularly France, Germany, and the United an October 4, 1984, meeting on the station pro
Kingdom (Italy had already answered in the posi- gram. The new Minister of Trade and Industry,
tive)—to decide whether they wanted to increase Geoffrey Pattie, told the meeting that the govern
their financial and political commitment to space, ment “had no preconceptions” and thus was very
and to ESA, to the levels required to carry out the interested in the opinion of attendees on whether
program that ESA was proposing. Great Britain should support station cooperation
within ESA; the tone of Pattie’s remarks to the sym
The British Position. At the time that President posium, however, were quite positive toward sta
Reagan first invited international participation in tion participation. A summary of the meeting noted
the station program, the United Kingdom was per general agreement that “the Space Station is a log
haps the most skeptical of the major ESA member ical development” and “surprising unanimity that
states regarding both a significant increase in the we should go ahead via ESA.”105 One NASA official
ESA budget and significant European engagement visiting the United Kingdom in the fall of 1984
in the U.S. space station effort. These would reported that top British space officials “appeared
require additional funds at a time when the optimistic about Cabinet approval for a major
Thatcher government was giving overriding priori British contribution to the ESA Space Station pro-
ty to cutting the U.K. budget. In addition, early dis gram.”106 When the U.K. cabinet did meet in late
cussions of potential European contributions to the 1984, it decided to provide those funds and to
U.S. space station had not clearly identified any make the accompanying commitment to coopera
element or activity of particular interest to Britain. tion with the United States on the station program.
This latter issue was resolved during 1984. The The French Position. Italian support for station
concept of the German-Italian Columbus program cooperation and for the ESA long-range plan incor
included one or more automated platforms to carry porating it had never been in question. What was
scientific and applications instruments. The lead uncertain as the January 1985 ESA ministerial
ing U.K. space firm, British Aerospace, became meeting grew closer was whether France and
interested in having the lead role in supplying Germany could find an approach to Europe’s
these platforms—particularly an Earth-observing future in space that reflected the interests of both
platform in polar orbit to complement a similar countries. Earlier, the outlines of a French-German
polar platform that was part of the “distributed compromise that would enable agreement on
architecture” of the U.S. station concept.103 An future ESA programs had been evident in the June
important feature of European space planning is 1984 ESA Council approval of preparatory pro
the ability to reach informal agreements on which grams for the HM60 cryogenic engine and for the
a country’s firms would act as prime and sec Columbus program. The proposed ESA long-term
ondary contractors for various ESA programs in plan was based on these central features.
advance of their actual approval. Germany and
France complicated the situation in late 1984 by space station by conducting experiments that she
requesting “Europeanization” of its Hermes space- would find useful and at low cost.
plane, arguing that just completed internal French
studies had demonstrated the feasibility of the con However, the sour experience of Spacelab
cept and that the goal of European autonomy was not cooperation, as well as the U.S. policy to limit
achievable unless Europe had its own means of technology and technical information transfer to
access to space for human crews. This last-minute the bare essentials to insure the compatibility of
push for Hermes was a surprise to most and was not European and U.S. elements, indicate the
well received by space advocates in other major limitation of such a cooperation. That is why a
European countries, particularly Germany and Great European policy in this field cannot count
Britain, because it implied a higher cost for the over heavily on cooperation with the U.S.
all space “package” that they were already having
some difficulty selling to their finance ministries. In Because of the major stakes involved, France has
France, by contrast, strong support for space came the same determination as she did 10 years ago
from Francois Mitterrand, who had early on in his in Brussels when she convinced her European
presidency accepted the Gaullist notion of space as partners to build Ariane. France proposes a
an arena in which to demonstrate French grandeur. In fundamental new step forward in European space
addition, the French Minister of Research, Hubert programs by deciding, right now, to acquire its
Curien, had been head of CNES before being autonomy in manned space flight and the
appointed as Minister, and he was actively pushing progressive establishment of a European Space
his counterparts in other countries for approval of the Station.108
Hermes concept.
The German Position. While support for space
France had been advocating Hermes since the station cooperation with the United States had
middle of 1983; the Mitterrand government had always been strong among German space officials
decided to make the space plane a key element of and in the German aerospace industry, during the
a plan for French space preeminence in Europe. 1982–1983 period, political support for the under
One justification for Hermes was that it could give taking was not yet assured. However, events in late
Europe independent crew access to the space sta 1983 changed this situation.
tion, so that Europe did not have to be totally
dependent on the Space Shuttle. This was part of a One of those events was the visit to Washington
more general French strategy of offering Europe an of Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber, German Minister for
alternative to dependence on a close alliance with Research and Technology. Prior to Riesenhuber’s
the United States as a key to its space future, meeting with James Beggs, Ken Pedersen told the
should discussions on station cooperation falter. NASA Administrator that the minister “was report
edly very favorably impressed with the amount of
When France pushed its partners during 1984 to public interest in space which was generated by
include Hermes development in the package to be the visit of the [Shuttle test vehicle] Enterprise to
considered by the January 1985 ministerial meet Bonn in May 1983.” Pedersen noted that “one pur
ing, both the United Kingdom and Germany resist pose of discussions with Riesenhuber is to promote
ed, believing that there had been inadequate study station activities, especially international coopera
of the concept to justify a commitment to its devel tive activities.”109
opment and being less committed to the political
ly driven concept of European autonomy in space Based on his discussions in Washington,
than was France.107 France continued to advocate Riesenhuber became an enthusiastic advocate of
Hermes right up to the time of the ESA ministerial station cooperation; during the following years, he
meeting. During January 1985, Fredric d’Allest, became an essential U.S. ally in securing European
CNES Director General, made a tour of European participation in the station program. Returning to
capitals in an attempt to increase support for the Bonn, he wrote James Beggs on October 27 that:
concept. On January 29, just two days before the
meeting convened, a column by d’Allest titled “A While I am aware that there is no approved
Space Policy for Europe” appeared in the influen program, I am interested in coordinating with
tial French paper Le Monde. In it, d’Allest argued: you as early as possible, even prior to the final
decision, the possibilities of a European
Participation—with conditions yet to be participation in a space station in the now
negotiated—in the American space station ongoing preparatory phase. I would be quite
through the Columbus project would allow willing to take the initiative as to the point that
Europe to benefit earlier from the use of the the Federal Republic of Germany, based on her
coordinating responsibility in the Spacelab The controversy was settled in early January when
cooperation, will provide the necessary political Riesenhuber and Stoltenberg agreed to a compro
and programmatic prerequisites for a European mise. Enough additional funds would be provided to
participation in the space station.110 the Research and Technology Ministry to cover half
of the costs of German participation in the
The support of Riesenhuber, and indeed of Columbus and Ariane 5 programs; the Ministry
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for continued would reprogram some of its existing budget to sup
space cooperation with the United States was rein port the rest of the cost of those programs. The U.S.
forced by the first successful Spacelab flight in late Embassy in Bonn reported that the German cabinet
November 1983. President Reagan and Kohl would “make a final decision on space station par
engaged in a three-way live conversation with the ticipation at a January 16 meeting. This will be little
Spacelab crew, which included the first ESA astro more than a formality, since the Chancellor is
naut, German citizen Ulf Merbold. After the mis known to be in favor of the Space Station and has
sion, Kohl wrote Reagan that the mission should be only been waiting for his ministers to agree on a
seen “as a symbol of our joint future.”111 financing plan.”114 The cabinet did meet on January
16 and agreed to German participation. A press
The importance placed by Riesenhuber on release announcing the cabinet decision noted that
assuring political support within Europe for station “our cooperation in space research is an important
cooperation was a critical factor in the European step on the way toward European integration and
decision-making process during 1984. Late in continuous improvement of transatlantic friend
1984, Riesenhuber and French Minister of ship.” Prerequisites for successful cooperation,
Research Hubert Curien came to agreement on noted the statement, included:
German support for Ariane 5 and French support
for Columbus, if only their respective governments • assurance of an appropriate relation between
would approve the budgets required; this “space give and take,
summit” was a critical step in clearing the path for
the Rome ESA ministerial meeting. • guarantees for access and necessary services,
such as transport with the space shuttle,
However, even with Riesenhuber’s strong support support and data transmission under
and the long-term bias toward cooperation with the nondiscriminatory conditions,
United States in space, German support for the ESA
long-range plan was not assured as the Rome minis • guarantee of unlimited scientific and
terial meeting drew near. A major sticking point was commercial utilization of results gained,
budget. A German commitment to the large pro unrestricted technology transfer for the
grams proposed by ESA—Columbus and Ariane 5— development of ESA’s own contribution and
implied either an increase in the German space for the commercial utilization of
budget overall or a reallocation of the resources of instrumentation and results, and options for
Riesenhuber’s Research and Technology Ministry. the utilization of European launcher
German space scientists (echoing their U.S. col capabilities.115
leagues) were skeptical of the scientific value of the
space station and strongly opposed to a reduction in The reference to the use of European launchers
the space science budget as a means of financing it. did not imply German support for Hermes. In a
German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, on press conference following the cabinet meeting,
the other hand, resisted increasing the Research and Riesenhuber said that it was “premature” to decide
Technology Ministry’s budget to allow for the addi on a commitment to Hermes, but that Germany
tional funding required. Another factor that came had not ruled out participating in the program
into play was the preference of Foreign Minister sometime in the future.116
Genscher for closer Franco-German ties rather than
continued emphasis on the transatlantic German-
U.S. alliance.112 ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station
Cooperation
This potential deadlock within the government of Despite this rejection of French aspirations, at
the strongest European supporter of station cooper least for the time being, by the beginning of January
ation was worrisome to the United States. On 1985, the U.K., French, and Italian governments had
December 13, President Reagan wrote Chancellor indicated their intent to approve the ESA-proposed
Kohl, reiterating U.S. hopes that Germany would plan, which at the time included no mention of
agree to participate in the station project.113 Hermes. With the German approval of its participa
tion in the Ariane 5 and Columbus projects, the last
obstacle to approval of the ESA long-range plan, and and control of station development and operations
to political agreement to the principle of European were unsettled issues as far as Europe and other
participation in the space station program, had been participants were concerned, while within the
cleared. The ESA Council met in Paris on January 23 in United States a decision that America must have
preparation for the ministerial-level meeting the fol the dominant station role had already been made.)
lowing week, and it discovered that the agency’s With respect to what acceptable terms and condi
member states were in agreement on all essential tions of a space station partnership might be, there
decisions to be taken at Rome. had been, at least since 1983, clear indications of
the European position. Preliminary discussions on
Meeting in Rome at the ministerial level on January a NASA-ESA agreement had been under way for
30–31, 1985, the ESA Council accepted the proposals several months in anticipation of a positive out
of the ESA executive for a long-range European space come at the ministerial meeting.
plan and agreed to the initial two-year commitment of
funds required to carry out that plan. In so doing, it The European ministers at Rome went on record
approved a statement of objectives for the ESA pro as to the objectives that had to be met if the space
gram that included, among other goals, the intent: station partnership were to be viable in European
eyes. Those objectives were stated in the form of an
• to strengthen European space transportation ESA resolution that was not made public until it had
capacity, meeting foreseeable user been delivered to both President Reagan and NASA
requirements within as well as outside Administrator Beggs. The resolution noted, with
Europe, and remaining competitive with respect to the U.S. invitation, that the ESA Council:
space transportation systems that exist or are
planned elsewhere; Accepts that offer—with a view to contributing
and strengthening a genuine partnership in the
• to prepare autonomous European facilities
space field with the United States of America . . .
for the support of man in space, for the
subject to the achievement of the following
transport of equipment and crews and for
fundamental objectives:
making use of low Earth orbit; and
– to seek an appropriate European participation
by the Agency in the space station programme;
• t o enhance international cooperation and in – to give Europe responsibility for the design,
particular aim at a partnership with the United development, exploitation and evolution of one
States through a significant participation in an or several identifiable elements of the space
international space station.117 station together with the responsibility for their
management with the aim of increasing the
Although the French proposal to include overall capability of the space station;
Hermes in the approved ESA program at the same – to ensure that Europe may have access to and
level of commitment as Ariane 5 and Columbus use, on a nondiscriminatory basis, all elements
was rebuffed, the ministers left the door to future of the space station system on terms that are as
Europeanization of Hermes wide open, taking note favourable as those granted to the most-
with interest of the French decision to undertake favoured users and on a reciprocal basis;
the spaceplane program and the proposal by – to reach a satisfactory agreement on the share
France to associate her European partners interest of the operation costs of the station;
ed in this program. The ministers invited France – to reach a satisfactory agreement on the level
and associated partners to keep the agency and conditions for the appropriate transfer of
informed of progress of these studies with the view technologies;
of including this program, as soon as feasible, in – to ensure that supplies and services provided
the optional program of the agency.118 by the United States industry and NASA for
European requirements are offset by European
With these decisions, Europe committed itself to supplies and services;
an ambitious future space program of its own and – to ensure maximum legal security and an
accepted, subject to the negotiation of acceptable identical level of the commitments entered into
terms and conditions, the U.S. invitation to partic by the European Governments and the United
ipate in what ESA insisted on describing as an States Government;
“international space station,” rather than a U.S. sta – to guarantee the availability of American
tion with foreign participation. (The differences in transportation and communication facilities
these two characterizations were more than required for the programme and the possibility
semantic, because the degree of non-U.S. partici of using the European facilities as they
pation and the consequent share in the content become available for the programme.119
This statement of objectives identified almost all chance to become involved in the space station
of the issues that would have to be resolved in appeared, according to one informed observer,
what turned out to be three more years of detailed “Japan—politicians included—does not want to
and difficult negotiations between the United miss the boat. The Japanese space community
States and Europe—and also with Japan and wants to participate.”123
Canada—in creating the final framework of agree
ments for the original station partnership. President Reagan’s invitation to participate in
the U.S. space station program came at a difficult
Because U.S.-European space cooperation in the time for Japan, however. The country’s space bud
space station would be based on a longer, more get, after rising rapidly during the 1970s, had
intense, and sometimes difficult history than with shown a slight decrease in 1983 over 1982, and no
other prospective partners,120 and because the antic meaningful growth was planned for 1984.124 Even
ipated European contribution to the partnership so, a revised space development policy for Japan
would be approximately twice (in financial terms) had just been proposed, and an implication of that
that expected from Japan and more than four times policy was an increased Japanese commitment to
that expected from Canada, European acceptance of space over the longer term. A central guideline of
the U.S. invitation was an important achievement that policy was “establishment of autonomy.” The
for those within the United States advocating the sta policy proposal noted that:
tion partnership. Without European involvement,
the partnership they had in mind would have been In the space technology field, Japan has been
much different in character. relying on advanced foreign nations in its large
portion because of her later starting, and the
Even after the Rome meeting, there was linger activities have been under the great influence of
ing opposition to station cooperation in Europe. such advanced nations.
France made it clear that it was ready to take the
lead in a program leading to European autonomy, Japan should, however, establish its own
should space station negotiations run into major technological capacity for its space development in
obstacles. Smaller ESA member states, who in gen the future so that its broad and diversified space
eral did not see industrial return proportionate to development activities can be performed in a steady
the costs to them of station participation, remained manner.
skeptical. However, the political strength of an
invitation from the U.S. President kept this opposi At the same time, Japan should possess advanced
tion muted in character. Only if the terms laid capability in order to implement space
down by the United States for participation were development activities properly at its discretion.125
unacceptable was it likely that Europe would
refuse to be the primary partner of the United The “advanced nation” referred to in the policy
States in the space station program. proposal was the United States, and the “techno
logical capability” important to Japanese autono
my included both an indigenous launcher and an
Japan Determined Not to “Miss the Boat”121 indigenous satellite bus incorporating advanced
Once the United States had formally invited technologies. The United States had helped Japan
Japan to participate in the space station program, develop launch vehicles and satellites during the
there was little doubt that invitation would be 1970s by licensing U.S. industry to sell various
accepted. During the 1969–1970 period, the technologies to its Asian ally, but those licenses
United States had asked Japan to become involved carried limits on how advanced the technology
in the planned post-Apollo program of manned thereby transferred could be. The objective was to
spaceflight. At that time, Japan was just getting license only that technology less advanced than
started on a large-scale space program, even the current U.S. “state of the art.” In addition,
though it had been carrying out small scientific Japan could not launch non-Japanese payloads
space activities throughout the 1960s. It took Japan using the boosters employing licensed U.S. tech
some time to form the internal consensus required nology without explicit U.S. permission to do so.126
to respond positively to the U.S. invitation; by the
time its response came, the conditions for post- Japan recognized, as had Europe a decade earli
Apollo cooperation had so changed that the er, that its independent access to space was a pre
opportunity Japan had decided to pursue was no condition for any degree of autonomy and, in early
longer available.122 So Japan was excluded from 1984, was in the final stages of deciding to devel
any opportunity to work with the United States in op a new launch vehicle, to be called the H-II,
the human flight area during the 1970s. When the based totally on Japanese-developed technology.
The H-II program was aimed at a first launch in that group managed Japan’s mission requirements
1991, and it was estimated to cost almost $1 bil studies that were carried out in parallel with similar
lion to develop.127 To accept President Reagan’s NASA studies and other station-related investiga-
invitation meant that Japan would have to commit tions.129 By October 1982, NASDA was able to join
itself to even more increases in its space budget, with several other organizations to sponsor a space
because the kind of contribution the United States station symposium in Tokyo; almost 400 attendees
was asking would be as expensive, if not more heard 92 papers presented.130
expensive, than the projected cost of the H-II pro
gram. While space advocates in Japan were enthu Japanese industry was quick to get involved. By
siastic about the possibility, the space program did September 1982, the Mitsubishi Group had briefed
not have a high priority outside of the science and the government on its concepts for participation,
technology community, and it was uncertain which included an “Experiment Module” consist
whether the government would be willing to make ing of “a manned pressurized module and an
the financial commitment required to carry out unpressurized pallet.” According to Mitsubishi,
both the H-II and space station programs. Japanese participation would:
The Japanese space community had been con • Establish a Japanese base for future space ac
sidering its response to a possible U.S. invitation tivities by participating in the U.S. Manned
since NASA had raised that possibility in early Space Station . . . Program
1982. In August of that year, it had established an
Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs, • Enlarge the field and scale of Japanese space
reporting to the blue-ribbon Space Activities utilization activities
Commission that advised the prime minister on
space policy. In typical Japanese style when con • I nvest and participate in the rapidly
sidering a new area of activity, the membership of progressing advanced space technology
this committee included representatives from vari

ous government ministries and their national • Contribute to the international society in a
research institutes, Japanese industry, and academ worldwide cooperative space development era
ic institutions with potential interest in the space
station program. This step was also taken to indi • Activate and promote Japanese manned
cate that Japan considered the space station to be space activities.131
a project of government-wide interest, not just the

concern of one Japanese agency. (The Mitsubishi presentation so impressed NASA
Administrator James Beggs that he sent a copy to
Japanese space activities were carried out by Secretary of State George Shultz as an example of
two separate organizations. One, the Institute of the benefits of international cooperation in the
Space and Astronautical Sciences (ISAS), was total space station, which would “provide an opportuni
ly devoted to space science; it had evolved from a ty to attract foreign research and development
University of Tokyo group and was still quite acad funds into a program which is perhaps uniquely
emic in style. ISAS received its relatively modest mutually beneficial. . . .”132) Other space industries
funding from the Ministry of Education, and it in Japan also studied the concept of an attached
cherished its independence from the rest of experimental module; also under investigation was
Japanese space efforts. The bulk of Japanese space a Japanese contribution in the form of a free-flying,
work was carried out under the management of the unmanned experimental platform.
National Space Development Agency (NASDA),
which was a public corporation operating under In March 1983, the Space Activities Commission
the policy guidance of the Science and Technology and its Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station
Agency (STA), although it received funding from Programs met with a NASA delegation led by
other government ministries and public corpora Associate Deputy Administrator Philip Culbertson
tions as well as from STA. In mid-1982, the Space (to whom the NASA Space Station Task Force report
Activities Commission formally designated NASDA ed). The NASA team also met with people from STA,
as the lead agency in Japan for space station plan- NASDA, and ISAS. The main purpose of these meet
ning.128 ings was to provide Japanese officials concerned
with the space station an in-person, top-level view
On an informal basis, Japan had been examining of NASA’s space station planning activities and to
possibilities for involvement in the space station pro indicate how Japanese activities fit into those plans.
gram from the start of 1982. On July 16 of that year, The NASA delegation stressed at every opportunity
the government established a space station task force; that the station program had not yet been fully
defined, much less approved by the White House Japan—Mitsui, Fuyo, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and
and Congress. With regard to specific Japanese Nisho-Iwai—formed teams to study station utiliza
hardware contributions to the station, the NASA tion and hardware development opportunities.
representatives noted that the Japanese “still had a Within the government, the influential Ministry of
lot of work ahead to prove to themselves—and International Trade and Industry (MITI) became
us—that they should undertake developments of involved in space station–related activities by creat
this scope.”133 ing its own study committee on space environment
utiliza-tion. Both of these developments caused
On June 15, 1983, the Ad Hoc Committee on conflict. Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that there
Space Station Programs of the Space Activities was disagreement within the private sector over
Commission issued an interim report that identified which industrial group should have the lead in
materials processing, life science, and advanced Japan’s involvement in the space station and that the
technology development as the uses most likely to MITI move into space was viewed by STA as an
benefit from the existence of a space station. The incursion into its area of jurisdiction.136
committee thought that a module attached to the
space station was the best site for work in these In reaction to this situation, on November 19,
areas, and it concluded that “a very large space sys the powerful Keidanren (a federation of Japanese
tem can be built” and that “the space station is the industries) formed a fifty-four-member Ad Hoc
first step of the enlargement of the living space of Committee for Promotion of Japanese Participation
human being[s].”134 Throughout the year, Japanese in the Space Station Program. The purposes of this
interest in station participation continued to group were “(1) to unify the space station use
increase. For example, in October the influential research groups . . .; (2) to coordinate the views of
paper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported that: the private sector; and (3) to coordinate informa
tion with the . . . STA and the . . . MITI.” This move
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. will participate in the U.S. toward creating consensus was seen as essential if
space station program in collaboration with STA was to get the budget allocation required to par
Hitachi, Ltd. and Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. . . . ticipate in Phase B definition studies for the station.137
The Mitsubishi Group of firms have already
announced their policy of actively participating in Indeed, it was the approval of this budget, rather
the program. . . . than any formal announcement, that would signal
Japan’s acceptance of the U.S. invitation. By mid
The Japanese government plans to participate in the 1984, STA had decided that Japan’s contribution to
space station project from the beginning, that is, the space station should be an Experiment Module,
even as the project is in the development stages.135 and studies of several other possible hardware ele
ments were halted. In December, NASA confirmed
By the time that James Beggs formally extended to STA that such a module would be an acceptable
President Reagan’s invitation to participate to Japanese contribution.138 After negotiations with the
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in March Ministry of Finance that had begun in August, on
1984, acceptance of that invitation was a foregone December 28, STA “with great pleasure” notified
conclusion, if acceptable terms for that participation NASA that the budget for Phase B station activities
could be developed and if the Japanese Finance had been approved within the government and
Ministry and the Diet (the Japanese legislature) could would be sent to the Diet in January.139
be convinced to provide the additional funds
required to support the cooperative undertaking. In Members of the Keidanren space station study
the revision of Japan’s space development plan committee visited the United States in February
unveiled in late February 1984, which gave the go- 1985 to hear for themselves U.S. responses to a
ahead to the H-II rocket, the Space Activities variety of questions that had been raised about the
Commission had also indicated Japanese intent to station program. They were apparently satisfied
participate in the station program. At the time of the with what they heard. Upon his return to Japan, the
Beggs visit, the Prime Minister Nakasone and the sci leader of the team, Tadahiro Sekimoto, President of
ence and technology minister made it clear that Japan NEC (Nippon Electric Company), wrote
would participate in a meaningful way, but that gov Administrator Beggs, telling him that “as the Space
ernment statements in support for the program would Station Program is an international project under
remain low-key until the process of developing con your initiative, I hope you would go ahead with it
sensus within Japan had taken place. by way of cooperation . . . between the two coun
tries. We will, of course, do our best on our side to
As part of the process of consensus-building with promote the Space Station Program.”140
in Japan, during 1984, five industrial groups within
The Japanese Diet approved the funds for Japanese As with Europe, then, Japan’s decision on its par
Phase B station activities in April 1985; with that ticipation in the U.S. space station was part of a
approval, Japan became the last of the three potential larger set of decisions on future Japanese interests
U.S. partners to make the political commitment to in space overall. Also similar to Europe, Japan rec
attempt to find an acceptable framework for cooper ognized that it could not both accept the U.S. offer
ation. (Canada had announced its intention to partic and satisfy its other space objectives without
ipate on March 18.) In its final report, issued in the increasing its financial commitment to space.
spring of 1985 and reflecting the thinking that led to Finally, as with Europe, Japan saw as its ultimate
the Japanese acceptance of the U.S. invitation, the Ad goal autonomy defined in terms of independence
Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs of the of action in critical areas of space activity. But
Space Activities Commission identified the benefits unlike Europe, there were no influential skeptics
Japan saw in participating in the station: within Japan regarding the wisdom of accepting
the U.S. invitation, although the Japanese space
1. Acquisition of highly advanced technology: It science community expressed little interest in
is expected that the space station will utilize becoming involved with the station program. The
highly advanced technologies in broad areas intense consultations and analyses within and
and, therefore, through the program Japan between government and industry from 1982 to
will acquire extremely advanced 1984 had produced a consensus in support of inti
technologies such as manned support mate collaboration with the United States in
technology, assembly technology for a large exploring the potentials of human spaceflight.
structure in space, etc., and also will
encourage development of various advanced
technology areas in robotics, computers and Canada Sets Its Space Priorities142
communications. This effort is expected to Although Canada had been actively involved in
contribute to the advancement of technical space since the 1960s and had provided the Remote
standards not only in space but in many Manipulator System (also called the Canadarm) as an
other technical fields. integral element of the Space Shuttle, the country in
the early 1980s had no central space agency. Also,
2. Promotion of the next generation science
since the 1960s, it had renounced any ambitions
and technology coupled with expansion of
related to independent access to space through a
space activities scope. . . . Canadian launch vehicle. Thus one of the considera
tions influencing European and Japanese evaluation
3. Contribution to international cooperation: of the U.S. space station invitation—the desire to
Japan’s space development policy attaches achieve substantial autonomy—was not relevant to
importance to harmonizing Japanese national the Canadian situation. Canada, to be active in space,
space development activities with had to cooperate; the issues were with whom and on
international space activities. . . . Japan’s what projects.
participation and co-operation in the [space
station] program will be quite effective in Planning for Canada’s space activities was the
maintaining and further promoting the responsibility of an Interdepartmental Committee
friendship between the United States and on Space, chaired by the Ministry of State for
Japan, coupled with contributing to the Science and Technology. It included as members
elevation of Japan’s own technology, by those ministries that were potential developers and
working with the space development users of space capabilities. Many space-related
activities of the free world. research activities were funded and managed
through the National Research Council of Canada,
4. Encouragement of practical use of space a quasi-independent government corporation. The
environment: The realization of the space National Research Council had been Canada’s link
shuttle regular flights in the United States has to NASA for the Remote Manipulator System pro
strongly pushed forward experiments in the ject. The Ministry of Communications and the
space environment for the production of Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Resources also had
materials and pharmaceutical products using substantial space involvement.
the microgravity of space. . . . The expansion
of commercial activities to space is now a When the United States invited Canada in 1982
target of various overseas countries as well as to begin to think about participation in the space
the United States and, therefore, this aspect station program, other projects seemed to the
has significance.141 members of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Space to have higher priority as Canada shaped its
space plans for the second half of the 1980s and in automation and robotics.146 Summarizing the
beyond. In particular, two large (for Canada) pro position of station advocates within Canada,
jects directly related to Canadian needs—a Mobile Doetsch said:
Communication Satellite for links among Canada’s
widely dispersed population and a Radarsat for We also think that the space station as a develop
Earth observations through cloud cover—were top- ment and as a technological stimulant has strong
priority projects. In its initial evaluations, the justification in its own right. This is coupled with
Interdepartmental Committee on Space gave the needs of the users, but it mustn’t be forgotten.
potential Canadian involvement in the U.S. space
station the lowest priority among these projects. The rate of return on investment is important, but
the strategic benefits are also important.147
The factors that changed this ranking were pri
marily political in character. The intense public inter Canadian-U.S. coordination at the technical level
est in the visit of the Space Shuttle test vehicle continued during 1983 and 1984, but the political
Enterprise to Canada in June 1983 demonstrated to decision on whether to accept President Reagan’s
Canadian politicians the symbolic importance of invitation to participate had to be put on hold. At the
involvement in human spaceflight. At the same time, time that James Beggs and his entourage visited
the Canadian government announced that it would Ottawa in March 1984, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre
accept the U.S. invitation to have a Canadian astro Trudeau had announced that he would leave office,
naut fly aboard the Space Shuttle.143 While within the and Minister of State for Science and Technology
Interdepartmental Committee on Space the Ministry Donald Johnston told the U.S. delegation that a
of Energy, Mines, and Resources continued to advo Canadian response to the Reagan’s invitation could
cate the Radarsat program and the Ministry of not be given until the elections were over, because it
Communications continued its support of the Mobile was the next government that would have to make
Satellite Program, from mid-1983, the Ministry of the financial commitment to back up an acceptance
State for Science and Technology had the political of the invitation.148
advantage through its link to human spaceflight.
A Progressive Conservative government headed by
In contrast to the U.S.-European experience with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was elected in
Spacelab cooperation, U.S.-Canadian cooperation September 1984; that government was philosophical
on the Remote Manipulator System had been a very ly more attuned to the Reagan administration than
satisfactory experience on both sides. Karl Doetsch had been its liberal predecessor and thus was more
of the National Research Council, who had managed likely to be positive toward accepting the U.S. offer as
the Remote Manipulator System project for Canada a means of strengthening U.S.-Canadian relations.
and was one of those supporting station cooperation, Canadian astronaut Marc Garneau flew as a payload
remarked in mid-1983 that “there’s a good feeling specialist aboard an October 1984 Shuttle mission,
that comes to the fore immediately, which says that further reinforcing the Canadian desire to be involved
the space station is great, we want to be a part of it. in future manned activities.
. . . However . . . one needs a little more than that.
One needs to find good reasons for it.”144 In a paper prepared for a December 1984 NASA
international workshop on the station program, Karl
To this end, the National Research Council of Doetsch summarized the “principal issues governing
Canada sponsored station utilization studies, as had Canadian participation”:
other potential station partners. Two studies were
conducted, one by Spar Aerospace Ltd. and the other • Importance to Canada of the use of the space
by a consulting group, Philip A. Lapp Associates. The station.
studies concluded that “Canada could benefit scien
tifically, technologically, economically and socially • I mportance to Canada of the privileged access
through participation in the development of the to the infrastructure which will accrue to
Space Station.”145 Particularly attractive to many participating nations.
Canadian users was the existence of a polar orbiting
Earth observation platform as part of the station pro • Desirability of maintaining and enhancing
gram, because data from remote sensing was impor Canada’s existing area of industrial space
tant to many Canadian applications. Also, Canada leadership.
saw the station, with its requirements for in-orbit

assembly and operations, as an opportunity to build • I mportance of spinoff to Canadian industry in
on the Remote Manipulator System program and the chosen areas of development.
to develop further Canadian industrial capabilities • Extent of the return on investment to be derived
from participation. invitation of the United States to participate in the

Space Station Program. . . .
• Desirability of cooperating with other major
nations in a major international venture which Space Station will be the predominant civilian
will have a profound effect on man’s ability to space initiative of the remainder of the century
exploit the space environment.149 and will alter dramatically many of the
established ways of operating in space. Canadian
These were clearly very different considerations participation would permit us to maintain and
than had stimulated Europe and Japan to consider improve our competitiveness in a number of
participating in the station project. leading-edge space technologies. All of our
international partners have decided to participate
The technical and the political arguments in which will offer us further opportunities to
support of accepting the U.S. invitation proved ulti develop new business relationships and
mately persuasive, but only after lengthy and intense cooperative programs with the world’s major
discussions within the Interdepartmental Committee space nations.153
on Space. As one individual closely involved in both
the internal Canadian discussions and those between When Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney com
the United States and Canada commented: pleted their “Shamrock Summit” on March 18, their
joint communiqué announced that “the Prime
It was a judgment call. It was the result of endless Minister informed the President that Canada has
discussions. . . . There was certainly a fair amount of accepted the U.S. invitation to participate in the
unhappiness that it [the station participation] was space station project.”154
going to run away with all the funds. . . . It was a
matter of visibility. If the space station was going to The overall Interim Space Plan was announced on
there Canada had to be part of it. This was the line March 20. Its interim nature was very evident; it pro
of argument that was used. And the potential vided funding for the three potential major space pro
benefit to industry—that helped push it through.150 jects (mobile satellite, Radarsat, and the space station)
only for the 1985–1986 period. It noted that “final
One factor influencing at least the timing of the decisions” on these projects would be taken at the
Canadian decision on whether to accept the U.S. end of 1985, when a long-term strategic plan for
invitation was the first summit meeting between Canadian space efforts would be issued. Future fund
President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, ing for the three major space projects would be deter
scheduled for Quebec City on March 17–18, 1985. In mined in accordance with “strategic thrusts” set out
late January, the top Canadian space policy official, in the long-term plan.155
W.M. “Mac” Evans, was optimistic that there would
be a positive decision on the part of the Canadian The development of the Canadian long-range
cabinet by that time.151 The U.S. Department of State space plan and the assignment of priorities to the
welcomed this news; it noted that it and other agen three competing projects proved very contentious,
cies were involved in an “exercise pointing towards although Canadian involvement in the space sta
achievements that can be realized before or during tion would eventually gain top priority. But that
the March 17–18 summit in Quebec. Canadian was in the future. With the March 18 announce
cooperation on the [manned space station] would be ment of the Canadian decision to accept the U.S.
such an achievement. . . . But we have not discussed invitation, all three partners—Europe, Japan, and
the possibility with the Government of Canada.” The Canada—had made the initial political commit
State Department noted that “an announcement at ment required. Now it was up to representatives of
the summit need not necessarily be lengthy.”152 the prospective partners to determine whether a
framework for cooperation acceptable to all could
The Canadian cabinet’s Committee on Economic be developed.
and Regional Development did approve a recom
mendation for Canadian participation in the space
station on March 5; full cabinet approval followed Conclusion
quickly thereafter. The approval came in the context Creating that framework eventually required three
of an endorsement of “Canada’s Interim Space Plan, rounds of international negotiations. One created a
1985–1986,” a document that had been prepared by set of three memoranda of understanding (MOU)
the Interdepartmental Committee on Space. This plan that would govern interactions between NASA and
noted that: its prospective partners during the preliminary design
phase (Phase B) of the station program, while more a
The government has decided to accept the permanent framework for those interactions was
created. This round of negotiations was complet space station partners decided after the end of the
ed on June 3, 1985, when NASA and ESA signed Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union to
their Phase B MOU at the Paris Air Show. Japan invite the Russian Federation to join the station
and Canada had agreed to similar MOUs earlier partnership. There followed another four years of
in the spring of 1985. These negotiations were not difficult discussions to revise the station intergov
particularly contentious; NASA and its partners ernmental agreement and MOUs to accommodate
agreed to defer to the next negotiating round a major new partner; the new agreements were
attempts to resolve the kind of difficult issues that finally signed by all partners except Japan on
had been identified in the January 31, 1985, ESA January 29, 1998. (The approval processes within
Resolution 2 on space station cooperation dis Japan again were not completed in time for Japan
cussed above. to sign the agreements at that time.)
The second round of space station negotiations This account does not cover the space station
was highly contentious, and on several occasions negotiations between 1985 and 1998. It is perhaps
its successful outcome was in doubt. However, on too soon to trace the various compromises that
September 29, 1988, the United States, a number were made by all parties to the discussions in order
of European countries, and Canada signed an to reach understandings to which all could agree,
intergovernmental agreement on station coopera and it of course is too early to make a definitive
tion (Japan signed the agreement later), and NASA judgment on the success of the partnership.156
signed more specific MOUs with its counterpart
space agencies in Europe, Japan, and Canada for When the United States and its closest allies
cooperation during the detailed design, develop began, in the early 1980s, to consider an ambitious
ment, and operation and utilization phases of the international partnership to design, develop, oper
space station program. ate, and utilize a permanent space laboratory—
Five years later, in December 1993, the original what has become known as the International
The Space Station Plan, as proposed in 1986, at the time of the initial agreements for international participation.

Space Station—they could not possibly have antic all elements of the International Space Station are in
ipated the twists and turns in the road to making place and ready for use. One can only hope that the
that partnership a reality. When President Ronald results of the partnership that began with both high
Reagan announced his approval of the space station anticipation and mixed feelings, in what was a differ
program in January 1984, he directed NASA to com ent era in space development, justifies all the time
plete the undertaking within a decade. It is likely to and effort to make it a success.
be two decades after Reagan’s announcement before

Notes
1. White House, “Address by the President on Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program: A
the State of the Union,” January 25, 1984. Policy Failure?,” Science, Vol. 232, May 30,
1986, pp. 1099–1105.
2. See Chapter One of John M. Logsdon, gen.
ed., with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. 7. See A rturo Russo, Big Technology, Little
Launius, Exploring the Unknown: Selected Science, European Space Agency (ESA)
Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil HSR-19 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, August 1997),
Space Program, Volume II: External and Logsdon, “U.S.-European Cooperation in
Relationships (Washington, DC: NASA Space,” for discussions of this dissatisfaction.
SP-4407, 1997), for a discussion of this
change in strategy and for documents relat 8. Memorandum f rom LI-15/Director of
ed to NASA’s international space activities. International Affairs to MFA-13/Director, Space
Station Task Force, “Strategy for International
3. On the evolution of NASA’s international Cooperation in Space Station Planning,”
activities, see Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring undated but August 1982 (hereafter referred to
the Unknown, Volume II, Chapter One. as Pedersen Strategy Memor-andum). Robert
Other related sources include Arnold Freitag, who was intimately involved in devel
Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space oping U.S.-European cooperation in the post-
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), Apollo period, suggests that “the major reason
pp. 3–165; John M. Logsdon, “U.S.- for not involving Europe in joint development
European Cooperation in Space: A 25-Year of the Shuttle was complexity of management
Perspective,” Science, Vol. 223, January 6, which would have been exacerbated by the
1984, pp. 11–16; Kenneth Pedersen, “The differences in technology experience.” Letter
Global Context: Changes and Challenges,” to author, November 17, 1989. Another
in Molly McCauley, ed., Economics and reviewer of an earlier draft of this section noted
Technology in U.S. Space Policy that the Department of Defense (DOD) inter
(Washington, DC: National Academy of vened to block the possibility of European
Engineering, 1987; and Task Force on development of the Tug when it became clear
International Relations in Space, NASA that many highly classified U.S. national secu
Advisory Council, International Space rity missions would be using the Shuttle and
Policy for the 1990s and Beyond, October would require an orbital transfer capability. To
12, 1987. DOD, the use of a non-U.S. system for such a
purpose was not acceptable. See Lorenza
4. National A
eronautics and Space Act of Sebesta, United States-European Cooperation
1958, Public Law 85–568, Sec. 102(c)(7). in the Post-Apollo Programme, ESA HSR-15
(Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, February 1995), for a
5. Arnold Frutkin, “International Cooperation fuller account of the events summarized here.
in Space,” Science, Vol. 169, July 24, 1970,
pp. 333–39. 9. For a history of the Spacelab project that
stresses its international aspects, see
6. For a discussion of the decision to proceed Douglas B. Lord, Spacelab: An International
with the Space Shuttle, see John M. Success Story (Washington, DC: NASA
SP-487, 1987). For a European perspective, (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics
see Lorenza Sebasta, Spacelab in Context, and Astronautics, 1985). See also Howard E.
ESA HSR-21 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, McCurdy, The Space Station Decision:
October 1997). Incremental Politics and Technological Choice
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
10. For a discussion of the evolution of European Press, 1990), for a history of the space station
space activity, see John Krige and Arturo concept and of space station–related decisions
Russo, Europe in Space, 1960–1973, ESA SP within the United States throughout the period
1172 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, September up to 1984.
1994).
15. Hans Mark, The Space Station: A Personal
11. One of the readers of an early draft of this sec Journey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
tion has commented: “The scars on both sides 1987), p. 121. The Mark book is a fascinating,
left by that (Spacelab) experience were a major highly personal account of the events leading
factor all during the [space station] negotia to the approval of the space station.
tions and still color working relationships.
Attitudes about whether Europe did or did not 16. This monograph is not a comprehensive his
make shrewd agreements, or get its money’s tory of the process leading to a decision to
worth, vary from one senior official to another. proceed with the space station. For such an
Still, Europe’s regional attitude about ‘never account, see Howard E. McCurdy, Space
again’ really drove a lot of things about the Station Decision.
sharing arrangements and the legal regime
agreed for the station. The experience was put 17. One product of the attempts in the first
to good use by Europeans selling the program month of the Reagan administration to cut
at home.” Comments were transmitted in a let the NASA budget that had a significant
ter from NASA Historian Sylvia Fries to the effect on the development of space station
author, November 27, 1989. cooperation was the cancellation in
February 1981 of the U.S. spacecraft
12. See Sebasta, Spacelab in Context, and planned to be part of a joint NASA-ESA
Russo, Big Technology, Little Science, for International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).
discussions of the European assessment of This cancellation was decided on without
Spacelab cooperation. consultation with ESA, and it was met with
outcries from ESA and European scientists
13. The remainder of this section is based on, in and diplomatic protests from several
addition to the sources cited, interviews with European countries. Coupled with the
Robert Freitag, May 31, 1988; Kenneth Spacelab experience, canceling the ISPM
Pedersen, June 15, 1989; James Beggs, spacecraft raised serious doubts in Europe of
February 12, 1989, and April 27, 1990; Hans whether the United States was a dependable
Mark, December 10, 1988; Margaret Finarelli, cooperative partner.
June 13, 1989; Lyn Wigbels, June 15, 1989; Gil
Rye, June 19, 1989; Philip Culbertson, April 18. Advanced P rograms, Office of Space
4,1990; John Hodge, May 4, 1990; and Luther Transportation Systems, NASA Headquarters,
Powell, March 26,1990. The author has also “Proceedings of Space Station Planning
profited from several conversations with Workshop Held at the Michoud Assembly
Terence Finn and Robert Lottmann regarding Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana on
issues discussed in this section and from November 18, 19, and 20, 1981,” undated.
reviewers’ comments on an earlier draft of this
section as transmitted by the previously cited 19. A primary forum for these discussions was a
Fries letter of November 27, 1989, as well as joint NASA-ESA study group chaired by Ivan
comments on the draft by Robert Freitag and Bekey and Robert Freitag of NASA’s Office
Richard Barnes. of Manned Space Flight and Jacques Collet
of ESA’s Space Transportation Directorate.
14. For a discussion of this evolution, see John According to Freitag, James Beggs was fully
Logsdon and George Butler, “Space Station aware of these discussions as he thought
and Space Platform Concepts: A Historical about international involvement in his space
Review,” in Ivan Bekey and Daniel Herman, station initiative. Freitag letter to author,
eds., Space Stations and Space Platforms— November 17, 1989.
Concepts, Design, Infrastructure, and Uses 20. “Proceedings of Space Station Planning
Workshop.” 34. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, p. 3.
21. Interview with Kenneth Pedersen. 35. Interview with Robert Freitag.
22. Pedersen’s remarks appear in Mireille 36. Lyn D. Wigbels, Memorandum for the Record,
Gerard and Pamela Edwards, eds., Space “Space Station International Orientation
Station: Policy, Planning, and Utilization Briefing,” December 3, 1982.
(New York: American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1983), p. 37. Interviews with Kenneth Pedersen, Peggy
116. Finarelli, and Robert Freitag and conversations
with Robert Lottmann.
23. Interview with Kenneth Pedersen. On
changes needed in NASA’s approach to 38. Telex from R.J. Barnes to Pedersen (LI-15),
international space cooperation, see “European Participation in Space Station Study
Kenneth Pedersen, “The Changing Face of Kickoff Meetings—Sept. 13–15,” undated.
International Space Cooperation,” Space Among the major European countries, it was
Policy, May 1986, pp. 123–30, and Kenneth France that took the lead in pushing for an
Pedersen, “The Global Context.” independent European approach to space; for
all ESA members, the memory of the 1981
24. “Space Station Briefing to Headquarters withdrawal of the U.S. spacecraft from the
Officials,” May 25, 1982. cooperative ISPM was still very much fresh.
25. Memorandum from MFA-13/John Hodge to LI- 39. Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space Station, p. 4.
15/Kenneth Pedersen, “Strategy for Particularly galling to space station partners
International Cooperation in Space Station throughout the period covered by this study,
Planning,” July 30, 1982. and even afterward, were the U.S. insistence of
coupling its goal of leadership with invitations
26. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, pp. 8–12. to others to cooperate (presumably as follow
ers) and the explicit acknowledgment that one
27. Ibid., p. 12. For an overview of the technol reason for inviting cooperation was to divert
ogy transfer controversy, see National foreign resources from programs that might be
Academy of Sciences, Balancing the competitive with the United States.
National Interest: U.S. National Security
Export Controls and Global Economic 40. Ibid., p. 117.
Competition (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1987). This study contains 41. Ibid., p. 122.
an extensive bibliography on export control
and technology transfer issues. 42. See McCurdy’s Space Station Decision for a
detailed discussion of SIG (Space) activity
28. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, p. 12. on the space station during 1982 and 1983.
29. See McCurdy, Space Station Decision, Chapter 43. Douglas R. Norton, “Technology Transfer and
9, for a discussion of the task force approach. Space Station Planning,” September 13, 1982.
Norton was the person within NASA’s Office of
30. It is interesting to note that Japan created a International Affairs who was responsible for
Space Station Task Force before the United interactions with the export control community.
States did; this was one indication of how eager
the Japanese were to participate in the program. 44. NASA Space Station/Mission Analysis Studies,
“Proposed Talking Points for DOD,” undated
31. Kenneth Pedersen, “Note for John Hodge— but probably November 1982.
Space Station Efforts in Japan,” May 5, 1982.
45. Ibid. For a review of various perspectives on
32. “Meeting of NASA Administrator and ESA the need to increase protection of technical
Director General, June 17, 1982, ESA Head information from unwanted transfer, see
Office,” Annex 3, ESA/NASA Space Station Harold Relyear, ed., Striking a Balance:
Planning Coordination. National, Security and Scientific Freedom
(Washington, DC: American Association for
33. Ibid. the Advancement of Science, 1985).
46. NASA Space Station/Technology T ransfer, 63. Memorandum f rom LI-15/Director of

“Proposed Talking Points for Schneider-Meeting International Affairs to FA-13/Deputy Director,
(Nov. 3, 1982).” Space Station Task Force, “Policy on
International Involvement in a Space Station,”
47. Interviews with Kenneth Pedersen and July 20, 1983.
Peggy Finarelli.
64. Interviews with James Beggs, Gil Rye, and
48. Letter from Kenneth Pedersen to Gordon Peggy Finarelli.
Woodcock of Boeing Aerospace, December
14, 1982. Similar letters were sent to the other 65. Letter from the President of the United States,
seven mission requirements contractors. January 25, 1984.
49. Interviews with John Hodge, Phil Culbertson, 66. The draft terms of reference as circulated by
and Robert Freitag. Gil Rye on February 6, 1984, said that NASA
“would take the lead” in preparing this report
50. Interviews with Pedersen and Finarelli. and that “other U.S. Government agencies will
be invited to participate in the report’s prepa
51. Letter from James Beggs to Edwin Meese III, ration.” The final terms of reference issued on
May 21, 1982. February 25 said that “NASA will take the
report” and specified that the Department of
52. Reagan’s speech is reprinted in Mark, Space Commerce, the Department of Defense, and
Station, p. 249. The Mark book contains a the Director of Central Intelligence would also
description of this early attempt to gain presi be involved in its preparation. Letter from
dential endorsement for the space station. Robert McFarlane to James Beggs,
February 25, 1984.
53. Ibid., p. 247.
67. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 162.
68. Interview with Peggy Finarelli and letter to
55. “SIG W
orking Group Talking Paper,” author from Thomas Niles, May 1, 1990. See
November 30, 1982. the subsection in this monograph titled “The
Partners Accept the Invitation” for more details
56. Memorandum f rom MFA-13/Executive on the link between space station cooperation
Secretary, SIG-Space Station Working Group, to and summit activities.
SIG-Space Station Working Group Members,
“Record of SIG-Space Station Working Group 69. “Terms of Reference” attached by McFarlane
Meeting, November 22, 1982.” to Beggs letter, February 25, 1984.
57. Mark, Space Station, p. 251. 70. Interview with James Beggs.
58. “Space Station Presentation to the President,” 71. Letter from James Beggs to James A. Baker III,
April 7, 1983. February 19, 1984.
59. McCurdy, Space Station Decision, Chapter 72. Memorandum f rom LI/Director of
17. McCurdy’s book contains a detailed International Affairs to A/Administrator,
account of the steps in the summer and fall “Potential Foreign Contributions to a U.S.
of 1983 leading to the presidential decision Space Station,” January 24, 1984.
to approve the space station.
73. Letter from James Beggs to George Shultz,
60. Mark, Space Station, pp. 164–65, and inter March 16, 1984.
views with James Beggs and Hans Mark.
74. Ibid. and interviews with James Beggs,
61. Ibid., pp. 178–80. Kenneth Pedersen, and Peggy Finarelli.
62. Letter from James Beggs to Robert C. 75. Letter from James Beggs to Kenneth Baker, U.K.
McFarlane, October 31, 1983. Minister of Trade and Industry, April 6, 1984.
Similar letters were sent to top-ranking individ
uals in other countries that Beggs had visited.
76. Letter from Robert C. McFarlane to James and Gabriel Laferranderie, Legal Counsel,
Beggs, February 25, 1984. ESA, respectively, on January 6, 1989, and
February 16, 1990, Jacques Collet, Space
77. Letter from Thomas Niles to the author, Transportation Systems Directorate, ESA, on
May 1, 1990. January 7, 1989, and Roger Bonnet, Director
for Science, ESA, on January 7, 1989, as well
78. Memorandum from LI/Director of as on several conversations with Reimar Luest,
International Affairs to Administrator, “Space Director General, ESA, and George van Reeth,
Station at the London Economic Summit,” Director for Administration, ESA. The author
February 28, 1984. also was helped by conversations with officials
of the French space agency (CNES), including
79. Letter from James Beggs to Honorable H. Daniel Sacotte, Director for International and
Allan Wallis, March 29, 1984. Industrial Affairs, Isaac Revah, Director of
Programs, and Alain Dupas, Long-Range
80. Letter from James Beggs to U.K. Minister of Program Planning, as well as with Hans
Trade and Industry Kenneth Baker, April 6, Hoffman of MBB/ERNO, Gottfreid Greger of
1984. A similar letter was sent to other top the German Ministry for Research and
officials met during the trip. Technology, and James Zimmerman, NASA
European Representative. Finally, the author
81. Ibid. benefited from comments on earlier drafts of
this section by Richard Barnes, former NASA
82. Letter from Beggs to Shultz, March 16, 1984. European Representative, Peggy Finarelli, and
Robert Freitag.
83. One potential partner had already, and
enthusiastically, made the decision to par 88. Resolution ESA/C/X/Res. 2, October 8, 1976.
ticipate. Even before NASA Administrator
Beggs arrived in Rome, Italian President 89. Kenneth Pedersen, “Memorandum for the
Craxi wrote to President Reagan, telling him Record,” February 19, 1982.
that a March 5 meeting of the Italian cabinet
had decided that “Italy . . . is quite ready to 90. Jesco von Puttkamer, “Memorandum for the
study the terms of significant cooperation.” Record: Results of NASA–ESA Advanced
Letter from B. Craxi to Ronald Reagan, Programs Coordination Meeting, February
March 6, 1984. 10–11, 1982, NASA Headquarters,”
February 11, 1982.
84. Economic Summit Communiqué, June 9, 1984.
91. Resolution Concerning the Space Transpor
85. Commenting on an earlier draft of this sec tation Systems Long-Term Preparatory
tion, former NASA European representative Programme,” ESA/C/LIV/ Res. 1, June 22, 1982.
Richard Barnes remarked that “the watering
down of the language on Space Station [in 92. Annex A to “Declaration Concerning a
the Summit communiqué] was a direct Preparatory Programme for Long-Term Space
result of last minute intervention by Jacques Transportation Systems,” ESA/C/LV/Dec.
Attali, the French Sherpa and President (Final), October 6, 1982, updated on
Mitterrand’s right hand man at the Elysee. February 23, 1983.
This was the first, but by no means the last,
example of behind-the-scenes maneuvering 93. Memorandum to Director of International
by the French aimed at impeding the dia Affairs from NASA European Representative,
logue on cooperation.” Personal communi “Highlights of December 8–9 ESA Council
cation to the author, April 5, 1991. Meeting,” December 23, 1982.
86. Hubert Bortzmayer, “Space Station Poses 94. Translation of Le Figaro article (undated) by
Dilemma for Europe,” Aerospace America, NASA European Representative, February 9,
February 1984, p. 26. 1983.
87. In addition to the specific sources cited 95. Jeffrey Lenorovitz, “Germany, Italy Propose
below, this account of European decision- Space Station, Aviation Week and Space
making is based on interviews with Jean Technology, February 20, 1984, pp. 55–56.
Arets, Head of International Affairs, ESA, Quote is on p. 55.
96. For background on French planning, see Office, Office of the Space Station, to
Jeffrey Lenorovitz, “French Plan Unmanned Director, Policy and Plans Office, Office of
Space Station,” Aviation Week and Space the Space Station, “London Trip,” November
Technology, August 3, 1981, pp. 49–51, and 5, 1984, and a letter from Jack Leeming,
David Dickson, “France Pushes Europe Department of Trade and Industry, to John
Toward Manned Space Flight,” Science, Hodge, NASA, August 16, 1984.
January 17, 1986, pp. 209–10. The quote is
from a NASA memorandum from James 105. Summary of meeting attached to a memoran
Morrison, Deputy Director of International dum from Robert Freitag, “UK Policy on Space
Affairs, to Director of Space Station Task Station,” November 2, 1984.
Force, August 16, 1982.
106. Memorandum from Deputy Director to
97. ESA efforts are divided between mandatory Director, “London Trip,” November 5, 1984.
programs, to which member states must con
tribute according to a preset formula, and 107. Dickson, “France Pushes Europe.”
optional programs, to which member states
contribute based on their political and indus 108. Frederic d’Allest, “A Space Policy for
trial interest. Scientific programs are part of Europe,” Le Monde, January 29, 1985, as
the mandatory portion; most large system translated by NASA European
development activities such as Spacelab and Representative Richard Barnes.
Ariane were optional programs.
109. Memorandum from Director of International
98. ESA Resolution ESA/C/LXIV/Res. 4 (Final), Affairs to Administrator, “Visit of Dr. Hans
June 28, 1984. Riesenhuber,” October 14, 1983.
99. European Space Agency, “Outline of a Long- 110. Letter from Hans Riesenhuber to James Beggs,
Term European Space Plan,” ESA/C (84) 46, October 27, 1983, as translated by the
Rev. 1, November 21, 1984, pp. 2–3. German embassy in Washington, DC.
100. Ibid., pp. 16, 17, 22. 111. Translation of the Kohl letter (undated) is
attached to a memorandum from Director of
101. Erik Quistgaard had been replaced in mid International Affairs to Administrator, “Reagan
1984 by Reimar Luest, a German Letter to Kohl,” January 20, 1984.
scientist/administrator. It was Luest who took
the lead for ESA in rallying member-state sup 112. Personal communication from Richard Barnes,
port behind the agency’s long-range plan. April 5, 1991.
102. Eurospace, Towards a European Long-Term 113. Note to Otho Eskin, Department of State, from
Space Programme, 1985. Margaret Finarelli, NASA, “Kohl Letter to the
President,” February 6, 1985.
103. In an attempt to gain the support of some in the
space science community for the space sta 114. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to
tion, NASA had included as part of its station Secretary of State, “Research and Finance
program several large automated Earth obser Ministers Agree on Space Station Financing:
vation platforms in a polar orbit quite separate Final Roadblock to German Participation
from the core station complex. The logic for Removed,” January 1985.
this inclusion was somewhat tenuous; scien
tists were told by NASA managers that the 115. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to
chance of getting approval for these observa Secretary of State, “Press Release on German
tion platforms would be enhanced by associ Participation in U.S. Manned Space Station,”
ating them with the politically strong space sta January 1985.
tion. The reality turned out to be somewhat dif
ferent, and the platforms were separated from 116. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to
the station program in the late 1980s. Secretary of State, “FRG Cabinet Gives Go-
Ahead to Space Station and Ariane 5
104. This discussion is based on an interview Program,” January 1985.
with Peggy Finarelli, a NASA memorandum
from Deputy Director, Policy and Plans
117. Council, European Space Agency, Station Task Force, “Japanese Space Station
“Resolution on the Long-Term European Planning,” July 15, 1982.
Space Plan,” ESA/C-M/LXVII/Res. 1 (Final).
129. Telegram from A. Kubozono, NASDA, to K.
118. Ibid. S. Pedersen, NASA, “NASDA Space Station
Task Force,” July 27, 1982.
119. ESA Council, “Resolution on Participation in
the Space Station Programme,” ESA/ 130. NASA, “Space Station Planning Activities in
C-M/LXVII/Res. 2 (Final), January 31, 1985. Japan,” December 8, 1982.
120. For a discussion of this history, see Logsdon, 131. Mitsubishi Group, “Proposed Japanese
“U.S.-European Cooperation in Space Participation in the U.S. Space Station
Science.” Program,” presented to Japanese govern
ment, September 1982.
121. In addition to the sources cited below, this
account of Japanese consideration of the U.S. 132. Letter from James Beggs to George Shultz,
invitation to participate in the space station January 4, 1983.
program is based on interviews with Kaoru
Mamiya and Masahiro Kawasaki of the 133. Philip Culbertson and Terence Finn, “Visit to
Science and Technology Agency and Japan—March 6–11, 1983,” p. 2.
Masatoshi Saito and Masafumi Miyazawa of
NASDA, May 15, 1991. 134. The subcommittee’s conclusions were
reported by Masatoshi Saito of NASDA at an
122. See the earlier section titled “Origins of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
U.S. Invitation to Cooperate” for an account of Astronautics Symposium in July 1983. See
how the United States, during the 1970–1972 Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space Station,
period, changed the conditions under which pp. 120–22.
foreign participation in the post-Apollo pro
gram was acceptable. These changes applied 135. Informal U.S. Embassy translation of Nihon
to Japan as well as to Europe. Keizai article of October 17, 1983, con
tained in cable from Ambassador Mansfield
123. “Japan’s Space Program: A National Priority,” to Secretary of State, October 1983.
interview with Nobuytki Arino, Executive
Managing Director, TRW Overseas, Aerospace 136. Translation of article that appeared in Nihon
America, March 1985, p. 65. Keizai Shimbun, November 21, 1984, p. 3
(JPRS-JST-85-018-L). MITI had been trying to
124. National Space Development Agency, NASDA get involved in various areas of space activity
185-186, September 1985, p. 8. that NASDA viewed as its “turf” since 1980.
125. Space Activities Commission, “Outline of 137. Ibid.

Japan’s Space Development Policy,” revised on
February 23, 1984 (unofficial translation), p. 7. 138. Letter from Philip Culbertson to Makoto
Miura, December 6, 1984.
126. Andrew Pollack, “Japan’s Space Race Struggle,”
New York Times, August 24, 1984, pp. D1, D5. 139. Cable from Makoto Miura to Philip
For an overview of U.S.-Japanese space rela Culbertson, “Japanese Space Station Phase
tions, see John M. Logsdon, “U.S.-Japan Space B Budget,” December 28, 1984.
Relations at the Crossroads,” Science, Vol. 225,
January 31, 1992, pp. 294–300 and John M. 140. Letter from Tadahiro Sekimoto to James
Logsdon, Learning from the Leader: The Early Beggs, March 6, 1985.
Years of Japanese-U.S. Space Relations
(Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, 141. Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station
George Washington University, 1998). Program, Space Activities Commission,
“Basic Plan for Japanese Participation in the
127. Ibid. Space Station Program” (Final Report—unof-
ficial translation), April 10, 1985, pp. 14–16.
128. Memorandum from Director of
International Affairs to Director, Space
142. In addition to the sources cited below, this 149. Karl Doetsch, “Space Station-Canadian
account of Canadian consideration of the Considerations for Participation,” paper
U.S. invitation to participate in the space enclosed with a letter from Doetsch to P.E.
station program is based on interviews with Culbertson, NASA, December 20, 1984.
Mac Evans and Karl Doetsch, respectively,
Canadian Space Agency, on June 10, 1989, 150. Interview with William Cockburn.
and March 13, 1990, and with William
Cockburn, then Counsellor for Science and 151. Cable from Ambassador Robinson to
Technology, Embassy of Canada, on Secretary of State, “Canadian Manned Space
August 10, 1988. Station Considerations,” January 1985.
143. “Canadian Astronaut Program Announced,” 152. Cable from Secretary of State Shultz to
Press Release, Ministry of State for American Embassy, Ottawa, “Canadian
Economic Development, Science and Contribution to the Manned Space Station,”
Technology, June 8, 1983. February 1985.
144. Doetsch’s remarks are in Gerard and 153. Canada’s Interim Space Plan, 1985–1986,
Edward, eds., Space Station, p. 118. reprinted in Kirton, Canada, the United
States, and Space, p. 101.
145. National Research Council of Canada,
“Canadian Participation in Space Station, in 154. Summary, “The Quebec Summit,” March
John Kirton, ed., Canada, the United States, 18, 1985.
and Space (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 1986), p.110. 155. Quoted in Kirton, Canada, the United
States, and Space, p. 100.
146. Ibid. and interview with William Cockburn.
156. See, however, John M. Logsdon, “Inter
147. Doetsch in Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space national Cooperation in the Space Station
Station, p. 118. Programme: Assessing the Experience to
Date,” Space Policy, February 1991,
148. Memorandum from Kenneth Pedersen, “Results pp. 35–46.
of Space Station Trip,” March 21, 1984.

TOGETHER IN ORBIT
John M. Logsdon
NASA Headquarters
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TOGETHER IN ORBIT

The Origins of International

NASA History Division

Office of Policy and Plans

Monographs in Aerospace History #11

Origins of the U.S. Invitation to Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Making the Space Station International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

The Space Station Decision Process and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

The Partners Accept the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Canada Sets Its Space Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Monographs in Aerospace History

Monographs in Aerospace History

Monographs in Aerospace History

Origins of the U.S.

Background had so changed the possibilities for international

Monographs in Aerospace History

This 1982 artist’s conception depicts a

Monographs in Aerospace History

Monographs in Aerospace History

Responsible for space policy matters within the

space station approval—convincing Reagan and his eligible for cooperation?

advisors of the merits of the program—bore fruit. Still,

Monographs in Aerospace History

Monographs in Aerospace History

Introduction kicking a proposal of the magnitude of the space

The results of the NASA Administrator’s rapid

informed of progress of these studies with the view technologies;

this committee included representatives from vari­

cate that Japan considered the space station to be space activities.131

a project of government-wide interest, not just the

tant to many Canadian applications. Also, Canada leadership.

saw the station, with its requirements for in-orbit

from participation. invitation of the United States to participate in the

Monographs in Aerospace History

Monographs in Aerospace History

Workshop.” 34. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, p. 3.

46. NASA Space Station/Technology T ransfer, 63. Memorandum f rom LI-15/Director of

125. Space Activities Commission, “Outline of 137. Ibid.

Monographs in Aerospace History

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this committee included representatives from vari