Section 6 – 10 of Limitation Act, 1963

DISABILITY

Section 6 deals with Legal Disability

i. Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a
decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane,
or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the
disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor
in the third column of the Schedule;

ii. Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned,
affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by
another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period
after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified;

iii. Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may
institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified;

iv. Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death of
the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-
sections (1) and (2) shall apply;

v. Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period
allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available
to that person had he not died.

For the purposes of this section, „minor‟ includes a child in the womb.

The combined effect of section 6 and Section 8 being that would be to enable the person,

who has been disposed of during his minority, to file a suit within 3 years of his attaining
majority or within the usual period of time ordinarily allowable to a major, whichever is

longer.

Section 65 of the Limitation Act makes it clear that the time will continue to run even

during the disability of a person. It does not give afresh starting point. Section 6 does not

prevent the running of time as against a person under disability. This section only extends

the person under disability is entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period

mentioned in the schedule calculated from the cessation of his disability subject to the

limitation mentioned in section 8.

The benefit of Section 6 applies to the person who is entitled to sue or apply for the

execution of decree at the commencement of the limitation. The section does not apply to

the person who cannot sue or apply for the execution of decree at the commencement of

the limitation.1

This section does not apply to cases where a person is not under any disability even

though the suit or the application is for the benefit of the person who is labouring under a

disability.2 Thus, this section is only applicable only to cases where the person who

makes the application is labouring under disability.

Onus of proof lies on the person who relies on the provision.3 He must allege in the

plaint that his case comes within one of them and then prove the facts on the strength of

1
General fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Jan Mohammad, AIR 1941 PC 6
2
General fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Jan Mohammad, AIR 1941 PC 6
3
Gopi Nath v Satish Chandra, AIR 1964 All 53
which he is entitled to rely upon those provisions. 4 If the lunacy or the alleged disability

cannot be proved than section 6 will not be attracted.5

Section 7 deal with Disability of one of several persons

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can
be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of
giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has
ceased.

This section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability, including a liability in respect
of any immovable property.

For the purposes of this section, the Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the
Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence
of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the joint family property.

Section 7 applies to cases of persons whose substantive rights is joint, and not to persons
whose rights are several though they may join together under Order I, Rule 1 of Civil
Procedure Code for the purpose of instituting a suit.6

The principle underlying section 7 is that when one of the several persons jointly entitled to
institute a suit under disability and if there is any other member, who can give a valid
discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability, the time will begin to run
from the date when that member competent to give a discharge can institute a suit.

Under section 7, the capacity or incapacity to give discharge is intended to relate to legal
capacity or incapacity.

4
Mehar Singh v KArtar Singh, AIR 1952 Pepsu 85
5
Devgonda Patil v Shamgonda Patil, AIR 1992 Bom 189
6
Ponnamma v Padmanabham, AIR 1969 Ker 163
In order to attract the terms of section 7, it is necessarily that one of the several persons
jointly entitled to institute a suit under disability and a discharge can be given without the
concurrence of such person by the other person jointly entitled to institute the suit.

Section 8 deals with Special exceptions

Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall

be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the
death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application.

The provisions of this section are not applicable to cases, to which a period of limitations is
prescribed by special or local law. This section refers to periods of limitations prescribed by
the Act itself and has no application to a case where the decree is barred by other special or
local law.

The combined effect of section 6, section 7 and section 8 results in

i. Where the ordinary period of limitation expires at the end of three years from the cessation
of disability. In such cases also the period of limitation cannot be extended under section 6 or
section 7 and such extension would contravene the provision of section8. 7

Thus section 8 imposes a limitation on the concession provided under section 6 or section 7
of the act to a maximum of three years after the cessation of disability. 8 Section 8 is a
proviso to section 6 or section7.

Section 9 deals with Continuous running of time.

Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or
make an application stops it:

Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to
his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be
suspended while the administration continues.

7
Darshan Singh v Gurdev Singh, AIR 1995 SC 75
8
Kolandavai v Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Mad 541.
Thus section 8 states that once a limitation has commenced to run it would continue to run
unless it is stopped by virtue of any express any statutory provisions.

Section 9 applies to cases where the cause action persists, no cases where cause of action is
cancelled by subsequent events.9

SUITS AGAINST TRUSTEES AND CONTRACTS ENTERED OUTSIDE

TERRITORIES

Section 10 deals with suits against trustees and their representatives

Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a
person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his
legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the
purpose of following in his or their hands such property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an
account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.

For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist
religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a
specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.

The object behind the section is that the trust should not suffer from misfeasance or non-
misfeasance or non-misfeasance of a trustee10. Section 10 grants a total exemption in regard
to suits mentioned in the section.11 A guardian under Guardians and Wards Act is not covered
by the section.12

The word, “trust” used in Section 10 of the Limitation Act us held to carry the same meaning
as in the Trusts Act.13

Swapna v. Thankavelu ((1990) 2 Ker LT 604), Justice Krishnamoorthy, following the

decisions reported in AIR 1985 SC 628 (Pratibha Rani v. Surajkumar and (1989) 1 Ker LT
636 (Maniyamma v. Abdul Rasaak), held that the husband is in the position of a trustee so far
9
SR Goel v Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1985 SC 1036
10
A. Pillai v State, AIR 1972 Ker 39
11
Beli Ram and Brothers v Md. Afzal, AIR 1948 PC 168
12
Mirabai v Kaushalyabai, AIR 1949 Nag 235
13
Chidambara Vinayagar Bevasthanam c Chidambaran Chettiar, (1943) 2 MLJ 389
as the ornaments and utensils entrusted to him by the wife are concerned and under Section
10 of the Indian Limitation Act there shall not be any limitation for such such a suit by the
wife against husband.