STANDARD

DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
REFERENCE REV
TITLE: PROTECTION APPLICATION SCSASACJ0 0
PHILOSOPHY DATE JULY 2002
PAGE 1 OF 11
REVISION DATE:
JULY 2005
TESCOD APPROVED
COMPILED BY FUNCTIONAL RESP. APPROVED BY AUTHORIZED BY

Signed Signed Signed Signed

.............................. ................................... .............................. ............................
H D Mills H D Mills P R Groenewald M N Bailey
Protection SC for TESCOD DTM for ED(D)
Chairman

Contents
Page

Foreword .................................................................................................................................................... 2
1 Scope ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
2 Normative references............................................................................................................................. 2
3 Definitions and abbreviations................................................................................................................. 3
3.1 Definitions............................................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... 3
3.3 Conventions used .................................................................................................................. 3
4 Design guide .......................................................................................................................................... 4
4.1 Current transformers. ............................................................................................................. 4
4.2 Power transformers................................................................................................................ 5
4.3 Line protection........................................................................................................................ 7
4.4 Cable networks. ..................................................................................................................... 9
4.5 Metal-clad switchgear ............................................................................................................ 9
4.6 Busbar protection. .................................................................................................................. 9
4.7 Telecontrol............................................................................................................................ 10

Annex
A Revision information ........................................................................................................................... 11
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Foreword
This guide was prepared through the efforts and contributions of the following:

Hilton Mills
Izak van der Merwe
Paul Gerber
Vic Christie
Patrick Arendse
Keith Harley
Andrew Craib
Rudi Kleinhans
Angelo Duthie
Armien Edwards
André de Jongh
Anura Perera

1 Scope

1.1 Purpose
To set out protection application philosophies and application issues for the majority of distribution
applications.

1.2 Applicability
This standard is applicable to all Distribution Group protection applications including interfacing with
customers or other supply utilities.

2 Normative references.
The following documents contain provisions that, through reference in the text, constitute
requirements of this standard. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All
standards and specifications are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this standard
are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the documents
listed below. Information on currently valid national and international standards and specifications can
be obtained from the Information Centre at Megawatt Park and on Eskom documents from the Eskom
Documentation Centre at Megawatt Park.

SG 000/14 Information Manual on Protection Systems (I.M.P.S.)

E2-44 Series of Protection reports.

SABS 0200: 1985, Neutral earthing in medium voltage industrial power systems.

ESKASAAO4: Rev 1, Standard for electronic protection and fault monitoring equipment for power
systems.

SCSASABB2: Rev 0, Design standard for a.c. and d.c. distribution systems (draft).

NRS 048-2: 1997, Quality of supply Part 2 Minimum standards

SCSASACI9: Rev 0, Standard design for distribution protection schemes

SCSAGAAI0: Rev 0, Protection Guide: Line Distance Protection up to and Including132 kV

SCSAGAAG0: Rev 3, Transformer Protection Philosophy

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SCSAGAAQ0: Rev 0, Rural Reticulation Protection: Section 0 – Network Philosophies

SCSAGAAP9: Rev 0, Rural Reticulation Protection: Section 1 - Settings Guideline

SCSSCAAQ2: Rev 0, Specification for a Medium Voltage Reticulation Protection Scheme

SCSSCAAQ3: Rev 0, Phase III protection schemes for 11 kV and 22 kV reticulation cable feeders

SCSASAAN1: Rev 0, Settings for reticulation feeder sensitive earth fault relays and associated auto-
reclosing

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

3.1.1 direct transfer trip: A signal that causes a remote end to trip without reclose irrespective of
that end sensing the fault or not, for example, local ”breaker fail” condition.

3.1.2 permissive signals: A signal that assists the protection device to make a trip decision, for
example, permissive overreach impedance relaying.

3.1.3 intertrip: A signal that causes a remote end to trip and reclose irrespective of that end sensing
the fault or not, for example, remote weak infeed condition.

3.1.4 protection scheme: All switches, relays, controls, indications, wiring, terminals and the
cabinets housing these items, that provide the required protection functionality for the specific
application.

3.2 Abbreviations

3.2.1 a.c.: Alternating current

3.2.2 A: Ampere(s)
3.2.3 ARC: Auto reclose
3.2.4 CT: Current transformer
3.2.5 DTT: Direct Transfer Trip
3.2.6 d.c.: Direct current
3.2.7 HV: High-voltage
3.2.8 PNH: Protection not healthy
3.2.9 QOS: Quality of Supply
3.2.10 RTU: Remote terminal unit
3.2.11 SE/F: Sensitive earth fault
3.2.12 VT: Voltage transformer

3.3 Conventions used

3.3.1 anti pump timer: The philosophy is such that the protection scheme shall have this timer
fitted, irrespective of a timer being available on or within the circuit-breaker. This enables all
protection related timer settings to be applied (and tested) at the protection panels, without any
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devices being exposed to outdoor conditions. Where a circuit-breaker has a timer and circuitry fitted,
this shall be disabled to allow the panel mounted device to operate correctly.

3.3.2 cross tripping philosophy: Where protection schemes have been designed with “back-up”
tripping philosophy, and applied to circuit-breakers with two trip coils, all tripping signals shall “cross
trip” and effectively provide a trip signal to both trip coils.

3.3.3 current transformer orientation: The Eskom practice of orientation of High Voltage
Current Transformers (CTs) is that the P1 terminal always faces the busbar. The P2 terminal faces
the item of plant. For bus coupler / bus section CTs, the P1 terminal faces the circuit-breaker. For the
detailed reasoning for the orientation, see the CT section in 4.1.

3.3.4 primary power plant equipment arrangement (PPPE): PPPE is physically positioned
from the busbar in the following order : Busbar link, circuit-breaker, CT, line VT (where used), line link
and line surge arrester for HV line bays. Where the use of power line carriers is required for
teleprotection communication purposes, the line trap and coupling capacitor are mounted on the line
side of the line link. For applications requiring line VTs and power line carriers, the coupling capacitor
may be replaced with a capacitive VT combined with a coupling capacitor. The transformer bay power
plant equipment is physically positioned from either busbar as follows: Transformer busbar link, circuit-
breaker, CT, transformer link and transformer. Transformer surge arresters are physically positioned
as close to the transformer bushings as possible to ensure optimal surge protection, preferably
mounted on special brackets on the transformer tank itself. MV feeder bays utilize combined CTs and
circuit-breaker devices within a single ‘dog-box’ cubicle, with the physical positions from the MV
busbar as follows: Busbar link, circuit-breaker and CT cubicle, line link and line surge arrester.

3.3.5 tripping philosophy: For all schemes that utilize unit trip protection elements, this output shall
trip the associated circuit-breaker directly, and possibly operate a latching type relay as well (i.e.
restricted earth fault, transformer differential, etc. operating a master trip relay).

3.3.6 voltage transformer applications: Three single-phase busbar-connected VTs are utilized for
standard distance based HV line protection schemes. Where synchronizing or single pole tripping
schemes are utilized, an additional single, line connected VT, will be required. For each section of
busbar a separate VT is required where either measurement or protection functionality dictates their
use. For metal-clad switchgear applications, a five-limb VT will be required. Each transformer shall
have a single MV VT available for measuring the transformer tap-change voltage.

4 Design standard

4.1 Current transformers.

4.1.1 CT star points : Standard Eskom practice with regard to the connection and earthing of
current transformers is such that the item of plant to be protected, has the star point of the CTs facing
the item of plant. For example: CTs connected to a distance relay, protecting the HV line, have the
star point of the CTs connected towards the line side, busbar protection has the buszone CT star
points connected so that they face each other across the busbar and transformer CT star points face
each other across the transformer (where applicable). The reason for this practice is to enable the
secondary quantities vector diagram representation to replicate the primary quantities. The
Measurements discipline utilizes a convention that considers load flow and thus their orientation could
be different to that of the Protection discipline.

4.1.2 CT star point earth connection: The utilized CT star points are connected to earth at
the protection panel and not at the junction box. This enables field teams to test the earth connection
of the CT from within the control room, and not from within the substation yard. All CT cores shall be
connected to earth at one point only, to prevent the possibility of circulating currents. CTs are earthed
to prevent voltage build-up that could occur due to capacitive coupling with the HV / MV system. CTs
connected to tertiary windings of transformers shall, similarly, be earthed at one point only.
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4.1.3 CT cores - Over-lapping zones: The utilization of CT cores is such that zones of
protection are arranged to over-lap each other. The principle of over-lapping zones of protection shall
be applied wherever possible, thereby emphasizing protection dependability and reducing the
potential for any “blind spot” for the protection elements. A “blind spot’” refers to a fault position that
does not cause fault current to flow through the CT connected to a protection element.

4.1.4 Unused CT Cores: Unused CT cores are shorted out and earthed at the CT junction box
and are not brought back to the control room or the protection panel. This practice reduces the
number of control cable cores required between the primary plant and the control room.

4.1.5 P1 - P2 orientation: The philosophy regarding P1 and P2 orientation of primary

connections of CTs, is that the P2 terminal of post type CTs is connected to the metal outer casing of
the CT. Therefore any fault or flashover at this point is detected by protection elements as a line fault
rather than a busbar fault, resulting in the minimum plant being removed from service for this fault
condition. The P1 terminal of post type CTs faces the circuit-breaker. Transformer internal CTs have
terminal P1 facing the outer extremities of the plant.

4.1.6 Eskom / Customer / Utility Supply Interface: Where the protection application and
design results in the direct supply of electricity to an Eskom customer or utility, substantial cost
savings can be achieved by the removal of redundant or duplicated equipment, without compromising
the protection security or dependability. Typical cases are where transformer MV circuit-breakers are
omitted and the supply to the customer is through MV power cables. The customer usually utilizes
metal-clad switchgear, but this discussion can equally be applied to outdoor-equipped substations.
For this application the installation of MV CTs is usually required within the Eskom substation, to allow
secure tariff metering to be applied.

Where the transformer size (and hence cost) dictates the application of transformer differential
elements, the Eskom MV CT shall be used to terminate the transformer differential connections. The
transformer MV Restricted Earth Fault (RE/F) is thus applied between the NEC/R and the customer
MV feeder CTs, and in so doing, provides suitable MV power cable protection. The rationale for this
application is to allow easy identification of most faults. For a transformer HV fault, the flagging would
typically be HV RE/F, Differential and/or transformer mechanical protection (Buchholz, pressure relief
etc.) Transformer MV faults (inclusive of the NEC/R) would result in MV RE/F, differential and / or
transformer mechanical protection (Buchholz, pressure relief etc.) However, for MV power cable
faults, only MV RE/F would provide flagging information. The assumption here is that the MV power
cable has an earthed screen and therefore any cable fault, would result in rapid detection and opening
of circuit-breakers.

Where the Eskom/customer interface results in the use of non-Eskom owned/maintained circuit-
breakers, tripping supplies and CTs, it is recommended that the tripping supply and trip circuit are
supervised by suitable alarm circuitry and remotely indicated by Eskom’s telecontrol system. In this
way, dependability is maintained. For any installation the possible benefits of rationalizing the power
plant to be installed shall be investigated to determine the potential effects upon dependability and
security. Where multiple transformers are connected to the same MV busbar, suitable unit type
protection shall be considered to complement the extended RE/F protection elements. This shall only
be considered where the transformer size and hence cost, justifies this additional relaying.

4.2 Power transformers

The Distribution protection application philosophy applicable to power transformers is described in the
transformer protection philosophy, SCSAGAAG0: Rev 3, Transformer Protection Philosophy. In
addition to the philosophy document the following points shall be noted:

4.2.1 Master Trip : A master trip operation shall cause the transformer forced cooling system to
trip, in an attempt to minimize the fire threat by stopping fanning of the flames.

4.2.2 Buchholz relays: For areas subjected to earth tremors special consideration shall be
given to Buchholz relays using mercury switches (i.e. an anti-seismic type relay). Ensure that the
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transformer specification includes this item. Care shall also be exercised regarding the calibration of
the oil surge portion of the Buchholz relays. Where MV earthing has been resistively limited to a pre-
determined value, the oil flow within the NEC/R tank and conservator, due to the heating effects of the
fault current within the device, has previously caused maloperation of Buchholz relays due to
uncalibrated surge elements. Care shall be exercised to ensure that the oil pipe between the device
tank and conservator is sufficiently sized to allow the oil flow not to operate the Buchholz relay surge
element.

4.2.3 Transformer feeder: This particular application refers to a typical substation where a
transformer, connected to a HV busbar through a HV circuit-breaker, supplies a single MV feeder. The
feeder length could be substantial and the load remote from the transformer. With no MV circuit-
breaker fitted at the transformer, special attention shall be paid where bus strip relays are fitted. A
system utilizing Direct Transfer Trip via a suitable communications channel would be required to trip
the remote transformer MV circuit-breaker. Special precautions shall be taken for the transformer MV
circuit and possible back-feeding the network or transformer must be avoided. Where fitted, bus strip
relays on the line (feeder) side of the transformer, shall be immobilized, as there could be a risk that
the busbar behind the transformer (i.e. the HV side) is stripped, due to the remote MV line circuit-
breaker being slow in operation. Where a risk of back-feeding the HV circuit exists, the back-up relays
installed at the transformer MV circuit-breaker (remote end), shall be directional to provide secure
back-up in the event of a communications failure.

4.2.4 Feeder transformer: This particular application refers to a typical substation where a HV
feeder, connected to a busbar through a HV circuit-breaker, supplies a remote transformer or
transformer bank. The feeder length could be substantial and the remote transformer does not utilize
a local HV circuit-breaker. A conventional feeder protection scheme, i.e. distance protection or feeder
current differential protection, shall be applied to provide protection for line faults. A system utilizing
Direct Transfer Trip via a suitable communications channel would be required to trip the remote feeder
circuit-breaker in case of a transformer fault. Special precautions shall be taken for the transformer
MV circuit and possible back-feeding the HV network must be avoided. Where a risk of back-feeding
the HV circuit exists, the over-current and earth fault relays installed at the transformer MV circuit-
breaker end, shall be directional to provide a trip signal to the transformer MV circuit-breaker. Any
“breaker fail” protection shall operate a secure direct transfer trip signal to the remote end of the
system.

4.2.5 Circuit-breaker trip coils: On certain circuit-breakers, where only a single trip coil is
available, the impact of this limitation for tripping and closing circuits, within the scheme design, shall
be taken into consideration. The transformer MV circuit-breakers shall have main and back-up trip
circuits connected together to operate a single trip coil.

4.2.6 Power transformer earthing arrangements: Although the earthing standards

document provides information relating to the earthing requirements, this document provides further
analysis of the various earthing practices.

4.2.6.1 HV Earthing

132 kV: Transformers purchased up to 2001 are solidly earthed at all installations due to insulation
requirements for transformer windings. Usually the winding insulation is fully graded and the potential
rise permitted at the star point is limited. This achieves a cost saving relating to the amount of
insulation required for the safe operation of the transformer.

The HV winding insulation of all transformers purchased from 2002 onwards will be partially graded
and it will be possible to protect the transformer HV neutral with a surge arrester instead of solidly
earthing it.

88 kV: Generally the neutral is protected by a 66 kV surge arrester (i.e. partially graded transformer
winding insulation.). This may not always be the case and specific installations could be solidly
earthed at remote positions to assist with protection settings discrimination. The multiple earthing of
the 88 kV system has been avoided due to the complexity introduced by the flow of zero sequence
currents in a faulted network, which leads to difficulties with distance relays installed at the source
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under-reaching the intended zone of protection. Although these effects can be compensated for in
solidly earthed networks by suitable system modelling, it is preferred that these complications are
avoided as these lines usually have numerous substations Teed-off the HV line.

66 kV / 44 kV : Similar to the 88 kV system earthing, i.e. protected by a suitable surge arrester.

4.2.6.2 MV Earthing

MV – 33 kV / 22 kV / 11 kV: Earthed through a NEC/R to limit earth fault current. The objective is to
comply with the SABS 0200-1985 code of practice.

4.2.7 Transformer bus zone applications: Where an application requires the installation of
HV busbar protection, the operation of the HV bus zone shall cause tripping of both transformer HV
and MV circuit-breakers. This practice ensures the clearing of any faults between the HV CTs and the
HV circuit-breaker by removing the possibility of back-feeding the transformer from the MV side, even
if the fault was initially cleared by the tripping of the HV circuit-breaker. Where MV busbar protection
has been fitted, for the operation of this protection, it is preferable not to trip both transformer circuit-
breakers. The rationale here is that the MV busbar protection shall trip the MV circuit-breaker only,
thus attempting to maintain the auxiliary supply especially in the case of single transformer
installations. If the condition exists as in the argument for the HV busbar tripping philosophy, i.e.
clearing of any faults between the MV CTs and the MV circuit-breaker, these faults shall be cleared
through the transformer scheme Sustained Fault Timer. For “breaker fail” protection, see 4.6, Busbar
protection.

4.3 Line protection

The Distribution protection application philosophy applicable to line protection is described in the line
protection philosophy, SCSAGAAI0: Rev 0, Protection Guide: Line Distance Protection up to and
Including 132 kV. In addition to the philosophy document the following points shall be noted:

4.3.1 Line check protection.

Line check protection is applied to cater for the condition of a circuit-breaker being closed onto a fault,
for example, working earths not removed. Closing the circuit-breaker either manually or remotely by
telecontrol, should enable the line check feature for at least a few hundred milli-seconds following
closure. The feature is arranged to provide an instantaneous 3-pole trip and lock-out. The uses of
line check are to cater for a number of faults that can have a circuit-breaker closed onto the fault.
Care should be taken to prevent the scheme from tripping on line check for cold load conditions.
These faults can be categorized into :-

• terminal faults. (i.e. bolted earths inadvertently left connected);

• mid point faults. (i.e. Zone 1 reach);

• far end faults (i.e. last 20 % of line).

4.3.2 HV lines 132kV to 33kV

4.3.2.1 Short lines : Lines less than 10 km (* see Note 1 ) in length and interconnected.

Digital Current Differential protection with suitable communications link. (see Note 2)

Where possible the use of directional back-up shall be considered when the grading of interconnected
or looped in-out feeders becomes difficult to achieve.

Note 1 With the variable costs associated with digital communications by fibre optic versus the cost
of traditional power line carrier or digital radio links, the line length to justify the break-even point would
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vary as technological advances are made within the telecommunications industry. Therefore the line
length justification should be performed for most applications.

Note 2 Past protection performance has indicated the use of “dark” fibre with digital current
differential relays is preferred. Systems utilizing managed fibre (using Bandwidth Management
Equipment –BMEs) or digital radio (TDMA) have performed poorly. Therefore until the performance
has indicated otherwise, these systems are to be avoided except when a 99.9 % availability can be
provided. In cases where fibre is used as the telecommunication link, only “dark” fibre shall be used.
The “dark” fibre may be multiplexed for teleprotection purposes only.

4.3.2.2 Long lines: Lines longer than 10 km.

Interconnected - Distance relays with permissive tripping channel. The permissive channel may be a
power line carrier, radio link, TDMA or “dark” fibre.

Where possible the use of directional back-up shall be considered when the grading of interconnected
or looped in-out feeders becomes difficult to achieve. This shall be done using the normal application
of placing the directional relay on the source side of the looped busbar with the directional elements
towards the source.

Radial - Distance relays shall be set to cover the line, plus a portion of the HV transformer winding in
Zone 1 with the MV busbars covered in Zone 3. This applies to Teed systems where the HV
transformer star point(s) are not solidly earthed (see earthing arrangements in 4.2.6.1). This is to
overcome potential problems with zero sequence currents being sourced by the transformer leading to
inaccurate measurements by distance relays. The advent of a multi-terminal current differential
scheme would require this to be reconsidered. In cases where the remote substation has a HV
busbar installed (because of the number of transformers fitted or additional line bays), it is not
necessary to install buszone protection at the remote HV busbar. Faults at this point are covered by
the Zone 1 elements of the distance relay at the source substation (see note 4 below).

Notes :

1) Single distance relays are usually used with dual distance relays applied on specific request.
Typically Transmission interface where QOS issues are predominant.

2) The application of Teeing-off 132 kV lines is not preferred and the looping in and out arrangement
is to be considered wherever possible.

3) At the end of the line, suitable care must be exercised to ensure that for any MV interconnection,
the MV busbar can be isolated from the transformer MV, to permit back-energizing of rural reticulation
networks.

4.3.2.3 Short line / long line scenario.

The Zones 2 and 3 elements from the shorter first line, cannot provide effective cover for the longer
line following the shorter line and the resultant over-tripping at the short line source will be to the
detriment of any consumers at the busbar following the short line. Further points to consider are the
potentially high fault current and resulting dips on the source busbar. QOS considerations at points of
common coupling must be considered (Traditional Zone 1 of 80 % of short line, with balance of line in
Zone 2 tripping time). Similar conditions exist for zone extension schemes where over-tripping could
occur. For applications where consumers connected to the busbar at the source or at the busbar
following the first short line, have stringent QOS requirements, consideration for application of unit
protection (current differential) to the short line might have to be taken. This scenario would require
the addition of busbar protection at the end of the short line.

Where this condition is reversed (i.e. short line following a long line), the resulting Zones 2 and 3
clearance times become tolerable due to the reduction of the fault currents for these systems. The
magnitude of the voltage depression at the point of common coupling shall always be determined and
evaluated.
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4.3.2.4 Auto-reclose.

Single shot (i.e. two trips to lock-out) auto-reclose for the main protection relay (Current Differential or
Distance) and for the High-Set elements on both O/C & E/F. The practice of auto-reclosing for
delayed tripping (IDMTL or DTL) should be avoided due to the back-up nature of these elements, and
the delayed nature of the tripping. (Prolonging the voltage depression and possible increased plant
damage)

Auto-reclose dead time of 3 s has been applied to 3-pole tripping schemes. Single-pole dead time of
1 s has achieved suitable performance in the past with a 3-pole trip and lock-out if the fault persists.
These times have been used for a number of years; the only criterion is for the arc products and
ionized air to dissipate (maximum 400 ms) before re-energizing the line. Therefore the current 1 s and
3 s dead times are deemed to be suitable.

4.3.3 MV lines - 11 kV / 22 kV and radial 33 kV.

Most applications are for radial overhead feeders where O/C and E/F relaying would suffice. For
interconnected or ring configurations, Directional O/C, E/F and SE/F shall be applied. For overhead
lines SE/F shall be applied. For further information see the rural feeder specification SCSSCAAQ2,
the philosophy document SCSAGAAQ0, settings philosophy SCSAGAAP9, and the SE/F standard
setting document SCSASAAN1.

4.3.3.1 Auto-reclose

Past practice utilized auto-reclose of up to 4 shots (4 trips to lock-out) for all fault types and this should
be reconsidered for phase 3 and future schemes. However, before altering the existing practice, the
nature of the area should also be considered so as to apply ARC as urban, semi-urban and rural
because these areas have vastly different safety criteria and associated risks. The differentiation
between earth-faults and phase-to-phase faults (with no earth-fault current) could also be utilized for
different reclosing philosophies.

4.4 Cable networks.

4.4.1 General

Cable networks operating in an open ring configuration, would typically have O/C and E/F with no
ARC or SE/F applied. Overcurrent settings are usually selected for cable emergency overload values.
Where cable networks are required to operate at high loading for prolonged periods of time, cable
protection may be achieved by thermal protection elements, set for the particular cable thermal
capabilities. For further cable information see the cable feeder specification SCSSCAAQ3.

4.5 Metal-clad switchgear

Indoor metal-clad switchgear has generally only been used where the feeders are predominantly
cable or where aesthetic and / or physical space considerations are prominent. The protection relays
are usually mounted on the switchgear and not on separate panels, to achieve cost savings on control
room sizing and panel costs. For metal-clad switchgear busbar protection, see 4.6. The voltage
transformer applications for metal-clad switchgear shall consider the Eskom earthing philosophy and
the possible use of directional protection. For these reasons a voltage factor of 1,9 and a five limb
core design are essential.

4.6 Busbar protection.

4.6.1 HV Lines : For interconnected lines protected with unit type protection, busbar protection
shall be used, as the Zones 2 or 3 protection or back-up elements from the source lines, would
typically protect the busbar. For network configurations consisting of a short line followed by a long
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line, the busbar connecting these two lines could warrant busbar protection, but voltage dip effects at
the source end must be evaluated. QOS standards as specified in NRS 048-2 would be the deciding
factor. For 66 kV to 132 kV substations, high impedance busbar protection schemes have been used,
but low or medium impedance type schemes could be utilized based on scheme costs and the
availability of suitable CT cores.

4.6.2 MV Lines : Busbar protection shall only be considered for special cases where consumers
connected to the particular busbar, fed from an interconnected or duplicate fed MV system, have a
supply agreement specifically related to QOS constraints.

4.6.3 Metal-clad switchgear : With the requirement for internal arc specifications to be met,
the addition of high speed tripping for internal arcs has resulted in the development of a “2 out of 2”
protection scheme. This scheme uses both an overcurrent condition and an internal flash or high
pressure to initiate high speed tripping of the circuit-breakers associated with the metal-clad
switchgear. Due to the poor dependability of frame leakage type busbar protection, it is not
recommended for any application.

Based on Technical bulletin 99TI-014, it is compulsory to install internal arc protection on all new
metal-clad switchgear. The most important and obvious reason is that is for safety purposes of both
personnel and plant. Metal-clad switchgear is currently rated to withstand the mechanical forces and
damage due to an internal arcing fault for 200 ms. After that major damage and injury may occur.

4.7 Telecontrol.
Because of the importance of substations with voltages higher than 44 kV, telecontrol shall be fitted.
This implies that substations with voltages of 66 kV, 88 kV and 132 kV shall be designed with
telecontrol facilities. The application of telecontrol to other voltage levels shall be based on requests
from Regional Control Centres where the relevant importance of telecontrol and the benefits thereof
can be evaluated. Due to the ever-increasing demand for telecontrol and automation, any future
expansion at existing stations shall be designed with the view to telecontrol at some point of time. The
circuit-breakers shall therefore have spring charging motors fitted, usually for 110 V d.c., and the
protection schemes shall be designed to support the Telecontrol Standard.
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Annex A
(informative)

Revision information

DATE REV. NO. NOTES

July 2002 0 Original issue.