Jarco Marketing Co. v. Court of Appeals
If not, then he is guilty of
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong,
Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's
branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents
Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and
the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at
the department store. Criselda was signing her
credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and beheld her daughter
pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter
structure. She was crying and shouting for help.
He was brought to Makati Medical Center,
where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years
old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners
the reimbursement of the hospitalization,
medical bills and wake and funeral expenses,
which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a
complaint for damages wherein they sought the
payment of P157, 522.86 for actual damages,
P300, 000 for moral damages, P20, 000 for
attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for
loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter
was Zhieneth’s act of clinging to it. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
It found that petitioners were negligent in
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.
The counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous. It also ruled that the child was
incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now
seek for the reversal of this decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was
accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether
the same was attributable to private respondents
for maintaining a defective counter or to
CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside
the store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event
in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event
or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, an event which under
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens." On the other
hand, negligence is the omission to do
something, which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations, which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something, which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Negligence is
"the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." The test in
determining the existence of negligence is: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation?
negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell
ZHIENETH was no accident and that
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements
made to a physician are generally considered
declarations and admissions. All that is required
for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is
that they be made or uttered under the influence
of a startling event before the declarant had the
time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court.
Under the circumstances thus described, it is
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such
tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
doctor whom she trusted with her life. We
therefore accord credence to Gonzales'
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH
performed no act that facilitated her tragic death.
Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence
or omission to secure or make stable the
counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another
store supervisor were personally informed of the
danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy
the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's
employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus,
as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence
required of a good father of a family. Anent the
negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favors children
below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we
attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH
and assume that she climbed over the counter,
no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-
year old could not have caused the counter to
collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by
both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal
otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was
heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area
and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too,
should be absolved from any contributory
negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit
card slip. At this precise moment, it was
reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of
her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot
away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both
significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and
did not loiter as petitioners would want to
impress upon us. She even admitted to the
doctor who treated her at the hospital that she
did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Corporation
Lessons Applicable:
Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)
Facts:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David
Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a
cylinder for a miniature engine.
After leaving the power house where they had
asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces
they found some twenty or thirty brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground
These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each
has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of
which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity
They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power
the boys picked up all they could find, hung
them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to
Manuel's home
The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps trust the ends of the wires into an
electric light socket - no result break the cap with
a stone - failed
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding
that it was filled with a yellowish substance they
got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a
lighted match to the contents.
An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck.
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
David was struck in the face by several particles
of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessity of
its removal by the surgeons.
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And
Light Company liable
Issue:
1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make
Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company
liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
sufficiently proved that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage - NO
Held:
reversing the judgment of the court below
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault
or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage
so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or
on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for
the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not
have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place.
in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:
Damages to the plaintiff
Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
while we hold that the entry upon the property
without express invitation or permission would
not have relieved Manila Electric from
responsibility for injuries incurred, without other
fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received
cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4
months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in
his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month
after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more
than average intelligence, taller and more
mature both mentally and physically than most
boys of 15
The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion, as described
by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did
not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him,
or that defendant or anyone else should be held
civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor
can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such
acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very
nature of things the question of negligence
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor
to understand the character of his own acts and
their consequences
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate result of
his own willful and reckless act, so that while it
may be true that these injuries would not have
been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa
sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire
just thing is that a man should suffer the damage
which comes to him through his own fault, and
that he can not demand reparation therefor from
another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven
by him who alleges it.
Far Eastern Shipping Company vs Court of
Appeals
Facts:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (FESC) arrived at
the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned
by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to
conduct docking manuevers for the safe
berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself
in the bridge, with the master of the vessel,
Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2000 feet
from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the
crew of the vessel. However the anchor did not
hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did
not slacken.
A commotion ensued between the crew
members. When Gavino inquired about the
commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino that
there was nothing to it.
The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of
the pier causing considerable damage to the
pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money
against FESC, Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in
favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA
(employer of Kavankov) entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino.
Issue:
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts
which require the exercise of the court's
disciplinary powers?
Held:
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario thru its associate, Atty
Tria, is the counsel of record for FESC in both
GR no 130068 and GR no 130150. GR 130068
which is assigned to the Court's second division,
commenced with the filing of a verified motion
for extension of time which contained a
certification against forum shopping signed by
counsel Tria stating that to the best of his
knowledge there is no action or proceeding
pending in the SC, CA or any other tribunal.
Reviewing the records, the court finds that the
petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then
pending with the third division was duly filed with
a copy thereof furnished by registered mail to
counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to
conclude that when FESC filed its petition GR
no 130068, it would aready have received a
copy of the copy of the petition by MPA. It wa
therefore encumbent upon FESC to inform the
court of the pending action. But considering that
it was a superfluity at that stage of the
proceeding , it being unnecessary to file such
certification of non forum shopping with a mere
motion for extension, the court disregarded such
error.
On the other hand it took the OSG, representing
PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably long
period of time to file its comment, thus unduly
delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR no
130068, it took 210 days before the OSG filed its
comment. FESC was not even furnished with a
copy. In Gr no 130150 it took 180 days before
comment was filed. This disinclination of the
OSG to seasonably file required pleadings
constitutes deplorable disservice to the public
and can only be categorized as inefficiency on
the part of the govt law office.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario
and Del Rosario, specifically its asscociate Tria
is reprimaded and warned that a repetition of the
same acts shall be dealt with severely.
The original members of the legal tean of the
OSG are admonished and warned tha a
repetition shall also be dealt with more
stringently.
Baka lang itanong kung ano ruling: The decision
of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC
are declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of
the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the
amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed
reserved fund.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and
LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS'
HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.
Facts:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo
So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente and
Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda
motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He
was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal
flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any
protective helmet or goggles. He was also only
carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner
CASTILEX Industrial Corporation, registered
owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. ABAD drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around
the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut
against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to
his route to General Maxilom St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and
the pick-up of ABAD collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD
brought Vasquez to CEBU DOCTORS'
HOSPITAL where he died.
A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but
which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. An action for damages was then
commenced by respondents against ABAD and
petitioner CASTILEX
Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents
and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and
solidarily respondents
Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately
appealed the decision.
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court holding ABAD and petitioner CASTILEX
liable but held that the liability of the latter is
"only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously
liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle
Held:
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply
to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business or industry. Since it is engaged in
the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said
provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should
apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth
paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
"even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry"
found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the scope
of his assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and
5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
 Both provisions apply to
employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners
and managers of an
establishment or
enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to
employers in general,
whether or not engaged
in any business or
industry.
 The fourth paragraph
covers negligent acts of
employees committed
either in the service of
the branches or on the
occasion of their
functions, while the fifth
paragraph
encompasses negligent
acts of employees
acting within the scope
of their assigned task.
 The latter is an
expansion of the former
in both employer
coverage and acts
included.
 Negligent acts of
employees, whether or
not the employer is
engaged in a business
or industry, are covered
so long as they were
acting within the scope
of their assigned task,
even though committed
neither in the service of
the branches nor on the
occasion of their
functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180, whether or not
engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable
for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of
his assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to
establish the employer-
employee relationship;
once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer
liable, that the
employee was acting
within the scope of his
assigned task when the
tort complained of was
committed
Whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the
incident, he was driving a company-
issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving
the restaurant where he had some
snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the
petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a
manager of a company-issued vehicle is
within the scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and
circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The
mere fact that ABAD was using a
service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient
to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating
the vehicle within the course or scope of
his employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the
employer's liability for the injuries
inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer's
motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an
employee who uses his
employer's vehicle in going from
his work to a place where he
intends to eat or in returning to
work from a meal is not
ordinarily acting within the
scope of his employment in the
absence of evidence of some
special business benefit to the
employer
o In the same vein, traveling to
and from the place of work is
ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and
not a part of his services to his
employer. Hence, in the
 absence of some special benefit overtime work had already been
to the employer other than the completed. His being at a place which,
mere performance of the as petitioner put it, was known as a
services available at the place "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug
where he is needed, the pushers and addicts," had no
employee is not acting within connection to petitioner's business;
the scope of his employment neither had it any relation to his duties
even though he uses his as a manager. Rather, using his service
employer's motor vehicle vehicle even for personal purposes was
o In the same vein, traveling to a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
and from the place of work is perks attached to his position
ordinarily a personal problem or - Since no evidence that ABAD was
concern of the employee, and acting within the scope of the functions
not a part of his services to his entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX
employer. Hence, in the had no duty to show that it exercised the
absence of some special benefit diligence of a good father of a family in
to the employer other than the providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
mere performance of the Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious
services available at the place liability for the consequences of the
where he is needed, the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle
employee is not acting within
the scope of his employment
even though he uses his
employer's motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee
be deemed to be acting within
the scope of his employment in
going to or from work in his
employer's vehicle, the
employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of
the accident, the employee has
left the direct route to his work
or back home and is pursuing a
personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his
motor vehicle to an employee
for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours
is generally not liable for the
employee's negligent operation
of the vehicle during the period
of permissive use
o Even where the employee's
personal purpose in using the
vehicle has been accomplished
and he has started the return
trip to his house where the
vehicle is normally kept, it has
been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and
the employer is not liable for the
employee's negligent operation
of the vehicle during the return
trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD
did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office. After, he went to
Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña,
7km away from petitioner's place of
business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor,
testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively
place" even at dawn because Goldie's
Restaurant and Back Street were still
open and people were drinking thereat.
Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug
addicts littered the place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took
some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving
the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own
or was carrying out a personal purpose
not in line with his duties at the time he
figured in a vehicular accident. It was
then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988,
way beyond the normal working hours.
ABAD's working day had ended; his