Why Spinoza Is Intolerant of Atheists God and The Limits of Early Modern

WHY SPINOZA IS INTOLERANT OF ATHEISTS: GOD AND THE LIMITS OF EARLY MODERN
LIBERALISM
Author(s): MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 65, No. 4 (JUNE 2012), pp. 813-839
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WHY SPINOZA IS INTOLERANT OF ATHEISTS: GOD
AND THE LIMITS OF EARLY MODERN LIBERALISM
MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL
SpINOZA IS OFTEN LAUDED as a founder of modern liberalism.

Most recently, Jonathan Israel has argued that Spinoza was a central
figure in what he calls the "Radical Enlightenment." In particular, he
claims that Spinoza's focus on individual freedom of thought
contributes more to our contemporary ideals of toleration than
Locke's emphasis of freedom of conscience.1 One way to test the
extent of Spinoza's liberalism would be to ask whether or not he
would tolerate atheists. Locke, of course, was notorious for arguing
that the state should not tolerate either atheists or Catholics. We
might think that Spinoza would argue explicitly to the contrary.2
However, while he does not outright ban Catholics, he is hardly
friendly to their views, especially regarding Papal infallibility and
authority.3 As we shall see, his position on atheism is not immediately
obvious. In order to answer the question - was Spinoza intolerant of
atheists? - we need to examine the two concepts that structure the
question itself. What does it mean to be tolerant or intolerant in
Correspondence to: Michael A. Rosenthal, Department of Philosophy,

Box 353350, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3350.
'J. I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity, 1650-1 750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 266.
References to Spinoza's political works, the Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus (henceforth abbreviated TTP) and the Tractatus Politicus
(henceforth TP), are first to the chapter and paragraph number of the
forthcoming second volume of Edwin Curley's translation: Baruch Spinoza,
The Collected Works, trans. Edwin Curley, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, Forthcoming), and then to the volume and page number of
the Gebhardt edition: Baruch Spinoza, Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg:
Carl Winters Verlag, 1972). References to the letters (henceforth Ep) are to
Baruch Spinoza, The Letters, ed. Steven Barbone, Lee Rice, and Jacob Adler,
trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995).
References to the Ethics (henceforth E) are to the first volume of Curley's
translation: Baruch Spinoza, The Collected Works, trans. Edwin Curley
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
3 See TTP, 7.38 (GIII/105) and 7.88 (GIII/116).
The Review of Metaphysics 65 (June 2012): 813-839. Copyright © 2012 by The Review of
Metaphysics.
81 4 MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL
Spinoza's view? What is his view

very explicit on either matter.
twice in the Theological-Politic
something undesirable. The bes
atheism is to look at how he reac
In the letter in which he states hi
Scripture, which was to become t
writes that "common people" ( vu
"atheist" and complains "[I am]
far as I can."5 The most importan
in Letter 43 to Jacob Ostens, w
Lambert van Velthuysen in Letter
on toleration is, of course, to look
The problem is that Spinoza does n
tion. His goal, he says, is to prom
his views on the toleration of her
along the way as part of his broa
the history of lauding him as a f
Spinoza's conception of toleratio
shall show, it takes seriously the
which means to bear a burden, wh
In other words, Spinoza does no
accepting something as worthy of respect but rather enduring
something distasteful. If he were to consider atheism as a worthy
position, then it would seem hard to square it with the notion of
tolerating something distasteful or problematic. It turns out that there
is something wrong with atheism, and what is wrong with it raises the
question of the limits of toleration most directly.
4 The first appearance is in chapter 2 on "Prophets," where Spinoza

writes: "Alas! Things have reached a state now where those who openly
confess that they have no idea of God, and that they know God only through
created things (of whose causes they are ignorant), do no blush to accuse
Philosophers of Atheism" (2.2; GIII/30). The second appearance is at 6.27;
GIII/86-7.
5 Ep 30, 186.
WHY SPINONZA IS INTOLERANT 81 5
II
Was Spinoza an Atheist? The exchange with Velthuysen. One

way to get a sense of what the charge of atheism meant in this period
is to look at the views of someone who believed that Spinoza was an
atheist or had a position that led to atheism.
In Letter 42 to the "learned and accomplished Jacob Ostens,"
Lambert van Velthuysen offers his "opinion" and "verdict" on the
" Discursus Theologico-Politicus " (that is, the Tractatus). Velthuysen
was a physician and enthusiastic advocate of Cartesian thought in
Utrecht.6 He understands the goal of the TTP as I am quite sure
Spinoza does, that is, to end strife among factions and parties by
analyzing its causes and ridding his own mind of any prejudice and
superstition. "But," Velthuysen writes,
In seeking to show himself free from superstition, he has gone too
far in the opposite direction, and to avoid the accusation of
superstition, I think that he has renounced all religion.7
However, aware that he may be going too far to actually prove his
claim, Velthuysen qualifies his charge:
At any rate, he does not rise above the religion of the Deists, of
whom there are considerable numbers everywhere (so deplorable
is the morality of our age), and especially in France.8
Then he backtracks again and says:
6 For a brief biography, see the editors' introduction to the Letters , 34.
For a discussion of the exchange in light of Velthuysen's earlier work and
other contemporary critics, see Wiep van Bunge, "Van Velthuysen, Batalier
and Bredenburg on Spinoza's Interpretation of the Scriptures," in The
Spinozistic Heresy: The Debate on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ,
1670-1677 , and the Immediate Reception of Spinozism (Proceedings of the
International Cortona Seminar , 10-14 April 1991), ed. Paolo Cristofolini
(Amsterdam and Maarssen: APA-Holland University Press, 1995). Van Bunge
notes that both shared similar political goals of tolerance, but diverged in
their approaches to religion: "whereas Van Velthuysen attempted to
rationalize theology . . . Spinoza tried to naturalize religion" (ibid. 58). It
should also be mentioned that later Spinoza and Velthuysen continued in their
correspondence - see letter 69, in which Spinoza praises the latter's
"exceptional sincerity of mind" (Ep 69, 324) - and even met regularly (van
Bunge, The Spinozistic Heresy , 59).
7 Ep 42, 225.
8 Ep 42, 225.
81 6 MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL
But I think that scarcely anyone of

of that evil cause so maliciously, so
author of this dissertation. Further
man does not rank himself among
men to retain the slightest portion of
Velthuysen goes on to summariz

pernicious doctrines that it teaches. For instance, he condemns
Spinoza's rejection of the Cartesian view (of which Velthuysen is an
advocate) that Scripture can and ought to be interpreted by reason.
Among the various criticisms we can focus on three of them.
First and most importantly, he thinks that Spinoza is committed to
fatalism and that fatalism is a doctrine that undermines morality.
Velthuysen admits that Spinoza "acknowledges God and declares him
to be the maker and founder of the universe," but he claims that
Spinoza believes that "the form, appearance, and order of the world
are wholly necessary, equally with God's nature and the eternal truths,
which he holds to be established independently of God's control."10
The view that the world is necessary is just a step removed from, if not
the same thing as, believing in the identity of God and the world:
"there is not much difference between asserting that all things
necessarily emanate from God's nature and that the universe is itself
God."11 If God is not in control of the world, then it certainly cannot be
the case that man has any control over his actions. So, the idea that
God has commanded us to do certain things and we have the power to
either obey these commands or not must be an illusion. It is merely
our ignorance that has led us to believe that we can act in this way.
"And so what is embodied in the precepts does not depend on man's
will, nor will any good or evil befall men as they neglect or heed them,
any more than God's will can be influenced by prayer or his eternal
and absolute decrees be mutable."12 If we cannot obey or disobey
commands, then the notion of reward and punishment is also rendered
meaningless. As Velthuysen notes, Spinoza "locates man's highest
pleasure in the cultivation of virtue, which he says is its own reward
9 Ep 42, 226.
10 Ep 42, 226.
" Ep 42, 227.
" Ep 42, 226.
and the stage for the display of all that is

for being virtuous has nothing to do wit
Spinozist would not be motivated by the "
of reward." Instead, a man would be virt
by the beauty and the joy ... in the practic
Once he has argued that Spinoza has
that undermines traditional morality, Ve
more crucial point. Although Spinoza th
liable to "errors of judgment" and came t
that were false, they nonetheless served
men to those virtues which no one ever d
of any controversy among mankind."1
without knowledge of the truth, it is po
As Velthusyen puts it, "For [Spinoza] thin
in regard to other matters makes no cont
holiness is not in fact to be found in s
knowledge of truth, and also of myste
extent that it promotes piety."16 If Spino
at least in a theist conception of God), and yet he thinks that the
profession of belief is useful for the sake of piety - which he thinks
can be defined in terms of "works alone" that lead to obedience17 -
then the conclusion is that true religion is only defined by its moral
and political function.
It is clear that Velthusyen believes that Spinoza has joined the
ranks of the "Machiavellians," who think that religion not only is useful
to the state but that in fact "belief in God arose from its
indispensability to civil rulers."18 Since the truth of the belie
irrelevant in itself and only valuable to the extent that it pro
13 Ep 42, 227.
Ep 42, 227. On this point see also the letters from Tschirnhau
Schuller (Letters 57 and 58) as well as Oldenburg (Letters 61 and 62)
15 Ep 42, 227.
16 Ep 42, 228.
17 TTP, Preface.28 (GIII/11) and TTP, 13.29 (GIII/172).
Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1 650-1 729, vol. I: The
Orthodox Sources of Disbelief (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1990), 74-5. As Kors points out later, the source of this view was not
necessarily modern philosophy but could be found in the ancient Epicureans
(ibid., 222-3). Hence, we often find the equation of Epicureans and atheism in
Bayle and other thinkers of the period.
818 MICHAELA. ROSENTHAL
goals of the state, it is possible

other tool. Indeed, sometimes w
of neighbor and of truth are v
encourage: "And so it may come
upright man to set truth in the
to let citizens share in that truth
think that more harm than goo
promulgation."19 When the prom
harmful, then the ruler is fully ju
According to Velthuysen, this
error. Because the only sign of
belief that leads to virtue is not
case that more than one theolo
lead its adherents to virtue. Most
each other is found in its forms
to time and circumstance. Insofa
of virtue these practices are praiseworthy. Spinoza "regards as
pointless all knowledge of mysteries that is not inherently adapted to
promote virtue."20 However, Velthuysen notes that, according to
Spinoza, "God has instilled into the minds of all nations the principles
and, as it were, the seeds of virtue," and that "God has not left other
nations destitute of the means of gaining true blessedness."21 Because
he has diminished theology to the point of irrelevance, and emphasized
the role of works, Spinoza must end up treating all religions on a par,
even the Muslims:
[T]he author has not left himself a single argument to prove that
Mahomet was not a true prophet. For the Turks, too, in obedience
to the command of their prophet, cultivate those moral virtues
about which there is no disagreement among nations.22
Spinoza has undermined not only the special election of the Jews but
also, and more importantly, the privileged place of Christian revela-
tion.
19 Ep 42, 234.
20 Ep 42, 232.
21 Ep 42, 231.
22 Ep 42, 236.
Spinoza's response to Lambert van Velt

of his views in the subsequent letter is rel
its target but quite illuminating nonethe
main points of his response it is worth no
Spinoza points out that Velthuysen was
attack ad hominem, quoting his correspon
importance to know of what nationality I
pursue."23 Although we might think
disappointed that Velthuysen did not cons
[S]urely if he had known this, he would n
convinced that I teach atheism. For atheists are usually inordi-
nately fond of honours and riches, which I have always despised, as
is known to all who are acquainted with me.24
As we shall see below, this is an important point, which can teach us

something significant about Spinoza's own attitude toward atheism.
Before we get to that, let us turn to Velthuysen's other charges.
Spinoza denies, of course, the main charge of atheism. "Does that
man, pray, renounce all religion, who declares that God must be
acknowledged as the highest good, and that he must be loved as such
in a free spirit?"26 It is indeed somewhat surprising, given Spinoza's
constant recourse to the concept of God throughout his writings, that
he would be accused of atheism. We might even accept what Richard
Mason asserts: "The existence of God was not 'self-evident', though the
nonexistence of God would be incoherent. Atheism would be a case
that cannot be formulated." 26 Spinoza does not deny that

conception of God may be tantamount to what some like Velthuyse
may consider "deism." In particular, he does not deny the charge th
in his view God is a necessary being. Nonetheless, he does not think
that the idea of God as a necessary being is the same as subjecting G
to necessity, as if there were some other being or power external t
God that could act on him.
This is clear in Spinoza's response to the charge that he denies

miracles, a charge to which, in the strict sense, he admits. Velthuysen
23 Ep 43, 237.
24 Ep 43, 237.
Ep 43, 238.
Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 22-3.
summarizes Spinoza's view on miracles and links it to the

metaphysical view that God does not have any power other than to act
according to his regular nature.27 If God could act against his nature
then it would lead to a contradiction in his essence. Spinoza does not
bother to respond to Velthuysen's discussion of miracles perhaps
because Spinoza believes that Velthuysen understood his view
correctly.
Spinoza considers the more important point to be denying that his
view on necessity implies what Velthuysen claims it does. He argues
that necessity is not the same as fatalism and that it does not
undermine morality. The "inevitable necessity of things," he writes,
"does not do away with either divine or human laws."28 Although the
theist conception of a God who decrees laws like a king is false,29
nonetheless "divine and human laws . . . are still divine and salutary."30
The goods that follow from those laws are still good, even if they
follow necessarily (as they must, if they are to be intelligible), as are
the evils. Moreover, the motivations to follow these precepts, such as
hope and fear, are also just as valid, even if they are necessaiy. He
does not pursue the metaphysical aspect of his response any further,
however controversial it may be, but Spinoza does look deeper into
the question of motivation. He questions Velthuysen's view that fear is
the main motivation for virtuous behavior. Instead, he argues that the
reason for obeying the commandment to love God ought not to be fear
or some external reward but the love of God itself.31 Both on the
metaphysical and practical score, then, Spinoza believes that morality
and religion are strengthened rather than weakened by his view.32
Spinoza does not deign to answer directly the second charge, in
which Velthuysen claims that the TTP is a kind of Machiavellian text,
serving one truth (atheism) to the philosopher and a falsehood
(theism) to the masses. Velthuysen has not been the only reader of the
TTP to make this charge. One of the most influential interpreters of
27 Ep 42, 229.
28 Ep 43, 239.
29 See Ethics, 2p3s: "For no one will be able to perceive rightly the things
I maintain unless he takes great care not to confuse God's power with the
human power or right of Kings."
30 Ep 43, 239.
31 Ep 43, 240.
See also Ethics, 5p41.
WHY SPINONZA IS INTOLERANT 821
the last fifty years, Leo Strauss, based hi

it.33 However, there is ample evidence t
refute this charge. One response, whic
paper, is to think of the differing point
part of a strategy of rhetorical accomm
do not need to defend this response here, for the text we are
examining here - the letter in response to Velthuysen - is clear enough
on this point and indicative of a larger pattern. What reason would
there be to doubt Spinoza's sincerity when he holds openly and firmly
to his quite radical interpretation of God? Even if he failed to convince
many of his readers - though Jonathan Israel's recent work36 would
suggest that Spinoza did in fact gain a large following - Spinoza began
his work with the expectation that his view of God as a necessary
being was familiar and would convince his audience. Indeed, despite
the fact that their outrage focused on Spinoza, most of his critics
believed that Spinoza's view represented a position whose origins
were to be found in antiquity.36 Velthuysen was not sure whether to
classify Spinoza as an atheist or a deist, and his main concern was
simply that Spinoza undermined what he took to be Christian belief.
The charge of atheism was a way to ratchet-up the worry about the
possible dangerous implications of Spinoza's view of God. The point
simply is that Spinoza believed a deist position was a possible, albeit
33 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1988). In this context, see the discussion in Paul J. Bagley,
Philosophy, Theology, and Politics: A Reading of Benedict Spinoza' s
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ed. Leora Batnizky, Christian Wiese, and Eliot
Wolfson, vol. 6, Supplements to the Journal of Jewish Thought and
Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2008). The Maimonidean or Averroist distinction
between exoteric and esoteric truths dovetails with the charge of
Machiavellianism when the esoteric view is identified as atheism. As Kors
notes, "It was one thing to point out that religious truth was useful to the
state. ... It was quite a different thing ... to suggest that belief in God arose
from its indispensability to civil rulers" (Atheism in France, 74-5).
34 See Michael A. Rosenthal, "Persuasive Passions: Rhetoric and the
Interpretation of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise," Archiv fuer
Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2003).
36 Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity, 1650-1750.
36 This was a common critique of early modern atheists. See the
discussion of Buddeus (1667-1729) and his analysis of the sources of atheism
in Kors, Atheism in France, 1650-1 729, 242-3.
822 MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL
dangerous, position in his world

of it. In this sense Spinoza is bet
camp of believers rather than so
altogether.37
Other than the fact that he argued for the existence of God, the
best evidence that Spinoza is not an atheist is that God is central to his
ethical project. Velthuysen claims either theoretical atheism - the
belief that there is no God - or theoretical deism - the belief that God
is not directly concerned or involved in human affairs - will lead to
practical atheism - that is, immorality, or acting as if no God existed.38
Since both theoretical atheism and theoretical deism lead to practical
atheism, it does not matter much to which of the two theoretical
camps Spinoza belongs. However, as we have seen, Spinoza does care
about this distinction and rejects Velthuysen's conclusion. Spinoza
makes it clear that he is not a theoretical atheist and that his form of
deism does not lead to practical atheism. Hence, he insists in his later
correspondence with Oldenburg that his views do not undermine
"religious virtue." As we shall see below, this point becomes the crux
of the question of the toleration of atheists.
Spinoza's response to Velthuysen's third criticism is revealing and
has obvious implications for the larger question of toleration. Spinoza
agrees with his critic that there is nothing essentially good about any
particular religion. When he claims that reason is not the interpreter
of Scripture, it is because he thinks that Scripture is a product mostly
of the imagination and so not liable to any systematic exegesis on the
basis of reason. (This does not mean, however, that we cannot
discover aspects of Scripture that happen to be compatible with
reason.) Since virtue must be based on reason rather than the
imagination, the status of religious revelation (based on Scripture) as a
phenomenon of the imagination means that revealed religion as such
cannot be essentially virtuous.
37 This raises a set of issues, many of which are very thoughtfully

explored in Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza's Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish
Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
I found the following to be helpful in sorting out these relations: David
Berman, A History of Atheism in Britain: From Hobbes to Russell (London:
Croom Helm, 1988).
His view of Mohammed is interesting f

second point, namely, the importance of some kind (that is,
compatibilist) of freedom (and not predestination or fatalism) to his
view of morality. "Mahomet was an imposter," Spinoza claims, "since
he completely abolishes the freedom which is granted by that
universal religion revealed by the natural and prophetic light."39
Otherwise, his claim that religion should be judged in terms of its
practice rather than its explicit beliefs is crucial.
As for the Turks and the other Gentiles, if they worship God by the
exercise of justice and love of their neighbor, I believe that they
possess the spirit of Christ and are saved, whatever convictions
they may hold in their ignorance regarding Mahomet and the
oracles.40
It is possible to tolerate a variety of religions as long as they lead to

practical benefits for everyone, that is, they are moral. If atheism
means that a person does not believe in the notion that Christianity is a
religion privileged above all others in the sense that it is true and the
exclusive path to a moral life, then Spinoza is indeed an atheist.
Nonetheless, this passage suggests that he thinks there may be
something true in Christianity that other religions share and that is
expressed in the acts of justice and loving kindness. In fact, other
religions ought to be tolerated in relation to this standard. This view
would certainly deviate from orthodox norms of belief in God, but it is
consistent with the conception of God that Spinoza espouses.
Let us summarize this exchange. Velthuysen accuses Spinoza of
being either an atheist or a deist. In either case, he thinks that
Spinoza's view undermines morality. Spinoza would deny that he is an
atheist and agree that he is a deist. However, while atheism would
deny morality (and is therefore problematic) Spinoza believes that his
conception of God (what most at this time would call "deist") does not.
In fact, it provides a superior basis for morality, one based on love
rather than fear. Now that we have a sense of what it means to be
termed an atheist and what is at stake in this view, we can turn to the
question of toleration.
39 Ep 43, 241.
40 Ep 43, 241.
III
What is toleration and what are its limits? Now that we have
examined the exchange between Spinoza and Velthuysen over
atheism, we need to turn our attention to Spinoza's view on toleration.
It is striking to note that in the TTP, which is the main source for
Spinoza's view on this matter, the word only appears once and Spinoza
does not offer any explicit analysis of it.41 Although some have argued
that Spinoza does not "defend toleration in general" but rather has the
narrower aim of vindicating his own philosophy,42 there is ample
reason to consider Spinoza's work as a systematic treatise on the
subject.43 The real question is what should be included under the topic
of toleration? Jonathan Israel has remarked that "in Spinoza, freedom
of worship, far from constituting the core of toleration, is very much a
secondary question, a topic which he discussed only briefly and
peripherally. For in Spinoza toleration has primarily to do with
individual freedom, not a coexistence of churches."44 However, while
it is certainly true that a defense of "freedom of philosophizing" is the
central aim of the TTP, Spinoza is equally concerned with the question
of freedom of worship. It turns out that it is not possible to guarantee
free thought without the state regulating the relations among the
churches.
One way to understand the complexity of Spinoza's view on
toleration is to focus on the idea of a "right" and its relation to free
thought. Here is the first part of a crucial passage:
Therefore, since the supreme right of thinking freely, even
concerning Religion, is in the hands of each person, and it is
inconceivable that anyone can abandon his claim to this right, there
will also be in the hands of each person the supreme right and the
41 See TTP, 17.107; GIII/219-20.

See Theo Verbeek, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring
the Will of God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). And my review of it, Michael A.
Rosenthal, "Review of Theo Verbeek, Spinoza's Theological-Political
Treatise: Exploring the Will of God," Journal of the History of Philosophy
45, no. 2 (2007).
43 See Michael A. Rosenthal, "Spinoza's Republican Argument for
Tolerance," Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 3 (2003).
44 Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity, 1650-1750, 266.
supreme authority of judging freely con

of explaining it to himself and interpretin
The passage focuses on the individual's

and judge what is true and false, right
Spinoza defines the idea of a "natura
right and established practice of nature
the nature of each individual, accord
thing to be naturally determined to
way."46 It follows that "each individ
everything in its power, or that the righ
its determinate power does."47 In the n
claim to something determined by the
by God and discovered by human reas
independent and separate moral order created by God as part of a
providential scheme. Instead, he argues that human activities, including
the production of legal claims, take place within a single, determined
natural order. In the natural law tradition, it would be unlikely but still
possible to abdicate one's right to think for oneself. In the same way
one could and should give up one's own life to another, if the (moral)
law decreed it. In Spinoza's view, by contrast, it is "inconceivable" that
a person could completely give up to another the right to think for
oneself - any more than one could willingly give oneself up to another to
be killed - precisely because it would entail the voluntary erasure of
one's own determinate nature, which is impossible.48 As a matter of fact,
it is possible for a person to give up this right partially - a person could
come under the sway of another or could allow someone else to
determine his thoughts to some extent - just as a person might cede
physical control of himself to someone else or come under that
another's dominion. Nonetheless, the juridical language of "right"
46 TTP, 7.91 (GIII/117).

46 ITP, 16.2 íGIII/189).
47 TTP, 16.3 (GIII/1891
48 It is, perhaps paradoxically, the fact that we come to exist as finite
beings in a determined order that preserves our freedom and integrity as
individuals in Spinoza's system. The doctrine of the conatus or striving that
defines a finite essence is something to be understood not as independent of
the causal order but as part of it.
symbolizes a basic metaphysical p

as basic as the right to exist and c
Spinoza makes it clear in the se
sphere of sovereign right is distinct
For the only reason the supreme au
the supreme judgment concerning
the magistrates is that they are m
the same reason the supreme auth
judge regarding it will be in the ha
a matter of the right of each person
Spinoza offers a version of a socia

authority is constituted throug
Where Spinoza differs from othe
is that he "always preserves natur
the sovereign power in a state has right over a subject only in
proportion to the excess of its power over that of a subject."50 In
Hobbes's account, the subjects have ceded their rights to the
sovereign, which then has absolute power over them. In Spinoza's
view, the power of the sovereign requires the active and dynamic
transfer of the individuals' rights. Because rights are nothing other
than the power of the individual to act according to its determinate
nature, the state is constituted through the ongoing transfer, both
passive and active, of individual power to the collective. It is one thing
to have the right over one's own actions (private right) and quite
another to have a right over another (public right). It would seem,
then, that Spinoza has a legal and ontological ground for his claim that
the state does not have authority or power over individual religious
beliefs.
Nonetheless, this distinction is not nearly so hard and fast as it

looks. If a right is only the power to act in a determinate manner, then
not only is the right of the state qualified by the power and interests of
its subjects, so too is the right of the individual qualified by the
interests and power of the state. Because there is an obvious lack of
symmetry in the power relations between individual and state, even if
the state cannot completely take away the power of an individual to
49 TTP, 7.92 (GIII/1 17).

60 Ep 50, 258.
think his own thoughts, it can limit the

even attempt to influence their content
it is a natural temptation for states to in
subjects:
If it were as easy to command men's min
every ruler would govern in safety and n
For everyone would live according to the
and only in accordance with their decree
is true or false, good or evil, right or wrong.
Although in the end this is a temptation

sake of the state's own welfare, Spinoza
possible:
I confess that someone else can get con
many ways, some of them almost incredibl
directly under that person's command, it
so much on what the other person says th
rightly be said to be subject to his control.52
Not only is this possible, there are states

Moses is the best example of a ruler who was able to turn the
judgments of his people in a direction that was amenable to the state's
interests. While it is unlikely that another ruler will have this success,
the fact that Spinoza admits the possibility of states influencing the
thoughts of their subjects is very important.63 Just as this insight can
be used by religious parties to pursue their policies or spread their
beliefs, it also underlies his own recommendation for an Erastian
project in which a sovereign will establish its authority over religious
factions. The sovereign will have to convince a divided populace that
the imposition of his authority over the religious factions will benefit
them. To achieve this end the sovereign will have to employ some of
the same techniques of persuasion that the religious factions used to
make their case for political control. The idea that a state will attempt
to influence systematically its subjects' beliefs presages the practice of
51 TTP, 20.1 (GIII/239).

52 TTP, 20.4 (GIII/239).
For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Michael A. Rosenthal,
"Spinoza on Why the Sovereign Can Command Men's Tongues but Not Their
Minds," in Nomos, ed. Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron (New York:
NYU Press, 2008).
modern regimes that rely exten

ends.
We must also remember that Spinoza thinks that each person's
individual right extends to "whatever" he does according to his
nature.54 According to Spinoza, a person can have different kinds of
thoughts, some that he deems "adequate," which are based on reason,
and others that he considers "inadequate" or partial, which are based
on the imagination.65 Whether a person has an opinion based on
reason or one that is less than rational and based on the imagination,
the person has a right to it.56 Spinoza also argues in the Ethics and
asserts in the TTP that while actions based on reason lead to concord,
those that follow from the imagination and passions lead to conflict.57
In the TTP, he focuses on the negative as a way to motivate entry into
a social contract: "For according to the laws of appetite each person is
drawn in a different direction."58 He is also aware that irrational
thoughts greatly outnumber rational thoughts in most individuals and
across society. Spinoza uses this analysis to explain how it is that
irrational (inadequately conceived) ideas of religion come to
predominate in most individuals and how these ideas tend to produce
conflict among members of society.
If we combine this point - irrational religious ideas are
prevalent - with the previous one - the state can influence its subjects'
beliefs - we come to this conclusion: The fact that one's ideas and
beliefs can cause or contribute to conflict among men means that the
state, whose very purpose is to produce security for individuals
through limiting or mediating this conflict, has an interest in the
regulation of those beliefs.
But we also cannot deny that treason can be committed by words
as well as deeds. So if it is impossible to take this freedom
completely away from subjects, it will also be quite fatal to grant it
completely. Our task here, then, is to inquire how far this freedom
64 TTP, 16.5 (Gin/190).

56 For his taxonomy of ideas, see Ethics, 2p40s2.
" See TTP, 16.6: GIII/190.
57 For the Ethics, see 4p34 and 4p35.
68 TTP, 16.14 (GIII/191).
can and must be granted to each person w

peace of the state and the right of the suprem
The private right to one's ideas can and

with the state's right to regulate matt
Spinoza's time this was primarily throug
of inadequately formed beliefs about God
Spinoza's strategy to mediate the conf
private right to hold religious beliefs and
those beliefs that might threaten public
argues that the state should hold contro
religion. This is one of the lessons tha
from the example of the ancient Israelite
state needs to make sure that whatever is the equivalent of the
priesthood should neither have sovereign authority nor even give
advice to the sovereign unless it has been requested.61 The second way
in which the actual or potential conflict between private and public
right in the matter of religion is mediated is through the "dogmas of the
universal faith" [dogmata fidei universalis]. Once sovereign authority
has been taken away from the priests, the state can determine what
the set of beliefs that foster its goals should be. Although a belief that
produces obedience to the state is consistent with the idea of a public
right, Spinoza does not think that obedience under any circumstances
fosters the public good. It is obedience through acts of charity and
loving-kindness that is the external mark of faith.
In a world in which the vast majority of people have different
religious beliefs, it is necessary for the state to regulate the relation of
churches for the sake of preventing conflicts. Since conflicts are
produced through debates over questions about which there is no
rational solution, it is important to limit the scope of public debate not
only through limiting the political influence of churches (which is done
through giving political control of religion to the sovereign) but also
through endorsing certain beliefs as part of public right. The immedi-
ate source of these dogmas is supposed to be the analysis of Scripture
that precedes the fourteenth chapter. The dogmas simultaneously
59 TTP, 10.10 f GIII/2401

60 See TTP, 17.27; GIII/226.
61 TTP, 17.22 (GIII/225).
focus the public's attention on

promote the public good and ser
certain superstitious beliefs by m
( adiaphora ), that is, beliefs w
either Scripture or philosophy.62
must tend to this point: that the
Justice and Loving-kindness; that
bound to obey this being and to w
and Loving-kindness toward his ne
Spinoza thinks that the adoption

prevent conflict among sects wi
more detailed mechanism to dete
tolerated and to what extent. As we saw in the third point of the
exchange with Velthuysen regarding Islam, Spinoza thinks that there is
a core morality - what he called "the spirit of Christ" - that might be
found in other religions and would justify their toleration.
While the complete list of dogmas and their content need not
concern us here,66 there are three observations that are important for
our discussion. First, despite the claim that the individual has a formal
right to his own opinions, Spinoza obviously thinks that the state
should promote the dogmas of universal faith in the public sphere.
This has in turn two aspects: (a) the state should not allow other
beliefs to become matters of public right - that is, they will remain
private affairs and the state will be intolerant towards attempts to
make them public matters - and (b) as long as it remains private, it will
not make any effort to suppress the belief itself. Second, Spinoza
asserts the mutual interdependence of the dogmas: "For if any of
62 See TTP, 14.23-24 (GIII/177).

63 TTP, 14.24 (GIII/174), emphasis mine.
As he points out in TTP, chapter 19, sections 50-54 (GIII/237), because
Christianity was spread by private men who used various arguments - some
with differing philosophical assumptions - to persuade different audiences,
the problem of sectarianism was endemic to Christianity.
The first dogma is: "I. that God exists, i.e., that there is a supreme
being, supremely just and merciful, or a model of true life; for whoever does
not know or does not believe that he exists cannot obey him or know him as a
Judge." All the other dogmas involve the belief in God. See TTP, 14.25-28
(GIII/177- 8).
these tenets is taken away, obedience is

has obvious and special application to the
dogma asserts the existence of God as a b
dogmas would not make any sense without this belief. Indeed,
Spinoza seems to be committed in many (if not all) of them to a theist
view, in which God governs, punishes, rewards, and guides the world
directly. This would be surprising - given Spinoza's own assertions of
deism - if it were not for the next point. Third, Spinoza does not think
that everyone will interpret these dogmas in the same way:
[E]ach person is bound to accommodate these tenets of faith to his
own power of understanding, and to interpret them for himself as it
seems to him easier for him to accept them without any hesitation,
with complete agreement of the heart, so that he may, as a result,
obey God with full agreement of the heart.67
This is especially true of the underlying idea of God:

[W]hat God, or that model of true life, is, whether he is fire, spirit,
light, thought, etc. - that does not matter as far as faith is
concerned; nor does it matter in what way he is a model of true life,
whether because he has a just and merciful heart or because all
things exist and act through him, and hence that we also
understand through him, and see, through him, what is true, right,
and good. It is all the same, whatever anyone maintains about
these matters.68
As we saw above in his exchange with Velthuysen, Spinoza believes

that, when it comes to morality, a deist like himself can come to
precisely the same conclusions as the theist. The dogmas would
guarantee the toleration of a wide range of religious beliefs, including
those of Spinoza.69 The question remains whether atheists in the pure
sense - that is, those who deny the existence of God - would be
tolerated. While the dogmas would lead the state to tolerate atheism
in the loose sense in which it was most often used in the seventeenth
66 TTP, 14.29 (GIII/178).

67 TTP, 14.32 (GIII/1781
68 TTP, 14.30 (GIII/178).
For a more detailed discussion of the dogmas, including an account of
how they can be interpreted in more than one way, see Michael A. Rosenthal,
"Spinoza's Dogmas of Universal Faith and the Problem of Religion,"
Philosophy and Theology 13, no. 1 (2001).
century - as unorthodox belief or deism - they would seem to

preclude any toleration of atheism in the stricter or pure sense.
IV
Should Atheists be tolerated? We are now in a better position to

answer the question whether Spinoza would tolerate atheists. If by
atheism we mean that one believes in a deist rather than a theist
conception of God, then the answer is yes. Although in the TTP he h
only assumed that a deist God exists, in the Ethics he has proven th
such a God exists and that knowledge of this God leads to the highe
good. The belief in this conception of God in private would lead to a
practice in public that is consistent with standards set forth in t
dogmas. The sovereign ought to tolerate the deist - or at least a deis
like Spinoza- just as he would tolerate theists of various persuasions.
Because Spinoza takes his own views to be consistent with the
dogmas - in the sense that reason would lead to similar conclusions in
practice and also explain how the irrational (imaginative) beliefs of
religion came to the same end - he would not need to dissemble in
front of the magistrate. He considers himself and others like him to be
pious and so obedient to God in a way that is consistent with the goals
of the state. In this way Spinoza expands the domain of toleration to
include a set of views (his own at least) that many others would not
have tolerated.
However, if we mean by atheism that a person denies the

existence of God altogether and not merely that he holds an
unorthodox view of God, then the question is still open for
consideration. If we take Spinoza to have been sincere, as I think we
should, when he implores his correspondents to accept his own
professions of belief in God, then the fact that we have concluded that
the state should tolerate his philosophical views would be insufficient
by itself to determine the answer to this further question. What we do
have, though, is a means of answering it. Spinoza thinks that a belief
should be tolerated if it does not interfere with public right. What is
the likelihood that the belief that God does not exist would lead to
immoral behavior that would interfere with the public good and thus
require the state to interfere not just with the behavior but with the
idea that is the cause of it?
It was a commonplace in the sevente

would not only violate religious morality but would also as
consequence pose a danger to the state. John Locke, for instance,
argues in "A Letter Concerning Toleration" that it was not in the
magistrate's power to coerce inner belief and he did not have the
warrant (that is, the right) to promote religious truth any more than
another person.70 Yet he also thinks that the magistrates do not have to
remain neutral towards all religions and that they have a vested
interest in promoting those beliefs that are good for the state.71 On that
basis Locke denies toleration to Catholics - because they owe their
principal allegiance to a foreign sovereign - and to atheists (that is,
"those who deny the being of a God") - because "[p]romises,
covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have
no hold upon" them. The "taking away of God, though but even in
thought, dissolves all."72 While Spinoza would agree with Locke on the
general view that the state has an interest in regulating beliefs that
might be harmful to the public, he would not have been very
sympathetic to the specific reason Locke provides in the case of
atheists. For Spinoza argues that "no contract can have any force
except by reason of its utility," and "[i]f the utility is taken away, the
contract is taken away with it, and is null and void."73 This is "especially
applicable," he says, to the institution of the state, whose right depends
on the constant transfer of the subject's power based on their own
conception of the contract's utility. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that in
the TTP Spinoza thinks that the belief in a transcendent deity who
rewards and punishes us for our deeds on earth can be usefully
deployed by the state to keep people true to their contracts with each
70 See John Locke, Political Writings of John Locke, ed. David Wootton
(New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 394-9.
71 Locke, Political Writinas of John Locke , 411.
72 Locke, Political Writings of John Locke, 426. In his introduction to
Political Writings of John Locke, David Wootton points out that it may well
be the case that atheists keep their contracts Gust as Catholics may obey their
country's sovereign rather than the Pope), but that due to Locke's concern
with the "law of opinion" the idea that in principle an atheist had no ground
for obeying a contract other than earthly self-interest would influence others
(109).
73 TTP, xvi.20 (GIII/192).
other and the state itself.74 So

view on this point than it might
Pierre Bayle had caused a scandal in 1682 when, in Various
Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet [Pensées diverses sur la
comète ], he argued that society of atheists could exist and that atheism
did not lead to immorality.75 This is a complex work and it would be
impossible to canvass all the arguments relevant to this theme. I shall
focus on two points, which are somewhat in tension with one another,
because they will serve to highlight Spinoza's view. He claims that
"man does not always act according to his principles."76 So while a
believing Christians are often hypocrites and do not act morally, those
who profess to be atheists may in fact act morally. The reason is that
certain passions - "ambition, avarice, envy, the desire to avenge
oneself, shamelessness," and so forth - are present in all ages among
all men and subvert our good principles.77 So we should be wary of
regulating people on account of their explicit beliefs. The answer to
this problem can be found in the second point. Bayle argues that the
belief in a transcendent God and the attendant belief in reward and
punishment in the afterlife are not necessary to morality. The pagan
world offers various examples of just how it is possible to live morally
without this concept of God. "Epicureans," Bayle writes, "have been
seen to perform many laudable and decent actions which they could
have refrained from without fearing any punishments and in the
course of which they sacrificed utility and pleasure to virtue."78 It is
not rational principles but another set of passions, such as sensitivity
to "worldly honor, . . . avid of praise and flattery" - also potentially
present in all men without reference to their religious beliefs - that
corrects the vicious passions and lead us to virtue.79 What the pagans
found were ways of life that reinforced the good passions and served
to suppress the bad ones. A society of atheists who live a moral life is
74 See Michael A. Rosenthal, "Two Collective Action Problems in

Spinoza's Social Contract Theory," History of Philosophy Quarterly 15, no. 4
(1998).
Pierre Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet, trans.
Robert C. Bartlett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
76 Ibid., Section 136, 68.
77 Ibid., 169.
possible.80 If the atheists are to be ex

Bayle's position is not entirely clear,81 i
undermining morality.
Bayle had little sympathy for Spinoza
described Spinoza's concept of God as substance as "the most
monstrous hypothesis that could be imagined, the most absurd, the
most diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our spirit."82
Because Spinoza supposedly denied the liberty of the first cause and
all divine providence, he was for Bayle the exemplary atheist against
whom all others were measured.83 Nonetheless, given Bayle's view on
the relation of atheism to morality, Bayle would have to admit that
Spinoza himself is an example of a virtuous atheist.84
Spinoza would have rejected not only Bayle's critique of his
metaphysics of substance, but also his theory of action. As Geneviève
Brykman has pointed out, "the key objective of [Bayle's] Spinoza
article" is "to put on trial, not Spinoza, but human reason."85 Bayle
attempts to reduce Spinoza's immanent conception of metaphysics to
absurdity through his critique of the idea that all finite things are
modes of a single substance. Reason is simply not capable of making
sense of the idea that a single thing can be infinitely many. Likewise,
the idea that we can discover the inner relation of reason to action is
overstepping the bounds of our cognitive capacity. All we can do is

infer, as Hume would later point out forcefully, the constant
conjunction of cause and effect. Spinoza will have none of this. His
rationalism is deep and thoroughgoing. To restrict ourselves to the
second issue: Spinoza argues that there is a necessary relation

81 Given Bayle's argument that sincere beliefs, however in error, are to be
tolerated, Jonathan Israel argues that "in theory, even atheists, indifferent,
and infidels have to be tolerated," but goes on to note that Bayle "concedes a
mechanism for excluding atheists" (Radical Enliqhtenment, 336).
82 Pierre Bayle, "Dictionnaire Historique Et Critique." (Amsterdam, 1730),
http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/content/dictionnaire-de-bayle., vol. 4, 259
[accessed May 18, 20111.
See the discussion in Kors, Atheism in France, 246-53.
84 As Jonathan Israel notes, this led many to conclude that, despite his
attack, Bayle secretly was in sympathy with Spinoza ( Radical Enlightenment,
339-40).
85 Geneviève Brykman, "Bayle's Case for Spinoza," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 88 (1987-88): 269.
between thought and action, on

reason and systematically explor
of our passions, constituted by i
the preface to Part 3 of the Eth
actions and appetites just as if it
bodies." As we have seen, the
premised on the idea that we can
ideas are produced in the relatio
with nature. At the heart of our
conception that we have of God.
God, then we are going to be b
which will exacerbate conflict. W
and begin to correct it when we
view, based on the true idea of G
fully in the Ethics. The effort to
of our efforts to live a better life.8
As we have seen, from Bayle
qualify as a virtuous atheist. It
which are reducible to pagan materialism, are mistaken, because
actions are the basis on which we judge virtue. However, from
Spinoza's point of view, Bayle's position is unfounded, precisely
because using reason to acquire the correct beliefs about God is
central to acting in the right way and becoming virtuous. At every
level, the success of Spinoza's project depends on us arriving at the
correct idea of God. Philosophers need the true idea of God acquired
through reason as the beginning and end point of their quest to attain
the highest good. Even nonphilosophers require an imaginative idea of
God that, at a minimum, satisfies the demands of political obedience
and hence is consistent with some degree of rationality.
If we want to find an idea of what the moral life of an atheist was
like to Spinoza, then we do not have to look any farther than to
Hobbes. There has been considerable debate regarding the question of
86 The same contrast between "empty and futile" ideas of the good and
the "true good . . . which, once found and acquired, would continuously
give . . . the greatest joy, to eternity" is found in the opening lines of Spinoza's
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Collected Works, volume 1, 7;
GII/10-16). The true idea of God, of course, is that which Spinoza seeks in the
first part of the Ethics.
whether or not Hobbes was an atheist.

that given the variety of intellectual
might be a difficult question to resolv
find several places in Spinoza's work
what he thinks of the matter. Spinoza
that there is a highest good for man. I
"intellectual love of God";88 in the TTP,
things through their first causes, whic
habits of virtue."89 Hobbes, by contras
Summum Bonum, for "Felicity is a con
from one object to another."90 This giv
and goals of a Hobbesian might be like
a life without a greatest Good when
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual
after power, that ceaseth onely in Dea
inclination results in "competition o
other power," as well as a "Desire of
his exchange with Velthuysen, Spino
inordinately fond of honours and riche
as is known to all who are acquainted w
of the life and character of an atheist derives from the typical
description of an Epicurean. It is no accident that this language
87 See, for instance, Edwin Curley, "Calvin and Hobbes, or Hobbes as an

Orthodox Christian," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34(1996).
Ethics, 5p32c.
89 TTP, iii. 12 (GIII/46).
90 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , ed. C. B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin Books, 1968), 160.
Hobbes, Leviathan, 161.
92 Ep 43, 237. It is interesting to contrast Velthuysen's own reading of
Hobbes in his dissertation with that of Spinoza's. See: Jon Parkin, "Taming
the Leviathan - Reading Hobbes in Seventeenth Century Europe," in Early
Modern Natural Law Theories: Contexts and Strategies in the Early
Enlightenment , ed. T. J. Hochstrasser and P. Schröder (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2003). As Parkin relates, "the substance of Velthuysen's
argument was that Hobbes' theory in the De cive contained an orthodox
moral theory" (ibid., 36). The crux of the reading is that God commands
individuals to obey the sovereign to preserve themselves. While this line of
interpretation has its defenders to this day, it clearly differs from Spinoza's
Epicurean reading of Hobbes, with its attendant charges of atheism and
immorality, which, as Parkin notes, was common at least since the 1650s
(ibid., 42).
coincides with Hobbes's descripti

offers an unflattering portrait of
Both philosophers draw politiceli consequences from this
miserable view of human life. As we have just seen, Hobbes thinks
that the restless desire of delight and power results in the "competition
of Riches, Honour, Command or other power," that produces the
conflict that defines the state of nature. Nonetheless, he also makes
clear that in order to secure these small pleasures, we are willing to
give up our rights absolutely to a sovereign. The goal is to maintain
our "vital motions" - that is, our physical survival through the flow of
blood, breathing, and so forth - so that we can pursue our desires
without unnecessary interruption from others.94 Spinoza mocks this
conception of the state quite directly in the Politicai Treatise :
When I say, then, that the best state is one where men pass their
lives harmoniously, I mean a human life, which is defined, not
merely by the circulation of the blood, and other things which are
common to all animals, but mostly by reason, the true virtue and
life of the Mind.96
The ungodliness of Hobbes's conception of the state is reflected in the

very title and epigraph of his greatest work, The Leviathan. The title,
of course, ironically refers to the Biblical monster, which Hobbes in
the Introduction explicitly compares to the commonwealth. Hobbes
says that the central mechanism of the state, the "pacts and covenants"
that bind people together, "resemble that Fiat, or the let us make man,
pronounced by God in the creation."96 The state is nothing less than a
substitute for the activities of a God. Still, without a true God, the
state is but an infernal machine, an artificial body that plays the role of
God and his natural laws in the absence of a God and the highest
93 For a discussion of the early modern background, see Catherine

Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origin of Modernity (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2008).
94 Wilson points out that Hobbes's view that the desire for "Ease and
sensuali Delight" along with the desire to be free from pain as "the only
possible ground for political authority" is "unprecedented" (. Epicureanism ,
191). But she also notes Hobbes's clear debt in political thought to Lucretius
as well as the fact that others in the seventeenth century read him as an
Epicurean.
95 TP, 5.5 fGIII/296).
96 Hobbes, Leviathan , 82.
being. Spinoza does not want to return to

theory and he must accept central elemen
state is a construct. However, without a c
influence the moral order of the modern state, Hobbes's ironic
comment on the monstrous nature of the modern state can become all
too real.
As Spinoza sees it, the life of an atheist - that is, a life that lacks a
true idea of the highest good, that is ruled by fleeting pleasures and
passions, and that delivers itself up to politiceli servitude - is
objectively inferior to the life of a deist - that is, a life governed by the
quest for the intellectual love of God, ruled by reason rather than by
passions, and requiring participation in a republic of free men. Like
many other early moderns Spinoza used the stock figure of an
Epicurean to describe the life of an atheist. What we might have
expected would have been the moral critique of an atheist's life and
the political acceptance of it. What we find instead is that Spinoza
suggests that atheists are not only morally vicious but also bad
citizens. For that reason religion plays a role in all his discussions of
political organization. The moral and political consequences of living
without the idea of God justify a measure of intolerance toward the
atheist.
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WHY SPINOZA IS INTOLERANT OF ATHEISTS: GOD AND THE LIMITS OF EARLY MODERN

SpINOZA IS OFTEN LAUDED as a founder of modern liberalism.

Correspondence to: Michael A. Rosenthal, Department of Philosophy,

Spinoza's view? What is his view

4 The first appearance is in chapter 2 on "Prophets," where Spinoza

Was Spinoza an Atheist? The exchange with Velthuysen. One

Then he backtracks again and says:

But I think that scarcely anyone of

Velthuysen goes on to summariz

and the stage for the display of all that is

goals of the state, it is possible

Spinoza's response to Lambert van Velt

As we shall see below, this is an important point, which can teach us

that cannot be formulated." 26 Spinoza does not deny that

This is clear in Spinoza's response to the charge that he denies

summarizes Spinoza's view on miracles and links it to the

the last fifty years, Leo Strauss, based hi

33 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University

dangerous, position in his world

37 This raises a set of issues, many of which are very thoughtfully

His view of Mohammed is interesting f

It is possible to tolerate a variety of religions as long as they lead to

41 See TTP, 17.107; GIII/219-20.

supreme authority of judging freely con

The passage focuses on the individual's

46 TTP, 7.91 (GIII/117).

symbolizes a basic metaphysical p

Spinoza offers a version of a socia

Nonetheless, this distinction is not nearly so hard and fast as it

49 TTP, 7.92 (GIII/1 17).

think his own thoughts, it can limit the

Although in the end this is a temptation

Not only is this possible, there are states

51 TTP, 20.1 (GIII/239).

modern regimes that rely exten

64 TTP, 16.5 (Gin/190).

can and must be granted to each person w

The private right to one's ideas can and

59 TTP, 10.10 f GIII/2401

focus the public's attention on

Spinoza thinks that the adoption

62 See TTP, 14.23-24 (GIII/177).

these tenets is taken away, obedience is

This is especially true of the underlying idea of God:

As we saw above in his exchange with Velthuysen, Spinoza believes

66 TTP, 14.29 (GIII/178).

century - as unorthodox belief or deism - they would seem to

Should Atheists be tolerated? We are now in a better position to

However, if we mean by atheism that a person denies the

It was a commonplace in the sevente

other and the state itself.74 So

74 See Michael A. Rosenthal, "Two Collective Action Problems in

possible.80 If the atheists are to be ex

overstepping the bounds of our cognitive capacity. All we can do is

80 Ibid., Section 172, 212.

between thought and action, on

whether or not Hobbes was an atheist.

87 See, for instance, Edwin Curley, "Calvin and Hobbes, or Hobbes as an

coincides with Hobbes's descripti

The ungodliness of Hobbes's conception of the state is reflected in the

93 For a discussion of the early modern background, see Catherine

being. Spinoza does not want to return to

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