Sei sulla pagina 1di 129

A Deep Dive into using

the Firepower Manager


William Young, Global Security Architect
willyou@cisco.com
@WilliamDYoung
BRKSEC-2058
Cisco Spark
Questions?
Use Cisco Spark to communicate
with the speaker after the session

How
1. Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App
2. Click “Join the Discussion”
3. Install Spark or go directly to the space
4. Enter messages/questions in the space

© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Just Some Security Guy
• William Young
• Security Solutions Architect, Cisco
• 27 Years in Security
• 14 Years working with “Sourcefire” / “Firepower”
• Focus areas:
• Security Operations
• Policy & Compliance
• Threat Forensics and Investigation
• Hacker: Or just some guy that breaks stuff

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5
Cisco Firepower Sessions
BRKSEC-2050 BRKSEC-2051
Deploying AnyConnect
BRKSEC-2058
Tuesday Firepower NGFW
Internet Edge
SSL VPN with ASA A Deep Dive into using
(and Firepower Threat the Firepower Manager
Deployment Scenarios
Defense)

BRKSEC-2064 BRKSEC-2056 BRKSEC-3300


Wednesday NGFWv and ASAv in
Public Cloud (AWS and
Threat Centric Network Advanced IPS
Security Deployment
Azure)

BRKSEC-3667 BRKSEC-3035 BRKSEC-3455


Thursday Advanced Firepower
SSL policy
Firepower Platform
Dissecting Firepower
NGFW “Installation &
Deep Dive
troubleshooting Troubleshooting

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6
Do You Really Know Firepower Manager?
• A policy configuration tool for NGFW / NGIPS
• A quick way to see the context / composition
of your network
• A tool to “check-on” your threat events

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7
Data Correlation & Organisation is Critical

OS
DNS
All Intrusion Local
IOCs Version
Activity
Events Events Vuln
Data

IP Sec URL Sec DNS User Threat


Intel Intel Sec Intel Data Intel

Policy Network App


Malware File Data
Violation Flow Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8
Data Correlation & Organisation is Critical

Analysis
Organisation
Filtration
WHY? Correlation
• Most SOCs fail or keep getting Relatedness
“re-invented” Intelligence
• Good Security Analysts are hard Integration
to find/keep and are expensive

The COST of security is not sustainable even in


today’s climate of regulation, fear, and loss.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9
Firepower Is More Than Just “Threat Protection”

Firepower Management Centre (FMC) manages threat detection. It also:


• Puts threat into context within YOUR unique network.
• Provides actionable security, network, and business data
• Can allow “Security” to come out of the “Dog House” by supporting multiple
business outcomes
• Create automation in your ”threat hunting”
• Trigger automated response
• Bend itself to your organisation's workflow
or automate that workflow.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
Event Source Matters

Understanding Data

Misunderstood Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12
Visual Guide to Firepower Event Sources

Security Traffic DNS SSL Application Network File IPS Engine


Normalisation URL Identity AMP
Intelligence Sinkhole Decrypt Detection Discovery Detection (Snort®)

Security Connection Discovery Intrusion File Malware AMP 4


User Activity Endpoints
Intelligence Events Events Events Events Events

Servers File
Info
Supplemental Data
• Geo IP Data Applications
File
• CVE / Vuln Data Trajectory
• IP Reputation Data Application
Details
• URL Data

Host Indications of
Host Profiles Compromise
Attributes

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13
The Host Profile: End Point Context
Applications

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 14
Host Profile: Under the Hood

Authoritative Identity Sources

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 15
Host Profile: Network Discovery Placement

• Capture Internal Traffic


• Better Fidelity when closer to
the End Point
• Avoid Duplication when
possible
• Map Zones to best CIDR
• Exclude CIDRs from
more distant zones
• Leverage Passive
interfaces/SPAN
• vFTD makes a great Network &
App Discovery tool at no cost
• Adding IDS will cost more
“Normal Way”
is flawed

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16
Host Profile: Create Your Own Attributes

• Text Label
Update • URL
• Manually • Integer Range
• Via Host Input API • List of Labels based on current IP
• Via Remediation API

Attributes can be leveraged for additional data,


reporting, queries, and Correlation Rules.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 17
Host Profile: Tuning IOCs

40 Pre-built IOCs selected from:


• Malware Events
• Some IPS Events
• Some Security Intelligence

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18
Host Profile: Vulnerability Mappings

Vuln Mappings in Policy App Detectors

IPS Events
(Snort®)

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19
Myth: “Vuln Scans make better Impact Scores”

Host Profiles
Informs
Impact Analysis

Vuln Data from dynamic V V V


Net Discovery
‘worst case’ V V V
fidelity 3rd Party Mappings:
• take priority
dynamic V V V • static
Vuln Data from
• do not change with host changes
3rd Party Scan V V V
precise • update only from a new scan
fidelity • Be mindful which hosts use
at the time Remember! network discover vs. 3rd party data
of the scan Host Profiles are • Consider change controls
usually meant to • Consider risk of “false negative”
change

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 20
IPS (Snort®) Events & Impact
Analysis
Understand How Intrusion Events Work
Understanding Detection Conditions is Important

• Snort® rules use variables to determine


“directionality”
• $EXTERNAL_NET -> $HOME_NET (inbound)
(state established) • $HOME_NET -> $EXTERNAL_NET
(outbound)
• TCP based events from the Snort® Engine are
Structure and Content Testing based on ESTABLISHED sessions
• Reduces false positives
★ IPS events are generated when sessions ARE
What makes a Host Profile THROUGH the perimeter
• Passive data collection (network packet analysis) TCP request responds map
• “State” table based on Discovery Events to Server Port
• Server Services: TCP based respond to UDP request sent map to
connections Server Port
UDP based initiate UDP packets
• Applications (generally TCP) Understanding directionality
detected during session initiation from host. is key to Impact Flags

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 22
Understanding Snort® Rule Directionality
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS
(msg:"MALWARE-CNC SambaCry ransomware download attempt";
flow:to_server,established; urilen:9; content:"/minerd32"; Outbound:
fast_pattern:only; http_uri; metadata:impact_flag red, policy balanced-
ips drop, policy security-ips drop, service http; Indication of
reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/ef7ee620ce09cd8edca81dc786
6fbe87405c4a8ac88f985ac350269d8d081073/analysis/; Compromise
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:45472; rev:1; gid:1; )

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 3690 -> $HOME_NET any


(msg:"SERVER-APACHE Apache Subversion svnserve integer overflow
attempt"; flow:to_client,established; content:"184467440737095516";
depth:18; content:"|3A|"; within:1; distance:2; metadata:policy max- Inbound Attack!
detect-ips drop, policy security-ips drop; reference:cve,2015-5259;
reference:url,subversion.apache.org/security/CVE-2015-5259-
advisory.txt; classtype:attempted-user; sid:40849; rev:1; gid:1; )

NOTE: Make sure your $Variables are appropriate for where your detection is placed.
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 23
Understanding Impact Flags
Intrusion Events Host Profile Impact Flag Action Why
[Outside Profile Range]
Source / Destination IP General info†† Event occurred

[Host not yet profiled]


0 Event outside outside profiled
profiled networks networks

IP Address
Protocol (TCP/UDP) Good information
Previously

User IDs
4 host is currently
unseen host
within monitored
not known
network
Source / Destination Protocols
Port Good information Relevant port not

Server Side Ports


3 event may not open or protocol
have connected not in use

Service Client Side Ports Relevant port or


Worth
protocol in use
Services
2 investigation.
but no vuln
Host exposed.
mapped

CVE
Snort ID Client / Server Apps
Act immediately. Host vulnerable

Operating System
1 Host vulnerable to attack or
or compromised. showing an IOC.
IOC: Predefined Impact
Potential Vulnerabilities †† If you have a fully profiled network
this may be a critical event!
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 24
Understanding Impact Flags
Intrusion Events Host Profile Impact Flag Action Why
[Outside Profile Range]
Source / Destination IP
[Host not yet profiled]
0
Ignore Impact Flag
Protocol (TCP/UDP) IP Address Definitions in the Docs
User IDs
4
Source / Destination Protocols
Port Impact Flag Logic
Server Side Ports
3
+
Service Client Side Ports Snort® Config
Services
2 +
Your Network =

CVE
Snort ID Client / Server Apps
1 Better Threat Hunting
Operating System
IOC: Predefined Impact
Potential Vulnerabilities †† If you have a fully profiled network
this may be a critical event!
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 25
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
Sample Mapping of FMC Events to Kill Chain
Command
Recon Weaponise Deliver Exploit Install Action
& Control

Connection Intrusion Indications of Indications of Indications of Indications of


Events Events Compromise Compromise Compromise Compromise

Discovery File Intrusion AMP 4 Discovery Connection


Events Events Events Endpoints Events Events

Security Malware Security


Malware Connection
Intelligence Events Intelligence
Events Events

Intrusion Custom
User Activity Connection Security
Events Correlation
Events Intelligence

User Security Custom


Activity Intelligence Correlation Understanding the Kill Chain is the
beginning of understanding which
Conditions and data will vary based on the campaign event types will “show” the attack.
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 27
Goal: Getting to Remediation

Order of Investigation†
Remediation – Incident Response – Data Collection
You’ve been Owned! Under Attack Research & Tuning
Indication of Compromise Impact 0 Impact 1 Impact 3 (then 2) Impact 4
“Critical Assets”

Not Blocked

Internal Source

External
Source
Correlation
Dropped
Rules

†may vary based on corporate priority


BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 28
POP QUIZ: Where Do I Start My Investigation?

From the FMC Dashboard From the FMC Context Explorer

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 29
This Is What Most Of Our Networks Look Like.
Some ways to choose
• Look for Malware Executed (Endpoint AMP)
• Dropper Infection (Endpoint AMP)
• Threat detected in file transfer
• CNC Connected Events
• Shell Code Executed
• Impact 1 (these were probably blocked)
• Impact 2 (these were probably blocked)

THEME: Start with what is compromised first.

Let’s see what these 63


From the FMC Context Explorer events are all about.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 30
Drilling into the IOC

Busy event. Looks like


we’re getting more.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 31
Digging into the IOC

Seems active across 6


hosts. Let’s drill into one.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 32
Looks like Kim
Ralls has a lot
going on her
Windows host.




Events from multiple


sources:
• IPS Engine
• File Protection
• AMP for Networks

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 33
• .147 Tried to send the file 5 times
• .147 was sent the file once
• IPS blocked it! (yeah)
• What does Impact 4 mean?
• Should we investigate more?

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 34
Did you forget
about these?

Let’s see if that


file moved around
without the IPS
seeing it.




BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 35
Yep. That file is
malware

We see it in the
malware
summary, too.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 36
• A lot more than the 6
file transfers and hosts
the IPS engine
stopped.

• Good thing they have


AMP for Endpoints,
too.
Take Away
Be sure to look at every angle • Bet they wished they
enabled quarantining.
around an event. Try to tell the
whole story and find every part of • Problem scoped. Time
to remediate.
the issue.
• Maybe a good time to
look at file analysis /
Threatgrid to learn
what other artifacts are
left behind.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 37
Good SecOps is Thorough
OODA Loop

Remediate Capture
Events

Choose & Determine


Prioritise Impact &
Response Scope

DURING an outbreak this must be as automated as possible.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 38
Looking at an Impact 3 Attempt

• Source IP: all internal,


• Destination IP: all external
• Impact 3: no Host Profiles for external hosts
• Sourced from my Network = I’m the attacker? = Indication of Compromise
• TCP detection: means established connection
• These hosts definitely “launched” an attack.
• Next Step: Focus on the Source Host. Probably compromised.
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 39
Assessment:
This has has to be
stopped!

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 40
Breached? Follow an Order of Operations
Multiple Event Vectors Mission/Op Critical

IPS, Malware, Connection, File, Context


Correlation IOCs,
Trajectory, DNS, Impact Flags

Event
Check all the related data. Directionality
Protocol: TCP / UDP?

Leverage Rule Documentation

“See the big story” : Packet not


always necessary
Build a complete timeline – tell a
story.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 41
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
Default Reports
• Not just what’s in the templates
• Dashboard widgets are “mini”-reports
• Over 120 preset reports within a widget
• Create custom Widgets for more
• Think of the Dashboard as your
unlimited report designer.
• Tools:
• Searches
• Custom Workflows
• Custom Tables = Data goldmine

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 43
Event Viewing

Tables • Listing of events with a data set (IPS, Connection, Malware, etc.)

• Customised organisation of specific column headers


Workflows • Allows Analysts to go straight to meaningful data

• Search for specific or generalised matches within event tables


• Each table can have it’s own filters
Filters • Hundreds of filters pre-installed
• Customisable

Custom • Join of two or more individual event tables


• Aggregate useful data for faster decision making and reporting
Tables • Has it’s own Workflows and Filters

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 44
Workflows
A Default Event View

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 46
A Default View

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 47
Changing The View Helps Focus Analysis

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 48
Create a Custom Workflow

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 49
Create a Custom Workflow

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 50
How It Turned Out GEEK Tip: Bookmark these in your browser!

Remember order
of investigation

Actionable Data:
Hosts .52, .56, and .111
need to be investigated!

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 51
Custom Tables
Building Custom Tables Intrusion Events Host Data

Have all the data you need immediately in one view.


Custom Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 53
Custom Table: Intrusion Event with Host Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 54
Custom Table: Intrusion Event with Host Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 55
Custom Table: Intrusion Event with Host Data
Custom tables can even
have their own workflows

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 56
Custom Table: Intrusion Event with Host Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 57
Custom Table: Intrusion Event with Host Data

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 58
Custom Table: Includes Custom Filters

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 59
Custom Table: Includes Custom Filters

Tables, Custom Tables, and Filters can also be leveraged on the


Dashboard. Just choose the 1 column that is most meaningful.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 60
Leveraging the Dashboard
Customise The Dashboard

▪ There are a number of default


dashboards
▪ All of them have customisable
widgets
▪ Create / Customise your own
for better visibility and report
designs

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 62
Custom Analysis Widget

This is your
most powerful
widget

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 63
Dashboards That Meet Your Needs Threat Focused

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 64
Dashboards That Meet Your Needs
Network Focused

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 65
Build Reports Straight from the Dashboard

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 66
Interesting Data for Filtering Potential ”new” Threat
List Int. Source IP List Ext. Source IP List Int. Source IP List Int. Source IP List Int. Source IP

Executable Exfil Retrospective


Threat Top File Odd URLs
Destinations Sources
Internal IPs that Internal IP
Internal IPs
send files to addresses
Top Sec Int. Top External connecting to
External Address Associated with
Events with Source IPs for (esp. exe, jar, pdf,
URL Categories
Retrospective
external Dest. IP files doc, archive, etc.) “of concern”
Malware

List Int. Source IP List Int. Source IP List Int. Source IP

Correlation Processes Invalid App


DNS Bad SSL Events Introducing Usage
Malware
Internal IPs Internal IPs using Internal IPs Internal IPs using
generating DNS invalid SSL Certs sourcing (prebuilt in FMC, Apps on non-
Sinkhole Events to external IP Correlation requires AMP 4 standard
Events Endpoints) protocols

* Create Correlation Rules


* Leverage Open AppID
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 67
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
APIs Open Firepower to Orchestration
3rd Party Threat
Intelligence 3rd Party Vuln Data

Firepower Management
Centre ISE Stealthwatch
NGIPS

NGFW

AD
Tetration

AMP Threatgrid
Data

Web Security
AMP for
Endpoints
Logging
DNS
SEIM
Orchestration
Sending Data Umbrella
to SEIM Email Investigate
API transaction Security
Identity from ISE

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 69
API’s For Firepower
API Description

E-Streamer Transmission of 100% of FMC event database to SEIM. Sensor (generates events) ->
FMC -> FMC additional analytics / aggregation / custom correlation events -> all
original and additional events SEIM. Much richer data than syslog.

Host Input Customise Host Profile data, policy oriented labels, CVE data, etc. Programmatically
insert data into FMC for use with Impact Analysis and Firepower recommendations.

JDBC Direct query access to event database, rule documentation, host profile tables, etc.
Allows for external system to supplement data available in FMC for a common or
central dashboard (Splunk).

Remediation Programmatic interface for FMC to initiate command instructions to other devices.
Threat-Centric NAC (with ISE), Host Profile modification, 3rd party product introduction.

REST Programmatic interface for GET, PUT, and PUSH command with Firepower devices.
Command summary on next slide.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 70
Estreamer API
Estreamer: Easy Setup

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 72
Estreamer: Easy Setup

Install Cert on SEIM


Estreamer Client

SEIM

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 73
Host Input API
Enabling a Host Input

• Provide the cert to your Vuln Input tool / Client App


• Added Benefits:
• Asset Integration Data
• Host Input + Host Profile Attributes : Provide any additional data re: endpoint that is meaningful
• The default Import Tool (in the SDK) + CSV File will meet most use cases

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 75
JDBC Connector
JDBC Connector

Why JDBC Connector is used:


• Customised Reporting tools
• Additional data lookups (packet data,
rule documentation).
• Useful for SEIMs that do not have
Estreamer support

• Programatic integration:
• Splunk, Huntsman
• Phantom Cyber

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 77
Remediation API
Automating Response
Automating Response – Remediation API
Boolean
Intrusion Events Correlation Rules
Conditios
Discovery Events
User Activity
Host Inputs
Connection Events Correlation Policies
Traffic Profiles
Malware Event Actions
Correlation Rules Correlation Events
(API, Email, SNMP)

Sample Remediation Modules


• Cisco ISE: Rapid Threat Containment
• Guidance Encase
• Set Host Attributes Use Case 2
• Security Intelligence Blacklisting
• Nmap Scan
• SSH / Expect Scripts
• F5 iRules
• Solera DeepSee
• Netscaler
• PacketFence
• Bradford

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 79
ISE + Firepower = Rapid Threat Containment
WWW

4. Endpoint
Assigned Quarantine
+ CoA-Reauth Sent

Controller MnT

3. pxGrid EPS
1. Security Action: Quarantine
Events / IOCs + Re-Auth
NGFW Reported
2. Correlation
FMC
Rules Trigger
i-Net Remediation Action
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 80
Remediation Modules

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 81
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

Open the
System:Integration
page

Enter ISE Server


details
ise-1.mynet.com
ise-2.mynet.com
Be sure to
configure your certs
for the integration

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 82
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 83
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 84
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 85
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 86
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

Notice your ISE


mitigation actions!

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 87
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 88
Configure Rapid Threat Containment

Be sure to assign
the action to a
Correlation Rule
within a
Correlation Policy

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 89
REST API
REST: Turning It On

Leverage REST for:


• NetOps integration & Monitoring

• Platform Status

• REST + Remediation API


• Programmatic integration means more changes to be initiated
based on anything you can build

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 91
Explore REST: https:<FMC_IP>:443/api/api-explorer>

Tip:
This is a great
way to update
firewall objects!

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 92
Integration Example: Working with Splunk
Syslog:
Event messages Splunk
System level information
Health Events
(FMC & Sensor)
E-streamer:
Contextualised event messages JDBC
AMP for Endpoints Events Snort Rule Docs Syslog:
Host Profile, Misc Event messages **
DB Queries System level information
FMC REST API
get, pull, post, delete
instructions

Sensor-FMC
Event messages
healthdata
FP Sensors
FP Sensors
FP Sensors

** event messages are richer from estreamer

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 93
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
Recommended Rules
False Negatives Means You Are NOT Protected
Too many exploits succeed because: Cause Resolution
• Systems aren’t patched Event Overload! Impact Analysis
• Detections aren’t enabled Tuning Failures Understanding Detection Tools
Attackers succeed with “old” exploits Detections Disabled Knowing What Needs Protection
Verizon Data Breach Report(s)
Cisco Annual Security Report(s)

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 96
Firepower Recommendations Knows What I Do Not

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 97
Recommended Rules – How It Works
Snort Rules SVID Possible Vuln

SID: 24671, 32361 99675 CVE:2012-1528


Integer Overflow in Windows
Remotely exploitable
Remote exploit
vulnerability

SID: 33306
BLACKLIST: Connection to
a malware sinkhole.

Detection of behaviour that comes from a


compromised host or one that is about to
be compromised.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 98
Recommended Rules – The Details
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $SMTP_SERVERS 25 (msg:"BROWSER-IE
ActiveX installer broker object sandbox escape attempt"; flow:to_server,established;
flowbits:isset,file.exe; file_data; content:"|55 8B EC 6A FF 68 A8 31 01 10 64 A1 00 00
00 00 50 83 EC 0C A1 20 B0 01 10 33 C5 89 45 F0 56 50|"; fast_pattern:only;
metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips drop, service smtp;
reference:cve,2014-4123; reference:url,technet.microsoft.com/en- Not all
us/security/bulletin/ms14-056; classtype:attempted-user; sid:32265; rev:1; )
rules
have a
Rule that will map to
CVE!
Recommended Rules
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"BLACKLIST Connection to
malware sinkhole"; flow:to_client,established; dsize:22; content:"Sinkholed by
abuse.ch|0A|"; fast_pattern:only; metadata:impact_flag red, policy balanced-ips drop, policy
security-ips drop, service http; reference:url,en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinkhole_Server;
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:33306; rev:1; ) Rules disabling
by default

Some rules will


turned off by
Recommended
Rules

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 99
Recommended Rules
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $SMTP_SERVERS 25 (msg:"BROWSER-IE
ActiveX installer broker object sandbox escape attempt"; flow:to_server,established;
flowbits:isset,file.exe; file_data; content:"|55 8B EC 6A FF 68 A8 31 01 10 64 A1 00 00
00 00 50 83 EC 0C A1 20 B0 01 10 33 C5 89 45 F0 56 50|"; fast_pattern:only;
metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips drop, service smtp;
reference:cve,2014-4123; reference:url,technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/security/bulletin/ms14-056; classtype:attempted-user; sid:32265; rev:1; )

Rule that will map to


Recommended
Rules
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"BLACKLIST Connection to
malware sinkhole"; flow:to_client,established; dsize:22; content:"Sinkholed by
abuse.ch|0A|"; fast_pattern:only; metadata:impact_flag red, policy balanced-ips drop, policy
security-ips drop, service http; reference:url,en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinkhole_Server;
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:33306; rev:1; )

Some rules will


ALWAYS be
turned off by
Recommended
Rules
You may want to uncheck this.
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 100
Correlation Rules
Custom: Correlation & White List Events
Correlation Events:
Internal events based on
FMC Events Correlation boolean conditions within and
Correlation Events across multiple event
Rules
databases within the FMC.
[Tip: Correlation Rules can
monitor changes in flow!]
Traffic
Profiles

White List Events / Violations:


Discovery Host Profile White List Internal events based on
Events Changes Events changes to individual or
grouped host Profiles
First step in
creating
automated
response!
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 102
Correlation Rules / Correlation Policy
Correlation Rules allow for
100,000 events BOOLEAN decisions on one or
Value:
more sets of data within the
• Automate Security Decisions Firepower console.
• Track Business Outcome 5,000 events Rules can then lead to Actions
• Trigger Automated Response to 500 events
such as: Email, Syslog, SNMP
events or remediation actions.
specific conditions
100 events
Correlation Policy
Correlation Correlation
Rule Event
Correlation
20 events Action
Rule

10 events Email
Syslog
SNMP
Remediation Module
3 Events
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 103
Correlation Rules Go Into Correlation Policies

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 104
Building a Correlation Rule

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 105
Sample Correlation Rule
Correlation Rule to:
• Ensure only HTTPS traffic is
used on port 443

• Ensure traffic is initiated by a


Host within a defined Location
(host Attribute) is POS

• Ensure the HTTPS traffic from


the POS host is received on
hosts in the PCI network.

• Any traffic outside this profile


will generate an event.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 106
Correlation Rule Example: Production Network Change

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 107
Example: Production Network Change is Exfiltrating Traffic

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 108
Some Correlations Rules To Drive Action

If “an Intrusion Event occurs”. . . If “a Malware Event occurs”


“by retrospective network-based malware detection”
O Impact Flag is 3 - Yellow
R Impact Flag is 4 - Blue Sending IP is in 192.168.0.0/16
O Sending IP is in 10.0.0.0/8
Source IP is in 192.168.0.0/16 R
Sending IP is in 172.16.0.0/12
A O Source IP is in 10.0.0.0/8 O
N R Source IP is in 172.16.0.0/12 R
Receiving IP is in 192.168.0.0/16
D O Receiving IP is in 10.0.0.0/8
Destination IP is not in 192.168.0.0/16 R
Receiving IP is in 172.16.0.0/12
O Destination IP is not in 10.0.0.0/8
R Destination IP is not in 172.16.0.0/12
A recently seen file has been retrospectively determined to
be malware!
Go Stop it NOW!
You have a compromised host
“attacking” systems off your network.

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 109
Some Correlations Rules To Drive Action

Make it even more actionable If “a Malware Event occurs”


based on the file TYPE “by retrospective network-based malware detection”

Sending IP is in 192.168.0.0/16
O
Sending IP is in 10.0.0.0/8
R
Sending IP is in 172.16.0.0/12
O
R Receiving IP is in 192.168.0.0/16
O
Receiving IP is in 10.0.0.0/8
R
Receiving IP is in 172.16.0.0/12

A recently seen file has been retrospectively determined to be


malware!
Go Stop it NOW!

Just add another Boolean Condition

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 110
White Listing
Whitelisting
• Tool to profile/snapshot a host or network segment to monitor for change.
• Changes generation a correlation event

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 112
Whitelisting

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 113
Whitelisting

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 114
Whitelisting

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 115
Whitelisting

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 116
Traffic Profiling
Traffic Profiles

• Graphically & Statistically monitors the change in traffic over time


• Build profiles based on multiple conditions: IP, Port, Protocol, VLAN, Application,
Base OS, Host Attribute (filter like correlation rules)
• Standard and velocity based views

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 118
Traffic Profiles

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 119
Traffic Profiles: Automate Alert w/ Correlation

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 120
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Integration Automation Deployment Closing


Packets and Policies: Know What’s Happening Where
Prefilter
Policy ASA/Lima
Fastpathed

Ingres Existing N Egress L3/L4 ALG L3, L2


RX Pre-Filter NAT TX
Interface Conn Interface ACL Checks Hops
VPN
Decrypt
Y QoS
VPN VPN Encrypt
Config DAQ

Discovery
SI:
NAP App
SI (IP) SSL Pre-proc DNS ID L7 ACL File/AMP IPS
IPS Pasv ID
URL
Host

Firepower
SSL Network DNS Identity Intrusion Network Access Malware Intrusion
Policy Analysis Policy Policy Policy Discovery Control & File Policy
Policy (NAP) Policy Policy Policy
$VAR
$VAR Objects
Knowing your detection process impacts:
• How you analyse the data
• How you tune your security appliance Element Enabled in AC Policy
BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 122
Access Policy Tips
• Rule not turning off? Check your Network Analysis Policy
• Putting a monitor rule at the top of your AC Policy can impact performance.
• Be careful of overly precise rules
• Defining Zone AND Network AND VLAN (or SGT) can potentially lead to event duplication or
skipped threat detections

• IPS Rules can have a NOT condition in traffic matching ”!”


• AC Rules do not have this option
• Deploying in-line (non-routed) it’s handy to have a network object all non-RFC 1918 addresses.
• Especially if VLAN or Routing decisions are made “north of the appliance”
• This can help reduce excess connection events or duplicate IPS events

• FMC automatically checks rules for problems, leverage it, but don’t rely on it.
• Nothing beats reviewing connection and intrusion events for duplication

• Pre-FILTER un-inspectable or low impact traffic (backup, SIP, some SSL/TLS)


BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 123
Event Security
Why FMC Reporting
Context Investigation

Healthy
Integration Automation Closing
Deployments
Call to Action
• Firepower Management Centre can be the centre of your security operations.
• Look at FMC as security automation framework -> Automate Threat Hunting
• Don’t ”hunt the same problem twice” – Use Correlation Rules
• Look for cross product integration to strengthen FMC’s value.
• Be creative in creating solutions. Look beyond “IPS” or “Threat Protection” opportunities.
• FMC’s real value is in how it can merge security operations and business outcome.
• Look for additional consumers of FMC data.
• Security will have greater value as a business enabler.
• Check out Firepower more at the World of Solutions! What can you make it do?!

BRKSEC-2058 © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 125
Thank you
And remember to fill out your surveys!
Q&A
Complete Your Online
Session Evaluation
• Give us your feedback and
receive a Cisco Live 2018 Cap
by completing the overall event
evaluation and 5 session
evaluations.
• All evaluations can be completed
via the Cisco Live Mobile App.
Don’t forget: Cisco Live sessions will be
available for viewing on demand after the
event at www.CiscoLive.com/Global.

© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Thank you

Potrebbero piacerti anche