UP Law F2021 080 Qua Chee Gan v.

Deportation Board
Administrative Law Revised Admin Code, Sec. 69 1963 Barrera

SUMMARY

Petitoners Qua Chee Gan et. al., were charged before the Deportation Board (Board) and was ordered
arrested. After paying the necessary bonds, they were temporarily set free. They now assail the power of
President to order investigation for purpose of deportation. The SC held that by express provision of Revised
Admin Code, Sec. 69, the President, concurrently with Commissioner of Immigration, may exercise such
power. Corrollarily, the issue of whether the power of investigation comes with power to arrest pending
investigation, and whether such power may be delegated to the Board. The SC without ruling with respect to
existence of power of arrest pending investigation, ruled that the said power, if there is such, cannot be
delegated since it requires exercise of discretion. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties
may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so
delegated.

FACTS

 May 12, 1952 – Special Prosecutor Emilio Galang charged before the Deportation Board (Board)
petitioners Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy with purchasing US$130,000 without the necessary
permit from the Central Bank and secretly remitting the same to Hong Kong;
 They were also charged with attempt to bribe the officials of the government in order to evade
prosecution but as later acquitted;
 They were arrested. After paying for the surety bond, they were temporarily set free;
 The petitioner Chee Gan et. al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that charges presented against them
do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain such charges;
 The Board denied the motion;
 The petitioners filed before the SC a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, and was given due
course but made returnable to CFI of Manila;
 They question the validity of power of the President, and consequently of the delegation to the Board
of such power, to deport aliens, together with ancillary power to investigate. They argued that the
power is vested with the Legislative, not the Executive hence there must be a legislation (law) to
authorize the exercise of this power;
 A writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) was granted restraining Board from hearing the deportation
charges against the petitioners pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition
proceeding;
 Board, thru its Answer, averred that as an agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges
filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest;
 The lower court upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the Board of his power to
conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in the country
would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State;
 The court, likewise, sustained the power of the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest and x
bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory
that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and
complement the power to deport aliens, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Hence this appeal before the SC. They question the power of the President, and at the same time the
ancillary power to arrest by virtue of EO 398 (issued by President Quirino).

RATIO

W/N the President has power to deport aliens and whether he can delegate the same to the Board
Yes, on both.

The Court concluded that there are two ways to effect deportation of the undesirable aliens under the then
existing laws:
 1. By the order of the President after due investigation pursuant to Revised Admin Code Sec. 69 1 (Act No.
2711); and
2. By order of the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 372 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 194).

While Sec. 69 of RAC did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens,
unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but
merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that
such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien — which provision was
expressly declared exempted (under Sec 523) from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of
1940 — is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of
the existence of such power in the Executive. And the exercise of this power by the Chief Executive
has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.4

There seems to be no doubt that the President's power or investigation may be delegated. This is
clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent."

W/N the power to order arrest of the alien pending investigation can be delegated by the President
[RELEVANT]
No.
Note that the Court did not decide whether the power to investigate has the ancillary power to order
arrest pending investigation. This is a mere discussion of whether such power, if there is, can be
delegated to the Board.

1. The Court pointed out the existence of the provision in the then 1935 Constitution the right to be secure
in his/her person of local or alien alike. It provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of
arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., Under the
express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation.
Conceded that to carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to older the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien
be arrested.
2. Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of
discretion by the one issuing the same. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied
upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the
issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which
requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of
whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official
functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an
implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter

1
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case
the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to
cross-examine the opposing witnesses
2
“Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of Commissioner of Immigration after designation of Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien…”
3
“SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their
exclusion deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven which shall continue in force and effect: . . ."
4
In re Patterson, 1 Phil. 93; see also In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41; Tan Tong v s. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-7680, April 30, 1955;
Ang Beng v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9621, January 30, 1957
 under discussion, that would serve as a curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person,
such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then a delegation of that implied power,
nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberties of the people. The guarantees of
human rights and freedom cannot be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

W/N the President has power to deport on ground/s not enumerated in Immigration Act
Yes.

This contention is not without merit, with a number of laws that had been enacted to include other certain
act or conduct to be just cause for deportation to those originally contained in Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613. Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute
in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central
Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the
provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Immigration Act of 1940. The President
may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have
committed the act charged.

FALLO

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the ling of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to
fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a
consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and
the bonds led pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.