INTERNATIONAL tORGANIZATIONS tAS tLAW-MAKERS

INTRODUCTION
The tpurpose tof tthis tpaper tis tto tanalyze tthe tlaw-making tprocesses tof tinternational torganizations
tand tthe timpact tthereof, tparticularly tin tthe tlight tof tthe tfunctionalism tconstitutionalism tdichotomy

tand tagency ttheory. tThe tformer tdistinction tessentially tjuxtaposes tthe tclaim tof tinternational

torganizations tto tsuch trights, tprivileges tand tauthority tas tare tnecessary tto tfulfil ttheir tfunctions,

tand tthe tcall tfor tmore tcontrol tover tthese torganizations. tThe tconstitutionalist tapproach tis tmore

trecent tand thas tbeen tdeveloped tmainly tin treaction tto tapparent tflaws tin tthe tfunctionalist tmodel.

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tThere tare ttwo tstrands tof tconstitutionalism t: tone temphasizes tthe texistence tof ta tnumber tof

tuniversal tcore tvalues tsuch tas thuman trights tthat tpermeate tevery tlevel tof tthe tworld tlegal torder,

tthe tother trather tfocuses ton tthe tpossibility tof tcontrolling tinternational torganizations tthrough

tvarious tprovisions tin ttheir tconstituent tcharters. t

LAW-MAKING tBY tINTERNATIONAL tORGANISATIONS t

It tis tundisputed tthat tinternational torganisations tcan ttake tdecisions tthat tare tbinding tupon ttheir
tMember tStates tand tthat tthey tcan teven texercise tsovereign tpowers. tThis tis tevident tin tsuch

torganisations tas, tfor texample, tthe tUnited tNations t(UN), tthe tEuropean tCommunity t(EC), tthe

tWorld tHealth tOrganisation t(WHO), tthe tInternational tCivil tAviation tOrganisation t(ICAO), tthe

tOrganisation tof tAmerican tStates t(OAS), tNATO, tthe tOrganisation tfor tEconomic tCo-operation

tand tDevelopment t(OECD), tthe tUniversal tPostal tUnion t(UPU), tthe tWorld tMeteorological

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tOrganisation t(WMO) tand tthe tInternational tMonetary tFund t(IMF). tTraditionally, teach tanalysis

tof tthe tlaw-making tpowers tof tinternational torganisations tstarts tfrom tthe tfollowing tthree

tpropositions: t(1) tMember tStates tprovide tthe tinternational torganisations tthey testablish twith tthe

tlaw-making tpowers tas tthey tsee tfit, tlaid tdown tin tthe tconstituent tinstrument tof tthe torganisation

t(constituent ttreaty); t(2) tinternational torganisations thave tonly tthe tlaw-making tpowers tthat thave

tbeen tattributed tto tthem tin tthe tconstituent ttreaty tby ttheir tMember tStates t(doctrine tof tattributed

tpowers); tand t(3) tthe tlaw-making tpowers tof tinternational torganisations tare tgenerally tlimited tto

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tinternal tmatters. tThe taforementioned tpropositions twould tideally tresult tin tinternational

1 tE. tde tWet, t“The tinternational tconstitutional torder”, tICLQ t2006, t51-76. t
2 tR.A. tWessel tand tJ. tWouters, t“The tphenomenon tof tmultilevel tregulation: tinteractions
tbetween tglobal, tEU tand tnational tregulatory tspheres” tin tA. tFollesdal, tR.A. tWessel tand
tJ. tWouters t(eds.), tMultilevel tregulation tand tthe tEU. tThe tinterplay tbetween tglobal,
tEuropean tand tnational tnormative tprocesses, tLeiden, tMNP, t2008, t13. tSee tfurther, tD.
tSarooshi, tInternational torganizations tand ttheir texercise tof tsovereign tpowers, tOxford,
tOUP, t2005 tand tC.F. tAmerasinghe, tPrinciples tof tthe tinstitutional tlaw tof tinternational
torganizations, tCambridge, tCUP, t2005. t
3 tJ.E. tAlvarez, tInternational torganizations tas tlaw-makers, tOxford, tOUP, t2006, t120-
121. t
torganisations tcreating tlaw tthrough tpredictable tmechanisms tin ta tway tconsistent twith tthe toriginal

tgoals tof tthe tMember tStates, twithout tany tneed tfor tfurther tmeasures tof tcontrol. tRecent

tdevelopments tand tobservations tsuggest, thowever, tthat tthe ttraditional tpropositions tno tlonger

thold ttrue. tThis tdevelopment thas tgreat timplications tfor tthe tfunctionalism-constitutionalism

tdistinction tnoted tearlier, tas twill tbe tdiscussed tin tthe tfollowing tparagraphs. tConstituent

tinstruments testablishing tinternational torganisations tare, tlike tall tnational tand tinternational tnorms,

tsubject tto tinterpretation tby tthe tparties tand torgans tapplying tit. tIt tis tpossible, ttherefore, tthat tthe

ttreaty tprovisions tpertaining tto tthe tlaw-making tpowers tof tthe torganisation twill tbe tconstrued tin ta

tdifferent tway tthan twas toriginally tintended tby tthe tdrafting tnations, tas tit tproves tvery tdifficult tto

tdraft tan tinstrument tin tsuch ta tmanner tas tto teffectively tpreclude tany tother tpossible

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tinterpretation. t

The tcustomary trules tfor tinternational ttreaty tinterpretation thave tbeen tcodified tin tthe tVienna
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tConvention ton tthe tLaw tof tTreaties t(Vienna tConvention). tArt. t31 t(1) tVienna tConvention

tprovides tthat: t“A ttreaty tshall tbe tinterpreted tin tgood tfaith tin taccordance twith tthe tordinary

tmeaning tto tbe tgiven tto tthe tterms tof tthe ttreaty tin ttheir tcontext tand tin tthe tlight tof tits tobject tand

tpurpose.” tThis tprovision tsupports tthe tfunctionalist tapproach tinsomuch tas tit timplies tthat

tprovisions tattributing tpowers tto tan tinternational torganization tshall tbe tinterpreted tin tlight tof tthe

tpurpose tof tthe tconstituent ttreaty tand tthus tof tthe tfunction tof tthe torganization. tA tjudicial torgan

tapplying tthis tprinciple tto tthe tlaw-making tprovisions tof ta tconstituent ttreaty twill ttherefore

ttypically tconclude tthat tthe torganization thas tsuch tpowers tas tare tnecessary tto trealize tits tgoals. t

DECISION-MAKING tMETHODS t
The tdecision-making tprocesses tin tinternational torganizations tcan ttake tmultifarious tforms tthat
trange tfrom tanywhere tbetween tconsensus, tvoting tand tunanimity. tInternational torganizations

tfrequently tresort tto tadopting tdecisions tby tmeans tof tconsensus, twhich timplies tthat tthey tcontinue

tto tdebate tand tdiscuss toptions tuntil ta tgeneral tagreement tis treached, trather tthan tforce ta tdecision

tby ttaking ta tvote. tWhile tit tis tpossible tthat tone tor tmore tMember tStates thave tsome treservations

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ton tthe toutcome, tthey tdecide, tfor tvarious treasons, tnot tto tblock tit. tNevertheless, tconstituent

4 tD.C. tSmith, t“Beyond tindeterminacy tand tself-contradiction tin tlaw: ttransnational

tabductions tand ttreaty tinterpretations”, tAJIL t1995, t1. t
5 tVienna tConvention ton tthe tLaw tof tTreaties, t22 tMay t1969. tPursuant tto tArt. t5, tthe
tConvention talso tapplies tto tany ttreaty twhich tis tthe tconstituent tinstrument tof tan
tinternational torganization. t
6 tThe tUN tdefines tconsensus tas tthe t“adoption tof ta tdecision twithout tformal tobjections
tand tvote; tthis tbeing tpossible tonly twhen tno tdelegation tformally tobjects tto ta
tconsensus tbeing trecorded, tthough tsome tdelegations tmay thave treservations tto tthe
ttreaties tof tinternational torganizations tfrom ttime tto ttime tresort tto tmajority tvoting tif tno

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tconsensus tcan tbe treached. tExamples tof tlaw-making tby tinternational torganizations tby

tconsensus tcan tbe tfound tin, tinter talia, tthe tpractice tof tthe tUnited tNations tSecurity tCouncil tsince

tas tearly tas t1948. tOccasionally, twhen ta tdecision tof tsubstance thas tto tbe ttaken, tthe tPresident tof

tthe tUNSC twould tpropose ta tstatement, twhich, tif tno tmember tvoices texpress tdisagreement, twould

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tbe taccepted tby tconsensus. tFurther, tdue tto tcircumstances tpeculiar tto tthe tsituation tat tthe ttime,

tno tvoting ttook tplace tduring tthe t19th tannual tsession tof tthe tUN tGeneral tAssembly tin t1964. tThe

tpractice tof tdeciding tby tconsensus thas tsubsequently tbeen tadopted tby ta tnumber tof torgans tof tthe

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tUnited tNations, tand tincreasingly tby tthe tGeneral tAssembly titself. t

An timportant tnumber tof tinternational torganizations trequire tunanimity tfor tall tor tcertain
tcategories tof tdecisions. tAn texample tfrom tthe tpast tis tthe tLeague tof tNations, twhich tnotoriously

trequired tunanimity tfor tall tthe tdecisions tof tthe tCouncil tand tthe tAssembly, texcept tfor tprocedural

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tmatters. tVoting tas ta tmethod tof tdecision-making tcan ttake tmany tforms tand tcan trun tthe tgamut

tfrom ta tsimple tmajority tvote twith tequality tof tvoting tpower tto tqualified tmajority twith tweighted

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tvoting. tThe tpreferred tmethod tof tlaw-making tby tinternational torganisations tand ttheir tMember

tStates thas tshifted tover ttime tand tdeserves tto tbe tanalysed tagainst tthe tbackdrop tof tagency ttheory

tintroduced tearlier tand tthe tdiscussion tof tfunctionalism tvs. tconstitutionalism. tIt tis tself-evident

tthat tone tof tthe tforemost tmethods tof treining tin tthe tinternational torganisation tas tan tagent, tis tfor

tthe tprincipals tto tdecide tupon tcertain tmethods tof tdecision-making tin tthe tconstituent tinstruments

tthat twould tallow tthem tto tpermanently tinfluence tthe tcourse ttaken tby tthe tagent. tThe tfirst

tinternational torganisations toriginally ttook tdecisions talmost texclusively tby tunanimity, tup tuntil

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tthe tbeginning tof tthe t20th tcentury. tThe tPermanent tCourt tof tInternational tJustice t(PCIJ)

tsubstantive tissue tat tissue tor ta tpart tof tit” t(definition tproposed tby tthe tUN tOffice tof
tLegal tAffairs, tUNJY t1987, t174).
7 tSee, tfor texample, tArt. t7 t(1) tand t11 t(1) tof tthe tConstitutive tAct tof tthe tAfrican tUnion,
t11 tJuly t2000; tArt. t9 t(6) tof tthe tTreaty testablishing tthe tCommon tMarket tfor tEastern
tand tSouthern tAfrica, t5 tNovember t1993 tand tArt. tIX.1 tof tthe tWTO tAgreement. tSee
talso, tfor tthe tdifference tbetween t‘passive tconsensus’ tand t‘active tconsensus’ tin tthe
tWTO, tM. tFooter, tAn tinstitutional tand tnormative tanalysis tof tthe tWorld tTrade
tOrganization, tThe tHague, tNijhoff, t2005, t138–139. t
8 tS.D. tBailey tand tS. tDaws, tThe tProcedure tof tthe tUN tSecurity tCouncil, tOxford,
tClarendon, t1998, t260. t
9 tK. tZemanek, t“Majority trule tand tconsensus ttechnique tin tlaw-making tdiplomacy” tin
tR.S.J. tMacDonald tand tD.M. tJohnston t(eds.), tThe tstructure tand tprocess tof tinternational
tlaw: tessays tin tlegal tphilosophy, tdoctrine tand ttheory, tDordrecht, tNijhoff, t1989, t862-
863. t
10 tArt. t5 tof tthe tCovenant tof tthe tLeague tof tNations, t28 tApril t1919.
11 tFor tan textensive tdiscussion tof tthe tvarious tmethods tand ttheir timplications, tsee
tH.G. tSchermers tand tN.M. tBlokker, tInternational tinstitutional tlaw, tLeiden, tNijhoff,
t2003, tparas. t791-856. t
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tconfirmed tthis tin tits tadvisory topinion ton tthe tTreaty tof tLausanne tand tstated tthat, twith trespect

tto torganisations tcomposed tof tgovernment trepresentatives t“from twhom tthey treceive tinstructions

tand twhose tresponsibility tthey tengage t[...] tobservance tof tthe trule tof tunanimity tis tnaturally tand

teven tnecessarily tindicated. tOnly tif tthe tdecisions t[...] thave tthe tsupport tof tthe tunanimous tconsent

tof tthe tPowers tcomposing tit, twill tthey tpossess tthe tdegree tof tauthority twhich tthey tmust thave.”

This tpractice tis tlogical tfrom tthe tperspective tof tthe tagency ttheory tsince trequiring tunanimity tfor
tall tdecisions tis tone tof tthe tmost tcertain tways tof tminimizing tagency tlosses. tHowever, tit tcannot

tbe texplained tas teasily tfrom tthe tvantage tpoint tof tthe tfunctionalist ttheory, tnevertheless tthought tto

tbe tmore tapplicable tto tinternational torganizations tof tthe tpast, tfor tthe tunanimity trule tstrongly

trestricts tthe tinternational torganizations tin ttheir tfreedom tto tfunctionally tfulfil tthe tgoals tfor twhich

tthey twere testablished. tFunctionalist tneeds twere tapparently toverruled tby tnational tconcerns twhen

tinternational torganizations tfirst tappeared. tIt tshould tcome tas tno tsurprise tthen, tthat, teven tthough

tmost tconstituent tinstruments tof tinternational torganizations tto tsome textent tprovide tfor ta tmajority

tvote, tin tpractice, torganizations tnevertheless toften tresort tto tdecision-making tby tconsensus. tThis

tpractice tbecame tparticularly twidespread tin tthe tsecond thalf tof tthe t20th tcentury tand twas

tsubsequently toften tformalized tand tcodified tin tthe ttreaties tof tthe trespective torganizations, tas thas

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tbeen tobserved tin, tfor texample, tthe tdecision-making trules tof tMERCOSUR, tthe tWTO, tthe

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tCommonwealth tof tIndependent tStates t(CIS), tthe tAfrican tEconomic tCommunity t(AEC),

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tECOWAS , tthe tSouthern tAfrican tDevelopment tCommunity t(SADC),18 tthe tCommon tMarket tfor
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tEastern tand tSouthern tAfrica t(COMESA), tthe tAssociation tof tSoutheast tAsian tNations

12 tIbid., tpara. t783. tSee talso tR. tMonaco, t“Les tprincipes trégissant tla tstructure tet tle
tfonctionnement tdes torganisations tinternationales”, tRec. tCours t1977, tVol. tIII, t130. t
13 tConsensus twas talso tthe tmain tdecision-making tmethod tunder tGATT. tSee tArt. tIX.1
tof tthe tWTO tAgreement, twhich tprovides tthat t“[t]he tWTO tshall tcontinue tthe tpractice
tof tdecision-making tby tconsensus tfollowed tunder tGATT t1947”. t
14 tArt. t23 tof tthe tCharter tof tthe tCommonwealth tof tIndependent tStates, t22 tJanuary
t1993. t
15 tArt. t10 tof tthe tTreaty testablishing tthe tAfrican tEconomic tCommunity, t3 tJune, t1991.
16 t1 tArt. t10 t(8), t11 t(6), t13 t(6) tand t19 tof tthe tDeclaration tand tTreaty testablishing tthe
tSouthern tAfrican tDevelopment tCommunity, t17 tAugust t1992. t
17 tArt. t8 t(7) tand t9 t(6) tof tthe tTreaty testablishing tthe tCommon tMarket tfor tEastern
tand tSouthern tAfrica, t5 tNovember t1993. t
18 tArt. t20 t(1) tof tthe tCharter tof tthe tAssociation tof tthe tSoutheast tAsian tNations, t20
tNovember t2007 t(“As ta tbasic tprinciple, tdecision-making tin tASEAN tshall tbe tbased ton
tconsultation tand tconsensus”). t
19 tArt. t112.7 tof tthe tRome tStatute tof tthe tInternational tCriminal tCourt, t17 tJuly t1998
tand tRule t61 tof tthe tAssembly’s tRules tof tProcedure. t
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t(ASEAN) tand tthe tAssembly tof tStates tParties tto tthe tRome tStatute tof tthe tInternational

tCriminal tCourt.

This tshift tin tpractice tfrom tmajority tvoting tto tadopting tdecisions tby tconsensus tis tmost
tcommonly texplained tby tthe thuge texpansion tof tthe tmembership tof tmany tinternational

torganisations tin tthe tsecond thalf tof tthe t20th tcentury, tespecially tfollowing tthe tcoming tinto tbeing

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tof ta tgreat tnumber tof tnew tStates tas tpart tof tthe tdecolonisation tprocess. tThe tfounding tmembers

tof tmost tinternational torganisations tcreated tan tagent twith tcommon texpectations tand tconceptions

tas tto tthe tfunctions tand tgoals tto tbe trealized tby tthe tlatter. tOften, tthese tMember tStates tcould talso

tas tregards ttheir tinterests tact tas ta tcollective tprincipal tin tthe tPA trelationship twith tthe

tinternational torganisation tthey testablished, tand tadopting tdecisions tby tmajority tvote tposed tno

tgreat trisk. tWith tthe tarrival tof ta tlarge tnumber tof tnew tactors twith toften tcompeting tinterests ton

tthe tscene, thowever, tthis tprospect tabruptly tchanged. tVoting tsuddenly theld ta trather tlarge trisk tof

tloss tof tinfluence tfor tthe toriginal tmembers. tFrom tan tagency ttheory tpoint tof tview, ttherefore, tit

tproved tmore tprofitable tfor tthe toriginal, toften tWestern, tmembers tto ttry tand treach ta tconsensus

twhere tpossible.

tIt tis tsometimes tnoted tthat tvery tlittle tpractical tdifference texists tbetween tunanimity, tthe tpreferred

tmethod tof tdecision-making tin tthe tearly tdays tof tinternational torganizations, tand tthe tmodern-day

tpractice tof tdecision-making tby tconsensus.While tthe ttwo tare tobviously tnot tinterchangeable tand

tare tsufficiently tdifferent tto twarrant tthe tdistinct tterminology, tit tshould tbe tnoted tthat tboth

tmethods tdo tsupport ta tmore tconstitutionalist tapproach tand thave tbeen tused tto tpreclude t‘rebel’

tbehaviour tin tagents. tHowever, tthe treasons tfor tdecision-making tby tunanimity tand tconsensus,

twhen tplaced tin ttheir thistorical tcontext, tare tdifferent. tThe tunanimity trule twas tmainly tinspired tby

tissues tof tsovereignty trelied tupon tby tStates topting tfor ta tmore tfunctional tapproach twhen tdealing

twith tinternational torganisations, twhereas tthe tmethod tof tconsensus tcan tbe tinterpreted tas ta

treaction tto tagency tslack tand tthe tneed tfor tmore tcontrol tover tinternational torganizations tand tthus

tas ta tconstitutionalist tresponse tto tfailed tfunctionalism. tFrom tthe tabove tit tappears tthat tthere tis ta

tcertain ttrade-off tbetween tmeasures tthat tbenefit tthe tfunctionalist tapproach tand tagency tlosses.

tThe tautonomy tthat tis tnecessarily tgranted tto tallow tagents tto trealise ttheir tfunctional tgoals tas tset

tout tin tthe tconstituent tinstrument tdepends tto tsome textent ton tthe tmethod tof tdecision-making tthat

20 tArt. t20 t(1) tof tthe tCharter tof tthe tAssociation tof tthe tSoutheast tAsian tNations, t20
tNovember t2007 t(“As ta tbasic tprinciple, tdecision-making tin tASEAN tshall tbe tbased ton
tconsultation tand tconsensus”)
21 tB. tBuzan, t“Negotiating tby tconsensus: tdevelopments tin ttechnique tat tthe tUnited
tNations tconference ton tthe tlaw tof tthe tsea”, tAJIL t1981, t326 tand tH.G. tSchermers tand
tN.M tBlokker, tsupra tnote t41, tpara. t784. t
thas tbeen tadopted. tWhen tthis tautonomy tis tperceived tto tbe ttoo tlarge tby ta tsufficient tnumber tof

tactors, tefforts twill tusually tbe tmade tto trein tin tagency tlosses, tinter talia, tthrough tmodifying tthe

tdecision-making tprocess. t

Another tmethod tfor tprincipals tto tcontrol ttheir tagent tis tby testablishing tcertain tchecks tand
tbalances twithin tthe tstructure tof tthe tinternational torganization, tsometimes tin tthe tform tof ta

tjudicial torgan, twhich twill tthen tmonitor tthe tactivities tof tthe torganization’s torgans tand ttheir

tcompliance twith tthe tconstituent ttreaty tand tgeneral tnorms tand tprinciples tof tinternational tlaw.

tExamples tof tsuch tjudicial torgans tare tthe tInternational tCourt tof tJustice, tthe tCourt tof tFirst

tInstance t(CFI) tand tthe tCourt tof tJustice t(ECJ) tof tthe tEuropean tCommunities, tthe tWTO’s

tStanding tAppellate tBody, tthe tCourt tof tJustice tof tthe tAfrican tUnion, tthe tCOMESA tCourt tof

tJustice, tthe tSADC tTribunal tand tthe tCourts tof tJustice tof tCARICOM tand tthe tAndean

tCommunity. tAn tadditional tadvantage tof tthese tand tother tinternational tjudicial tbodies tis tthat,

tthrough ttheir tcase-law tand tthe tauthority tthereof, tcompliance twith tglobal tand tregional

tinternational tnorms tis tenhanced.

From tthe tperspective tof tagency ttheory, tjudicial torgans tof tinternational torganizations tcan tbe tseen
tas tbeing testablished tin torder tto treduce tagency tlosses tby tensuring tcompliance tby tthe

torganizations twith ttheir town tfunctional tpowers tand tgoals. tTo tthis tend, tStates, torgans tof tthe

tinternational torganizations tand tindividuals, tcan tbring tcomplaints tbefore tthese tjudicial tbodies.

tAn tinteresting texample tin tthis trespect tis tthe tcreation tin t1994 tof tan tindependent tinspection

tpanel tin tthe tseat tof tthe tWorld tBank tto thear tcomplaints tfrom tprivate tand tpublic tgroups tas tone

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tof tseveral tmeasures tto treduce tagency tslack. tThe tcreation tof tinternational tadjudicatory tbodies

tis tthus ttestament tto ta tmore tconstitutionalist tapproach ttowards tinternational torganizations.

tHowever, tthe tvery tnature tof tjudicial tdispute tsettlement tmechanisms tat tthe tsame ttime talso

tentails tsubstantial trisks tof tagency tlosses. tIndeed, tthe tmembers tof tjudicial tagents twill ttypically

tbe trather treluctant tto trelinquish ttheir town tlegal tviews tin tfavour tof tthe twishes tof ttheir

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tprincipals. tFurthermore, tthe tnormative tprinciples tof tinternational tlaw tpertaining tto tdue tprocess

tobligations, tincluding tthe timperatives tof timpartiality tand tindependence, twill tmake tit tvery

tdifficult tfor tthe tprincipals tto tadjust tthe tprovisions tregulating tthe tworkings tof tthese tjudicial

torgans tso tas tto talign tthem twith ttheir town tinterpretations tof tthe tinternational torganizations’

tfunctions tand tgoals. tSuch tattempts tat treducing tthe tadjudicatory tbody’s tdiscretion tin treaching

tdecisions twill tnot tonly tbe tcostly, tbut talso tlargely tineffective tand, tit tis tsubmitted, tundesirable. t

22 tSupra tnote t5.

23 tD.A. tLake, t“Anarchy, thierarchy, tand tthe tvariety tof tinternational trelations”, tInt’l. tOrg. t1996, t1-33. t
CONCLUSION
Explaining tthe tlaw-making tdynamics tof tinternational torganizations tis tno teasy ttask tand tone
tshould tbe tcareful tnot tto tdraw toverly tbroad tconclusions tin tthis trespect. tWhat tis tclear, thowever,

tis tthat tinternational torganizations thave trecently tbecome tincreasingly tactive tplayers tin tthe tfield

tof tinternational tlaw-making, tmost tnotably twith trespect tto ttreaties tand tthe tinterpretation tof tthese

tand tother tnorms tby tinternational tadjudicatory tbodies. tAs tthis tpaper thas ttried tto tdemonstrate,

tthis tevolution thas tnot talways tand tnecessarily tbeen tthe tresult tof tdeliberate tconsiderations ton tthe

tpart tof tthe tMember tStates t(principals) twho thired tthe tinternational torganizations t(agents). tIt

trather tfollows tfrom ta tcombination tof tconstitutionalist tinspired tmeasures ttaken tby tthe tprincipals

tin torder tto tminimise tand totherwise trectify tthe tagency tcosts tand tlosses tinherent tin tall tfunctional

tPA-relationships.