Social Distance According To St. Thomas Aquinas - J. Rawley Myers

THE^CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA]
\ Philosophical Series
Number 162
Abstract No. 17
SOCIAL DISTANCE
ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
REV. JOSEPH RAWLEYj MYERS, M. A.
Washington, D. C.
The Catholic University of America
1955
Nihil Obstat:
Ignatius Smith, O. P., Ph. D.
Censor Deputatus.
Imprimatur :
K Patrick A. O'Boyle, S. T. D.
Archbishop of Washington.
May 5, 1955.
Copyright, 1955
The Catholic University of America Press, Inc.
PRINTED IX THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY J. H. FURST COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
B7&5
INTRODUCTION
One of the most vital and pressing problems of our times is
that of group conflict, both international and intranational,
which is brought on by prejudicial attitudes of social distance.
Communism is one example of intergroup animosity; the race
problem in America is another. And because of these tensions,
peace, so dearly desired, eludes the grasp of man. What is the
answer to the problem of social distance ?
St. Thomas with his brilliant mind, as in so many other cases,
points the way. His principles, first of all, show us precisely what
social distance is. He presents for us a clear picture of how
prejudicial attitudes arise. Finally, from St. Thomas we learn that
education and love are two key factors for the solution to this
problem.
Group conflict is a massive problem. It will not be solved in
a day or a year. Its ultimate solution, perhaps, will be found
only in a gigantic, world-wide revolution of love, in a day when
men will hold truth in great reverence, seeking after her with a
burning thirst; in a time when righteous men will govern their
lives and their nations by truth and reason, when justice and
charity will reign in the hearts of all. But because the problem
looms so large before us is no reason to abandon hope; rather,
each individual should strive to establish and create peace in his
own little world of influence, in his block and neighborhood and
community. The principles of St. Thomas will guide us. He has
furnished us the blueprints ; he stands like a beacon to show us the
way. The worst thing that could happen for us who have been
exposed to the truths of Thomas is that from henceforth as we
walk among men we be in no way distinguishable from the myriads
who grope in the darkness.
In conclusion, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those
who helped me in the completion of this study. Special apprecia
tion is expressed to the Most Reverend Louis B. Kucera, D. D.,
Bishop of Lincoln, and the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, 0. P.,
Dean of the School of Philosophy.
v
389
THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
The purpose of the dissertation of which this abstract is but a

brief summary is to establish the nature of social distance and to
posit factors necessary for a solution to this problem, according
to the perennial philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. But prior to
this particular task, it is of value to note the importance and scope
of this problem and what contemporary thought has to say con
cerning it.
Social distance may be thought of either as an attitude of mind
or as those acts flowing from this mental state. An attitude of
social distance is an erroneous bias unreasonably held by the indi
viduals of one group against another group. Acts of social distance
are unjust differential treatment of individuals considered to belong
to a particular group. It will be the task of the following section
on the psychology of social distance to explain these definitions
according to Thomistic philosophy.
Prejudice is a broader term than social distance. It is the genus
of which social distance is a species. For that reason much of
what is said of prejudice or prejudicial attitudes pertains to social
distance. Prejudice may be defined as an attitude of mind towards
persons or things producing a bias in favor of, or adverse to, such
persons or things and a judgment on them before adequate knowl
edge of the facts has been obtained.
Actually the term prejudice is used today in a wide variety of
ways. In its most broad and all-inclusive sense it means merely
a preference which is either a mental attitude or expressed in act.
Since prejudice, thus considered, is simply a preference, it may be
either for or against, true or false, reasonable or unreasonable. In
this broad sense there are multifarious types of prejudice: race,
color, culture, language, religion, national, social, political, sex,
education, economic, and legal prejudices, to name but some of
them.
We, however, are interested in that particular type of prejudice
which is a group prejudice and which is always unreasonable
because it is based on error, ignorance or illogical procedure. And
this is called social distance.
1
2 Social Distance According to St. Thomas Aquinas
The importance of discussing this problem is evident. It is a

matter of daily observation. If civilization is to survive, we are
told by our political leaders, we must cultivate the science of
human relationship among all the peoples of the world. The fate
of the human race, social psychologists tell us, hangs primarily
on the course of developments in the area of intergroup relations,
both national and international. It is now only too obvious, others
say, that we are confronted by a world seething with tensions and
open conflicts among all kinds of racial, cultural, economic, and
political groups. Therefore, the rapid discovery and application
of effective and practical techniques for the control of intergroup
tension and hostility is one of the crucial needs of our time.
How widespread the problem of social distance is can be quickly
ascertained by brief observations in any direction. Group tensions
and difficulties are found in practically every phase of human
living. Experts in sociology tell us that no major society in the
world today is without crosscurrents of intergroup antagonism and
conflict, touching almost every individual.
Communism is one such example of group conflict. Communism
pits the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. It inspires discord
and revolution because based on a philosophy of dialectics it holds
that the conflict of opposites produces progress. Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegal, who greatly influenced the father of Communism,
Karl Marx, held that man is born totally in subjection and attains
emancipation in the state. Only the will that obeys laws is free,
and the will of the state is the source of morality.
For Marx there was no need of a God to explain matter, because
matter itself is endowed with motion. It develops by shocks,
oppositions, clashes, struggles, and catastrophes. The whole uni
verse is dialectical: reality is revolution. Marx converted the
notion of struggle for survival from a struggle among individuals
to a struggle between classes. The big problem of the world was
economic for Marx; man as an individual had no real significance.
History is class war : one class gets control and exploits the others.
This is the result of an inevitable law of history. Each dominant
class necessarily develops its opposite, the class that will destroy
it. Keligion, law, decent behavior, social etiquette are all bourgeosie
inventions for keeping the proletarians in chains. Bloody revolu
The Problem of Social Distance 3
tions must throw off the shackles of oppression. Terror is freely

employed; all humanitarian considerations and individual rights
are disregarded; hatred is to be desired, for the proletariat is an
unceasing enemy of the capitalists. Little wonder, then, that Pope
Pius XI spoke of Communism as undermining the very foundation
of Christian civilization.
Another type of politico-economic regime that foments hatred
and attitudes of social distance is Statism, best exemplified in
modern times by Fascism. The dictator of such a state can only
keep the people in check by filling them with false fears of fabri
cated enemies both within and without the state.
Fascism is an authoritarian government. Among other things
the Fascist state enforces a rigid censorship over minority opinion ;
it believes in the absolute sovereignty of the state and all must
blindly obey its commands. It is rooted in materialistic philosophies
that debase man. Fascism stirs up hatred by advocating extreme
and belligerently fierce nationalism and by the tenet that the
inequality of man is immutable and beneficial. The individual is
subordinate and inequality is natural. Fascism retains its power
through violence and suppression: it is a constant camp of war;
in fact, it would seem to consider war as a necessary state. So
Mussolini spoke of the grandeurs of war, stating that war is to the
man what maternity is to the woman. He said that he did not
believe in perpetual peace since it would negate all the fundamental
virtues of man.
Attitudes of social distance based on color are well known to
Americans. The inferior position of the Negro in this country
has been established by law and common consent. The Negro
was emancipated but not made free. His history here has been a
history of second-class citizenship: an extension of slavery regula
tions into a free society. One author points out that despite the
Constitution no country today violates the principles inshrined
in it more than the United States does.
There is hardly a community in America where the purchase
of a house by a Negro in a hitherto " white " section does not cause
resentment, leading at times to violence. The income of the
average Negro is still only half that of the average American white ;
the unemployment rates for Negroes are fifty per cent higher than
for whites. Most Negroes are still held to unskilled jobs.
Because of inferior medical care, the life expectancy of our
Negro population is seven years less than that of whites. According
to the United States census, 9.2 per cent of all homes occupied by
white Americans are dilapidated almost beyond repair, while among
Negroes the figure is four times greater.
Segregated schools still exist despite the ruling of the United
States Supreme Court, and they are far inferior to those for white
children. The number of white and Negro Protestant Christians
who worship together is negligible, according to a recent survey,
and many Catholic churches are guilty of the same scandal. Segre
gation exists at many restaurants, theaters, swimming pools, recrea
tion centers, buses, trains, rest rooms, drinking fountains, parks,
hotels, and tourist courts.
As one national magazine recently stated : In the United States
15 million Negroes are still denied the right to the pursuit of
happiness on equal terms with whites.
Another type of social distance is racism, best exemplified in our
day by Nazism. Hitler welded the German people together by
stressing their racial unity. Race worship based on false biological
notions of the Nordic race was inaugurated. They were ferociously
intolerant of other cultures. In an attempt at unity the Nazis
ruthlessly suppressed the Jews, many Churches and universities,
trade unions, political groups, pacifists, and, in a word, all oppo
sition. The function of the state, according to Hitler, is to lead
the German people to a dominant position in the world. It is the
right of the strong to rule the weak since all men and races have
a basic inequality. Total war is inherent in the theory of the
totalitarian state and so there is a strategy of terror both in peace
and war.
There is as great a distinction between Nordic and lower humani
ty as between the savage and an animal. The role of the Nordic,
therefore, is to rule and thus the Nazis glorified hate and conquest.
There are here strong echoes of Nietzsche's superman theory.
For he says that one must be ruthless, hard, unsympathetic, and
should sternly cultivate the will to power. We need no God, no
supernatural aim: the aim of true ethics is the development of
the great, the strong, the ruthless blond beast, the Superman.
The Superman is the meaning of the earth. And he shall cut
down and destroy all who stand in his way to greatness.
Attitudes of social distance based on cultural differences are
evident in the United States which is a " melting pot " for almost
all cultural groups. Culture prejudice results from stratified think
ing whereby a person ranks various out-groups. This ranking is
based on a superiority-inferiority scale which the individual has
formed in his own mind.
Likewise, attitudes of social distance are prevalent in the field
of religion. According to recent surveys made in this country
there are millions who have ill-feelings, look down on, or have
had unpleasant dealings with those of other religions.
Finally, we see that economic differences cause social distance,
between labor and capital and between farmers and urbanites.
Clashes of interests between economic groups have been frequent.
Among wage earners there exists a widespread conviction that
wealth is largely the result of inherited position, "influence,"
" personal connections," or luck. Wealth no longer is thought by
most persons to be the sign of moral excellence as many formerly
did. It is definitely envied. The relations between labor and
management are not founded on loyalty and are impersonal because
of the contract system. Unions resort to strikes, picketing, closed
shop, and boycotting. Employers use lockouts, the injunction,
company unions, the blacklist. Likewise, the rural-urban conflict
is ever present, friction existing here because of numerous economic
factors and grievences, actual and supposed.
Thus, then, we see the import and the scope of the problem of
social distance. Our next question is, What does contemporary
thought have to say concerning it?
Sociologists, social psychologists, psychologists, and others, especi
ally in our own day, have sought an explanation for social distance.
Many theories have been brought forth.
There is the racist approach. Doctrines on race assume that
various human groups, by reason of heredity, are essentially
different from each other not just in physical characteristics but
likewise intellectually, emotionally, and in cultural characteristics.
The result is that there is a hierarchy of superior and inferior
groups. This theory takes for granted that groups of " pure "
racial stock exist and that persons who belong to these races possess
automatically the group characteristics. And these characteristics
are presumed unchangeable since they are supposed to inhere in
differences in biological makeup of every individual of each group,
and, therefore, superior groups forever rule inferior groups.
And there is the nationalistic approach. Members of ethnic or
national groups usually show forth characteristics that are more
or less uniform. The people of a nation then use their own traits
and tendencies as a standard in judging all others. They assume an
attitude of superiority and rank all who are unlike them, high or
low accordingly as they approach their own provincial standards.
Next, there is the psychoanalytic approach. The Freudian school
plays a predominant role in this theory of social distance. Aggres
sion is a response to frustration. In the group the individual can
throw off the repressions of his unconscious instincts. The solidarity
of a group is traceable to the sex instinct. Man also has a death
instinct an urge to kill, and civilized society is always menaced with
disintegration because of the primacy of hostility of men towards
one another. Man innately is destructive : group conflicts and wars
are outbursts of irresponsible aggressive instincts.
This theory in various forms is found in many of the present-
day explanations given for social distance. One author thinks
prejudice is an unconscious expression of feelings of guilt: the
individual eases his conscience by attributing his own failings to
an entire group. Another holds that the original condition of man
was a war of all against all. Today, children are reared in a network
of restrictions made necessary for the orderly living of society.
The child rebels against these frustrations; however, parents and
the in-group will not tolerate aggressions. But he is allowed a
certain expression of these tendencies in various ways including
hostility to other groups. Others are of the opinion that prejudice
results from a desire for superiority and social recognition. Still
others, from threat orientation or authoritarian submission.
The leadership approach states that the leader exerts greater
influence in group interaction than anyone else. He is the final
arbitrator of group directions and of relations with other groups.
The rest are followers who comply with the wishes of the leader
in the degree that he arouses their emotions or casts his hypnotic
spell.
The animal behavioristic approach holds that human relations
and human social behavior can be understood through an under
standing of the behavior and interaction of subhuman animals.
Because they are first studied in their simpler forms, this theory
claims that complex phenomena can be more effectively observed
and experimented upon. A ranking and comparison of the various
kinds of aggregations takes place.
Then, there is the stereotype approach. According to this
popular theory people tend to generalize and classify minority
groups, and establish definite mental pictures of a people, fitting
all individuals that one comes in contact with into the fixed picture.
These unfavorable stereotypes are uncritically taken over by others,
especially children. Whenever, they say, that the interests of
different groups clash a set of negative traits is attributed to the
other group by the in-group and these are standardized. People are
prone to oversimplification and exaggeration, to tabloid thinking;
many persons draw general conclusions from one or two unpleasant
experiences.
The group-attitude approach maintains that bias and hostility
toward the members of other groups come about from learning
the proper modes of behavior of one's own group towards these
others. A superstructure of values becomes standardized for a group
to which the members of the group must conform. A member of
a group, then, acquires his prejudices against others exactly the
same way that he acquires his identification, values, loyalties, and
responsibilities. In order to be a good member of the in-group
he must share their prejudices, positive and negative. This theory,
therefore, says that attitudes of social distance are learned.
It should be noted that most authorities do not hold exclusively
to one approach to social distance. More often a theorist is eclectic,
combing several approaches to explain prejudice. Thus George
Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger of Oberlin College, in perhaps
the most exhaustive study of this problem to date, attribute
prejudice to three factors: 1) a manifestation of the "needs" of
individual personalities; 2) the structure of society; and 3) the
culture of a group.
The history of the study of prejudice shows that the reasons for
attitudes of social distance are still greatly disputed by the experts.
And the social psychologists are the first to admit it. The investi
gation is yet too young to have established any definite factors.
Some good research has been done, some key trends have been
determined, but its results are still inconclusive. This must be
the conclusion ascertained from a survey of current thought on
social distance.
We turn now to the more important task of presenting the nature
of social distance and factors necessary for the soulution of this
problem according to St. Thomas' philosophy.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
The Thomistic philosopher feels that no genuine answer to the

problem of social distance can be found unless it springs from
true principles concerning the nature of man and his thinking.
It is only in this way that we can come to a knowledge of how man
arrives at attitudes of social distance and what precisely these
attitudes are.
Since social distance is an erroneous bias unreasonably held, it
seems important that we investigate the causes of man's errors so
that we might determine the causes of social distance. A bias is
a bent, a tendency ; it is an attitude of thinking and ultimately of
acting. Why does man have biased attitudes? What causes his
erroneous judgments concerning others ? To answer these questions
we must, firstly, look at the nature of man, determining how his
various parts interact and influence his judgments. Secondly, we
must see precisely how man thinks and forms true judgments and
then how error can come about. In this manner we will see the
source and cause of his erroneous attitudes of social distance.
A man, a human being, is a reality existing by himself, there
fore he is a substance since a substance is that which can exist in
and by itself. It is a reality to which belongs existence in itself
and not in another as in a subject of inhesion. A subsisting
complete individual substance underlying accidents is called a
hypostasis. Man likewise is a hypostasis, and since he is an intelli
gent being he is a rational hypostasis or person. St. Thomas says
that a human person signifies a distinct being in a human nature.
In person, the independence of an hypostasis is augmented by
reason, through which the ego is conscious that its substance is
really individualized and incommunicable. A person is capable
of thinking, judging and choosing; he is autonomous. This is
what we mean when we speak of person. Man is a person.
Looking at man from another point of view we see that he like
all finite corporeal beings is a hylomorphic creature. Man is not
a soul alone nor a body alone, he is a composite of body and soul.
But he is a perfect unit, the soul being united to the body as its
form. ^
9
Man is not a soul alone because, although the principle of
intellectual life, the soul needs the matter in order to know. Its
knowledge is primarily that of the corporeal world and is acquired
through the instrumentality of the senses. The soul acts through
and needs the body.
Man is not a soul, for the operations of sense which must be
attributed to the supposit man cannot be the operations of a
spiritual form such as the soul of man, but of necessity demand a
subject composed of body and soul. St. Thomas says that sensations
are evidently accompanied with change in the body. Therefore
the sensative soul has no per se operations of its own but every
operation of the sensative soul belongs to the composite.
It is observed that the emotions in general proceed from the
body and soul in conjunction. But it is impossible that one and
the same action should issue from more than one source of action,
since the action of a thing is the consequence of its power and so
of its form.
The fact of man's unicity is evident from an analysis of the
specific definition of man which must include not only rationality
but animality as well.
St. Thomas proves that the soul is united to the body as its
form by pointing out that nothing acts except in so far as it is
in act : a thing acts by that whereby it is in act and it is clear that
the first thing by which the body lives is the soul.
The intellectual soul is united to the body as its substantial
form, for the same essential form makes man an actual being,
a living being, an animal, and a man. Xothing is absolutely
one except by one form by which that thing has its existence, a
thing has both being and unity from the same source. If besides
the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial
form by which the subject of the soul were made actual, it would
follow that the soul does not give being simply and is not the
substantial form. But such is not the case. The substantial form
is that by which a thing primarily operates and to which operation
is attributed and the soul is such a principle.
Finally, our internal experience shows our substantial unity,
as does our mode of predication. We predicate both animal and
man of an individual person. If the person, however, were animal
The Psychology of Social Distance 11
by one form and man by another, then only one of these two
perfections could be predicated directly of him.
We say, then, that the soul, an incomplete substance, is trans-
cendentally related to the body as act to its potency. In the
intimate union which such a relation demands, the soul communi
cates substantiality to the body, together with the act of existence.
Hence all the actions of man must be predicated of the whole man.
We have been thus far considering man in the ontological sense
as permanent, static, and immobile. We now turn to the empiri-
ological person, changing, dynamic, mobile, and differing from one
man to another, and even in the same person. The empiriological
person is called personality. Personality in the psychological sense
is the sum total of all the potentialities in a man which have
become actual. It is compounded of the acts, powers, and habits
of man. Attitudes, habits, traits, temperament, and character go
to make up personality. These are influenced by heredity, physical
equipment, and environment. To account for personality differ
ences in men we must look to all these things. And all the differ
ences that go to make up the personality of an individual will
play a part in his thinking.
Since man is a composite of body and soul, each of these inter
plays with the other and reacts on it. Because of the intimate
substantial union of body and soul there is an interdependence and
reaction between them. Therefore the body can, and often does,
play a part, indirectly, it is true but sometimes vigorously, in our
thinking. St. Thomas tells us that one man's intellect can operate
more perfectly than another's on account of the body. Act and form
are received into matter according to matter's capacity, so the better
the disposition of a body the better the soul allotted to it. Thus
one's individual nature will be determined not only by one's matter
and form but by the interplay of one upon the other. This
involves temperament, character, heredity, environment, habits,
experiences, and passions.
Having determined what man is, and having established the
substantial unity and therefore the interaction of the essential
elements of man, we turn to the subject. of how man thinks and
how this union plays a part in his thinking. We will see how man
arrives at truth and also error, and that the latter is the cause of
social distance.
Our first step is to determine how knowledge is acquired by
man. Knowledge is a vital and immanent action, radically of the
soul ; by it, something is manifested to the soul. This manifestation
includes two factors, the knowing factor and the presence of the
object in the mind through some representation.
By means of our sense faculties, internal and external, we are
made aware of individual things and events of the material world
around us. On the other hand what is apprehended by the intellect
is characterized by abstractness. How does this transition from
sense to intellect take place?
When sense perceives its data in the concrete, the intellect must
at the same time exercise a power of apprehending them in the
abstract. The abstractive faculty of intellect is the agent intellect.
Introspection shows us that the intellect, like sense, is not always
in act and must be reduced from potency to act. There must be,
then, on the intellectual level a power capable of determining the
possible intellect. Sense is incapable of determining the intellect
to its appropriate operation because the intellect is a spiritual
faculty and the data of the phantasm is material. Therefore, the
agent intellect produces a spiritual modification in the possible
intellect by which the latter—through an intellectual act producing
an expressed species—understands reality.
Knowledge comes by means of simple apprehension, which may
be either complex or incomplex. By comparing ideas judg
ments arise. Truth and error lie in the judgment. Truth is
had when the judgment asserts the real identity or diversity of
formally distinct concepts in conformity with the real exigencies
of the thing known. A judgment, therefore, is an act of the
intellect by which the intellect unites and divides by affirmation
and negation. Knowledge proper is in the judgment.
How does one attain truth? An analysis of our cognitive acts
results in asserting that there exists some reality outside our own
minds. Reflection shows that we first know, not ourselves, but a
reality external to us. Consciousness is not identified with knowl
edge and so to have a grasp of the self as knowing (consciousness)
one must previously have knowledge of something. The object
determines the act and the acts reveals the subject. Likewise, one
is conscious of some things as external to himself. Where does this
consciousness come from? It cannot be produced by nothing
nor can the difference between internal and external be meaning
less or otherwise there would be no such consciousness. Therefore,
there must be actually something external. If one denies that our
external experiences come from without he ought also to deny
our internal experiences comes from within since our assurance
to internality has precisely the same ground as that of externality.
If the external world were nonexistent then we could not correct
our erroneous judgments.
Further, in examining our conscious experience we realize that
the senses are infallible as regards their proper adequate and formal
object. The senses immediately sense the essential sense-object.
If a sense senses, it must sense what it senses. It cannot sense what
is not there. When a sense is stimulated it must be stimulated
by being, extension, and its proper object. Therefore as regards
being, extension, and its own proper object, distortion is impossible.
Since the proper object of sight is color it would be impossible,
for instance, for an uncolored object to appear to sight.
The senses do not themselves err or deceive because they do not
judge or interpret but merely report data. And they always report
that which under the circumstances they must— it is impossible
that they present a datum other or otherwise than they actually do.
From the data supplied by the senses the intellect by abstraction
apprehends what things are. The intellect apprehends essences
freed from concrete and material conditions.
The intellect cannot err in apprehending the absolutely simple,
unanalysable objects of thought. These things must be apprehended
as they are, as objects of thought, as intrensically possible and as
objective possibilities, each having no mutually incompatible factors
because each is only one factor and is possible because conceivable—
otherwise one does not apprehend at all. Error can only arise
because the power attains the object only partially, but partial
attainment can occur only when the object has some complexity
involved where a person can mistake a part for the whole or for
another part. However, an object in itself completely simple and
undivided cannot be partially attained and therefore there can be
no error.
Also, when the intellect has before it two absolutely simple
concepts, realizing them to be incapable of further analysis, it is
completely compelled to assert and assent to the identity or incom
patibility of these two—and here again the intellect is infallible
in stating that objective connection is really there. If these two
concepts are seen by the intellect they are necessarily seen to be
as they are; their necessary relationship can't help but be seen
since this is involved in their being seen as reality. Therefore,
the intellect in seeing them simultaneously can't avoid grasping
the relationship between them with the grasp of reality and there
is no way in which the intellect can help but grasp the connection
between them. First principles are constituted of two such abso
lutely simple concepts and so first principles are infallible.
This constraining force of the objects of our thought upon the
intellect, this property they have of compelling the intellect to
apprehend them as they are is what Scholastics call objective
evidence. And objective evidence is the supreme criterion of truth.
The criterion of truth is a motive which determines firm assent
as the cause and measure of knowledge ; a norm by which we discern
the true from the false. Self-evident first principles are their own
criterions of truth for their truth is clearly seen. And we are
able to be certain of the truth of any other proposition by tracing
it back to first principles. St. Thomas says that there never is
falsity in the intellect if resolution into the first principles be
carried out. And in this way man arrives at truth.
Prejudical attitudes of social distance, however, are not derived
from true but from false judgments. What, then, is error and
how does man make false judgments ?
Like truth, error is in the judgment. It is the opposite of truth.
Error is the deformity or inequality between a thing and the
intellect. The intellect affirms what the object has not, or denies
what it has. Because error is in the judgment, the source of error
is in those acts which prepare the way for judgment.
Although the senses cannot error in reporting what they sense
nevertheless because of a defective organ a man may judge that
what his sense reports is all that is there while actually it is not.
And although the essential acts of the intellect, those directed to
its formal object, are infallible, they may become erroneous per
accidens by the intervention of the judgment. And although first
principles are infallible, existential judgments are liable to error
since they treat of individuals. Error can creep into the formation
of ideas for clarifying ideas involves the intervention of the
judgment. Error may come from judgments based on defective
conditions of cognition: imagination, reasoning, passions, and
voluntary inattention.
All judgments are either judgments of existence or judgments
of essence : they either affirm or deny the actual existence or
happening of some concept, or else they affirm or deny the real
and intrinsic possibility of some concept. Judgments of the former
class can be erroneous even though the apprehended concept be
real, for though real it need not actually exist. By a series of
judgments of the latter class we form complex concepts, and here
also there may be error in judgment. For the complex judged to
be intrinsically possible need not really be so, even if each of the
simpler conceptual factors composing it may be itself possible.
The possibility of error lies in the fact that human cognition
is not a mere passive intuition or mirroring of reality by the mind,
but an active process whereby the mind abstracts successive aspects
of a given reality, analyzing and synthesizing, separating and
reuniting, these aspects ; and in this way gradually interpreting and
reconstructing intelligibily reality to itself.
Although no erroneous assent can be, after due reflection,
absolutely necessary or unavoidable by the human mind, neverthe
less the possibility of error is ever present because of the tendency
to undue haste or percipitancy in assenting; the irksomeness of
doubt as compared with the satisfaction of assent ; sloth in neglect
ing to apply the mind sufficiently to the task of investigating and
sifting evidence; and the permitting of undue influences of the
will, passions and emotions. Error often comes because the intellect
is allowed to be determined not by evidence but by the blind or
inevidential influence of these subjective factors.
Actually the will lies at the root of false judgments either
because the will does not direct sufficient attention to the matter
or it forces a hasty judgment to be made. Haste, rashness, con
fusion, prejudices, logical mistakes—all cause errors to be made.
And all those things that enter into making a man's personality,
which we saw earlier, can be the cause of erroneous judgments:

temperament, character, heredity, environment, habits, experiences,
and passions.
Constantly recurring as a cause of error in judgment are the
passions. The passions are sensile appetencies. An appetency is a
passive power, a tendency to something similar and agreeable.
In the sensile appetency there are three elements : perception,
movement (toward or away from), and bodily or organic reaction.
Sensile appetency follows sensible cognition, the object is always
a sensible good. The passions are closely connected with man's
intellectual life because of the intimate union and interdependence
between the lower and higher functions of his nature, as has been
pointed out previously. Passion is a powerful force, capable of
strong opposition to reason. The passions are controlled by reason
but can and do sometimes revolt against reason.
A higher type of appetitive power is the will which, as has been
said, lies at the root of false judgments. It is on the rational
level and follows the intellect. It is a distinct faculty from the
sensile appetency. These two differ in the way of desiring and not
so much in the object desired. Movements of the will are called
sentiments.
The object of the will is the good. The will, a faculty of the
soul, depends upon the intellect for enlightenment : the rational
nature of man is the basis of freedom. Sentiments are a state of
the will in which it moves toward and rests in some object perceived
by the intellect. It usually is not entirely isolated from sensile
emotions on account of the redundance and overflow because of
the substantial union of soul and body.
There is an interrelation between the intellect and will. The
intellect enlightens the will. St. Thomas says that in all particular
goods reason can consider the nature of some good, and the lack
of some good, which has the nature of an evil. In this way, it can
apprehend any single one of such goods as a thing to be chosen or
avoided. The intellect determines the will in the order of specifi
cation, the will moves the intellect to the exercise of its act. The
last practical judgment results from the willful consideration
determining the appetite to act or not in accordance to the direction
which the will gave the intellect.
The will, therefore, can interfere with judgment in many ways
causing error. The will can, for instance, command a decision in
the absence of evidence, in doubt, or in fear of rash judgment.
The will is primarily responsible in making the intellect work or
not on the securing of evidence.
Man must make many judgments each day. He must often take
a stand before all the evidence is in. He often cannot study out
each judgment at length, making sure of its veracity. He must
act if he is to live. And so he develops certain attitudes which
serve more or less as principles of departure, convictions of mind
which serve as spring-boards for further thinking and activity.
These attitudes, which guide all his subsequent thinking, are
really a short cut for him. He cannot trace each judgment back
to first principles so he establishes these islands of thought as
mediate reference stations to which he refers the experiences of
daily living. Naturally each man believes his attitudes to be based
on solid ground, that they are unquestionably valid. But the
question arises what if a person's attitude on some particular point
is not true. It would mean all the subsequent judgments formed
daily from this attitude would be false. The individual, of course,
is convinced that all his attitudes are sound and therefore that
all the judgments and acts originating from them are sound.
But these attitudes come to be from mediate judgments and mediate
judgments can be wrong. In fact, experience shows us that there
are many people who have erroneous attitudes. These are attitudes
that are prejudicial. Some such attitudes are those of social
distance.
What, precisely, is an attitude of social distance? An attitude
is a habit of thinking. It is a specific mental disposition toward
an incoming (or arising) experience, whereby that experience is
modified. In Thomistic psychology the term habit embraces both
the current psychological terms, mental attitude and habit.
St. Thomas states that habit is a disposition whereby that which
is disposed, is disposed well or ill, either in regard to itself or in
regard to another. Habit adds a perfection or imperfection to the
subject itself or to the subject's operations. It is an accident and
a quality. Habit modifies a subject in its nature, in reference to
its end, well if the habit is suitable to the perfection of the nature
or ill if the habit is unsuitable. Habit therefore considers the

nature in its changeableness. Habit helps to actuate potentiality.
It stands in potentiality to act, a principle of operation that moves
nature to act in a certain way. It gives facility of operation. Oper
ative habits modify the actions of man's faculties. The rational
faculties of man are not determined in themselves and so in order
that one freely incline to elicit actions, habits are developed in these
faculties which are the immediate principles of the human acts and
which prepare the way for the complete act. Nature cannot cause
the habit itself although it may prepare for its production and
development. From nature come the various inclinations and
aptitudes to habits. They arise both from specific and individual
nature: those which flow from the specific nature are common to
all men; those due to individual nature are individual character
istics.
The intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. Intellectual
habits perfect (or fail to do so) man's intellect in the pursuit
of truth which is the good of the intellect. That which is possible
to many is, as we have seen, an apt subject of habits, and the
possible intellect is in potency to all knowledge. These habits
consist of the species and conclusions to which the intellect has
reasoned. And they are habits, not insofar as they actuate the
intellect, but insofar as they remain in the intellectual memory.
So even if the intellect is not being actuated here and now, not
actually considering this knowledge, it can recall and consider it at
will—and with a facility and ease it did not possess before.
In like manner the will is the subject of habits.
There are three intellectual virtues in the speculative intellect :
the habit of principles, the habit of wisdom, and the habit of
science. The first has to do with first principles per se evident ; the
second is concerned with conclusions dealing with ultimate causes ;
and the last deals with conclusions—truths concerning proximate
causes. In the practical intellect there are two virtues which have
to do with contingent truths. The habit of prudence deals with
what is to be done by man as man, and the habit of art is con
cerned with the making of things.
Social distance can be considered in several ways. As an attitude
of speculative knowledge, although erroneous, it is a habit of

science. Considered as judging concerning a particular free act
to be done it is a habit of imprudence.
Likewise, social distance as an act fails against the moral virtue
of justice which demands that each be given his due.
FACTOES IN ELIMINATING SOCIAL DISTANCE
Social distance, both prejudicial attitudes and acts, makes man

fall short of what he is suppose to be as a human person. Man
possesses rational powers : he is made to know truth and love the
good. And so St. Thomas says that those things that have knowl
edge, in a way, approach to a likeness of God.
The earthly goal of man is to develop his intellectual powers
to their fullest, to search out truth. And the purpose of the will
is to control man's activity according to the dictates of right
reason. There are only two sources of truly human action, the
intellect and the will. And the perfection of these makes man
perfect as man. The perfect man, therefore, acts intelligently
and strongly. He knows the truth and has the strength of will to
act upon it, thereby properly adjusting and subordinating his
various desires according to the hierarchy established by the nature
of man. If man does not know truth and if he fails to control his
actions, he is failing his purpose as man. This is why we say
that prejudice in any form is a falling short of what man is suppose
to be as a human person. For social distance is based on error
that springs from the will's failures to maintain a proper ordering
of an individual's activities. While the intellect of man is made
to become more and more like the intellect of God in the possession
of truth, attitudes of social distance have the contrary tendency.
The prejudiced man refuses to become like God. He limits the
amount of truth that enters his mind. He gives assent before all
the data required for assent is in. Attitudes of social distance
distort one's personality, forcing him to accept an erroneous picture
of reality.
Man must strive to overcome his prejudices. Cardinal Newman
says that if, through malice or carelessness in the past, we have
allowed ourselves to become unjustly prejudiced, the wrong con
clusions into which those prejudices lead us will be imputable to
us. One must strive for a true picture of reality and to perfect his
nature. And such is the role of education, so that education stands
as a key factor in the problem of social distance.
20
Factors in Eliminating Social Distance 21
True education has for its purpose the development of the

intellect and the training of the will. Education strives to inculcate
good habits, train the senses and memory, develop the imagination
and the power of sound judgment, and strengthen the will. Genuine
education, then, is essential in eliminating social distance.
In training the intellect two things are necessary. Firstly, the
individual should be taught how to think properly according to
the canons of logic, and, secondly, he should learn the facts con
cerning the nature of man.
For the proper method of reasoning the reader is referred to
Logic, a department of philosophy, which is the science directing
the operations of the intellect in the attainment of truth. Attitudes
of social distance often arise from faulty reasoning, taking a part
for the whole, over-extending one's evidence, and the like. Logical
procedure in reasoning aids greatly in eliminating prejudice.
Equally important is a true knowledge of man, his dignity and
the essential similarity of one man to another.
Man is a person, capable of thinking, judging and choosing, he
is sui juris, autonomous. The term person signifies that which
is most perfect in all nature. In its highest sense it applies to
God alone but in an imperfect sense it applies also to man who is
endowed with a spiritual principle, a soul, and is, therefore, made
according to the image and likeness of God. It is because of reason
that a person is autonomous, responsible, and the possessor of
personal rights and a personal dignity and, therefore, entitled to
protection and respect. The soul gives man his intrinsic worth.
The soul, being immaterial and simple, is incorruptible. The soul,
made to the image and likeness of God and inclined to him as its
last end, makes man the highest and most noble creature on the
earth.
An examination of the activities and objects of both intellect
and will reveals the spirituality of their common subject and
principle, the soul. The intellect can know incorporeal things,
possesses the power of reflection, and is capable of having uni
versal ideas. The root of freedom of the will lies in the intellectu
ality of man's soul. By means of his intellect he can set goals and
propose suitable means for their attainment. By virtue of the will
he can choose one means in preference to another. The resemblance
22 Social, Distance According to St. Thomas Aquinas
of man's nature and operations to God's is based on man's ability

to know and love God after the manner of God's knowing and
loving Himself. St. Thomas further points out that the dignity
of man springs from the fact that man is inclined by nature to
the divine prototype as his last end. Man is obliged to seek goodness
and truth, he is inclined to Goodness and Truth itself.
Man's rational faculties, then, set him above all the other
creatures of the earth. Because of his intellectual life man tran
scends all merely corporeal creatures and is able to direct himself
to an end that is God Himself. It should be noted well, however,
that all men, regardless of accidentals like color, place of origin,
beliefs, possess these rational faculties. All men, being members
of the same species, are made to the image of God, have the same
end, and all men are persons having immortal souls. Therefore,
all men have the same basic dignity and no man should be treated
as an inferior being.
However, we observe that while all men have the same essential
nature, yet they differ one from another. This is because since
man is finite he is a composite being so that the specific act or
perfection (form) is limited by its corresponding potency (matter).
For an essence which can be multiplied, and such is the case in man,
is necessarily composed of two distinct principles, one actual, which
gives the perfection of this specific nature, the other potential,
which limits and somehow individuates the specific act. Matter
limits and individuates the form and under certain definite con
ditions is the principle of individuation.
Whereas the individuation of bodies is by means of this numerical
quantity, souls, too, are individuated by their relation to this
particular body. And this transcendental relationship to this body
by this soul constitutes the latter as individual.
All differences between men, then, cannot be eliminated, for
each man is individually different. They are different in body and
soul, in their organisms and psychological processes and in their
personalities. In fact, they are not equal in anything that is
perceptible to the eye. They are different in strength and intelli
gence and courage and beauty and virtue. Still all men have in
common something that entitles them all equally to the name of
man. When the Declaration of Independence states that all men
are equal it means they are equal only in the sense that all men
are equally men, just as all triangles are equally triangles. Men
are equal in all that is involved in being a man; they are unequal
in all individual human attributes. But being a man is so important
that the natural inequalities and differences are trifling in com
parison. One must be taught then to emphasize the equality of
being among men and to minimize the accidental differences. One
must be educated in the truth that all men are members of a
common humanity and are thereby entitled to the common heritages
of civilization without arbitary penalties of their fellowman. One
must learn the fact that all the individuals of a substantial species
communicate equally in the species and share the same operations
and powers for action which have their roots in the specific form.
Further, the fact that man is by nature a social being must
be emphasized. St. Thomas repeats this at least twenty times. The
perfection of man's nature can only be attained in his association
with other men. St. Thomas says that man needs the companion
ship of other men in order to attain not only his physical well-
being but likewise his moral perfection. The helpless condition
of the new-born child, the development of the intellectual and
aesthetic life, the means of exercising virtue and the need for
inspiration and guidance—all point to the need for society. Man
has powers such as speech and sex and hearing and the emotions
that show he is naturally intended to live in society. And the
purpose of society is the common good of all, not just the exclusive
few. To attain the common good a government must be organized
and the civil society has for its purpose the common welfare of its
members; that they might not only live but live well. Neither
the state nor its citizens should show favoritism. For favoritism is
opposed to justice and St. Thomas says it is therefore sinful. Man
has definite natural and civil rights that the state must protect.
These natural rights are essentially alike for all men since human
nature is fundamentally the same. No human law can justly take
away these fundamental natural rights.
Man has the right to life, integrity of his bodily members, and
proper physical development. Man has those rights that are
necessary for the conservation of the species. He has rights entailed
in his search for truth, and one of these is liberty or freedom.
In order to attain truth he must be free to do so. He is entitled to

freedom of education, freedom of speech, freedom of the press
and assembly, and freedom of religion.
In addition man enjoys other freedoms by right of nature:
freedom of the home, of recreation, of labor, of election, of social
life, of trial by jury.
Citizens should be protected by the state from attack by those
seeking to do violence or an injustice. It is the duty, then, of
society to do away with all acts based on prejudicial attitudes of
social distance.
The first great task of education is to teach the truth ; the second,
and equally important task of education, is to train the will. Only
a man whose will controls his actions will be guiltless of social
distance.
Emotions, passions, temperament, and the like are often permitted
by the will to influence reasoning and thereby cause to be made
erroneous judgments of a prejudicial nature. Man fortunately is
eased in the difficult task of controlling his lower nature by the
formation of good habits or virtues. Habit, as has been pointed
out previously, is a quality that disposes a man well or poorly in
relation to his human nature or his human actions. Man must
keep his various parts, intellect, will, passions, in order so that
he can reason and act rightly. By repeated actions of the same
kind man acquires his operative habits. Two virtues especially
needed in this day of group tensions are justice and charity. Justice
and love do away with tension and strife and conflict whether
international or intranational.
Justice inclines a man to give everyone what is due to him. It is
resident in the will since another is given his due only by exterior
action which is under the command of the will. Cooperation of
men with one another is vital if men are to achieve real success
in human living; there must be order and peace if society is to
successfully promote the common welfare. These things are attained
through the practice of the virtue of justice. Justice points up
the equality of men.
Man, as a member of civil society, has certain duties in justice
toward that society. Justice gives human life stability which men
need to work without fear or anxiety. It gives them inspiration
to work fruitfully. With justice in society men feel easy and
secure.
St. Thomas says of tolerance that just as God allows certain
evils to take place in the universe, which He could prevent but
does not lest greater harm might be done, so human governments
can rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or
certain greater evils be incurred. The Angelic Doctor's reason
for tolerance, the avoidance of scandal or dissension or some hin
drance to salvation, is only a negative way of stating that the
dignity of man forbids him, if he is otherwise well behaved, to be
led to truth by other than peaceful persuasion.
However, something more is needed to move the hearts of men
and transform ideas into act: love. Love is a movement of the
will, striving for, or resting in, the possession of an object perceived
as good. God's great love for each of us should make a man ashamed
to not love his neighbor.
God loves all existing things, for all existing things, is so far
as they exist, are good. God's will is the cause of all things and
to every existing thing God wills some good. Since to love anything
is to will good to it, it is manifest that God loves everything that
exists. Not only does God love all the creatures of His hand but
He deals with them justly, for he gives to all existing things what
is proper to the condition of each and preserves the nature of each
one in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.
God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and
goodness. Thus justice must exist in all His works.
God shows His love for all creatures by the care He takes of
them. God not only loves all creatures so much as to create them
and to conserve each of them in existence, but He is the final
cause of all things. The love of God for His creatures is from
eternity. God loves man more than we do or can love Him. He
has given man every good gift; He has communicated His happi
ness to him. He is no respector of persons, for God has made
all and He loves all. Far be it from puny man, then, to set himself
up as a judge of God's creation, as a critic of the Divine handiwork
by discriminating against his fellowman because of color, race,
or creed. If God loves every man then so must we. And God does
love everyman else He would not have created him.
Man is obliged to love his neighbor because of his love foi God.
What he ought to love in his neighbor is that he may be in God.
St. Thomas says it is specifically the same act whereby we love
God and love our neighbor. Therefore, the habit of charity extends
not only to the love of God but also to the love of our neighbor.
One loves man because of what he has of God. One loves all his
neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are
referred to one good common to them all, which is God.
Charity is not simply love but has the nature of friendship.
That love has the character of friendship which is together with
benevolence, when we love someone as to wish good to him. Well-
wishing alone, however, is not sufficient either for friendship: a
certain mutual love is required.
Aristotle says that it is our duty to render to each class of people
such respect as is natural and appropriate. St. Thomas says that
out of charity we ought to love our neighbor more than our own
body. In the good we wish men we ought to love all equally out
of charity because we wish them all the same generic good, namely
everlasting happiness.
Should we do good to all? Since the love of charity extends to
all, beneficence also should extend to all. Bach is close to us in
that all share the natural image of God and everyone has the
capacity for glory.
We should love our neighbor as ourselves. This does not mean
that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself. He should love his neighbor for God's sake,
even as he loves himself for God's sake; and he should not give
way to his neighbor in evil, even as he wishes himself well.
There is a mutual love within the species. The likeness of human
nature establishes a universal law of charity in the natural order.
It takes the form of benevolence and good will, love and friendship.
Man loves naturally what is one with him, for the union of
similarity is the very cause of love. The affection of one tends to
another as to himself because what each loves in himself can be
known and loved in another. Like likes like. Likeness is a cause
of love, says St. Thomas. Love arises from a kind of apprehension
of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover.
Social charity and social justice are indispensable for the right
ordering of social life. Social justice demands that each individual

in society give to others their due in the interest of the common
good; and social charity lays obligations of brotherly love on all
in society with a view to promoting the common good by mutual
service and cooperation. Social justice is essential but without
social charity the former is stiff and rigid. It needs the warmth
of life which social charity can infuse. Social charity transcends
restrictions of what is strictly due and by deeds of good will,
kindness, and beneficence strives to create a real union of minds
and hearts in social life.
Social charity brings men together in the spirit of mutual service
and cooperation. It puts down the strong forces of individualistic
striving within man; it creates equilibrium among the various
social groups.
Human beings everywhere form a world-wide brotherhood,
despite differences of tribes, races and nations, and despite distinc
tions of color, language, traditions, and customs. The natural basis
for this universal brotherhood is the common origin of man, all
coming from the creative hand of God. All men are one in the unity
of their common nature; one in the unity of the end they pursue,
namely, the attainment of happiness in the use of the things
created by God ; one in the unity of the same dwelling place which
they inhabit, the earth with its rich variety of resources; one in
the unity of their final end, eternal happiness with God; and one
in the unity of the means put at their disposal to reach that end.
Thus there is no room for race conflicts or class warfare.
Charity inspires mercy to have a compassionate heart and to be
bountiful to others. With its almsdeeds social charity builds a
bridge across the gap that separates rich and poor. It helps level
down social inequalities between classes in conflict over material
possessions.
Charity of its very nature causes peace, mankind's best and most
desirable possession. No power on earth save charity can destroy
envy, the mother of hatred, and her other daughters, ill will,
bitterness, and revenge. Charity allays the passion of hate. Agita
tors who foment class warfare are always hostile to social charity.
Captial and labor, city and country people must be linked by social
charity, learning that each needs the other and that they will
serve their own interests best by serving the interests of others.
Social charity among nations curbs selfish rivalry, unrestrained
competition, and chauvinistic nationalism. True charity does not
exclude enemies from its love. The brotherhood of man is the
only possible basis upon which society can be reconstructed.
Can one love all equally? On the part of the good we wish our
friends we ought to love all equally because we wish all the same
generic good, everlasting happiness. As regards affection we cannot
love all equally since our affection of love increases for a person in
proportion to his nearness to God and all are not equally close
to God. And St. Thomas says we should love more those who are
more closely united to us, parents, spouses, blood relatives, friends,
and fellow-citizens. One certainly has the freedom to choose his
friends but it is highly improper to exclude from one's friendship
persons who are liked on every other grounds save their color,
race, ethnic background, and the like.
Does patriotism mean hatred of others? Patriotism is based
on love and kept in its proper boundaries it is a virtue. However,
extreme patriotism or nationalism which loves the homeland to
such a degree as to foment hatred of other nations is wrong; it
is a type of selfishness, and any love that is so out of proportion
as to do injury to others is a vice. One can love his country and
other peoples of the world as well, just as one can love his family
and still love his neighbors.
The worst sin against charity is hatred. Hatred destroys love,
and strife, dissension, and war are the consequences.
The great effect of charity is peace, among classes within the
nation and internationally also. There can be no true peace among
men, however, until there is peace in the individual man. When
through proper education a man has truth and guides his life by
that light will he have justice and charity and there will be an
end to social distance.
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Hoban, James Henry. The Thomistic Concept of Person and Some of Its
Social Implications. Doctoral Dissertation. The Catholic University
of America Press, 1939.
Maher, Michael. Psychology. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948.
Mercier, Cardinal. A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. Vol. I.
St. Louis: B. Herder, 1932.
Meyer, Hans. The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Louis: B. Herder,
1944.
Niemeyer, Sister Fredericus. The One and the Many in the Social Order
according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Doctoral Dissertation. The
Catholic University of America, 1951.
Renard, Henri. The Philosophy of Being. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951.
. The Philosophy of Man. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952.
Sheed, Frank. Communism and Man. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1947.
Sheen, Fulton J. Communism and the Conscience of the West. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1948.
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Van Steenberghen, Fernand. Epistemology. New York: Wagner, 1949.
Walsh, Joseph B. Logic. New York: Fordham University Press, 1940..
Wolfe, Sister Joan of Arc. The Problem of Solidarism in St. Thomas.
Doctoral Dissertation. The Catholic University of America Press,
1938.
Non-Scholastic Philosophical Sources
Engels, Friedrich. Ludwig Feuerbach, translated by Austin Lewis, Chicago:
C. H. Kerr and Co., 1903.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Philosophy of Mind. Translated by
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Marx, Karl. Capital. New York: Modern Library, 1932.
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Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, " Thus Spake Zarathustra," The Philosophy
of Nietzsche, New York: Modern Library, 1937.
Psychological, Sociological, and Social Psychological Sources

Allport, Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., Inc., 1954.
Asch, Solomon E. Social Psychology. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1948.
Barnes, Harry Elmer. Social Institutions. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1946.
Boring, Edwin C, Langfeld, Herbert S., Weld, Harry Porter. Foundations
of Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1948.
Congar, Yves M-J. The Catholic Church and the Race Question. Paris :
UNESCO, 1951.
Dollard, J. " Hostility and Fear in Social Life," Readings in Social
Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1947.
Dunn, L. C, and Dobzhansky, Thomas. Heredity, Race and Society. Revised
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Freud, S., Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. London:
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. Civilization and Its Discontent. London: Hogarth, 1930.
Furfey, Paul Hanly. A History of Social Thought. New York: Macmillan,
1952.
Fyfe, Hamilton. The Illusion of National Character. London: Watts,
1940.
Haas, Francis J. Man and Society. New York: Appleton-Century Co.,
Inc., 1930.
An Inquiry, The Race Concept. Paris: UNESCO, 1952.
Klineberg, Otto. Race Differences. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935.
. Tensions Affecting International Understanding. New York:
Social Science Research Council, 1950.
Marrow, Alfred J. Living Without Hate. New York : Harper and Brothers,
1951.
McConnell, J. W. Basic Teaching of the Great Economists. New York:
Barnes and Noble Inc., 1947.
Messner, J. Social Ethics. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1949.
Miller, Delbert C, and Form, William H. Industrial Sociology. New York :
Harper and Brothers, 1951.
Moore, Thomas Verner. Cognitive Psychology. New York: J. P. Lippin-
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. The Driving Forces of Human Nature. New York: Grune and
Stratton, 1948.
Moore, Wilbert E. Industrial Relations and the Social Order. Revised,
New York: Macmillan, 1951.
Morant, G. M. The Significance of Racial Differences. Paris: UNESCO,
1952.
Moreno, J. L. Who Shall Survive? Washington: Nervous and Mental
Disease Publishing Co., 1934.
Munn, Norman L. Psychology. Second edition. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin
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Murphy, Gardner; Murphy, Lois Barclay; and Newcomb, Theodore M.
Experimental Social Psychology (revised edition), New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1937.
Murray, Raymond W. Sociology for a Democratic Society. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
Newcomb, Theodore M. Social Psychology. New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1948.
Odum, Howard W. American Social Problems. Revised edition. New York:
Henry Holt and Co.
Ross, E. 3. Fundamental Sociology, third printing. Milwaukee: Bruce,
1942.
Schwarzenberger, Georg. Power Politics, second edition, London : Stevens
and Sons, Ltd., 1951.
Secretary-General. The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination. United
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Seminar: A B C's of Scapegoating. Chicago: Central YMCA College, 1944.
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Simpson, G. E., and Yinger, J. M. Racial and Cultural Minorities. New
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Catholic University Press, 1941.
Walters, Sister Annette, and O'Hara, Sister Kevin. Person and Personality.
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Flanagan, Philip. Newman, Faith and the Believer. Westminster, Md. :
Newman Press, 1946.
Harrison, Martin. The Everyday Catholic. Oxford: Blackfriar Publi
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Hitler, Adolph. Mein Kampf. English translation. New York: Reynal &
Hitchcock, 1939.
Hughes, Emmet John. The Church and the Liberal Society. Princeton,
1944.
Knox, Ronald. Nazi and Nazarene. London: Macmillan, 1940.
Leen, Edward. What is Education? New York: Sheed & Ward, 1947.
Maritain, Jacques. Three Reformers. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons,
1936.
Ryan, Francis A., and Redden, John D. A Catholic Philosophy of Educa
tion. New York: Macmillan, 1936.
Sheed, Frank. Society and Sanity. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1953.
Articles
Aimee, Sister L., " Common Prejudices," National Catholic Education
Association Proceedings, v. 47, 1950, pp. 449-52.
Bowles, Chester, " The Negro—Progress and Challenge," New York Times
Magazine, Feb. 7, 1954, p. 1 ft.
Campbell, A. A., " A Factor Associated with Attitudes Toward Jews,"
Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt, 1947.
Charleen, Sister M., " Diagnosing Causes of Prejudice in School Children,"
National Catholic Education Association Proceedings, v.. 47, 1950,
pp. 453-6.
Drury, G., " Psychology of Prejudice," Catholic Mind, v. 46, Feb. 1946,
pp. 76-9.
Earle, E. M., " Methods of Nazi Statecraft," Foundations of Natural Power,
Princeton University Press, 1945.
Editors, "The U.S. Negro, 1953," Time, May 11, 1953.
Editors, " What Do We Think of Each Other," Catholic Digest, Feb.., 1953.
. "Do Americans Get Along Together?" Catholic Digest, April,
1953.
Editors, " Nazism," Encyclopedia Americana, 1953.
Editors, " Communism," " Fascism," " National Socialism," Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1940.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, " On Nationalism," Western Political Heritage,
New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949.
Gouch, Hermann, "New Elements of Race Investigation (1934)," Nazi
Guide to Nazism, Washington: American Council of Public Affairs.
Ita, Sister Mary, " Diagnosing Causes of Prejudices of Children in School,"
National Catholic Education Association Proceedings, v. 47, 1950,
pp. 441-4.
Katz, Daniel, " The Concepts and Methods of Social Psychology," Fields of
Psychology, second edition, New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc.,
1950, p. 170 ff..
Merton, Robert K., "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," Social Theory and
Social Structure, Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949. Pp. 179-95.
Muench, Aloisius J., " Social Charity," The Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas,
supplement, New York: Benziger Bros. Inc., 1948.. Vol. 3, pp.
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Paton, Alan, "The Negro in American Life," Colliers, Oct. 15 and 29, 1954.
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Reuter, Edward B., " Race and Culture," New Outline of the Principles
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Vosk, Marc, " Correlatives of Prejudice," chapter vi, Review of Educational
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America. of Prejudice, Summer, 1954, The
Catholic University of America.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
1. Agnosticism and Religion. An Analysis of Spencer's Religion of the Unknowable,

George Lucas. 1895.
2. Responsibility to Moral Life. Maurice J. O'Connor. 1903.
3. The Knowableness of God. Matthew Schumacher. 1905.
4. Theory of Physical Dispositions. Charles A. Dubray. 1905,
5. The Problem of Evil. Cornelius Hagerty. 1911.
6. The Basis of Realism. William Cunningham. 1912.
7. A History of the Theory of Sensation from St. Augustine to St. Thomas. Othmar Knapke.
1915.
8. Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology. Ignatius Smith. 1915.
9. The Critical Principles of Orestes A. Brownson. Virgil Michel. 1918.
10. St. Thomas' Political Doctrine and Democracy. Edward F. Murphy. 1921.
11. The Concept of the Human Soul. William P. O'Connor. 1921.
12. The Political Philosophy of Dante Alighieri. John J. Rolbiecki. 1922.
13. Moral Qualities and Intelligence According to St. Thomas. Joseph Earl Bender. 1924.
14. The Theory of Abnormal Cognitive Processes. Edward Brennan. 1925.
15. St. Thomas' Theory of Rationes Seminales. Michael J. McKeough. 1926.
16. Thomism and the New Aesthetic. Leonard Callahan. 1927.
17. Aristotelianism in Thomas Aquinas. Donald T. Mullane. 1929.
18. St. Thomas' Theory of Moral Values. Leo Ward. 1929.
19. Modern Notions of Faith. Joachim Bauer. 1930.
20. The Thomistic Theory of Mental Faculties. Charles A. Hart. 1930.
21. The Humanism of Irving Babbitt. Francis E. McMahon. 1931.
22. The Substantial Composition of Man According to St. Bonaventure. Conrad O'Leary.
1931.
23. The Phantasm According to the Teaching of St. Thomas. Sister Mary Anastaaia Coady.
1932.
24. Knowledge and Object. Edward Talbot. 1932.
25. Modern War and Basic Ethics. John K. Ryan. 1933.
26. Man in the New Humanism. Sister Mary Vincent Killeen. 1934.
27. Some Modern Non-Intellectual Approaches to God. Sister Agnes Theresa McAuliffe. 1934.
28. The Order of Nature in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Joseph Marling. 1934.
29. The Psychology of St. Albert the Great. George C. Reilly. 1934.
30. Cardinal Newman: His Theory of Knowledge. John F. Cronin. 1935.
31. The Primacy of Metaphysics. Joseph T. Casey. 1936.
32. The Philosophy of Athenagoras: Its Sources and Value. Henry A. Lucks. 1936.
33. The Philosophical Basis for Individual Differences According to St. Thomas Aquinas.
Robert J. Slavin. 1936.
34. Lawlessness, Law and Sanction. Miriam Theresa Rooney, 1937.
35. The Substance Theory of Mind and Contemporary Functionalism. Thomas J. Ragusa.
1937.
36. The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas. Clement M. O'Donnell. 1937.
37. The Rational Nature of Man. James C. Linehan. 1937.
38. The Metaphysical Foundations of Dialectical Materialism. Charles J. McFadden. 1938.
39. The Problem of Solidarism in St. Thomas. Sister Mary Joan of Arc Wolfe. 1938.
40. St. Thomas' Doctrine of Substantial Form, and the Relations Between This Doctrine
and Certain Problems and Movements of Contemporary Philosophy. Brother Benignus
Gerrity. 1937.of Altruism in the Philosophy of St. Thomas. Cyril Harry Miron. 1939.
41. The Problem
42. De Occultis Operationibus Naturae According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Joseph B,
McAllister. 1939.
43. The Philosophy of Personality in the Thomistic Synthesis and in Contemporary Non-
Scholastic Thought. James H. Hoban. 1939.
44. Potentiality and Energy. Edward M. O'Connor. 1939.
45. The Absolute and the Relative in St. Thomas and in Modern Philosophy. Sister Camilla
Cahill. 1939.
46. The Antecedents of Being: An Analysis of the Concept De Nihilo in St. Thomas'
Philosophy. Sister Consilia O'Brien. 1939.
47. Punishment, in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and Among Some Primitive
Peoples. George Q. Friel. 1939.
48. The Social Value of Property According to St. Thomas Aquinas. William J. McDonald.
1939.
49. The Philosophy of Labor in St. Thomas. Sylvester M. Killeen. 1939.
50. The Family. A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy. Anthony Leo Ostheimer. 1939.
51. First Principles in Thought and Being. James Bacon Sullivan. 1939.
52. The Theory of Knowledge of St. Bonaventure. Sister M. Rachel Dady. 1939.
53. The Metaphysical Foundations of Thomistic Jurisprudence. Karl Kreilkamp. 1939.
54. The Concept of Self in British and American Idealism. Hugh J. Tallon. 1939.
65. The Separated Soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Victor Sleva. 1940.
56. Efficient Causality in Aristotle and in St. Thomas. Francis X. Meehan. 1940.
57. Character Control of Wealth According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister Francis Augustine
Richey. 1940.
68. Essence and Operation in Thomistic and in Modern Philosophy. Sister Mary Dominica
Mullen. 1941.
59. The Intellectual Virtues According to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister
Rose Emmanuella Brennan. 1941.
60. Utopias and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister M. St. Ida Le Clair. 1941.
61. A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation According to St. Thomas Aquinas. 1941.
62. A Theory of Criticism of Fiction in Its Moral Aspects According to St. Thomas' Prin
ciples. Sister Mary Gonzaga Udell. 1941,
63. The Moral Basis of Social Order According to St. Thomas. George V. Dougherty. 1941.
64. Liberty Under Historical Liberalism and Totalitarianism. Rudolf Harvey. 1941.
65. The Qualities of Citizenship in St. Thomas. Gerard R. Joubert. 1941.
66. A Critique of the Philosophy of George Santayana in the Light of Thomistic Principles.
Sister Cyril Edwin Kinney. 1942.
67. The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus. Cyril
L. Shircel. 1942.
68. The Philosophy of Equality in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister Jane Frances
Ferguson. 1942.
69. Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles. Sister Mary
Dolores Hayes. 1942.
70. The Thomistic Conception of an International Society. Gerald Francis Benkert. 1942.
71. The Social Value of Hope in Modern Social Thought and Thomas Aquinas. Clement
Delia Penta. 1942.
72. The Act of Social Justice in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and in the Encycli
cals of Pope Pius XI. William Ferree. 1942.
73. A Thomistic Analysis of Social Order. John F. Cox. 1943.
74. The Philosophy of Modern Revolution. James J. Maguire. 1943.
75. The Nature of Demonstrative Proof According to the Principles of Aristotle and
St. Thomas Aquinas. Owen Bennett. 1943.
76. The Social Role of Truth According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Alan J. McSweeney. 1943.
77. Selfishness and the Social Order. John J. Reardon. 1943.
78. Social Leadership According to Thomistic Principles. Luke Fisher. 1943.
79. The Social Role of Self-Control. James Kerins. 1943.
80. The Totalitarian Philosophy of Education. Leonard B. Pousson. 1944.
81. The Philosophical Theory of Creation in the Whitings of St. Augustine. Christopher
O'Toole. 1944.
82. Psychology and Philosophy of Teaching According to Traditional Philosophy and
Modern Trends. Alfonso Vargas. 1944.
83. A Philosophy of Poetry Based on Thomistic Principles. John A. Duffy. 1944.
84. The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas. Gustaf J. Gustafson.
1944.
85. The Importance of Rural Life According to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.
George H. Speltz. 1944.
86. Metaphysics as a Principle of Order in the University Curriculum. Alfred F. Horrigan.
1944.
87. The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh St. Victor. John P. Kleinz. 1944.
88. The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Sister Marina Scheu. 1944.
89. The Thomistic Philosophy of the Angels. James D. Collins. 1944.
90. The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. Maurice J. Grajewski. 1944.
91. Philosophy of Social Change According to the Principles of St. Thomas. Bro. E.
Stanislaus Duzy. 1944.
92. The Intelligibility of the Universe. Sister Mary Cosmas Hughes. 1946.
93. The Social Thought of St. Bonaventure. Matthew M. DeBenedictis. 1946.
94. The Nature and Unity of Metaphysics. George Buckley. 1946.
95. A Critique of the Philosophy of Being of Alfred North-Whitehead in the Light of
Thomistic Philosophy. Leo A. Foley. 1946.
96. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. Allan B.
Wolter. 1946.
97. The Philosophical Frontiers of Physics. Vincent E. Smith. 1947.
98. The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and Its Contemporary Significance.
Sister Enid Smith. 1947.
99. A Philosophy of Submission. Henry V. Sattler. 1948.
100. The Role of Assent in Judgment. Frances M. Tyrrell. 1948.
101. A Thomistic Philosophy of Civilization and Culture. Robert P. Mohan. 1948.
102. The Theory of Evil in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas and Its Contemporary Signifi
cance. Sister Mary Edwin DeCoursey. 1948.
103. The Philosophy of the Equitable Distribution of Wealth. Leo S. Schumacher. 1949.
104. Social Progress and Happiness in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and Contem
porary American Sociology. Francis J. de la Vega. 1949.
105. The Philosophical Bases of Human Liberty According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Arnold
Rzadkiewicz. 1949.
L06. The Problem of Expropriation. Felix AUuntis. 1949.
107. Religion and the Concept of Democracy. Vincent F. Sheppard. 1949.
108. The Place of Economics in the Philosophical Hierarchy. Rocco E. Porreco. 1949.
(microcard)
L09. The Role of Prudence in Education. Walter E. Buehler. 1950.
110. The Social Value of Public Worship According to Thomistic Principles. Robert J.
Giguere. 1950.
111. A Philosophy of Liberalism. Max E. Guzikowski. (microcard). 1950.
112. A Thomistic Interpretation of the Contemporary Crises of Western Civilization.
Francis P. McQuade. 1950.
L13. The Dignity of a Human Person. Edward P. Cronan. (microcard). 1950.
114. The Nature and Significance of the One that Follows Being in the Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas. Ben B. Hunt, (microcard) . 1950.
115. Freedom in Education. E. Russell Naughton. (microcard). 1950.
116. The Problem of Belief in the Writings of John Henry Newman, William James and
St. Thomas Aquinas. Edmond D. Benard. (microcard). 1950.
117. The Thomistic Doctrine on the Possible Intellect. Edward Q. Franz. 1950.
118. Truth and Political Freedom According to Thomistic Principles. Sister Anne Virignia
Kane. 1950. (microcard)
119. The Role of Quality in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister M. Dunstan
Delehant. (microcard). 1950.
120. The Origin of the Rational Soul According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister Mary Alethea
Brennan. (microcard). 1950.
121. The Principle of Individuation: A Comparative Study of St. Thomas, Scotus, and
Suarez. Jean R. Rosenberg. 1950. (microcard)
122. A Philosophy of Courage. Roy R. Bode. 1950. (microcard)
123. The Doctrine of Separable Accident in the Philosophy of St. Thomas. Raymond G.
Fontaine, (microcard). 1950,
124. A Study of George Berkeley's Philosophy in the Light of the Philosophy of St. Thomas.
John J. Laky. 1951.
125. Max Scheler's Phenomenological Philosophy of Values. Marius Schneider. 1951.
(microcard)
126. The Thomistic Concept of the Vis Cogitativa. Dominic Cangemi. 1951. (microcard)
127. Etienne Gilson's Concept of the Nature and Scope of Philosophy. Sister Madeleine
Gabrielle Savaria. 1951. (microcard)
128. The Brotherhood of Man in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. John J. Bagen. 1951.
(microcard)
129. The Virtue of Prudence in the Social Philosophy of St. Thomas. Joseph E. Hogan. 1951.
(microcard)
130. The One and the Many in the Social Order. Sister M. Fredericus Niemeyer. 1951. (microcard)
131. Permanence and Process. A Philosophical Investigation into the Foundations of the
Law of Energy Conservation. Lawrence F. Moran. 1951. (microcard)
[32. Individualism: Extreme and Moderate. William Maloney. 1951. (microcard)
L33. The Subject, Object and Method of the Philosophy of Nature According to St. Thomas
Aquinas. Kenneth F. Dougherty. 1951. (microcard)
134. Banking and the Scholastic Analysis of Usary. John T. Noonan. 1951. (microcard)
L35. The Thomistic Philosophy of Culture and the Virtue of Art. Sister M. Joseph Wagataffe.
1951. (microcard)
136. The Nature of Human Knowledge According to St. Gregory of Nyssa. Alcuin A,
Weiswurm. 1953.
L37. Thomas More and Society: A Study in Renaissance Thought. Charles R. Dechert. 1952.
(microcard)
L38. Tne Concept of Nature in Philosophy and Physics. James F. O'Brien. 1952. (microcard)
139. The Thomistic Concept of the Virtue of Temperance and its Relation to the Emotions.
Kenneth F. Slattery. 1952. (microcard)
L40. The Relation of the Virtue of Justice to Personality. Edward W. Harkenrider. 1952.
(microcard)
141. Religion and Secularism in the Light of Thomistic Thought. Joseph S. Breen. 1952.
(microcard)
L42. The Contemporary Philosophy of Security in the Light of Scholastic Theory of
Divine Providence. John Harrington. 1952. (microcard)
143. Philosophy of Man in Communism. Marcellus Scheuer. 1952. (microcard)
L44. The Good Political Ruler According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Gerald J. Lynam. 1953.
(abstract)
145. Philosophical Aspects op Communication. John J. O'Gonnor. 1953. (abstract)
146. The Philosophy of Anger in Relation to the Virtues in the Philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Margaret M. Petritz. 1953. (abstract)
147. The Human Body in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sister M. Evangeline Anderson.
1953. (abstract)
148. The Thomistic Concept of Pleasure as Compared with Hedonistic and Rigoristic
Philosophies. Bro. Charles L. Reutemann. 1953. (abstract)
149. The Function of the Philosopher in American Pragmatism. James W. Keating. 1953.
(abstract)
150. Philosophical Bases for Human Dignity and Change in Thomistic and American Non-
Thomistic Philosophy, Sister M. Sophie Simec. 1953.
151. Moral Standards and Social Organization. Sister Anita Horrigan. 1953. (abstract)
152. St. Thomas and the Unconscious Mind. Paul F. Nolan. 1953. (abstract)
153. The Psychology of Ownership. Owen P. Fredrickson. 1954. (abstract)
154. The Role of the Will in Personality Development. Walter A. Coggin. 1954. (abstract)
155. The Persistence of Realism in the Modern Scientific Interpretations of Nature.
Norbert R. Feld. 1954. (abstract)
156. The Philosophy of Sex According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Mark Toon. 1954. (abstract)
157. A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of the Nature and the Knowledge of Reality in
the Light of the Principles of Thomism. Norbert J. Fleckenstein. 1954.
158. The Transcendental Notion of Supposit with Special Reference to the Material
Supposit and Its Quantity. Mary A. Warther. 1954. (abstract)
159. The Theory of Knowledge of Tommaso Campanella, Exposition and Critique. Bernar
dino M. Bonansea. 1954. (abstract)
160. Unconscious Drives and Human Freedom in Freud's Psychoanalysis. Augustine
Ramirez. 1955. (abstract)
161. The Concept of Man in Communist Philosophy. John J. Doherty. 1955. (abstract)
162. Social Distances According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Joseph R. Myers. 1955. (abstract)
Copies may be obtained at

THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Social Distance According To St. Thomas Aquinas - J. Rawley Myers

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THE^CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA]

ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PRINTED IX THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The purpose of the dissertation of which this abstract is but a

The importance of discussing this problem is evident. It is a

tions must throw off the shackles of oppression. Terror is freely

The Thomistic philosopher feels that no genuine answer to the

which we saw earlier, can be the cause of erroneous judgments:

or ill if the habit is unsuitable. Habit therefore considers the

of speculative knowledge, although erroneous, it is a habit of

Social distance, both prejudicial attitudes and acts, makes man

True education has for its purpose the development of the

of man's nature and operations to God's is based on man's ability

In order to attain truth he must be free to do so. He is entitled to

ordering of social life. Social justice demands that each individual

, The Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas, English Dominican translation,

Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1912-1925.

Psychological, Sociological, and Social Psychological Sources

Catholic University of America.

1. Agnosticism and Religion. An Analysis of Spencer's Religion of the Unknowable,

Copies may be obtained at

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