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TABLE OF CONTENTS
MODULE 1: LEGAL RESEARCH, WRITING AND ANALYSIS Grave Abuse of Discretion
1 The Four “Cs” of Effective Decision-Writing: An 4 16 Ocampo v. Enriquez 26
Introduction for Newly-Appointed Judges 17 GMA v. People of the Philippines 35
2 Legal Writing 201 6
3 Open Book: Succeeding on Exams from the 8 JUDGES
First Day of Law School Qualifications
4 How to Brief a Case 9 18 Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary 41
Role and Standards: Independence
MODULE 2: THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM 19 In Re: Allegations of Mr. Macasaet 42
THE JUDICIARY: COURTS Role and Standards: Integrity
Judicial Power 20 OCA v. Judge Floro 43
1 Lopez v. Roxas 10 Role and Standards: Impartiality
Separation and Blending powers 21 People v. CA 43
2 Angara v. Electoral Commission 12 Role and Standards: Propriety
Hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System 22 In Re: Allegations Made Under Oath 44
3 Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC 13 23 Manaog v. Rubio 45
4 Firestone Ceramics v. CA 13 Role and St3ndards: Competence and Diligence
5 Fabian v. Desierto 14 24 Ocampo v. Judge Arcaya-Chua 46
6 Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 15 Liabilities of a Judge
7 Carpio-Morales v. CA 16 25 Santiago III v. Enriquez, Jr 47
8 Duncano v. Sandiganbayan 17 26 OCA v. Judge Eliza Yu 48
Jurisdiction 27 In Re: Charges of Plagiarism 58
9 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 18 28 Atty. Melvin Mane v. Judge Medel Belen
Basis of Decisions
10 Oil and Natural Gas Comm. v. CA 19 LAWYERS
Judicial Bar and Council Nature and Scope of Legal Profession
11 De Castro v. JBC 20 29 Cayetano v. Monsod 59
30 Ulep v. Legal Clinic 60
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Admission to the Practice of Law
Origins of Judicial Review 31 In Re: Cunanan 61
12 Marbury v. Madison 21 Nature of Lawyer’s Oath
13 Francisco v. House of Representatives 23 32 Sebastian v. Calis 61
Political Question Qualifications
14 Tañada v. Cuenco 24 33 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma 62
Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality The Lawyer and Society
15 Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty 25 34 Castañeda v. Ago 63

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The Lawyer and the Legal Profession MODULE 5: ESSENTIAL LEGAL CONCEPTS
35 In Re: Edillon 64 Stare Decisis
The Lawyer and the Courts 53 Fermin v. People 106
36 In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty 64 54 Chinese YMCA v. Remington Steel 108
The Lawyer and the Client 55 Pepsi Cola v. Pagdanganan 109
37 Burbe v. Magulta 65 Res Judicata
38 Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez 66 56 Antonio v. Sayman 110
39 Regala v. Sandiganabyan 67 57 Republic v. Yu 111
40 Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui 69 Lis Pendens
58 Lim v. Vera Cruz 112
MODULE 3: THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES 59 Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove 113
THE EXECUTIVE Law of the Case
Scope of Executive Power 60 Villa v. Sandiganbayan 114
41 Marcos v. Manglapus 72 61 Padillo v. CA 115
Executive’s Emergency Powers Prospectivity of Laws
42 Lagman v. Medialdea 74 62 People v. Derilo 117
Executive Privilege 63 Co v. CA 118
43 US v. Nixon 86 Landmark Case
44 Neri v. Senate 87 64 Santos v. CA 118
Immunity from Suit 65 Ochosa v. Alano 119
45 Soliven v. Makasiar 89 Leading Case
46 David v. Arroyo 89 66 Ting v. Velez-Ting 121
Impeachment 67 Carpio-Morales v. CA (repeat case) 122
47 Estrada v. Desierto 91 Dura Lex Sed Lex
68 Corpuz v. People 122
THE LEGISLATURE
Scope of Legislative Power
48 Araneta v. Gatmaitan 96
49 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 97
Undue Delegation
50 Belgica v. Ochoa 98

MODULE 4: SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE LAW

COMMON LAW V. CIVIL LAW
51 Lost in Translation: Oral Advocacy in a Land 100
Without Binding Precedent
52 Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law 102
(Codified and Uncodified)

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MODULE 1
1 The Four “Cs” of Effective Decision-Writing:
An Introduction for Newly-Appointed Judges
4 PHILJA JUD. J. 29, 42-45 (2002) by Artemio V. Panganiban
I. Completeness
Legal Requirements on the Contents of a Decision:
1. Art. VIII, Sec. 14, Constitution: No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating legal basis
therefor.
2. Rule 36, Sec. 1, Rules of Court: Rendition of judgments and final orders. –
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed
with the clerk of court (1a).
3. Rule 120, Sec. 2, Rules of Court: Contents of the judgment. – If the
judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action
has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Case 1: Yao v. CA
CJ Hilario G. Davide, Jr.: The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of Yao
palpably transgressed Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution. The RTC decision
merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or
resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for
resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.
Case 2: People v. Bugarin
Functions of the Requirement that the Decisions of Courts Must be in Writing and
Set Forth Clearly and Distinctly:
• Inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decisions so that if any
of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts
or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees
• Assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning
• Safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from
deciding by ipse dixit
Case 3: Madrid v. CA
The trial court’s decision contains no analysis of the evidence of the parties and no
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It contains nothing more than
a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties.
4. Rule 16, Sec. 3, Rules of Court: Resolution of motion – After the hearing,
the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that
the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.
Case 1: Pefianco v. Moral
The rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to
dismiss ‘for lack of merit. This creates difficulty and misunderstanding on the part
of the aggrieved party in taking recourse and on the higher court called upon to
resolve the issue.
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5. Sanctions for Failure to Follow Legal Requirements (Reversal of Decision
and Possible Administrative Liabilities) D. Findings of Facts
Methods of Reporting Facts:
Judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered in the 1. Objective or Reportorial Method: summarizing, without comment, the
absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith. testimony of each witness, and the contents of each exhibit
• Not a license for negligence or abuse in performing adjudicatory 2. Synthesis Method: judge narrates what he expects as his own version
prerogatives without explaining what the parties’ versions are
3. Combination of the Objective and Subjective Methods: judge reports the
6. Parts of a Trial Court Decision testimony of each witness as in the first type and the makes his own version
A. Caption and Title as he sees fit
a.Caption
i. Name of the court E. Statement of the Issues
ii. Title of the action F. Court’s Ruling: Application of law and jurisprudence to the facts, and
iii. Docket number explanation for the conclusions reached
b. Title G. Dispositive or Disposition
i. Names of all parties and their respective participation
B. Introduction (Optional) Criminal Cases:
C. Statement of the Case • Finding of innocence or guilt
a. Civil Cases • Specific crime
i. Collection • Penalty
ii. Ejectment
• Participation of the accused
iii. Quieting of title
iv. Foreclosure of mortgage, etc. • Qualifying, aggravating and mitigating circumstances
b. Criminal Cases • Civil liabilities costs
i. Specific charge
ii. Accusatory portion of the information Civil Cases:
iii. Plea of the accused • Whether the complainant or petition is granted or denied
iv. Sometimes the conduct of preliminary investigation • Specific relief granted
• Costs
Case 1: People v. Dumaguing
The Court is disturbed by the fact that the decision of the trial court now subject of J. Reynato S. Puno: A disposition must be complete.
automatic review failed to include a statement of facts or at least a summary of the Test of Completeness:
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 1. Parties know their rights and obligations
reasonable doubt. 2. Parties know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies
• No mention of the evidence the prosecution presented in court 3. No need for further proceedings
• The trial judge is admonished for failure to comply with the Rules regarding 4. Terminates the case by according the proper relief
the form and contents of judgments 5. Adjudicate costs

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II. Correctness
Definition: the decision must conform to the law and settled jurisprudence 2 Legal Writing 201: Suggestions to Improve
Readability or How to Write for Judges, Not Like Judges
Scholarship and research are the landmarks of a great decision. By Judge Mark Painter

Some Guidelines in Correct Legal Writing: Introduction to Legal Writing:

1. Be Grammatical Legal Writing should be no different from other writing. While certain documents—
2. Be Clear and Precise complaints, briefs, deeds—may have a standard form, their content should be in
3. Use Specific Words that are Well-Positioned plain English. One problem in law school is that we read cases that are out of date.

III. Clarity Most judges write lengthy decisions. Some judges use 100 words when two sentences
Definition: a decision should be easy to read and to understand could suffice.
Even worse than the writings of judges for a case, are statues. Moreover the problem
Guidelines: is compounded exponentially by the law student’s encounter with other legal
1. Be Simple writing—leases, contracts, pleadings—some hardly changed from Norman times.
2. Be Consistent in Tone, Tense, Words, Images, and the Logical and
Grammatical Parallelism of Words or Groups of Words As lawyers, what we do most is write—Lincoln said that lawyers’ time and advice are
our stock in trade, but we express the advice in words. And we use our time in
3. Remember to Use in General:
drafting, in communicating mostly by the written word. Sometimes, though, we fail
a. Topics and titles for distinct ideas, headings and subheadings
to remember the first object of writing—to communicate.
b. Numbers or letter for enumerations and succession of ideas
c. Transition words and phrases
Writing is a skill that can be learned. We can substantially improve our
d. Proper punctuation marks
communication by learning a few skills, a few tricks, and unlearning some “rules”
e. Bold types or italics to stress words and phrases
that get in the way of good writing.
IV. Conciseness
RULE 1. KNOW YOUR AUDIENCE
Question: How long should a decision be?
The first question is all writing is: For whom are you writing? A good writer must
Answer: It depends on the facts and the issues involved.
adjust to its reader If you are to persuade a judge to rule in your favor, or an
adversary’s lawyer to pay you money or demand less money, you want to be
V. Final Word
persuasive. And the most important step in persuasion is communicating clearly what
“It is not wise to violate the rules, until you know how to observe them.” – T.S. Eliot
it is you are trying to persuade the other person to do.

RULE 2. FRONT-LOAD YOUR DOCUMENT—CONTEXT BEFORE

DETAIL
As with all writing, organize your document to be front-loaded. That is, educate the
reader as to what is coming. Put the important material up front. One reason we put
important points up front is we need to put context before details. The reader learns
by building on prior knowledge. If the reader starts with no knowledge of your

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case—which is generally true—you have to give them everything. the most important
part of putting context before detail is framing the issue—letting the reader know
what the case is about
RULE 3. FRAME THE ISSUE IN FEWER THAN 75 WORDS
The most important part of your trial or appellate brief, or even of a memorandum
to another lawyer, is framing the issue. What questions are trying to answer for the
court? What do you want the court to decide? Do not start writing your brief or
memo until you have a succinct statement of what the case is about. And you must
do this in 50-75 words. If you can’t explain the case in 75 words, you do not
understand it very well, and neither will your reader.
RULE 4. STATE THE FACTS SUCCINCTLY
Be concise, the fewer the words, the more memorable the point.
RULE 5. AVOID OVERCHRONICLING—MOST DATES ARE
UNIMPORTANT
There is no need to start every sentence with a date. Unless an exact date is important,
leave it out. Instead, tell us what the case is about—only the material facts, and why
they are important.
RULE 6. HEADINGS ARE SIGNPOSTS—THEY SHOULD INFORM
Headings do not just give context, they also signal the reader when to safely take a
break. The reader needs breaks in digesting complex material. Separate the parts—
and subparts—into headings.
RULE 7. WRITE SHORT PARAGRAPHS
Short paragraphs give the reader a chance to pause and digest what has gone before.
If you put three or four sentences with new information in each paragraph, that is
enough.
RULE 8. FORM IS IMPORTANT—MAKE IT LOOK GOOD
Obviously, the substance of the case is most important—but to communicate the
substance, use the best form possible.
RULE 9. CHECK YOUR DOCUMENT CAREFULLY
Proof reading is always a MUST.
RULE 10. KEEP IT SHORT—THE PAGE LIMIT IS YOUR FRIEND
The page limit is your friend; it requires you to refine your argument. You must strive
to write succinctly. It is much harder to write a short brief than a long one.
RULE 11. USE NO TALKING FOOTNOTES
If something is important enough to be in a footnote, it is important enough to be
in the text.
RULE 12. CITATIONS GO IN FOOTNOTES
Cluttering up your document with jumbles of letters and numbers makes it almost
totally unreadable. This practice should cease, especially now that footnoting
references is simple. Citations belong in footnotes. You will be amazed at the
increased readability.
RULE 13. USE THE OHIO FORM OF CITATION NOT IMPORTANT
(ALWAYS Use Ateneo Law Journal Citation for school matters.)
RULE 14. EDIT, EDIT, EDIT
Typos, bad grammar, and misplaced paragraphs (simply take away from your
argument.
RULE 15. WRITE SHORT SENTENCES—THE 1818 RULE, PART I
Write short, crisp sentences. What is the most underused punctuation mark in legal
writing? The period. The most overused is easy—the comma. Do not let your
sentences run-on.
RULE 16. USE MAINLY ACTIVE VOICE—THE 1818 RULE, PART II
If there is no good reason to use the passive voice, put your sentence back the way
real people would talk. Although writing in the passive voice is not forbidden.
Sometimes you do not need to name the actor—“Many books on this subject have
been published.” Or a smooth transition from one sentence to the next requires you
to put the subject first.
RULE 17. USE “BUT” AND “AND” TO BEGIN SENTENCES
And do not be afraid to start sentences with “and” or “but.” This signifies good
writing. The reason your grammar-school teacher told you not to start a sentence
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with “and” was because you wrote, “I have a mother. And a father. And a dog.” Use
“but” rather than “however” to start a sentence, and see how much better it reads.
RULE 18. DISTINGUISH BETWEEN “THAT” AND “WHICH”
Use “that” restrictively, and “which” nonrestrictively. The easiest way to
remember—which is preceded by a comma; that is not.
RULE 19. USE THE DASH, PARENTHESIS, AND COMMA FOR
DEGREES OF EMPHASIS
A dash provides the greatest emphasis—it is a stronger break—next in degree is the
parenthesis, then the comma
RULE 20. ONE WORD IS USUALLY ENOUGH
Do not use two or three or four words for one. Don’t write “filed a motion” unless
the filing itself has some significance. Write “moved.” Do not write “On October
13, 1995, plaintiff-appellant filed a timely appeal to this honorable court.” Again,
unless the timeliness or date (or the honor of the court) is in question.
RULE 21. NO PARENTHETICAL NUMERICALS
An opinion that states “There were two (2) defendants and three (3) police officers
present” is extremely hard to read, and also looks silly.
RULE 22. HYPHENATE PHRASAL ADJECTIVES
The reader is confused by nouns acting as adjectives, or two adjectives together
modifying one noun. Always hyphenate phrases like “wrongful-discharge suit,” or
“public-policy exception.”
RULE 23. ALWAYS QUESTION “OF”
It is better to write Ohio Supreme Court, rather than Supreme Court of Ohio. There
is nothing wrong with possessive. Write “the court’s docket,” not “the docket of the
court.”
RULE 24. USE THE SERIAL COMMA
In a list of three or more, always insert the serial comma. MAKE USE OF THE
OXFORD COMMA. My favorite sandwiches are grilled cheese, tuna, peanut butter
and jelly. Peanut butter and jelly is different from peanut butter, and jelly.
RULE 25. AVOID UNNECESSARY PREAMBLES
Some unnecessary preambles: It is important to add that . . . It may be recalled that .
. . In this regard it is of significance that . . . It is interesting to note that.
RULE 26. PURGE LAWSPEAK
“Hereinafter,” “aforesaid,” and the like do not add anything but wordiness and
detract from readability. Use Latin phrases sparingly. A few—res ipsa loquitur,
respondeat superior—are perhaps acceptable, but do not litter your opinion with
Latin phrases not many can understand.
RULE 27. THE PARTIES HAVE NAMES
The procedural titles chance throughout the case, but the names remain the same.
Using names also humanizes your client—even corporate names, e.g., “Smithco,”
sound much more human that “Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.”
RULE 28. USE QUOTATIONS SPARINGLY
You should explain how the cited cases support your theory of the case. Do not use
lengthy quotations—a few lines at most.
RULE 29. USE PERSUASIVE LANGUAGE
If you can’t explain your case, how can you expect the readers to understand it?
Similes or metaphors are very effective to illustrate your analysis.
RULE 30. CONTINUE YOUR RESEARCH
You might file a memorandum or a brief months before it is argued before the court.
Check every citation periodically, and again the day before the case is argued. It has
happened more than once in my tenure that a new Ohio Supreme Court case has
appeared in the interim.
3 Open Book: Succeeding on Exams from the First
Day of Law School by Barry Freidman and John C.P. Goldberg
The What and Why of Exams
• Law students hate exams because they come after weeks of classes covering
vast amounts of topics and little feedback is provided
• Law professors dislike exams too – difficult to make and distasteful to grade
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• The reason for sticking to the traditional method of exams in law school is
for the sake of testing and grading the students the same way they were
graded as well
• Purpose of this article is to explain why law school exams look the way they
do and to give students the knowledge on how to take them
• Law school exams test a very basic, yet elusive skill, which is the ability to
think like a lawyer – meaning the “ability to give a client legal advice”
• This entails being able to digest a series of facts (the client’s story), to
identify legal issues, to apply governing principles to those facts, and to
explain the possible consequences to the client under the law
• What matters most for exams is the ability to make cogent arguments about
how legal rules apply or should apply given a set of facts
• It is important to note that “Law is not about reciting legal rules or spouting
information, it is about reasoning cogently and making careful and
convincing arguments on the legal materials for particular conclusions”
• To further explain this point, to do well in law school, one must give up on
the idea that the job of a law school student is to find an answer that is
waiting to be discovered – precisely because there are always two sides to a
legal issue, much like a coin
• In real life and on law schools exams, legal issues often do not admit
definitive answers, rather, there are provisional probabilities and arguments
where answers should be
• Law school is not about learning or memorizing black-letter law, instead, it
is “deciding” with legal knowledge on how to resolve the legal issues
• Think in terms of arguments, not answers
• To do well on exams, and in the real world, you have to embrace a certain
degree of uncertainty and it is up to the judge or the professor to decide if
your arguments are sound and proper
• WHAT – The Law School Essay Exam is a mirror of what lawyers face in
the real world
• WHY – It prepares law school students to think on their feet and to see
both sides of legal issues, eventually arguing that one side is stronger than
the other through legal bases
The Bottom-Line
• Taking exams, like advising clients, is about identifying issues presented by
a set of facts, determining the rules that guide the resolution of those issues,
and making arguments about how those rules apply to the facts.
• Exam questions invite you to analyze and argue: Answers that merely recite
rules and asset definitive conclusions are missing the point (and losing
points)
• In law, conclusions usually take the form of predictions about the likelihood
a given position or argument will prevail.
4 How to Brief a Case by Christopher Pyle
Appellate Brief: A written legal argument presented to an appellate court. It
persuades the higher court to uphold/reverse the lower court’s decision. It is a one-
sided representation of the issues.
Student Brief: Short summary and analysis of the case for classroom discussion.
Systematic way of sorting out parties, identifying issues, understanding the decision,
and analyzing the court’s reasoning.
Keeping track of parties:
1. Plaintiff sues defendants in civil suits.
2. Government sues defendants in criminal cases.
The losing party asks the higher/appellate court to review the case - appeal - on the
ground that the judge made a mistake. 2 situations may arise from this:
1. If the law gives the right, the party’s lawyer files for appeal.
a. The appellate court is being asked to exercise its lawful discretion in
granting the cases a hearing.
b. The person filing for an appeal: appellant; and the opponent: appellee.
2. If the party has no right, the lawyer may ask for a writ of certiorari.
a. Person filing the writ: petitioner; opponent: respondent
In any case, the person filing for the petition/writ/case always appears first. E.g.
Tatum v. Laird - Tatum sued Laird.
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Student Brief 4. Decision/Holding: The court’s answer to the questions/issues presented to
Parts: it. If the issues were captured well, the holding can be the “yes” or “no” answer
1. Title and Citation that can be taken from the court’s language.
2. Facts of the case
3. Issues 5. Reasoning/Rationale: Chain of argument which led the judges either in a
4. Decision/Holding majority or a dissenting opinion to rule the way they did. Outline this, point by
5. Reasoning/Rationale point, in numbered sentences/paragraphs.
6. Separate Opinions
7. Analysis 6. Separate Opinions: Concurring and dissenting opinions. They should also be
analyzed properly in relation to the main points in the majority opinion. Seeing
1. Title and Citation: Helps in easily identifying the parties a judge’s decision count can be a tool for anticipating his/her future votes in
a. Title: shows the opposing parties other cases.
b. Citation: helps locate the reporter of the case
7. Analysis: Student’s evaluation of the case’s significance in relation to other
2. Facts of the Case: Shows the nature of litigation, who sued whom, bases of cases, its effect on history, and what it shows about the court, the members who
occurrences, and decisions of the lower courts. Facts are usually found at the voted, their decision-making process, the parties, the government, and society.
beginning of the decision, but sometimes, the separate opinions may give a These are implicit assumptions on the values of the justices, the “rightness” of
better narrative of what happened. The judge chooses the facts and “edits” the decision, and the like.
them according to how he/she will vote, and how he/she will apply the law.
Cautionary note: Read the case at least once before briefing. Look for articulated
Parts of a good statement of facts: premises, logical fallacies, manipulation of the facts, or distortions of precedent. Ask
a. An introduction - one sentence description of the nature of the case. the following questions:
b. A statement of relevant law. Put an emphasis on the keywords, e.g. underline. 1. How does it relate to other cases under the same law?
c. Summary of the complaint (civil) or indictment (criminal) plus relevant evidence 2. What does it show about judicial policy making?
and arguments of each side to paint a complete narrative. 3. Do you think the decision is fair?
d. A summary of actions by the lower courts. 4. How can it be decided better?

3. Issues: Questions of law raised by the facts. The judge may misstate this so be
careful. MODULE 2
a. Some cases will have multiple issues, make sure you have an understanding
of all.
b. Sometimes, the outcome of a case in the higher court will turn on the THE JUDICIARY: COURTS
meaning of a legal provision or doctrine. Make sure you capture this.
c. Rephrase them in a format that can be answerable by “yes” or “no” - e.g. 1 LOPEZ V. ROXAS G.R. No. L-25716 28 July 1966
Whether or not the petitioners had legal standing in this case.
d. Important: Make sure you understand the issues because if you miss them, QUICK REFERENCE:
you will most probably misread the entire case. Lopez and Roxas were candidates as Vice President for the 1965 General Elections.
Lopez won and Roxas filed an election protest with the Presidential Electoral

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Tribunal. Thereafter, Lopez filed a case in the Supreme Court and challenged the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1793 which created the said tribunal. It is
alleged, among others, that it created another court beyond the Constitutional
provision regarding judicial power. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The said
law only supplements by conferring upon the Supreme Court additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Fernando Lopez and Respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main
contenders for Vice President of the Philippines in the 1965 General
Elections. The Congress, acting as the board of canvassers, proclaimed
Lopez as the winner.
• Roxas filed an election protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
alleging that he was the one who obtained the largest number of votes.
• Thereafter, Lopez filed a case in the Supreme Court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction. He sought to prevent the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal from deciding the aforesaid election contest on the ground that
Republic Act No. 1793, the law that created the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, is unconstitutional.
• Lopez contends that the Congress may not authorize an election contest
for the positions of President and Vice President since the Constitution is
silent regarding the matter. For allowing election contest, the law appears
to be inconsistent with the constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim
the candidates elected. Further, it is alleged that the said law has the effect
of amending the Constitution since it permits the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to review the congressional proclamation for the president and
vice president positions, considering that the Constitution was deliberately
written to not have any provisions regarding election contest over the said
positions.
• With regard to the composition of the President Electoral Tribunal, Lopez
also contends that it is illegal for any Justice of the Supreme Court to sit as
members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal since the decisions thereof
are appealable to the Supreme Court on question of law. The Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court and the
Congress cannot appoint the members by mere legislation.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Republic Act No. 1793 is unconstitutional for seemingly
amending the Constitution with regard to election protests in the President
and Vice President positions.
RATIO:
• Before addressing categorically this issue, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to discuss what is judicial power.
• Under the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.” This
provision vest in the judicial branch of the government the entirety of the
said power, except as much as the Constitution confers the same upon
some other agency, such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House
Electoral Tribunal for election contest relating to the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively.
• Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper
exercise of said authority requires legislative action in (1) defining such
rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2)
determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said
controversies. Thus, the Constitution also provides that “Congress shall
have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts,” subject to the limitations also set forth in the Constitution.
• Prior to Republic Act No. 1793, election protest for the president and vice
president positions were not justiciable, i.e. there was no legal right to
demand election protest by recount. Thus, the passage of Republic Act No.
17931 had the effect of giving defeated candidates the legal right to contest
judicially the election, demand a recount, and secure a judgment declaring
he is the one elected, as the case may be. When law provided that the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of the Chief Justice and
the other ten Members of the Supreme Court, the law in fact conferred
upon the Supreme an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive
character.
• This means that the said law did not create a new or separate Court.
• The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court,
since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
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are more limited in scope that those of the Court in the exercise of its
ordinary functions. Republic Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption
by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the
President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the
Members of the Supreme Court.
• The Supreme Court held that the Constitution vested the Congress the
discretion to determine by law whether or not a president-elect or vice
president-elect may be contested.
• Thus, Republic Act No. 1793 is not unconstitutional.
2 ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-45081 15 July 1936
QUICK REFERENCE:
Angara and Ynsua were candidates for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. Angara won the elections. On 3 December
1935, the National Assembly issued Resolution 8 to confirm Angara’s victory.
Meanwhile, on 8 December 1935, Ynsua filed a protest before the Electoral
Commission. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss, but the said Commission denied the
same. The controversy now before the Supreme Court is whether the Electoral
Commission could be subjected to judicial review. The Supreme Court answered
positively, citing first the doctrine of separation of powers. In such cases where there
may be conflict in the powers of the departments, the court is vested with the role
to make the proper determination of the respective powers among the departments.
Electoral Commission, while not exactly a department, but an organ created by the
Constitution, such body is still subject to the reach of the court.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Jose Angara filed a petition for prohibition to restrain the
Electoral Commission from taking cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
Ynsua. The said election protest was filed against Jose Angara for his
election as member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas.
• Prior to this case, Angara and Ynsua were electoral candidates for the
position of member of the National Assembly. Angara was proclaimed as
the winner in the election.
• On 3 December 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 as
confirmation of the proclamation of Angara.
• On 8 December 1935, after the issuance of Resolution No. 8, Ynsua filed
a protest before the Electoral Commission. Thereafter, Angara filed a
motion to dismiss the protest primarily alleging that the protest was filed
out of the prescribed period. Angara contends that Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period when protest may be
filed. Any protest filed after the said confirmation is filed out of time.
• As his Answer, Ynsua alleged that there is no legal or constitutional
provision barring the presentation of a protest against after the
confirmation of the National Assembly. Further, this was in fact the last
date set by the Electoral Commission to file a protest.
• The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the said
motion to dismiss filed by Angara.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the controversy and over the Electoral Commission.
RATIO:
• Yes. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in the Philippines’
system of government. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, but it does not follow that the
three are to be kept separate and distinct. The Constitution provided a
system of checks and balances to secure coordination.
• The overlapping functions between several departments makes it hard to
exactly delineate their respective powers. Thus, in cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can determine the proper allocation of
powers between departments.
• The Constitution may be lacking in perfection, but it has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole.
• The Electoral Commission is no different to the other departments of the
government. It is still bound by the restrictions provided in the
Constitution.
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• It is true that the Electoral Commission is not a department of the
government. Rather, it is an organ created under the Constitution.
However, it is not correct to say that it is beyond the control of the
constitutional mechanisms of checks and balances.
3 DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205728 15 July 2015
QUICK REFERENCE:
COMELEC issued a notice for the Diocese of Bacolod to remove tarpaulins posted
on its front walls. The said tarpaulins contained a list of politicians labeled as “Team
Buhay” and “Team Patay,” in connection with the campaign of the church against
the RH Law. The Diocese immediately referred the case to the Supreme Court. The
issue in this case, among others, is whether or not there was a violation of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Generally,
an immediate resort to the Supreme Court is not acceptable. However, this rule
admits exception such as this case that involves genuine issues on constitutionality
and issues of transcendental importance.
FACTS:
• The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) regarding the latter’s “Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials” in 2013.
• The subject of the said notice was the tarpaulin posted in the front walls of
the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod. The tarpaulin contains messages
against the Reproductive Health Law. Also included is a list of politicians
categorized either as “Team Buhay” or “Team Patay.”
• After a series of correspondence between the COMELEC and the
Cathedral Bishop, COMELEC issued a letter ordering the removal of the
said tarpaulins.
• Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for exercise of free
speech, petitioner Diocese of Bacolod initiated this case before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not there was a violation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.
RATIO:
• No. It is correct that as a general rule, the observation of the hierarchy of
courts is compulsory. It is designed to shield the Court from cases within
the competence of the lower courts, consequently giving more time to deal
with more fundamental and essential tasks. After all, the Supreme Court is
a court of last resort. The doctrine was created to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner.
• The Supreme Court leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further
reiterating – the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar – existing precedents. Rather than a court of
first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court promulgates doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs
that role.
• The role of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and act in order
to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be
emasculated by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. That has never been the
purpose of the doctrine.
• Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. There can
be direct resort if there are (i) genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed immediately. Also, another exception is (ii) when the issue is
of transcendental importance. Other exceptions include (iii) cases of first
impression, (iv)constitutional issues raised and better decided by the
Supreme Court, (v) when the time element presented cannot be ignored,
(vi) review of the act of a constitutional organ, (vii) when there no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (viii)
dictated by public welfare.
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4 FIRESTONE CERAMICS VS. CA G.R. No. 127245 28 June 2000
QUICK REFERENCE:
There a motion filed by the petitioners referring the case to the Supreme Court En
Banc. In the Third Division, the members voted 4-1 against the transfer. However,
in the Court En Banc, 9-5 voted to accept the case. The issue then revolved whether
or not there was a proper transfer to the Court En Banc. Citing Resolution En Banc
dated 18 November 1993, it was ruled that there was a proper transfer. The fact that
En Banc voted to accept the accept should indicate the importance and merit of this
case that warrants the attention of the Court En Banc.
FACTS:
• This is a resolution of the petitioners’ Motion to Refer to the Court En
Banc these consolidated cases.
• The case involves a land of 99 hectares presumptively belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private
individual by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of
the said decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer
certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of
subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity
of the disposition thereof is in order.
• The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in
question, when the herein private respondents obtained their decree of
registration there over.
• Since there appears to be error, the petitioners motion the referral of the
case to the Court En Bank.
• On 8 March 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 denying the transfer.
However, on 14 March 2000, the Court En Banc voted 9-5 to accept the
case.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not case was properly referred to the Court En Banc.
RATIO:
• Yes. What happened here is a legitimate and valid exercise of the residual
power of the Supreme Court within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of
the Resolution En Banc of 18 November 1993, which reads: “All other
cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem
of sufficient importance to merit its attention.”
• The fact that paragraph 9 of the said Resolution was cited is an indication
of the sufficient importance of this case to merit and attention and
disposition of the entire Court en banc. This finding constitutes a reason
cogent and compelling enough to warrant that the Court En Banc has to
act upon and decide the petitioners’ motion.
• When the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition,
it does not imply that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering
objective and fair justice. The action of the Court only means that the
nature of the case calls for en banc attention and consideration. It is not an
undue exercise of sheer voting strength, but a mere decision based on well-
studied finding and sustainable opinion.
5 FABIAN V. DESIERTO G.R. No. 129742 16 September 1998
QUICK REFERENCE:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer
of the First Metro Manila Engineering Distxrict (FMED). Misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so
to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal
to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. The
case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. The deputy ruled
in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed
the case to the Supreme Court. She averred Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989), however, the Court later on declared this to be invalid.
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FACTS:
• PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project
including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
• A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19,
R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807
(Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive
suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who
inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private
respondents from the administrative charges.
• Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
RATIO:
• No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription
in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs.
The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
• Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
6 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906 7 October 2008
QUICK REFERENCE:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men upon the
suspicion that they were members of the NPA. They were taken against their will
without any warrant of arrest whatsoever. They were subjected to torture and illegal
detention. They were interrogated and forced to confess their involvement with the
rebels. The brothers maintained their non-involvement with the NPA. However,
they were continually beaten until after 18 months they escaped their captors. They
filed a case in Court to prohibit the Armed Forces from further detaining them and
threatening their freedom. While the case was pending, the Writ of Amparo took
effect. The respondents prayed that their case be heard under the new Rule. The
prayer was granted and the Writ of Amparo was resolved in their favor. The
petitioners were compelled to divulge the records of the abduction of the brothers.
The Secretary of Defense questioned the order. The Court ruled that the Writ of
Amparo was well under their power to issue. It provided a remedy for the plague of
enforced disappearances and extralegal killings. The Court is empowered under the
1987 Constitution to promulgate laws which safeguard Constitutional Rights of
Citizens, in this case their right to life and liberty.
FACTS:
• Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit) upon
the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA.
• Raymond was forcibly taken from his house in the presence of his mother
by uniformed men whose faces he recognized as CAFGU of Manuzon, San
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Ildefonso, Bulacan. He was forced into an L300 van. Thereafter, another
person was forced into the van, his brother Reynaldo.
• The brothers were beaten inside a van and then brought to a house. They
were ushered into separate rooms within view of each other. The brothers
saw each other being beaten by the CAFGU. They were interrogated and
being forced to confessed that they were members of the NPA.
• Certain “High Officials” would visit the brothers and ask them questions.
The CAFGU accorded such officials great respect. While in the presence
of such officials, the brothers were not beaten.
• The brothers met with Gen. Jovito Palparan who instructed them to tell
their families not to go after the Army for Human Rights Violations and
other claims if they wanted to live. Furthermore, the general demanded
their cooperation with regard the capture of certain NPA figures despite
them denying their involvement with the NPA.
• After 18 months of detention and alleged torture, the brothers were able to
escape their captors.
• After their escape, the brothers filed a petition in Court seeking to prohibit
the military operatives from depriving them forcibly of their liberty and
other basic rights.
• During the pendency of the case, the Writ of Amparo took effect on Oct.
24, 2007. The Manalos then filed their omnibus motion under the Writ
which had recently taken into effect.
• The Court granted the Writ prayed for by the Manalos was granted by the
Supreme Court and the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces were ordered to furnish the Manalos of the results of all
investigations both official and unofficial. The medical records of the
Manalos while under detention were also ordered to be furnished.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or Not the Supreme Court can issue an order commanding the
petitioners to disclose the details regarding the abduction of the Manalo
brothers and other materials related therewith i.e. medical records.
RATIO:
• It is within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate the Rules
regarding the Writ of Amparo.
• The Writ of Amparo (or Writ of Protection) was a Rule issued by the
Supreme Court “in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.” It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s
expanded power, under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to
protect the people’s Constitutional Rights.
• While Constitutional rights can be protected under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, such a remedy may not be adequate to address the problem of
extralegal killings.
• The new Writ of Amparo, which allows summary proceedings providing
for interim and permanent reliefs offers a better and swifter remedy to the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, both of which
are extremely time-sensitive.
• The Writ is both preventive and curative in addressing the abovementioned
crimes. It is preventive because it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of the said offenses. It is curative because it leads to the
punishment of perpetrators through the disclosure of records both official
and unofficial.
• The Writ of Amparo, and the power of the Court to order the disclosure
of records regarding forcible abductions helps ensure that military officers
can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any
investigation and action for violation of the rights of Citizens.
• “The Writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.”
7 CARPIO-MORALES V. CA G.R. No. 217126-27 10 November 2015
QUICK REFERENCE:
A preventive suspension order was issued against Binay Jr. (Mayor of Makati). Binay
Jr. obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals
against the suspension order. The Ombudsman assailed the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals (CA) to issue the TRO. The issue was whether or the CA had jurisdiction
to issue the TRO. The Supreme Court held that the CA had jurisdiction because
Paragraph 2 Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act saying who cannot intervene in the
investigation process of the Ombudsman is unconstitutional.
FACTS:
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• A complaint was filed before the office of the ombudsman against Makati
Mayor Binay Jr.
• He was accused of plunder, graft, and corruption practices regarding the
Makati City Hall Parking Building.
• On March 11, 2015, the Office of the Mayor of Makati received a copy of
the preventive suspension order.
• On the same day noon time, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) granted a
resolution for Binay Jr’s Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).
• The Office of the Ombudsman argued that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to issue a TRO because of Republic Act Republic Act 6670
(Ombudsman Act).
• Binay Jr. argued that it was well within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to issue the TRO and that the Ombudsman had no right to issue
a preventive suspension order because of the Condonation Doctrine.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the
Temporary Restraining Order on the preventive suspension order issued
by the Ombudsman.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in grave abuse of discretion
when it used the Condonation Doctrine.
RATIO:
• The Supreme Court ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is
vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the
landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn,
held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect
of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and
concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
• The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that
the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO, as it did so
base on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in
nature.
8 DUNCANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 191894 15 July 2015
QUICK REFERENCE:
Danilo Duncano was a Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He was
charged with failure to declare his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth
(SALN). He also failed to disclose his involvement in business interests which
according to the Office of the Special Prosecutor was prejudicial to the public. The
case against Duncano was heard before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Duncano
contended that his case is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and must be
heard instead by the Regional Trial Courts. He filed a motion to dismiss the case
before the Sandiganbayan but was denied. The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Sandiganbayan and ordered the case dismissed because Duncano did not fall
under the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided under R.A. 8249 which
provided that only executive officials with the position Regional Director and above
and a Salary Grade of 27 and higher are under Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction. The Court
reversed the Sandiganbayan decision because Duncano, while being a Regional
Director, only had a Salary Grade of 26.
FACTS:
• Danilo Duncano was a Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26.
• On March 24, 2009 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) charged
him with a criminal case for violation of Republic Act 6713, particularly
that he failed to comply with his obligation to accomplish and submit under
oath his statement of assets liabilities and net worth (SALN). He also failed
to disclose his interests in Documail Corporation to the prejudice of the
public interest.
• Duncano prayed that the case against him be dismissed arguing that his case
does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan i.e. that his
position of Regional Director with Salary Grade 26 does not fall within the
scope of the law.
• The OSP contended that under the law, being a Regional Director,
Duncano was under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of
Salary Grade.
ISSUE/S:
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• Whether or not the case against Danilo Duncano fell under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan
RATIO:
• No the case did not fall under Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction. The Court ruled
that the phrase “otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher” qualifies
“regional director and higher.” This means that in order to be subjected to
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction, the executive official must be a regional
director or higher AND have a salary grade of 27 or higher.
• The distinction gives life to the legislative intent. The Sandiganbayan is
allowed to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases of the so-called
“big fish” in government rather than those accused of “petty crimes” or the
“small fry” which helps the court decongest its dockets.
• However, those with Salary Grade below 27 may still be subject to
Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction if they fall under the enumeration of R.A. 8249,
Sec. 4(1) a to g.
9 ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601 19 January 1999
QUICK REFERENCE:
It is the submission of respondents that the Decision in this case having become final
and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority. The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final
judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the final decision.
The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend
the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter a decision.
FACTS:
• The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray.
• The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the Court no
longer has the authority to grant the TRO because:
1. That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment
that is already final and executory;
2. That it is encroaching on the powers specifically vested by the Supreme
Court to the executive department in granting the TRO;
3. That the purpose sought to be achieved by the TRO is nil due to certain
supervening events that transpired.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact
that the finality of judgment has already been rendered.
RATIO:
No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and
executory judgment having been rendered already.
1. The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it granted the TRO. In its decision, it
categorically answered the contention of the plaintiff in such that it is not changing
its judgment. The Court is merely suspending its execution temporarily.
• It was emphasized that the Court, in rendering the judgment lost its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same, but it retained its power to
execute and enforce it. It was further stated that the power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
• The 1987 Constitution, according to the Court, strengthened and
broadened the power of the Court in matters like these. It gave the Court
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, i.e. the right to life.
• On a final note regarding the first contention of the respondent, the DOJ
acknowledged this Court’s jurisdiction when it filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the Warrant of
Execution containing the date of Echegaray’s execution to the public. The
jurisdiction of the Court, it emphasizes, does not depend on the
convenience of the litigants.
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2. The respondent’s contention that the issuance of the TRO encroaches on the
power of the executive is also rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution
cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of the Court to Control the enforcement
of their decision after their finality. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power
of reprieve, although it has the same effect.
• It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative, and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict does not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
3. The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale behind the issuance of the TRO.
The Court had to decide on the petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to the execution of Echegaray. They had been
placed in a very difficult position because it was such a short period to ascertain the
validity and substance of the allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion.
• They also had no way of checking and verifying with Congress because it
was in recess at that time. The Court took an extremely cautious stance by
temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner because of fear that
any error of the Court in not stopping the execution will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard.
• At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It crystallized the
issue on whether the Congress is disposed to review capital punishment or
not. Supervening events like the (1) pronouncement of then President
Estrada that it will veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the resolution
of the Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the law; and (3) that
current actions undertaken by Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile.
10 OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V. CA
G.R. No. 114323 23 July 1998
QUICK REFERENCE:
The case is about the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarded in favor of
petitioner; a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the government of India
against private respondent, a corporation organized and existing under Philippine
Laws. The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from
the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the
petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several
demands. The appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court
could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The issue in this case is whether or
not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. The constitutional mandate that
no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity
of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
FACTS:
• This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered
by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against
the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED.
• The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
• The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from
the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement
to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite
petitioner’s several demands.
• The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring
its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract, which
stipulates that the venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
• The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in
favor of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award.
• To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition
before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the
decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India.
• This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the
private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees.
• Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and
several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private
respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as
owing to the petitioner.
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• The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint.
• RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The
petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
• In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.
• The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.
RATIO:
• The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum
decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
• Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
• If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees,
then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign
court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
• WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch
30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED.
11 DE CASTRO V. JBC G.R. No. 191002 17 March 2010
QUICK REFERENCE:
This case is about the Motion for Reconsideration on the decision that directs the
Judicial and Bar Council (“JBC”) to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidate to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Reynato Puno.
The movants of the cases states that the constitutional provision on midnight
appointments also intended a ban on the members of the judiciary. The issue is
whether or not the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII. The
Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the
dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only
Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
FACTS:
• This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the
Court.
• The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the
incumbent President.
• Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15
and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments
to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the
principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the
ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article
VII?
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RATIO:
• The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII.
• The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from
the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec.
15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision
on nepotism.
• Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court.
• The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies
in the Supreme Court
THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
12 FABIAN V. DESIERTO G.R. No. 129742 16 September 1998
QUICK REFERENCE:
In the interim between the presidencies of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices
for the District of Columbia under the Judiciary Act of 1801. However, when
Thomas Jefferson took office, he instructed Levi Lincoln not to deliver the remaining
commissions. Among those commissions not delivered was that of petitioner
Marbury. Petitioner Marbury filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme
Court of the United States, asking that his appointment as a justice of the peace be
completed. The Court denied Marbury’s petition, holding that the Supreme Court
does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
FACTS:
• Sometime during the Presidential Election of 1800 Thomas Jefferson won
as the third president of the United States defeating then incumbent
president John Adams. However Jefferson would not assume office until
about a month after he was proclaimed winner. On his last day in office,
President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Judiciary
Act of 1801 (Organic Act), which modified the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
act established ten new district courts, expanded the number of circuit
courts. It essentially gave the President at that time the authority to appoint
Federal Judges and Justices of the Peace. The Organic Act was an attempt
by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas
Jefferson took office as President. One of those appointed was William
Marbury.
• In order to complete such appointments, such were to be signed by
approved by the Senate and delivered to those appointed. Although all
these appointment were approved it was impossible to complete all such
deliveries before the end of Adams' term. Given such as Thomas Jefferson
took office he instructed Levi Lincoln not to deliver the remaining
commissions. One of those whose commissions were not delivered was for
the petitioner Marbury.
• Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, defendant
James Madison, to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had
granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
“…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority
of the United States.”
• Petitioner Marbury, seeing that his appointment was not completed, filed a
petition in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not petitioner Marbury has a right to the commission.
• If so, does the law provide Marbury with a legal remedy.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore
void.
• Whether or not Congress can expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the
Constitution.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus.
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RATIO:
• Marbury has a right to the commission.
• The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s
constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has
been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the
power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury
became effective when signed by President Adams.
• Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection.
• Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon
the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured
has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the
commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of
State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the
completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has
a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a
remedy.
• The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void.
• It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound
and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must
decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution,
and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they
both apply.
• Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
• The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to
leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power
between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body,
this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress
remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the
distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without
substance.
• The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.
• To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.
• It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet
to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter
of original jurisdiction.
• The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one
Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to
time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases
arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form,
may be exercised over the present case, because the right claimed is given
by a law of the United States.
• In the distribution of this power, it is declared that “The Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In
all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”
• It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original grant of jurisdiction to
the Supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause assigning original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative or restrictive words,
the power remains to the Legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that
Court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been
recited, provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United
States.
• If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to
apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
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according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to
have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power and the
tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section
is mere surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if such is to be the
construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be
original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it
shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution,
is form without substance
• It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised
in a variety of forms, and that, if it be the will of the Legislature that a
mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This
is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
• It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet
to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not
to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in
such a case as this to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
• RULING: The rule must be discharged. (Application for writ of
mandamus of Marbury is denied.)
• NOTE: This case is very important in American Common Law because
this is the case established, for the first time, the definition and scope of the
power or judicial review. In the Philippine Legal System, this case also bears
importance, because of the fact that the Philippine Legal System shares a
lot of the same principles with the American Common Law.
13 FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 129742 16 September 1998
QUICK REFERENCE:
A resolution was adopted in the House of Representatives that directed the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (“JDF”). The issue in this case is whether the resolution
thereof is a political question. The Supreme Court state that there are two species of
political questions: (1) truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions. Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions, which are not truly political in nature. From the record of the proceedings
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine.
FACTS:
• On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed
the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
• On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes."
• The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee.
• The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
• To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
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• This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a
political crisis.
RULING:
• From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine.
• Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
• From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions."
• Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
can review questions, which are not truly political in nature.
14 TAÑADA V. CUENCO G.R. No. L-10520 28 February 1957
QUICK REFERENCE:
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not
being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being
raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET
are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
The SC can take cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable
question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
FACTS:
• On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
elected respondents Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP
member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled
with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec. 11, Art.
6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party (CP) Senator Tañada.
Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the
respondents as staff members of Cuenco and Delgado. Petitioner alleges
that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules
for the Senate, violates the Constitution since 3 seats on the ET are reserved
for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives.
Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4
of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right as a CP
member of the ET, but also of respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial
body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondents, to be made permanent after a
judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents contend that the
Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET members, since
it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. They contend that the present
action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the Courts have jurisdiction over the matter.
• Whether or not the issue is a political question or a justiciable one.
RATIO:
• This is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the
latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their
duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that
the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
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• Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive
power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on
judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:
• "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be
exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been
validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers
of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act
is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to
ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are
merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done
or attented by either an executive official or the legislative."
• Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively
in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality
of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the
Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said
Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be
determined in the proper actions.
• In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot
properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress
or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass
upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded
without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction.
• As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the
question whether the issue before us is political or not.
• In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,
in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
• Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case.
Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in
the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
• Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is
for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute
prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may
determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to
deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S.,
439; emphasis supplied.).
• It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also,
the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.
15 FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL V. COLON HERITAGE REALTY
G.R. No. 129742 16 September 1998
QUICK REFERENCE:
• Republic Act 9167 aims to collect amusement taxes from class A and B
movies.
• Section 13 and 14 of the Act were assailed because the taxes would not go
to the benefit of the Local Government Unit.
• The Regional Trial Court assailed the Act/Law as unconstitutional
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• The issue was that since only sections 13 and 14 were assailed, should the
entire law be struck down as unconstitutional.
• The Supreme Court held that no because Republic Act 9167 has a
separability clause which basically means that the other provisions of the
law can still stand even if Section 13 and 14 were to be invalidated.
FACTS:
• Congress passed Republic Act 9167 establishing the Film Development
Council
• The purpose of this law was to collect amusement taxes from class A and
B movies.
• All other cities in the Philippines were conforming to this law except those
cinemas in Cebu City.
• Sections 13 and 14 were assailed by the cinema proprietors because the
amusement taxes would not proceed to the benefits of the Local
Government Units (“LGU”)
• The law was struck down by the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the entire Republic Act 9167 (RA 9167) should be struck
down as unconstitutional.
RATIO:
• No. The Supreme Court held that RA 9167 has separability clause which
section 23. With this clause, even if sections 13 and 14 would be invalidated,
the other remaining provisions of the law can still stand.
16 OCAMPO V. ENRIUEZ G.R. No. 225973 8 November 2016
FACTS:
Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo Visaya
directing the latter to undertake preparations to have the remains of the late former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos be transported from Ilocos Norte in order to be
interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), in accordance with the verbal order
of President Rodrigo Duterte to implement his election campaign promise
In turn, AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez issued the directives to the Philippine Army
(PA) Commanding General to provide the service honors, specifically to provide all
necessary military honors accorded for a President.
Petitioners, representing various groups and interests (mostly on human rights), filed
the present petitions with the Supreme Court, to challenge the above directives.
ISSUES:
Procedural
(A) WON President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred
at the LNMB poses a
justiciable controversy.
(B) WON petitioners have locus standi to file the instant
petitions.
(C) WON petitioners violated the doctrine administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.
Substantive
(A) WON the President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance
with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
(B) WON the President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is tainted with
arbitrariness, malice, ill will or
personal bias
(C) WON historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos
regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment
at the LNMB.
HELD:
I. Procedural Issues
A. Justiciable controversy
RATIO:
Requisites for exercise of judicial review
1. It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following
requisites for judicial inquiry are present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
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raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
2. In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential,
renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Requirement of a justiciable controversy
3. An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.
4. Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite of "ripeness,"
which means that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.
5. Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. As they are concerned with
questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.
6. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section
1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy
7. President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of
his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292 ) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that
it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse
in the exercise of such discretion, President Duterte's decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
B. Locus standi
Locus standi requirement
8. Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus
standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.
Petitioners have no legal standing
9. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators,
members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal
injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
(a) No standing as taxpayers
10. Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom
behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
(b) No standing as members of the Bar
11. Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, are required to allege any direct
or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an institution, or
its members may suffer as a consequence of the act complained of. Suffice it to state
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that the averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and
that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such that
their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with
requisite legal standing.
(c) No standing as concerned citizens
12. As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. In cases involving such issues, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence.
13. At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established
as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no
profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life
considering that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30)
years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to
demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.
(d) No standing as human rights victims
14. As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of
petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard of their state
recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is founded on the wrong premise that
the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by law to perpetuate the memory of
all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be
discussed further, reveals its nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and
national shrine, under the administration of the APP.
(e) No standing as legislators
15. Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator De Lima,
and Congressman Lagman, et al. come before the Court as legislators suing to defend
the Constitution and to protect appropriated public funds from being used
unlawfully. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or
the institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress
cannot be upheld. They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained
of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive of
the APP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach
on their prerogative as legislators.
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
16. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the
means of administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be
sought.
17. For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and dispose of the case. While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions.
18. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The
Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order.
Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners
would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the
matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense (DND).
D. Hierarchy of Courts
Petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
19. While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are
lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of
law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for
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certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
II. Substantive Issues
A. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance
with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
The principles and state policies embodied in the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action
in the courts
20. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed
because it has the effect of condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law,
thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-
dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." There is no merit to the
contention. While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people,
its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period.
21. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and
state policies." They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. The
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II are not "self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation." (see Tanada v. Angara, and Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato)
(a) No violation of the Constitution
22. Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is
not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be passed by the
Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As a matter
of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees”), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of
1989”), R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and
Republic Act No. 9485 (“Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007”). To complement these statutes,
the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions
relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees.
23. Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty
of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and
respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to
Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
24. The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President
to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book
III of the Administrative Code of 1987, is likewise not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power
to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is
self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately
related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation,
not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of law and,
corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them. Consistent with President Duterte's mandate
under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does
not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights
laws cited by petitioners.
(b) No violation of R.A. No. 289
25. R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial
place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes
and patriots. In 1953, President Quirino, by virtue of Proclamation No. 431, reserved
a site in Quezon City for the construction of the National Pantheon. In 1954,
President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos. 422
and 431, and reserving the parcels of land embraced therein for national park
purposes to be known as Quezon Memorial Park.
26. Petitioners that public respondents are not members of the Board on National
Pantheon, which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the
deceased Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
27. Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that
the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. The LNMB is distinct
and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land
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subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on
revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at
present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for
its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative
of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery,
the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally distinguished private cemeteries
already serve the noble purpose but without cost to the limited funds of the
government.
Proposed internment of Marcos in the LNMB does not confer upon him the
status of a "hero"
28. Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners'
allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the
"decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting
therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation
of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations.
29. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not
equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself
does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is
actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero"
nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly,
petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without
showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the
remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been
finalized by public respondents.
(c) No violation of R.A. No. 10368
30. In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of Human Rights Violations
Victims (HRVVs), which is part of the right to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368
entitles them to monetary and non-monetary reparation. R.A. No. 10368 also
requires the recognition of the violations committed against the HRVVs, regardless
of whether they opt to seek reparation or not.
31. The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of
R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at
the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually
contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily
inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a
"reparation" for the HRVVs, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should
remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is
irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying
material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
32. Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No
10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The
assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject
memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with
the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More
importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368
and other domestic laws are not curtailed.
33. It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether
express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations
G 161-375. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute
must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be
made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character.
(d) No violation of International Human Rights Laws
34. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of
the HRVVs to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). We do not think so.
35. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity,
call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes,
and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the
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country's constitutional processes, that are necessary to give effect to human rights
embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.
36. The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When
the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power
Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the
government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's
human rights obligations.
37. Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly
revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. The preservation and popularization of
our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and
collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
B. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias
National shrines
38. As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or
historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history
or association as declared by the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP). As sites of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and
eminent leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold and keep
the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.
39. P.D. No. 105 strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the
desecration of national shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity through
digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and committing
unbecoming acts within their premises.
40. The NHCP manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments,
historical sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value.
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials
and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the
administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) of the Department of National Defense (DND).
The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani is not a national shrine covered under PD 105,
but a national military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO
41. In 1954, President Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which ordered "the remains
of the war dead interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery and at other places in the
Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at
Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province". He later issued Proclamation No. 86, which
changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB) to symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers have died" and to "truly
express the nations esteem and reverence for her war dead.” Marcos then issued
Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the
administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.
42. P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208
predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines
enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the
catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is
erroneous because:
(a) Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105. (b) Following the canon of
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the LNMB is not a site "of the birth,
exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation."
(c) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the
jurisdiction of the PVAO. The reasons being that "the administration, maintenance
and development of national shrines consisting of military memorials or battle
monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they are removed from the
[DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter s greater capabilities and
resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely related and
relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."
The interment of Marcos does not violate the physical, historical, and cultural
integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine
43. Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal
remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the
presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will
be buried therein. The "nation’s esteem and reverence for her war dead," as originally
contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands
unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not
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constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the
LNMB as a national military shrine.
44. Reference should be made to Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington), which is
identical to the LNMB in terms of its prominence in the U.S. As one of the U.S.
Army national military cemeteries, the Arlington is under the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Army. Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are
established as national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have served in the
U.S. Armed Forces.
Presidential power of control (incumbent President Duterte not bound by
political agreements entered into by his predecessors)
45. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under
the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of
the President.
46. The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is
a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have
the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent
President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by
his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President
and awarded veteran satisfies the public use requirement
47. Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve
for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain
and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no
law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment
of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-
in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran,
and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his
status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds
to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for
valuable public services rendered.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty has not been
overcome
48. Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at
the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over
petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a
presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob
(debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-
evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their
claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since
We are not a trier of facts.
AFP Regulation G 161-375 remains authoritative in determining who are
entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB
49. A review of the regulations issued by the APP Chief of Staff as to who may and
may not be interred at the LNMB underscores the nature and purpose of the LNMB
as an active military cemetery/grave site.
50. Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB:
(a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c)
Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers
of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active
Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g)
Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
(h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
(i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and (j) Former Presidents, Secretaries
of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
51. The following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
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(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude.
52. In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP
Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are
entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were
empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the
rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.
Doctrine of qualified political agency (Alter ego principle)
53. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained for having been
issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of
National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.
54. Under alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. (see Jason vs. Torres)
55. It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has
the force and effect of law and, until set aside, is binding upon executive and
administrative agencies, including the President as the chief executor of laws.
C. Entitlement of Marcos to be buried in the LNMB
Qualification of Marcos under AFP Regulation G 161-375 (notwithstanding
the corruption tainting his presidential legacy, he is qualified to be buried in
the LNMB based on his other achievements)
56. AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear
and unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires
for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for
qualification for burial at the LNMB.
57. It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to
argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a
symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military
memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery
and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of
the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to
confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those
interred therein should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege of internment at
the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible
includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related
activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their significant
contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen,
national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense).
In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief
of Staff were added to the list.
58. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and
should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB
is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had
rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
59. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard
Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right
to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received.
In this sense, Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person.
While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who
erred like us.
Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications under AFP Regulations G 161-
375
60. Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 75. He was neither convicted by
final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
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separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
61. It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his
gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious military
records, as found by foreign and local courts as well as administrative agencies.
Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was
not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less
than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law and that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
62. To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital
crime (i.e., a crime which a sentence of imprisonment for life or death penalty may
be imposed) but who has not been convicted by reason of not being available for
trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution, may be ineligible for interment,
inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military cemetery. Nevertheless,
such ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in§ 553.21.
63. The various cases cited by petitioners, which were decided with finality by courts
here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature;
hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.
Marcos' ouster from the presidency via people power revolution is not
tantamount to his dishonorable discharge from the military service
64. Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO
expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended.
65. With respect to the phrase "[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service, " the same should be viewed in light
of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G 161-375 to the term "active service"
which is "[s]ervice rendered by a military person as a Commissioned Officer, enlisted man/woman,
probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and service rendered
by him/her as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date of
his/her separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for which military
and/or civilian service he/she shall have received pay from the Philippine Government, and/or such
others as may be hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638, as amended)." To my
mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a military person
in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment,
probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement
from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP
is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.
66. Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency
during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion
or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the Commander-
in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who
may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed
"dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP
Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is
an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the
ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.
67. It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the
people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people
should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious
consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the
Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people.
Equal protection clause is not violated
68. It is argued that to limit the application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 only to soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents,
soldiers have an additional cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results
(because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged would be disqualified for acts
that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos). Also, the AFP regulations
would place Marcos in the same class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact
he is a class of his own, sui generis. The other Presidents were never removed by
People Power Revolution and were never subject of laws declaring them to have
committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended burial would be an act of
similarly treating persons who are differently situated.
69. The equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right
to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact
would only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a
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favorable recommendation from the Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such
inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.
70. Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal
protection clause are not met. In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction
between a military personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable
discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military. There
is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents
buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were
not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification
between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of
Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for
military memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or
position held by the persons interred therein.
17 GMA V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 220598 21 July 2016
FACTS:
In July 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), together with several officers and the directors of
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman Reynaldo Villar, and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud
Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information alleged that the accused, taking advantage of their public positions,
conspired to accumulate Php 365,997,915 in ill-gotten wealth by means of,
principally, “diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO
to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any
time with minimal restrictions, and converting [or] transferring the proceeds drawn
from said fund, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious
expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit”.
The Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia (PCSO Chairman) ,
Morato and Roquero (PCSO Directors) upon finding that the evidence of guilt
against them was not strong. In the case of GMA and Aguas (PCSO Budget and
Accounts Officer), the Sandiganbayan denied their petitions for bail on the ground
that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
During trial, the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against all
the accused. As Chairman of the PCSO Audit Committee, she found that the former
management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the
operating fund, and maintaining them in only one main account in violation of the
PCSO Charter (RA 1169). The Audit Committee also found out that there was
excessive disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). It appears
that Uriarte (PCSO General Manager) would ask for additional CIF, by letter and
President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. A
summary of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010 showed a total of
P365,997,915.
In 2008, the CIF disbursement totalled P86,555,060 when the CIF budget for that
year was only P28 million. In 2009, the CIF disbursement was Pl39,420,875 but the
CIF budget was only P60 million. In 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010,
was P141,021,980 but the budget was only P60 million. For each year, there were no
savings for PCSO because they were on deficit. The President (GMA) approved the
release of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the
same in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project
proposals and specifications accompanying the request for additional CIF.
Also, for one to get a cash advance on the CIF, one must state what the project is.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash advance
from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's office. There is no particular project
indicated for the cash advance. Also, the requirement that prior advances be
liquidated first for subsequent advances to be given was not followed.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and
Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced P13.3 million. The rest
was made by Uriarte. All of these cash advances were made in excess of the
appropriation and were never liquidated.
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming
from different law enforcement agencies to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the
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effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any intelligence
operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and
Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused who were
members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any
PCSO funds to themselves.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia,
holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to
commit plunder. Specifically, as to GMA's participation, the Sandiganbayan stated
that GMA's "OK" notation and signature on Uriarte’s letter-requests signified
unqualified approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds.
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration of GMA, the Sandiganbayan declared
that although [GMA] did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing
CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their
releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury.
She is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the
CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari filed by GMA. GMA pleads that the denial
of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic Act No.
7080, the law on plunder.
HELD:
I. Procedural Issues
Petition for Certiorari ordinarily not a proper remedy to challenge the denial
of demurrer to evidence
1. The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail the denial of
her demurrer to evidence, which is an interlocutory order, because of the availability
of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was
an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper
recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the
errors to be reviewed.
SC can take cognizance of the certiorari petition if the denial of the demurrer
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
2. The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave
abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan as the trial court
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty
verdict.
II. Substantive Issues
Conspiracy and how it is proved
3. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy
is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
4. As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and
prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is found in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal
to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or
insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code.
When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement
to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal
design must be alleged and competently shown.
5. The community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the
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crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence
in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
6. In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express
conspiracy, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators
to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been
expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest.
Conspiracy as a means to commit a crime (wheel conspiracy vs. chain
conspiracy)
7. In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating
conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain
conspiracy.
8. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The
spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event
that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy.
However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the
other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
(a) An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved
was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former
President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub
while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the
spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
(b) On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States illustrates a
wheel conspiracy where multiple conspiracies were established instead of one single
conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent individuals to
obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the
defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common
purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a
single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although
all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure,
no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies
involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy.
9. The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals linked together in
a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective.
(a) Illustrative of chain conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno. There,
88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics.
This case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in
turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to
addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired
was a single chain conspiracy [since, as] reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at
one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop
with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their
sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part with which he was
immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This means,
therefore, that "every member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal
transaction carried out by other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in
Louisiana."
10. Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A
co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither
does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the
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execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is
individual and independent.
To be considered a co-conspirator, the accused must perform an overt act in
pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy
11. To be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to
have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy,
for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator,
and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this
connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:
12. An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt
act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that
so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused
is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of
the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (see People v. Lizada)
The Prosecution did not prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA,
Aguas and Uriarte
13. The Sandiganbayan declared that GMA is “rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who
accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.” The Sandignabayan's conclusion that GMA had been the
mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the
information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby
acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
14. In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of GMA's handwritten unqualified
"OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common
legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to
People v. Lizada, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime only when it
evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be
an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
15. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part of any design
to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire illgotten wealth. Absent
the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA' s
approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any means
irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution did not properly allege the of conspiracy to commit plunder
(information must identify the main plundered vis-a-vis the co-conspirators)
16. A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show
was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis
of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is
notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
17. The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as
the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly
states that plunder is committed “by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof.” Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who
may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel
conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the
main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly
alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
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18. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the
amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made.
19. Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating
and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be
improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the
main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten
wealth, which is far below the threshold value (P50 Million) of ill-gotten wealth
required for plunder.
20. We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan to the effect that
an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy
either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc.; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know
what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are
not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy,
however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted
under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of
the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such
identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable
for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be
set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense
because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constituted the offense charged.
Uriarte' s requests for additional CIF funds complied with LOI No. 1282
21. An examination of Uriarte' s several requests, which were approved by GMA,
indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded,
furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be
spent; (b) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the
expenditure; and (c) the particular aims to be accomplished.
22. A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to
be used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus
cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being
compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail
any qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should
not make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were
compliant with LOI No. 1282.
Approval and sourcing of additional CIF funds were not illegally done
23. COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be
approved only when there was available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution
suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests
because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed
out and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds
of the PCSO were co-mingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently,
although only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from
which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-
mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short,
there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
24. It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's comingling of funds,
did not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional
CIFs from one account was far from illegal.
Doctrine of command responsibility not applicable in this case
25. The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility
to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The
reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally
unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in
Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human
rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA's actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights
issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the
absence of any conspiracy between them.
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Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were
insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit
plunder
26. The Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied conspiracy
when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain legal
requirements, and issued certain certifications to the effect that the budgetary
allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the
expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
been liquidated or accounted for.
27. We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the
disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any
conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he
could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to
plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Plunder, elements
28. To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege
and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds
or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
29. The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth valued at not less than PS0,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas
30. As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50 Million, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even
the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA
or Aguas, or Uriarte.
31. After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any
knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50 Million, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and
dismissed the criminal action against them.
The phrase 'raids on the public treasury' requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit
32. The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No.
7080:
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds
or raids on the public treasury;
33. To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to
look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction
noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase
that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made
by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or
with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified
or restricted by the latter.
34. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit;
misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably,
or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds,
or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms
together is that the public officer used the property taken.
35. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other
terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury
similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis,
“raids on the public treasury” requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for
his personal benefit.
36. The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a
requirement for plunder. In support of the same, the Sandiganbayan quoted the
exchange between Senator Enrile and Senator Tanada in the Congressional
deliberations. The exchange reveal, however, that what was removed from the
coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person
who was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, yet who personally benefited
from the plunderers' action. The requirement of personal benefit on the part of the
main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
37. Not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence,
the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond
reasonable doubt.
JUDGES
18 KILOSBAYAN V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 177721 3 July 2007
QUICK REFERENCE:
Executive Secretary Ermita, in representation of the Office of the President
appointed respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice in order to fill up the
vacancy due to the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. However,
petitioners contested said appointment by claiming that respondent Ong is a Chinese
citizen, therefore ineligible for the position. Furthermore, petitioners contended that
although 11 years after respondent’s birth his father was granted Filipino citizenship
through naturalization, it would not make the respondent a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Respondent Ong however claimed that he indeed was a natural born citizen
by presenting a certification from the Bureau of Immigration as well as the
Department of Justice as proof. According to the facts, respondent is a naturalized
Filipino citizen. He must prove his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Without proving such, he cannot accept the appointment under the
law. Thus, he can actually be prevented from the appointment by injunction.
FACTS:
• Respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the
President, appointed respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
• However the appointment was recalled by Malacanang in view of the
question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
• Petitioners contend that the appointment is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
• Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship.
• The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent
Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was
also Chinese.
• Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Sction 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that No person
shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines natural-born
citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship.
• Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
• For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen
and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
declaring him to be such.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
RATIO:
• No. Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court
stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos,
respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still
appears in the records of this Court.
• Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.
Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he
can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
19 IN RE: ALLEGATIONS OF MR. MACASAET
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
QUICK REFERENCE:
Amado Macasaet alleged that a certain Justice of the Supreme Court accepted bribe
money in consideration of a criminal case of which she was the ponente. Macasaet
alleged that through several exchanges with his source, he found out that 10M pesos
was sent to the office of Justice Ynares-Santiago on separate occasions. Said money
was claimed by a secretary of the Justice. Justice Ynares-Santiago belied the claims
and the Supreme Court en banc called forth Macasaet to explain his allegations. A
committee composed of Retired Justices found that Macasaet’s allegations were
unbelievable. Macasaet alleges that he was protected by his right to freedom of
speech, particularly freedom of the press. The Court ruled that the Independence of
the Judiciary must be protected, especially from baseless claims as those propounded
by Macasaet. The freedom of speech is not absolute and must work in consonance
with other imperatives of Democracy such as Judicial Independence.
FACTS:
• Amado Macasaet in his Business Circuit column with the newspaper Malaya,
published a series of articles (4 in total) regarding alleged acceptance of
bribe money by a Lady Justice.
• The first of the articles did not specify the branch of the Judiciary that the
certain Lady Justice was working for. However, the succeeding two articles
disclosed that the Justice involved was a member of the Supreme Court.
• The publications alleged that the Lady Justice, later disclosed as being
Justice Ynares-Santiago, accepted the bribe amounting to a total of P10
Million to dismiss a graft case filed against Chinese-Filipino businessman,
Henry Go.
• The Assistant Court Administrator Midas Marquez put the subject of the
allegations in the High Court’s Agenda. On Sept. 25, 2007, the Court en banc
called forth Mr. Macasaet to explain his allegations under pain of indirect
contempt
• In his explanation, Macasaet was shown to be inconsistent with the details
of his accusations. This was confirmed by a committee composed of
Retired Justices which recommended, after finding the accusations to be
unbelievable, that Macasaet be held in contempt of court.
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• Macasaet argues that his right to freedom of the press is a preferred liberty
and is equal if not superior to judicial independence.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the allegations of Mr. Macasaet were protected under the
Constitutional right of free speech, from which the freedom of the press
emanates from.
RATIO:
• The Court found Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt.
• It has been consistently held that while freedom of speech, of expression
and of the press are core civil liberties of citizens in a democracy, such
freedoms are not absolute.
• In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales, it was held that while the right of freedom
of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties,
it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, “The
limitation on one’s right to extend one’s fist is when it hits the nose of
another.”
• In this case, the freedom of the press being asserted by Macasaet has had
an adverse effect upon the public perception of the Supreme Court. His
allegations proposed that the High Court can be bought. This heavily
degrades the Judiciary, the Supreme Court nonetheless as the bulwark of
democracy.
• The Independence of the Judiciary is integral to the public’s faith in the
justice system. Hence, it must be protected especially from baseless and
unbelievable claims such as those espoused by Macasaet.
20 OCA V. JUDGE FLORO A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
QUICK REFERENCE:
• Judge Floro was reconsidered to be a judge.
• After becoming one, he committed acts which were in violation of the
Canon of Judicial Conduct.
• A complaint was filed assailing his capability of being a judge.
• The issue was whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be judge.
• The Supreme Court held that no he is not fit to be one because he has
violated Canon Rules and the Canon of Judicial Conduct.
• Moreover, he claims to be a psychic and sees things which prove that he is
mentally and psychologically stable to be a judge.
FACTS:
• Judge Floro was previously considered unfit to be a judge because of his
psychological condition and state of mind.
• Eventually, he became a judge
• Judge Floro faced 13 charges calling for his disbarment and removal from
his office.
• Some of these charges included alleged partiality in criminal cases which is
against the Canon Rule and Canons of Judicial Conduct
• He allegedly violated other Canons Rules of the Canons of Judicial Conduct
• He also claimed that he has psychic powers.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be judge
RATIO:
• No. The Supreme Court held that Judge Floro has a medical condition that
rendered him unable to properly serve as a judge with integrity.
• A judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible
representative of the law. His claims of his psychic powers and seeing things
is strong evidence that he is mentally and psychologically incapable of being
a judge.
21 PEOPLE V. CA G.R. No. 118882 26 September 1996
QUICK REFERENCE:
This is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. Acting on the said petition, the Court resolved to require
respondents all of whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to comment
thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking further action in the said Criminal
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Cases. It appearing that private respondents failed to file their respective comments
within the period, respectively, the Court resolved to require said private respondents
to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to
file the required comments, both within ten (10) days from notice. Thus, so as not
to unduly delay the disposition of these Criminal cases, we now resolve to dispense
with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding
is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, cannot be considered to adequately
possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judge Espina's previous decision
in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality. The Honorable Pedro Espina, is
hereby declared disqualified. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-
raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
FACTS:
• Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which seeks to:
o annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.",
insofar as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge
Pedro S. Espina of
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal
Cases entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al."
and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and;
o enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in
the aforesaid criminal cases.
• Acting on the said petition, the Court resolved to require respondents all of
whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to comment thereon
within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking further action in the
aformentioned Criminal Cases.
• It appearing that private respondents failed to file their respective
comments within the period.
• Respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to require said private
respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt with
for such failure, and to file the required comments, both within ten (10)
days from notice.
• As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the
Tacloban City Jail), copies of the resolution requiring them to file comment
were returned unserved with the postmaster's notation "unknown in said
address". The Court, on October 11, 1995 directed the Solicitor General to
serve the same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such service,
both within ten (10) days from notice.
• One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every
litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections
• This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not a previous decision of the judge can serve as a sufficient
and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality
in handling criminal cases.
RATIO:
• Yes. One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. The
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. Herein, Judge
Pedro Espina cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision
in.
• Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient
and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality
in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for
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Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.
22 IN RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
QUICK REFERENCE:
The case surrounds the "pork barrel scam" involving Mrs. Janet Napoles (Napoles)
which involved money that was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) and allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate,
the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country. Prior to PDAF
scandal, however, Napoles had been involved in another case (Kevlar Case) wherein
it was proven by the testimony of her cousin Benhur Luy (Benhur) that she had used
Justice Gregory Ong (Respondent) as a connect in order to have Napoles acquitted
from said case as the case was held before the Sandiganbayan and Respondent was a
Justice of said court. Prior to her acquittal in the Kevlar case, Respondent was spotted
and such was evidenced by a photograph posing together with Senator Jinggoy
Estrada who was the one who introduced the two. It was proven that Napoles had
indeed utilized Respondent in order to get acquitted from the Kevlar case and
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions
was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
FACTS:
• Benhur testified against Napoles regarding the Kevlar case.
• He essentially was a whistleblower of Napoles and since he worked closely
with her he spilled to the Blue Ribbon Committee how Napoles was
acquitted in the prior Kevlar case
• Benhur stated that Jinggoy Estrada introduced Napoles and Respondent in
a social gathering pending the Kevlar case which was evidenced by a
photograph of the 3 of them together.
• Ledgers of Napoles also evidenced bribe expenditures which had about
P100 million to the name of Respondent.
• Respondent vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him:
• asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency
of the Kevlar case;
• Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,
respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members
of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina
J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or
influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
• On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case,
respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his
reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have
received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and
sister-in-law were convicted;
• Ong admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012,
after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010
• He further explained the reason for having met with Napoles which
allegedly was to have access to the robe of the Holy Black Nazerene in
order to heal him of his prostate cancer.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Respondent was guilty of violating the doctrine of judicial
propriety.
RATIO:
• (Respondent found GUILTY)
• Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two
occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
• SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
• A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and
that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
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accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
• Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.
• They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground
for reproach. Respondent’s acts have been less than circumspect. He
should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and
endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression
of indecorum.
23 MANAOG V. RUBIO A.M. No. P-08-2521 13 February 2009
FACTS:
On October 21, 2005, Christopher D. Manaoag went to the Office of the Clerk of
Court tosecure information on ownership of certain parcels of land, which had been
transferred to othersallegedly through fraud. He was inquiring at the information
counter in the lobby of the Hall of Justice, when respondent Rubio approached him
and said, "Digdi" (It’s here) after the former saw the documents he had brought with
him. The complainant claims the respondent told him that theperson whose
signature appeared on the said documents was already dead, and whatever recordsthe
complainant was looking for were already gone. A discussion followed, culminating
in a verbaltussle between them. On October 26, 2005, he returned to the Hall of
Justice with his brother to verify the identity of the other employee (respondent
Surtida) who had joined respondent Rubio in verbally abusing him. The
respondents called them “Beasts” and “Nutcase”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
RATIO:
Yes. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility
whichcourt officials and employees are mandated to perform. They are constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. This is so because the image of
the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of
the men and women who work there. Thus, court employees have been requested
to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in order to preserve the
judiciary’s good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
Respondents Rubio and Surtida should be held liable for conduct unbecoming court
employees. Their acts of provoking the complainant constitute behavior wholly
unexpected from those in the judicial service. They should be reminded that
government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing
justice, civility is never a sign of weakness, and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no place in government service in which
personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.
Sheriff Jose Arnel Rubio is guilty of simple misconduct for which he is suspended
from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay. He is also guilty of
conduct unbecoming a court employee for which he is reprimanded
24 OCAMPO V. ARCAYA-CHUA
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ 23 April 2010
QUICK REFERENCE:
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law by Petitioner Ocampo who alleged that respondent acted
improperly during a special proceeding between Petitioner Ocampo and his wife for
custody of their children. Petitioner alleged that respondent judge acted arbitrarily
and unfairly when she ordered a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of
Ocampo’s wife as well as ordering monthly payments for support in the amount of
P50,000. However, during the investigation, it was recommended by Justice Salazar-
Fernando that the case be dismissed as the allegations lacked substantial evidence
and that judicial officers cannot be held liable for erroneous decisions when rendered
in good faith.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Ocampo charged Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with
harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross
misconduct for her actions during a special proceeding where Ocampo was
the respondent.
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• The said special proceedings was petition by Ocampo’s wife for sole
custody of their minor daughters.
• Ocampo alleged that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua: 1. Denied his motion
to dismiss despite overwhelming evidence justifying such motion; 2.
Scheduling the hearing immediately a day after the summons was served
upon the respondent; 3. Improperly issued a TPO and 4. Ordered payment
for monthly support in the amount of P50,000 without sufficient basis.
• Respondent Judge commented that the suddenness of the schedule of the
hearing was never her intention but rather, the summons were supposed to
be delivered earlier but was unsuccessful because the respondent was not
at his residence during the first delivery of the summons.
• Respondent Judge likewise stated that the issuance of the TPO was
rightfully anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262.
• Furthermore, Ocampo’s wife originally prayed for a monthly support of
P150,000 but the court only awarded the P50,000, as it found that to be a
reasonable amount.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua can be charged with gross
ignorance of the law.
RATIO:
• NO. During the investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that
the Ocampo case should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy,
in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts
are erroneous.
• The Court sustained the recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando
that the case be dismissed in the absence of substantial evidence that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charges brought against her.
25 SANTIAGO III V. ENRIQUEZ
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J 13 February 2009
QUICK REFERENCE:
Complainant Genaro Santiago III filed an administrative complaint against
Respondent Court of Appeals (“CA”) Justice Enriquez, Jr. for gross ignorance of the
law and gross incompetence in rendering an alleged unjust judgement in a previous
case. However, the Court ruled that an administrative complaint is not the proper
remedy when there are other judicial remedies available, unless the challenged
Decision is tainted with fraud or malice. Through the principle of judicial immunity,
judicial officers are protected from being held criminally or civilly liable for an
erroneous decision given in good faith.
FACTS:
• Complainant Santiago filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”) a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original
Certificate of Title No. 56, which the court subsequently granted.
• The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(“OSG”) appealed the decision to the CA.
• The case was raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison of the 13th Division of the
CA, where Respondent Enriquez, Jr. was the chairperson.
• Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her report to which the Respondent
expressed his dissent. In view of his dissent, Respondent requested that
there be a Special Division of five to rule on the matter.
• Subsequently, Respondent’s dissenting opinion became the majority
opinion and the Special Division decided to reverse and set aside the
original decision of the RTC.
• Complainant then filed an administrative complaint against Santiago,
charging respondent with Gross Ignorance of Law/Gross Incompetence.
• Respondent Santiago commented that the complaint was just a tactic to
harass and inhibit him from handling the case. Respondent also contends
that an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to determine
whether a Decision is erroneous or contrary to law.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the complaint has merit.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
“Pls. I dissent with the night court assignment. I have pending legal question before the Office of
RATIO: Court Administrator.”
• NO. The complaint has no merit.
• The filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is unwarranted The pending legal question Judge Yu adverted to had been posed in her letter to the
unless the Decision made by the judge is tainted with fraud, malice or Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez. In her letter, Judge Yu averred that: “the
dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause injustice. police officers cannot apprehend, detain and bring the arrested persons charged with
• In this case, there was no showing of such fraud or malicious intent in the cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure at night without being liable for
Decision of the Special Division of the CA. Arbitrary Detention....”
• The principle of judicial immunity protects judges from being held criminally,
Judge Yu communicated her reservations about the night court by letter directly to
civilly or administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good
Department of Tourism (DOT) Secretary Lim, request for the establishment of the
faith. To rule otherwise would make it impossible for the judiciary to
night courts was supported neither by statistical data nor by any study. After
function. In order for the proper administration of justice, the judicial
rendering a lengthy discourse on the flaws of establishing night courts, she ended her
officer or judge should be free to exercise his function without fear of
letter with a request for additional compensation and security in case she would
personal consequences, as long as he does so in good faith and without
undertake night court duties.
fraud, malice or ill-intent to cause injustice.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) responded in a letter to Judge Yu
responding to the concerns raised in her letter. However, the continued refusal by
26 OCA V. JUDGE YU
Judge Yu to render night court service prompted Executive Judge Colasito to assign
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 22 November 2016
additional night court duties to the other MeTC Judges and their personnel.
FACTS:
Consequently, the OCA submitted a memorandum to the Court, 16 recommending
These consolidated administrative proceedings involve the several charges of gross
that her insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of The New Code of Judicial
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and
Conduct be docketed as an administrative complaint against her.
conduct unbecoming of a judge leveled by various complainants, some of them her
fellow Judges, against respondent Judge Eliza B. Yu, the Presiding Judge of Branch
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836
47, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pasay City.
Judge Yu requested to fill the position of Clerk of Court III in her sala. Three
applicants vied for the position, namely: Ms. Ellen Serrano, Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
and Ms. Eloisa Bernardo. From the outset, Judge Yu favored Ms. Bernardo for the
In January 2011, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 19-2012
vacancy.
which designated certain branches of the MeTC in Pasay City and Makati City as
night courts to expeditiously hear and try cases involving nighttime apprehensions,
After evaluating the applicants' qualifications, the Selection and Promotion Board
special cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and criminal cases involving tourists
for the Lower Courts (OCA-SPBLC) recommended the appointment of Ms. Tejero-
Then Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito issued a Memorandum
Lopez, then a Legal Researcher assigned at MeTC Branch 46. The OCA-SPBLC had
(February 9, 2011) prescribing the schedules for night court service. Judge Yu was
found Ms. Bernardo to have lacked the required training.
assigned night court duties every Friday. But Judge Yu did not desire to comply, and
so inscribed the following marginal note on the Memorandum of Judge Colasito:

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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
Judge Yu, by letter, requested the temporary designation of Ms. Bernardo as the
Clerk of Court but OCA-SPBLC denied the request in view of the availability of a
qualified applicant.
Ms. Tejero Lopez paid Judge Yu a visit in her chambers where Judge Yu had
apparently shouted "Nanggugulo ka[!]...” then demanded her (Ms. Tejero Lopez)
withdrawal with a threat to revoke her appointment later on. Faced with the prospect
of eventually losing her job, Ms. Tejero-Lopez decided to withdraw her application.
After an investigation that established that Ms. Tejero-Lopez did not voluntarily
withdraw her application, the OCA-SPBLC continued processing her appointment,
and she was eventually appointed Clerk of Comi III effective May 31, 2011. Judge
Yu refused to administer her oath. Judge Yu also wrote to Atty. Cabello, Chief of
Office, OCA-Office of Administrative Services (OCA-OAS), to protest the
appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez for lacking any personal indorsement. In another
letter, she expressed her refusal to honor the "void ab initio" appointment of Ms.
Tejero-Lopez, which she characterized as "a big joke." The Court dismissed Judge
Yu's protest against the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez
Likewise, in June 2010, Judge Yu initiated a complaint against Ms. Mariejoy P.
Lagman, Legal Researcher II of Branch 47, for grave misconduct, falsification,
usurpation of judicial functions and dishonesty. Ms. Lagman requested her transfer
to another branch of the MeTC pending the hearing of the complaint against her.
The Court appointed her as Clerk III of Branch 108 of the RTC in Pasay City.
Ms. Lagman's appointment did not sit well with Judge Yu, who assailed it before the
OCA-SPBLC as a "fast appointment" for being made despite her pending
administrative complaint. She threatened to file formal charges against the members
of the OCA-SPBLC.
The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing the misconduct and insubordination of
Judge Yu relative to the appointments of Ms. TejeroLopez and Ms. Lagman. The
Court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she should not be
disciplined for her actions
A.M. No. 12-109-METC
Several complaints were filed by the court staff of MeTC Branch 47 charging Judge
Yu with (a) oppressive conduct towards her staff (b) disrespectful attitude towards
co-judges, SC officers and offices, and (c) Gross ignorance of laws, rules and
regulations.
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821
This administrative matter emanated from the Letter-Complaint of MeTC Judge
Emily San Gaspar-Gito whereby the latter imputed to Judge Yu conduct
unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual
undertones via Facebook and electronic mail. (about a $10 meal stub and 69 sexual
position; love scenes in certain movies, etc.).
A month after sending the meal stub message, Judge Yu apologized for said message
claiming it was probably some computer prank or Facebook hacker.
Judge San Gaspar-Gito also accused Judge Yu of creating a fake Facebook account
under the name "Rudela San Gaspar." That account contained captured
photographs, including that of the complainant's son. Judge San Gaspar-Gito
confronted Judge Yu and threatened to initiate an administrative complaint. This
threat prompted the respondent to take down the fake account.
Judge San Gaspar-Gito received a message from her friend, Juliet Tabanao-
Galicinao, informing her that a certain Bambi Yu had inquired about her sexual
orientation, whether she (Emily San Gaspar) was an “ACDC” or bisexual.
Recommendation and Evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator The
OCA made the following findings:
(a) Judge Yu's refusal to comply with A.M. No. 19- 2011 and to honor the
appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejera-Lopez is insubordination;
(b) Judge Yu's letter to DOT Secretary Lim constitutes gross misconduct, and a
violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
(c) Judge Yu's conduct in relation to the request for sick leave by Noel Labid, and
the appointment of Ms. Tejera-Lopez as oppression;
(d) Judge Yu's acts of allowing the criminal proceedings in her court to continue
without the presence of the public prosecutor, and of ordering the reception of
evidence by the OIC who was not a member of the Bar is regarded as gross ignorance
of the law.
(e) Judge Yu's issuance of the show cause order against Executive Judge Colasito, et
al. is grave abuse of her authority; and (f) Judge Yu's actuations towards Judge San
GasparGito is conduct unbecoming of a judge.
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(g) Judge Yu 's use of the official letterhead of her court in summoning the brother
of Judge San Gaspar-Gito to a conference demonstrated her abuse of power, and
constituted a violation of "section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RATIO:
A. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
1. Judge Yu's unresolved protest was not a sufficient justification for her to resist the
implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011. She was quite aware that A.O. No. 19- 2011
was issued pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers to
the [Supreme] Court the power of administrative supervision over all courts, and was
for that reason an issuance to be immediately implemented and unquestioningly
obeyed by the affected Judges.
2. Her resistance to A.O. No. 19-2011 manifested an uncommon arrogance on the
part of a Judge of a court of the first-level towards the Court itself. Such attitude
smacked of her unbecoming condescension towards the Court and her judicial
superiors.
Constitutional right to free speech and expression and the duty to respect the
dignity of the judicial office
3. Although she might have regarded her reservations as impressed with outstanding
merit, that was no justification for her to defer or reject the implementation of A.O.
No. 19-2011 in her court for any length of time, and to be public about it. A.O. No.
19-2011 dealt with an administrative matter on the administration of justice and
procedure over which the Court was the supreme and sole authority. Her freedom
to exercise her constitutional right to free speech and expression was not a
consideration. She had no privilege to disobey; hers was but to follow.
4. It is timely for the Court to use this occasion to remind Judge Yu and other judicial
officers of the land that although they may enjoy the freedoms of speech and
expression as citizens of the Republic, they should always conduct themselves, while
exercising such freedoms, in a manner that should preserve the dignity of their
judicial offices and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
5. As to this duty to observe self-restraint, Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is clear and forthright, viz.:
Sec.6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
6. Judge Yu's expression of her dissent against A.O. No. 19- 2011 was misplaced. We
may as well declare that she did not enjoy the privilege to dissent. Regardless of her
reasons for dissenting, she was absolutely bound to follow A.O. No. 19-2011.
Indeed, she did not have the unbridled freedom to publicly speak against A.O. No.
19-2011 and its implementation, for her being the Judge that she was differentiated
her from the ordinary citizen exercising her freedom of speech and expression who
did not swear obedience to the orders and processes of the Court without delay.
The refusal of a Judge to comply with any resolution or directive of the Court
constitutes insubordination and gross misconduct
7. Judge Yu's resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 constituted gross
insubordination and gross misconduct, and put in serious question her fitness and
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to her judicial office.
8. Insubordination is the refusal to obey some order that a superior officer is
entitled to give and to have obeyed. It imports a willful or intentional disregard of
the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer. Judge Yu's obstinate
resistance to A.O. No. 19-2011 displayed both her rebellious character and her
disdain and disrespect for the Court and its directives.
9. Judge Yu's unwillingness to comply with A.O. No. 19-2011 was also a betrayal of
her sworn duty to maintain fealty to the law, and brought dishonor to the Judiciary.
In that regard, her conduct amounted to gross misconduct.
10. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of
law or standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of official
functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a
persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgement.
11. Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and
gross misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she
deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
She deserved to be removed from the service because she thereby revealed her
unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.
B. Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel
12. Although Judge Yu insisted on the irregularity of the appointment of Ms. Tejero-
Lopez for lack of personal endorsement from her as the Presiding Judge, and of the
appointment of Ms. Lagman due to a pending administrative complaint, the
appointments of Ms. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman were valid and regular. As such,
Judge Yu had no good reason to reject the appointments.
13. The authority to appoint emanated from the Supreme Court itself. Judge Yu had
no right to reject the appointment, making her rejection another instance of gross
insubordination by her.
Presiding judge can only recommend and endorse persons to a particular
position, but the final decision rests with the Supreme Court which must be
obeyed
14. While a presiding judge can recommend and endorse persons to a particular
position, this recommendation has to be approved by the Supreme Court. The
Constitution grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all the courts
and personnel thereof. The memorandum from the OCA regarding the designation
of court personnel is no less an order from this Court. Court officials and personnel,
particularly judges, are expected to comply with the same.
15. Judge Yu could only recommend an applicant for a vacant position in her court
for the consideration of the SPBLC, which then accorded priority to the
recommendee if the latter possessed superior qualifications than or was at least of
equal qualifications as the other applicants she did not recommend. She could not
impose her recommendee on the SPBLC which was legally mandated to maintain
fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the applicants.
A pending administrative complaint shall not disqualify an employee from
promotion
16. Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just as unwarranted.
Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), a pending administrative complaint shall not disqualify an employee
from promotion. The rule, which is reiterated in Section 42 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) of 2011, cannot be interpreted
otherwise. Accordingly, Judge Yu's administrative complaint had no bearing on Ms.
Lagman's appointment, more so because Ms. Lagman was held liable only for simple
misconduct, a less grave offense that did not merit termination from public service
for the first offense.
17. It is relevant to point out, too, that Judge Yu had no personality to object to or
oppose Ms. Lagman's appointment, considering that only a qualified next-in-rank
employee has been recognized as a party-in-interest to file the protest in accordance
with paragraph 1.6.1, Article IX of the 2002 Revised Manual of Clerks of Court.
Use of disrespectful language towards the court constitutes serious
misconduct
18. We also take Judge Yu to task for disrespectful language uttered against the Court,
no less. She characterized the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez as"void ab initio" and
"a big joke." The use of such language in assailing the Court's exercise of its absolute
power of appointment was highly offensive and intemperate. She thereby
disregarded her obligation to show respect and deference toward the Court and its
officials. She was thereby guilty of another serious misconduct.
Making of the verbal threats to compel a subordinate to withdraw her
application constituted grave abuse of authority and oppression
19. Judge Yu issued verbal threats of filing administrative, civil and criminal charges
against Ms. Tejero-Lopez unless she withdrew her application. The making of the
verbal threats by Judge Yu to compel a subordinate to withdraw her application
constituted grave abuse of authority on the part of Judge Yu. Grave abuse of
authority is committed by a public officer, who, under color of his office, wrongfully
inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act
characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. Also, the
intimidation exerted upon Ms. Tejero-Lopez amounted to oppression, which refers
to an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.
C. Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court personnel
20. Judge Yu gravely abused her authority in issuing the show-cause order against his
fellow Judges, the complainants against her in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ. Judge Yu
required the complainants to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for
surreptitiously taking the TSNs, orders and minutes of the proceedings in Criminal
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
Case No. M-PSY- 09-08592-CR and using these as part of their attachments to their
complaint.
Abuse of court process
21. The issuance of the show-cause order by Judge Yu represented clear abuse of
court processes, and revealed her arrogance in the exercise of her authority as a
judicial officer. She thereby knowingly assumed the role of a tyrant wielding power
with unbridled breadth. Based on its supervisory authority over the courts and their
personnel, the Court must chastise her as an abusive member of the Judiciary who
tended to forget that the law and judicial ethics circumscribed the powers and
discretion vested in her judicial office.
22. Judge Yu supported her actions by citing the rulings in People v. Godoy, Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, and Salcedo v. Hernandez. But the cited rulings had no relevance at all. ,
the factual settings for the cited rulings involved parties or counsel of the parties,
while the factual setting in this administrative matter concerned the act of merely
copying the records of Judge Yu's court for purposes of producing evidence against
her in the administrative cases her fellow Judges and the concerned court employees
would be initiating against her. The latter were not parties in any pending case in her
court.
Duty of judge to disqualify himself from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially
23. Judge Yu breached her duty to disqualify herself from acting at all on the matter.
Such self-disqualification was required under Section 5, Canon 3, and Section 8 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, viz;
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings
in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear
to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
xx xx
Section 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interest,x x x.
24. By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for contempt
of court, Judge Yu wielded a power that she did not hold. Hence, she was guilty of
gross misconduct.
D. Refusal to sign the application for leave of absence and other allegations
of oppression
25. The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court governs the approval of an
application for sick leave by court "personnel. The Manual requires the submission
of a medical certificate or proof of sickness prior to the approval of the application
for sick leave. It is likewise provided that: “Approval of sick leave, whether with pay or
without pay, is mandatory provided proof of sickness or disability is attached to the application in
accordance with the applicable requirements. Unreasonable delay in the approval thereof or non-
approval without justifiable reason shall be a ground for appropriate sanction against the official
concerned.”
Unjustified refusal to approve Noel's leave application constituted grave
abuse of authority
26. Noel Labid complied with the Manual by submitting the medical certificate and
clinical abstracts certified by the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). However,
Judge Yu was unconvinced by such submissions. Judge Yu demanded a prior written
notice about Noel's serious medical condition and required Noel to submit the
certificate of fitness to work.
27. Judge Yu chose to ignore the medical records certified by a government health
institution, and unjustifiably demanded the submission of documents that the 2002
Revised Manual did not require. Judge Yu did not convincingly establish that her
actions came within the limits of her authority as a court manager, or were sanctioned
by existing court regulations and policies. Her unjustified refusal to approve Noel's
leave application exposed her to administrative sanction under paragraph 2.2.2 of the
2002 Revised Manual. Accordingly, Judge Yu was again guilty of grave abuse of
authority.
Deliberate refusal to sign Noel's leave application amounted to oppression
28. It is not hard to believe that Judge Yu deliberately refused to sign Noel's leave
application in order to cause additional hardship to him in retaliation for his joining
the administrative complaint against her. By acting so, therefore, Judge Yu was
vindictive, and exhibited indifference to the plight of the critically ill subordinate in
urgent need of assistance. She was guilty of oppression, which is any act of cruelty,
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority constituting
oppression.
29. Nonetheless, we dismiss the other allegations of oppression towards the
staffmembers of Branch 47 for failure ofthe complainants to substantiate the same.
In administrative cases, the complainant bears the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint.
E. Charges of gross ignorance of the law
30. In OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ, the complainants charged that Judge Yu had
allowed on-the-job trainees (OJTs) to have access to court records. She denied this
charge, however, and claimed that the students were merely "observers" because of
the prohibition.
(i) Prohibition on OJT students to under go training in the different offices of
the courts
31. The memorandum dated November 2, 2010236 issued by Judge Yu indicated her
intention to delegate the duties of an encoder to a certain Ms. Angelica Rosali, one
of the OJTs. That the memorandum was not disseminated to the person concerned,
and that it was not implemented were immaterial to the charge. The fact that Judge
Yu issued the memorandum naming Ms. Rosali, a student, as the encoder and
assigning to her court duties similar to those of a regular court employee signified
Judge Yu's intention to treat Ms. Rosali as a trainee instead of as a mere observer.
32. In this regard, Judge Yu deliberately ignored OCA Circular No. 111- 2005 which
disallows students to undergo on-the-job training/practicum in the different offices
of the court.
(ii) Designating a first level personnel to a second level position (OIC) was in
violation of court rules
33. Judge Yu designated as OIC of Branch 47 of the MeTC a Mr. Ferdinand Santos,
who occupied the position of Clerk III. Under the 2002 Revised Manual, the position
of Clerk III fell under the first level position while Clerk of Court III was a second level
position. The minimum education and training qualification requirements for each
are vastly different.
34. Under the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 dated February 15, 2005, “First
level personnel cannot be designated to perform the duties of second level positions.” Designating a
first-level personnel like Mr. Santos as OIC defied CSC Memorandum Circular No.
06-05 because the position of OIC was reserved for personnel belonging to the
second level. It becomes immaterial whether nobody from Branch 47 opposed the
designation because the memorandum circular expressly prohibits designation of
first level personnel to a second level position. It is emphasized that the
memorandum is crafted in the negative; hence, the memorandum is mandatory, and
imports that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.
35. The OIC referred to here was the acting Branch Clerk of Court (Clerk of Court
III). Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt
and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and
administrative orders, processes and concerns. They perform delicate functions as
designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises. The functions of a clerk of court require a higher degree of education as
well as understanding of the law and court processes, that they cannot be delegated
to first level personnel. The position requires not only trust and confidence, but most
importantly, education and experience. Ineluctably, the respondent ignored the clear
import of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06- 05 in designating Mr. Santos as OIC.
(iii) Ordering presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC who was not
a member of the Bar
36. Section 9, Rule 30 of the Revised. Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires that only
clerks of court who are members of the Bar can be delegated to receive evidence ex
parte.
37. Judge Yu argued that she did not commit any irregularity in ordering the
presentation of ex parte evidence before her OIC who was not a member of the Bar
because the rule was only directory under Section 9, Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, which uses the word may.
38. The word may used in the rule related only to the discretion by the trial court of
delegating the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, not to the requirement
that the Clerk of Court so delegated be a member of the Bar. The rule on ex parte
reception of evidence was unequivocal on this point, and required no elaboration.
Neither the agreement by the parties nor their acquiescence could justify its violation.
Breach of the rule on reception of evidence represented her ignorance of the rule of
procedure in question, and subjected her to administrative liability for misconduct.
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(iv) Allowing criminal proceedings without the actual participation of the
public prosecutor
39. Anent the charge that she allowed the prosecution of criminal actions without
the presence of the public prosecutor, Judge Yu retorted that the complainants were
not the proper parties to assail her orders; that the accused in People v. Manduriao had
begged to be arraigned without counsel after being informed of the penalty for the
offense charged; and that the trial of the case could proceed without the public
prosecutor, but not in the absence of a judge.
40. Under, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. The true reason
is that the prosecution of criminal offenses is always a public function. In Pinote v.
Ayco, the Court castigated the respondent judge for allowing the presentation of the
defense witnesses in the absence of the public prosecutor or the private prosecutor
specially designated for the purpose. A breach of the Rules of Court like that could not
be rectified by subsequently giving the Prosecution the chance to cross-examine the
witnesses.
41. In addition, Judge Yu disregarded Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court when
she allowed the change of plea by the accused without the assistance of counsel.
Judge Yu justified herself by claiming that she had apprised the accused of the penalty
for the offense charged, which had then convinced the accused to change his plea.
The Court cannot accept her justification.
42. The justification that the accused had waived his right to counsel, and had
changed his plea after the respondent Judge had explained to him the imposable
penalty for the offense did not stand considering that in order that the waiver by the
accused of his right to counsel would be valid, the trial court must ensure that the
accused did so voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, taking into account the
capacity of the accused to give such consent. We have nothing to show that Judge
Yu took the pains to enforce the safeguards.
43. Judge Yu was guilty of gross ignorance of the law, which is ignorance of the
law when the law is so elementary, and when one professes not to know it, or when
one acts as if she does not know it. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
prescribes that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of the judicial
office. By failing to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic
rules of procedure, Judge Yu seriously compromised her ability to be an effective
magistrate.
F. Sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of a judicial
officer
44. Judge Yu denied sending the messages to Judge San Gaspar-Gito, and countered
that it was the latter who first sent the "meal stub" message. She maintained that the
messages were confidential and inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Exclusionary rule does not apply (it was the recipient of the messages, as
owner thereof, which granted access, no violation of right to privacy on the
part of the sender)
45. The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a
violation of law on the part of the agents of the Govemment, and bars the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures expressly defined under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution refers to the
prohibition against the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions.
46. Judge Yu did not specify that the State had unlawfully intruded into her privacy.
The subjects of the present inquiry were the messages sent by her to Judge San
Gaspar-Gita. Regardless of the mode of their transmission, the ownership of the
messages pertained to the latter as the recipient. Considering that it was the latter
(owner) who granted access to such messages, there was no violation of Judge Yu's
right to privacy. As such, the grant of access by Judge San Gaspar-Gito did not
require the consent of Judge Yu as the writer. To recall, the Court directed the MISO
to retrieve the messages for purposes of these cases. Based on the certification issued
by the authorized MISO personnel, the messages were extracted from the Yahoo
and Facebook accounts of Judge San Gaspar-Gito with the use of her official
workstation. Hence, the exclusionary rule did not apply.
Conduct unbecoming of a member of the Judiciary
47. It is notable that the Facebook and Yahoo messages started in August 2009 when
Judge Yu was still a public prosecutor. Nonetheless, she could still be disciplined for
such acts committed prior to her appointment to the Judiciary because her internet
stalking of Judge San Gaspar-Gita continued after she had herself become a MeTC
Judge in Pasay City on January 12, 2010 and lasted until July 2010.
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48. Our reading of the messages supports the studied conclusions by CA Justice
Abdulwahid that they did contain sexual insinuations that were ostensibly improper
for a Judge to write and send to another. The messages, however they may be read
and understood, were at least vexatious and annoying. In any case, the sender showed
her deep-seated proclivities reflective of conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Judiciary.
Liability of Judges for using their official letterhead to advance their personal
interests
49. The OCA submits that Judge Yu's use of the letterhead of her office or court in
summoning to a conference Atty. Reynaldo San Gaspar, the brother of Judge San
Gaspar-Gito, constituted abuse of power, and violated Section 8, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
50. In Rosaura v. Kallas, we found the respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03
of the Code of the Judicial Conduct when he used his stationery for his
correspondence on a private transaction with the complainant and his counsel parties
with a pending case in his court. We clarify, however, that the use of a letterhead
should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the
use-the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of "impropriety" or
"appearance of impropriety".
51. The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title
of Judge or Justice in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the
use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has
earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the
appellation. While the title can be used for social and other identification purposes,
it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully
advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a
judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To do any
of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
52. In the letter in question, Judge Yu used the phrase "our court" in issuing the
invitation to Atty. San Gaspar. She was obviously intending to use her authority as
an incumbent Judge to advance her personal interest. Such conduct was
reprehensible because she thereby breached Section 4 of Canon 1 (Independence)
and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
G. Penalty of dismissal from service
53. Judge Yu unquestionably committed several gross and serious administrative
offenses ranging from gross misconduct and gross ignorance to the lesser offense of
conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer. The grossness and severity of her offenses
taken together demonstrated Judge Yu's unfitness and incompetence to further
discharge the office and duties of a Judge. Her arrogance and insubordination in
challenging A.O. No. 19-2011, and her unyielding rejection of the appointments of
court personnel constituted gross insubordination and gross misconduct, and
warranted her immediate dismissal from the Judiciary. Her requiring her fellow
Judges to submit to her authority by virtue of her show cause order, whereby she
revealed her utter disrespect towards and disdain for them, as well as her conduct
unbecoming of a judicial officer aggravated her liability. The administration of justice
cannot be entrusted to one like her who would readily ignore and disregard the laws
and policies enacted by the Court to guarantee justice and fairness for all.
H. Disbarment
Automatic Conversion of some Administrative Cases against Justices, Judges
and Court Officials into Disciplinary Proceedings
54. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar, relevantly states:
“Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that
have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
INTRODUCTION TO LAW 2017 55
 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.”
55. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred
on the ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her
open disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers
appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless
with legal actions to make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing the
penalty of disbarment.
56. The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney herself as it is to
safeguard the administration of justice, the courts and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from the
Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby
proved themselves unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them
as members of the Bar.
57. The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that
were also grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be
treated as justifiable disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This
treatment is explained by the fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral
aspect of her qualification for judgeship. Also, her moral and actual unfitness to
remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain
as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the basic
rules of judicial conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because she had
thereby also violated her Lawyer's Oath. Also, Judge Yu's violation of the
fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a breach of the canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (specifically, Canon 1, 6, 11)
Disbarment cannot be meted without Due Process
58. However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in
any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such,
her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to
comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To
accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to
defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine
whether or not to disbar her.
OCA V. JUDGE YU
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 14 March 2017
FACTS:
Same facts as OCA v. Judge Eliza Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, 2016
RATIO:
I. Motion for Reconsideration is denied. Guarantee against self-incrimination
does not apply in non-criminal matters
1. The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-
incrimination has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional
guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating
questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable. The
constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness - whether a party or not - the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. The privilege did not
prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters.
Right against self-incrimination applies to oral testimony and does not apply
to object evidence
2. Moreover, the rule only finds application in case of oral testimony and does not
apply to object evidence. The right against self-incrimination, as put by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Holt vs. United States, x x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him. It is simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of
his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. (see People v.
Malimit)
3. The respondent's (email) correspondences were outside the scope of the
constitutional proscription against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to
testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right against self-
incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to
be present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses and evidence during
the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
Abdulwahid. She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the
complainant and her witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence
divested her of the right to insist on the right to confrontation, if any.
Mitigating circumstances not appreciated
4. Respondent Uy would have the Court consider in her favor the mitigating
circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative
Cases in Civil Service.
(a) Physical illness
5. Firstly, the respondent does not present any compelling argument on how her
having medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a)
of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of
circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the provision expressly
recognizes other analogous circumstances, she cannot simply state any situation without
pointing out why it would be analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is
unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for allergies could
generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive conduct
that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints.
(b) Good faith
6. Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith.
Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the
totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to
commit a wrong cannot be probable.
7. In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state
of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or
belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."
8. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something
internal, we can ascertain a person's intention by relying not on his own protestations
of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
(c) Lack of experience
9. Lack of experience had no relevance in determining her administrative liabilities
for acts and actuations fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial ethical
standards. We even believe that her being a novice in the Judiciary, instead of
mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her offense, for her being a neophyte
judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater prudence and caution in
her daily actuations and performance.
(d) Awards for outstanding performances
10. On the other hand, the awards for outstanding performances as a professional
and as a judge, far from accenting her good qualities as a person, rather highlighted
her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her misconduct and
general bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards and recognitions in
serious question.
Gross insubordination and Gross misconduct
11. Respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary by reason of her
gross insubordination and gross misconduct did not proceed only from her non-
compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011. Other acts and actuations were also efficient
causes, namely: (1) her refusal to abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge
that resulted in the disruption of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs to the
prejudice of the public service and public interest; (2) her direct communications to
the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously breached established protocols,
thereby opening an irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her defiance to the
directive of the Court itself; and (3) her willful disregard of the direct advice by the
Court Administrator despite the latter being the official expressly authorized by law
to assist the Court in exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and
personnel.
12. We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the respondent's
recalcitrant streak did not end with her unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to
A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the
valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware
that the appointing powers pertained to and were being thereby exercised by the
Court, and that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the appointments.
Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with the mantle of
good faith in regard to her insubordination and arrogance.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
II. Disbarment imposed
Automatic conversion of some administrative cases against justices, judges,
and court officials into disciplinary proceedings as members of the Bar
13. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002, provides:
“Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that
have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.”
14. As held in the November 2016 Decision: “However, this rule of fusing the
dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside
the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would
be violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she
should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a
lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her.”
Disbarment on the ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court.
15. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on
the ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open
disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to
her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal actions
to make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing the penalty of
disbarment.
16. Gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of
any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the
respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for
disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence.
17. The penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping
the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to protect
the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys
should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they
serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.
27 IN RE: CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM
A.M. No. 10-7-17 8 February 2011
QUICK REFERENCE:
Following a Supreme Court decision, the petition filed by the Malaya Lolas
Organization in accordance with Vinuya vs. Romulo was dismissed. Atty. Roque Jr.
acting as counsel for Vinuya et al questioned the decision. He claimed that Justice
Mariano del Castillo who acted as ponente in the case plagiarized three books when
the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed
decision. As such, Justice del Castillo was said to be guilty of plagiarism, misconduct,
and at least inexcusable negligence. But, it was held that there was no plagiarism. in
the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors
but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these
foreign works as his own. But, even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court
in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule
on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
FACTS:
(Short background on Vinuya case)
• Petitioners in the Vinuya case claimed that in destroying villages in the
Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army systematically raped
them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in
houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them. Their
petition for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
INTRODUCTION TO LAW 2017 58
 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
before the International Court of Justice and other tribunals were denied
by Justice Del Castillo.
• On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for
reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo
of “manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism” when he wrote the
decision for the Court and of “twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources … to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.” They charged
Justice Del Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages
from three foreign articles:
• A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-
Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
• Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
• Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge
University Press (2005).
• These sources were twisted and used without proper attribution and made
to look that these sources support the judgement’s arguments in dismissing
their petition when in fact, these sources even make a firm case for the
Petitions claims.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
RATIO:
• No, there is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme
Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al
in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
28 ATTY. MANE V. JUDGE BELEN A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
FACTS:
• Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demeaning,
humiliating and berating" him during the hearing in which he was counsel
for the plaintiff. During the hearing Judge Belen asked Atty. Mane if he was
from UP Law in which he replied that he was from Manuel L. Quezon
University. Judge Belen responded by saying “Then you're not from UP.
Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created
equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance.”
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Judge Belen can be held Administratively liable.
RATIO:
• YES. The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
• Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,
especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing
before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the
attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the
courts for the litigants.
• Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be
courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced
and also to all those others appearing or concerned in the administration of
justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses and others in
attendance upon his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is
unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of
a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be studious
to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt
counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions.
Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or
premature judgment.
• A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to
hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their
clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence
in the dispatch of business before the court. He may utilize his
opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys,
brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.
• An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of
the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers,
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer
is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties
LAWYERS
29 CAYETANO V. MONSOD G.R. No. 100113 3 September 1991
QUICK REFERENCE:
Respondent Monsod was nominated by Pres. Aquino as Chairman of the
COMELEC. The petitioner challenged the nomination alleging that Monsod did not
satisfy the requirement of being engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
However, the Court ruled that Monsod’s past work experience did, in fact, satisfy
the requirement and that the term “practice of law” is not only limited to the conduct
of cases in court.
Facts:
• Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that “there shall
be a Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”
• Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991.
• On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod.
• On June 18, 1991, Respondent Monsod took his oath of office and
assumed the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
• Petitioner Cayetano challenged the nomination because Monsod did not
possess the required qualification of being engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years and asked that the appointment be declared null and
void.
• Atty. Christian Monsod passed the 1960 Bar Examinations and is a member
of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not Respondent Monsod has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least 10 years.
RATIO:
• YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
embraces all other aspects such as advising clients and preparing legal
documents, among others, which is done outside of the courtroom.
• There are various definitions of the term “Practice of law” and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator satisfies the requirement of being
“engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
30 ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC B.M. No. 553 17 June 1993
QUICK REFERENCE:
Legal Clinic, Inc. was established by Atty. Rogelio Nograles and offers paralegal
services to Filipino clients. The Legal Clinic, Inc. posted an advertisement offering
services for divorce in Guam, which is against Philippine law. The issue is whether
or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law. Held: The Supreme Court
held that the Legal Clinic offered services which may only be performed by licensed
lawyers. The Court also noted that lawyers must not advertise themselves, but their
skill and reputation is sufficient for their self-promotion.
FACTS:
• The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a corporation that renders paralegal services to
clients in the Philippines.
• Although its largest stockholder and incorporator is lawyer Rogelio
Nograles, the company does not hire the services of other lawyers.
• The Legal Clinic posted advertisements for its company, which offered to
aid in securing divorce services in Guam, whereas divorce is generally not
permitted under Philippine law.
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• Petitioner contends that The Legal Clinic, “makes advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law.”
• Sought for their positions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”),
Philippine Bar Association (“PBA”), Philippine Lawyers’ Association
(“PLA”), UP Women Lawyers’ Circle (“WILOCI”), Women Lawyers’
Association of the Philippines (“WLAP”), and the Federacion International
de Abogadas (“FIDA”) all rejected the position of respondent The Legal
Clinic that they were merely offering paralegal services and not actual legal
services, contending that the name The Legal Clinic gives the impression
that the corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders full
legal services.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not The Legal Clinic, Inc. offers legal services as defined under
the practice of law, and thus should not be allowed to make such
advertisements and misrepresentations.
RATIO:
• PETITION GRANTED. The Supreme Court held that the practice of law
covers a wide-range of responsibilities, and is not merely limited to litigation
in court. It includes rendering services such as pleadings, special
proceedings, foreclosure of mortgages, enforcement of claims, etc. The
Court held that it does not matter that the United States has paralegal firms
because paralegals are a profession on its own in the U.S., with specialized
courses offered in American universities. Whereas in Philippine
jurisdiction, no such specialization exists, and thus only a person admitted
to the Bar may render such services. Likewise, the Court held that The
Legal Clinic’s advertisements did indeed give the impression to the general
public that it renders legal services in the practice of law, and not merely
paralegal services. The Court also noted that lawyers must not advertise, as
their skill and reputation must be sufficient for their self-promotion. The
Supreme Court enjoined respondents from issuing advertisements similar
to its divorce advertisement, and prohibited it from engaging in practices
prescribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics.
31 IN RE: CUNANAN 94 Phil. 534
QUICK REFERENCE:
Congress passed Republic Act 972 which was meant to aid bar examiners who
affected by the War. Section 1 of RA 972 lowered the passing mark of the Bar Exams
from 1946-1955, while Section 2 stated that after attaining a grade of 75 in a bar
exam, the examiner is deemed to have passed that subject for subsequent exams, if
any. The issue is whether or not RA 972 is unconstitutional for encroaching the
powers of the judiciary Held: The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. With
respect to Section 1, the Court held the period from 1946-1952 as unconstitutional
for encroaching the powers of the judiciary. The Supreme Court has the sole
authority in determining who may practice law, and the duty to determine the
standard by which persons are accepted in the legal profession rests on the Supreme
Court.
FACTS:
• In 1952, Congress passed Republic Act 972, or otherwise known as the
“Bar Flunkers Act.”
• Section 1 of RA 972 was to lower the passing marks of the Bar
Examinations from 1946 to 1955, provided that no grade in any subject is
below 50%.
• Section 2 provides that a bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and shall be
included in the computation for subsequent bar examinations.
• The purpose of RA 972 was to allow law students from the post-War era
who had difficulty studying the law due to a lack of materials destroyed by
the War, as Congress itself stated.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not RA 972 is unconstitutional for encroaching the powers of
the judiciary.
RATIO:
• PARTLY GRANTED. With respect to Section 1 of RA 972, the Supreme
Court held that the period covering 1946-1952 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the period covering 1953-1955 is IN
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FORCE AND EFFECTIVE. The Court noted that Congress itself stated
that the purpose of the Act was to aid law students who had inadequate
preparations due to the War. However, the Court noted that it is its
prerogative on who it may admit to the practice of law, not Congress, and
thus it is an encroachment of the separation of powers. The Supreme Court
held that lawyers must be held to a very high standard, and Congress may
not lower that standard by its own. With regard to Section 2, the Court
held that it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because (a) it was not embraced in
the title of the Act, which was meant to affect only bar flunkers, and (b)
provides a permanent system for an indefinite period.
32 SEBASTIAN V. CALIS A.C. No. 5118 8 September 1999
QUICK REFERENCE:
Marilou Sebastian hired the services of Atty. Dorotheo Calis to procure the necessary
travel documents in order to travel to the US. Atty. Calis charged a fee of
Php150,000 for his services. He subsequently informed Marilou Sebastian that she
will be using the name Lizette Ferrer in her passport, which caused Sebastian to ask
for a refund. Calis convinced Sebastian otherwise. Sebastian was caught in
Singapore for using false documents and was deported to the Philippines. She asked
for a full refund from Calis which was only partially complied with. The issue is
whether or not Atty. Calis violated a breach of professional ethics. Held: Yes, Calis
violated professional ethics for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral, deceitful conduct.”
The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege granted by the Supreme Court to
those who can pass their high standards and the qualifications it sets. Calis was
disbarred.
FACTS:
• Marilou Sebastian hired the services of Atty. Dorotheo Calis to procure the
necessary travel documents needed to travel to the United States.
• Atty. Calis charged a fee of Php150,000 to procure all the necessary
documents.
• After a series of partial payments, Atty. Calis informed Sebastian that she
will be using passport bearing the name Lizette P. Ferrer.
• After realizing that she will be using spurious documents, Sebastian sought
a refund from Atty. Calis.
• Atty. Calis convinced Sebastian that he will take responsibility should she
be caught, and will also subsequently give a full refund.
• Sebastian flew to Singapore where immigration officers noticed her
spurious documents, was detained and deported.
• Sebastian sought a full refund from Atty. Calis but Atty. Calis only partially
complied.
• Sebastian then subsequently filed a complaint against Atty. Calis.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Atty. Calis violated a breach of professional ethics.
RATIO:
• While Atty. Calis was initially only suspended, the Supreme Court disbarred
him for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral, deceitful conduct, as well as a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.” The original judgment sanctioned only a
suspension, because the Court held that Sebastian’s knowledge of Atty.
Calis’ act mitigated his liability. However, after reconsideration, the Court
found that Atty. Calis unduly put Sebastian’s life in danger and thus held
that a more severe penalty is appropriate. The Court stated that the practice
of law is not a right, but a privilege granted by it, and such a privilege may
be revoked if it finds that such person no complies with the high standards
of the Court and the qualifications it requires.
33 COJUANGCO, JR. V. PALMA A.C. No. 2474 15 September 2004
QUICK REFERENCE:
Respondent was hired by Petitioner to be his legal counsel. Respondent married the
complainant’s daughter in Hong Kong, despite already being married with three
children. The complainant then filed a disbarment case against the respondent.
Respondent argues that he is a good lawyer and that his marriage with complainant’s
daughter has nothing to do with his practice of law since he is in love. The court
ruled that there is no distinction between a lawyer’s personal and professional life.
The court ruled that he should be disbarred considering that he knew his marriage
with complainants daughter would be considered bigamous.
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FACTS:
• Cojuanco Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Palma.
• Palma was hired by Cojuanco after he used the services of ACCRA law and
he became fond of Palma.
• The two parties became very intimate with each other, when Palma would
frequently visit Cojuanco’s house and even tutor his daughter Luisa who
was a student at the Assumption Convent.
• On June 22, 2982 Palma then went to Hong Kong with Luisa and there
they got married.
• Complainant then filed a disbarment case against Palma.
• Complainant states that Palma is a married man with three children and
therefor he cannot marry Luisa.
• On August 24, 1982 the complainant filed for a declaration of nullity of the
marriage between Palma and Luisa.
• The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action and that there is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness,
lack of skill, or ignorance of the law.
• Respondent stressed that he married Luisa with the utmost sincerity and
good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an
immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.
• The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that the
respondent be suspended to practice law for 3 years, because he knew that
the marriage he was entering into with Luisa was a bigamous marriagae and
is penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the respondent’s act of marrying Luisa would warrant his
disbarment.
RATIO:
• The Supreme Court (SC) stressed that there is no difference between
transgression committed in the lawyers professional capacity and his
provate life.
• When Palma married Luisa, while still being married to Hermosisima, his
act constitutes grossly immpral conduct, which is a ground for disbarment
under section 27, rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• The court ruled that the respondent committed grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer.
• The penalty of suspension is not commensurate to the gravity of his
offense.
• The penalty given is disbarment.
34 CASTANEDA V. AGO G.R. No. L-28546 30 July 1975
QUICK REFERENCE:
Petitioner’s filed a replevin case against the respondent. Judgement was then
rendered in favor of petitioners and the house and lot of the respondet was sold at
auction to the petotioners. The petioner now says that the sale should be null and
void because the judgment was made against his personal property and that the house
and lot is part of the conjugal property of Ago and his wife, where the wife has one-
half share and therefor should not be put up for auction. The petitioners now
contend that the petitioner, his wife, and their counsel have misused and made a
mockery of the legal system. They maneuvered for 14 years to resist the execution of
judgement through unhonorable tactics. The court said that it is the duty of the
lawyer to guide his client’s responsibly and his duty is first and foremost to the cause
of justice and not to his client.
FACTS:
• Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit (an action seeking return of
personal property wrongfully taken) against Ago
• In 1957, judgement was rendered in favor of the petitioners, ordering Ago
to return the machinerires of pay a definite sum of money
• On August 1961 a writ of execution was issued for a sum of P172,923.87
• Levy was made on Agos’s house and lots in Quezon City
• The house and lot was sold via auction to Castaned and Henson
• Ago , now being joined by his wife filed a complaint to annul the sale on
the count that the judgement was for Ago’s personal property and his wife
has a one-half share in their connjugal properties and therefore it cannot be
used to satisfy the judgement
• Petitioners contend that the respondents, together with their counsel, Atty.
Luison, have misused legal remidies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgement
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• They maneuvered for 14 years to resist the execution of the judgement thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not respondents and their counsel conspired using legal
remedies to thwart the judgment
RATIO:
• The court ruled that Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator
for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in
the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice
• It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, to the intricacies and vagaries
of the law, on the merit or lack merit of his case
• If the lawyer finds his client’s case is defenseless, then it is his duty to advise
the latter to acquisce and submit
• A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable
35 IN RE: EDILLON A.M. No. 1928 3 August 1978
QUICK REFERENCE:
The IBP filed a disbarment case against Edillon for non-payment of IBP dues.
Edillon argues that it is unconstitutional for the IBP to require monthly dues,
However the Court ruled that the IBP has every right to disbar Edillon because
according to Sec. 10 of their by-laws, non-payment for one year merits disbarment.
The Court ruled the disbarment of Edillon.
FACTS:
• On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 recommending to the court the removal
of the name of the respondent from the Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s
constitution notwhithstanding due process
• On January 21, 1976 the IBP submitted a resolution to the Court that states
that they will give the respondent until June 29 to pay his dues or they will
recommend to the Court his disbarment
• On January 27 the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution, Edillon then replied and still refused to pay his dues
• The IBP then replied to Edillon’s reply by saying that according to Section
10 of the IBP by-laws if a member of the IBP does not pay his dues for 1
year, he will be disbarred
• The respondent on the other hand states that, him being forced to pay dues
is against his constitutional rights of liberty and property
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the IBP can disbar Edillon for non-payment of dues
RATIO:
• The court ruled that the IBP can disbar Edillon for non-payment of dues
• The IBP is dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests
and personal convenience of individual lawyers
• Also, the Court said that, entering into the IBP is voluntary and therefore
Edillon cannot complain against its by-laws
36 IN RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC 8 March 2011
QUICK REFERENCE:
This is a plagiarism case wherein respondent lawyers are being charged for plagiarism
in the construction of the Vinuya v Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) case. Not
only should they be disciplined for their violations to the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), but they must also be punished to uphold the integrity of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
FACTS:
• Works were allegedly plagiarized from the Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
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• According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, works plagiarized in the Vinuya
decision include the ff:
• Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens”
• Christian J. Tams’ book “Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law”
• Mark Ellis’ article “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International
Crime”
• The decision reportedly plagiarized the above mentioned articles.
Furthermore, what made the plagiarism even more vague is the fact that
materials directly lifted from the above mentioned articles were used to
convey points that were the complete opposite of what they were truly
meant to be. This makes the misrepresentation and the plagiarism even
more unforgiveable.
• The argument that the ponente cannot be expected to have been thorough
in citing sources is a weak one as this is a matter of discipline that is
expected of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
• It is then the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law that
• Plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary is
unacceptable
• Endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system
• Does damage to the primordial function of the SC as the ultimate dispenser
of justice to all
• To save the honor and dignity of the SC as an institution, the ponente of
the Vinuya case must resign, without prejudice to any other sanctions that
the court may consider appropriate
• SC must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts
research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent
a recurrence of similar act
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the 37 respondent law professors should be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
• Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
• Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
• Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
• Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
the test of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not bee proved.
• Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
• Canon 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
• Rule 11.05 – A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
• Canon 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
RATIO:
• Yes, the respondent lawyers are to be disciplined in this case but only to
remind them of their lawyerly duty. Further or subsequent future violations
will merit a higher penalty.
37 BURBE V. MAGULTA A.C. No. 99-634 10 June 2002
QUICK REFERENCE:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Magulta for taking the money of Burbe while
failing to file his case in the proper courts. As a lawyer, there is a responsibility to
uphold towards justice that goes beyond the need for payment. This responsibility
binds all lawyers regardless of the payment that they have received which is why Atty.
Magulta was still liable for a 1 year suspension from the legal profession due to his
actions.
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FACTS:
• This is a disbarment case involving the respondent, Atty. Magulta, filed by
complainant Burbe in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
• Burbe met Atty. Magulta who agreed to help him with his legal needs.
• Respondent prepared demand letters and other legal purpose pursuant to
the agreement that they had with each other.
• A filling fee was demanded by the respondent before he filed the case in
the proper courts.
• After a payment of 25,000 pesos by the complainant, there was still no
update on the status of the case.
• Respondent would avoid communications with the complainant until
complainant decides to visit the clerk of court himself.
• Complainant was surprised to find that the case was not filed by the
respondent
• In his defense, respondent alleged that the 25,000 peso payment was an
incomplete payment of his retainer and therefore, he was not bound to
filing the case due to this lack of payment.
• Further, complainant admitted that he used the payment for other personal
purposes first but offered to return it through two post-dated checks.
• The current case with the IBP is now filed against Atty. Magulta due to
malpractice from misappropriation of client’s funds and rules 16.01 and
18.03 of the CPR.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Atty. Magulta can be disbarred due to misappropriation of
client’s funds and rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the CPR.
RATIO:
• No, disbarment is too heavy a penalty. However, the court decided to
suspend Atty. Magulta from practicing law for a year due to the charges
against him in this case.
• The lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never
paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business;
it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Atty. Magulta had a responsibility and obligation to maintain
fidelity to the law and he went against this obligation through how he dealt
with Burbe throughout this entire case.
38 PACANA, JR. V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ A.C. No. 8243 24 July 2009
QUICK REFERENCE:
This disbarment case against Atty. Pascual-Lopez was filed due to the evident
conflict of interest that she took advantage of. Conflict of interest exists when the
acceptance of the cause of one client goes against the cause of another previously
accepted client. As a lawyer, there is a duty to eliminate conflict of interest, but in
this case, Atty. Magulta used it to take advantage of the complainant and posed as a
mediator when in fact, she was wrongfully representing both clients with directly
conflicting interests.
FACTS:
• An administrative complaint was filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant)
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent)
• Charges against respondent include flagrant violations of the provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibilty (CPR), namely conflict of interests,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render and accounting of all
the money and properties entrusted to her.
• Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC), now known as Precedent
Communications Corporation (Precedent), is an affiliate company Multitel
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel)
• In 2002, Multitel was subject to demand letters from its members and
investors due to failures in investment plans
• Complainant became the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of
Precedent and was also the trustee of a 30 million peso deposit at Real Bank
• Being confused, complainant sought the help and advice of a friend and
fellow member of Couples for Christ (CFC), respondent Atty. Pascual-
Lopez.
• Respondent gave legal advice and helped prepare standard quitclaims for
the complainant
• Respondent offered a retainer agreement with 100,000 php acceptance fee.
Complainant refused.
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• No formal written document of any sort was executed stating that
respondent was the official legal counsel of the complainant.
• Complainant followed the advice of respondent and went to the US while
the case is pending to avoid conviction.
• When complainant returned respondent refused to acknowledge him as her
client and insisted that she represented the investors of Multitel instead.
• Respondent insisted that because there was no formal written agreement
making her the legal counsel of the respondent, then she was not bound by
the CPR.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Atty. Pascual-Lopez is bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and can therefore be disbarred due to conflict of interests,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render and accounting of all
the money and properties entrusted to her.
RATIO:
• Yes, Atty. Pascual-Lopez is still bound by the CPR even in the absence of
any written agreement and was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
• The respondent’s argument that she was not bound by the CPR because of
the absence of a written agreement is weak in the presence of the obvious
legal advice she gave the complainant. The determination of fidelity to the
practice is not limited by the presence of written agreements. Further,
conflicting interest is present when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test “whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue of claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.” Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform and act in a way that will injuriously affect his first client in any
manner.
• There was an obvious conflict of interest in this case that Atty. Pascual-
Lopez took advantage of and is sufficient grounds for her disbarment.
39 REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 105938 20 September 1996
QUICK REFERENCE:
FACTS:
Defendants (ACCRA Law Partners) and Raul Roco assisted in the organization and
acquisition of corporations linked to a complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the
PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth. The PCGG in an amended complaint dropped Raul Roco as party-defendant
on the promise of revealing his clients and was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan while
denying the inclusion of the other defendants upon their failure to, as ordered by the
PCGG: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings. The defendants then filed a petition for certiorari among several
grounds arguing that the Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s)
and the other information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers’ alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners’ client(s) in the case at bar.
HELD:
YES. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
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There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and
parcel of petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an
integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear
that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists.
FACTS:
• This case is in relation to a complaint dated July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. for the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in
the (PCGG Case No. 33, Civil Case No. 0033, Republic of the Philippines
v. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al). The defendants of this case (partners of the
law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices-
ACCRA Law Firm) as well as private respondent Raul Roco admitted in
the assistance in the organization and acquisition of the companies included
in the Case No. 0033 and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA
lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved
in the sequestration proceedings.
• On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint” and “Third Amended Complaint” which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominees/stockholder
in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
• The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners (ACCRA LAW) from the
complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
• In its “Comment,” respondent PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
• On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the
Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. ACCRA lawyers moved for a
reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking as one of the grounds:
• The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not
holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
• Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes
the identity of the client(s).
• The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity
of petitioners ACCRA lawyers’ alleged client(s) but extend to other
privileged matters.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners’ client(s) in the case at bar. -YES
RATIO:
• An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree
of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires
a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective
representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of
option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
• As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as
in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse
to divulge the name or identity of his client.
• Reasons:
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• The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information
is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
• The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is
a client.
• The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
• Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.
• Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified
by some important exceptions:
o Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
▪ Ex-Parte Enzor- A state supreme court reversed a lower
court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her
client on the ground that the subject matter of the
relationship was so closely related to the issue of the
client’s identity that the privilege actually attached to
both
▪ U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig- Where a strong probability exists
that the disclosure of the client’s identity would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyer’s legal advice was obtained.
o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged.
▪ Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the New
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer’s claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
Also, in the matter of Shawmut Mining Company.
o Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an
attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s
name is privileged.
▪ Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the
undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
• The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client’s name
would lead to establish said client’s connection with the very fact in issue
of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there
would be no attorney-client relationship). The link between the alleged
criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies
in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
o the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
o submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
o the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.
• From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.
• There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was
part and parcel of petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More important,
it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners,
therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
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• Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s
name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise exists.
40 ROXAS V. ZUZUARREGUI G.R. No. 152072 31 January 2006
QUICK REFERENCE:
FACTS:
During an expropriation case filed by the NHA involving the Zuzuarreguis for a
parcel of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal, they engaged the legal services of Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, and sought to represent them. An
agreement was entered upon by the parties stating that the contingent attorney’s fees
would be based in any and all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS
(P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds. A Compromise Agreement was
executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA stipulating among other things,
that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per
square meter payable in NHA Bonds or a total of P54,500,000.00. The records show
that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to
P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds. Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the
1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total
price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00.
Then the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages on 14
November 1989, against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and
Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA
bonds be turned over to them.
Petitioners Roxas and Pastor contend that the letter of agreement executed regarding
the payment of contingent attorney’s fees must be upheld as a contract is the law
between parties. Thus, they are entitled to P23,980,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter-agreement dated 10 December 1985, executed by the
Zuzuarreguis, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, fixing the exact amount that must go to
the former, should stand as law between parties.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that although there was a valid contract, and that the
contract is the law between parties, according to Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of
a court, as to its reasonableness.
SC cited Licudan v. Court of Appeals, where it did not allow the Contract for
Professional Services between the counsel and his client to stand as the law between
them as the stipulation for the lawyer’s compensation was unconscionable and
unreasonable.
Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, states that in cases
where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of
a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Supreme Court with the case at bar, held that the awarding of almost P24,000,000
pesos as contingent fees to Attys. Roxas and Pastor is unreasonable and
unconscionable reiterating the fact that the Courts may reduce it. This is in line with
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
• In 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation
proceedings against the De Zuzuarreguis for a parcel of land situated in
Antipolo, Rizal. They engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas
and Santiago N. Pastor, and sought to represent them.
• On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between
Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the
one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other.
The said Letter-Agreement confirms an amendment to their agreement
regarding attorney’s fees as lawyers and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s
properties expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES. It was stated that the
Zuzuarregui’s are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for our
179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS
(P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR
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HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA
Bonds and committed to pay the contingent attorney’s fees any and all
amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter
payable in NHA bonds.
• As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement
was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in Civil Case No.
26804. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that
the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50
per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December
1985, the RTC, Branch 141, Makati, approved the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties.
• On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B.
H. Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as
“partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of 1,790,570.36
square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal.” On even date, Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas delivered NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui in the amount of
P15,000,000.00. On 04 February 1986, the amount of P34,500,000.00 in
Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in
behalf of the Zuzuarreguis. On 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued
a receipt for receiving the amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included
the P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17
February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis, through Beatriz Zuzuarregui Vda. De
Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA
bonds. The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this
amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis
by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds. Computed at
P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total
amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of
P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
• Then the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages
on 14 November 1989, against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo
G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that
the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them.
• Petitioners Roxas and Pastor contend that the letter of agreement executed
regarding the payment of contingent attorney’s fees must be upheld as a
contract is the law between parties.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the letter-agreement dated 10 December 1985, executed by
the Zuzuarreguis, and Attys. Rosas and Pastor, fixing the exact amount that
must go to the former, should stand as law between parties.
RATIO:
• The Supreme Court held that although there was a valid contract which is
a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service, it
sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the return of the
NHA bonds to the Zuzuarreguis but applied a different computation
regarding the contingent attorney’s fees.
• The Supreme Court based its decision in Licudan v. Court of Appeals, where
it did not allow the Contract for Professional Services between the counsel
and his client to stand as the law between them as the stipulation for the
lawyer’s compensation was unconscionable and unreasonable.
• Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive
contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that
contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:
13. Contingent Fees.—
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
• and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
CANON 20—A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01.—A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
(d) The skill demanded; Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; MODULE 3
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; THE EXECUTIVE
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and 41 MARCOS V. MANLAPUS G.R. No. 88211 15 September 1989
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
• However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same QUICK REFERENCE:
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should Mr. Marcos wanted to return to the Philippines, but Mrs. Aquino, considering the
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such consequences to the nation of his return, barred his return. The liberty of abode and
that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is the right to travel are guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, while the right to return
tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. to one’s country is guaranteed by International Law. However, due to the residual
powers of the President that are grounded on general welfare of the people, Mrs.
• Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees
Aquino has the power to deny the rights guaranteed in favor of Mr. Marcos.
is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the
same is excessive and unconscionable. Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the
FACTS:
Rules of Court partly states:
• This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
• SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney shall be
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services • Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
• Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
of Mr. Marcos and his family.
determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney’s
fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory • The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
prerogative of the courts. liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
• In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view
equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including
that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount
of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there
was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a • The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
RATIO:
• The Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. It would not be accurate, however, to state
that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere
in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also
grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law.
• On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated.
• The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that the prime duty
of the Government is to serve and protect the people and that the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
• In the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government,
and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point
of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President
has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
• In the present case, the problem of the President is one of balancing the
general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
MARCOS V. MANLAPUS G.R. No. 88211 27 October 1989
QUICK REFERENCE:
By a vote of eight to seven, the Supreme Court (“SC”) on September 15, 1989, found
that the President validly denied former President Marcos and family from returning
to the Philippines. On September 28 of the same year, former President Marcos died,
and President Aquino reaffirmed the decision to bar the Marcos’ return. Marcos’
family filed a motion for reconsideration on October 2, 1989. The SC denied said
motion on the ground that as movants, Marcos’ family failed to present compelling
reasons to overturn the original decision. Likewise, the SC reaffirmed the President’s
decision as part of the residual powers vested in the President, as supported by
American Jurisprudence. The SC found that the decision to bar the return of the
Marcos family to the Philippines was not arbitrary or done with grave abuse of
discretion as the present circumstances warranted such bar.
FACTS:
• On September 15, 1989, the Supreme Court (“SC”) dismissed, by a vote of
eight to seven, the original petition, after finding that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in denying former President
Marcos and family’s return to the Philippines, given the present
circumstances.
• On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii. President Aquino reaffirmed the decision to deny Marcos’ return,
for the tranquility of the state and order of society.
• On October 2, 1989, Marcos’ family filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
raising the following arguments; (1) to bar the return is to deny inherent
right of citizens and rights guaranteed by the Constitution, (2) the
President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country, (3) No
basis for barring the return of Marcos’ remains and the Marcos family.
• Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and
academic as to the deceased former President. The Solicitor General also
asserts that the Marcos family sought to return under the guise of “right to
return” to destabilize the country, as evidenced by Mrs. Marcos’ statement
that the current President Aquino is “illegal”.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the President may validly bar the return of Filipinos.
RATIO:
• Yes, the President has residual powers, which includes the power to bar the
return of Filipinos to the country, which in this case is the Marcos family.
The SC holds that the movants for the reconsideration failed to present
compelling reasons for reconsideration. Also, the SC upheld that the
President has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant
of executive power which are necessary to comply with the duties under
the Constitution. Such view is found in American Jurisprudence, as
espoused by Hamilton and affirmed by Taft, on the American Constitution,
highlighting the sweeping language used for the executive power as
compared to the limiting words used for the other powers. The SC holds
that such view applies to the Philippine Constitution, as it has been
patterned after the American Constitution’s separation of powers.
Furthermore, the SC acknowledged that among the duties of the President
is that of the protection and promotion of the interest and welfare of the
people. The barring of the return of former President Marcos’ remains and
family under present circumstances is in compliance with such duty, absent
any clear showing of arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion.
42 LAGMAN V. MEDIALDEA G.R. No. 231658 4 July 2017
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagudd with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for
decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts
of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the
Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings
in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups
have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the
ISIS-backed Maute Group.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a governmeµt operation to
capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and the Maute Group was
conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence
aimed not only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise
against civilians and their properties
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader
of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam
Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open hostility
against the government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence
directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions and
establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political
foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control
was intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH
wilayat or province in Mindanao
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the
President to conclude that:
• These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt
to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire
Mindanao.
• The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of
young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen
display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable
intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from
its allegiance to the Government.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
• There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive
the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City
as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an
attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.
• The groups’ occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because
of its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao.
Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local
criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining
their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These
circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of
the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and
finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance
with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
compelling reason to revoke the same".
The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments.
Lagman’s petition are as follows;
• There is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao.
It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion 12
since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part
thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 13 It
labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other
outlying areas as mere propaganda1 1 4 and not an open attempt to remove
such areas from the allegiance to t Philippine Government and deprive the
Chief Executive of the assertion an exercise of his powers and prerogatives
therein.
• The Lagman Petition also avers that L~. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself
admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or
initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon.
• That all the acts of terrorism found in the report of Duterte are fake.
• The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did
not consult the military establishment or any ranking officiai27 before
making the proclamation.
• Based on the review by senate, there was absence of any hostile plan by the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied
with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a
meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute
Group
Culamat’s Petitions:
• In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described i Proclamation
No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire
region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show
any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in th entire Mindanao,"35
"failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Maraw'· City, much less x x x
allege that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole
of Mindanao".
• The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute
Group and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage
to property"37 does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare
martial law in the whole of Mindanao. 38 It also posits that there is no
lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.
• In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations,
and falsities in the Report of the President to Congress.
Mohamad’s Petitions:
• It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be
dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces;
second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and finally, the power to declare martial law. It maintains that the President
has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to us~; moreover,
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
his choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, t1e exigencies
of the situation
• It asserts that th Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a
public necessit brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel
the imposition at 1f martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus".
• Report of Duterte regarding martial law is bereft of substantiation.
• Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that
the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not
just the presence of arbitrariness".
Government’s petition:
• The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
vests the Court with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits
that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the exercise of such
authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the
vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding"
mentioned therein may be resorted to.
• Sufficiency of facts in the proclamation should be reviewed under the lens
of grave abuse of discretion.
• Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis musk be
assessed from the trajectory or point of view of the President and base on
the facts available to him at the time the decision was made.69 It argue that
the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not based on the
facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial
law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion
to an impossible standard. 70 It reiterates that the President's decision
should be guided only by the information and data available to him at the
time h made the determination. The OSG thus asserts that facts that were
established after the declaration of martial law should not be considered i
the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law.
• The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its
review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation, it would
in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether martial
law should be revoked or extended.
• Since the power to declare martial law is vested solely on the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from the Defense
Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration,
or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
• Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly
refute the facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his
Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly
contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay
evidence, twice removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative
value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on
governmental acts".
• Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the
burden rests with the petitioners. (He who alleges must prove)
ISSUES:
• W/N the petition to review the validity of declaring martial law is
appropriate
• W/N petitioners has locus standi
• W/N respondents has the burden of proof
• W/N the facts which the proclamation was based depends on the approval
of the defense secretary; that facts on which it is based must include future
facts: that facts are correct
• W/N the power to review by the court is independent on the power to
review by the legislature
• W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president
• W/N there is an actual rebellion
• W/N the proclamation fits the void for vagueness doctrine
RULING:
LOCUS STANDI ISSUE
YES, ALL PETITIONERS HAS LOCUS STANDI
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional
question is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to
INTRODUCTION TO LAW 2017 76
 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
challenge it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend towards
relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section
18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding
to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for
standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen.
He need not even be a taxpayer."
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all
women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".
In the Lagman petition, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they
are suing's citizens but merely referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives
Considering, however , the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as
well as i e transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will
exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter.
In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition
are at! citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement fof them to be elected
as representatives. We will therefore consider them a! suing in their own behalf as citizens of this
country. Besides, respondent did not question petitioners' legal standing.
APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING TO QUESTION MARTIAL LAW
IT DOES NOT REFER TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI it is SUI
GENERIS
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. 87 It is a special
and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by the law. 89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by
the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act
or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in
the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied from the
language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it
will not be held to exist.91
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her
functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a
petition for certiorari, the Court would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article
VII.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible
abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos
martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third
paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also
relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the
sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a
demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said
proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal
to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis, and to
render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment
of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason
why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but
remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
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 AQUILA LEGIS FRATERNITY
While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted,
nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent
of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of
the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably,
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII.
In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and
5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President
can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of the
Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different
rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The
usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to
promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It
could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court
REVIEW OF THE COURT INDEPENDENT FROM REVIEW OF
CONGRESS
YES, IT IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM REVIEW CONDUCTED BY
CONGRESS
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the/ extraordinary
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said
presidential action. In particular, the President' extraordinary powers of suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the
veto powers of the Court1 and Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in anl appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack 01 sufficient factual basis. On
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by th e President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation o~ suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."106 On thd other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness of
the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further;
it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic
in the sense that it , may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory,
which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court
to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest
the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other
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A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately
be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and
surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the
Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress
"defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this
proceeding.
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on
the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
CALIBRATION OF THE PRESIDENT’S POWER
NO, IT DOES NOT CALIBRATE THE PRESIDENT’S POWER VESTED
BY THE CONSTITUTION
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and
involves ordinary police action. 114 The President may resort to this extraordinary
power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115
the only limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries
or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use
to which the President puts the armed forces is xx x not subject to judicial review.
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
rebellion, and public safety requires it.
Limitations of martial law and or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus: (1) time limit of 60 days, (2) review and possible revocation of congress, (3)
review and possible nullification of SC
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of tle writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights a d individual freedom.
Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a wami g to citizens that the Executive
Department has called upon the military ~o assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and while the emergen~1y remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and
punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order
and enforce t e law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by
t e Congress, and review by the Court
What really happens during the imposition of martial law?
Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that
under a vali declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may
ordet the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on publi
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and ( d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the Presidenf may perform
do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
martial law. This is because martial law does not suspen the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation o civil courts or legislative
assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under th Bill of Rights remain in place during
its pendency. And in such instanc where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
also suspended, sue suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion
or offense d . h. . 129 connecte wit mvas10n.
GRADUATION OF POWERS
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-,. Chief, a
'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'.
It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on
scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or
order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This socalled "graduation of
powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which
power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-
Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation
warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also
lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the
President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to
address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State. 132
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It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so
would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement
on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial
review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his
graduated powers be availed of in a given situation.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations
In necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege I of
the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the
Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of concurrence of the
Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when
public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof,
there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the
country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same
leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution
to the Executive Department.
RECOMMENDATION OF DEFENSE SECRETARY
NO, IT IS NOT A CONDITION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT CAN
PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National
Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President
to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
shows that the President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition
except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly
so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
In any event, the President initially employed the most benign action -the calling out power before he
declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency
on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential
actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his
part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis still the
President made the conscious and deliberate effort to first employ the most benign
from among hjs extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towar ,s
suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided
to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on
the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sol~ and exclusive prerogative,
the President decided to impose martial law an~ suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the belief that thf armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to
actual rebellion and publif safety requires it.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
NO, IT IS NOT VOID ON ITS FACE
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by
the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in its Whereas Clause and for lack
of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation,
misinterpretation, confusion.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
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The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge
is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible '
"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does
not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
chills him into silence."
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds void for vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that
may be facial challenged. 148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216
open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55,
which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the
ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within
the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere
tools for the implementation of the proclamation.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, generql orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being, irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders i
violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should
be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas,
it would be deemed a~ trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the
exercise of its power to revoke.
NULLIFYING THE PROCLAMATION HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON
PREVIOUS ACTIONS COMMENCED BY THE PRESIDENT
PURSUANT TO THE SITUATION.
NO, IT WILL HAVE NO EFFECTON THE PREVIOUS
PROCLAMATION AND OR DECISION OF PRESIDENT DUTERTE
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the! President's
declaration of a state of national emergency on account of 1 lawless violence in
Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called
upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National1 Police (PNP) to undertake
such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao
region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere
in the Philippines
In Kulayan v. Tan, 152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a
different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to declare martial law:
Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review
the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to call out
the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although,
of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the President's exercise
of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion.
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This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the
Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
declaration of martial law
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the
declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect that President's
exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of
the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine,"
the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared
unconstitutional.158
'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
SCOPE OF THE POWER TO REVIEW
ONLY TO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTING PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION
Th 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on the
determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with the
test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution.
Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should
be understood as the only test for judicial review of the. President's power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs
to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review
of this Court Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the ' determination
of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only
on facts or information known by o available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as that written Report
submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on that situation existing at the time the
declaration was made or past events. As tq how far the past events should be from the present
depends on the President
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to
the President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what
to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking
into account the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be
forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential infonnation that may prejudice
the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are
included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had
already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or
reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as
part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court
should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in
the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all
facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's
appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-
making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm
the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining
would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but
would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him.
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need
to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant,
for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had
not been accurately reported to him.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the
President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an
examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the
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Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the
declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
IS THERE REBELLION
YES, THERE IS REBELLION
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence
of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down
Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer t~ rebellion as
defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only
create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which
may be abused -a situation that the constitution seeks to prevent
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there
is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the
purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to
the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."
Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable
cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes
of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike
other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and
therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much
simpler.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored
his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President
that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial
law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the
President As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information h~
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. 179 However, they insist
that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political
purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory
of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b)
to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the
following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of
his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion."221
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising
against the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the
purpose of removing Mindanao -starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur -
from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive
of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the
people therein and the nation as a whole."222
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted
authorities -the President, foremost -of their powers and prerogatives. "223
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of
a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao. "224
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5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young
Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed
consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a
segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags
constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and
eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting tp deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives withih Marawi City as a precedent
to spreading their control over the enti~e Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his
control over executi~~e departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his
mandate to ensu e that all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory
powe s 226 ' over local governments." · I
i i 7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now faqe pronounced
difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to tlle city-wide power
outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevente from performing their
functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services
in Marawi City have been adverse! affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by
the groups effective! deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic services to
its citizen .... Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government
fro restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered. "227
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being
provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug mone , and their blatant acts of
defiance which embolden other armed groups_ ~n Mindanao, have resulted in the
deterioration of public order and safety · n Marawi City; they have likewise
compromised the security of the enti e Island ofMindanao."228
I 9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities amojlg terrorist groups,
local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in
attaining their long-standing goal: absolu e control over the entirety of Mindanao.
These circumstances demand swi and decisive action to ensure the safety and security
of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity."229
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to
the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his powers and prerogative~, leading the President to believe
that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed
and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual ' bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists.
The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which
was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated f n Proclamation No. 216
and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/ r hyperbolic, does not persuade.
As mentioned, the Court is not concern d about absolute correctness, accuracy, or
precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President
in responding to an urgent situation.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels
of the Report; along with these alleged false data is arsenal of other independent facts
showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists, and public safety requires
the declaration of martial law r suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely
not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion
and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of
violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against
government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their
properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches
were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or
Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group;248
medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of
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government troops and civilian movement were hindered;250 and the security of the
entire Mindanao Island was compromised.25
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation
No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and
that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from
being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state
that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and
information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in
the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security. These documents may
contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of
firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and
sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some
information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report.
But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or
Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this.
During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in
the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he
also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and
confidential data, concomitant with his positions Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof
under martial law.
The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and
past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public
safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our
country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies
but also against those enemies~ lurking from beyond our shores
Conscious of those fears ~d apprehensions, the Constitution placed several
safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The
1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of
[the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to
actual invasion r,· r rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless
soon r revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto
powers of the Court and Congress.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law,
"involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the
safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as
crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical
form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes
and bounds.
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily
be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually
transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime
of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net
of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes
in themselves.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only
to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends ~o other areas where the
present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It 'is not intended merely to prevent
the escape of lawless elements from Mara i City, but also to avoid enemy
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines
The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe
upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs
to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the principle of
separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system
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To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the
strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It
would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the
territorial metes and bounds of martial law.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both
for symbolic and strategic reasons. , Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As
mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi
City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to establish a
wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017,
Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as
Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of
military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth
to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and tbe linkages established among
rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined
only to Marmfi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the
Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless
bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulµ, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot
simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the
President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective,
and called for by the circumstances.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective
of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance
of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime
is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is
terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err
in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime
of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism,
the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing
in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally
recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies
with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him
from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 whiJh states that rebellion and
terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other ?r that they cannot co-exist together. RA 93 72 does
not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have differett elements. 300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region.
43 U.S. V. NIXON 418 US 683 (1947)
QUICK REFERENCE:
President Nixon was issued a subpoena duces tecum by the US District Court of
Columbia to produce tape recordings and documents relating to his conversation
with aides and advisers. Nixon argued that he has absolute executive privilege. The
issue here is whether the subpoena should be quashed because it demands
confidential conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would
be inconsistent with the public interest to produce. The court stated that: “We
conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.”
FACTS:
• This litigation presents for review the denial of a motion, filed in the
District Court (“DC”) on behalf of the President, to quash a 3rd-party
subpoena duces tecum issued by the US District Court of Columbia.
• The subpoena directed the President to produce certain tape recordings and
documents relating to his conversation with aides and advisers. The court
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rejected the President’s claim of absolute executive privilege, of lack of
jurisdiction, and of failure to satisfy the requirement of Rule 17(c).
• On March 1, 1974, the grand jury of the US DC for Columbia returned an
indictment charging 7 named individuals with various offenses, including
conspiracy to defraud the US and to obstruct justice.
• The grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted
coconspirator. Upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces
tecum was issued to the President, which required the production of certain
tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain
precisely identified meetings between the President and others.
• The President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations;
portion f 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were
included.
• The President’ counsel filed a “special appearance” and a motion to quash
the subpoena accompanied by formal claim of privilege.
• Further motions to expunge the grand jury’s action naming the President
as an unindicted coconspirator and for protective order against the
disclosure of that information were filed or raised orally.
• DC denied the motions and further ordered “the President or any
subordinate officer, official, or employee with custody or control of the
documents or objects subpoenaed,” to deliver the originals, as well as an
index and analysi of those items, together with tape copies of those portions
for which transcripts had been released to the public by the President.
• DC rejected the jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the
dispute was nonjusticiable because it was between the Special Prosecutor
and the Chief Executive and hence “intra-executive” in character; it also
rejected the contention that the Judiciary was without authority to review
an assertion of executive privilege by the President.
• DC held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim
of executive privilege. The court concluded that the presumptive privilege
was overcome by the Special Prosecutor’s prima facie “demonstration of
need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers.”
• The President filed a timely notice of appeal from the DC order. Later on,
the Special Prosecutor also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before
judgment
ISSUE/S:
• Whether the subpoena should be quashed because it demands “confidential
conversations between a President and his close advisors that it would be
inconsistent with the public interest to produce.”
RATIO:
• Since the Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and
delineate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the Court
has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged to derive
from enumerated powers.
• We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court “to say
what the law is” with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.
• In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President urges 2 grounds.
The 1st ground is the valid need for protection of communications between
high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the
performance of their manifold duties.
• Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of
their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and
for their own interests to the detriment of the decision making process.
• The 2nd ground asserted by the President in support of the claim of
absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is
argued that the independence of the Executive Branch within its own
sphere, insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing
criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential
communications.
• However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an
absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
process under all circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on the
broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of
need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets,
we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all
the protection that a DC will be obliged to provide.
• To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute
privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes
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on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality
of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the
constitutional balance of “a workable government” and gravely impair the
role of the courts under Art. III.
• We conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
44 NERI V. SENATE G.R. No. 180643 25 March 2008
FACTS:
• On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People's Republic of China.
• In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced
in the Senate to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation in connection with
were various bills pending in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Neri was among those invited. He
was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and
October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing,
claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
• In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It
appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed
through a loan from the Chinese Government.
• On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees
for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve.
• Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with
petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
• On November 20, 2007, Neri did not appear before the Committees. Thus,
on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring
him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. NerI replied
Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege. The Committees found Ner's
explanations unsatisfactory. They issued the Order citing him in contempt
of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the communications implied by the subject three questions
subject to executive privilege.
HELD:
• YES. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably,
adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power,
broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and
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that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way
for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
• The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
• In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy
decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
• Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close
advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, Neri can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
45 SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR G.R. No. 82585 14 November 1988
FACTS/ISSUES:
• In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether
petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
RATIO:
1. Moot and Academic. The Sec. of Justice sustained the City Fiscal’s finding
of a prima facie case against the petitioners. Also, it should be noted that
instead of submitting counter-affidavits, Beltran filed a “Motion to declare
proceedings closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits.
2. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if
on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction But this privilege of
immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
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President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege.
46 DAVID V. ARROYO G.R. No. 171396 3 May 2006
QUICK REFERENCE:
FACTS:
In issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground
for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA,
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing.
RATIO:
The following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
• cases involve constitutional issues;
• for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
• for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
• for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
• for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas,
is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from
“illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law.
FACTS:
• These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege
that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion.
• Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
• On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency:
• I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency because the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and
the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists—the historical
enemies of the democratic Philippine State.
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• On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President
lifted PP 1017.
• According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as
the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the
rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf
S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing.
RATIO:
• Locus standi (Legal Standing) is defined as “a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the
“real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Accordingly, the “real-party-in-interest” is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
• “In matter of mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties
. . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and
see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a
public grievance be remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action
in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot
be denied.”
• For a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that
he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
• This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
• The following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
o Cases involve constitutional issues;
o For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
o For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
o For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
• Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
• The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
• Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him
by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to
anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but
he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that
is by impeachment.
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47 ESTRADA V. DESIERTO G.R. Nos. 146710-15 2 March 2001
QUICK REFERENCE:
FACTS:
The Case Is A Petition By Estrada Alleging That He Is The President On Leave
While Respondent, Arroyo Claims She Is The President.
Governor Singson Went On Air And Accused Estrada Of Receiving Millions From
Jueteng Lords; P220M In Jueteng Money And 70m In Excise Tax On Cigarettes
From Governor Singson.
Cardinal Sin Issued A Statement Asking Estrada To Step Down As He Had Lost
Moral Authority, Former President Aquino Also Asked Estrada To Take The
Supreme Self-Sacrifice And Resign. Fidel Ramos Also Joined And Even Vice
President Arroyo Asked For Estrada’s Resignation But Estrada Held On And
Refused To Resign.
And The Articles Of Impeachement Was Signed By 115 Representatives Or 1/3 Of
The Members Of The House Of Representatives Which Eventually Led To The
Senate Formally Opening The Impeachment Trial Of Estrada. During The Trial A
Testimony Was Made By A Senior Vice President At Equitable PCI Bank Stating
She Saw Estrada Affix The Signature Of ‘Jose Velarde’ On Documents Involving A
500m Agreement With Their Bank. Later, An Envelope Which Allegedly Contained
Evidence Showing Estrada Held 3.3B In A Secret Bank Account Under The Name
Jose Velarde Was Put To A Vote And By A Vote Of 11-10 The Senator Judges Ruled
Against Opening The Envelope. Prosecutors Walked Out In Protest Of The Ruling
And In A Few Hours Thousands Of People Assembled At EDSA Shrine. Estrada
later agreed to surrender the office and began negotiations for the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power but before the negotiations were finalized and executed
chief justice Davide administered the oath of arroyo as president and on that same
day Estrada and his family left the palace.
On that same day, he also signed a letter stating that he is unable to exercise the
powers and duties of his office and by operation of law the vice president shall be
acting president.
After His Fall From Power, Estrada’s Legal Problems Began. Estrada later filed with
the supreme court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the ombudsman from
conducting further proceedings in his criminal cases until after his term as president
is over. A petition for quo warranto was also filed praying for a judgement to confirm
that he is the lawful and incumbent president temporarily unable to discharge his
duties and that arroyo is only holding the presidency in an acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner resigned as president or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th president of the
republic.
RATIO:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as president.
FACTS:
• The Case Is A Petition By Estrada Alleging That He Is The President On
Leave While Respondent, Arroyo Claims She Is The President. In 1998,
Estrada Was Elected President And Arroyo Was Elected Vice President.
Since The Beginning Of His Presidency, Problems Kept Eroding His
Popularity And His Decent From Power Began When Governor Singson
Went On Air And Accused Estrada Of Receiving Millions From Jueteng
Lords; P220M In Jueteng Money And 70m In Excise Tax On Cigarettes
From Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee And
Committee On Justice Then Began Joint Investigations And The House Of
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Representatives Committee On Public Order And Security Also Began
Investigations. Representatives Also Spearheaded The Move To Impeach
Estrada.
• Later, Cardinal Sin Issued A Statement Asking Estrada To Step Down As
He Had Lost Moral Authority, Former President Aquino Also Asked
Estrada To Take The Supreme Self-Sacrifice And Resign. Fidel Ramos Also
Joined And Even Vice President Arroyo Asked For Estrada’s Resignation
But Estrada Held On And Refused To Resign.
• Soon Enough His Economic Advisers Resigned And The Articles Of
Impeachement Was Signed By 115 Representatives Or 1/3 Of The
Members Of The House Of Representatives Which Eventually Led To The
Senate Formally Opening The Impeachment Trial Of Estrada. During The
Trial A Testimony Was Made By A Senior Vice President At Equitable PCI
Bank Stating She Saw Estrada Affix The Signature Of ‘Jose Velarde’ On
Documents Involving A 500m Agreement With Their Bank. Later, An
Envelope Which Allegedly Contained Evidence Showing Estrada Held
3.3B In A Secret Bank Account Under The Name Jose Velarde Was Put
To A Vote And By A Vote Of 11-10 The Senator Judges Ruled Against
Opening The Envelope. Prosecutors Walked Out In Protest Of The Ruling
And In A Few Hours Thousands Of People Assembled At EDSA Shrine.
As More People Gathered And With Others Such As Students And
Teachers Walking Out Of Classes To Show Their Concordance — The
Call For Estrada’s Resignation Intensified.
• Thereafter, The Chief Of Staff Of The Armed Forces Had Withdrawn Its
Support For The Estrada Administration Followed By The PNP. Cabinet
Secretaries And Bureau Chiefs Also Started Resigning From Their Posts
And Rallies For Estrada’s Resignation Exploded In Various Parts Of The
Country. Even Estrada’s Announcement Of Holding A Snap Election In
Which He Will Not Run As A Candidate Did Not Diffuse The Crisis.
• Estrada later agreed to surrender the office and began negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power but before the negotiations were
finalized and executed chief justice davide administered the oath of arroyo
as president and on that same day estrada and his family left the palace and
issued a statement wherein he said that although he had doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of arroyo’s proclamation as president, he did
not wish to be a factor to prevent the restoration of unity in society and he
is leaving the palace, the seat of the presidency for the sake of peace and
order so that the healing process of the nation may begin. On that same
day, he also signed a letter stating that he is unable to exercise the powers
and duties of his office and by operation of law the vice president shall be
acting president.
• After his fall from power, Estrada’s legal problems began. Several cases of
bribery, graft, corruption, plunder, perjury, serious misconduct and illegal
use of public funds were filed against him. Estrada later filed with the
supreme court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the ombudsman from
conducting further proceedings in his criminal cases until after his term as
president is over. Estrada also later a petition for quo warranto praying for
a judgement to confirm that he is the lawful and incumbent president
temporarily unable to discharge his duties and that arroyo is only holding
the presidency in an acting capacity.
• In a resolution the court resolved that it did not issue a resolution declaring
the office of the president vacant and ordered the parties to refrain from
discussing the cases while they were pending decision by the court. A 30
day status quo was also issued enjoining the ombudsman from resolving
and deciding on the criminal cases against Estrada.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada, in the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still president, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
RATIO:
• None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question.
Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner
denies he resigned as president or that he suffers from a permanent
disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the president was not vacant
when respondent arroyo took her oath as president.
• The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article
VII of the Constitution which provides:
• “Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or
resignation of the president, the vice president shall become the president
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
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from office, or resignation of both the president and vice president, the
president of the senate or, in case of his inability, the speaker of the house
of representatives, shall then act as president until the president or vice
president shall have been elected and qualified.x x x.”
• The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as president or should be
considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath
as the 14th president of the republic. Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
• In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined
from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
• Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as president.
• To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the
petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expose
of governor Singson. The senate blue ribbon committee investigated. The
more detailed revelations of petitioner’s alleged misgovernance in the blue
ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The articles of
impeachment filed in the house of representatives which initially was given
a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained
the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the house of
representatives. Soon, petitioner’s powerful political allies began deserting
him. Respondent arroyo quit as secretary of social welfare. Senate president
drilon and former speaker villar defected with 47 representatives in tow.
Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
secretary of trade and industry.
• As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people’s call for his
resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven
(11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second
envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of
january 16 was over, the edsa shrine was swarming with people crying for
redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
• The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay
even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the court these circumstances during the
oral argument. It strikes the court as strange that the letter, despite its legal
value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis.
• To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would
be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not
to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he
resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause
the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He
cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
• Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of Republic Act 3019, bars him from
resigning.
• We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is
debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
manifestation of withdrawal of appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending
against petitioner when he resigned.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO G.R. Nos. 146710-15 3 April 2001
FACTS:
• Same as Estrada v Desierto March 3, 2001
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ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the court disregarded the clear and explicit provisions of
Art. XI. Section 3 (7) of the constitution and the settled jurisprudence
thereon.
RATIO:
• Petitioner contends that this court disregarded section 3 (7) of article xi of
the constitution which provides:
• “(7) Judgment In Cases Of Impeachment Shall Not Extend Further Than
Removal From Office And Disqualification To Hold Any Office Under
The Republic Of The Philippines, But The Party Convicted Should
Nevertheless Be Liable And Subject To Prosecution, Trial And Punishment
According To Law.”
• Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the
impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. A
plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision
conveys two uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in
impeachment cases has a limited reach . . . I.e., it cannot extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the
limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings considering its
nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of
manipulation will justify petitioner’s non sequitor submission that the
provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment for the
offenses he is now facing before the respondent ombudsman.
• Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors’ walk out from
the impeachment proceedings “should be considered failure to prosecute
on the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of
the case by the senate is equivalent to acquittal.”40 he explains “failure to
prosecute” as the “failure of the prosecution td prove the case, hence
dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.”41 he then
concludes that “dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an
acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double jeopardy.
• Without ruling on the nature of impeachment proceedings, we reject
petitioner’s submission.
• The records will show that the prosecutors walked out in the january 16,
2001 hearing of the impeachment cases when by a vote of 11-10, the
senator-judges refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing
the p3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank account under the
name “jose velarde.” The next day, january 17, the public prosecutors
submitted a letter to the speaker of the house tendering their resignation.
They also filed their manifestation of withdrawal of appearance with the
impeachment tribunal. Senator raul roco immediately moved for the
indefinite suspension of the impeachment proceedings until the house of
representatives shall have resolved the resignation of the public
prosecutors. The roco motion was then granted by chief justice davide, jr.
Before the house could resolve the issue of resignation of its prosecutors
or on january 20, 2001, petitioner relinquished the presidency and
respondent arroyo took her oath as president of the republic. Thus, on
february 7, 2001, the senate passed resolution no. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio.
• Petitioner did not move for the dismissal of the impeachment case against
him. Even assuming arguendo that there was a move for its dismissal, not
every invocation of an accused’s right to speedy trial is meritorious. While
the court accords due importance to an accused’s right to a speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, this right cannot be
invoked loosely. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial.47 the following provisions of the revised rules of criminal
procedure are apropos:
• “rule 115, section l(h). Rights of accused at the trial.—in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: (h) to
have speedy, impartial and public trial.”
• “rule 119, section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—
trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable
until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable length of time for
good cause.
• The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel,
set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case
shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the
first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the supreme court.”
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• Petitioner therefore failed to show that the postponement of the
impeachment proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an
unreasonable length of time. Recalling the facts, on january 17, 2001, the
impeachment proceeding was suspended until the house of representatives
shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of the public prosecutors.
This was justified and understandable for an impeachment proceeding
without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process.
However, three (3) days from the suspension or january 20, 2001,
petitioner’s resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the
impeachment court became functus officio and the proceedings were
therefore terminated. By no stretch of the imagination can the four-day
period from the time the impeachment proceeding was suspended to the
day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable period of delay violative
of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
• Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute
immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not
prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our decision, we
exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and
its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of
the 1987 constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a
public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting president, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
president. Petitioner’s rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised
new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still president,
albeit, a president on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire
term of office or until june 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has
relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure president.
• Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting president
enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his
position with the deliberations of the constitutional commission, viz.:
• “mr. Suarez. Thank you. The last question is with reference to the
committee’s omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the
president. I agree with commissioner nolledo that the committee did very
well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original
provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 constitution. But would
the committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first
sentence that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure,
considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the president-in-exile in
hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
• Fr. Bernas: the reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
• Mr. Suarez: so there is no need to express it here.
• Fr. Bernas: there is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation
made by the 1973 constitution was to make that explicit and to add other
things.
• Mr. Suarez: on the understanding, i will not press for any more query,
madam president. I thank the commissioner for the clarification.”
• Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent.50 from the deliberations,
the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from
suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
• Indeed, petitioner’s stubborn stance cannot but bolster the belief that the
cases at bar were filed not really for petitioner to reclaim the presidency but
just to take advantage of the immunity attached to the presidency and thus,
derail the investigation of the criminal cases pending against him in the
office of the ombudsman.
THE LEGISLATURE
48 ARANETA V. GATMAITAN
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191 30 April 1957
QUICK REFERENCE:
The President issues Executive Order (“EO”) No. 22 which prohibited the use of
trawls in San Miguel Bay. A group of Otter trawl operators assailed the validity of
the EOs and the power of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
enforce said EOs.
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The issue is whether the EOs were valid and whether undue delegation of legislative
power was granted to the President.
The Court ruled that the EOs were valid because the Fisheries Law authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to enact rules and regulations to
protect fish fry and fish eggs. Given the valid delegation of rule-making power, the
validity of the EOs issued by the President become apparent, given the provision in
the Constitution granting the President control over all executive departments,
among which the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is included.
FACTS:
• The President issued Executive Order (“EO”) No. 22 which prohibited the
use of trawls in San Miguel Bay
• Said EO was amended by EO 66 and 80
• A group of Otter trawl operators, praying the an injunction be issues to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Fisheries from enforcing the said executive order, filed a
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila
• The Court rendered a decision declaring EOs 22, 66, and 80 invalid
• The argument being that only the Legislature, not the Executive, may
restrict trawl fishing
• Respondents filed an appeal, arguing that the lower court erred in ruling
that the President has no authority to issue the EOs in question
ISSUE/S:
• Whether the President has the authority to issue EOs 22, 66, and 80; and
• Whether EOs 22, 66, and 80 were valid for the issuance thereof was not in
exercise of legislative power unduly delegated to the President
RATIO:
• Yes, the President has the authority to issue EOs 22, 66, and 80
• The Fisheries Law authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fishing
device— including the net trawl fishermen use— for the protection of fry
or fish eggs
• The same law also declares unlawful and fixes a penalty for the taking,
destroying, or killing of any fish fry and fish eggs
• Thus, even without the EOs in question, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources may authorize the banning of trawl fishing
• The Constitution, in Article VII Section 10 (1), provides that “the President
shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, or offices” and the
Revised Administrative Code, in Sections 63 and 74 place the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources under the President’s control
• Thus, the President has the power to issue the EOs in question
• Yes, the EOs are valid and are not in exercise of unduly delegated legislative
power
• The power to legislate and the discretion as to the execution of the law are
different
• The power to legislate is limited to the Legislature
• The discretion as to the execution of the law (rule-making power) may be
exercised by the Executive
• Insofar as this case is concerned, the Congress has already exercised its
power to legislate as seen in the Fisheries Law, and Congress has also
authorized the Executive, through the office of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to promulgate the rules and regulations to carry into
effect the legislative intent
• Thus, the EOs and the restriction of trawl fishing are valid and do not
qualify as undue delegation of legislative power
49 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA G.R. No. 76633 18 October 1988
QUICK REFERENCE:
Vitaliano Saco was the Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed
in an accident in Tokyo. His wife sued for damages under E.O. No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow
is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a
domestic employee and consequently his widow’s claim should have been filed with
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission. Memorandum Circular No.2 prescribes a standard contract to be
adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies, and this said contract
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has a clause as to the death benefits being awarded here. In addition, the provisions
of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract of Saco as a
postulate of Police Power. Held: The Court held that Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA is not violative of the non-delegation of legislative power. In this case,
both tests (completeness and sufficient standard test) are correctly applied since the
law leaves nothing for POEA to do but to enforce what is written in the law, and the
standard is to protect the rights of OFWs to fair and equitable employment practices.
FACTS:
• Vitaliano Saco, the husband of private respondent, Kathleen D. Saco, was
the chief officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages under EO 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
• The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that
the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an
overseas worker.
• The petitioner, Eastern Shipping Lines (ESL), does not contend that Saco
was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable.
What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a domestic
employee and consequently his widow’s claim should have been filed with
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission. ESL also avers that granting if he was an overseas worker or
not, the award made by the POEA was not contained in the contract of
Saco and thus, should not be made to pay them.
• POEA says that Memorandum Circular No.2 prescribes a standard contract
to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies, and this
said contract has a clause as to the death benefits being awarded here.
• In addition, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed
written into the contract of Saco as a postulate of Police Power.
• POEA granted judgment for private respondent, giving her death benefits
totaling Php 192,000.00.
• ESL raised it to SC, saying that the MC is violative of the non-delegation
of legislative power
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA is violative of
the non-delegation of legislative power.
RATIO:
• NO. It is not violative of the non-delegation of legislative power.
• There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz., the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
• Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.
• Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegated authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.
• Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
• In this case, both tests are correctly applied since the law leaves nothing for
POEA to do but to enforce what is written in the law, and the standard is
to protect the rights of OFWs to fair and equitable employment practices.
• The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation
of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.
• DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10,
1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
50 BELGICA V. OCHOA G.R. No. 208566 19 November 2013
QUICK REFERENCE:
Several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. The
Court held that the PDAF is unconstitutional for many reasons specifically, it is
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violative of the principles or constituional provisions on separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative powers and checks and balances.
FACTS:
• In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as enacted in the 2004 General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for
lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.
• In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe
into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork
barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."
• The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation — "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) — had swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an
entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of
PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted
into Napoles' private accounts.
• On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results
of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators' PDAF
from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo
administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of
releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including
Local Projects (VILP) by the DBM, the application of these funds and the
implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and
several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).
• The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in
PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%,
respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have
been made nationwide during the audit period.
• Accordingly, the CoA's findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and
Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made
public, the highlights of which are as follows:
• Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of
legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
• Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of
sponsoring members of the Lower House.
• Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated
under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
• Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these
having been turned over to the government.
• Significant amounts were released to [implementing agencies] without the
latter's endorsement and without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
• Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
[implementing agencies] themselves but by [NGOs] endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
• The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
• Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
• Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred
seventy two (772) projects amount to [P]6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
• Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of
goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with
law.
• As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that "at least
P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project
off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy Non-governmental Organization (NGO).
• Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional.
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ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on the non-delegability
of legislative power.
RATIO:
• Yes. It is unconstitutional.
• The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in
Philconsa — is lodged in Congress.
• That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is
clear from Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law."
• To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum
from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
• Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much
from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine.
• As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation
as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
• Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
MODULE 4
COMMON LAW v. CIVIL LAW
51 Lost in Translation: Oral Advocacy in a
Land Without Binding Precdent
Introduction
Common law jurisdiction is designed to allow judges to be the primary lawmakers
with jurisprudence as their primary source of law. Professors direct students to read
series of cases to provide them with the date they are to use to deduce the governing
legal norms. This “case book” method of teaching has an effect on how students
develop their advocacy skills in law school and how they ultimately argue before
appellate bodies as practitioners. Conversely, the language of the Code and the
writings of scholars comprise the core of the civil law legal system. Although the
common-law and civil law legal traditions share similar social objectives, including
individualism, liberalism, and personal rights; the common-law theory of precedent,
is incompatible in many ways with the legal method used to decide cases in civil law
courts. Although the common-law and civil law legal traditions share similar social
objectives, including individualism, liberalism, and personal rights; the common-law
theory of precedent, is incompatible in many ways with the legal method used to
decide cases in civil law courts. The traditional common law oral advocacy style, then,
is not suitable for a civil law argument.
Common Law Origins
The common law legal tradition evolved in England beginning in the Eleventh
century and traveled through conquests and colonization to forty- nine of the United
States, Australia, Canada and many countries in Africa and Asia. In its most basic
form the common law is a body of law comprised of precedent, which means a prior
decision, or a consistent group of decisions which represent a model to be followed
by subsequent decisions or more precisely the binding decisions of higher courts of
the same jurisdiction. As the common law system grew and evolved it needed
legitimacy, predictability, and consistency in its decision making. From this need
arose the cornerstone of the common law legal systems: the doctrine of Stare decisis.
This doctrine commands judges to apply the law as it has been set out in a prior case
when a higher, or sometimes equal, court made the prior decision. A decision has a
stare decisis effect with regard to a later case only if the question on which the
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decision in both cases rests is the same, or substantially the same. To determine
whether the legal questions are the same or substantially so, the court must consider
the prior decision.
Even though statutes and regulations increasingly shape the United States legal
landscape, court decisions still play a significant role in traditional common law areas,
such as torts and property, in understanding how statutes should be understood and
applied. As has often been repeated, “statutes in derogation of the common law are
strictly construed.” That is to say, where some statutory provisions appear to be in
conflict with a deeply rooted rule of the common law, the tendency will be to
interpret the provision in such a way as to evade the conflict with a deeply rooted
rule of the common law, the tendency will be to interpret the provision in such a way
as to evade the conflict.
Civil law is a legal tradition originating in Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris
Civilis of Justinian, and subsequently developing on continental Europe. Today, it is
the dominant legal tradition in the greater part of Western Europe, Central and South
America, Asia and Africa, and even a few parts of what is generally considered the
common law world (Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico).
Generally, the exclusive sources of law in civil law jurisdictions are written
constitutions, codes, specific statutes or decrees, and international treaties. Civil law
is highly systematized and structured. It relies on declarations of broad, general
principles and often ignores details. There are five basic codes typically found in a
civil law jurisdiction: the civil code, the commercial code, the code of civil procedure,
the penal code, and the code of criminal procedure.
A civil law judge applies the law; he does not create it. In part this is due to the
function of a civil law judge as a civil servant. A judicial career is but one of the
several responsibilities open to law school graduates.
The role of judges, as operators of the legal system, is to apply the applicable Code
provisions to the case before them. This application requires an adherence to existing
Code principles, legal science and scholarly developed doctrine, but far less emphasis,
than the common law, is placed on discretion and interpretation.
In a civil law system, judicial decisions are not a source of law. It would violate the
convention against judicial lawmaking if decisions of courts were binding on
subsequent courts. The orthodox view, consequently is that no court is bound by the
decision of any other court.
Prior decisions, however, are not without any respect in the civil law system; the
decisions may have persuasive value to later courts. The doctrine of jurisprudence
constant refers to a series of decisions forming a constant stream of uniform and
homogenous rulings that have the same reasoning, the doctrine affords the cases
considerable persuasive authority and justifies, without requiring, the court in
abstaining from new inquiry because of its faith in the prior decisions.
Advocacy
Advocacy is the process of trying to convince your audience through the technique
of persuasion. Oral advocacy is an interactive effort that requires a well-organized
presentation of an advocate’s case as well as spontaneous responses to the judge’s
questions.
In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, advocates should have a mantra that
reduces their case to the bare essence. That is, the advocate should have a central
theme that she will approach from different angles: facts, law, intent, and policy. This
theme should then flow through the oral argument, the traditional structure of which
is generally divided into four component parts: (1) Opening Statement; (2) Road
Map; (3) Body of the Argument; and (4) Conclusion.
In the opening statement the advocate should cordially greet the judges, and
introduce him or herself as counsel as well as cocounsel where appropriate. Next,
the advocate should briefly set forth the procedural posture of the case. This is
followed by what the advocate is asking the court to do; affirm, reverse, remand.
Lastly, the advocate should ask if the court would like a brief statement of the facts
The road map lets the judges know the order in which the advocate has organized
the issues. The advocate should give the court a concise outline or road map of the
issued she will argue to support her position. Rather than merely reciting the issues,
the advocate should state the points of her road map in an affirmative and persuasive
manner. An advocate is always well-advised to present her strongest point first to
attract the court’s attention and ensure that these points are not omitted. When
questions are asked, direct responses must be made. Where rebuttal is appropriate,
and advocate should not reserve more than 2 or 3 minutes for rebuttal, rather, the
advocate should use the time to make 2 or 3 concise points in response to the most
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injurious points of the opponent. The conclusion should briefly summarize the
important of the advocate’s argument in light of the theme set forth at the beginning
of the argument.
Oral Advocacy in Common Law Jurisdiction - Body of the Argument
In the common law the dominant style of reasoning is inductive: courts interpret and
synthesize earlier court decisions to create general legal principles and then apply
those principles to the facts of the case before them. They do the same when applying
statutes. Accordingly, the common law advocate must focus on fact patterns. In the
body of her argument she must analyze cases presenting similar but not identical
facts. She must, from those cases, extract the specific rules, and then through
deduction, determine the often narrow scope of each rule, and sometimes proposes
new rules to cover facts that have not yet presented themselves.
Judicial reasoning involves three separate, but closely related steps: recognition of
the similarity between cases, interpretations of a rule fashioned from the material
facts of the case, then application of the rule to the second case.
Common Law Advocacy in Practice
The dominant style of reasoning is deductive: courts apple general legal principles to
specific situations by reasoning with guidance from scholars. The civil law advocate
must build the body of her argument around legal principles, tracing their history,
identify their function, determining their domain of application, and explaining their
effects in terms of rights and obligations. Civil law requires the judge to search for
legal concepts in the Civil Code delineating a pattern of competing interests closely
resembling the interests pressing for recognition.
Transferring Common Law Advocacy Skills to Create an Effective Civil Law
Argument
The goal of an advocate is to convince the court that her client should prevail. To
achieve this goal, the advocate must understand and appreciate the main goals of the
oral-argument persuasion and education. Transferring common law advocacy skills
to create an effective civil law argument requires: (1) an understanding of the purpose
of the oral argument, as well as the governing rules of the court or tribunal hearing
the argument; (2) an appreciation for the role of the judge hearing the argument; (3)
a broader grasp of what the common law considers secondary authority; and (4) an
awareness of the applicability of non-binding precedent.
An advocate appearing before a court or tribunal in a civil law jurisdiction needs to
shift her focus to make the applicable code and treaty provisions central to the body
of her argument. While the advocate is not wholly precluded from making reference
to the decisions of other courts she must understand that the court is not bound by
the prior ruling. The body of her argument cannot solely rely upon and make
reference to earlier decision. Rather, her argument must also find support in scholarly
doctrines and notions of customary international law, consisting “of rules of law
derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law
required them to act that way."
The body argument cannot solely rely upon and make reference to earlier decision,
rather, her argument must also find support in scholarly doctrines and notions of
customary international law, consisting “of rules of law derived from the consistent
conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way.”
In a similar fashion to a common law advocate’s use of primary authority, a civil law
advocate should weave doctrine into her argument to persuade the court that a
proper application of the governing Code section mandates a ruling in her favor.
Conclusion
Cicero’s advice, although centuries old, still rings true today. An advocate must be
clear so that the court understands her argument. An advocate must be interesting
so that the court pays attention to her argument. And, an advocate must be
persuasive so that the court rules in favor of her argument. In order to properly
achieve this trifecta, the advocate must first fully comprehend the legal system that
governs the court or tribunal to which she is presenting her argument.
An advocate, trained in a common law jurisdiction, cannot present her argument in
form and substance, in an identical fashion in both common law and civil law courts.
Although the common law and civil law legal traditions share similar social
objectives, the common law corner stone of stare decisis and theory of precedent,
are incompatible with the Code based method applied by civil law courts.
Accordingly, an advocate cannot structure the body of her argument as an appeal to
precedent. Rather, she must begin with a strong understanding of the substance and
structure that comprise a common law argument. By garnering a greater awareness
for the civil law system, including an understanding of the rules that govern the court
or tribunal that will be hearing the argument, an appreciation for the role of scholars
in the civil law system, an advocate will be able to effectively craft a persuasive civil
law argument.
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52 Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law
(Codified and Uncodified)
INTRODUCTION
Related Entitites and their Definitions
A. Legal Systems
- is an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules.
B. Legal Traditions or Families
Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature
of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper
organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be
made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.
C. Civil Law
may be defined as that legal tradition which has its origin in Roman law, as codifed
in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian,' and as subsequently developed in Continental
Europe and around the world.
D. Common Law
Its principles appear for the most part in reported judgments, usually of the higher
courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising in disputes which courts have
adjudicated. The common law is usually much more detailed in its prescriptions than
the civil law. Common law is the foundation of private law,
E. Statutory Law
law found in legislation other than civil codes, is basic to both the civil and common
law.
F. Mixed Legal Systems
A mixed legal system is one in which the law in force is derived from more than one
legal tradition or legal family. For example, in the Quebec legal system, the basic
private law is derived partly from the civil law tradition and partly from the common
law tradition.
G. Mixed Jurisdiction
A mixed jurisdiction is a country or a political subdivision of a country in which a
mixed legal system prevails. For example, Scotland may be said to be a mixed
jurisdiction, because it has a mixed legal system, derived in part from the civil law
tradition and in part from the common law tradition
H. Maritime Law
Civil Law and Common Law: Differences in Sources, Concepts, and Styles
A. Order of Priotiy: Jurisprudence and Doctrine
that priority in civil law is given to doctrine (including the codifiers' reports) over
jurisprudence, while the opposite is true in the common law. Common law, on the
other hand, finds in judge-made precedent the core of its law.
B. Doctrine: Functions
The civil law doctrine's function is “to draw from this disorganised mass [cases,
books and legal dictionaries] the rules and the principles which will clarify and purge
the subject of impure elements, and thus provide both the practice and the courts
with a guide for the solution of particular cases in the future.”
The common law doctrine's function is more modest: authors are encouraged to
distinguish cases that would appear incompatible to a civilist, and to extract from
these specific rules.
C. Doctrine: Style
The common law author focuses on fact patterns.
The civilist focuses rather on legal principles.
D. Jurisprudence: Function
Common law jurisprudence sets out a new specific rule to a new specific set of facts
and provides the principal source of law.
Civil law jurisprudence applies general principles, and that is only a secondary source
of law of explanation.
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E. Stare Decisis
The English doctrine of stare decisis compels lower courts to follow decisions
rendered in higher courts, hence establishing an order of priority of sources by
“reason of authority.”
Stare decisis is unknown to civil law, where judgments rendered by judges only enjoy
the “authority of reason.”
F. Jurisprudence: Style
Civil law judgments are written in a more formalistic style than common law
judgments. Civil law decisions are indeed shorter than common law decisions, and
are separated into two parts-the motifs (reasons) and the dispositif (order). This is
because civil law judges are specially trained in special schools created for the
purpose, while common law judges are appointed from amongst practising lawyers,
without special training.
G. Statutes: Functions
Civil law codes provide the core of the law-general principles are systematically and
exhaustively exposed in codes" 6 and particular statutes complete them. Finally
follows the jurisprudence
Common law statutes, on the other hand, complete the case law, which latter
contains the core of the law expressed through specific rules applying to specific
facts.
H. Style of Drafting of Laws"'
Civil law codes and statutes are concise while common law statutes are precise
I. Interpretation of Laws
In civil law jurisdictions, the first step in interpreting an ambiguous law is to discover
the intention of the legislator by examining the legislation as a whole, as well as the
provisions more immediately surrounding the obscure text.
In common law jurisdictions, by comparison, statutes are to be objectively construed
according to certain rules standing by themselves.
J. Appointment of Judges
Common law judges, who are called to play an important role in deciding what the
law is, are appointed from among experienced practising lawyers.
Civil law judges, whose main function is adjudicating, are appointed fresh from
specialized schools.
K. Evolution of the Law
civil law principles, frozen into codes and often rigid doctrine, are imposed on courts,
most common law rules can be changed from time to time, subject to the doctrine
of stare decisis.
On one hand, the realities of modem life can be addressed in a more timely fashion
through the common law, e.g. the salvage lien and repairer's lien.
L. Concept of Legal Rule
Consequentially, civil law systems are "closed," in the sense that every possible
situation is governed by a limited number of general principles,' ' while common law
system are "open," in the sense that new rules may be created or imported for new
facts."
Civil law allows for wider rules than does the common law in private law matters
(those rules that can be avoided by contract), in that civil law rules are suppletive (the
parties are deemed to know the law and hence to be aware of those rules), while
common law rules are presumptive of the intention of the parties when relevant facts
are present.
M. Categories of Laws
Civil law categories are based on the rules themselves, e.g. private law and public
law,"' while common law categories were founded on the law that was administered
by different courts.
N. Rights vs. Remedies
Civil law focuses on rights and obligations, while common law is oriented toward the
jurisdiction of particular courts to grant the sought-after remedy
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CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW: RESULTING DIFFERENCES IN LAW
A. Economic Loss
Civil law’s unitary system provide for the same means of enforcement regardless of
the obligation while Common law used to be unwilling to be unwilling to award pure
economic loss. This attitude has been softened recently however.
B. Pre-Judgment Interest
Pre-judgment interests are recoverable as of right in civil law, because they are
understood as part of the lucrum cessans while it is only in recent times for common
law systems (except in maritime law).
C. Lex Mercatoria
Modern lex mercatoria finds its strength in civilian jurisdictions. Thomas
Carbonneau pointed out that “the strongest advocates of the new law merchant are
from civil law jurisdictions where general legal principles constitute the primary
source of law and specialized courts have long handled commercial disputes at an
intermediary level of the legal system” while “critics of lex mercatoria and
delocalization are steeped in the common law tradition of narrow rules and holdings,
where decisional law is the foremost source of law and courts are its oracles”.
D. Conflicts of Laws
Terminology – common law includes choice of law, choice of jurisdiction and
recognition of foreign judgments, while civil law’s appropriate translation is “private
international law” because it merely governs choice of law rules.
History – common law conflict of laws rules are relatively new because procedural
requirement used to be sufficient to limit courts’ jurisdiction to domestic conflicts.
Emphasis – civil law puts more emphasis on its choice of law rules while common
law focuses on the rules of jurisdiction.
Traditional Method – civil law traditional method consists in characterizing the dispute
as belonging a defined category, and then identifying the applicable internal law in
relation to points of attachment of the category concerned. The characterization of
issues is always influenced by the lexfori; hence a delay to sue issue would be
characterized as substantive in civil law and procedural in common law.
Special methods – civil law and common law developed similar rules to limit the scope
of traditional method. For instance, the civil law notions of fraude a La loi and fraude
au jugement are similar to the common law rule of "no evasion of the law"; the same is
true of civil law's international public order and common law's public policy.
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court, which has
jurisdiction to hear a claim, refuses to do so, because it believes another court of
another state also has jurisdiction to hear the claim and can better render justice in
the circumstances. This principle was unknown to civil law courts. Forum non
conveniens was accepted by English courts in order to palliate the absence of rules
of international jurisdiction.
F. Forum Conveniens
Forum conveniens is the common law principle whereby a court, which does not
have jurisdiction over a claim, nevertheless accepts jurisdiction, because there is no
other appropriate jurisdiction to hear the claim and justice would not otherwise be
done. This principle is not known in civil law.
G. Arbitration
A common law equity clause in an arbitration agreement "purports expressly to
dispense the arbitrator from applying the law either wholly or in part.” In civil law,
these are called amiable compositeur clauses. While strict equity clauses are suspect
in England, amiable compositeur clauses are generally permitted in civil law
jurisdictions and are found in civilian codes.
H. Arbitration and Interpretation/Construction of Contracts
The common law objective contract theory dictates that contractual promises be
interpreted according to the reasonable expectation of the promisee. Civil law, which
is based on the autonomy of free will, requires actual consent but presumptions of
fact are available to the trial judge.
Some Civilian Principles Now in the Common Law
A. Restitution
The modern law of restitution resembles the civil law principles of quasi-contract
found for centuries in Scottish civil law. The revival or creation of restitution in
England intrigues civilians, particularly in codal countries. While the principle of
unjust enrichment now unites restitutionary claims at common law, unjust
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enrichment at civil law is but one of the quasi-contracts which triggers restitution. It
is interesting that today the three basic requirements of unjustified enrichment under
both civil law and common law are: 1) an enrichment by the receipt of a benefit, 2)
that this benefit be gained at the plaintiff's expense, and 3) a lack of legal cause.
B. Negligence: Delict – The General Tort of Negligence
Before Donohue v. Stevenson, there was no general duty of care at common law. Civil
law, on the contrary, always recognized the general obligation not to act unreasonably
in situations not governed by contract. Donohue v. Stevenson created, amongst the
special duties of care already sanctioned by the action in negligence, a general duty
of care similar to that of civil law: "you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour”.
C. Foreseeable Contractual Damages
In civil law, it is not sufficient that contractual damages be the immediate and direct
consequence of the non-performance; they must have been foreseen or foreseeable
at the time that the obligation was contracted unless there is intentional or gross fault.
In 1854, Hadley v. Baxendale, the court adopted the rule that, besides those damages
arising naturally from the breach, consequential damages include such damage as
"may reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it”.
D. Pre-judgement Interests
the general principle of restitutio in integrum entails that prejudgment interests be
granted as a loss of profit
E. Proof of Foreign Law
Common law is more adversarial, while civil law is more inquisitorial, when it comes
to proving the substance of a foreign law, a question of fact arising in a choice of law
or recognition of foreign law situation. At common law, foreign law was proven by
the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, who were summoned to court, and
subject to examination as to both their qualifications as experts and their knowledge
and interpretation of the foreign law in question.
In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, foreign laws needed usually be proven
only by the production of a certificate, prepared by a diplomat of the relevant state
or an expert in the foreign law concerned, who, however, was not called to testify as
a witness at trial
F. Contributory Negligence
While at common law contributory negligence has always been a complete bar to an
action in tort, civil law has always dealt with this issue as a mere question'of causation,
thereby apportioning liability according to the gravity of the concurrent faults.
G. Marine Insurance
Common law speaks of an undertaking to indemnify "marine losses, that is to say,
the losses incident to marine adventure."' Civil law is concerned instead with the
guarantee of "risks in respect of a maritime operation."
CONCLUSION
This paper has identified some of the principal mixed jurisdictions in the
contemporary world and has sketched (very briefly) the historical development of
their respective mixed legal systems. Special attention has been devoted to systems
combining elements of the common law tradition with elements of the civilian
tradition in either uncodified form (e.g. Scotland and South Africa) or in codifications
(Louisiana and Quebec). Some major differences in content, structure and style as
between these two traditions have been explored, and some examples of differences
between the substantive law rules of each have been presented.
The contribution of the lex mercatoria (both ancient and modem) to reconciling
differences between legal traditions has been surveyed. In this domain, the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1994, that
remarkable synthesis of fundamental values and ideas on international- trade law
achieved by specialists from different legal systems, is of particular importance,
because it is increasingly accepted as a guideline and applied as a substantive
restatement of supranational commercial norms. The paper has also noted the recent
Canadian project of harmonizing federal legislation (reflecting common law)with
Quebec civil law by statute. I have also made personal observations on mixed legal
systems, from the viewpoint of a practitioner, a legislator and a law teacher.
Finally, I have warned that mixed jurisdictions can best survive if each legal system
has its own language, courts and legislature.
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The preservation of different languages, cultures and institutions (legislative and
judicial) within a mixed jurisdiction, high quality legal education and the enactment
of codes and statutes, can all be of significant assistance in the continuance and
evolution of a mixed legal system, in the face of globalization and pressures for
standardization. Equally important to the survival and development of any mixed
legal system, however, is the awareness of judges, lawyers, legislators and academics of
the distinctiveness of the legal traditions underlying the system. This must be coupled
with a profound commitment to defend, and indeed to celebrate, the integrity of each
of those traditions, so that they may make their particular contributions to the system
as a whole.
For those of us living and practising in mixed jurisdictions, the fate of our mixed
legal systems at the turn of the millennium depends, in the final analysis, not on our
stars, but on ourselves.
MODULE 5
ISSUE/S:
53 FERMIN V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 157643 28 March 2008
RATIO:
FACTS:
• On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie)
Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel were filed against
Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218.
• That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN,
publisher, and BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with
offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City,
and circulated in Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and the
whole country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, publicly and acting with malice, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline and
lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID issue of June 14, 1995 when in
truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false
and untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose
said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as
it depicts her to be a fugitive from
• The Regional trial Court affirmed the libel case while the Court of Appeals
upheld the conviction of Fermin but acquitted Tugas.
• Petitioner (Fermin) posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher
knowingly participated in or consented to the preparation and
publication of the libelous article. This principle is, allegedly, based on
our ruling in U.S. v. Taylor, People v. Topacio and Santiago, U.S. v. Madrigal, U.S.
v. Abad Santos, and U.S. v. Ocampo, as purportedly clarified in People v. Beltran
and Soliven. She submits that these cases were applied by the CA in acquitting
her co-accused Tugas, and being similarly situated with him, she is also
entitled to an acquittal. She claims that she had adduced ample evidence to
show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the
offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of
the articles published in Gossip Tabloid.
• Whether or not Fermin is liable for libel.
• The Supreme Court held that the arguments of the Petitioner are too
simplistic and the cited jurisprudence are either misplaced or, in fact,
damning. Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v. Abad Santos are not
applicable to the present case. U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal
prosecution under Section 30 of Act No. 1519 for fraudulently
representing the weight or measure of anything to be greater or less than
it is, whereas U.S. v. Abad Santos refers to criminal responsibility under the
Internal Revenue Law (Act. No. 2339).
• The other cases are more in point, but they serve to reinforce the
conviction of, rather than absolve, petitioner.
• In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277
which provides that: “Every author, editor or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any
words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or
serial as fully as if he were the author of the same.” However, proof
adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the
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publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was
directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter
contained in the said libelous article.
• In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb “publicar.”
Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the
person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person
who prints or publishes it. Based on these cases, therefore, proof of
knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article
is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author,
editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication, as
petitioner and Tugas are in this case.
• The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code was enunciated in U.S. v. Ocampo, to
wit:
• “According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United
States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is
liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and
his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication
in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other
persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with
its publication are liable as publishers.”
• In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St.
Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor
of a newspaper was discussed.
• “The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a
newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the
libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a
libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence
prima facie to charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its
publication.
• “A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper
for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared
by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it.”
• Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by the CA in People v. Beltran
and Soliven such that Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The Philippine Star,
was acquitted by the appellate court in view of the lack of evidence
that he knew and approved the article written by Luis D. Beltran
about then President Corazon C. Aquino in the newspaper’s October
12, 1987 issue. Petitioner submits that People v. Beltran and Soliven serves as
a guide to this Court regarding the criminal liability of the publisher
of the newspaper where a libelous article is published. Put
differently, it appears that petitioner wants this Court to follow the
CA decision and adopt it as judicial precedent under the principle of
stare decisis.
• The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code, is
enunciated, thus:
•
“The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.”
• Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained finality at the level of
the CA. Thus, if the CA seemingly made a new pronouncement
regarding the criminal liability of a publisher under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, that ruling cannot bind this Court unless we
purposely adopt the same. Be that as it may, we find no compelling
reason to revisit U.S. v. Ocampo; to modify it would amount to judicial
legislation. Article 360 is clear and unambiguous, and to apply People v.
Beltran and Soliven, which requires specific knowledge, participation, and
approval on the part of the publisher to be liable for the publication of a
libelous article, would be reading into the law an additional requirement
that was not intended by it.
54 CHINESE YMCA V. REMINGTON STEEL
G.R. No. 159422 28 March 2008
QUICK REFERENCE:
The Court held that the final Resolution of a previous case between the parties
governs the right of the parties in the present case under the principle of stare decisis
because the facts and issues of the present case and of the previous case are similar
to one another. The principle of stare decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a
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principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of
whether the parties and property are the same.
FACTS:
• Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals (“CA”), the Court
held that the final Resolution of the Court in the previous case, "Remington
Industrial Steel Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association
of the Philippine Islands," governs the right of the parties, under the
principle of stare decisis.
With this, respondent Remington filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that it was denied its right to due process when the
Court, instead of remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings,
decided the merits of the case by considering the final Resolution as a
precedent in the present case, and that the principle of stare decisis is not
applicable because the parties and facts in the present case differ from those
of the final Resolution. On the other hand, petitioner YMCA filed its
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the principle of stare decisis is applicable to the present case.
RATIO:
• YES, it is applicable.
• The principle of stare decisis directs that, once a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same, regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. The
common issue of law in the two cases was whether possession of the
ground floor units was unlawfully withheld despite constructive delivery
thereof. In the final Resolution, the Court held that possession of the leased
premises was unlawfully withheld. Once a case has been decided one way,
any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided
in the same manner.
55 PEPSI-COLA V. PAGDANGANAN G.R. No.167866 12 October 2006
QUICK REFERENCE:
Winning customers of petitioner Pepsi received the winning number 349, but were
not able to collect their awards because the security codes they received were
incorrect, prompting the former to sue the latter. Respondents Pagdanganan and
Lumahan filed a complaint against petitioner based on the same ground, but the
Court ruled in favor of petitioner under the principle of stare decisis since the facts
and issues of the present case were already resolved in previous cases involving the
same facts and issues. Under the principle of stare decisis, it is the better practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.
FACTS:
• Petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO launched a promotional campaign
entitled “Number Fever”. Petitioners announced the notorious three-digit
combination 349 as the winning number. However, petitioners learned of
reports that numerous people were trying to redeem 349 bearing crowns
and/or resealable caps with incorrect security codes L-2560-FQ and L-
3560-FQ, which did not correspond to that assigned to the winning number
349.
• Despite of the anouncement of the petitioner with regard to the error,
respondents Pagdanganan and Lumahan demanded from petitioners the
payment of their corresponding cash prizes. However, Petitioners refused
to take heed of the aforementioned demands.
• Respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners for sum of money and
damages in the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”), but the latter dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Respondents appealed the
Court of Appeals (“CA”), which reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the
same.
• Petitioners argues that by virtue of the principle of stare decisis, their
previous cases against other customers who also experienced the same error
have already settled the issue of whether or not petitioners PCPPI and
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PEPSICO are liable to holders of non-winning 349 bearing crowns and/or
resealable caps.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the principle of stare decisis applies in the present case?
RATIO:
• YES, it applies in the present case.
• There is no question that the cases of Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan and De
Mesa, including the case at bar, arose from the same set of facts concerning
the Number Fever promo debacle of petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.
Mendoza, Rodrigo, Patan, De Mesa, Pagdanganan and Lumahan are among
those holding supposedly winning 349 crowns and/or resealable caps. Said
crowns and/or resealable caps were not honored or allowed to be cashed
in by petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO for failing to contain the correct
security code assigned to such winning combination. As a result, the
rejected crown and/or resealable cap holders filed separate complaints for
specific performance/ sum of money/ breach of contract, with damages,
all against petitioners PCPPI and PEPSICO.
• The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code, to wit: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
With this, it is quite evident that the appellate court committed reversible
error in failing to take heed of our final, and executory decisions considered
to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the Pepsi/349
cases are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal
maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the
decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases
involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity
of parties.
56 ANTONIO V. SAYMAN G.R. No.149624 29 September 2010
QUICK REFERENCE:
Res judicata does not apply in this case because the subject matter of Civil Case 1,
the 7,500 sq. meters of the property, is different from the subject matter of Civil Case
2, the remaining 8,403 sq. meters of the property. There is bar by prior judgment
when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of
judgment.
FACTS:
• Pansaon sold only 7,500 sq. meters of her property to Monje. The deed
of absolute sale was duly notarized. Macedonio Monje immediately took
possession thereof and constructed a house.
• The heirs of the deceased Pansaon sold the subject property, which was
already sold Monje, in favor of Spouses Manguiob. Immediately thereafter,
spouses Manguiob had executed an absolute deed of sale of the entire
15,903 sq. meters of the property in favor of their sister-in-law, Avelyn B.
Antonio, the entire property. The sale was duly notarized.
• Monje knew it only thereafter when he received a letter from Antonio,
informing him that she is now the registered owner of the subject property
under a new Transfer Certificate of Title (“TCT”).
• CIVIL CASE 1: Aggrieved, Monje filed before the Court of First Instance
(“CFI”) a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale and the TCT in
favor of Antonio. The CFI decided in favor of Monje, ordering the
cancellation of the aforesaid documents.
• Petitioners Spouses Antonio appealed the above-mentioned decision all the
way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in their favor. CIVIL CASE 2:
With this, petitioners filed a case for a sum of money, accounting of the
proceeds of the copra, and damages against defendants in the Regional Trial
Court (“RTC”). However, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res
judicata.
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• Petitioners appealed with the Court of Appeals (“CA”), but the latter
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not res judicata applies in the present case?
RATIO:
• NO, res judicata does not apply in the present case.
• Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. A final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The
principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
• There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action.
• But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as conclusiveness of judgment.
• The Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether
or not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of
the principle ofres judicata. One test of identity is the absence of
inconsistency test where it is determined whether the judgment sought will
be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the
prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.
• The more common approach in ascertaining identity of causes of action is
the same evidence test, whereby the following question serves as a sufficient
criterion: would the same evidence support and establish both the present
and former causes of action? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the
prior judgment is a bar to the subsequent action; conversely, it is not.
• Aside from the absence of inconsistency test and same evidence test, we
have also ruled that a previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent
one when it had touched on a matter already decided, or if the parties are
in effect litigating for the same thing.
• The Court does not agree with the conclusion of the RTC and the CA that
Civil Cases 1 and 2 involve the same subject matter. The bone of contention
in Civil Case 1 is confined to the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1
bought by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, while the subject
matter in Civil Case 2 is the remaining 8,403 square meter parcel of the
same lot. Since there is no identity of subject matter between the two cases,
it is but logical to conclude that there is likewise no identity of causes of
action. Both the questioned rulings of the RTC and the CA may have arisen
from an apparent confusion that the whole of Lot No. 1, consisting of
15,903 square meters, is owned by respondents. In sum, the Court finds
that there is no res judicata in the present case.
57 REPUBLIC V. YU G.R. No. 157557 10 March 2006
QUICK REFERENCE:
In 1966, the Supreme Court (“SC”) affirmed the expropriation of Lot No. 939 as
against Valdehueza. In 1986, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) annulled a sale by
Valdehueza to Yu of the same lot subject of the 1966 case. The 1986 CA decision
became final and executory. In 1992, Valdehueza filed a complaint for reversion on
the ground that Republic abandoned the lot and was thus no longer the valid subject
of expropriation. The SC found that the 1992 case is barred by res judicata. The SC
elaborates the elements of res judicata, (1) judgement is final, (2) jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties, (3) judgement on the merits, and (4) identity of the subject
matter, parties and cause of action. The SC likewise explained two concepts of res
judicata, that of “bar by prior judgement” which applies when the 4 elements of res
judicata are present, and that of “conclusiveness of judgement” which provides that
the matters directly and actually resolved in a prior case cannot again be brought up
in a new case. In this case, Valdehueza claims that the new case is valid as the
abandonment of the lot gives rise to a new cause of action. Assuming that there is a
new cause of action, the SC finds that 1992 reversion case would still be barred by
conclusiveness of judgement. The status of the lot has already been resolved with
finality in both the 1966 and 1986 cases. The 1992 case is thus barred by res judicata.
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FACTS:
• In Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), the Supreme Court (“SC”) affirmed the
judgement of expropriation of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City. It ruled
that Valdehueza was not entitled to possession of said lot, but only to its
fair value.
• In Yu v Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals (“CA”) annulled
Valdehueza’s subsequent sale of the same lot to Yu, holding that Yu and
company were not purchasers in good faith. Judgement became final and
executory.
• On October 1992, Yu filed a complaint for reversion of subject lot (On the
ground that Republic abandoned the lot and thus was no longer a proper
subject of expropriation), Republic refuted the claim on the ground of res
judicata. Trial Court dismissed the case in favor of the Republic.
• On appeal, the CA found no res judicata in the 1992 case and remanded it to
the Trial Court.
• Case is now before the SC. Republic claims the ground invoked by Yu
(Abandonment of the lot) did not give Yu a new cause of action.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the 1992 action is barred by res judicata.
RATIO:
• The 1992 action is barred by res judicata. The SC elaborates that res judicata
“lays the rule that an existing final judgement or decree rendered on the
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matter in
issue in the first suit”. The SC provides the elements of res judicata, namely
(1) the judgement sought to bar the new action must be final, (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties, (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgement on the merits, and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
The SC further provides two concepts of res judicata, (1) “bar by prior
judgement”, and (2) “conclusiveness of judgement”. “Bar by prior
judgement” applies when there is identity of the parties, subject matter and
causes of action. The doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgement” provides
that facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised, even if such suit may have a different claim or cause of
action. In this case, Yu’s argument rests solely on the assumption that the
abandonment of the lot gave rise to a new cause of action. Assuming the
assumption is valid, conclusiveness of judgement would apply, as the Yu v.
Republic case (1986), which is final and executory, clearly nullified the sale.
Yu has no right over the lot. Res judicata applies, Petition is granted.
58 LIM V. VERA CRUZ G.R. No. 143646 4 April 2001
QUICK REFERENCE:
Vera Cruz claims ownership over a 200 square meter lot by prior possession since
1960 and subsequent purchase from its owner, Aldaba, in 1983. Lim claimed
ownership over the property by virtue of a title covering 5,432 square meters which
included the 200 square meters claimed by Vera Cruz. Vera Cruz filed for the
attachment of a notice of lis pendes on Lim’s title to protect his interests. Lim claimed
that such notice must be cancelled for being only for the purpose of molesting Lim
and not being necessary in protecting Vera Cruz’ rights. The Trial Court decided the
case in favor of Lim, cancelling the notice of lis pendens on the ground that Vera
Cruz’s claim of 200 square meters failed to outweigh the limitation imposed upon
Lim’s title covering 5,432 square meters. Court of Appeals (“CA”) found for Vera
Cruz, finding the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the
notice. The Supreme Court (“SC”) affirmed the CA decision, finding that the Rules
of Civil procedure only provide for two grounds to cancel a notice of lis pendens, (1)
the purpose being to molest the owner against which the notice is sought, and (2)
unnecessary in protecting the notice applicant’s rights. In this case, the SC found that
the notice of lis pendens only applied to the 200 square meters claimed, and thus did
not molest Lim’s rights, and was in fact necessary in protecting Vera Cruz’ rights.
FACTS:
• Vera Cruz alleges that he has been in possession of a 200 square meter
portion of Lot 4204 since 1960 covered by TCT No. 191498 (Aldaba Title)
owned by Aldaba. That on January 1983, Aldaba sold said 200 square meter
portion to Vera Cruz.
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• In 1993, Lim filed a complaint for ejectment against Vera Cruz, who claims
to be an owner of said Lot, being a portion of TCT No. T-16375 (Lim Title)
registered in Lim’s name.
• Vera Cruz filed a complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages
alleging that Lim acquired the Lim Title in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever
machination.
• Vera Cruz subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
the Lim Title to protect his right over the property covered by said title.
Lim moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens on the ground that such notice
for the sole purpose of molesting Lim and not necessary to protect Vera
Cruz’ rights.
• Trial Court cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the Lim Title on the ground
that Vera Cruz’ claimed right over 200 square meters did not outweigh the
limitation imposed on the Lim Title, which covered 5,432 square meters.
The Trial Court instead required Lim to file a bond commensurate in
amount to the value claimed by Vera Cruz, as a compromise safeguard.
• The Court of Appeals (“CA”) set aside the Trial Court’s decision holding
that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the
notice. The CA thus reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
• Case is now before the Supreme Court (“SC”). Lim alleges that Trial Court
was correct in cancelling the notice of lis pendens as it was for the sole
purpose of molesting Lim and that it was not necessary in protecting Vera
Cruz’ rights.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was proper.
RATIO:
• No, the cancellation the notice of lis pendens was improper. The SC
elaborates that lis pendens has been conceived to protect real rights of a
party causing its registration. Such notice would serve as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the property is in litigation.
The SC notes that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
recorded. Petitioner claims that the notice covers the entire 5,432 square
meters of the Lim Title, and thus, as the Trial Court found, molested Lim’s
rights as an owner. However, the SC finds that, by express provision under
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of lis pendens applies only to the
particular property subject of litigation, which in this case is the 200 square
meters claimed by Vera Cruz, not the entire property covered by the Lim
Title. Such notice then was not for the purpose of molesting Lim’s rights
as an owner, and was necessary in protecting Vera Cruz’ rights. The SC also
notes that the Trial Judge’s imposition of a bond is an acknowledgement
that the cancellation was not in order. The purpose of the doctrine of lis
pendens is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court
until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgement
or decree by subsequent alienation. Petition is therefore denied.
59 ATLANTIC ERECTORS V. HERBAL COVE
G.R. No. 148568 20 March 2003
QUICK REFERENCE:
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (“Atlantic”) and Herbal Cove Realty Corporation (“Herbal
Cove”) entered into a construction contract where Atlantic would build townhouses
for Herbal Cove. The construction was not completed on time by Atlantic, and
Herbal Cove refused to pay. Atlantic filed a complaint for sum of money and filed
for a notice of lis pendens based on such complaint. The Trial Court denied both at
first, but on reconsideration allowed the notice of lis pendens on the basis of the
pendency of an appeal. The Court of Appeals (“CA”) found that the complaint for
sum of money was not a sufficient lien to impose a notice of lis pendens and thus
ordered the notice’s cancellation. The Supreme Court (“SC”) affirmed the CA’s
decision, on the ground that the complaint for sum of money did not constitute a
proper lien on the property as to justify the attachment of a notice of lis pendens. The
SC elaborated that the notice of lis pendens as a general rule only applies to cases
involving ownership and use of property relating to a title. This does not include the
personal action of claim for sum of money.
FACTS:
• On June 1996, Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (“Atlantic”) and Herbal Cove Realty
Corporation (“Herbal Cove”) entered into a Construction Contract
whereby Atlantic would construct four units of townhouses and one
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detached unit for Herbal Cove. The contract period was 180 days starting
on July 1996 and was to terminate on January 1997.
• The period was not followed. Atlantic alleged that the period was not
followed for reasons attributable to Herbal Cove, suspension orders,
additional works, force majeure, and unjustifiable acts of omission or delay on
the part of Herbal Cove. On the other hand, Herbal Cove denied such
claims and instead pointed to Atlantic having exceeded the contract period
aggravated by defective workmanship and utilization of materials not in
compliance with specifications.
• On November 1997, Atlantic filed a complaint for a sum of money with
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Atlantic also filed a
notice of lis pendens for annotation on the titles of the Titles covering the
construction projects.
• On January 1998, Herbal Cove moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, as the contract provided a clause requiring the parties to submit
their dispute to arbitration. On April 1998, Herbal cove filed a motion to
cancel notice of lis pendens on the ground that the complaint for sum of
money is a personal action and thus not subject to the application of notice
of lis pendens. The Trial Court subsequently granted both, dismissing the
complaint for sum of money and cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
• Atlantic filed a motion for reconsideration. On reconsideration, the Trial
Court maintained the dismissal of the complaint for sum of money, but
reversed itself as to the notice of lis pendens, ordering its reinstatement.
• Herbal Cove filed with the Court of Appeals (“CA”) a Petition for
Certiorari. The CA granted the petition and reinstated the original
judgement cancelling the notice of lis pendens on the basis that the original
complaint was a personal action and thus not subject to an attachment of
notice of lis pendens.
• Case is now before the Supreme Court (“SC”). Atlantic alleges that CA
erred in reinstating the notice of lis pendens, claiming that the money claims
constitute a proper lien upon which a notice of lis pendens may be based
upon.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not the money claims constitute a proper lien for the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens.
RATIO:
• No, the money claims do not constitute a proper lien for the annotation of
a notice of lis pendens. The SC notes that as a general rule, the only instances
in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are (a) an action to recover
possession of real estate, (b) an action for partition, and (c) any other court
proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon
or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally, the Court has held that
resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title
or possession of real property, as it also applies to suits seeking to establish
a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in a specific real property, or to
enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. This case does not
fall under any of the situations provided by the SC. The SC notes that while
Atlantic may have moved on the premise of a contractor’s lien under the
Civil Code, such lien only applies to preference of credits, and does not on
its own constitute a proper lien upon which a notice of lis pendens may be
based. The SC also notes that while the Trial Court was correct at the first
instance to have cancelled the notice of lis pendens, it erred on
reconsideration when it considered the pendency of the case as a factor to
necessitate the notice of lis pendens. Having failed to constitute a proper lien
for annotation of a notice of lis pendens, the cancellation of the notice was
proper. Petition denied.
60 VILLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 87186 24 April 1992
QUICK REFERENCE:
The Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of
Cebu regarding the violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a), (e), (h), and (i) of R.A.
3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the other hand,
the Sandiganbayan found the accused Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Leonor, and Sucalit
guilty of violating Section 3, paragraphs (a), (c), (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019.
The main issue is whether the decision of the acquittal of the CA promulgated 6
months before the decision of the Sandiganbayan bars their conviction pursuant to
the doctrine of the law of the case.
The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan which held that the doctrine of the law of
the case only applies to the same parties of the same case and that the case decided
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by the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu and the case decided by the Sandiganbayan
are separate and distinct cases. Thus, the doctrine of the law of the case shall not be
applied.
FACTS:
• Investigation of the alleged anomalous transactions at the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (“CAA”), Mactan International Airport led to the filing of
criminal charges against David, Centeno, Dario, and Robles
• The Criminal Court of Cebu found all of the accused guilty of violating
Section 3, paragraphs (a), (e), (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019, also known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and also found that Jimenez,
Montayre, Villa, Sucalit, Leonor, and Bustamante were equally liable for
conspiring with the convicted accused
• The presiding judge directed the Chief Prosecutor of the Ministry of Justice
to conduct an investigation for other possible violations of R.A. 3019
• The investigation led to the filing of an information with the Sandiganbayan
against Jimenez, Montayre, Villa, Sucalit, Leonor, and Bustamante
• The case against Bustamante was dismissed without prejudice for lack of a
prima facie case
• The facts of the case were established as follows:
• Dario, Centeno, and Robles negotiated with Jimenez for the purchase of
transformers and electrical supplies for the Mactan International Airport
• Montayre issued the Requisition and Issue Voucher for said supplies
• Jimenez approved the requisition and Leonor certified the availability of
funds
• Jimenez signed the Advertisement Form, and Sucalit delivered it to Rocen
Enterprises
• The Bidding Committee, which included Villa approved the lowest bid for
the articles, the lowest bidder being Rocen Enterprises
• The requisitioned articles were delivered in July by UTESCO, a losing
bidder, to Rocen Enterprises, leading to additional charges
• The articles were supposedly inspected from June 25-30
• Rocen Enterprises, owned by Centeno, turned out to be registered with a
line of business in paper products and printed matters, not electrical
supplies
• The defense of the accused were as follows:
• The acquisition of the electrical items was an emergency measure
necessitated by the brownout at Mactan Airport
• The Cash Disbursement Ceilings would expire on June 30, so the items
requisitioned were made to appear to have been inspected before such time
• Jimenez disclaimed responsibility in determining the reputability of the
supplier
• Montayre contended that his participation in the transaction was limited to
requisitioning the electrical supplies and that he had nothing to do with
canvassing the prices, determining the winning bidder, and determining the
reputability of the supplier
• Villa argued that he did not participate in the canvass of the requisitioned
items and that he processed the vouchers on Montayre’s direction
• Sucalit testified that she had no responsibility to determine who were
qualified to participate in the bidding
• The Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty of violating Section 3,
paragraphs (a), (c), (h), and (i) of R.A. 3019
• While the case was pending in the Sandiganbayan, the CA promulgated a
decision reversing the conviction of the Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu on
the ground of insufficient evidence
ISSUE/S:
• Whether the decision of the CA bars the conviction of the accused by the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to the doctrine of the law of the case
• Whether there was conspiracy among the accused
RATIO:
• No, the doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable.
• The doctrine of law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case so long as the facts on
which the decision was made continue to be the facts before the court
• The Sandiganbayan’s case is separate and distinct from the Circuit Criminal
Court’s case and the identity of the parties are not the same so the doctrine
of the law of the case cannot be applied
• Res judicata may not be applied as well because the identity of the parties are
not the same
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• No, only Jimenez and Sucalit were in conspiracy
• Montayre and Villa were held to have no criminal intent in their actions
because they did not take part in the canvassing of supplies and the
determination of the reputability of suppliers
61 PADILLO V. CA G.R. No. 119707 29 November 2001
QUICK REFERENCE:
Padillo filed a civil case for damages against Averia as regards a property which
Padillo claims ownership of. The case for ownership of said property has been filed
separately from the civil case for damages. The Court resolved the case for ownership
in favor of Padillo, causing the trial court to resolve the civil case for damages in her
favor as well.
Upon Averia’s appeal, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) declared that the civil case for
damages cannot be resolved because res judicata applies to the case for damages— the
res judicata being caused by the resolution of the case for ownership.
The issue in this case is whether the CA erred in claiming that res judicata barred
Padillo’s claim for damages.
The Court ruled that while the requisites of res judicata are present, the law of the case
dictates that Padillo may claim for damages in the separate civil case because in the
decision made by the CA regarding the case for ownership, the CA merely suspended
the civil case for damages instead of requiring the claims for damages to be filed. The
doctrine of the law of the case dictates that the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, may be applied to that one particular case.
FACTS:
• Padillo, alleging that she is the absolute owner of a 251sqm. parcel of land
in Quezon Avenue, Lucena, filed a petition for declaratory relief and
damages against Averia and Casilang for unlawful refusal to turn the
property over in her favor
• Padillo prayed for the issuance of an injunctive writ to place her in the
possession and use of her said property and for respondents to pay jointly
and severally PhP 150,000.00 for the annual unrealized income for the use
of her property, PhP 80,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and moral and exemplary
damages
• Casilang filed an Answer specifically denying the material allegations against
him
• He alleged that he vacated the subject property so the case against him
should be dismissed
• Averia filed his Answer with a Counterclaim and a Motion to Dismiss
wherein he invoked another civil case against de Vera-Quicho, the owner
from which Padillo claims to have purchased the property
• Averia raised the defenses of litis pendentia, laches, estoppel, res judicata, and
lack of cause of action
• As it turns out, prior to the civil case filed by Padillo, the property in
question has been subjected to three actions, namely, Civil Case No. 1620-
G, M.C. No. 374-82, and Civil Case No. 1690-G
• In Civil Case No. 1620-G, Marina M. de Vera-Quicho was ordered to
execute the necessary documents over the property, and the Register of
Deeds (“RD”) was enjoined to desist from entering any
encumbrance/transaction on said title except in favor of Averia
• In M.C. No. 374-82, Padillo compelled the RD to register the deed of sale
wherein Margarite de Vera sold to Padillo half of the lot and the building
erected thereon
• The RD refused to register in view of the restraining order from the
previous civil case
• The Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Lucena ordered the RD to register
the deed of sale
• In Civil Case No. 1690-G, Averia filed for the rescission of two deeds of
sale, namely the (1) deed of sale reflected by the M.C. No. 374-82 and (2)
the deed of sale between Marina de Vera-Quicho and Padillo
• The case was dismissed for improper venue, because it was not filed in the
RTC of Lucena
• Averia assailed the decision in M.C. No. 374-82, and the Supreme Court
(“SC”) declared that the RTC had jurisdiction to order the registration of
the deed of sale; the SC also ordered for a new trial
• In the new trial, Padillo was declared as sole and exclusive owner of the
property in question
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• Going back to the current case, Civil Case No. 9114, the trial court decided
in favor of Padillo, requiring Averia to pay damages for the unrealized
income, attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages, and costs of suit
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the trial court’s decision
based on res judicata
• The CA argued that the petitioner should have already included the claim
for damages in M.C. No. 374-82, especially since a new trial had been
granted in consideration of all the civil cases involving the property
ISSUE/S:
• Whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision
RATIO:
• Yes, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision
• The requisites of res judicata are:
• finality of the former judgment,
• the judgment being rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties,
• the judgment being based on the merits, and
• the identities of the parties, the subject matter, and the cause of action being
the same
• While the requisites of res judicata are met, the principle of the law of the
case warrants a different conclusion
• The law of the case is different from res judicata in the sense that it only
applies to one case and res judicata forecloses in one case what has been done
in another case
• The law of the case in this particular case shows that the CA incorrectly
ordered the mere suspension of Civil Case No. 9114 instead of dismissing
the case or ordering the claim for damages to be filed
• Thus, even if erroneous, Padillo cannot be faulted for pursuing her claim
in Civil Case No. 9114
• The law of the case is that the civil case should only be suspended
• The Court, however looked into the award granted by the trial court and
reduced the same accordingly
• Damages must be proved so the speculative damages for unrealized income
is reduced by the Court
• No merit was found for the amount of the moral and exemplary damages
62 PEOPLE V. DERILO G.R. No. 117818 18 April 1997
QUICK REFERENCE:
Derilo, Baldimo, Doños, Confuentes and one John Doe were charged with the crime
of murder committed by a band. At the time of the commission of the crime, such
was punishable by the death penalty. When the new Constitution (1987) came into
force, it provided that any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The Court held that being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No.
7659 may not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant,
based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is
that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly,
plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied
FACTS:
• Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro
Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the socalled crime of
murder committed by a band.
• Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was
apprehended and brought within the trial court’s jurisdiction.
• At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the
conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force
dealing with the crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided
that any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Then on February 2, 1987, a new
Constitution came into force after its ratification on that date by the people.
The 1987 Constitution, regarded by some as progressive since it contains
new provisions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, proscribed in
Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the imposition of the death
penalty, as follows:
o Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
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for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
• Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in
the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain
heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as
Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not RA 7659 should be made to have retroactive effect.
RATIO:
• No. Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not
be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based
on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is
that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is
clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied
• In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive
operation of laws. Nor can the prospective application of Republic Act No.
7659 be doubted just because of the constitutional provision leaving to
Congress the matter of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since
Congress did not otherwise provide.
• One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is
prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Article
21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “no felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission”
and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases to mean that no
act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except
by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed. Besides, to
give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 7659
would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws.
• Among others, an ex post facto law has been defined as one which changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed. It is settled that a penal law may have
retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused. Obviously, with
a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for
murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659
cannot fall within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal
laws.
63 CO V. CA G.R. No. 100776 28 October 1993
FACTS:
• In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel —
and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations
therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm
on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was
deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-
stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
• A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed
by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court.
The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being
sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to
indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
• He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on
September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to
the prejudice of the accused.
HELD:
• No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
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"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This
is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law
looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.
• The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
64 SANTOS V. CA G.R. No. 112019 4 January 1995
QUICK REFERENCE:
Petitioner (Leouel) met Respondent (Julia) in Iloilo City and eventually got married.
They lived with Julia’s parents thereafter and bore a baby boy. The couple started to
quarrel more often as time went on; primarily about how Julia’s parents kept
meddling with their relationship. Julia soon left for the US to work as a nurse despite
Leouel’s plea for her to stay. Julia negged on her promise to return to the Philippines
at the end of her employment contract and refused to communicate with Leouel for
a span of about 5 years. Leuoel’s attempt to locate Julia in the US had failed which
compelled him to file a complaint for Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the grounds that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. After
thorough review of the construction and deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee, the Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances and facts surrounding
the case at bar do not justify nor come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage which must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
FACTS:
• Leouel who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia.
• They lived together with the parents of Julia.
• Julia gave birth to their son named Leouel Jr.
• The couple often quarreled because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs.
• Somewhat short of two years after getting married, Julia left for the US for
a job as a nurse.
• Leouel pleaded with Julia not to take the job but she took it anyway.
• The first time Julia contacted Leouel was via a long distance call after 7
months from her departure.
• She promised to return to the Philippines after her contracted had expired
but never did.
• Leouel, not knowing the whereabout of his wife, went to the US in the
attempt to locate Julia under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Phil.
• He was unable to locate Julia thus filed a petition for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Leouel contended that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances
that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the marriage is void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. NO
RATIO:
• The case was essentially a review of the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee and their interpretation of Article 36 and the definition
of “psychological incapacity”
• The law does not provide a definition nor does it provide examples since
doing so would limit the definition of “psychological incapacity” there
being a wide variety of psychological disorders.
• The guidelines, however, for establishing “psychological incapacity” was
that the same had to be characterized by: (LANDMARK)
• Gravity
• Juridical antecedence
• Incurability
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• The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
• The fact that Julia refused to communicate for years do not equate to the
psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
65 OCHOSA V. ALANO G.R. No. 167459 26 January 2011
QUICK REFERENCE:
Jose (Petitioner) and Bona (Respondent) fell in love and got married. Since Jose was
an Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officer he was stationed away from Bona
for the most part during the first 12 years of marriage until they were given a
permanent living quarter in Fort Bonifacio where the couple lived together with their
adopted daughter Ramona. Apparently Bona was was illicit sexual relations with
other men from the beginning of their marriage and continued until they were
stationed in Fort Bonifacio. After Jose got out of jail for being charged with rebellion,
he filed for the nullity of his marriage on the ground of Bona’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. The Supreme Court (SC)
ruled that based on the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals followed by the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, Jose failed to prove that Bona’s infidelity
(psychological incapacity to fulfill essential obligations of marriage) existed prior to
their marriage and existed at the time of the celebration thereof. In short, the
landmark cases laid down the requisite of juridical antecedence which Jose failed to
prove Bona’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
• Jose (petitioner) met Bona (respondent) back in August 1973
• Jose was a young lieutenant in the AFP
• Bona was a 17-yr old college drop-out
• Their romance and sexual intimacy led their marriage a year later before a
judge in Basilan.
• They acquired no property, debts nor any offspring.
• They found an abandoned baby girl and registered her as their daughter in
1976 and named her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
• Due to the nature of his work, Jose was assigned to various parts of the
Philippines and rarely cohabited with Bona since she preferred to stay in
her hometown, Basilan.
• In 1985, Jose was appointed as Battalion Commander and was given living
quarters in Fort Bonifacio where Bona and Ramona joined him.
• Two years later, Jose was charged with rebellion for participation in a faild
coup d’etat and was incarcerated in Camp Crame
• Apparently Bona has been having illicit relations with other men from the
onset of their relationship up to the time they moved together in Fort
Bonifacio.
• Example: Bona was caught having sex with Jose’s driver while Jose was
away.
• Jose used a military pass to leave Crame and confront Bona about the
rumors: she admitted.
• Jose drove Bona out of their living quarters and brought Ramona with her.
• In 1994, Ramona left Bona and went to live with Jose.
• Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the Makati
RTC seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
• 3 witnesses testified about Bona’s marital infidelity
• Fourth witness was a psychiatrist who testified that, after conducting
several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering
from histrionic personality disorder due to:
• Excessive attention seeking behavior
• Historically traceable to parents’ behavior
• Incurable
• RTC: Granted the petition for annulment on the ground that the
psychological incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY,
ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
• Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court
of Appeals contending Jose’s abject failure to discharge the burden of
proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
• CA: Reversed RTC ruling
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ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. NO
RATIO:
• In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
• Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity as mandated in Santos, it was laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
• The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
• The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
• The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.
• Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
• Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
• The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
• Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
• The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state
• The Court is not convinced that the totality of Bona’s acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code.
There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” were already
present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words,
her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential
requisite of “juridical antecedence.”
• The only evidence of Bona’s promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose was
the latter’s testimony in open court.
• The psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to
cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion
• Psychiatrist evaluated Bona’s psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses.
• Bona’s sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced
to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of
the said marriage.
66 TING V. VELEZ-TING G.R. No. 166562 31 March 2009
QUICK REFERENCE:
The guidelines of the Molina Doctrine on psychological incapacity, decided after the
case for annulment of marriage was filed before the RTC, should still be applied by
virtue of stare decisis. Hence, Benjamin and Carmen’s marriage should not be
annulled by virtue of psychological incapacity for failure to fulfill the guidelines set
in the case of Molina.
FACTS:
• The Petitioner Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting were classmates in
medical school and fell in love. Thereafter, they were married after Carmen
was pregnant with Benjamin’s child.
• After the birth of their 6th child, Carmen filed for a declaration of nullity of
their marriage before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) on the ground of
Benjamin’s psychological incapacity, as provided by Article 36 of the Family
Code since Benjamin was: 1) An alcoholic; 2) Violent because of his
excessive drinking; 3) Compulsive gambling; 4) Irresponsibility in failing to
financially support his family.
• The RTC annulled the marriage.
• However, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the RTC’s decision since
the guidelines on psychological incapacity set in the case of Molina,
previously decided by the Supreme Court, were not fulfilled.
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• Carmen argues that the Molina doctrine should not be binding in the
case at bar, since the case was promulgated on February 13, 1997
whereas Carmen filed the case before the RTC on October 21, 1993.
Hence, the doctrine on stare decisis, which enjoins adherence by
lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions, does not apply.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the leading case of Molina applies in this case by virtue of
Stare Decisis.
• Whether or not Benjamin is Psychologically Incapacitated, as provided in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
• Yes. While it is conceded that the case was filed before the guidelines set in
Molina was promulgated, such guidelines should still be applied to the case
at bar. interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part
of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
• No. the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove
that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of
him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years
ago. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. In this case, respondent
failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage,
she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with
his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
67 CARPIO-MORALES V. CA G.R. No. 217126-27 10 November 2015
QUICK REFERENCE:
A preventive suspension order was issued against Binay Jr. (Mayor of Makati). Binay
Jr. obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the Court of Appeals
against the suspension order. The Ombudsman assailed the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals (CA) to issue the TRO. The issue was whether or the CA had jurisdiction
to issue the TRO. The Supreme Court held that the CA had jurisdiction because
Paragraph 2 Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act saying who cannot intervene in the
investigation process of the Ombudsman is unconstitutional.
FACTS:
• A complaint was filed before the office of the ombudsman against Makati
Mayor Binay Jr.
• He was accused of plunder, graft, and corruption practices regarding the
Makati City Hall Parking Building.
• On March 11, 2015, the Office of the Mayor of Makati received a copy of
the preventive suspension order.
• On the same day noon time, the Court of Appeals (“CA”) granted a
resolution for Binay Jr’s Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).
• The Office of the Ombudsman argued that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to issue a TRO because of Republic Act Republic Act 6670
(Ombudsman Act).
• Binay Jr. argued that it was well within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to issue the TRO and that the Ombudsman had no right to issue
a preventive suspension order because of the Condonation Doctrine.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the
Temporary Restraining Order on the preventive suspension order issued
by the Ombudsman.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in grave abuse of discretion
when it used the Condonation Doctrine.
RATIO:
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• The Supreme Court ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is
vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in the
landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn,
held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect
of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and
concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
• The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that
the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO, as it did so
base on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in
nature.
68 CORPUZ V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 180016 29 April 2014
QUICK REFERENCE:
The Court should execute the sentence provided by the legislature through the
Revised Penal Code despite being severe and excessive as applied in the case at bar,
and Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code instead submit to the Chief Executive its
findings to suggest for a modification of the law.
FACTS:
• Tangcoy and Corpuz met in Admirale Royale Casino in Olongapo City,
where the former was engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players. Corpuz found out that Tangcoy was also engaged in the business
of selling jewelry. Thus, Corpuz offered to sell Tangcoy’s jewelry on a
commission basis.
• Tangcoy agreed, and turned over several jewelries such as bracelets and
necklaces for Corpuz to sell.
• Corpuz never returned the jewelry or the value of the said jewelry
amounting to P98,000.00.
• Thus, Tangcoy filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”)
for the crime of Estafa against Corpuz. Corpuz was adjudged guilty and
was sentenced to imprisonment for the indeterminate penalty of 4 years
and 2 mos. of Prision Correccional in its medium period as MINIMUM to 14
years and 8 years of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period as
MAXIMUM. T
• he Court of Appeals (“CA”) affirmed the decision and modified the
sentence to 4 years and 2 months of prision coreccional as minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional
P10,000.00 or a total of 7 years, as applied for the range of penalties
imposed on persons convicted of crimes involving property adjusted to the
value of the money and property in 1930 when the Revised Penal
Code(RPC) was enacted.
• Corpuz appealed the decision and further averred that the sentence was too
harsh of a penalty for the alleged crime.
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not the execution of the sentence be suspended for being too
harsh and excessive.
RATIO:
• No. The Court held that it could not modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. As supported by the
several amici curiae invited by the Court such as Dean Sedfrey Candelaria,
Dean Jose Diokno, the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch
of the government. In line with Article 5 of the RPC, the Court shall instead
submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of
the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.
-oOo-
Ad astra per aspera
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