MAKATI SHARNG v. HARPER
103047 September 2, 1994
Antecedents
In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper
came to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power
Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel and
was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to check out on
November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date,
however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors. He was then 30 years old.
A MAN IS purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch valued at
P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards
and an American Express credit card issued in the name
of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in answering the
queries phoned in by a credit card representative
sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza
Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the customer’s passport
upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put
the credit cards on hold.
Mendoza subsequently viewed the closed circuit
television (CCTV)
tapes, from which he found that Harper had entered his
room at 12:14 a.m.
of November 6, 1999, and had been followed into the
room at 12:17 a.m. by
a woman; that another person, a Caucasian male, had
entered Harper’s room
at 2:48 a.m.; that the woman had left the room at around
5:33 a.m.; and that
the Caucasian male had come out at 5:46 a.m
WHEREFORE, finding the defendant hotel to be remiss
in its
duties and thus liable for the death of Christian Harper,
this Court orders
the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of:
Appealed at CA: but CA Affirmed decision.
Appeal to SC:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
WERE ABLE
TO PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE
AFFIRMATIVE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THEY ARE
THE
WIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
*CHECK P 7-18 of decision for DECISION*
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G.R. No.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for
private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by
private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As
ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.
ISSUE: WON MARRIAGE IS VALID IN THE ABSENCE
OF M. LICENCE
HELD:
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was
the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil
registrar of due search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-
issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification
in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents
to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
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value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability
to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a
ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a
"secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas
was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro
testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her
husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with
notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same.
For failure to answer, he was properly declared in
default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on
record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the
appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage
license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by
Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being
no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
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CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Sy vs. Court of Appeals
April 12, 2000
The case:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
The facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando
Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the
Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both
were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with
two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately and their two children were in the custody of
their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a
petition for legal separation before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a
petition for separation of property. Judgment was
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains
and approving a regime of separation of properties
based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action
for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on
August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the
petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises
the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date
of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is
contained in their marriage contract which was attached
in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of
their marriage certificate and marriage license are
different and incongruous.
The Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of
marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
Held:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of
evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the
case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The
marriage contract also shows that the marriage license
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number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in
Carmona. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is
clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of
exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of
the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning. The
remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now
mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage
of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time heir marriage was
solemnized.  from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void
ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara  and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
Facts: Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for
annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the
same day. They went through another marriage
ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March
1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed
that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring
their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry
on file.   administratively liable.
Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and
maintained that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.  marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:  Was there an absence of marriage license that
would render the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio?
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Held: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires thatthe absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
license was issued to the parties.  In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this
effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara
license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the
absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of
his marriage. 
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite.  Even then,
we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day
period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they
appeared before a “fixer” who arranged everything for
them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
priest -- will not strengthen his posture.  The authority of
the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by
the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs
to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the
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duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.
De Castro V. De Castro
Void ab initio marriages
Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in
1991.  They applied for a marriage license in Pasig City
in September 1994.  They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged
in sex thereafter.  When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired.  Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five
years.  The couple got married on the same date.  essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife. On 13 Nov 1995,
Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A.
De Castro. Since the child’s birth, the mother has been
the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has
“reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.”
Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that
the marriage is void ab initio because the affidavit they
jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by
Annabelle to marry her to avoid the humiliation that the
pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court
ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support.   The Court of Appeals
denied the appeal. Prompted by the  rule that a marriage
is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration
of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage.  In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to
undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not be used as a
vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of
his being irresponsible.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by  he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, in Malate,
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child. The appellate court also
ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very
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same case.   There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it
that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage.  The burden of proof to show that
the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a
matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of
nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the
void ab initio,  whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable.  In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage.  Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the
affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a
mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. 
The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license.  In the instant case, there was no “scandalous
cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all.  The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper.  They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen,
met in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived in the Philippines and
on January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines,
but was not told of the nature of said ceremony where he
and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he only
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found out that it was a marriage contract when Gloria
told him. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and
that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003,
he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license. The Municipal
Civil Registrar, issued a certification stating that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted was the number of another
marriage license issued to another couple. He also
alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002. On the other hand, Gloria presented her
own side. Rev. Mario Dauz, a minister of the Gospel and
a brgy captain stated that he is authorized to solemnize
marriage and that he was doing it since 1982 and he is
familiar with the requirements. There were two
witnesses, one of them was Atty Sanchez who handed
him the marriage license on the day of the wedding.
Gloria testified that a certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them,
and after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged that
she has a daughter with Syed. She filed a bigamy case
because Syed married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura. RTC’s ruling: no marriage license, neither
of the parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Void
ab initio. CA’s ruling: granted Gloria’s appeal. Marriage
is valid and subsisting.

Issue: W/N the marriage was valid.

HELD: cited Arts 3, 4, 35(3) of FC. RTC was right.

Ruling on Republic vs CA not applicable. Their marriage
licensed is registered to another couple. Hence, they
were married without securing a marriage license. Void
ab initio.

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NINAL V. BAYADOG gr 160172
Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974.  They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.  Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24,
1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal.  1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license.  They instituted an affidavit stating that they had
lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license.  Pepito died in a car
accident on February 19, 1977.  After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1.  Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was
void?
2.  Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for
the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his
death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of
the marriage license.  They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law.  Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and
cannot be the source of rights.  It can be questioned
even after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
ARANES V. OCCIANO GR 380 SCRA 402
ARANES VS OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent
judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is
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the Presiding Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized
her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength
of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's
right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving
the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage
of petitioner
HELD:
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing
a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara, the Court held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did
not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
NAVARRO V. DOMAGTONG s.c a.m. mtj 96-1088
Navarro vs Domagtoy
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed
by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a
subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they
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are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their
conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years.   The said judge
likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.  The judge holds his
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he
solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were
void.
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and
Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting
marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda.  Albeit, the
latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead,
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.  raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario,
the latter only made the written request where it should
have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the
Family Code.  Their non-compliance did not invalidate
their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held
administratively liable.
VILLAR V. PARAISO 96 PHIL 659
G.R. No. L-8014             March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,  of both parties.
vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for
respondent-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951,
Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among
the candidates registered and voted for the office of
mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was
made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered
1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a
plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso
was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was
then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate
under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings
praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume
office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be
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declared null and void. He also prayed that he be
declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu
of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and
claimed that he resigned as minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951,
that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his
church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on
August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not
eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared
elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible
for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and,
consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null
and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as
mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
from this election both parties have appealed,
respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and
petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be
declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals.
However, as the latter court found that while petitioner
raises in his brief only questions of law respondent
are indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, that
court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the
provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is
exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being
an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he
actually resigned as minister before the date of the
elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed,
thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is
a question of fact the determination of which much
depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that
respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical
Church of the Philippines in 1944 and as such was given
license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public
Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as
minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously
and without interruption and has been renewing his
license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the
regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on
April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been
assigned to work in the same place and chapel during
the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent
applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister
of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said
license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of
the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly
known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of
his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand,
tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of
the United of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed
his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951,
because of his desire to engage in politics; that said
resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at
a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27,
1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his
office to the elder members of his religious order on
August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself
separated from his order and in fact he has refrained
ever since from conducting any religious services
pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after
weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not
found any reason for deviating from the finding of the
trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of
the order to which he belonged and that the resignation
he claims to have filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the
prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire
to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really
and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the
religious organization to which he belonged for the
purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not
resign in due form and have the acceptance of his
resignation registered with the Bureau of Public
Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be
underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold:
to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to
keep it informed of any change in his religious status.
This information is necessary for the protection of the
public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to
solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made
by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It
is no argument to say that the duty to secure the
cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not
upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization
or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such cancellation,
because the law likewise imposes upon the interested
party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the
instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate
of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as
minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by
law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his
claim by submitting as evidence certain documents
purporting to show the alleged resignation and its
acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting
held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said
documents in the light of the shortcomings we have
pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them as
self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve
the political designs of respondent in an attempt to
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obviate his disqualification under the law. And this
feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-
called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose
Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the
church, because upon an examination thereof one would
at once get the impression that it was prepared
haphazardly and not with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities
of a well established religious order. As the trial court
aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with
the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and
acceptance were made at a later date to cure the
ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore
constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to
hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible,
petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained
second place in the elections, our answer is simple: this
Court has already declared that this cannot be done in
the absence of an express provision authorizing such
declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such
provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what
we said in at least two cases where we laid down a
ruling which is decisive of the present case.
. . . . In the first case when the person elected is
ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he
were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration
of election in favor of the person who has obtained a
plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of
candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the
Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the
contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be
proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law
contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing
of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of
whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the
lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al.,
84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
TECHAVEZ V. ESCANO SCRA 355 AT PAGE 360
Tenchavez v. Escaño 15 SCRA 355
FACTS: Pastor Tenchavez, 32, married Vicenta Escano,
27, on February 24, 1948 in Cebu without the knowledge
of Escano’s parents. They were planning to elope but
this did not materialize because Vicenta went back to
her college. When she confessed her marriage to her
parents, her parents were angered. But because of the
fear the marriage could cause, they wanted them to
have a church wedding, which Escano refused upon
receiving anonymous letter saying that Tenchavez had
another woman. Escano later on moved to Misamis
Occidental to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
petition drafted by Sen. Pelaez to annul her marriage.
She did not sign the petition and case was dismissed.
She then applied for a passport, indicating there that she
was single, her purpose was to study, and she intends to
return after 2 years. In US, she filed a divorce against
Tenchanez on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character. The divorce was granted. Later on,
Escano married an American. On August 8, 1958, she
acquired American citizenship. In May 1956, Tenchavez
initiated proceeding at bar against Escano, legal
separation for bigamy; against Escano parents whom he
charged for dissuading Escano to live with him as his
wife; and against the Catholic Church for having decreed
an annulment of marriage. He asked for 1 million for
damages. Vicenta claimed that she had a valid divorce
and validly married to her current husband. She also
claimed that she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel whom she charged in conspiracy with
Tenchavez.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce was valid
HELD: No. When the divorce was granted, Escano was
still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine
law.
MARTINEZ V. TAN 12 PHIL 731
Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before
the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the
witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute
a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the
defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were
married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting this
were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of
defendant that he and plaintiff appeared before the
justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori
and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the
defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the
justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony
of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the
testimony of the bailiff of court that defendant, appellant,
justice of peace and two witnesses were all present
during the ceremony.  Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993,
Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were
married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the
justice of the peace  ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for
Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the
defendant of the complaint is affirmed. 
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained
a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be
married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the
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plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace,
stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice,
the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the
marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as
shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace,
signed by both contracting parties, which certificates
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized
the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of
the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had
contracted the marriage certified to in the document
signed by her, which admission can only mean the
parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they
appeared and signed the said document which so states
before the justice of the peace who authorized the same.
It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant
were able to read and write the Spanish language, and
that they knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this particular
case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place
before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
MORIGO V. PEOPLE GR 145226
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts
when the school year ended. When Lucio received a
card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant
communication took place between them. They later
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed
to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19,
1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On
October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second
marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The
petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago.  Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
MADRIDEJO V. DE LEON 55 PHIL 1
Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1
FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man
and wife and had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio
de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez had a child named
Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez,
being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis, by
the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following
day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her first
marriage, and Melecio Madridejo, her son in her second
husband. The parish priest failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid
HELD: Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their
marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal
requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing
that the essential requisites required by law for its
validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said
essential requisites.
PEOPLE V. BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old
niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada
(mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because
Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her
son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his
father and together, they went to Susana’s hut. There
they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying
infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the
weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said
that because they were legally and validly married, he
should only be liable for “homicide” and not “parricide”.
He thinks such because there was no marriage contract
issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in
his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife
and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
 
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract
render a marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with
the image of being married, are presumed married
unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the
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common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a
marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the
requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and
consent. The absence of the record of such marriage
does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration
and all requisites are present.
 
Person living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil.
216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all
requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one
of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).  The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity
increased from 12,000 to 30,000
SHANGRI-LA VS. HARPER
Check harper case decision
YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES 167 SCRA 786
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786
FACTS: Sy Kiat is a Chinese national who died on
January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties
here in the Philippines worth about P300,000. Aida Sy-
Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration and alleged that (a) they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation
of her children to him. The petition was opposed by Yao
Kee et al who alleged that she is the lawful wife of Sy
Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and
the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee. Probate court ruled that Sy Kiat
was legally married to Yao Kee and the other oppositors
were legitimate children of Sy Mat. On appeal, CA
simply modified probate court’s judgment and stated that
Aida Sy-Gonzales et al are natural children of Sy Mat.
They filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD: For a marriage to be recognized as valid, the
existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the
alleged marriage must be proven by clear and
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did
not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only because
they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly,
there is no showing that they are competent to testify on
the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction.
CASE DIGEST OF YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES [167 S
737] - F: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in
Kaloocan City, where he was residing, leaving behind
substantial real and personal properties here in the
Phils. Petition for letters of administration filed by his
natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat
was legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on
1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate
children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor
of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the
CA w/c held that both sets of children were
acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for
partial reconsideration. 
HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom,
and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not
present any competent evidence relative to the law and
customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao
and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's
law or custom on marriage not only bec. they are self-
serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence." On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact." The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom. 
REPUBLIC V ORBECIDO III GR 154380
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros
Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
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Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.  They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively.  In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along
their son Kristoffer.  A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and
married a certain Stanley.  He thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under
Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree.  The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article
26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
FUJIKI V MARINAY GR 196049
In an earlier post on this blog, the Philippine judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree in a Rule 108
proceeding was discussed. The discussions in that
post were anchored primarily on the Supreme Court
Decision in Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR 186571, 11 Aug
2010).
Recently in the case of Fujiki vs Marinay (GR
196049, 26 June 2013), the Supreme Court
applied Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas in reinstating
petitioner Fujiki’s (a Japanese national) petition for
judicial recognition before the RTC of Quezon City of
a foreign judgment obtained in Japan by Fujiki’s wife
Marinay (Fujiki & Marinay married in 2004)
declaring Marinay’s subsequent marriage to Maekara
(Maekara & Marinay married in 2008 in Quezon City)
void due to its bigamous nature.
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
The Fujiki vs Marinay case has repercussions on
various principles under Philippine Family law.
We have traditionally understood Article 26 of the
Family Code (in allowing a judicial recognition by the
Filipino spouse of a foreign divorce decree obtained
abroad) as the only express statement in Philippine
law allowing the judicial recognition of a foreign
judgment affecting the marital status of a Filipino
citizen. Fujiki has made us understand that Article 26
of the Family Code is merely an expression of a
greater general rule that foreign judgments relating to
marital status may be recognized in the Philippines if
the foreign judgment is consistent with Philippine
public policy and the State has a sufficient interest in
the recognition of the foreign judgment. The Supreme
Court said:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[CIVIL
CODE , Art. 17.]
 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
“[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
In other words, although Article 26 of the Family
Code is an express legislative statement that a divorce
decree is consistent with Philippine public policy so
long as the requisites laid down by jurisprudence (see
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eg, Republic v. Orbecido(GR 154380, October 5,
2005) where a spouse must be an alien at the time the
divorce is procured, irregardless of the original
citizenship of that spouse at the time of marriage) are
complied with, Article 26 of the Family Code does not
preclude the recognition in the Philippines of a
judgment affecting the status of Filipino citizen, so
long as that judgment is ‘consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws’ (quote
from Fujiki). From the reinstatement in Fujiki vs
Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) of the petition,
it may be inferred that, at the very least
under Fujiki’s facts, a petition for judicial recognition
filed by a foreigner spouse of a foreign judgment
declaring the Filipino spouse’s subsequent marriage
as void, due to its bigamous nature, is consistent with
Philippine public policy, even if that foreign judgment
was obtained by the Filipino spouse (in Fujiki, the
foreign judgment was obtained by the Filipino
spouse). It, however, remains to be seen whether or
not such a petition filed in Fujiki would succeed had it
been the Filipino spouse who filed the petition for
recognition of the foreign judgment. This is because
while the Supreme Court in Fujiki explained the
public policy repercussions of maintaining a direct
action under Philippine law to declare as null and void
a marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On
Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages
And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages), It did not go
further in explaining the standards by which foreign
judgments should be deemed sufficiently or
substantially in accordance with the public policy
sought to be protected by a direct action. The
Supreme Court in Fujiki explained the public policy
underlying a direct action as follows:
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage,[FAMILY CODE , Art. 35-67.]83 support
pendente lite of the spouses and children,[quoting ARTICLE 84
FAMILY CODE; Cf. RULES  OF  COURT, Rule 61]
 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,[quoting ARTICLE 50
FAMILY CODE]
and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion.  A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary
to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the
corresponding civil registry is located.” [quoting ARTICLE 48 FAMILY
CODE; quoting s 9 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC]
Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013) also
affirmed the earlier pronouncement in Juliano-
Llave vs Republic (G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011),
which gave a spouse of the first marriage, an interest
as an ‘aggrieved spouse’ under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC to file a direct action to have his/her other spouse’s
subsequent bigamous declared null and void.
In Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), the
Supreme Court citingCorpuz vs Sto. Tomas (GR
186571, 11 Aug 2010) stated what the petitioner
seeking recognition of the foreign judgment must
prove:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or
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(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
xxx
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify
facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
“[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a  party or a particular fact.”
xxx
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine
courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule
of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able
to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is either inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of
a right between the parties.” Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding the lack of an express statement
in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 June 2013), it is
submitted that foreign law must also be proven in the
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment, for how else can one determine whether or
not the foreign court had jurisdiction, or that the
foreign procedure is consistent with our public policy,
or that the effects of the foreign decision is to
capacitate the parties to remarry (see
where Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas(GR 186571, 11 Aug
105 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
2010) citing Garcia vs Recio (G.R. No. 138322, 2
October 2001) where ‘conformity to the foreign law
allowing it’ must be demonstrated)? In Fujiki, the
Supreme Court alluded to the need to prove foreign
law, when it said that ‘Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered.’
 ==========================================
LESACA v LESACA
ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE
SARMIENTO, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
JOSEFA R. LESACA, defendant-appellant.
Juan R. Arbizo for appellee.
Pastor de Castro for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 31, 1949, plaintiff filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Zambales praying for the
rescission of the contract of sale executed between
her and defendant for failure of the latter to place the
former in the actual physical possession of the lands
she bought.
After issues were joined, the parties submitted the
case for decision upon the following stipulation of
facts: that on January 18, 1949, plaintiff bought from
defendant two parcels of land for P5,000; that after
the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical
possession of the lands but was prevented from doing
so by one Martin Deloso who claims to be the owner
thereof; that on February 1, 1949, plaintiff instituted
an action before the Tenancy Enforcement Division of
the Department of Justice to oust said Martin Deloso
from the possession of the lands, which action she
later abandoned for reasons known only to her; that
on December 12, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant
asking the latter either to change the lands sold with
another of the same kind and class or to return the
purchase price together with the expenses she had
incurred in the execution of the sale, plus 6 per cent
interest; and that since defendant did not agree to this
proposition as evidenced by her letter dated
December 21,1949, plaintiff filed the present action.
On April 11, 1957, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the deed of sale entered into between
plaintiff and defendant rescinded, and ordering the
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
latter to pay the former the sum of P5,000,
representing the purchase price of the lands, plus the
amount of P50.25 which plaintiff spent for the
execution and registration of the deed of sale, with
legal interest on both sums from January 18, 1949.
Defendant, in due time, appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the case was certified to us on the
ground that the questions involved are purely legal.
The issue posed by appellant is whether the
execution of the deed of sale in a public document
(Exhibit A) is equivalent to delivery of possession of
the lands sold to appellee thus relieving her of the
obligation to place appellee in actual possession
thereof.
Articles 1461 and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to deliver
and warrant the thing which is the subject-
matter of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed
delivered when the vendee is placed in the
control and possession thereof.
If the sale should be made by means of a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
is the subject-matter of the contract unless the
contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred
from such instrument.
From the above it is clear that when a contract of sale
is executed the vendor is bound to deliver to the
vendee the thing sold by placing the vendee in
the control and possession of the subject-matter of
the contract. However, if the sale is executed by
means of a public instrument, the mere execution of
the instrument is equivalent to deliveryunless the
contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such
instrument.
The question that now arises is: Is there any
stipulation in the sale in question from which we can
infer that the vendor did not intend to deliver outright
the possession of the lands to the vendee? We find
none. On the contrary, it can be clearly seen therein
that the vendor intended to place the vendee in actual
possession of the lands immediately as can be
inferred from the stipulation that the vendee "takes
actual possession thereof ... with full rights to dispose,
enjoy and make use thereof in such manner and form
as would be most advantageous to herself." The
possession referred to in the contract evidently refers
106 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
to actual possession and not merely symbolical
inferable from the mere execution of the document.
Has the vendor complied with this express
commitment? she did not. As provided in Article 1462,
the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the
vendee is placed in
the control and possession thereof, which situation
does not here obtain because from the execution of
the sale up to the present the vendee was never able
to take possession of the lands due to the insistent
refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender them claiming
ownership thereof. And although it is postulated in the
same article that the execution of a public document
is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds
true when there is no impediment that may prevent
the passing of the property from the hands of the
vendor into those of the vendee. This is what we said
in a similar case:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the
obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing
is considered to be delivered when it is placed
"in the hands and possession of the vendee."
(Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same
article declares that the execution of a public
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, but in
order that this symbolic delivery may produce
the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
vendor shall have such control over the thing
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
material delivery could have been made. It is
not enough to confer upon the purchaser
theownership and right of possession. The
thing sold must be placed in his control. When
there is no impediment whatever to prevent
the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the
purchaser by the sole will of the vendor,
symbolic delivery through the execution of a
public instrument is sufficient. But if,
notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it himself or through another
in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of
another will, then fiction yields to reality — the
delivery has not been effected. (Addison vs.
Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil., 404; See
also Garchitorena vs. Almeda, 48 Off. Gaz.,
No., 8, 3432; 3437)
The next question to resolve is: Can plaintiff rescind
the contract of sale in view of defendant's failure to
deliver the possession of the lands?
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
We are inclined to uphold the affirmative. While
defendant contends that rescission can be availed of
only in the cases enumerated in Articles 1291 and
1292 of the old civil Code and being a subsidiary
remedy (Article 1294) it can only be resorted to when
no other remedy is available, yet we agree with
plaintiff's contention that this action is based on Article
1124 of the same Code, which provides:
Art 1124. The right to resolve reciprocal
obligations, in case one of the obligors should
fail to comply with that which is incumbent
upon him, is deemed to be implied.
The person prejudiced may choose between
exacting the fulfillment of the obligation or its
resolution with indemnity for losses and
payment of interest in either case. He may
also demand the resolution of the obligation
even after having elected its fulfillment, should
the latter be found impossible.
Undoubtedly in a contract of purchase and sale the
obligation of the parties is reciprocal, and, as provided
by the law, in case one of the parties fails to comply
with what is incumbent upon him to do , the person
prejudiced may either exact the fulfillment of the
obligation or rescind the sale. Since plaintiff chose the
latter alternative, it cannot be disputed that her action
is in accordance with law.
We agree with the trial court that there was no
fraud in the transaction in question but rather
a non-fulfillment by the plaintiff-appellee C.N.
Hodges of his obligation, as vendor, to deliver
the things, which were the subject-matter of
the contract, to the defendant-appellant
Alberto Granada, as purchaser thereof (article
1461, Civil Code), and place them in the
latter's control and possession (article 1462,
Civil Code) which was not done. Inasmuch as
the obligations arising from the contract of
purchase and sale, Exhibit A, which was
entered into by the plaintiff-appellee and the
defendant-appellant, are reciprocal and the
former had failed to comply with that which
was incumbent upon him, the latter has the
implied right to resolve them, and he may
choose between exacting from the vendor the
fulfillment of the obligation or its resolution
with indemnity for damages and payment of
interest in either case (article 1124, Civil
Code). Inasmuch as the defendant-appellant
had chosen to rescind the aforesaid contract
of purchase and sale in his cross-complaint,
there arose the necessity on the part of the
107 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
plaintiff-appellee, to return the purchase price
with interest thereon, and on the part of the
defendant-appellant, to restore the things
which were the subject-matter thereof, in case
he had received them (article 1295, Civil
Code). (Hodges vs. Granada, 59 Phil., 429,
432; See alsoPabalan vs. Velez, 22 Phil., 29;
Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, supra;
Rodriguez vs. Flores, 43 Off. Gaz., No. 6,
2247.)
Wherefore the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-26462
TERESITA C.
YAPTINCHAY, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES,
Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch;
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her
own behalf and in her capacity
as Special Administratrix in the
Intestate Estate of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and JESUS
MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY
ELIGIR, ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY,
ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY,
ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA
Y. MONZON, ISABEL Y.
VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y.
YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y.
ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and
JOHN DOE, respondents.
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for
petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and
Feliciano for respondents.
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
SANCHEZ, J.:
The problem posed in this, an original petition
for certiorari, is whether or not this Court in
the exercise of its supervisory powers should
stake down as having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
the respondent judge's order of June 15, 1966
in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of
Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special
Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the
estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
the North Forbes Park property hereinafter
described, and to refrain from disturbing or
interfering in any manner whatsoever with the
latter's possession thereof, such order having
been amended by said respondent judge's
subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn
enjoining defendants in said case (private
respondents herein) and/or their duly
authorized agents or representatives from
selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering
said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of said case. We
granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for and directed respondents
to return the possession of the North Forbes
Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-
bond.
The controlling facts are the following:
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her
appointment first as Special Administratrix
and then as regular administratrix of the estate
108 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in
Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in
the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P.
Petitioner there alleged that the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband
and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to
1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and
from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue,
Pasay City; that the deceased who died
without a will left an estate consisting of
personal and real properties situated in the
Philippines, Hongkong and other places with
an estimated value of about P500,000; that to
petitioner's knowledge and information, the
deceased left three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and
Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July
7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away
from the residences aforesaid personal
properties belonging to the deceased together
with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It
was averred that in these circumstances the
appointment of a special administrator to take
custody and care of the interests of the
deceased pending appointment of a regular
administrator became an urgent necessity.
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court
issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing
herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay
special administratrix of the state of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a
P25,000-bond.
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an
opposition was registered by Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and
Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of
the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the
ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not
being an heir of the decedent, had no right to
institute the proceeding for the settlement of
the latter's estate, much less to procure
appointment as administratrix thereof; and
that having admittedly cohabited with the
deceased for a number of years said petitioner
was not qualified to serve as administratrix for
want of integrity. At the same time, oppositors
counter-petitioned for the appointment of
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the
deceased, as special administratrix and of
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving
spouse, as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard,
the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set aside
its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner
Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard,
the probate court granted counter-petitioners'
prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.
On August 18, 1965, the special
administratrix submitted a preliminary
inventory of the assets of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included
amongst these was "[a] bungalow residential
house with swimming pool, situated at Park
109 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
corner Talisay Road, North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this
opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay had been appointed special
administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita
C. Yaptinchay made her second move. That
was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner
filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for
replevin and for liquidation of the partnership
supposedly formed during the period of her
cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and
for damages. This case was docketed as Civil
Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the question
of the issuance of the writs of replevin and
preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent
judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order of
August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining
defendants therein (private respondents here)
and their agents from disposing any of the
properties listed in the complaint and from
interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's)
rights to, and possession over, amongst others,
"the house now standing at North Forbes
Park, Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private
respondents herein) resisted the action,
opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin
and preliminary injunction, mainly upon these
propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch in the special proceedings
heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings
No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation
case was filed to oust said probate court of
jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in
this, the second case (Civil Case 8873); and
(3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the
remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged
right sought to be protected thereby being
doubtful and still in dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before
this Court) in turn prayed the court for a writ
of preliminary injunction to direct plaintiff
(petitioner here) and all others in her behalf to
cease and desist from disturbing in any
manner whatsoever defendant Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the
North Forbes Park house and to order the
removal from the premises of said North
Forbes Park house of the guards, agents and
employees installed therein by plaintiff; to
enjoin plaintiff and her agents from entering
the aforesaid house and any other real
property registered in the name of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from
disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of
administration over the assets registered in the
name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the
latter's possession at the time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15,
1966 issued in said Civil Case 8873, the
110 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
pertinent portion of which reads: "From the
pleadings as well as the evidence already
submitted and representations made to the
court during the arguments, it appears that one
of the properties in dispute is the property
located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay
Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal
which at the time of the death of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under
construction and it also appears that after his
death said property was among the properties
of the deceased placed under the
administration of the special administratrix,
the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
Information has been given that in the evening
of August 14, 1965, the plaintiff was able to
dispossess the special administratrix from the
premises in question and that since then she
had been in custody of said house.
While the Court is still considering the merits
of the application and counter-application for
provisional relief, the Court believes that for
the protection of the properties and
considering the Forbes Park property is really
under the responsibility of defendant Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being
appointed Special Administratrix of the estate
of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court
denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with
respect to the Forbes Park property and the
restraining order issued by this Court is lifted.
The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease
and desist from disturbing in any manner
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a
bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ
of preliminary injunction is requiring the
plaintiff, her representatives and agents or
other persons acting in her behalf to deliver
the possession of the property located at the
corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North
Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special
Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to
refrain from disturbing interfering in any
manner whatsoever defendant's possession
thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the
court order of June 28, 1966, which in part
recites:
Considering that the present case treats
principally with the liquidation of an alleged
partnership between the plaintiff and the
deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and considering
further that said house in North Forbes Park is
included among the properties in dispute, the
Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15,
1966 by enjoining the defendants and/or their
duly authorized agents or representatives from
selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering
said property in any manner whatsoever
pending the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15,
1966 order was overturned by respondent
111 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
judge's order of August 8, 1966, which recites
that:
Considering that defendants, principally
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or
physical possession of the said properties
which were formerly held by the deceased
Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue
of her appointment and under her authority, as
Special Administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
[[
2]]
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966
triggered the present proceedings in this
Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she
was occupying the Forbes Park property at the
time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay, grave
abuse of discretion attended respondent
judge's order issuing an injunctive writ
transferring possession of said property to
respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed
in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to be
granted for the purpose of taking property out
of possession and/or control of a party and
placing it in that of another whose title thereto
has not been clearly established. 3  With this
[[ ]]
as guidepost, petitioner would have been
correct if she were lawfully in possession of
the house in controversy when Civil Case
8873 (where the injunctive writ was issued)
was commenced in the Pasig court, and if
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
respondent special administratrix, to whom
the possession thereof was transferred, were
without right thereto. But the situation here is
not as petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond
debate that with the institution on July 13,
1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P,
properties belonging not only to the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal
partnership of said deceased and his legitimate
wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4  were brought
[[ ]]
under the jurisdiction of the probate court,
properly to be placed under administration.
5  One such property is the lot at North
[[ ]]
Forbes Park. 6 [[ ]]
With respect to the Forbes Park house,
petitioner offers varying versions. In the
verified petition before this Court, petitioner
avers "that the construction of said North
Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly
by petitioner and the deceased, petitioner
even contributing her own exclusive funds
therefor." 7  This is a reproduction of an
[[ ]]
allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966
alternative motion for reconsideration or for
clarification/amendment of the herein
controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil
Case 8873. 8  And again, in the affidavit of
[[ ]]
Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965,
she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real
and personal, in her own words, "through
our joint efforts and capital, among
which properties are those situated" in "North
Forbes Park." 9  All of which contradict her
[[ ]]
averment in the amended complaint dated
October 25, 1965 — also verified — in said
112 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired
through her own personal funds and efforts
real properties such as ... the house now
standing at North Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal."  10
[[ ]]
But herein private respondents vehemently
dispute petitioner's claim of complete or even
partial ownership of the house. They maintain
that the construction of that house was
undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's)
intervention and the deceased paid with his
own personal funds all expenses incurred in
connection with the construction thereof.  11
[[ ]]
It was only after hearing and considering the
evidence adduced and the fact that after the
death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes Park
house "was among the properties of the
deceased placed under the administration of"
respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, that
respondent judge issued the injunction order
of June 15, 1966 herein complained of. Worth
repeating at this point is that respondent
judge, in his order of August 8, 1966, declared
that defendants (private respondents herein),
"principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
took actual or physical possession",
amongst others, of the North Forbes Park
house — "by virtue of her
appointment and under her authority, as
Special Administratrix."
On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled
to the injunction she prayed for below.
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
2. As well established is the rule that the grant
or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound
discretion of the court, in the exercise of
which appellate courts will not interfere
except in a clear case of abuse.  12
[[ ]]
A considerate and circumspect view of the
facts and circumstances in this case obtaining
will not permit us to tag the disputed order of
June 15, 1966 with the vice of grave abuse of
discretion. It is quite true that, in support of
the allegation that the house in North Forbes
Park was her exclusive property, petitioner
presented proof in the form of loans that she
had contracted during the period when said
house was under construction. But evidence is
wanting which would correlate such loans to
the construction work. On the contrary, there
is much to the documentary proof presented
by petitioner which would tend to indicate
that the loans she obtained from the Republic
Bank were for purposes other than the
construction of the North Forbes Park home.
And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of
petitioner's memorandum before this Court;
and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay,
Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph
4 that she obtained various loans from the
Republic Bank "for her own exclusive
account" and that the proceeds thereof "were
also used by affiant both for her business and
for the construction, completion and
furnishing of the said house at North Forbes
Park", and which cites her seven promissory
notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices
1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one of the
113 |
CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the
proceeds for the construction of the North
Forbes Park house. On the contrary, there is
Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000
which says that the purpose of the loan for
"Fishpond development"; Appendix 3 for
P100,000 for the same purpose; Appendix 5
for P50,000, "To augment working capital in
buying & selling of appliances & gift items";
and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For
Agricultural Development". In plain terms,
the fact alone of petitioner's indebtedness to
the Republic Bank does not establish that said
house was built with her own funds.
It is in the context just recited that the
unsupported assertion that the North Forbes
Park house is petitioner's exclusive property
may not be permitted to override the prima
facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay
(or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance,
and during the existence of his marriage with
respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of
the estate that should be under the control of
the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership
presumably based on the provisions of Article
144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said
Article 144 says that: "When man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the
creation of the civil relationship envisaged in
Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions,
the existence of which must first be shown
before rights provided thereunder may be
deemed to accrue.  13  One such condition is
[[ ]]
that there must be a clear showing that the
petitioner had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved. Until such right to co-ownership is
duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered
the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a
writ of injunction.  14  For, the existence of a
[[ ]]
clear positive right especially calling for
judicial protection is wanting. Injunction
indeed, is not to protect contingent or future
rights;  15  nor is it a remedy to enforce an
[[ ]]
abstract right.  16
[[ ]]
At any rate, it would seem to us that the
interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes
Park property be in the hands of the bonded
administratrix in the estate proceedings. For
then, her acts would be subject to the control
of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of
respondent judge, the herein petition for
certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction  17 issued
[[ ]]
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by this Court is hereby dissolved and set
aside.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Eugenio vs Velez
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the
former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC
of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined
by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.  The court then
issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to
surrender the Vitaliana’s body to the sheriff on the
ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas
corpus proceedings.  Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died
of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s
residence.  The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio
assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody
of the deceased.
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of
Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers
and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
      
“Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased
was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any
kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest
kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages where “a
man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in
common law jurisdictions”.  In addition, it requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way
be incapacitated to contract marriage.  Whereas, the
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another
woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting
for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband,
and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband,
who had lived with another woman, died a year before
she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her
Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is
not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.   it is within the scope of free exercise protection.  The
According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.  After
ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for
a couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the
declaration which was completely executed by Escritor
and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by
three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.       
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct”
and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction
of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of
the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency.  “There is nothing in
the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override
respondent’s plea of religious freedom.  Indeed, it is
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CASES IN PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state.
The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of
the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential
that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as
Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be
an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom
but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the
Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General
is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality
of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b)
to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest"
to override respondent's religious belief and practice;
and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrator's receipt of this Decision.     
Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Puno, J.:
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch
253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada
requested for an investigation  of respondent for living
with a man not her husband while she was still legally
married and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is
committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the
image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed  therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband
was still alive but living with another woman. She
likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies
any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct
because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the
conjugal arrangement was in  conformity  with their
religious beliefs, and 3)  That the conjugal arrangement
with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with
her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s
witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses
#rheyne.attyinthemaking
to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries
where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for
grossly immoral conduct. Escritor’s conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out
a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—
including religious freedom—may be enjoyed. 
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode
the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

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