CSC Ruling on Nepotism in Public Appointments

University of Santo Tomas
Faculty of Civil Law
POLITICAL
LAW REVIEW
Volume 2-B
Atty. Enrique V. Dela Cruz, Jr.
4C (2018-2019)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Law on Public Officers ......................................................................................................... 1

1. The Civil Service ..........................................................................................................................................................1
2. Accountability of Public Officers ........................................................................................................................23
B. Administrative Law ............................................................................................................. 53
C. Election Law ........................................................................................................................ 86
D. Local Government.............................................................................................................. 154

1. Local Autonomy ...................................................................................................................................................... 154
2. Creation, Conversion, Abolition ...................................................................................................................... 160
3. Local Governance ................................................................................................................................................... 191
4. Term and Tenure ................................................................................................................................................... 206
E. National Economy and Patrimony .................................................................................. 227
F. Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports ....................................... 243
G. Public International Law ................................................................................................. 253

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – 4C (2018-2019)
Law on Public Officers
The Civil Service
Lopez, Sherlyn
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999.
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor
of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices
that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.
FACTS
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against
Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism. Civil Service Commission
(CSC) conducted a formal investigation and found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism
on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and
utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as
the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration. However, CSC denied the motion.
Then, he filed a Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
CSC and ruled that Dacoycoy is not guilty of Nepotism. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of Nepotism.
HELD
Yes. The law defines nepotism as follows:
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief
of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word relative and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
1
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in

favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following:a) appointing authority;b) recommending authority;c) chief of the bureau or office,
andd) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the
positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr.
Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment
of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as
watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short
durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS
Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags
immediate supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional
Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr.
Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy
who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated
his performance as very satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position
description form that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on
nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the
appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag
recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under respondents
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career
positions.
2
Magtira, John Michael

QUIMBO v. GERACIO
G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not
considered of the actual penalty of suspension—service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited
as service of the penalty.
FACTS
Petitioner, the Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for harassment
and oppression by Padaon, a general foreman who was detailed to the Motor Pool Division. During
the pendency of the administrative case, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension without
pay for six months. The Ombudsman, found petitioner guilty of simple misconduct only and
penalized him with suspension from office for a period of two months without pay.
Petitioner prayed that the order be modified to take into account the period of his preventive
suspension he actually served for two months and seventeen days.
ISSUE
Whether or not the period of preventive suspension can be credited to the imposed penalty of
suspension.
HELD
No, it cannot be credited.
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive

measure and suspension as penalty. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to
prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence
potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him.If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is
the penalty.
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not
considered of the actual penalty of suspension—service of the preventive suspension cannot be
credited as service of the penalty.
3
Mangahas, Bethany
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. ODESLA-IAD, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board
G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O.
292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
FACTS
President Benigno Aquino III issued E.O. No. 13 abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Pichay, Jr. assailed the constitutionality of E.O. No. 13, alleging that
the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the IAD-ODESLA, and that by
creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has
not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate
quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE
Whether or not E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create
a public office.
HELD
NO, the President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department or the
offices under him as stated in Section 31 of E.O. 292 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of
the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer
of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative
of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office. The
abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization
required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division (the IAD) through which ODESLA could take on the additional
functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
Neither did the President delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agency by the
creation of IAD-ODESLA. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested
with quasi-judicial powers. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
4
Manuel, Kenneth Glenn
RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF JUDGE MOSLEMEN T. MACARAMBON

UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946
A.M. No. 14061-RET, 19 June 2012, EN BANC (Brion, J.)
Resignation stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his
post. It absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in general. Retirement, on the other hand,
takes effect by operation of law and the employment relationship endures for the purpose of the grant
of retirement benefits.
FACTS
Judge Moslemen Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) for a period of
18 years, 1 month and 16 days. Before reaching the optionalretirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon
was appointed as Commissioner of theCommission on Election (COMELEC) by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo(President Arroyo). Judge Macarambon served as COMELEC Commissioner
forless than a year and was subsequently appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the
National Transmission Corporation. Thereafter, Judge Macarambonresigned from the position when
he failed to receive a reappointment fromPresident Benigno C. Aquino III.
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requested that he be allowed to retireunder Section 1 of

Republic Act 910. Judge Macarambon asserted that Section1 allows the payment of retirement
benefits to a judge of the RTC who resignsby reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office.
Judge Macarambonposited that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated him
todischarge his duties as an RTC Judge on account of his “submission to the will ofthe political
authority and appointing power.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resignedfrom his judicial office
before reaching the optional retirement age to receiveretirement benefits under R.A. 910, as
amended
HELD
Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying differentmeanings and legal
consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee canresign at any time, retirement entails the
compliance with certain age and servicerequirements specified by law and jurisprudence.
Resignation stems fromthe employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her
post.Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’semployment,
resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship ingeneral; in retirement, the
employment relationship endures for the purpose ofthe grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as
amended allows the grant ofretirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from
judicial serviceor resigned from judicial office.
In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance withthe age and service
requirements as provided in R.A. No. 910, as amended. Thesecond sentence of Section 1 imposes the
following minimum requirements foroptional retirement: a.) must have attained the age of sixty (60)
years old; and b.)must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the
lastthree (3) of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary. Strictcompliance with
the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and thegrant of exception remains to be
on a case to case basis.
5
On the other hand, resignation under R.A. No. 910, as amended must be“by reason of
incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.” The resignation contemplated under R.A. No. 910, as
amended must have the element ofinvoluntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than
physical or mentaldisability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from
theintent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicialemployment were it
not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyondhis/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’scase does not render
him eligible to retire under R.A No. 910, as amended.
6
Marasigan, Mariella
ELSIE S. CAUSING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

G.R. No. 199139, 9 September 2014
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 are transfer and
detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency
to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency
to another with or without the issuance of an appointment”; while detail as defined in the
Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the
issuance of an appointment
FACTS
Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12), commanding for the
detailing of Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor.
Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron ordering her detail
to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it violated of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in
connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron countered that the
purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her
functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her coemployees and with
the public transacting business in her office.
The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for
lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation.
Moreover, Causing initiated an administrative case in the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to
challenger her reassignment pursuant to the same office orders, which amounted to constructive
dismissal. CSC rendered a decision that the reassignment was valid.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from her
office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute a prohibited act
under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the COMELEC?
2. Whether or not the CSC erred in rendering a decision that the reassignment made by Mayor
Biron is valid.
HELD
1. No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there was no probable cause
to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil
Registrar. She was merely required to physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her
functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work
physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over
the staff as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may
7
encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff,
that by itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Moreover, Causing’s
tooliteral understanding of transfer should not hold sway because the provisions involved here were
criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense punishable under
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be
resolved in favor of the accused.
2. NO. Although Mayor Biron used the word detailing referring to the personnel movement effected,
the personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment, viz:
In the instant case, Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR). She
was merely required to physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as
Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically
outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff
as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter
difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by
itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. That difficulty, nonetheless,
is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor Biron prefers to ensure that Causing
faithfully discharging her duties as MCR is principally an exercise of his sound judgment and
discretion. He alone has the discretion to decide when to resort to the necessity of implementing
changes in the workplace as he occupies the ideal vantage point and is in the best position to
determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy those needs. Besides, contrary to the
allegations of Causing, none of the elements of constructive dismissal is present.
8
Marcelino, Kristen
EVALYN I. FETALINO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 191890, 4 December 2012
The right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the
conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No. 1568 — are fulfilled; and second,
when an actual retirement takes place.
FACTS
On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the
petitioners as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2,
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos
renewed the petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however,
adjourned in May 1998 before the Commission on Appointment could act on their appointments. The
constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer
re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners.Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec
Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998.
Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and
monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.The Comelec initially approved the
petitioners’ claims pursuant to its Resolution No. 06-1369dated December 11, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting the petitioners a
pro-rated gratuity and pension. Subsequently, on October 5, 2007, the petitioners asked for a re-
computation of their retirement pay on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, does not cover a pro-
rated computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution referring the
matter to its Finance Services Department for comment and recommendation. On July 14, 2009, the
Comelec issued another resolution referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and
recommendation.
In the presently assailed Resolution No. 8808dated March 30, 2010, the Comelec, on the
basis of the Law Department’s study, completely disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum
benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec reasoned out that of these four (4) modes by which the
Chairman or a Commissioner shall be entitled to lump sum benefit, only the first instance
(completion of term) is pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear that the non-
confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or incapacity or
death.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress
already adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-
year lump sum gratuity;
2. Whether or not they now have a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA
No. 1568 in view of the finality of Resolution No. 06- 1369.
HELD
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners are not entitled to the lump
sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. That the petitioners failed to meet
conditions of the applicable retirement law — Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568— is beyond dispute.
9
To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the
following events must transpire:
(1) Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office;
(2) Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office; 
(3) Death while in the service; and 
(4) Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term
of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in
the government at the time of retirement.
The Court emphasize at this point that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two
conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable law – in this case, R.A. No.
1568 — are fulfilled; and second, when an actual retirement takes place.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any
Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office.
The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never
completed the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution; they served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16,
1998 to June 30, 1998.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petitioners’ service, if any, could only
amount to tenure in office and not to the term of office contemplated by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568.
While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo“as a permanent
appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office,” we have also positively ruled in that case that “an ad interim
appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute
a term of office.”
Based on these considerations, the Court concludes that the petitioners can never be
considered to have retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but,
more importantly, because they did not serve a “term of office” as required by Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568, as amended.
As to the last issue, the Supreme Court held that there were no vested rights over retirement
benefits. The Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the retirement benefits granted
to the petitioners under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have
no vested right over these benefits.
10
Mendoza, Roland Joseph
MELINDA L. OCAMPO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. NO. 188716, 10 January 2013
Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of double
compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same creditable period.
FACTS
On 1 March 1996, Ocampo retired from the National Electrification Administration under
Commonwealth Act No. 1863 as amended, by Republic Act No. 1616, after more than seventeen (17)
years of service. Ocampo availed of the lump sum payment with a net gratuity of P358, 917.01.
Three days thereafter, on 4 March 1996, under Letter of Appointment dated 16 February
1996, Ocampo assumed office as Board Member of the ERB. On 30 June 1998, upon expiration of her
term, Ocampo retired under Executive Order No. 172, “Creating the Energy Regulatory Board” in
relation to Republic Act No. 1568, “An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the
Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections.” Ocampo availed of the five year lump
sum benefit and the corresponding monthly pension to be paid out for the remainder of her life. This
first gratuity lump sum payment based on sixty (60) months or five (5) years advance salary was
immediately received by Ocampo after her retirement. Likewise, Ocampo began to receive her
monthly pension.
On 25 August 1998, Ocampo was again appointed, this time as Chairman of ERB with a
term of four (4) years. On 15 August 2001, the ERB was abolished and replaced by the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136. For the
second time, Ocampo sought retirement under Executive Order No. 172. Ocampo’s claim was
endorsed by the then Chairperson of the ERC to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
Upon release by the DBM of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding
Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA), Chairperson Barin approved the payment thereof to Ocampo.
However, on post-audit of the transaction with Ocampo as payee, State Auditor IV, Nelda R.
Monterde, issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2002-002101 dated 10 July 2002: (1) suspending
payment of the amount of P1,452,613.71 covering Ocampo’s second retirement gratuity computed on
a pro-rata basis equivalent to only two years, eleven months, and twenty days;6 and (2) requiring
submission by the ERC of “legal basis for [the payment of] retirement gratuity twice under the same
law (EO 172).”
On 28 October 2002, Ocampo likewise wrote Auditor Monterde asking for the lifting of NS
No. 2002-002-101 dated 10 July 2002 and asseverating her entitlement to the second retirement
gratuity. The same was denied on the basis of the last paragraph of Section 1 of EO 172, quoted
hereunder, thus: The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or
upon becoming eligible for retirement under existing laws shall be entitled to the same retirement
benefits and privileges provided for the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
ISSUE
Whether COA erred in ruling that Ocampo is entitled to receive only the benefits
corresponding to her retirement as ERB Chair and the period during which she served as member of
the said board should be merely tacked in to the period during which she served as such chair.
HELD
11
At the outset, it must be clarified that the claim of Ocampo for two (2) sets of retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 is not, strictly speaking, a claim for double compensation
prohibited under the first paragraph of Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Claims for double
retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against the receipt of double compensation when they
are based on exactly the same services and on the same creditable period.
In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same
creditable period. Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2)
retirements from the ERB. In other words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is
based on distinct creditable periods i.e., one for her term as member of the ERB and another for her
term as chairman of the same agency.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 that allows
a qualified retiree to therein recover two (2) sets of retirement benefits as a consequence of two (2)
retirements from the same covered agency. As worded, Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, only
allows payment of only a single gratuity and a single annuity out of a single compensable retirement
from any one of the covered agencies.
Having settled that Ocampo is only entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits
under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended. While Ocampo is entitled to receive only one set of
retirement benefits despite her two (2) retirements, We believe that her subsequent stint as
Chairman of the ERB and her consequent second retirement necessitated an adjustment of the
retirement benefits she is entitled to under the law. This is because Republic Act No. 1568, as
amended, reckons the amount of gratuity on the retiree’s last annual salary and actual years of
service not exceeding five (5) years, and it bases the amount of annuity on the retiree’s last monthly
salary.
12
Navarro, Jessica
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR

ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER
III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M.No. 12-8-07-CA, 16 June 2015
The payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued,efficient, and meritorious service: (1)
in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the Judiciary is the basis
and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and efficient service of the recipient
in the Judiciary.
FACTS
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando
In her letter dated August 22, 2012, Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services
as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983 to
July 31, 1987, and as Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), from
February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, be considered as part of her judicial services “as in the case
of Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.” Accordingly, Justice
Salazar-Fernando requested that her longevity pay be adjusted “from the current 10% to 20% of [her]
basic salary effective May 25, 1999.”
We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of

Administrative Services (OAS), for study and recommendation. In her February 18, 2013
Memorandum, Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services as MTC
Judge be credited as judicial service that can be added to her present longevity pay. Atty.
Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s request that her
services at the COMELEC be also credited for her present longevity pay. Nonetheless, she
recommended that Justice
Salazar-Fernando’s services in the COMELEC be included in the computation of her longevity pay
upon retirement “as in the case of Justice Pardo.”
B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan
In her letter dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), from March 3, 1998
to November 5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be given a
longevity pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her salary, allowances
and benefits be made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on November 6, 2009. In the Court’s
Resolution8 of November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO)
to comment on Justice Gacutan’s letter.
In her Comment of January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court
and Chief of Office of the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Justice Gacutan’s request for the crediting
of her services as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial service be granted, but only for purposes
of her retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory retirement on December 3, 2013; and (2)
Justice Gacutan’s request that her salary and allowances be adjusted retroactive from her
assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be denied.
C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso
13
In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration,10 Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s
October 23, 2012 Resolution that denied his request for the crediting of his services as NLRC
Commissioner as judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits, specifically his
longevity pay. Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 _ which amended Article 216
of the Labor Code _ should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained
under this view that he already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was
appointed to the appellate court on February 4, 2004. We referred Justice Veloso’s motion for
reconsideration to the FMBO for report and recommendation in our Resolution of November 27,
2012. In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013, Atty. Ferrer- Flores
recommended that Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration be denied since the points he raised
were a rehash of his arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request.
ISSUE
Whether or not computation of longevity pay should include previous services in other
branches of the government
HELD
Longevity Pay under Section 42
Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner ofcomputing longevity pay,
i.e., to be paid monthly, based on the recipient’smonthly basic pay at the rate of 5% for each five
years of continuous,efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that theamount
of longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixedamount, in contrast with the
“salary” under Section 41; it is a percentageof the recipient’s monthly basic pay which, at the least, is
equivalent to5%.Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and
meritorious service: (1) in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in
the Judiciary is the basis and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and
efficient service of the recipient in the Judiciary.
From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e.,to the judges and
justices of the Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due onlyupon the fulfillment of certain conditions)
grant. In negative terms, it is notan absolute grant that is easily transferrable to other departments
ofgovernment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to: (1) NOTE the Memorandum dated
February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and the Report and Recommendation dated February
15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores; (2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A.
Salazar- Fernando that her services as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be
included in the computation of her longevity pay; 3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios
A. Salazar-Femando that her services as COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation
of her longevity pay; (4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as
NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay from the time she started
her judicial service; (5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso for lack of merit; and ( 6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the
handling of granted longevity pay benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant
to the guidelines and declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution. SO
ORDERED.
14
Magtira, John Michael
TORRES v. DE LEON
G.R. No. 199440, 18 January 2016
The PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis in character, thus, requiring this Court to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis
FACTS
When petitioner was the Chapter Administrator of the PNRC, General Santos City Chapter,
the PNRC Internal Auditing Office conducted an audit of the funds and accounts of the PNRC,
General Santos City Chapter and based on the audit report submitted to respondent Corazon Alma
G. De Leon (De Leon), petitioner incurred a "technical shortage" in the amount of P4,306,574.23.
Hence, respondent De Leon in a Memorandum formally charged petitioner with Grave

Misconduct for violating PNRC Financial Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances and
Disbursement of Funds.
After the completion of the investigation of the case against petitioner, respondent issued a
Memorandum imposing upon petitioner the penalties of one month suspension.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal addressed to the Board of Governors of the
PNRC through respondent and furnished a copy thereof to the CSC. Petitioner addressed her appeal
memorandum to the CSC and sent copies thereof to the PNRC and the CSC. Respondent, in a
memorandum denied petitioner's appeal.
The CSC promulgated a Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal and imposing upon her the
penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC, but the
same was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
ISSUE
Whether the Civil Service Commission have appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case.
HELD
Yes.
The CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at hand is the enforcement of
labor laws and penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC,
and as such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act
6713stating that:
Section 1. These Rules shall cover all officials and employees in the government, elective and
appointive, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service, including
military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of
amount.
15
Thus, having jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty and
order the dismissal of petitioner from the service. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as
decisions of this Court, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction on administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary. The CA, therefore, did not err when it agreed with the
CSC that the latter had appellate jurisdiction.
16
Pagtalunan, Maylen
WINSTON F. GARCIA, GM of GSIS v. MARIO I. MOLINA

and ALBERT M. VELASCO
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those
created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the
law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and
general terms and conditions of employment.
FACTS
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate
Memoranda from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
Both were suspended for 90 days without pay. In their answer, both respondents denied the
charges and averred instead, that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in
charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual and
legal basis. Respondents filed an Urgent Petition for to Lift Preventive Suspension Order before Civil
Service Commission (CSC) as well as Petition to Transfer Investigation. CSC failed to resolve both
motions.
Respondents filed with CA a Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for TRO. CA granted the Petition and agreed that the investigation should be done by CSC and not
GSIS.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conduct of Preliminary Investigation in Administrative proceeding is an

essential requisite to the conduct of adjudication.
HELD
Yes.
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or those
created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to
the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and
general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees.
In addition, the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities the authority to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. By this legal provision, Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not without
limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing a formal
charge against an erring employee.
17
The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite
preliminary investigation is null and void. However, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient
in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a
Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall
quite obviously indicate that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his
side. As can be gleaned from the procedure, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge.
The petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. In particular, due process in
administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent's legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
18
Perianes, Laurisse Marie
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.CRISOSTOMO M. PLOPINIO

G.R. No. 197571, 3April 2017, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
While the dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature, as the concerned public official
or employee need not be notified or be heard, and it shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefit of
the public official or employee concerned nor in said public official or employee’s disqualification from
reemployment in the government. The circumstances for the dropping of a public officer or employee
from the rolls for AWOL without prior notice must be fully established. For the burden of proof that
said public officer or employee committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. The latter
must be able to show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed.
FACTS
Crisostomo M. Plopinio (Plopinio) respondent herein served as a COMELEC Election Officer

III of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, prior to his separation from service. A certain Alber G. Adan (Adan)
filed a letter-complaint against respondent alleging that because of respondent’s frequent absences,
the latter failed to act on his petition for disqualification of a barangay candidate. Acting Director IV
Adolfo A. Ibañez (Director Ibañez) of the Personnel Department of COMELEC conducted an
investigation to said letter-complaint, and submitted a Memorandum to Commissioner Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr. (Commissioner Tuason), who in turn, forwarded the same to the COMELEC En Banc for
appropriate action.
In its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc adopted in toto Director Ibañez’s findings and
recommendations which is for the dropping of Plopinio from the rolls of COMELEC Employees.
Thereafter, Commissioner Tuason issued a Memorandum directing respondent to immediately cease
and desist from performing his official duties, based, among other grounds, on his unauthorized
absences. Meanwhile, Director Ibañez issued another Memorandum, withdrawing his earlier
recommendation to drop respondent from the rolls of employees upon finding that respondent
submitted his daily time records (DTRs) for the months of January to April 2002 and January to
July 2003 but his supervisor, Acting Provincial Elections Supervisor Atty. Liza Zabala-Cariño,
refused to sign and forward the same to his Personnel Department , claiming that she cannot attest
to the fact that Plopinio did show up in his office on the time and date stated in his DTRs.
As a result, respondent sought the reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution.

Accordingly, the COMELEC En Banc was misled by Director Ibañez’s initial recommendation to
drop him from the rolls of employees, which lacked factual and legal bases; that he was not afforded
due process as he was never confronted with any formal charge regarding his alleged absenteeism
prior to the COMELEC Resolution. Additionally, said Resolution lost ground since it was based
solely on Director Ibañez’s recommendation which was later withdrawn. Unfortunately, the
COMELEC En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Plopinio then appealed the aforementioned Resolution to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), who affirmed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc. It ratiocinated that
respondent failed to present evidence that he was reporting for work. The motion for reconsideration
of said decision was likewise denied. Aggrieved, Plopinio appealed the CSC Resolution before the
Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA found merit in respondent’s
appeal, and adjudged that since it was established that the DTRs were submitted, the resolution of
the COMELEC dropping Plopinio from the rolls is without basis. Atty. Cariño’s accusation of
19
Falsification of a DTR is a factual issue which must have been accorded with a proper administrative
investigation to ascertain the truthfulness thereof. Thus, CSC filed the instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in finding that respondent
was deprived of due process.
HELD
NO. Based on current rules, a public officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for
absence without official leave (AWOL) without prior notice, under any of the following
circumstances: (1) the public officer or employee was continuously absent without approved leave for
at least 30 working days; or (2) the public officer or employee had established a scheme to
circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences, though less than 30 working days, three
times in a semester, such that a pattern was readily apparent. But respondent’s circumstances did
not constitute a clear-cut case of AWOL. There was no proof that respondent was actually absent or
did not report for work for 30 days or more. Plopinio’s AWOL was merely presumed from the fact
that his DTRs for the periods of January to April 2002 and January to July 2003 were not on file
with the COMELEC Personnel Department.
However, as respondent consistently avowed, he had submitted his DTRs for the periods in
question, presenting before the COMELEC his evidence: the transmittal letters for his DTRs;
certified photocopies of his DTRs; and Memorandum to the COMELEC Personnel Department
accounting for the dates of submission and the person/s at the OPES who received his DTRs. In
contrast, Atty. Cariño, as Plopinio’s immediate supervisor, had been glaringly silent all throughout
the proceedings, unable to categorically deny that her office received respondent’s DTRs for the
periods in question. In fact, the only time she spoke up in this case was to admit to Director Ibañez
that respondent submitted hid DTRs, but she did not sign the same because she found some of
respondent’s entries in said DTRs questionable.
Taking into account the evidence submitted by respondent, together with PES Cariño’s
admission, Director Ibañez issued his Memorandum explicitly declaring that there was the inability
to fully establish a successful thirty-day absence without approved leave (AWOL) on the part of
respondent and withdrawing the recommendation in his earlier Memorandum to drop respondent
from the rolls. He even recommended that instead PES Cariño file an administrative disciplinary
case as warranted. The COMELEC cannot simply disregard Director Ibañez’s Memorandum
recalling his earlier Memorandum, when the COMELEC En Banc entirely based its Resolution
thereto. Notably, the COMELEC En Banc in denying Plopinio’s Motion for Reconsideration did not
proffer any explanation as to why it rejected the findings and recommendations of Director Ibañez’s
subsequent Memorandum.
Additionally, it was unreasonable to still require respondent to submit his DTRs duly signed
by PES Cariño, when the root cause of respondent’s problem in the first place was the latter’s failure,
if not outright refusal to sign Plopinio’s DTRs and forward the same to the COMELEC Personnel
Division.
20
Onia, Steven Ralph

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ESPINA
G.R. NO. 213500
Public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is
not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully
comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand
to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
FACTS
On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO)
filed before the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint and a supplemental complaint, respectively,
charging Espina and several other PNP officers and private individuals for: (a) violation of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7080, RA 3019, RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and Serious
Dishonesty; arising from alleged anomalies that attended the Philippine National Police's (PNP)
procurement of 40 tires, and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance services of a total
of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and delivery
expenses of 18 units of LAV s between August and December 2007. It averred that the PNP did not
comply with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the
bid documents were not furnished to possible bidders; (b) no pre-procurement and pre-bid
conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation; (d) the procuring agency did not require the submission of eligibility requirements as
well as the technical and financial documents from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification was
conducted. Further, it claimed that there were "ghost deliveries," i.e., the tires were never delivered
to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works were actually performed on the LAVs. The
alleged anomalous transactions amounted to P404M.
In defense, Espina denied any participation in the bidding and/or procurement process and
maintained that he belonged to the Management Division which is responsible for the inspection of
deliveries made to the PNP after the bidding and procurement process. He also pointed out that
pursuant to the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No. XXA dated November 17, 1993, his only
duty, as the said division's Acting Chief, was to note the reports. According to him, it was not his
responsibility to personally inspect and confirm deliveries and go beyond the contents of the IRFs
submitted by his subordinates, absent any irregularity reported by the property inspectors who are
tasked to check and examine deliveries.
In a Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012, the Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict Espina and several other PNP officers for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b)
(4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman also found them guilty of Grave Misconduct and
Serious Dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal from government service.
The CA found Espina guilty, instead, of Simple Misconduct, a less grave offense punishable
with suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second offense. It rejected Espina's defense of reliance in good faith on the acts of
his subordinates, holding that he had the obligation to supervise them and ensure that the IRFs and
Work Orders they prepared, as well as every procurement-related document released by his division,
21
were regular, lawful, valid, and accurate, considering the significance of the transaction related to
the disbursement of public funds over which great responsibility attached.
However, the CA absolved Espina from the charge of Serious Dishonesty, considering that he
did not personally prepare the IRFs but merely affixed his signatures thereon. At best, he
imprudently failed to check and counter-check the contents of the IRFs and the Work Orders he
signed, which, however, does not equate to Serious Dishonesty.
ISSUE
Whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges imputed
against him.
HELD
The petition is partly meritorious.
In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious dishonesty before
the Ombudsman which found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him the supreme penalty of
dismissal from government service with all its accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him guilty
only of simple misconduct and punished him with a three-month suspension.
However, after a circumspect review of the records, the Court finds Espina administratively
liable, instead, for Gross Neglect of Duty, warranting his dismissal from government service. At the
outset, it should be pointed out that the designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is
charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense
where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one's guilt, as in
this case. Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO's supplemental complaint accused Espina with failure to
exercise due diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect of
Duty.
Gross neglect of duty is defined as "negligence characterized by want of even slight care, or
by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfuly
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give
to their own property." In contrast, simple neglect of duty is the failure of an employee or official to
give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference."
Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "public office is a
public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and
lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric
and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run
the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for
disbursements made in violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section 52, Chapter 9, Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust,
are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their
ability. Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.
22
Accountability of Public Officers
Ramo, Keif Khari M.
Office of the Ombudsman vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005
DOCTRINE/S
The impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The list is
exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is
essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits
of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the
grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of
the government.
The rule that an impeachableofficer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses
whichconstitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuancein office. Hence, the moment he
is no longer in office because of hisremoval, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no barto
his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement baran administrative investigation from
proceeding against theprivate respondent, given that, the former’s retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in viewof the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices
Act.
FACTS
On 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;

2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the ₱7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas
employees on the date the said amount was due for release.
To underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass leave of absence,
and in fact took their cause to the media.
Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter.
The FFIB, in its Report, found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of
extortion, sexual harassment and oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a
constituted Committee of Peers.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after
careful study, and following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy
Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment.
23
Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint as criminal and
administrative cases.
Accordingly,the Committee of Peers (COP) directedprivate respondent Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615

entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) to
submit his controverting evidence.
On April 6, 2000, a Motion was filed to place respondent under preventive suspension, claiming that
the offenses for which private respondent Mojica was charged warranted removal from office, the
evidence against him was strong, and that Mojica’s continued stay in office would prejudice the case,
as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or otherwise desist from pursuing
the case. On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandumto the COP, directing them to
conduct administrative proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees v.
Mojica (for dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, and directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office), and submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica
under preventive suspension.
Subsequently, the COP issued an Orderin OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence against
Mojica and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within ten days, as
well as his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying
that a resolution be issued issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the
petition to enjoin and restrain the respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman,
the Committee of Peers, and the Special Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from
suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica).
The Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and required the
Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued.
Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order to the effect that having failed to submit the
required counter-affidavits despite the lapse of seventeen days from the expiration of the extended
reglementary period for filing the same, respondent Mojica was deemed to have waived his right to
present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both criminal and administrative cases submitted for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motionbefore the Court of
Appeals to enjoin the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and
administrative cases aforementioned.
The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution by the Court
of Appeals on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining all therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-
00-0615 (criminal) and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the private respondent
Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for "violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019" (OMB-00-0-1050) and for "grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service" (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely
an attempt at circumventing the directives of the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion
24
before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause again why they should not be cited for
contempt.
By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that since Mojica’s term of office had already
expired as of 6 July 2000, the private respondent could no longer invoke his alleged immunity from
suit.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order deeming that cases No. OMB-
0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of
the evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for the
immediate issuance of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action
whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and OMB-0-00-1050.
In 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. In essence, the
appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official,
it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of the Court’s past rulings. Thus, the
order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation was SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND
VOID, and the complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-
ADM-0-00-0316, respectively, filed against the petitioner were DISMISSED. It declared all acts or
orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and the Committee of Peers, subjecting
the petitioner [herein private respondent] to criminal and administrative investigations, or pursuant
to such investigations INVALID.
ISSUE
Is Deputy Ombudsman an Impeachable Official?
HELD
NO.
The Court has taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the
Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of
them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.The list is
exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is
essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits
of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the
grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of
the government.
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held
criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which
constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is
no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to
his criminal prosecution in the courts.
25
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private
respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
26
Revadillo, Clarence
FACURA, et al. v. CA
GR No. 166495, 16 February 2011
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully
perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the charge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and
attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.
FACTS
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a GOCC chartered under PD 198. De
Jesus was the Deputy Administrator for Administrative Services of LWUA, while Parungao was its
Human Resources Management Department (HRMD) Manager for Administrative Services.
De Jesus was dismissed from the service per LWUA Board Resolutions and prohibited him
from acting on any matter as head of Administrative Services. De Jesus appealed to the CSC to
nullify said Board Resolutions. Pending resolution of his petition with the CSC, De Jesus filed a
petition for reinstatement with a newly-reconstituted LWUA Board, which granted it. De Jesus then
withdrew his petition with the CSC.
Under the CSC Accreditation Program, LWUA has been granted the authority to take final
action on appointment papers effective January 1, 1997.
Prior to the grant of authority to De Jesus to sign appointment papers, LWUA requested the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for authority to hire confidential staff for the LWUA
Board of Trustee. DBM granted the request. LWUA Board members issued their respective inter-
office memoranda and letter containing the retroactive appointments of their confidential staff. As
HRMD Head, Parungao forwarded the said documents to the Personnel Division to have them
transformed into formal appointment papers. De Jesus and Parungao issued office orders stating the
retroactive appointment of 9 personnel. LWUA Administrator Jamora issued an inter-office
memorandum to the accounting department ordering the immediate payment of their back salaries
and other remunerations. A LWUA disbursement voucher was approved amounting to P692,657.31
for payment of the back salaries.
ISSUES
1) W/N De Jesus is liable as a public officer

2) W/N Parungao is liable as a public officer
HELD
1) Negative.
The authority to exercise the delegated authority to take final action on appointment papers
is lodged in the LWUA Administrator. The only duty of De Jesus is to sign appointment papers
previously approved by the Administrator or Board. Thus, his duty is only ministerial in nature,
while the discretionary power to take final action on appointments remains with the LWUA
Administrator.
In exercising his ministerial duty of signing the appointment papers, De Jesus obeyed the
patently lawful order of his superior. CSC Resolution does not charge De Jesus with the duty to
27
know and comply with the rules of the Accreditation Program. Thus, so long as the appointment
papers were approved by the Administrator or Board, the order to sign them is patently lawful.
Hence, De Jesus cannot be faulted for obeying the patently lawful orders of his superior. Moreover,
there is no evidence on record to indicate that he acted in bad faith.
2) Positive.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected
from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. The Court found Parungao, as
HRMO, guilty of simple neglect of duty. Given her duties under the CSC Accreditation Program, she
should have been aware of the reportorial requirements, and of the fact that it is the CSC which has
authority over appointments, and not the DBM. Had she given the proper attention to her
responsibility as HRMO, the first set of appointment papers would never have been issued, thereby
avoiding the present predicament altogether.
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully
perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the charge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution
and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs. Parungao failed to
exercise such prudence, caution and attention.
28
Rosario, Patrica Mae
VILLANUEVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188630, 23 February 2011 (Mendoza, J.)
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying positions in the government occupying positions with a Salary Grade lower than SG 27, the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts, whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS
Petitioner Filomena L. Villanueva (petitioner) was the Assistant Regional Director of the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) of Region II, a position lower than Salary Grade 27. On
various dates in 1998, the petitioner and her husband Armando Villanueva (Armando) obtained
several loans from the Cagayan AgriBased Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI). Upon the
default of Armando in the payment of his loan, CABMPCI, represented by its General Manager,
Petra Martinez (Martinez), filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against Armando before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). An administrative complaint for Willful Failure to Pay Just Debt
was also filed by Martinez against petitioner before the CDA during the pendency of the civil case.
The collection suit was eventually dismissed upon appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) on the
ground that the obligation had already been settled.
Thereafter, Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) charging petitioner with Violation of Section 7(d) in relation to Section 11 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave
Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for
re-employment in the government service. The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman, stating,
among others, that Martinez failed to prove that petitioner had used undue influence in soliciting
the loan.
Aside from those cases, a criminal case was also filed against the petitioner for violation of
Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), where petitioner was
found guilty. The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the RTC.
Upon appealing of her conviction before the CA, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the petition. The CA agreed with the OSG and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD
Yes. There is no quibble that petitioner, through her former counsel, had taken a wrong
procedure. After the RTCrendered an adverse decision, she should have sought relieffrom the
Sandiganbayan in conformity with R.A. No. 8249. In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying positions in the government and where none
of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, the
Sandiganbayan shallexercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
29
orders of regional trial courts, whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction.
The peculiar circumstances of the case, however, constrain the Court to reconsider its
position and give the petitioner a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. The Court notes
that the CA eventually decided the administrative case filed against petitioner in her favor. This
administrative case (where only substantial evidence is required) is so intertwined with this criminal
case (where evidence beyond reasonable doubt is required). The CA pointed out that Martinez had
issued an Official Receipt and Certification that petitioner had indeed paid her loan. The said receipt
was signed by Martinez herself as the General Manager of CABMPCI, attesting to the payment of
the loan. The CA further ruled that Martinez failed to prove that the petitioner exerted undue
influence in obtaining the loans. Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against
petitioner was merely an afterthought considering that the civil case against her husband and the
administrative case against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
In light of what has been shown, the Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the
petitioner a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes exception to
the general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the client.
30
San Gil, Kamille Bernadeth
MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

ON JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011
The purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: (1) to prevent undue or too frequent harassment;
and (2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task of legislation. The consideration behind the
intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints.
FACTS
On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses
Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner.
Then, on August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint. On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
The House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in form and substance.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
publishedon September 2, 2010.
ISSUES
a. Whether the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules constitute denial of due
process.
b. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two impeachment complaints to public respondent
violates the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec. 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.
HELD
a. Publication of the impeachment rules
NO. The petitioner tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which
directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section. Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of
rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation.
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in

their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood that is, to make known. The Constitutional Commission did not restrict
promulgation to publication. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing
and publication.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for
Congress to make known its rules. Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules
31
published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in
legislative inquiries. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal term in the English
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
b. One-year bar provision
NO. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint
may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Citing the case of Francisco vs. House of Representatives, it states that the term initiate
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.The initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to
the Committee on Justice.
The purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: (1) to prevent undue or too frequent harassment;
and (2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task of legislation. The consideration behind
the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so
that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress
should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its
main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means
filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.
32
Solis, Patrick David
TRADE & INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP., v. MA. ROSARIO DEMEGILLO

G.R. No. 176343, 18 September 2012
Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the imposition of preventive
suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
FACTS
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly

owned government corporation whose primary purpose is to guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in
part, granted to any domestic entity, enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in
business in the Philippines.
The Board of Directors TIDCORP formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo

(Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties.
TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo engaged in a verbal tussle with Mr. Joel Valdes (Valdes), President
and CEO of TIDCORP. Allegedly, Demigillo also sent a memorandum addressed to Valdes which
contained discourteous and arrogant words.
Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive suspension for 90
days.
Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
CSC ruled that her suspension was not proper because under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service officer like
Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the disciplining authority only if any of the two
grounds were present, to wit: (1) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly
influence or intimidate potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil
service employee might tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the CSC.
ISSUE
Whether or not Demigillos 90-day preventive suspension is proper?
HELD
The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid.
Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the imposition of preventive

suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there
must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may tamper
the documentary evidence on file in her office.
33
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August
31, 1999. It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an
investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper
disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the
charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant
her removal from the service.Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly
influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is
not among the prerequisites.
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension pending investigation "is
a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by
preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him." As such,
preventing the subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the witnesses during investigation
or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing
preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word "intended."
34
Tandoc, John Karol
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting

through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in
Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A.
GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG
G.R. No. 196231, 4 September 2012
FACTS
After the Manila hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima
and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo.
Prior to this incident, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct,among others, was filed before
the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others.
On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of
the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision in the ombudsman finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of
Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
On November 5, 2009, Rolando and company filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
approximately 9 months later it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate
attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
The investigating committee of the hostage taking incident eventually identified petitioner
Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to
the Office of the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for
the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings to which he was eventually dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD
YES
35
Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners
asseverate that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office
of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they,
as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes
of said office.
The Court is not convinced.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of the ombudsman act declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand,
grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any
of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and
Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of
the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern
that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy Ombudsman and

aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled anobvious gap inthe law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all
other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject
to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor

isImplied from his Power toAppoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not Diminish
theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman.
36
The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it
from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people.
What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments
and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions
on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.
Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be
removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts, falling
short ofconstitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of public trust.
Taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and
evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that:
(1) petitioner failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S
Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp.
Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts
and prevent its immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp.
Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.
In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of
petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts
amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust.
Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's

duties constitute betrayal of public trust warranting immediate removal from office?
BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST -The Constitutional Commission eventually found it

reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of
being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers."In other
words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from
office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity
and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an
unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the
same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public
trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
37
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and

the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as
the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-
460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED
38
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO,
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ,
AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG
G.R. No. 196231, 28 January 2014
FACTS
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed
on him the penalty of dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman act is constitutional.
HELD
NO
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’
petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are
subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.The Office of the Ombudsman, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in
carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence
is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with
the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably
with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office.
For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a
Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman,
or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who
can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the
public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of
the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged from approaching
the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the
39
Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an

impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as
champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.
40
Urbano, Mary Yasmine
CARPIO MORALES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015
The condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the abandonment is prospective in effect.
FACTS
A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the
City Government of Makati accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
Binay argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases 1 and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during
his first term . His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against
him moot and academic.
The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al.under preventive suspension. The CA
granted Binay’s prayer for TRO enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
order.According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO considering that if it
were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.
Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative cases,

(1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct;
( 2 ) an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct,
thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
(3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character
of candidates, of their right to elect officers.
ISSUE
Whether or not Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO
and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine
HELD
No. The condonation doctrine is abandoned.
Records disclose that the CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. Thus, merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine,
which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed
a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution.However, the condonation doctrine should
be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it.
41
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
42
Vicencio, Carmel Louise
SAMBO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 223244, 20 June 2017
For as long as there is no showing of ill intent and the disbursement was made in good faith,
public officers and employees who receive subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may keep
the amounts disbursed to them
FACTS
QUEDANCOR is a government-owned and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act

No. 7393. Petitioners Sambo and Avila are the Acting Regional Assistant Vice President and
Regional Accountant, respectively, of QUEDANCOR, Regional Office V.
In September 12, 2008, the Audit Team Leader (ATL)/ Resident Auditor in QUEDANCOR of
COA Naga City issued a regulation disallowing disbursement and payments in the total amount of
P94,913.15. The disallowed expenditures consist of benefits to several employees of QUEDANCOR
for the CYs 2006 and 2007. The reason for the disallowance by the ATL was that the payees for the
YEB, PerB and PIB are casual employees and, therefore, not entitled to receive the benefits and
allowances. The appointments were merely covered by Special Orders issued by the QUEDANCOR
President and Chief Executive Officer (COE) and were without approval of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Hence, the employees’ contracts of services are not governed by the CSC laws,
rules and regulations. The ATL stated that the nature of the employment of the payees is in the
nature of contracts of service or job orders. Being such, their employment cannot be classified as
government service because there is no employer and employee relationship between them and
QUEDANCOR. Hence, they are not entitled to receive the benefits enjoyed by government employees
like the YEB, PerB and PIB.
The Medicine Reimbursements were disallowed in audit in the absence of statutory authority
for its grant, citing Section 84(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1445, otherwise known asthe
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, which provides that revenue funds shall not be paid
out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority. According to the ATL, a mere Memorandum issued by the President and COE of
QUEDANCOR authorizing the grant of medicine reimbursement is not the “statutory authority”
contemplated by P.D. 1445.
The COA Commission Proper rendered a Decision that the officers who
authorized/certified/approved the payment of the disallowed benefitsshall be solidarily liable for the
total disallowance, but the rank-and-file employees who received the benefits in good faith need not
refund theamount they each received.
Petitioners argue in their petition that (a) they could not be held liable for the disallowance
as they are mere subordinate officers performing ministerial functions in good faith when they
certified and approved the disbursements of employee benefits disallowed by the COA; and (b) it is
the Policy-Makers, Board of Directors, President and CEO of QUEDANCOR, who made the circulars
and guidelines for the payments of disallowed benefits, that should be held directly and primarily
liable for the disallowance not the subordinate officers who merely followed it to the letter.
Respondentargued that petitioners failed to prove that they acted in good faith in
disregarding the provisions of RA 6758and AONo. 103 pertaining to payment of allowances. RA 6758
standardizes the salary rates of government officials and employees, while AO 103 enjoins head
ofgovernment agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
43
Respondent averred that the blatant disregard of the petitioners (approving officers) to abidewith the
provisions of AO 103 overcame the presumption of good faith.
ISSUE
Whether or not the public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making
the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be
solidarily liable for their reimbursement
HELD
Presidential Decree No. 1445 spells out the rule on general liability for unlawful
expenditures: Section 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures.·Expenditures of government
funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. Under this provision, an official or
employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized expenditures if the following requisites are
present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of government funds or use of government property;
(b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and (c) the official is found directly
responsible therefor.
Public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal
expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be solidarily liable
for their reimbursement. However, in cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments,
benefits, and allowances due to government employees, jurisprudence has settled that recipients or
payees in good faith need not refund these disallowed amounts. For as long as there is no showing of
ill intent and the disbursement was made in good faith, public officers and employees who receive
subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may keep the amounts disbursed to them.
On the part of the approving officers, they shall only be required to refund if they are found
to have acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent amounting to bad faith. In common usage, the
term “good faith” is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting “honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts
which render transaction unconscientious.”
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail
in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. COA, 642 SCRA 210
(2011), this Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered
claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Land Bank of the Philippines’
Manual on Lending Operations.
44
Alava, Quino
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213716, 10 October 2017
The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may
give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.
FACTS
During the 11th Congress (1998 to 2001), the Senate's Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security held hearings to
investigate the alleged anomalous acquisitions of land by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in Calamba, Laguna and Tanauan,
Batangas. Prompted by a series of resolutions by the Senate, the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and other Law Enforcement Offices sent to the COA a request dated April 29, 2004 for the
conduct of audit on past and present transactions of the AFP-RSBS. Thus, the COA constituted a
special audit team (SAT) to conduct the special audit/investigation.
The SAT found, among others, that the AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, purchased
from Concord Resources, Inc. four parcels of land with a total area of 227,562 square meters in
Calamba, Laguna (collectively, the Calamba properties). The SAT discovered that two deeds of sale
containing different considerations were executed to cover the purchase. The deed of sale recorded
with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna disclosed that the total purchase price was
P91,024,800.
The SAT concluded that the deed of sale filed before the Registry of Deeds was the true deed
of sale, considering that it was signed by both parties. It followed then that the true purchase price
was P91,024,800 and as such, the government lost P250,318,200 when it allegedly paid Concord
Resources, Inc. P341,343,000. The SAT also concluded that the execution of two deeds of sale
covering the same parcels of land resulted in the underpayment of capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes in the amount of P16,270,683. Based on the amount paid by the AFP-RSBS to Concord
Resources, Inc., the total taxes that should have been paid was P22,187,295 and not P5,916,612.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COA has authority to institute an administrative complaint or

proceedings against petitioner who had already resigned.
HELD
The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may
give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. This simply means that a public officer may
be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or
wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured pat1y. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may also
be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or
other administrative sanctions.
The action that may result for each liability under the "threefold liability rule" may proceed
independently of one another, as in fact, the quantum of evidence required in each case is different.
Thus, in Reyna v. Commission on Audit, we held that a criminal case tiled before the Office of the
Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA.
45
Furthermore, the right of the government to exercise administrative supervision over erring
public ot1icials is lost when they cease their functions in office. Consequently, the government must
commence an administrative case while they are in office; otherwise, the disciplining body would no
longer have any jurisdiction over them. The same is not true with civil and criminal cases. We have
ruled in the past that even if an administrative case may no longer be filed against public officials
who have already resigned or retired, criminal and civil cases may still be filed against them.The
administrative case contemplated under the threefold liability rule is one that goes into the conduct
of the public official and is intended to be disciplinary.
This is not the nature of the present case against petitioner. The audit proceedings before the
COA may be characterized as administrative, but only in the sense that the COA is an
administrative body. Essentially, though, the conduct of the audit was not an exercise of the
government's administrative supervision over petitioner where he may be meted out with a penalty
of suspension or dismissal from office, with an order of restitution a mere accessory penalty. What
was being determined through the COA audit proceedings was his civil liability and accountability
over the excess in the disbursement of public funds and the underpaid taxes. The audit proceedings
not being an administrative case against him, petitioner's resignation in 1998 does not serve to bar
the present case.
46
Alforque, Jimmie Jan
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v .MAYOR JULIUS CESAR

G.R. NO. 216871, 1 January 2016, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio,J.)
The aplication of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same
position in the immediately succeeding election.
FACTS
A complaint was filed by Bonifacio Garcia on June 2005 before petitioner’s Office of the
Environmental Ombudsman against respondents Mayor Julius CesarVergara, and then-Vice Mayor
Raul Mendoza. Petitioner alleged that respondents maintained an open burning dumpsite located at
the boundaries of 2 barangays in Cabanatuan City. He claimed that the dumpsite is not a four-storey
high mountain of mixed garbage exposing the residents of atleast 87 barangays to all toxic solid
wastes. He further alleged that the respondents ordered and permitted the littering and dumping of
the solid wastes in the said area, causing immeasurable havoc to the health of the residents of
Cabanatuan.
The respondents denied that they neglected the performance of their duties. They claimed
that they were already aware about the growing problem of garbage collection in Cabanatuan City.
Respondents were found guilty and each of them is meted the penalty of Suspension for 6
months.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the decision cannot be
implemented or enforced as the same runs counter to the doctrine of condonation, since he was re-
elected as Mayor of Cabanatuan.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the doctrine of condonation
HELD
YES. The Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in

application.
In this case, the respondent was re-elected as Mayor by the same electorate that voted for
him when the violation was committed. As such, the doctrine of condonation is applied.
47
Angeles, George II
FRANCISO T. BACULI v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, REGION 2 v. FRANCISO T. BACULI
G.R. Nos. 188681 and 201130, 8 March 2017
The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public officials and employees, whether
they are presidential appointees or not. For presidential appointees, the suspension should last only
within a reasonable time. For non-presidential appointees, the maximum period of preventive
suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable period of preventive suspension had been served, the public
officials and employees must be automatically reinstated.
FACTS
On July 16, 1988, the Baculi was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) - Cagayan by then President Corazon C. Aquino. In
1991, acting in his capacity as PARO II, he entered into several contracts with various suppliers for
the lease of typewriters, computers, computer printers, and other accessories. Separate reports from
the DAR Commission on Audit and the DAR Regional Investigating Committee of Cagayan,
however, revealed that the foregoing transactions were tainted with irregularities. A formal charge
against Baculi for gross dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service was filed by the DAR Secretary. Simultaneous to the charge, the
Baculi was placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending the investigation of the
complaint.
The DAR Legal Affairs Office conducted a formal investigation on November 16, 17, and 18,
1992. On May 17, 1994, then DAR Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Hector D. Soliman issued an
order dismissing the Baculi from the service. Secretary Garilao affirmed the said order on August 2,
1994. The Baculi then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Seeing no reversible error,
CSC affirmed the dismissal of the Baculi. He filed a motion for reconsideration but the CSC refused
to reconsider its previous resolution.
On August 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside the order of dismissal of Secretary
Garilao and ruled that the former is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over presidential appointees.
Hence, his order to remove the Baculi was a total nullity. In the same fashion, the resolutions of the
CSC affirming such order were likewise held null and void. The DAR Secretary, however, was given
the prerogative to forward his findings and recommendations to the Office of the President.
After the CA nullified his FIRST Dismissal through the decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49656, Baculi commenced in the RTC the special civil action for mandamus to compel the DAR,
represented by the DAR Secretary and its Regional Director of Agrarian Reform for Region 2, to pay
his basic salaries, benefits and other emoluments corresponding to the period from August 2, 1994 -
the date of the FIRST Dismissal - until June 25, 2003 - the date when the Office of the President
dismissed him from the service, plus interest at the legal rate.
The DAR countered in that suit that Baculi's monetary claim was unfounded because he had
not been exonerated from the offenses charged against him.1âwphi1 It reminded that the decision of
the CA did not exculpate him, but even suggested that the DAR Secretary could still forward the
findings against him to the Office of the President for proper action.
After the RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus, Baculi appealed to the CA to reverse
the dismissal of his petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 115934).Ultimately, on June 16, 2011, the CA reversed
48
the RTC, and decreed in its decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 115934 that Baculi was entitled
to the back salaries and other benefits owing to his position at the rate last received before the
suspension was imposed from September 4, 1992 to June 25, 2003 except the 90-day period of
preventive suspension and the period from March 12, 2001 to December 31, 2001 during which he
was briefly reinstated.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the findings of the RTC, and in granting the
petition for mandamus
HELD
No. By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period
of his preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said period.
We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive
suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal where
the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after review
the respondent official or employee is exoneratedPreventive suspension pending investigation is not
violative of the Constitution because it is not a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the charge
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or
whenever there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant
removal from the service. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the
administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending
investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive suspension is lifted
and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential
appointees, the preventive suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the
circumstances of the case may warrant."
Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the

respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite
preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the
due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public officers and employees to
security of tenure.
Conformably with the foregoing disquisitions, we hold that the CA correctly decreed that
Baculi should be paid his back salaries and other benefits for the entire time that he should have
been automatically reinstated at the rate owing to his position that he last received prior to his
preventive suspension on September 4, 1992. Such time corresponded to the period from December 4,
1992 until June 25, 2003, but excluding the interval from March 12, 2001 until December 31, 2001
when he was briefly reinstated.
49
Balingasa, Mary Angeline
NINI LANTO v. COA, et. al.

G.R. No. 217189, 18 April 2017
Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to
convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer’s performance of his duties.
FACTS
On August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan convicted Leonel Labrador, Chief of the POEA’s
Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD), for bribery. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. In February 2001, Labrador applied and was granted probation. Thereafter, at the end of
Labrador's probation period, a Probation Officer's Final Report was issued, recommending that his
probation be terminated and that he be discharged from its legal effects. The Sandiganbayan,
however, withheld its approval and, instead, issued a Resolution dated March 2, 2004, stating that
Labrador's application for probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal
from his judgment of conviction. Further, owing to the probation officer's finding that Labrador
continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief despite him having been sentenced to suffer the
penalty of temporary special disqualification from office the Sandiganbayan directed that copies of
theMarch 2, 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-Baldoz, as POEA Administrator. On March 9,
2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz issued a notice/order of separation relieving Labrador of his duties.
On February 7, 2005, COA issued its Audit Memo containing audit observations pertaining
to payment of salaries to Labrador. Based on these observations, COA issued a Notice of
Disallowance on January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees,
personally liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount of
P1,740,124.08, paid through various checks. Dimapilis-Baldoz sought the reconsideration of the
Notice of Disallowance, asserting that the POEA should not be held liable for the refund of the
foregoing amount since Labrador's employment was fully and promptly terminated upon receipt of
SB’s 2004 Resolution. Nevertheless, Decision No. 2009-121 was issued affirming the Notice of
Disallowance. In order to enforce its Decision No. 2009-121, the COA subsequently issued the Order
of Execution on October 26, 2011. On July 16, 2013, the Court promulgated the ruling in Dimapilis
Baldoz v. Commission on Audit affirming COA Decision No. 2009-121 and deleting the portions
pertaining to Dimapilis-Baldoz’s personal liability. The entry of judgment in Dimapilis-Baldoz v.
Commission on Audit was made on August 13, 2013. On November 25, 2013, the COA issued its
assailed Order of Execution to enforce its decision against other responsible officers of the POEA.
The petitioner argued that she acted in good faith and with due diligence in certifying to the
correctness of the payrolls for the period September 16, 2002 to March 2004; that Labrador had
rendered service during said period based on his daily time records duly signed by his supervisor,
but whose copies were no longer available for presentation; that during her tenure as Director II of
the POEA she had no information, document or record showing that there had been a pending
criminal case against Labrador; that the POEA was not furnished with copies of the various notices
and orders, decisions or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan; hence, she had no basis or authority to
stop the payment to Labrador of the disallowed salaries, wages and other benefits until the POEA's
actual receipt of the resolution dated March 2, 2004 on March 9, 2004 from the Sandiganbayan. She
also points out that she was on foreign assignment, specifically deployed to the Philippine Overseas
Labor Office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in the period from October 2008 to October 31,
201O;18 and that she was not notified and had no information that the COA had issued Decision No.
2009-121 dated October 29, 2009, the Notice of Finality of Decision dated January 7, 2010, and the
Order of Execution dated October 26, 2011. COA, on the other hand, argued that the decision
affirming its Decision No. 2009-121 has already attained finality and is now immutable.
50
ISSUE
Whether the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner personally
liable to refund the disallowed salary payments.
HELD
YES. Considering that the petitioner dispatched her letter to COA Chairperson Pulido-Tan
seeking the reconsideration of the November 25, 2013 Order of Execution on January 2, 2014, or 15
days from her receipt of the Order of Execution on December 18, 2013, and further considering that
she received the Memorandum denying the letter of reconsideration on February 12, 2015, she had
only 16 days remaining, or until February 28, 2015, within which to file the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64.Yet, because she actually filed the petition only on March 31, 2015, or 31 days beyond
the reglementary period, the petition would be dismissible for being filed out of time, with the result
of rendering the Order of Execution dated November 25, 2013 unassailable and immutable as to her.
The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment or order serves a two-fold purpose, namely:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why the courts exists. The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability
of final judgments are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tune entries that
cause no prejudice to any party; and (3) void judgments.
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several justifications to suspend the strict adherence
with rigid procedural rules like the doctrine ofimmutability, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor
or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (e) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Upon careful appreciation of the records, the
Court considers justifications (a), (b) and (c) to have relevance to the petitioner's situation.
First of all, the adverse result would surely make her personally liable for a substantial sum
of monetary liability from which she had not directly benefited, thereby prejudicing her right to
property. Secondly, the petitioner's good faith in certifying to the correctness of the payrolls based on
available records about Labrador having actually reported to work, and on her absolute lack of
knowledge of his having been dismissed and of the pendency of the criminal case in the
Sandiganbayan constituted compelling circumstances that justified applying the exception in her
favor.At the time she made the certifications of the payrolls she relied on the relevant public and
official documents showing that Labrador had rendered actual service during the periods concerned.
Her honest belief that Labrador was legally entitled to the salary payments thereby became
established. Moreover, Labrador's 201 File did not contain any indication of the criminal case
pending against him in the Sandiganbayan. And, thirdly, the fact that the petitioner was on foreign
assignment when the COA rendered the assailed issuances plausibly explained why she did not
seasonably assail or oppose the disallowances.
Only convincing proof of the petitioner's malice or bad faith in the performance of her duties
could have warranted the rejection of her plea of good faith. The Court has emphatically stated in
Dimapilis-Baldoz v. Commission on Audit, viz.:
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith
in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public
officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability
51
for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty. Good faith is always
presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden to convincingly show that
malice or bad faith attended the public offlcer'sperformance of his duties.
But the COA did not adduce proof of her malice or bad faith.In light of the foregoing
circumstances, the COA's directive to withhold the petitioner's salary was void and produced no legal
effect. As such, the assailed COA issuances did not attain finality and immutability as to her.
52
Administrative Law
Balonkita, Christa
Santos v. Go
GR No. 156081, 19 October 2005
Administrative Law; A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its
awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the
Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
FACTS
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). On
October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in
Nasugbu, Batangas allegeldly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to
convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort,
leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to
market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured
approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. The
Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the
terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last
installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI would execute a final
Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the
property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms and
conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked. In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go,
FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPIs
application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPIs hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending
before this Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would
resume developing the properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.
Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPIs statements and he made several demands
upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands.
Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and filed a
separate complaint-affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of RPC.
Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for
sale since they knew fully well that the development of the property and issuance of its
corresponding title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet
been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly
misrepresented itself as owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it
received from him the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner.
53
The City prosecutor found no misrepresentation. Thereafter, Go appealed the City

Prosecutors Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City
Prosecutors findings.
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos
and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court
of Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.
On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. The
appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode
of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or
officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive
and not a quasi-judicial function.
ISSUE
1. Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of
the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case
2. Whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial
function.
HELD
1. NO. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-
judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not
among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
2. NO. We cannot agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-
judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the
case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to
file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions,
orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not
appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002 and November
12, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED
54
Guevarra, Jhaypee
SANTOS v. WILSON GO
G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005, Davide, Jr., C.J.,
A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case
when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is
reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
FACTS
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured
approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. The
Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the
terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last
installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI would execute a final
Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the
property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. Thereafter, he filed a complaint before the HLURB,
and a separate complaint for estafa against its officers before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City. Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the
preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City.
On the other hand, Go maintained that the City Prosecutor had jurisdiction because
payments were made in Pasig, and the demand letters bore the address of Pasig. The DOJ held that
there is probable cause to indict the petitioners herein for the crime of estafa. Hence, they appealed
the same to CA under Rule 43 which the latter dismissed the appeal.
Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the
Secretary of Justice since during preliminary investigations, the DOJs decisions are deemed as
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, and its prosecutorial offices are considered quasi-judicial
bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions.
ISSUE
Whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial

function
HELD
NO. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-
judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not
among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a preliminary

investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
55
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or

innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
56
Cabitac, Fernando III

MIAA v. CA
G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
FACTS
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter").
MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from
real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with
respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some
of the real estate tax already due.
On 28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City
of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the
City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale
the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals also denied on 27 September
2002 MIAA's motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, MIAA
filed on 5 December 2002 the present petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws.
HELD
Respondents argue that MIAA, being a government-owned or controlled corporation, is not

exempt from real estate tax. Respondents claim that the deletion of the phrase "any government-
owned or controlled so exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local Government Code
withdrew the real estate tax exemption of government-owned or controlled corporations. The deleted
phrase appeared in Section 40(a) of the 1974 Real Property Tax Code enumerating the entities
exempt from real estate tax.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from

real estate tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or
controlled corporation as follows:
57
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental
or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or non-stock

corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently

its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference
is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– x x x x

(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police
authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order.
The third whereas clause of the Administrative Code states that the Code "incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
governance." Thus, the Administrative Code is the governing law defining the status and
relationship of government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities. Unless a
statute expressly provides for a different status and relationship for a specific government unit or
entity, the provisions of the Administrative Code prevail.
58
Castillo, Jepthah
CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO v. ROLANDO BANIQUED
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.
FACTS
Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya and companions,

filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house
built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City.
On May 19, 1999, Domogan, then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition
against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for
prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in BaguioCity.
In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done
without due process of law. Baniqued argued that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, so
too are Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, National Building Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1096 and the 1991 Local Government Code which does not empower the mayor to order the
demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the
provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied.
On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of
Baniqued and four (4) months later, the RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the
complaint of Baniqued. The latter moved for reconsideration which was opposed and on March 3,
2000, the RTC denied the motion. Baniqued appealed the decision of the RTC where the Court of
Appeals sustained Baniqued and held that the mayor, although an executive official, has also been
given the authority to hear controversies involving property rights in the exercise of his quasi-
judicial functions.
Left with no other recourse, petitioners interposed the present appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in ruling that
the act of the City Mayor in issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function.
HELD
No.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function
as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism
in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants
through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities.
59
There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in
determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are
involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally
guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-
judicial powers. Quasi-judicial function has been defined as applying to the action discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action,
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the
result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.
60
Dator, Peter Paul
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CITY TREASURER OF THE CITY OF

MANILA
G.R. No. 186242 (2009)
As an instrumentality of the national government, GSIS is itself not liable to pay real estate
taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties.
Following the “beneficial use” rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak
property, leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof
devolves on the taxable beneficial user.
FACTS
GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land – the Katigbak property and the
Concepcion-Arroceros property.Title to the Concepcion- Arroceros property was transferred to this
Court in 2005 pursuant to Proclamation No. 835, which reserved the same property for the City of
Manila Hall of Justice.
The City Treasurer of Manila informed GSIS of the unpaid real property taxes due on the
aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002. GSIS replied emphasizing the GSIS’ exemption
from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA) 8291.
GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining and
injunctive relief before the Manila RTC. GSIS argued that (1) the Katigbak property has, since
November 1991, been leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has
contractually bound itself to pay any realty taxes; and (2) the Concepcion-Arroceros property is
partly occupied by GSIS and partly occupied by the MeTC of Manila.
ISSUES
(1) Whether GSIS under its charter is exempt from real property taxation? YES
(2) Assuming that it is so exempt, whether GSIS is liable for real property taxes for its
properties leased to a taxable entity? NO, but MHC is liable under the beneficial use rule.
(3) Whether the properties of GSIS are exempt from levy? YES
HELD
(1) In 1936, Section 26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any legal process and liens but only
for insurance policies and their proceeds. In 1977, PD 1146 provided for a new tax treatment
for GSIS, as follows:
“Sec. 33. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – xxx the System, its assets, revenues
including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds. xxx”
However, when Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, the LGC provides for the
withdrawal of tax exemption privileges and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from
payment of real property taxes.
In City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, the Court held that “GSIS liable for real
property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 (contested real estate tax assessment therein), its previous
61
exemption under PD 1146 being considered withdrawn with the enactment of the LGC in 1991. xxx
GSIS’ tax-exempt status withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC was restored in 1997 by RA 8291.”
Under RA 82911 enacted in 1997, the full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored. RA
8291 also provides that real property taxes assessed and due from GSIS considered paid.
GSIS is an instrumentality of the National Government.
In Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, MIAA does not qualify as a GOCC. MIAA is
rather an instrumentality of the National Government and, hence, outside the purview of local
taxation. The airport lands and buildings MIAA administers belong to the Republic of the
Philippines, which makes MIAA a mere trustee of such assets.
The rationale underpinning the disposition in that case is squarely applicable to GSIS, both
MIAA and GSIS being similarly situated.
a) A GOCC following the teaching of MIAA, for, like MIAA, GSIS’ capital is not divided into
unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of. Its management is entrusted to a Board
of Trustees whose members are appointed by the President.
b) The subject properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned by the Republic. The GSIS is
but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the
Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system.
c) GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability
benefits of all government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure,
constitutes an essential and vital function which the government.
(2) The foregoing notwithstanding, the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to
the “beneficial use” principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC, which exempts from real estate
taxes real property owned by the Republic, unless the beneficial use of the property is, for
consideration, transferred to a taxable person.
The provisions allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an agency or
instrumentality of the national government. Such grant does not necessarily result in the loss of the
tax exemption. The tax exemption the property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries ceases
only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of 1991, “beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.”
GSIS, however, lost in a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when it
contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a taxable person.
The unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person who had
actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner. Being in
possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for
the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002. MHC has obligated itself
under the GSIS-MHC Contract of Lease to shoulder such assessment.
1 xxx the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically
revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. xxx
These exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and
categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as
an essential factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund xxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under
this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts,
quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies xxx”
62
(3) A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless, it will not be remiss
to note that it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes. The proscription against
the levy extends to the leased Katigbak property, the beneficial use doctrine,
notwithstanding.
63
Del Mundo, Angelo Raphael B.
ATTY. ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC, PETITIONER v. TAN TIONG BIO A.K.A. HENRY

TAN, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 186652, 6 October 2010
Sec.14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ
Secretary.
FACTS
Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683- square-meter
lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil- Estate Golf & Development, Inc.
(Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot,
despite repeated demands. Fil- Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the purchase
price. Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent, filed a complaint for
Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc
(petitioner) and other employees. On the basis of petitioner's above-quoted allegations in her
Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004 for insufficiency of evidence,
and denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by Resolution of July 20, 2005
signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice motu proprio dismissed the petition
on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error, following Section 12(c) of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal).
Respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of January 23, 2006, he
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008, set
aside the DOJ Secretary's Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its Resolution dismissing respondent's petition for review without therein expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding
HELD
No. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a

preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
“A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication nor exercise rulemaking functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged of a crime and to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the prosecutor makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not theprosecutor.”
64
A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the

sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.
In the case of Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, in fact iterates that even the action of the
Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor's order or resolution via appeal or petition for review
cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body.Section14,Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ
Secretary. Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the present case for,
as the Supreme Court stated, the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
lengthier one when it resolved the therein respondent's motion for reconsideration."
Respondent's position fails. Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution
in resolving the therein respondent's motion for reconsideration is immaterial. The extended
resolution did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and
January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED.
65
Del Prado, Darren Joseph M.
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G. R. No. 177131, 7 June 2011
BSP is a public corporation or a government instrumentality, the Court concludes that it is

subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions
of the BSP Charter.
FACTS
The Commission on Audit issued COA Resolution No. 99-011 in which the said resolution
state that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the
Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as
constituted under its charter, was a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of
Article IX (B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government
instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”
The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed by the BSP
National President Jejomar Binay. He claimed that RA 7278 eliminated the “substantial government
participation” in the National Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and
executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education, as members thereof; and (ii)
the appointment and confirmation power of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the
members of the said Board.
The BSP further claimed that the 1987 Administrative Code itself, of which the BSP s.
NLRC relied on for some terms, defines government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies
organized as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present charter, is not.
And finally, they claim that the Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds invested in
the BSP. The BSP is not an entity administering special funds. The BSP is neither a unit of the
Government; a department which refers to an executive department as created by law; nor a bureau
which refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department.
ISSUE
Whether the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
HELD
After considering the legislative history of the amended charter and the applicable laws and
the arguments of both parties, the Court found that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are
subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the following public
interest or purpose: xxx to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the
ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scout craft, and to
inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline
and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order
to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the BSP,
which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate,
66
comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code
and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a

general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private
corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or
groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical

personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16,
notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government
owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exist another
distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public
corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government which are not subject to the test of ownership or control and economic viability but to
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives
and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.
Since BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government
instrumentality, the Court concludes that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit
jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.
67
Diaz, Jose Rodolfo
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI v. RICHARD J.

GORDON
G. R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that
when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until such question will be unavoidable.
FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J.
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency
as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that
the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited
his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the
PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths
of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative
seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV
of the 1935 Constitution states that the Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the Court was correct to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter.
HELD
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among
the issues defined in the body of the Decision, thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v.
PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a
well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to
be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment,
that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a
party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No.
6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of
a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of
this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the
time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not
been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
This Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention
has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be
reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the
latter to negate the former.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing
that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
69
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore
stay.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
70
Evangelista, Kevin
DELA LLANA v. CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS
The COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre- audit of government financial
transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed the state policy that all resources
of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations,
and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to
ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities
and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, the COA issued
Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the pre- audit of selected government transactions. The
selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said
anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre- audit of
government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -
controlled corporations (GOCCs).
On 18 May 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the selective pre-
audit of government transactions in view of the rising incidents of irregular, illegal, wasteful and
anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of public funds and disposals of public property. Two
years later, or on 22 July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of
government transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009- 002.
Petitioner Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit
service. On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the prior issuance of
Circular No. 89-299.
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges
that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that
pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities
in government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam,
irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher
Education, and many others.
On 22 February 2008, public respondents filed their Commenton the Petition. They argue
therein that the Petition must be dismissed. Public respondents further averred that the circular is
valid, as the COA has the power under the 1987 Constitution to promulgate it.
ISSUE
Whether or not COA has the power to promulgate such circulars
HELD
Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which
71
reads as follows:
Section 2
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted

fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities; 
c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or
equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to limitations in this

Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
He claims that under the first paragraph quoted above, government transactions must
undergo a pre-audit, which is a COA duty that cannot be lifted by a mere circular.
We find for public respondents.
Petitioners allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is

nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government
transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre- audit requirement is
found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the
COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the
COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language
of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application.Neither can the
scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.
72
Ibanez, Abigail
ENCINAS v. AGUSTIN
G.R 187371, 11 April 2013
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if
it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
FACTS
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim
that on 11 March 2000, petitioner who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija informed
them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos (5,000), they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.Fearing the reassignment, they
decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up
short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to
come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued
instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug,
respectively. Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP
Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990.On 27 October 2000, after a
fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner
was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
HELD
Yes. Petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa this Court elaborated on the specific acts that
constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that
no concrete description is provided under the Civil Service Law and rules. The Court outlined
therein following acts: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back
to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false
entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established
by substantial evidence.
Petition Denied.
73
Landayan, Mary Mercedita
DACUDAO v. SECRETRY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 188056, 8 January 2013
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification; There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause
or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried;
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect except when it is procedural in nature.
FACTS
Petitioners, residents of Davao City, were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles,
Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of
the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action with the exemption of the cases filed in
Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by another DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009. Pursuant
to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182 as it violated their right to due process, their right to the equal
protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182
was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive
effect. Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March
2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already
filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of
merit.
ISSUES
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No.
182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’
constitutionally guaranteed rights?
74
HELD
1. No. Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly
to the Court without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the
direct filing of the petition. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse.
Every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, defined and enjoined
in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an
act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with
the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Secondly, the writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a special civil action
for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.The burden of proof lies on petitioners.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. The petition did not show that the
Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because
his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. A preliminary investigation is not a
quasi- judicial proceeding. A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law
or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of
the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law.
Thirdly, the petition could not be one for mandamus. The main objective of mandamus is to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. The writ of mandamus
does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which,
it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances
excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably
entitled.
75
Lastly, petition cannot be on for prohibition. They have not shown in what manner and at
what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. No. DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party
List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well
as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret

the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if
they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became

incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that
the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s
functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the
impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not
deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against
them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like
them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong
through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to
conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases.
Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
3. No. Firstly, the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009,
the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where
many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary
investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had
already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No.
182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary
of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of
DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground
that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.
Secondly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition
of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition
of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.It
is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of
76
the concept. The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to
obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them.
Thirdly, petitioners maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition
against passing laws with retroactive effect. This assertion is baseless. As a general rule, laws shall
have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is
procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or
modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent without
violation of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted
obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to
assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of
offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion
in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies
by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.
Unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or
arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby
aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the
rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition.
77
Lelay, Lord Bien
TESDA v. COA
G.R. No. 196418, 10 February 2015
The decisions of administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon the recognition that such
administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce. The Court
has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS
Being assailed is the March 23, 2010 decision issued in COA Decision No. 2010-039, whereby
the Commission on Audit (COA) affirmed the findings of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO) as regards the issuance of Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 04-005 (101) dated
January 26, 2004 disallowing the payment by petitioner Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) of the healthcare maintenance allowance of ₱5,000.00 to covered
TESDA employees for the year 2003.
The TESDA, an instrumentality of the Government established under Republic Act No. 7796,
is an attached agency of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In view of the
inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work experienced by government
personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 430,
series of 2003, authorizing the payment of healthcare maintenance allowance of ₱5,000.00 to all
officials and employees of the DOLE, including its bureaus and attached agencies. AO No. 430 was
purportedly based on Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, series of
1997, and Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.
Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Rosemarie A. Valenzuela issued AOM No. 04-005 on
January 26,2004, and later endorsed the matter to the COA Director of the LAO-National for
appropriate legal action. Atty. Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAO-National,
subsequently issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006, addressed to
then TESDA Director General Augusto Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance had no
legal basis, it being contrary to Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law of 1989).
The TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper, assailing the disallowance
by the LAO-National. The TESDA maintains that there was sufficient legal basis for the release of
the healthcare maintenance allowance of ₱5,000.00 to its employees.In contrast, the COA explains
that MC No. 33 referred to the institutionalization of a health care program in the Government, and
did not suggest the payment of direct allowances to the employees of the Government. The COA
Commission Proper promulgated the now assailed decision dated March 23, 2010, denying the
appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND No. 2006-015 pursuant
to AOM No. 04-005.
HELD
No. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed
decision.
78
The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the
power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been
intended by law. Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds,
particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law.
Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of administrative authorities like the COA as a
matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also upon
the recognition that such administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. The Court has accorded not only respect but also finality to their findings
especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion. Only when the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain and
grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.
MC No. 33 dealt with a healthcare program for government employees. A program is

ordinarily understood as a system in place that will draw the desired benefits over a period of time.
Ostensibly, MC No. 33 did not intend the health care program to be a single activity or endowment
to achieve a fleeting goal, for it rightfully concerned the institutionalization of a system of healthcare
for government employees.
79
Lintao, Jude
ANNA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, et al. v. TOLL REGULATORY

BOARD, et al.
G.R. No. 181293, 23 February 2015
A franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may
operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility,
particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of
certain classes of public utilities.
FACTS
The respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created to supervise and regulate, on
behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private
sector. P.D. 1113 was also issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and
authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways for a period of 30 years. TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement.
PNCC and PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA), an Indonesian company, later on
entered into a joint venture wherein they created the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation
(CMMTC).
The Republic of the Philippines executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA)
covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under
the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive
privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. Meanwhile, the operation and maintenance of the project
roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway
Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter's
obligations under the STOA.
The STOA was later on amended (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway 0 & M Corporation
(SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro
Manila Skyway.
The petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint against respondents praying that the
implementation of the ASTOA, as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO, be
stopped.
Petitioners argued that the franchise for the operation of the toll is vested with PNCC and
that by agreeing that SOMCO replace PSC, PNCC breached the terms of its contract and abdicated
its rights to SOMCO. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the TRB is empowered to grant
authority and enter into contracts for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a toll facility.
ISSUE
Whether or not TRB has the authority to grant franchises for toll facility projects
HELD
YES. A franchise from Congress is not required before each and every public utility may
operate. Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public
80
utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the
operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case, there is no law that states that a
legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to
authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts.
It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the
operation of public utilities. We cannot abide by the contention of petitioners that the franchise for
toll operations was exclusively vested in PNCC, which effectively breached its franchise when it
transferred the toll operations to SOMCO. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that
states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others.
Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance
of the toll facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D.
1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities.
Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll
facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the
franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it.
81
Lopez, Sherlyn
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) v.CITY OF LAPU-

LAPU and ELENA T. PACALDO
G.R. No. 181756, 15 June 2015
The airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties of public dominion because they are
intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the
Republic of the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man.
FACTS
Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by Congress

on July 31, 1990 under Republic Act No. 6958. Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from
realty taxes. However, this Court rendered a decision in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Marcos4 (the 1996 MCIAA case) declaring that upon the effectivity of Republic Act No.
7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), petitioner was no longer exempt from real estate taxes.
Respondent City issued a statement of real estate tax on the lots including the Mactan
International Airport amounting to ₱151,376,134.66. Petitioner claims that these lots which include
airfield, runway, taxiway are utilized solely and exclusively for governmental purposes and are
exempt from real property tax.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a petition for prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The petition for prohibition
sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing a warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties and
from selling them at public auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations.
Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent City did not pass
any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax and thus Respondent City should not
collect and impose real property taxes. RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction but it was
also lifted upon the motion of the Respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. It ruled that petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation
and its properties are subject to realty tax. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is exempted from real estate tax.
HELD
Yes. MCIAA is a government instrumentality exempted from real estate tax.
The petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely
and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield,
runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not subject to real property tax and
respondent City is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.
Petitioner MCIAA is vested with corporate powers but it is not a stock or non-stock
corporation, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Like MIAA, petitioner MCIAA has capital under its
charter but it is not divided into shares of stock. It also has no stockholders or voting shares.
Republic Act No. 6958 provides:
82
Section 9. Capital. The [Mactan-Cebu International Airport] Authority shall have an

authorized capital stock equal to and consisting of:
(a) The value of fixed assets (including airport facilities, runways and equipment) and such
other properties, movable and immovable, currently administered by or belonging to the
airports as valued on the date of the effectivity of this Act;
(b) The value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports; and
(c) Government contribution in such amount as may be deemed an appropriate initial

balance. Such initial amount, as approved by the President of the Philippines, which shall be
more or less equivalent to six (6) months working capital requirement of the Authority, is
hereby authorized to be appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following
its enactment into law.
Thereafter, the government contribution to the capital of the Authority shall be provided for
in the General Appropriations Act.
Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties of public dominion
because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong
to the State or the Republic of the Philippines, and are outside the commerce of man. This, unless
petitioner leases its real property to a taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject to
real property tax; in which case, only those portions of petitioners properties which are leased to
taxable persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Lapu-Lapu.
83
Mangahas, Bethany
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016
Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. As they are concerned with questions of policy and
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be
beyond the ambit of judicial review.
FACTS
Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum

to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army
(PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,
in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as
defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal
capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation
and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of
the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-
sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and
several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several
others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson
of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial
law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.
ISSUE
84
Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
HELD
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial
inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous. An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. As they are concerned with
questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure,
political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted
for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of
policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
85
Election Law
Marasigan, Mariella
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

G.R. No. 221318, 16 December 2015
Unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or
other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional.
FACTS
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno Aquino (President Aquino) signed into law R.A.
10367, which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for
new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology. Furthermore, the law directs that voters who did not register and
failed to validate their biometrics, their records will be deactivated.
Due to the new law enacted, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), issued various
resolutions to implement the law, prescribing the procedure validation, deactivation, reactivation of
voter’s registration records (VRRs).
Petitioners, Kabataan Party List (Kabataan) filed an instant petition with the application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 10367 and the various resolutions that COMELEC issued to implement
the new law. Kabataan assails the following:
(a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where
there is penalty of deactivation; (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated by the 1987 Constitution; (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state
regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage; (d) voters to be
deactivated are not afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as
warning against exacting adherence to the system.
ISSUE
Whether or not R.A. 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolutions, all related thereto, are
unconstitutional.
HELD
NO. Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the
exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
86
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of

suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the
right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
Moreover, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution provides:
“As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily

conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others,
the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.”
Kabataan’s claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented
under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this
requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was
institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to
the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's
pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held that:
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For

registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election
process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to
the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as
a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important
end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent, and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that
is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's
ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional, as in this case.
87
Marcelino, Kristen
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 190793, 19 June 2012
Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means to achieve
one’s goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is sufficient to deny a party
registration and accreditation.
FACTS
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections.In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed
by MAGDALO. The relevant portions of the assailed Resolution read:
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C,
Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over
of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and
using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized
societies. x x x
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means.
HELD
No. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of
parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied
the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation
and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice
may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration.”Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence
commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper
subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the
introduction and reception of evidence thereon.
88
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied
registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly
announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their
dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged
corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state.Ultimately, they
wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to
resign.To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the
premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash
methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its
support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full
battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security
risk to the public. At the very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence
that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse
of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of
MAGDALO for resorting to violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
Supreme Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent
amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the
Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifications from party registration.
89
JUAN DOMINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. NO. 188716, 10 January 2013
It is doctrinally settled that the term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
FACTS
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine
(9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.
On 30 March 1998, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to
the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of
the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet
become final and executory.
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes shows that DOMINO garnered the highest
certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, number of votes over his opponents
for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
DOMINO’s subsequent motion for reconsideration and prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order were denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
HELD
The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
90
intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy
for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention
to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent
residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change
of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his
act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise
to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former
barangay.
91
Navarro, Jessica
MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM

DILANGALEN
G.R. No. 182369, 18 December 2008
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,

or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
FACTS
After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan,6 the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), on November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 2057 creating the
Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted
by separating Barangays Balong, Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P. Labio,
Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting from the Municipality of Kabuntalan. Mike A.
Fermin, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan, claiming that he had been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for
the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North
Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay Indatuan
a component of Northern Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the
transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan,
Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor
of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. On April 20, 2007,
private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition
for Disqualification against Fermin with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff
Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required
for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting
record.
Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case.
After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with 1,849 votes over
Fermin’s 1,640.15 The latter subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato City.
On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of
April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a
resident of BarangayIndatuan for at least one year.
Petitioner contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Following Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6646, the same must be filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of CoC, which, in this case,
is March 30, 2007, and considering that the said petition was filed by Dilangalen only on April 20,
2007, the same was filed out of time. The COMELEC should have then dismissed SPA No. 07-372
outright.
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Petitioner further argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the
creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of
his voter’s registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year
residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly
created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the
effective date of its creation.
In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for
disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for
filing of the CoC but not later than the candidate’s proclamation should he win in the elections. As
he filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before the proclamation of the eventual winning
candidate, the same was filed on time. Private respondent likewise posits that petitioner failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement for him to be able to run for an elective office in
Northern Kabuntalan. Petitioner applied for the transfer of his voting record on December 13, 2006,
and this was approved only on January 8, 2007.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC;
(2) Whether or not it was filed on time;
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a
resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections.
HELD
I. Pivotal in the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen petition is its proper
characterization.
As aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was filed
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC; while private respondent counters that the same is based on
Section 68 of the Code.After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in
the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 7833 of the OEC. The
petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made
a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would
affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his
certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.
It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate’s eligibility for public office, in this
case, his possession of the one-year residency requirement under the law.Lest it be misunderstood,
the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but
on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states
in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is
to be read in relation to the constitutional35 and statutory36 provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.–Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party

is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
93
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
Likewise, the other provisions of law referring to "disqualification" do not include the lack of
the one-year residency qualification as a ground therefor, thus:
Sections 12 of the OEC. SEC. 12. Disqualifications.–Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC) SECTION 40. Disqualifications–The

following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;(c)
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;(d) Those with dual citizenship;(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of

the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in
the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section
78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
II. We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 752 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,53
contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing
"Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure
in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates54 (retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections
explains that "the ‘procedure hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to
refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases,
[but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x
94
x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions under
the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of
Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to
the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC in order to ascertain
whether the Dilangalen petition filed on April 20, 2007 was well within the restrictive 25-day period.
If it was not, then the COMELEC should have, as discussed above, dismissed the petition
outright.The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern
Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections on March 29, 2007.58 It is clear
therefore that the petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermin’s CoC was filed by Dilangalen well
within the 25-day reglementary period. The COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion, much
more gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition outright.
III. However, the Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it
precipitately declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year
prior to the said elections.In its assailed June 29, 2007 Resolution, 59 the COMELEC ruled that
clearly the respondent is not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan earlier than 15 May 2006 as his
very own oath of office would reveal that he is really a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan less
than 365 days immediately preceding the May 14, 2007 elections. He is a resident of a barangay not
a component of the local government unit in which he seeks to be elected as of May 15, 2006 and is
therefore not qualified or eligible to seek election as mayor in the said municipality.
Obviously, the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office
subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that
he was a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of
evidence does not necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner merely
admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year
before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the
residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay
Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.
We emphasize that the mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a
candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the
cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.63 A litigating party
is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his
opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by
sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, the COMELEC’s order for the dismissal of Fermin’s
election protest is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, considering that the same is premised on
Fermin’s alleged lack of legal standing to file the protest, which, in turn, is based on Fermin’s alleged
lack of residency qualification. With our disposition herein that the Dilangalen petition should be
dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin has no standing as a candidate would be reckless and
improper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari are GRANTED. The assailed
issuances of the COMELEC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
95
Pagalilauan, Gerome
MORENO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 168550
The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
FACTS
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an
answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted
probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code which
provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2)
years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but
did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the
Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE
Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?
HELD
Yes.
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
96
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the
Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute.
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Pagtalunan, Maylen
MANUEL B. JAPZON v. COMMI SSI ON ON ELEC TI ONS

a nd JAI ME S. TY
G. R. No . 180088
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
FACTS
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the
local elections held on 14 May 2007.
On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petitionto disqualify and/or
cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in
his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what
was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta
Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the USA and became a citizen thereof. Ty
had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28
March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of
origin. Ty did not establish his residence in the Municipality of General Macarthurjust because he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Ty did not become a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225. Japzon asserts that
Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections.
Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers, the 14 May
2007 elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
The COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolutiondated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions.
HELD
Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship. The statute does not at all
touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention
any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
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concerned natural-born Filipino.Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which
he is also a citizen.
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
The Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive
factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification
requirement.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the
local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying
community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for
and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing
residence so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required
by law.
99
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JESUS L. VICENTE
G.R. No. 187478, 21 December 2009, EN BANC (Leondardo-De Castro, J.)
A candidate who has been proclaimed and who has taken his oath of office can be said to be a
member of the House of Representatives. Thus, he is within the jurisdiction of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their members.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven days a
week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement.
There is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning
property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the address they
had indicated as their place of residence in their Certificate of Candidacy. Likewise, the Constitution
does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run
but only that he resides in the district for at least a year prior to election day.
FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez (Fernandez) filed for candidacy as Representative of

the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/ exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St.,
Villa Toledo, Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna.
While private respondent herein Jesus L. Vicente (Vicente) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna, which was forwarded to the Commissions on Elections
(COMELEC). Vicente sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as
a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of
residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and
Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which
was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of
merit.
Petitioner was later proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Laguna. Thereafter, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the
Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared null
and void. Vicente’s main ground for the quo warranto was that petitioner lacked the required one-
year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support
of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged
Sta. Rosa Residence; (2) the period of his residence in the legislative district, which he indicated as
one year and two month; and (3) his eligibility for the office where he was seeking to elected.
Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent Vicente, this petition was filed.
ISSUES
100
1. Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases
involving the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives.
2. Whether or not petitioner Fernandez sufficiently complied with the one-year residency
requirement to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987
Constitution.
HELD
1. YES. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of
the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections
and the proclamation of the winning candidates.
The private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case,
the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of
the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a
candidate.
2. YES. The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution.
Vicente’s documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner only prove that petitioners domicile of origin
was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained to be his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other
hand, what petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC was that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna in the First District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondents evidence failed to
contradict the claim.
The fact that a few barangay health workers, presented by private respondent herein
attested that they failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de
Toledo is of no moment, especially considering that there were witnesses (including petitioner’s
neighbors thereat) that were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident
of the said Villa, in the address he stated in his COC. The law does not require a person to be in his
home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven days a week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement.
Neither do the Court find anything wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or
received visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa Residence, as there is
nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and
exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the address they had indicated
as their palce of residence in their COC.
Additionally, petitioner’s ownership of properties in other places cannot be taken to mean

that he did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his
domicile of origin. Neither the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the
time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. For the Constitution does not
require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but
only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day – to use ownership of
property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence
implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residence requirement to the right to
hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
101
Also, it was incumbent upon private respondent to prove his assertion that petitioner is
indeed disqualified from holding his congressional seat. Vicente’s burden of proof was not only to
establish that petitioner’s domicile of origin is different from Sta. Rosa but also that petitioner’s
domicile for the one year prior to election day continued to be Pagsanjan, Laguna which was
petitioner’s domicile of origin or that petitioner had chosen a domicile other than Sta. Rosa for that
same period. It would be absurd to rule that the petitioner in a quo warranto suit only needs to prove
that the candidate had some other previous domicile, regardless of how remote in time from election
day that previous domicile was established, and then the candidate would already have the burden
to prove abandonment of that previous domicile. It is the burden of the petitioner in a quo warranto
case to first prove the very fact of disqualification before the candidate should even be called upon to
defend himself with countervailing evidence.
Finally, it must be remembered that when a candidate has received popular mandate,
overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidate’s eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.
102
Onia, Steven Ralph
PENERA v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 181613
A n y u n law fu l ac t or omis s ion a pplic a ble to a c an d id ate s h all ta ke effect onlyupon the
start of the campaign period
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed
her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When
she w e n t t o t h e C O M E L E C O f f i c e f o r f i l i n g s h e w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y h e r
p a r t y m a t e s . Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and
ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for
her and the other candidates of their political party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition again st her alleging premature
campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: “Election or
partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.” She argued
that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign
period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.
Wh ile th e petition w as pen din g in th e COM ELEC, sh e w as v oted as may or

an d t o o k h e r o f f i c e t h e r e a f t e r . T h e C O M E L E C S e c o n d D i v i s i o n d e c i d e d i n
f a v o r o f t h e c o m p l a i n a n t and found her guilty of premature campaigning.
ISSUE
Whether or not she is guilty of pre campaigning.
HELD
No, an y ac t is law fu l u n le ss ex pr e ss ly dec l a r ed u n law fu l by l aw . I t i s en ou g h

th a t C on g r ess s t ate d th at “ an y u n law fu l a c t or o mi s sion ap pl ic ab le to a c an di da te
sh a ll t ake effect onlyupon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start
of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on
the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what w as dec ide d in th e Lanot
Casew h ic h say s th at pr ior to th e c am pa ig n per iod, ev en if th e c an d ida te h a s fi le d
h is/ h er c er tif ic a te of c an di dac y , h e/ sh e is n ot y e t c on si der ed a s a c an did at e f or
pu r pose s o th er th an th e pr in tin g of b al lot s. Hen c e, sh e c an n ot be g u i lty
of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did
was an exercise of her freedom of expression.
103
Ramo, Keif Khari M.
LUIS A. ASISTIOvs.HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010
DOCTRINE/S
 The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen,
enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government to ensure that it can
truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of its constituents.
 The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and
at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.
 "Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. “Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that
a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
 Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1)
an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that
purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
FACTS
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis
A. Asistio (Asistio) a Petitionfor Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan
City (Petition for Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City. Public respondent Judge
Arthur O. Malabaguio (Judge Malabaguio) presides over MeTC Branch 52. The petition alleged that
Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15,
Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010
Automated National and Local Elections.Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was
the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy
filed by Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to
the latter’s petition, he found out that Asistio’s address is non-existent.He said that, per his
verification, the votersduly registered in the 2009 CVL using the address No. 123 P. Zamora St.,
Barangay 17, Caloocan City did not include Asistio.
Asistio filed his Answer; he alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City,
and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in
the contract of lease with Angelina dela Torre Tengco (Tengco), which was 123 Interior P. Zamora
St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
Meanwhile, on January 26, 2010, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification.
The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and that he
had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his Answer raised the
104
same arguments with respect to his residency and also argued that the President of the Philippines
granted him an absolute pardon.
The MeTC rendered a decision directing the Election Registration Board of Caloocan City to remove
the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.
Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal and his Appealand paid the required appeal fees through postal
money orders.Echiverri filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees.Judge Aguirre
directed Echiverri’s counsel to file the appropriate responsive pleading to Asistio’s appeal in her
Order. This Order, however, was cancelled by Judge Aguirre herself and issued an amended Order,
holding in abeyance the filing of the responsive pleading of Echiverri’s counsel and submitting the
Motion for resolution.
In another Order, Judge Aguirre granted the Motion on the ground of non-payment of docket fees
essential for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.
The OSG points out that Asistio’s family is "known to be one of the prominent political families in
Caloocan City, and that there is no indication whatsoever that [Asistio] has ever intended to
abandon his domicile, Caloocan City." Further, the OSG proposes that the issue at hand is better
resolved by the people of Caloocan City. In all, the OSG propounds that technicalities and procedural
niceties should bow to the sovereign will of the people of Caloocan City.
ISSUE
Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City for
failure to comply with the residency required by law.
HELD
NO.
The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen,
enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government to ensure that it can truly be
said to derive its power solely from the consent of its constituents.Time and again, it has been said
that every Filipino’s right to vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full effect.A citizen cannot be
disenfranchised for the flimsiest of reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear and
convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom.
In this case, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that the appellate docket fees were not filed
on time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant
case on substantial grounds. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of
frustrating and nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.
this Court has recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal construction of procedural rules to
serve substantial justice. Courts have the prerogative to relax rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily end litigation and the parties’
right to due process.
105
As can be culled fromSection 1172 of The Omnibus Election Code and Section 93 of The Voters
Registration Act of 1996, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the
Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.
"Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is
doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intentioninferable from
a person’s acts, activities, and utterances.“Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence where,
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.In the consideration
of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.There must
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His
family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served
in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives,
having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought
election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration,it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere,
or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010
elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he
indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan
City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve as basis for an
election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),or an action to deny due course to the
2SECTION 117. Qualifications of a voter.—Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years
of age or over, who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be registered as a voter.
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation; profession;
employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army,
navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law, shall be deemed not to have lost his original residence.
3SEC. 9. Who May Register.—All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18)
years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession,
employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the
Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Force, or confinement or detention in
government institutions in accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence but who, on the day
of election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.
106
COC.But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan
City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City.
107
Revadillo, Clarence
QUINTO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010
FACTS
On December 1, 2009,the Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13
of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional.
December 14, 2009, COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his
certificate of candidacy”.
ISSUE
Whether the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection
clause of the constitution.
HELD
These laws and regulations implement Section 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.
108
Rosario, Patricia Mae
FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996 (Panganiban, J.)
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,

and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof.
FACTS
Juan G. Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections (1988,
1992, and 1995) but was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his
alien citizenship. In the preceding 1995 elections, his citizenship to hold office was again questioned
before the COMELEC. However, Frivaldo now claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation, under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of
allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor, in 1988 and 1992, and thereafter his opponent Raul L. Lee,
who got the second highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, was proclaimed as the newly elect
Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD
Yes.
The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160) expressly requires Philippine citizenship as
a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor. In this case, as
petitioner Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon
him to show that he has reacquired citizenship in order to qualify for the position; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by

naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral
argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the
bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives” due, according to him, to the “maneuvers of his political
rivals.” In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects. Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo
was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in
the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he
was judicially declared a non- Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,

and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
109
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term
of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
110
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON
G.R. No. 189034, 11 January 2010
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
FACTS
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were
among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. Edilito
C. Martinez, a "habal-habal" driver, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Accordingly, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.However,
the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a
nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.
Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections by a slim margin of 104
votes. Martinez filed an election protest based on 300 ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C.
Martinez) who had the same surname.
Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in
accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: "Where only the first
name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if there is no
other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office."
ISSUE
Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" votes in favor of Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III despite the finality of the
COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
HELD
YES. Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor
should the absence of objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from
raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did
not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was
an unknown in politics within the district, a "habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial
resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname with that of
petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of winning
the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An
election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which
becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is
aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the
111
electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance
candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of Election
Day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery
by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare
them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
112
JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

670 SCRA 572 (2012)
For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
FACTS
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to
Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother,
Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran’s Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1,
2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in
compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village
where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration
as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Veteran’s Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration
Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) voters
list for Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim
in Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. After hearing, the
MCTC rendered a decision, denying the petition. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed
the MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and executory.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC7on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and
(2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained
Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the
residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere
guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his
domicile.
Acting on Jalosjos’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court
resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a status quo ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its
February 11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was
proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race in the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay.
ISSUE
113
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor
to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election
laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not
only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency
requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but
one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has
met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he
successfully changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he
was unable to discharge the burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it
must be assumed that his domicile is either Quezon City or Australia.
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his
birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to
Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in
that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He
left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss
of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in
a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that
the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
114
Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at
his residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better
chance of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo
presented, who just sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that
Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and
national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like
the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is
sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.
Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
115
Tandoc, John Karol
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M.

PACETE
G.R. No. 192221, 13 November 2012
FACTS
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the
Sangguniang Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique under the ticket of the National People’s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela
Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on

the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election
process in mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with
petitioner’s surname.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division DECLARED Aurelio as a nuisance
candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong but
despite this, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates and Official Sample Ballot
issued by the COMELEC.
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
praying, among other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s name
from the Official List of Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other
election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in
the event Aurelio’s name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the
COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8844 listing the names of
disqualified candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon. (Emphasis supplied)
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled.
Aurelio’s name remained in the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of
Bugasong on May 13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in
her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844.
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed
Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an
election protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the
annulment of respondent Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her
proclamation as winning candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
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By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting
the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the COMELEC’s
First Division gravely abused its discretion.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes
cast for Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which
cannot be supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law, invoking
this Court’s ruling in Kare v. COMELEC that the aforesaid provision when read together with
Section 72, are understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification
has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the votes in favor Of Aurelio Dela Cruz be considered as strat votes
HELD
NO. The petition is meritorious.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC
when it issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211
(24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless,
if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots,
every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its
rejection. The board of election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that
the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
xxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall
be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a
candidate, whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor,
shall be considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to
disqualification by conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment;

the law lists other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section
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211(24) of the OEC is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is
clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the election code.
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes
cast for the disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as
explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to
petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance
candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a
certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run
for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section
68 (giving money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making
prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under

Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under
Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and
resulting in different eventualities.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12
or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled
or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified
under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78
cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what
COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified
candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been cancelled or
denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was
cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC.But should
these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered
stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions
in special action cases, provides:
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This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or

division, particularly on special actions (disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it
is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases
shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court;
xxx
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether
the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably
filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and
tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed.
Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in
favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted
in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a
slim margin.
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the
same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter,
remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the
OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of
such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified
on grounds provided in the OEC and Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the
cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we
pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their
will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could
have been intended only for the legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in
names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day,
cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering
that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the
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bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct
the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule
well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
120
JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to
the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done
by any fair and reasonable interpretation.
FACTS
On November 16, 2001, the Court convicted petitioner by final judgment of two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an
order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on
March 18, 2009.
On April 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because
of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the
Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent
List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the MTCC of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the
same, he filed a CoC on October 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming
May 2013 Elections. In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and
that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
However, MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was
affirmed by RTC. Meanwhile, five petitions were lodged before the COMELEC Divisions, praying for
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending resolution, the
COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio a resolution cancelling and denying CoC petitioner as
Mayor of Zamboanga City due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had
already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
HELD
No. The Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains disqualified to
run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
Petitioner submitted that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Section 40(a) of
the LGC and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.
The argument is untenable.
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Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with
those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.
Section 40(a) of the LGC provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. -

The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office
shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may
have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be
elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the
lapse of two years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to
cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect
of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
It is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct
and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to his
conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses involving
moral turpitude and those punishable by one year or more of imprisonment without any
consideration of certain disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of
the LGC should be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more
definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted
as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed
therefor should prevail.
Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for
elective office. Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision – such as
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Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office.
Hence, despite the lapse of two years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the
same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any
subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to
subsist.
Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned
accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of
the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty. In Lacuna v. Abes the court explained the
meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of disqualification to run for public office.
It mentioned that the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of
the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code). But this does not hold true
with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts
during the term of the sentence.
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TALAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 196804 and G.R. No. 197015. 9 October 2012
A candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed a CoC is not at all a candidate
FACTS
Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of
candidacyfor the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010
national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-KampiCMD, declared in his
CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.Four days later, Castillo filed
with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to
or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served
Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite
knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City,
still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution disqualifying Ramon to run for Mayor of
Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the Resolution of the
COMELEC. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby
filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had
nominated Ramon.
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of

Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolutionfinal and executory.
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the
votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting
in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615
votes.Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers seeking the suspension of
Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its
Law Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917,
thereby including her in the certified list of candidates.Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara
Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.
Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC. He alleged that
Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due
course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had
approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be
considered stray.
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Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,
positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been
invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
ISSUES
a) Whether or not the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband is valid
b) Who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective position?
HELD
a) No. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidateof a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may
file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate
of the country, with the Commission.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the
sameway as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Likewise, a
candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a
substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required
by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or

confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for
they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose
CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all
because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya 311 SCRA
617 (1999), has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly
substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he is not considered a candidate.
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced
both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution
provides: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the
constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials, to wit: Section 43. Term of
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Office.—(a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.The objective of imposing the
three-term limit rule was “to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power
over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.”
b) Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should
be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the
disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was “not the choice of the
sovereign will.” Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be
deemed elected to the office. There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the
election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position. No law
imposed uponand compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.
The COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the
position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to
substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC
before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she
was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of
her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and
in fact, a candidate. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus
resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in
Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor,
ViceGovernor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—If a permanent vacancy occurs in the Office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor.
126
Onia, Steven Ralph

VINZON-CHATO v. COMELEC
GR 199149
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
r a i s e d , t h a t i s s u e i s b e s t a d d r e s s e d t o t h e H R E T . I t avoids duplicity of proceedings
and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the people’s mandate.
FACTS
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district
of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed respondent Unico as
representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First
Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23,
2004, it lifted thesaid order on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not
only divested theCommission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) is precluded from
entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on matters relating to the
preparation,transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass
involving the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-
List..
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to the
proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a ministerial function. Absent a lawful
order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was
mandated to comply with its duties and functions including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning
candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed for utter
lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was
elevated to the COMELEC Enbanc for resolution.
ISSUE
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD
No, In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en bancdenied petitioner
Chato’s motionfor reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that
respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It reasoned, thus :In Pangilinan
vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement
that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby divesting the Commission
on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa(Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and
decide the pre- proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as
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of the Senate.The Honorable Court reiterated the afore quoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et al.
(G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns ,and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
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LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE

G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014, (Peralta, J.)
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a COC
the name by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through court-
approved proceedings, and that he may include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally
or popularly known in the locality.
FACTS
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and
materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when
he declared under oath in his COC that "L-RAY JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname or stagename and that
the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP;
that respondent deliberately omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead "LRAY JR.,"
which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte,
Jr."
Respondent denied the commission of any material misrepresentation and asserted that he
had been using the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word
to appear on the ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters
would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced.
COMELEC first division and En Banc dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
HELD
We find no merit in the argument. Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code states that no
person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn COC within the period
fixed herein. Section 74 thereof enumerates the contents of the COC.
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall use in a
COC the name by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate has changed his name through
court-approved proceedings, and that he may include one nickname or stage name by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality, which respondent did. As we have discussed, the name
which respondent wrote in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a material
misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as it does not pertain to his
qualification or eligibility to run for an elective public office.
Finally, petitioner claims that the false representation of respondent's nickname written on
the COC is meant to undermine the statutory requirement regarding the alphabetical
listing/arrangement of names of the candidate as provided under Section 1319 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9369 amending RA 8436, the automated election system; that he would be put to a great and
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undue disadvantage as he became no. 5, while respondent was in no. 4 in the list of candidates for
Governor of Camarines Sur.
Considering that respondent's name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ, his name would
indeed be ahead of petitioner's name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot which contains the
alphabetical listing of the candidates for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines
Sur. However, petitioner's claim that such listing would lead to confusion as to put him to undue
disadvantage is merely speculative and without basis as the voters can identify the candidate they
want to vote for.
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Angeles, George II
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et. al.

G.R. No. 207900, 22 April 2014
The votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election for these do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. On
the other hand, those votes for the eligible and legitimate candidates form an integral part of said
voice, which must equally be given due respect , if not more.
FACTS
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J.
Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC. Omar basically
asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his
residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of
South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
On November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on January
31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC’s First Division dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to
cancel Hayudini’s CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini
committed false representation as to his residency.
Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5.
The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name
in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters of Appeals (CA), but on April 17, 2013, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 05426, the same was denied.In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a
Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening
Event on March 26, 2013.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was
proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC.Thus,
Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES
a. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction when it resolved to cancel petitioner Hayudini’s CoC and declare his
proclamation null and void.
b. Whether or not it was grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his
proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever
filed.
HELD
a. No. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is
eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The false representation mentioned in
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these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who
falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she
can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification
for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a
registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in
the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent
the local government under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as expressed
through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent todeceive the electorate as
to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be
elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a
petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by
the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirmingthe disapproval
of Hayudini’s petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when
he stated in his CoC that “he is eligible for said office," Hayudini made a clear and material
misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay
Bintawlan. Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural
deficiencies, South Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is
supposed to govern, thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the
COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy.
b. No. CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.
The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes. If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case
is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the
proclamation of the winner.
Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise
applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.The only
exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC
ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office.
As held in Aratea v. COMELEC, which is a case for cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before
or after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found
that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, he was never
a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the second
placer, the only qualified candidate, who actuallygarnered the highest number of votes, for the
position of Mayor.
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EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR

"EGAY" S. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 212398, 25 November 2014
The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases
involving criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in para. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. Hence, an erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
FACTS
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
Edgar “Egay” San Luis before the COMELECagainst Emilio Ramon “E.R.” P. Ejercito, who was a
fellow gubernatorialcandidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna.
The petition alleged that Ejercito distributed “orange card” to influence voters in his favor; and
Ejercito exceeds the amount of expenditures necessary. Ejercito was proclaimed as Governor.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference. Ejercito prayed
for the dismissal of the petition which wasimproperly filed because it is in reality a complaint for
election offenses, thus,the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, and
ifwith probable cause, file with proper court.The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the
disqualification of Ejercito. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First
Divisionthat San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito.
Ejercito filed a case before the Supreme Court imputing grave abuse of discretion against
COMELEC and contends that it violated the right of the petitioner to due process when it ruled for
the disqualification of petitioner even if it was not prayed for disqualification. Worse, there is yet no
finding of guilt by competent court that he committed election offense.
ISSUE
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD
NO. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an
independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or anyother plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or anyother
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawmeant to correct simple errors of
judgment. More importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is
actually proved to exist. Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailedResolution
with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed
by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution ofelection offense but for disqualification as
well. Ejercito cannot feign ignoranceof the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. The title of
San Luis’ petitionshows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which is the specific rule governing the disqualification ofcandidates. Moreover, the
averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of
action. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code precisely enumerates the grounds for the
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disqualification of a candidate forelective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall
bedisqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, fromholding the office. A
similar tenor was expressed in the prayer in the petitionfiled by San Luis.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if
elected, from serving, or to prosecute him forviolation of the election laws. A petition to disqualify a
candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Offenses that are
punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a Section 68
petition. The electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done through an administrative proceeding
which is summary in character.
An election offense has both criminal and electoral aspects. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. Thecriminal aspect of a disqualification case
determines whether there is probablecause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The
prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probablecause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its LawDepartment, files
the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedingsbefore the proper court demand a full-
blown hearing and require proof beyondreasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall
result in thedisqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a
future public office.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case.The “exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary
investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws” stated in para. 1 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case.Hence, an
erring candidate may bedisqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in
apreliminary investigation.
#338
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Balonkita, Christa
ARNADO v. COMELEC
GR No. 210164, 18 August 2015
Only natural-born Filipino who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.
FACTS
Rommel Arnado is a natural-brn citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent

naturalization as a citizen of the United States, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and took the Oath of Allegience to the Republic of the Philippine on 10 July 2008. On the same day,
an order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship. On

November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections. A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification
case against Arnado on the ground that Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such act of using a US passport constitutes dual
allegiance and that is a ground for disqualification under the Local Government Code. In short, it
was argued that Arnado remained a US citizen. In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to
run for public office because he complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which
provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for elective public office if (1) they meet the
qualifications for the elective office they desire, and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships – which must be done before the filing of the COC. Arnado explained
that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not know yet that
he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when he received said Philippine passport, he
used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an Affirmation of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a notary public. Balua however presented proof that
Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and in March 2010. Eventually, the
Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared another
rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).
Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival
candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No.
195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 S 2016-2017 INA CG 26 elections as he
even acquired 84% of the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan. Later however, the COMELEC
disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections and his declaration as Mayor of
Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able to comply with the requirements of RA 9225;
and that his disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arguments of Arnado are tenable.
HELD
No.
Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements set
by law. The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory
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cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain
provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. 2. The COMELEC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines and renounced his US
citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted or withdrawn
when he again used his US passport. In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used
his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is
therefore disqualified to run for public office. What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of
running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again (for the third time) his US citizenship. But he
never did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the 2013 elections too. Note also that assuming
that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when he again
made a second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of
Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of the original. Under the Best
Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the original must be presented unless
the same is lost. In this case, the original was never alleged to have been lost. Further, the said
Affidavit was being used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section
34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.”
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Guevarra. Jhaypee
ARNADO v. COMELEC
GR No. 210164, Aug 18, 2015, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the
sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the
qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad
and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a
foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Further, matters
dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with
FACTS
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after
he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even
date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition was issued in his favor. On
April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty
post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Balua, another mayoralty candidate, questioned the citizenship of Arnado because his
continued use of his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid
Affidavit of Renunciation. Pending the petition, Arnado obtained the highest number of votes.
Afterwhich, the Comelec decided that the use of US Passport of Arnardo effectively negated the
affidavit of renunciation. However, it was reversed by the COMELEC En Banc on the basis that at
the time of the use, Arnado was unaware that his PH Passport had already been issued.
Maquiling, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in
the case.
On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC for the same position for May 13, 2013 elections.
Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
The court ruled against Arnado. Thus, a disqualification case was then again filed against
Arnardo. The Comelec second division disqualified him on the same ground of his continued use of
US Passport and his failure to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13,
2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of
Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice because it
should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Arnado
HELD
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The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in
sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the
May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he
filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is
disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano, it was clarified that
the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.'' Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
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DR. REY AQUINO v. COMELEC,

G.R. Nos. 211789-90, 17 March 2015
The Constitution and the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and second, to
"promulgate rules and regulations."
FACTS
On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC),issued PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010
(reassignment order) directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees. On the
same date, Aquino released the reassignment order. On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued
an Advisory implementing the reassignment order.
In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to
the Chairman of the Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed
before the COMELEC a complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge,
Executive VP and Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881.
On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition before the COMELEC maintaining that
PhilHealth SO No. 16-2010 is beyond the coverage of Resolution No. 8737.
In an October 19, 2012 resolution, the COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the
appropriate information against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section
261(h) of BP 881; it dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint against Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.
The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of BP 881 when he directed the
transfer/reassignment of the PHIC officers and employees within the declared election period
without its prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h) considers an election offense for "any
public official who makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in
the civil service x x x within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission."
ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737 that defined transfer, as
contemplated under Section 261(h) of BP 881, to include all personnel action including
reassignments; and if so, whether the COMELEC validly found prima facie case against Aquino for
violation of Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h).
HELD
The Constitution and the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and second,
to "promulgate rules and regulations." Together, these powers ensure that the COMELEC is well
armed to properly enforce and implement the election laws and enable it to fill in the situational
gaps which the law does not provide for or which the legislature had not foreseen.
In exercising these powers and fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition, must
necessarily interpret the provisions of the law that they are to enforce and for which they will craft
139
the guidelines. Thus, to this extent and in this sense, the COMELEC likewise exercises the power of
legal interpretation pursuant to the legal principle that the grant of a power includes all the powers
necessary for the exercise of the power expressly given.
The COMELEC defined the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" found in Section 261(h) of
BP 881 as including any personnel action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino questions this COMELEC
interpretation as an unwarranted expansion of the legal prohibition which he argues renders the
COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.
The Court already clarified the interpretation of the term whatever as used in Section 261(h)
of BP 881 in relation to the terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General’s
position, this Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever
such that "any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office
or agency, during the election period is covered by the prohibition.
As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30)
days after the election date pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of
BP 881. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is
not precluded from setting a period different from that provided thereunder.
In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections at 120
days before and 30 days after the day of the election. We find this period proper as we find no
arbitrariness in the COMELEC’s act of fixing an election period longer than the period fixed in the
Constitution and BP 881.
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881,a person commits the election offense of violation of the
election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or
employee of the government during the election period absent prior approval of the COMELEC.
By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions.
The elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the election
period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval
Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
this case based on the following facts: First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the
concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election period. Second, Aquino sent out, via the
PHIC’s intranet service, the reassignment order to all affected PHIC officers and employees before
the election period. Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated
clearly the affected PHIC officers and employees as well as their respective places of reassignments,
and was made effective immediately or on the day of its issue, which was likewise before the election
period. Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued were not reassignment orders per se
contrary to the COMELEC’s assessment.
Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment
of the affected PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period. In this sense, the
evils sought to be addressed by Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the timely exercise of his
management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices
necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell
outside the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation of Section
261(h).
140
In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, firstly, it used wrong or
irrelevant considerations when it sought to hold Aquino liable for violation of Section 261 (h) for
issuing orders that were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders for retention of
position or orders for temporary discharge of additional duties.
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Castillo, Jephthah
POE v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner.
FACTS
On June 24, 2004, Congress, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed GMA
the duly elected president of the Philippines against FPJ (12.9M vs 11.8M). FPJ filed an election
protest on July 23, 2004. On December 14, 2004, FPJ died. Despite his death, periodic mass actions,
demonstrations and rallies raised outcries for HRET to decide the electoral protest.
Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has submitted to the
Tribunal, a MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ, by his widow, who signed the verification and
certification therein.
Mrs. FPJ: it is of paramount interest that substitution be allowed to ascertain the genuine
will of the people. Citing De Castro v. COMELEC and Lomugdang v. Javier to the effect that death
of protestant is not a ground for dismissal of the contest nor does it oust the trial court of jurisdiction
to decide the election contest.
GMA: cited Vda. De Mesa v. Mencias as well as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rules
wherein it was held that a widow is not a proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a
public office is personal and not property that can pass on to the heirs.
ISSUE
May the widow substitute for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters
protest case?
HELD
No.
Rule 14 of PET: Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest
the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within 30 days after the proclamation of the
winner.
Only 2nd and 3rd placers may contest the election: By this express enumeration, the rule
makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest.
It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the
electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the
legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest. There is not rule on substitution for PET but it
allows for analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court
and of electoral tribunals.
142
As Applied: Public Office is personal and not property that is transmissible to the heirs.
Thus, the court has consistently rejected substitution by widow or heirs in election contests where
protestant dies during pendency of the case.
Vda. De Mesa v. Mencias: recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but denied
substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. BUT an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death
of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have
allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the
avails of the suit. Substitution by the vice-mayor (VM) is permitted since the VM is a real party in
interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the VM succeeds to
the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume office.
(1) Though Public Interest is involved, rules still have to be followed. Rule 19, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET
Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by the effect of the judgment.
As Applied, movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not
a real party in interest to this election protest. No real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants
in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased
protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene,
proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy
of the law. It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and
substitution under the law and the rules.
143
Dator, Peter Paul

BANAGA Jr. V. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 134696 (2000)
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
conditions must concur, namely: (a) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (b) the votes not cast
would have affected the result of the election.
FACTS
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of
the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers
proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner
Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was
replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous
Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be
altered, falsified or fabricated. In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election
offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be
considered as the true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor
in the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied
upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear
that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be
viewed as an election protest.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio
without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
ISSUE
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
HELD
NO. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the

petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. There
are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes; or
144
c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to electon account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
In summary, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure
of election two conditions must concur, namely:
a) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was
voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and
b) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.
Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
In the foregoing instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the
first two scenarios, where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the
third scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the
consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid, is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a
winner.
The Court painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner Banaga before the
COMELEC and found that petitioner did not allege at all that elections were either not held
or suspended. Neither did he aver that although there was voting, nobody was elected. On
the contrary, he conceded that an election took place for the office of vice-mayor of Paraaque City,
and that private respondent was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. While petitioner contends
that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a
declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented or
suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody
and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the
petitioner below, but he did not.
The foregoing instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr., the respondent
COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
145
Del Mundo, Angelo Raphael
JOEL G. MIRANDA v. ANTONIO M. ABAYA

G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in

the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all.
FACTS
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate
of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Private
respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by Comelec and they further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel
G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent
vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private
respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. He prayed for the
nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been
cancelled and denied due course.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner, who was beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, be qualified to substitute a candidate whose COC was cancelled and denied?
HELD
NO. In Bautista vs. Comelec the Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not
give rise to a valid candidacy." A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered
a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy -- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but
logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate
of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office.
In Gador vs. Comelec, the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period
fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner
as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person
146
whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of
votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for. The evident purposes of the law in
requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefore are: (a) to enable
the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they
are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes
cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast
even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for
another office in the same election.
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily

understood why in Bautista the Court ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate
at all.
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in

the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, if we were to allow
the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for
the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by
our Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that the Court should GRANT the instant petition
for certiorari and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of public respondent COMELEC En
Banc dated December 8, 1998 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, as well as to REINSTATE the resolution of the COMELEC First
Division dated May 16, 1998.
147
Del Prado, Darren Joseph
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN

ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.
G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
FACTS
Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr., the respondent
were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes
in the May 13, 2013 elections. The private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy claiming that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes.
However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in
Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant
to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Furthermore, he asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes, on May 14, 2013. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc but the same was denied.Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private respondent took his Oath of Office on
December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
HELD
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin
Caballero.
Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not persuaded. It is true that the
petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Nevertheless, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. It is settled ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. In the case at bar, the petitioner permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he had in effect
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
148
More so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as
required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 , declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of the law.
However, it does not mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The petitioner's retention
of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence
in Uyugan, Batanes.
149
Onia, Steven Ralph

GOH v. BAYRON
G.R. No. 212584
GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to
authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.
To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.

However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of
the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to "conduct... elections," which even if not expressly
spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific
to fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular
but also special or recall elections.
FACTS
Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Puerto Princesa Mayor Lucilo Bayron for loss of
confidence due to “gross violations of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials”, among others COMELEC issued Res. 9864,
finding the petition sufficient in form & substance, but suspended any recall elections until they
determined where to get the funds for it. ◦Sec. 75, Local Government Code & Sec. 31, COMELEC
Res. 7505: states all expenses incidental to recall elections are to be borne by COMELEC, and
mandates a contingency fund included in the GAA for it ◦Finance Services Department (FSD)
questioned if COMELEC should bear the burden of funding the entire process of any and all recall
elections, stalling the proceedings, including the verification process COMELEC issued Res. 9882,
stating that while Recall is one of its constitutional mandates (A9-C,S2[9]), it cannot proceed with
elections since it doesn’t have legal authority to commit public funds for it(A6, S29), and they have
no contingency fund to do so: While the Commission has a line item for the “Conduct & supervision
of elections, referenda, recall votes, and plebiscites under the program category of its 2014 budget in
the amount ofP1.4B”, it cannot be considered as “an appropriation made by law” nor as a contingency
fund.
ISSUES
W/N COMELEC is correct that it can not conduct a recall election as it is not specified in the GAA
W/N COMELEC can tap its saving to conduct a recall election.
HELD
No, GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation
to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.
YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR PERSONNEL

SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES. RECALL ELECTIONS
ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES BECAUSE THE EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE THE
SAME PERSONNEL WHO WILL EVALUATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECALL
PETITIONS.
However, contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the appropriations for personnel services
and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under “Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” constitute a line item which can be augmented from the
150
COMELEC’s savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections
requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC’s existing personnel in Puerto
Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct
the recall elections
151
Evangelista, Kevin
AGUSTIN v. COMELEC
FACTS
In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America.On
October 5, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party,he declared
in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural
born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for
25 years.
On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the
COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio
A. Agustin, alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating
that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a
voter therein only on May 31, 2012.
Petitioner countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter
registration; that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for
business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence;
and that as regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S./American
Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012.
Upon denial of his Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Agustin, Pillos filed a motion for reconsideration underscoring that the certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his
travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on
October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a
resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run for public office
HELD
No, while the Courts finds that petitioner did not commit any material misrepresentation in
his COC, he is disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a
dual citizen. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012,36 after having renounced his USA citizenship
and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing
himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels
abroad despite having been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby
effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA
passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be
considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6,
2012. The petitioner continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA
passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, viz.:
152
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
XxxX
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he

lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. Even if it made no finding that the petitioner had
deliberately attempted to mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the
COMELEC could still declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the
Local Government Code.
153
Local Government
Local Autonomy
LIMBONA v. MANGELIN
G.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989
No one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the recourse amounts to
malicious prosecution; The autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of
our national courts.
FACTS
Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang

Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. He was then
was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly for brevity), composed of eighteen (18) members.
The Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII in a consultation and dialogue
on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
"our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress takes precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook."
In defiance of petitioner's advice, the Assembly held session on November 2, 1987 where the
seat of the Speaker was declared vacant upon motion and voting of the Assemblymen in attendance.
On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed and those who were not present on the
November 2 session were made to vote on the motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor; one abstained and none voted against.
Accordingly, the petitioner prays that a judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held
by respondents on November 2, 1987 as null and void and holding his election as Speaker of the
Assembly valid and subsisting.
Pending further proceedings, this Court received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook expelling petitioner from the membership of the Sanggunian on the grounds, among other
things, that petitioner had caused the payment of the “salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who
was considered resigned” and with no showing that a request to that effect was ever made, that
"such action constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," that the petitioner "had
recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-
payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," and that he had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
petition had become "moot and academic". The respondents claim that the Sangguniang Pampook(s)
are "autonomous," hence, the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike
down their acts.
ISSUES
154
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot
and academic;
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts?/ What is the extent of self-government given to the
two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
3. Whether or not petitioner's removal as Speaker is valid
HELD:
1. No. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and
academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. While we
have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require
notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, it does not appear herein
that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft
and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity
to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations
that cannot warrant expulsion.
Secondly, access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless the
recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by PD

1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy" in the two regions "within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein. It requires the autonomous
regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions,"
except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government.” In relation to the central government, it provides that "the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions."
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of
the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
155
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in

the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of

Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that
is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. PD 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made
to discharge chiefly administrative services. Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
3. The November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.
It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides likewise
that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals. But the Court
agrees with the respondents that the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15,
198 was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when
arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally since
clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker
could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date
session opens under the same Rules. A recess cannot be validly declared without a session having
been first opened. Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session.
But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter
whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to
(1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof.
156
Lopez, Sherlyn
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY

GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY,
AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870, 26 June 2012
It is the policy of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
FACTS
Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic

corporation. Respondent Province of Aklan (respondent Province) is a political subdivision of the
government created pursuant to Republic Act No. 1414, represented by Honorable Carlito S.
Marquez, the Provincial Governor (Governor Marquez).
Governor Marquez of Province of Aklan through the authorization of Sanggunian

Panlalawigan file an application before the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim
about 2.64 hectares of land along the foreshores of Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay,
Province of Aklan for commercial purposes.
Barangay Caticlan filed an opposition as the proposed foreshore lease practically covered
almost all the coastlines of said barangay, thereby technically diminishing its territorial jurisdiction,
once granted, and depriving its constituents of their statutory right of preference in the development
and utilization of the natural resources within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, Municipality of Malay
expressed its strong opposition to the intended foreshore lease applicationmanifesting therein that
respondent Provinces foreshore lease application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit,
at the expense of the local government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful
entity to develop, utilize and reap benefits from the natural resources found within its jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ
of Continuing Mandamus. The Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO).
The Petition is premised on the ground that the reclamation project is co-located within
environmentally critical areas i.e. Barangay Caticlan and Municipality of Malay requiring full
impact assessment. And that the Respondent province failed to obtain the endorsement of the LGU
concerned.
ISSUE
Whether public consultation for the project with the LGUs concerned is necessary.
HELD
Yes. It is the policy of the State to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology. The State also wants to achieve a balance between socio-economic
development and environmental protection.Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two
requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
157
In this case, both prior public consultation and approval of Municipality of Malay and
Barangay Caticlan are missing. The proposal of the reclamation shall be enjoined.
158
Mangahas, Bethany
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO v. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his
capacity as mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014
The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so.
FACTS
On November 20, 2011, during the incumbency of former Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana,
and its adjoining areas from industrial II to commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were given
six months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their
businesses" Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction were
issued in favor of the oil depot operators.
On 14 May 200 9, during the incumbency of Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended,
rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027 Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 , and all
other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the operation oil
depots. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is
invalid and unconstitutional.
HELD
YES. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city" subject to
the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.According to the Court, the same public interest that governed their decision in
G.R. 156052 should be applied here. The oil depot remained to be a threat to the life, security, and
safety of the constituents of Manila. Its stay would clearly violate the constitutionally protected
rights of the residents. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil
depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
159
Creation, Conversion, Abolition
Marasigan, Mariella
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, Jr. in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
G.R. No. 103328, 19 October 1992
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated
by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would
participate in the plebiscite.
FACTS
Pursuant to R.A. No. 7155 which approved the creation of Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in
the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of several barangays; the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 2312, which gave the guidelines of the plebiscite to be
conducted on December 15, 1991 in the areas or units affected and the remaining areas which will be
affected.
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890
votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a
majority of votes.
Petitioner, as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on
December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. He contends that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that
the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the
12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui,
San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa.
Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother
unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
To support his stand, he argued that with the approval and ratification of the 1987
Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied
upon by respondent COMELEC is now passé, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive
Secretary which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of
the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite. Thus, he asserts that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution and rejecting the proposed
creation of Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution

No. 2312 and rejecting the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
HELD
160
NO. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs.
COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our
ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished
colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of
a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such
political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, the Court
conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2312.
161
Marcelino, Kristen
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ et al. v. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his

capacity as Executive Secretary, et al.
G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance
certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty
Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the
Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.
FACTS
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Public hearings on HB No.
8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government and on January 28, 1994, HB
No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No.
1243, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component
City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
A little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the
said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation
that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was
on all fours with SB No. 1243.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading
and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President
on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When
a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, mainly because the Act allegedly did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.Petitioners also claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city
because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its
conversion into a city.
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting
the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991
constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty
Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
ISSUES
162
1. Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion
into an independent component city, and
2. Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
HELD
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the funds generated from local taxes, IRAs
and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are
used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the
Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit,
among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered
items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be
all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without
need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.They thus constitute income
which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the
income. Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 3593correctly encapsulizes the full import of the
above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by
provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the
internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code,
but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others.
As to the second issue, in the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section
24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should,
by constitutional prescription,originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No.
1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB
No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB
No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB
No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
163
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et

al.,
G.R. NO. 189793, 7 April 2010
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed
FACTS
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen
(15) days following its publication. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
ISSUE
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province
HELD
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. Before
a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a
violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is
to sustain.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second
sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement
for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
164
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a

representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at
least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least
a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet
a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
165
Navarro, Jessica
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and

MINERVA ALDABA MORADA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: Any province that
may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
FACTS
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos1cralaw and the
municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591
lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the
city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill
No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos
City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no
dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will
be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending
that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for
a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
WON the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected,
for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010
elections.
HELD
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated
Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The
Certification states that the population of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The
Certification further states that it was "issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the
City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional
district of the Province of Bulacan."
The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda
is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states
that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that
intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no
showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a
certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this
166
Court.Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78%
per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of
Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August
2007.9cralaw Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as
of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069
as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010. All these conflict with what the
Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the
Certifications own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000
before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for
individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces. Executive Order No. 135
cannot simply be brushed aside.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: Any province that
may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There
is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of
250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.Clearly, there is no official
record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to
the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such
population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight
of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts." Compliance with
constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the "aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts."
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591

UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
167
Pagalilauan, Gerome
NAVARRO v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050
A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office
FACTS
The President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from
both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355
for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and
rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
Movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of
the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the
said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
Movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing several rulings of the Court,
allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be
filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.
The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory.
168
ISSUE
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD
Yes.
The Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-pledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation
of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province,
they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
169
Pagtalunan, Maylen
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951, 12 April 2011
FACTS
57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the
House of Representatives during the Eleventh Congress,. However, Congress acted on only 33 bills.
R.A. No. 9009 was enacted revising the Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from ₱20 million annual income to ₱100
million locally generated income in the Twelfth Congress. In the thirteenth Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The cityhood bills contained provision exempting
the particular municipality from the ₱100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign the cityhood bills which thereafter lapsed into
laws.
Petitioners filed to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.
HELD
No. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
The Court declared that we should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by
the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also
complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009.
Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the Congress with respect to the
considerable disparity between the income requirement of ₱20 million under the Local Government
Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the ₱100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A.
No. 9009 were definitively articulated in the interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there
were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th Congress prior to the
adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, including the municipalities covered by the
Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157
occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were
then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No.
9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate.
The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having
generated the threshold income of ₱100 million from local sources, including those already converted
into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the
Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from
170
Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent,
i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding
because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in
Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the
income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly
envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be
arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local
government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger
share in the national coffers than other local government unit.
171
ANGEL G. NAVAL v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA

G.R. No. 207851, 8 July 2014, EN BANC (Reyes, J.)
The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate
themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen’s equal access
to public service. These are the restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help
ensure the continued vitality of our republican institutions.
FACTS
From 2005 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, petitioner Angel G. Naval (Naval) had been elected and
served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act No. 9176, which reapportioned the
legislative districts of Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out 10 towns were taken from the old Second
District to form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two
remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. She served until 2013. She ran anew and was reelected as Member of the Sanggunian,
Third District in 2013 elections.
Private respondent Nelson B. Julia (Julia) was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate
from the Third District in the 2013 elections. He invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had full served the entire Province of
Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the
district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to
the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Accordingly, allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is
violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which
must be strictly construed.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division cancelled Naval’s COC for: (1)
having been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) fully
serving three consecutive terms. Undaunted, Naval appealed the said Decision to the COMELEC En
Banc which denied both his appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. It ratiocinated that
the conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the case as the records
clearly establish that Naval is running for the 4th time for the same government post.
Unperturbed, Naval elevated the case before the Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Commission on Elections gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
HELD
172
NO. The drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if
there would be no limit to reelection. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences, on whether the
term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only
three consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can
once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her election.
The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few,
while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are
worthy to be called statesmen. The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was
a result of exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant.
Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called
for.
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. The
aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The
basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number
of registered voters therein.
The words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District is to be created, but
the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers mean what they say. The verb create means to “make or produce
something new.” A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the
lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current Third District.
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District
from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This
numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the
old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are
elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and
fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
173
Pura, Valentin V
BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Jaraula sponsored a house bill to
increase CDO's legislative district from one to two. The bill became Republic Act 9371. Hence, for the
May 2007 elections, the constituents of each district (classified depending on their place of residence)
would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.
Respondents argued that RA 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City.
ISSUE
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a
local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de
Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened
here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for
its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000
of the city’s population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now
services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
174
Ramo, Keif Khari M.
Alvarez vs Guingona
G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996
DOCTRINE/S:
 A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law
and possessedof substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,
the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only
at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
 Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
 The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
FACTS
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included
Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was
referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations
on May 5, 1993.
Public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The
committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, in December 9, 1993. A few
days thereafter, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and
was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243 (entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago")
was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May
19, 1993, just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No.
8817.
A little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee
on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. The said committee submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No.
1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by
signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government.
Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third
Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised
of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
175
The enrolled bill, was signed by the Chief Executive as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on
the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor
of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual
income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required
annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners
having computed Santiago's average annual income. In arriving at the average annual income, the
amounts for internal revenue allotments (IRAs) for the last two (2) consecutive years were deducted
from the total income for the last two (2) consecutive years.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 mainly because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE
Can Santiago qualify into a component city?
HELD
YES.
The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs
Petitioners contend that the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is
allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation.
It is their position that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the
national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing.
Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the
income of Local Government Units.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision
of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated,
enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit
is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and
effectively carry out its functions.Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in
every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the
right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the
general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes
176
of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations.As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of
the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is
defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming
the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit.They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance
certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty
Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the
income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a
basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct
from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces,
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but
exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others"
177
Revadillo, Clarence
UMALI v. COMELEC
723 SCRA 170 (2014)
FACTS
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.
183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of

the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized
city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said
plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern
Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted
were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should
be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city,
the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase
“qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the
qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component
city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various
adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only
in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB),
by a vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-
0925.
ISSUE
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in
Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC).
HELD
Entire province of Nueva Ecija
178
The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will
come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of
independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance
from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”
179
NAVARRO v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050, 10 February 2010 (Peralta, J.)
The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
FACTS
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
However, on December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the

mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government
Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
Thereafter, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355
for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and
rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
The movants-intervenors raised three main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of
the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of
two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
As such, the movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment.
They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet
existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
proceedings in this case.
The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
180
ISSUE
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation
of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province,
they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should
not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
181
ARNOLD D. VICENCIO v. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, et al.

G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012
There is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance
granting it.
FACTS
On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM),
presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City
Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled "An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay
Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the
Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern x x x."
Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner Vicencio was elected City Vice-
Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at
the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat. Similarly, petitioner Vicencio entered into
Contracts for Consultancy Services and appropriated funds for it under the Legislative Secretariat.
Respondent Zosa issued Notice of Disallowance based on the findings that there was no
authority for the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005. City
Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 which was used as basis of authority to hire
consultants specifically authorized the former Vice-MayorYambao to enter into a contract for
consultancy services in the Sangguniang Secretariat covering the period June to December 2003
only.
ISSUE
Whether public respondent Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion when
it affirmed the disallowance of disbursements concerning the services rendered by hired consultants
for the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Malabon.
HELD
NO. Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the following are the
powers and duties of a city vice-mayor:
SECTION 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. – (a) The city vice-mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants
drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the
sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and
employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the
event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in
cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code; and
182
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may
be prescribed by law or ordinance.
(b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-eight (28) for a highly urbanized city and Salary Grade twenty-six (26) for a
component city, as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued
pursuant thereto.
Under this provision, therefore, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-
mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city
mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly
circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-
Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given
under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a
"continuing authority" for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into
subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
183
GAMBOA, Jr. v. AGUIRRE, Jr.,

G.R. No. 134213, 20 July 1999.
It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the “powers and duties” of the Office of the
Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only “acts” as the Governor but does not “become”
the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive
does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.
FACTS
Sometime in August, 1995, the Governor of Negros Occidental designated Vice-Governor

Romeo Gamboa, Jr. as Acting Governor for the duration of his official trip abroad until his return.
Later, when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) held its regular session, respondent members
thereof questioned the authority of Gamboa to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting
Governor. When the court declared Gamboa temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the
sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor, Gamboa filed this petition for
review.
ISSUE
May an incumbent ViceGovernor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to

preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
HELD
It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the “powers and duties” of the Office of
the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only “acts” as the Governor but does not
“become” the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief
Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor.
Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely
becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the
higher office. But the problem is, while in such capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the
sessions of the SP?
This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the
Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet
this term should be reasonably construed to mean “effective” absence, that is, one that renders the
officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office. By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the
designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.
Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent
vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the
event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. This is so because in the eyes of the law, the
office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of
the office of the Vice-Governor.
184
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise
the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear
rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already
been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates
a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as
Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of
the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for
the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code—concerning the
election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-Governor)
powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section
49(b), “(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.”
185
Tandoc, John Karol
CORDILLERA BOARD COALITION v.COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 79956, 29 January 1990
FACTS
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220which created the (Cordillera

Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an
organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province
and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Its main functions are the following:
1. to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive
departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region.
2. Monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region [sec. 20].
3. Establishment of the Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a

Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in
the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act
and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
ISSUE
Whether or not Execitive Order No. 220 is constitutional
HELD
YES
We have carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the
conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded.
186
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to
the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation
of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. Namely:
1.A regional consultative commission shall first be created.

2.The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a
list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies.
3.The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous
region.
4.The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within
eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law.
5.Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.
Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras"
We find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a
region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating
the planning and implementation of programs and services.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure,
nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial
and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not
have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested
with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued,
the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As
stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new.1âwphi1 The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the
law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased
to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional
187
offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies,
plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to
provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with
regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
[See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the
local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about
the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the
offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the
line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything
else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These
councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to
accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this
wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development
council.
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art.
X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
188
KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 196271, 18 October 2011
The ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
FACTS
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Two years after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution RA No. 6734 was enacted being the organic act that established
the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054
amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November
26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates
of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. However on June 30, 2011, Republic Act
(RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for
Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide
with the regular national and local elections of the country.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 10153 is constitutional.
HELD
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153.
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the
synchronization of national and local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot
question the manner by which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In passing RA No. 10153, acted
strictly within its constitutional mandate. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a
positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. The Court finds no reason to accord merit to the
petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
189
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government.
Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article
wholly devoted to Local Government.
190
Local Governance
RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-53766, 30 October 1981
Evidently, the lawmaker in requiring that the municipality should be represented in its court
cases by a government lawyer like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the
municipality should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also
assumed that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles
its litigations.
FACTS
This case is about the legality of a municipality’s hiring of private counsel to file a suit in its
behalf. The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, through the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia
(now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza & Alday), sued in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan Marciano
Domingo, Leonila Guzman, Maria C. Ramos and Consorcio Cruz for the recovery of its 74-hectare
fishpond.
It was alleged that the municipality had obligated itself to pay Cruz Durian & Academia as
attorney’s fees not less than twenty percent of the amount to be recovered by the plaintiff.
The provincial fiscal of Bulacan and the municipal attorney of Hagonoy entered their
appearance as counsel for the municipality with the manifestation that its private counsel would be
under the control and supervision of those officials. Notwithstanding that appearance, Domingo and
Maria C. Ramos (lessee and sublessee of the fishpond) moved to disqualify the Cruz law firm from
serving as counsel of the municipality.
The trial court denied the motion. It found that Angel Cruz, the head of the law firm,
volunteered to act as counsel for the municipality because he desired to serve his native town.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cruz law firm may act as counsel for the municipality in collaboration with
the fiscal and the municipal attorney
HELD
No. The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a
private law firm does not legalize the latter’s representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil
Case No. 5095-M. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous arrangement
is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff. Section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as complemented by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing
that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a municipality in its
lawsuits. That provision is mandatory.
The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing private counsel in its
lawsuits is further implemented by section 3 of theLocal Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264,
which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a
municipality, “shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise
such powers as may be assigned to him by the council.” The municipal attorney is paid out of
191
municipal funds (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 5185, Decentralization Act of 1967). He can represent the
municipality even without the fiscal’s collaboration (Calleja vs. Court of Appeals, L-22501, July 31,
1967, 20 SCRA 895). Evidently, the lawmaker in requiring that the municipality should be
represented in its court cases by a government lawyer like its municipal attorney and the provincial
fiscal intended that the municipality should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private
lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the municipality would be best protected if
a government lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the
fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the municipality’s interests and that, as civil service
employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty.
The questioned-ruling of the two courts also contravenes settled jurisprudence. Applying
section 1683, it was held that the municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
192
Onia, Steven Ralph S.

MANCENIDO v. CA
G.R. NO. 118605
Where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to
redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.
FACTS
On September 6, 1990, private respondent [herein petitioner] Eduardo Mancenido filed an

action for mandamus and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte, Branch 38,
Daet (docketed as Civil Case No. 5864), against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte,
the school board, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the
teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases.
On December 19, 1990, petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed their answer to the
complaint.
On December 20, 1993, the lower court rendered a decision ordering the Provincial School
Board to appropriate and satisfy plaintiffs' claim in the amount of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary
increases.
On February 21, 1994, petitioners [herein co-respondents] filed a notice of appeal.
On February 24, 1994, respondent judge issued an order giving due course to petitioners'
appeal.
On March 1, 1994, private respondents filed a notice of appeal.
On the same date, private respondents filed an opposition to petitioners' notice of appeal and
a motion for partial execution of judgment.
On April 8, 1994, respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23,
1994, granting the appeal of petitioners, (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3)
granting their motion for partial execution.
On April 14, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 8, 1994.
On June 1, 1994, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition.
and injunction with the Court of Appeals with the prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal
be given due course and the trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of its
judgment. Said petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34331.
Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for prohibition and mandamus and hereby
orders respondent judge. (1) to elevate the original record of Civil Case No. 5864 to the Court
of Appeals in due course of appeal; and (2) to desist from the partial execution of the decision
in the case.
No costs.
193
SO ORDERED. hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N The Court of Appeals has erred in recognizing the authority of Atty. Jose Lapak to file
the subject Notice of Appeal.
HELD
No, Sec. 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the
appointment of a legal officer, whose function is:
(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein
the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided,
That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;
The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a private
attorney. In Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held
that only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire
the services of a special attorney. We reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169
(1972). In Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960), we enumerated the instances when the
provincial public prosecutor is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, i.e., when
the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when the
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the
same province, and when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse,
or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise.
But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC,
Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in
resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action
filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be
considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 192 Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the representation by private
counsel of a provincial governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint contained other
allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by
them in their private capacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we
declared that where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right
to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.
194
QUISUMBING v. GOV. GARCIA

G.R. No. 175527, 8 December 2008, EN BANC (TINGA, J.)
Prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive
may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit.
FACTS
Gabriel Luis Quisumbing (Quisumbing), Estrella P. Yapha, Victoria G. Corominas, and Raul
D. Bacaltos (Bacaltos), collectively petitioners, assail the Decision of the RTC of Cebu City, which
declared that under the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, and the Government
Procurement Reform Act, respondent Cebu Provincial Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia (Gov. Garcia),
need not secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan before entering into
contracts committing the province to monetary obligations.
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the period
ending December 2004. Its audit team rendered a report, Part II of which states: "Several contracts
in the total amount of P102,092,841.47 were not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan
resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22
of R.A. No. 7160."
Alleging that the infrastructure contracts subject of the audit report complied with the
bidding procedures provided under R.A. No. 9184 and were entered into pursuant to the general
and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Gov.
Garcia alleged that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary.
ISSUE
Whether or not prior approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was required before Gov.
Garcia could have validly entered into the questioned contracts
HELD
As it clearly appears from the foregoing provision, prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit.
Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local
chief executive to make disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the
annual or supplemental appropriations. The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that
which enacts the local government unit’s budget, for which reason no further authorization from the
local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization of the
budget.
To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render
the requirement of prior sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would
be no instance when such prior authorization would be required, as in contracts involving the
disbursement of appropriated funds. Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had in mind when
it required, as a condition to the local chief executive’s representation of the local government unit in
business transactions, the prior authorization of the sanggunian concerned. The requirement was
deliberately added as a measure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief
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executive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local government unit are
wielded as much by its chief executive as by its council.
The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a reenacted budget in 2004 lent a
complexion to this case which the trial court did not apprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides
that in case of a reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing
positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the
annual and supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and
disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith."
196
Angeles, George II
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et. al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al.

G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005
Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the project's implementation is illegal.
FACTS
On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), which provides in part:The DENR agrees to immediately allow the utilization by the MMCof
its land property located at Pintong Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site.
It turns out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation Area as per CENRO Investigation Report.It also appears that as per record, there was
no permit issued to the MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes.It is further
observed that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and
environmental factors in this community.
Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies
aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and
issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995, "Excluding from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and
Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority."
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Pending the resolution of the case, on 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA that
caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos Highway to stop the dump
trucks from reaching the site for five successive days from 16 January 1999. On the second day of the
barricade, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the
rally, and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province. As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreed to abandon
the dumpsite after six months. Thus, the municipal mayors of Rizal, particularly the mayors of
Antipolo and San Mateo, agreed to the use of the dumpsite until that period, which would end on 20
July 1999.
On 13 July 1999, the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early Resolution in
anticipation of violence between the conflicting parties as the date of the scheduled closure of the
dumpsite neared.On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the
gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence would erupt among the
parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 December 2000.
197
On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local

Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite
"in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical
and imminent health and sanitation epidemic."Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No.
9003, otherwise known as "The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000," was signed into
law by President Estrada.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Local Government Code gives the local government units all the
necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants
HELD
Yes.The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates Rep. Act
No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of
the state "to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions." Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be
implemented by governmentauthorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporaryrestraining order, Director
Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals
that they had conducted the required consultations. However, he added that "(t)his is the problem,
sir, the officials we may have been talking with at the time this was established may no longer be
incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing
dialogue.” The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, at the height of
the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all
the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact fulfilling their
mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows every local government unit to "exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare," which involve, among other things, "promot(ing) health and safety,
enhance(ing) the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants."
In Lina , Jr. v. Paño, we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate
local government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or
ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project's
implementation is illegal.
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BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF AKLAN

G.R. No. 196870, 26 June 2012
Two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
FACTS
Gov. Carlito Marquez of the Province of Aklan was authorized by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to file an application before the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim a
portion of the Caticlan foreshore, which is a strait away from Boracay, for commercial purposes. The
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan
registered their opposition, arguing that no public consultation was made prior to the approval of the
Province of Aklan’s application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), which is a
prerequisite for the reclamation. Thereafter, the Municipality of Malay and Barangay Caticlan filed
for a Temporary Environmental Protection Order.
ISSUE
Whether prior public consultation with all stakeholders is mandatory before a national
project affecting the environment may be made.
HELD
YES. Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects
implementation is illegal.In fact, the prior public consultation is necessary so that the environmental
concerns of all stakeholders could be taken into account in the Environmental Impact Assessment,
which in turn, is required before an ECC is issued and a national project is undertaken.The claim of
respondent DENR-EMB RVI is that no permits and/or clearances from National Government
Agencies (NGAs) and LGUs are required pursuant to the DENR Memorandum Circular No. 2007-
08. However, we still find that the LGC requirements of consultation and approval apply in this
case. This is because a Memorandum Circular cannot prevail over the Local Government Code,
which is a statute and which enjoys greater weight under our hierarchy of laws.
It is the policy of the State to “protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature”, and to strike a rational and
orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.
The primordial role of local government units under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991, Section 2 (Declaration of Policy) is to “enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.”
In this case, since the Municipality of Malay and Barangay Caticlan were not consulted prior
to the issuance of the ECC and prior to the approval of the project by the PRA, the implementation of
the reclamation project must be enjoined.
199
Balonkita, Christa
RIMANDO v. NAGUILAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER

GR No. 198860, 23 July 2012
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the
same is a delegated police power, hence discretionary in nature
FACTS
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before
Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing
Center, Inc., against Abraham P. Rimando who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting
mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.
The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue
a business permit in favor of the respondent.
Respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly
belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent
had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008,
the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding
fees therefor.
The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to
signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the
petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether or not a mayor can be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit
HELD
NO. a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise
of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement
of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor where a determination was made on the nature
of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code,viz:
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the
respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the
delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be
deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is
within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus
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Guevarra, Jhaypee
ABRAHAM RIMANDO v. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., represented by

its President, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 198860, 23 July 2012, (Reyes, J.)
FACTS
It is a petition for mandamusto compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of
the respondent and damages filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by
Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Llarenas against Rimando
who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La
Union.
The respondent had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007.
On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and
paid the corresponding fees therefor.
The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to
signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the
petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for mandamus.
ISSUE
Whether the Mayor may be compelled to issue business permit by way of Mandamus
HELD
NO. A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the
pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor where a determination was
made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government
Code. Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides that the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is
pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Accordingly, Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated
police power to local governments.1âwphi1 Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that
the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law
or ordinance. As it is delegated, , the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the
question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of
certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
201
LA CARLOTA CITY v. ATTY. REX ROJO

G.R. No. 181367, 24 April 2012
Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to
break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the
presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a member of
the Sanggunian.
FACTS
On March 10, 1994, Rojo, a member of the Sanggunian Panlungsod (SP) of La Carlota City,
applied for the vacant position of SP Secretary. On the March 17, 2004 session of the SP, Rojo
tendered his irrevocable resignation as SP Member. At that time, Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon
(Jalandoon), as presiding officer, and six members of a twelve-member sanggunian were present.
On March 18, 2004, Jalandoon appointed Rojo as SP Secretary and the latter immediately
took his oath of office. On March 26, 2004, the appointment ban for the May 2004 elections took
effect. On April 27, 2004, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Field-Office disapproved Rojos
appointment due to incomplete requirements. Jalandoon appealed the disapproval to the CSC
Regional Office.
The 2004 elections resulted in changes in the La Carlota local government. The newly elected
Mayor and Vice-Mayor of La Carlota City sought to affirm the disapproval of Rojos appointment,
alleging that there had been no quorum when Rojo tendered his resignation before the SP. Since
Rojos resignation could not have been validly accepted for lack of quorum, it was argued that Rojo
continued to be an elective official who was ineligible for appointment to a public office under the
Constitution.
ISSUES
Whether the appointment of respondent as sangguniang panlungsod secretary violated the

constitutional proscription against eligibility of an elective official for appointment during his tenure
Whether respondents appointment as sangguniang panlungsod secretary was issued
contrary to existing civil service rules and regulations.
HELD
Petitioners insist that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
should not be counted in determining whether a quorum exists. Excluding the vice-mayor, there
were only six (6) out of the twelve (12) members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod who were present
on 17 March 2004. Since the required majority of seven (7) was not reached to constitute a quorum,
then no business could have validly been transacted on that day including the acceptance of
respondents irrevocable resignation.
Under RA 7160, the city vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of

the SangguniangPanlungsod, thus:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of
the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal
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vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay. The
presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of the
city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members,
the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of
the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as
members.
Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to
break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the
presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a member of
the Sanggunian.
In this case, the SangguniangPanlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed

of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of
thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least
seven (7) members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7)
members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of
respondent was validly accepted.
On the issue that respondents appointment was issued during the effectivity of the election
ban, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that
since the respondents appointment was validly issued on 18 March 2004, then the appointment did
not violate the election ban period which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Indeed, the Civil Service
Commission found that despite the lack of signature and certification of the Human Resource
Management Officer of La Carlota City on respondents appointment papers, respondents
appointment is deemed effective as of 18 March 2004 considering that there was substantial
compliance with the appointment requirements.
203
Castillo, Jepthah
AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF AKLA N
LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.
FACTS
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land
Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the DENR. The Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was
within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no
action was ever taken by the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, ordering the closure and
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the
hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding
with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal
mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of
illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
HELD
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which
can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident, its location and
not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed
in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As
such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government
Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
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demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments.
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Term and Tenure
Dator, Peter Paul

BORJA v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 133495 (1998)
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office — he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
FACTS
On January 18, 1988, Capco was elected as vice-mayor of Pateros. Almost two years into his
term, he unexpectedly assumed the role of the mayor because of the incumbent mayor’s (Cesar Borja)
death. Following his stint as mayor by operation of law, Capco successively ran for mayor in the next
two elections. He won both times.
This case deals with the dispute that arose after Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for the
same position (mayor of Pateros). The source of the controversy is the petition for disqualification
that a fellow candidate and herein petitioner, Benjamin Borja, filed.
Borja’s primary contention was that Capco had already served for three consecutive terms
and was thus ineligible for candidacy (term that he took over from Borja after the latter’s death plus
the two terms for which he was elected). Further, Borja argued that the fact that Capco became
mayor the first time around by virtue of political succession because the rationale of the successive-
term limit is to prevent the monopolization of power. Capco would eventually win the election.4
The COMELEC (en banc) upheld the eligibility of Capco. It was of the opinion that Capco’s
succession to the position of Cesar Borja by reason of the latter’s death did not count insofar as the
three-successive term limit imposed by law is concerned.
ISSUE
WON Capco is ineligible by reason of serving three consecutive terms despite the fact that
his first term arose by virtue of succession.
HELD
NO (i.e., he is eligible)
In order for the term limit to apply, two things must concur:
1. Third successive term fully served

2. Elected for all three terms
4 Relevant provisions:
o Article X, §8 of the Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
o LGC, SEC. 43. Term of Office — (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected x x x
206
The Court was quick to point out that the prevention of the monopolization of power was the
only consideration of the framers (of the constitution) when they imposed the successive-term limit.
The other concurrent consideration for such provision was the enhancement of choice, as regards
elective officials, of the voters. Hence, whether or not the term limit would apply turned not only
actual years spent in office but also upon the manner in which an elective official came to occupy a
particular position.
Hence, according to the Court, the two considerations may be reduced to the following factors:
1. Service of term – derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office
2. Election – derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those
whom they wish to govern them be preserved
The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he
was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply
207
Del Mundo, Angelo Raphael
LONZANIDA v. COMELEC
G. R. No. 135150, 28 July 1999
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
FACTS
Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran
for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his then opponent Juan
Alvez who filed an election protest before the RTC, which declared a failure of elections and that the
office of the mayor was declared vacant. Upon appeal to the COMELEC, the COMELEC, after a
revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed CoC for mayor of San Antonio. His
opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San
Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post. COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.
ISSUE
Whether or not Lonzanida’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from
May 1995-March 1998 can be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the
three-term limit for elective local government officials?
HELD
NO. The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of
barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the
case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr. where the issue raised was whether a
vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the
incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have served a term
in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. The Court pointed out that from the
discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the
premise that the official’s assumption of office is by reason of election.
Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the
COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as
a result of election. The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars
“such officials” from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that
“voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” The term served must
therefore be one “for which the the official concerned was elected.” The purpose of the provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.” This
Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
208
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, Lonzanida
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections
and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The second sentence of the
constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
he was elected. “The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent
the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Lonzanida vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral terms.
209
Del Prado, Darren Joseph
SOCRATES v. COMELEC
G. R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition.
FACTS
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three
consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which
Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings
and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates
sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE
WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for
mayor in the recall election.
HELD
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.”
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.”
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-
term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after
the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following
the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
210
covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution

prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-
election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in
the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-
election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run
in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits
is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001.
211
Onia, Steven Ralph

MENDOZA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation
would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to
uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the
votes cast.
FACTS
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:
a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994
and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the
May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as
governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included
in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
HELD
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the
balance of the latter's term of office. The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before
the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily
gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being
unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one
term” for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term
in reckoning the,three-term,limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected
local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall
election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the
office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in
212
1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of
Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was
actually only his third term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in
effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes
cast.
213
Evangelista, Kevin
LATASA v. COMELEC
FACTS
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was
declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. This event marked the end of
petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of
the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of
Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May
14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had
already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running
for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in
the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
that petitioner was ineligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been elected
and served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor from 1992 to 2001.
Petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he was able to fully disclose that he had
served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Such fact, according to him,
does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will be
the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Respondent COMELEC issued a Resolution declaring that the respondent’s certificate of

candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which remained unacted upon until the day of the
elections, May 14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed a Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or
Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins
the Elections. Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001,
having garnered the most number of votes.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor
of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of
the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos.
HELD
214
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those
who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it
limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
Latasa was correct that the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief
executive for nine years.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the
May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by
reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did
involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor,
he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a
short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief
executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception
to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after
having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as
chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred
by it
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
215
Ibanez, Abigail
ONG v. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 163354, 23 January 2006
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
FACTS
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the
COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on
the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998,
and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties
thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.
HELD
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms. With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein,
thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been
duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and
serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein
controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that
Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the
1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not
Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term
limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term,
and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by
the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected
and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. Petitioner Francis
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation
was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule.
216
Petition Dismissed
217
ALDOVINO, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009
The intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms.
Preventive suspension is the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation
FACTS
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September
2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90
days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners)
sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had
been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour holding
that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for
the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Said rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete
service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. The
COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling. Hence, the present petition
seeking to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling.
ISSUES
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-

term limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in
Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD
1. No.Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive

suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term.
The intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
218
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. Significantly, this provision
refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which an official has title to office and
can serve. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a
fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred
from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term
of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is
one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. The "voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official’s voluntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of
the exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension
being only one of them.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or
at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official

who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates
the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability. While a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This
was what exactly happened to Asilo.
To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary – some of them personal and some
of them by operation of law – that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising
the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness,
inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a
time without forfeiting title to office.
2. Preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary

renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not
the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-
comparable.
219
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not
allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its nature,
does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the
three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider
it an effective interruption of a term.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the
assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to
run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term.
220
Lelay, Lord Bien
DIZON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182088, 30 January 2009
Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
FACTS
Roberto L. Dizon, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is a resident and taxpayer of the

Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is
the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat,

Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same.
Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and
same municipality.
Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same
position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Under the said provision, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms for the same position.
The present case covers a situation wherein we have previously ruled that Morales had been
elected to the same office and had served three consecutive terms, and wherein we disqualified and
removed Morales during his fourth term. In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as
mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June
2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from
his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court
previously ruled that Morales' proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no
interruption of the continuity of Morales' service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the
trial court's ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Dizon claims that Morales is currently serving his fifth term as mayor.
In its Resolution dated 27 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division resolved to deny the
instant Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Petition for the Disqualification of
Marino P. Morales for lack of merit. Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
ISSUE
Whether the 2007-2010 term is really Morales' fifth term.
HELD
No. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his
fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales
were considered stray votes.
221
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads: “The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.”
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code restated Article X, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution as follows: “No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.”
For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term
limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times. There
should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales' involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor's office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice
mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales'
continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June
2007.
222
Lintao, Jude
NICASIO BOLOS, Jr. v. COMELEC AND REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE

G.R. No. 184082, 17 March 2009
The three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two
parts: The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term
limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term.
FACTS
Petitioner Nicasio Bolos, Jr. served as Punong Barangay in Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol
for 3 consecutive terms in the years 1994, 1997 and 2002. In May 2004, while he was still holding the
said position, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor and later won.
After his term as municipal councillor ended on October 29, 2007, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Punong Barangay. Respondent opposed such move by filing a petition to disqualify
petitioner arguing that the latter has already served the 3-term limit and therefore, no longer
eligible to run for another term. Respondent further alleged that by assuming the office of the
municipal councillor, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong
Barangay.
However, petitioner claimed that his remaining term of office was unserved when he
assumed office as municipal councillor and that such assumption was by operation of law, hence, it
should be considered an involuntary renunciation on his part.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor.
HELD
YES. The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are
covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office
of barangay officials shall be five (5) years.
The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post;
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner
was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for
disqualification.
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when
he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the
Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office. In this case, petitioner did not fill in or
223
succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office as Punong

Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of
Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
224
Lopez, Sherlyn
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, Sr. v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.

VEGA
G.R. No. 201716, 8 January 2013
FACTS
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the
2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral
contest, Torres seeks to disqualify him due to three-consecutive term limit rule.
Before COMELEC resolve the disqualification case herein private respondent Ernesto R.
Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warrantoto unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised in his petition to disqualify. RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor.
Abundo appealed to COMELEC but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
HELD
No. The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term,
cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section
8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June
2007 term. During the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election
protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term
until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. It cannot be said that
Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
225
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004
until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of
the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the
said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the
May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the
legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be
said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo
actually served less.
226
National Economy and Patrimony
Mangahas, Bethany
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, v. PR BUILDERS, INC.,

G.R. NO. 156364, 25 September 2008
Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the
petitioner when he filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional
proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to
Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the
contract before the execution of the final deed transferring ownership.
FACTS
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst and his spouse, Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell
with PR Builders, Inc. for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse
project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. When PR Builders failed to comply with its verbal
promise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed before the HLURB a complaint for rescission
of contract. HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of spouses Hulst and order to reimburse the
purchase price paid by the complainants to P.R. Builders with damages and attorney’s fees. HLURB
Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution and the Sheriff levied on PR Buikder's 15 parcels of land and sold
it to an auction sale. CA reversed the decision and set aside the levy on the ground that the subject
properties cannot be owned by Hulst being a foreign national.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell is valid.

2. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to reimbursement.
3. Whether or not Hulst is entitled to recover damages and attorney’s fees.
HELD
1. NO. Sec. 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Since
petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from
acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into
by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void.
2. YES. Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the because they are
deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault. In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds
that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract. No suit can be maintained
for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation and where the parties are in pari
delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other. This rule,
however, is subject to exceptions one of which is Uuder Article 1414 which states that,one
who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place
is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid.
3. NO. Hulst is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the
purchase price paid to respondent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no
civil effect. It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. No damages may be
227
recovered on the basis of a void contract. Being nonexistent, the agreement produces no
juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well
as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
228
Marasigan, Mariella
INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL

SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.) v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012
The nationality requirement imposed by the Water Code refers to the privilege "to appropriate
and use water." This, we have consistently interpreted to mean the extraction of water directly from its
natural source. Once removed from its natural source the water ceases to be a part of the natural
resources of the country and may be subject of ordinary commerce and may even be acquired by
foreigners.
FACTS
Respondent, Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is a

government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise
known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA). The EPIRA provided a
framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the
assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive structure,
and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.
Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP)
contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs
in an optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of
existence.
In 2005, PSALM commenced a privatization of the 246-megawatt Angat Hydro-Electric

Power Plant (AHEPP) located in Bulacan. A bidding was commenced it was awarded to K-Water, a
wholly owned Korean corporation.
Petitioners, Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services,
Inc. (IDEALS Inc.) filed a petition in court praying for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction.
One of the contentions of IDEALS was that PSALM clearly violated the constitutional
provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the
Water Code of the Philippines limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at
least 60% Filipino-owned.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acquisition of K-Water of the AHEPP in relation to the constitutional
policy on our natural resources is valid.
HELD
YES. The DOJ has consistently regarded hydropower generation by foreign entities as not
constitutionally proscribed based on the definition of water appropriation under the Water Code.
While the Water Code imposes a nationality requirement for the grant of water permits, the same
refers to the privilege "to appropriate and use water." This should be interpreted to mean the
extraction of water from its natural source (Art. 9, P.D. No. 1067). Once removed therefrom, they
cease to be a part of the natural resources of the country and are the subject of ordinary commerce
229
and may be acquired by foreigners (Op. No. 55, series of 1939). In case of a contract of lease, the
water permit shall be secured by the lessor and included in the lease as an improvement. The water
so removed from the natural source may be appropriated/used by the foreign corporation leasing the
property.
Applied to the instant case, and construed in relation to the earlier-mentioned constitutional
inhibition, it would appear clear that while both waters and geothermal steam are, undoubtedly
"natural resources", within the meaning of Section 2 Article XII of the present Constitution, hence,
their exploitation, development and utilization should be limited to Filipino citizens or corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens, the
utilization thereof can be opened even to foreign nationals, after the same have been extracted from
the source by qualified persons or entities. The rationale is because, since they no longer form part of
the natural resources of the country, they become subject to ordinary commerce.
A contrary interpretation, i.e., that the removed or extracted natural resources would remain
inalienable especially to foreign nationals, can lead to absurd consequences, e.g. that said waters and
geothermal steam, and any other extracted natural resources, cannot be acquired by foreign
nationals for sale within or outside the country, which could not have been intended by the framers
of the Constitution.
The fact that under the proposal, the non-power components and structures shall be retained
and maintained by the government entities concerned is, to us, not only a sufficient compliance of
constitutional requirement of "full control and supervision of the State" in the exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources. It is also an enough safeguard against the evil
sought to be avoided by the constitutional reservation.
Moreover, NPC’s water rights remain an integral aspect of its jurisdiction and control over
the dam and reservoir. That the EPIRA itself did not ordain any transfer of water rights leads us to
infer that Congress intended NPC to continue exercising full supervision over the dam, reservoir
and, more importantly, to remain in complete control of the extraction or diversion of water from the
Angat River. Indeed, there can be no debate that the best means of ensuring that PSALM/NPC can
fulfill the duty to prescribe "safeguards to enable the national government to direct water usage to
protect potable water, irrigation, and all other requirements imbued with public interest" is for it to
retain the water rights over those water resources from where the dam waters are extracted. In this
way, the State’s full supervision and control over the country’s water resources is also assured
notwithstanding the privatized power generation business.
To reiterate, there is nothing in the EPIRA which declares that it is mandatory for PSALM
or NPC to transfer or assign NPC’s water rights to buyers of its multi-purpose hydropower facilities
as part of the privatization process. While PSALM was mandated to transfer the ownership of all
hydropower plants except those mentioned in Sec. 47 (f), any transfer of possession, operation and
control of the multi-purpose hydropower facilities, the intent to preserve water resources under the
full supervision and control of the State is evident when PSALM was obligated to prescribe
safeguards to enable the national government to direct water usage to domestic and other
requirements "imbued with public interest." There is no express requirement for the transfer of
water rights in all cases where the operation of hydropower facilities in a multi-purpose dam
complex is turned over to the private sector.
As the new owner of the AHEPP, K-Water will have to utilize the waters in the Angat Dam
for hydropower generation. Consistent with the goals of the EPIRA, private entities are allowed to
undertake power generation activities and acquire NPC’s generation assets. But since only the
hydroelectric power plants and appurtenances are being sold, the privatization scheme should enable
the buyer of a hydroelectric power plant in NPC’s multi-purpose dam complex to have beneficialuse
230
of the waters diverted or collected in the Angat Dam for its hydropower generation activities, and at
the same time ensure that the NPC retains full supervision and control over the extraction and
diversion of waters from the Angat River.
In fine, the Court rules that while the sale of AHEPP to a foreign corporation pursuant to the
privatization mandated by the EPIRA did not violate Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which
limits the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the full supervision
and control of the State or the State’s undertaking the same through joint venture, co-production or
production sharing agreements with Filipino corporations 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens, the stipulation in the Asset Purchase Agreement and Operations and Maintenance
Agreement whereby NPC consents to the transfer of water rights to the foreign buyer, K-Water,
contravenes the aforesaid constitutional provision and the Water Code.1âwphi1
Section 6, Rule 23 of the IRR of EPIRA, insofar as it ordered NPC’s water rights in multi-
purpose hydropower facilities to be included in the sale thereof, is declared as merely directoryand
not an absolute condition in the privatization scheme. In this case, we hold that NPC shall continue
to be the holder of the water permit even as the operational control and day-to-day management of
the AHEPP is turned over to K-Water under the terms and conditions of their APA and O & M
Agreement, whereby NPC grants authority to K-Water to utilize the waters diverted or collected in
the Angat Dam for hydropower generation. Further, NPC and K-Water shall faithfully comply with
the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Agreement on Water Protocol, as well as with such
other regulations and issuances of the NWRB governing water rights and water usage.
231
Marcelino, Kristen
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al. v. REDMONT

CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580, 21 April 2014
There are two cases in determining the nationality of the Investee Corporation. The first case
is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test and second case is the Strict Rule or
the Grandfather Rule Proper. The Grandfather Rule or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only
when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt
FACTS
Respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation organized

and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the
province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities
where already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners
Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed three separate petitions for denial of the Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners before the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA). On June 15, 2007, petitioners filed a conversion of their MPSA applications to Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs). The POA, in its December 14, 2007 Resolution, observed
this suspect change of applications while the case was pending before it and held:
The filing of the FTAA application is a clear admission that the respondents are not capable
of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need the financial and technical
assistance of a foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the participation of
MBMI Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation only proves the fact that
it is the Canadian company that will provide the finances and the resources to operate the
mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the same and not the Filipino
stockholders who only have a less substantial financial stake in the corporation.
x x x The filing of the FTAA application on June 15, 2007, during the pendency of the case
only demonstrate the violations and lack of qualification of the respondent corporations to
engage in mining. The filing of the FTAA application conversion which is allowed foreign
corporation of the earlier MPSA is an admission that indeed the respondent is not Filipino
but rather of foreign nationality who is disqualified under the laws. Corporate documents of
MBMI Resources, Inc. furnished its stockholders in their head office in Canada suggest that
they are conducting operation only through their local counterparts.
Aggrieved by the Resolution and Order of the POA, McArthur and Tesoro filed a joint Notice
of Appealand Memorandum of Appealwith the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) while Narra
separately filed its Notice of Appealand Memorandum of Appeal. MAB reversed and set aside the
resolution of POA.
Redmont filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered a Decision
which partially granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the Orders of the MAB. In the said
Decision, the CA upheld the findings of the POA that the herein petitioners are in fact foreign
corporations thus a recommendation of the rejection of their MPSA applications were recommended
to the Secretary of the DENR. With respect to the FTAA applications or conversion of the MPSA
applications to FTAAs, the CA deferred the matter for the determination of the Secretary of the
232
DENR and the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
In their Motion for Reconsideration dated October 26, 2010, petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the petition asserting that on April 5, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed and issued in their favor FTAA No. 05-2010-IVB, which rendered the petition moot and
academic. However, the CA, in a Resolution dated February 15, 2011 denied their motion for being a
mere "rehash of their claims and defenses."Standing firm on its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling
that petitioners are, in fact, foreign corporations. In determining the nationality of petitioners, the
CA looked into their corporate structures and their corresponding common shareholders. Using the
grandfather rule, the CA discovered that MBMI in effect owned majority of the common stocks of the
petitioners as well as at least 60% equity interest of other majority shareholders of petitioners
through joint venture agreements. The CA found that through a "web of corporate layering, it is
clear that one common controlling investor in all mining corporations involved x x x is MBMI.”Thus,
it concluded that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are also in partnership with, or privies-in-
interest of, MBMI.
ISSUE
Whether the nationality of the Petitioners are Filipino
HELD
Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation:
the control test and the grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005,
adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other
laws pertaining to the controlling interests in enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural
resources owned by Filipino citizens, provides:
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is

owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the
number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine
nationality.
Under the above-quoted SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the
Investee Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test
in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules
which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which
is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the liberal
Control Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino
stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned
is considered as Filipino. The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and
pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, "but if the
percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number
of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality." Under the
Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the
Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of
Filipino ownership.
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the
second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in
doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with
less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is
233
either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino-
foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the
application of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails
and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in
the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common
investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them.
Petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian
corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is derived from
grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and
adding to the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies statement– –regarding
the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves
SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the "layered" corporations boils
down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has joint venture
agreements with, practically exercising majority control over the corporations mentioned. In effect,
whether looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships between and among the
corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or
more of their capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.
234
Marcelino, Kristen
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al. v.REDMONT

CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580, 9 December 2015
With respect to cases affecting an FTAA's validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-
judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the
point, the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely
exercised a contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action
which should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's proper exercise of a
quasi-judicial function, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is,
perforce, null and void.
FACTS
Redmont separately sought the cancellation and/or revocation of the executed Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) through a Petition dated May 7, 2010 (May 7, 2010
Petition) filed before the Office of the President (OP), docketed as O.P. Case No. 10-E-229. Redmont
asserted, among others, that the FTAA was highly anomalous and irregular, considering that
petitioners Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation, Tesoro Mining and Development,
Inc., and Me Arthur Mining, Inc. and their mother company, MBMI, have a long history of violating
and circumventing the Constitution and other laws, due to their questionable activities in the
Philippines and abroad.
OP granted Redmont's petition. It declared that the OP has the authority to cancel the FTAA
because the grant of exclusive power to the President of the Philippines to enter into agreements,
including FTAAs under Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, or the "Philippine Mining Act of 1995," carries
with it the authority to cancel the same. Thus, finding, inter alia, that petitioners misrepresented
that they were Filipino corporations qualified to engage in mining activities, the OP cancelled and/or
revoked the said FTAA, and, in turn, gave due course to Redmont's EP application.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the OP Ruling. It found no procedural error in the OP's action on the FTAA,
holding that it was done in accordance with the President's power of control over the executive
departments. As to its merits, the CA ruled that the Republic, as represented by the OP, had the
right to cancel the FTAA, even without judicial permission, because paragraph a (iii), Section
17 thereof provides that such agreement may be cancelled by either party on the ground of "any
intentional and materially false statement or omission of facts by a [p]arty.” Accordingly, it
sustained the OP's finding that petitioners committed misrepresentations which warranted the
cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA.
Unperturbed, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed on appeal the OP's cancellation and/or revocation
of the FTAA.
HELD
235
No. Section 68 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that the
cancellation/revocation/termination of an FTAA may only be done after due process. In relation,
Section 77 of RA 7942, to reiterate, provides that the POA has the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to hear and decide mining disputes:
Section. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. - x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear and decide on the following:
a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of
this Act.
The scenario at hand does not involve a complaint for cancellation/revocation commenced
before the ordinary courts of law. Hence, Redmont's recourse to the OP - that, on the assumption
that it even had the legal standing to oppose an already executed FTAA which it was not a party to -
was, by and of itself, done outside the correct course procedure. Observe that RA 7942 and its RIRR
do not state that the OP has the power to take cognizance of a quasi-judicial proceeding involving a
petition for cancellation of an existing FTAA. In fact, there is even no mention of a petition for
cancellation or revocation to be taken by a third party before the OP. While it may be said that the
OP has administrative control or supervision over its subordinate agencies, such as the POA, again
the jurisdiction of that body pertains only to mining disputes, and not those which involve judicial
questions cognizable by the ordinary courts of law
Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an FTAA's validity, the Court holds that the OP
has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of
belaboring the point, the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e., the
Republic. It merely exercised a contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely
administrative action which should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's
proper exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and
its Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary
issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
236
RESIDENT MARINE MAMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON

STRAIT, et al. v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, et al.
G.R. NO. 180771, 21 April 2015
While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract
for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the
Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said
protected seascape.
FACTS
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
(IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for
an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for
the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in
the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both
dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. Whether the case is moot and academic.

2. Whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the
case;
3. Whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws.
HELD
No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-46, the
Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within the exceptions. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues
raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’ contested actions are capable of
repetition.
237
Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of

others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall
contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the
case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish
the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or
furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed
by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”
Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively
applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in
rules of procedure.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the
SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In
Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:
“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered

into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.” (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous

petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President
be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
238
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary
Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were
out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate
the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President
has authorized or approved of the service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.
The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a
guide for the Government when executing service contracts.
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having
been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological
system.
Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no
environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the
seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in
violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource
in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is
a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
239
Navarro, Jessica
CITY OF BAGUIO v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG
GR No.195905, 4 July 2018
The grant or denial of these provisional remedies should not affect their ancestral land claim
as the applicants are not barred from proving their rights in an appropriate proceeding.
FACTS
Private respondents Magdalena Gumangan, Marion T. Pool, Lourdes C. Hermogeno;

Bernardo Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph Basatan, Marcelino Basatan, Josephine Legaspi, and
Lansigan Bawas (Gumangan petition) are the petitioners in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09. In their
petition, filed on 23 July 2009, they prayed that their ancestral lands in the Busol Forest Reserve be
identified, delineated, and recognized and that the corresponding Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT) be issued. In addition, the Gumangan petition sought to restrain the City Government of
Baguio, et al., (petitioners) from enforcing demolition orders and to prevent the destruction of their
residential houses at the Busol Forest Reserve pending their application for identification of their
ancestral lands before the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office. On. the other hand, private respondents
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., Julio Daluyen, Sr., Concepcion Padang, and Carmen Panayo (Ampaguey
petition) are the petitioners in NCIP Case No. 3 l-CAR-09. In their petition, filed on 23 July 2009,
they prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing the demolition orders affecting their
properties inside the Busol Forest Reserve. The Ampaguey Petition claimed that they have pending
applications for their ancestral land claims before the NCIP.
Both the Gumangan and Ampaguey petitions assail that petitioners have no right to enforce
the demolition orders and to evict them from their properties. They aver that their claims over their
ancestral lands are protected and recognized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (JPRA). Proceedings be/ ore the NCIP-CAR In his 27 July 2009 Order,5
public respondent Atty. Brain Masweng (Atty. Masweng), NCIP-CAR Hearing Officer, issued a 72-
Hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the Gumangan petition. On the same date, he issued
another order6 for a 72-Hour TRO on the Ampaguey petition. On 14
August 2009, 'Atty. Masweng issued a writ of preliminary injunction in
NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-097 and 31-CAR-09.
CA: The appellate court elucidated that the present petition constituted forum shopping
because petitioners had a pending motion to dismiss before the NCIP. Further, the CA ruled that the
NCIP had the power to issue the injunctive relief noting that the NCIP did not act with grave abuse
of discretion because the issuances were in accordance with law
ISSUE
WON private respondents' ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by Proclamation No.
15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an injunctive writ.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
Clear legal right and irreparable injury
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding ·prior to

the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is an equitable and extraordinary peremptory remedy to be exercised with
240
caution as it affects the parties' respective rights. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established that: (a) the applicant is entitled to the
relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; (b) the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant ; or ( c) a
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or attempting to do; or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Before the preventive writ may be issued, first and foremost there must be a clear showing
by the complainant that there is an existing right to be protected, a clear and unmistakable right at
that. Thus, it is incumbent upon private respondents to establish that their rights over the land in
the Busol Forest Reserve are unequivocal and indisputable. They, however, admit that their claims
for recognition are still pending before the NCIP; they are but mere expectations-short of the
required present and unmistakable right for the grant of the issuance of the provisional remedy of
injunction.
An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a
repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated
only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects,
either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property
has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of
the loss thereof.
While the Court does not discount the possible loss private respondents may suffer should
their land claims be recognized with finality, still it bears reiterating that they failed to show that
they are entitled to an injunctive relief. In summary, private respondents do not have a clear and
unmistakable legal right because their land claims are still pending recognition and any loss or
injury they may suffer can be compensable by damages. To add, their occupation of the Busol Water
Reserve poses a continuing threat of damaging the preservation or viability of the watershed. Any
danger to the sustainability of the Busol Water Reserve affects not only individuals or families inside
the watershed but also the entire community relying on it as a source of a basic human necessity-
water. Furthermore, unlike the injury private respondents may suffer, any damage to the Busol
Water Reserve is irreversible and may not only affect the present generation but also those to come.
Stare decisis vis-a-vis res judicata
In its assailed decision, the CA ruled that the NCIP did not act with grave abuse of discretion
because its actions were in accordance with law as it complied with the IPRA and its implementing
rules and regulations. Still, it must be remembered that judicial decisions form part of the law of the
land. In The City Government of Baguio v. Atty. Masweng (City Government of Baguio), the Court
explained that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definitive recognition of land claims over portions of the
Busol Forest Reserve, to wit: The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by
its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law
concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its
effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents' ancestral land claim
was indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by
an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must
show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed
241
are violative of said right. Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessor-ininterest of private respondents, as claimants of
a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as
inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest
Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not
endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands. In City Government of Baguio, it
was recognized that the NCIP is empowered to issue TROs·and writs of injunction. Nevertheless, the
said case ruled that therein respondents were not entitled to an injunctive relief because they failed
to prove their definite right over the properties they claimed. The circumstances in City Government
of Baguio and the present case are similar. In both cases, the claimants principally rely on
Proclamation No. 15 as basis for their ancestral land claims in the Busol Forest Reserve.
Unfortunately, it was ruled that the said proclamation is not a definitive recognition of their
ancestral land claims as it only identifies their predecessors-in-interest as claimants.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction. Against fencing of the Busol Watershed
Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at
bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1)
that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of
the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private
respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction,
particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors.
Thus, the Court is constrained to similarly rule that the injunctive relief issued inthe present
case are without basis because the applicants failed to establish a clear and legal 'right. After all, it
has been settled that Proclamation No. 15 is not a definite recognition of their ancestral land claims.
In the present case, the preventive writs issued in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09
themselves are being questioned. Thus, the Court had, on more than one occasion, found occupants
of the Busol Watershed Reservation not entitled to the preventive writ for lack of a clear legal right,
considering that their recognition claims were still pending before the NCIP.
Taking into account all the cases involving land claims over the Busol Water Reserve, it is
settled that Proclamation No. 15 and the IPRA, notwithstanding, provisional remedies such as TROs
and writs of preliminary injunction should not ipso facto be issued to individuals who have ancestral
claims over Busol. It is imperative that there is a showing of a clear and unmistakable legal right for
their issuance because a pending or contingent right is insufficient. Nevertheless, the grant or denial
of these provisional remedies should not affect their ancestral land claim as the applicants are not
barred from proving their rights in an appropriate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 5 August 2010 Decision and 31 January 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 110598 are REVERSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples-Cordillera Administrative Region in NCIP Case Nos. 29-CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09
are hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
242
Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
Pagalilauan, Gerome
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN v. CA
G.R. No. 100588, 7 March 1994
Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom
of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
FACTS
The present case involves third year Nursing students who failed to meet the retention policy
of the school, that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing subject and in two minor
subjects. As a consequence, the school refused to re-admit them.
Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim
Soand Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San
Agustin(USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters
of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than
80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience).
Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and
finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to
accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they
filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner
USA to re-admit them.
Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean
Concepcion Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena,
Ma.Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from
finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance
of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject,
including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year. Private
respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80%performance rating.
To buttress petitioner's stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act
of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study
subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases
of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vest in gin
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to
study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.
Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for
mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which
has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them,
since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties.
Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic
freedom.
The RTC ruled that mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll petitioning
students because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondents’ university falls
within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause of our Constitution.
243
The CA did not agree with the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the students can compel the school to allow them to complete their course?
HELD
No. Mandamus does not lie.
The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the
issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrollment. Taking into
account the admission of private respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the
Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has
clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed. However, even if a case were
moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of
dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated. We shall adhere to
this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following
cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and
(3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The nature of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled
that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to
compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion.
On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and indispensable
requisites of a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they possess a clear legal right to be
enrolled in petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that petitioner USA has an imperative duty to enroll
them, it does not appear to this Court that the duty is merely ministerial; rather, it is a
duty involving the exercise of discretion.
This was likewise our ruling in the case of Tangonan v. Paño et al., which involves a factual
setting similar to the present petition. We adopted as our own the rationalization of the trial court
therein: Every school has the right to determine who are the students that should be accepted for
enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students. While petitioner questions the findings of
respondent school as to her academic competence, the Court cannot find any legal jurisdiction to
interfere in the exercise of judgment of the school on this matter.
Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educational
institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
244
objectives, and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its
intent.
245
Pagtalunan, Maylen
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and, in the process, has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
FACTS
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy.
After going over private respondent’s dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo
Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was CSSP Dean Paz
that she committed plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four
out of the five panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.
On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent’s
graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however,
that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the
final copies of her dissertation.
University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester
of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval,
included private respondents name. Dean Paz sent a letter to the Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for
graduation. The letter did not reach the Board on time hence private respondent graduated.
May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
The Committee strongly supported the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to
withdraw her doctoral degree.
She then filed a petition for mandamus and damages. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to
restore her degree and to pay damages.
ISSUE
Whether the University can withdraw her doctoral degree.
HELD
Yes.
Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that an academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitutionlikewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to institutions of
higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
246
students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of Appeals
held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the
investigation of private respondent’s case began before her graduation.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University
Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student’s rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if
it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more
objectionable than bestowing a university highest academic degree upon an individual who has
obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s
concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from
serious threats to its integrity.
247
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR.

EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB.
G.R. No. 187226, 28January2015, THIRD DIVISION (Reyes, J.)
The qualifications of teaching and nonteaching personnel of private schools, as well as the
causes for the termination of their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system of
private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the teaching.
It is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines
whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as
respectable or moral.
FACTS
St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove (SSCW) is a catholic and sectarian educational

institution. In 2001, it hired petitioner Cheryll Santos Leus (Leus) as an Assistant to SSCW’s
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, SSCW’s Directress advised her to file a resignation
letter. In response, petitioner informed the latter that she would not resign from her employment
just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Petitioner was thereafter formally
directed to explain in writing why she should not dismissed for committing such acts which
constitute a serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic School. On the
other hand, Leus explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock does not amount to serious
misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She further averred that she is unaware of any
school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered a serious misconduct, and
thus, a ground for dismissal.
Unsatisfied with Leus’ explanation, SSCW terminated the former’s employment it explained
that pending the promulgation of a “Support Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS) on the cause for termination of employments; that Section
94(e) thereof cites “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in addition to the just
causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. SSCW maintained that
as a Catholic institution of learning, it has the right to uphold the teaching of Catholic Church and
expect its employees to abide by the same.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against SSCW. In her
position paper, Leus claimed that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative as there was no
just cause for her dismissal. She claimed that her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as
serious misconduct since the same is purely private affair and not connected in any way with her
duties as an employee of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her boyfriend
eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision which dismissed the complaint by petitioner. It
found that there was a valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct. The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a
Catholic educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic values taught by
SSCW to its students. As a result, petitioner Leus appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no
valid ground for the termination of her employment. Unfortunately, the NLRC issued a Resolution
248
which affirmed the LA Decision. Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA) which denied said petition. Having her motion for reconsideration also denied,
Leus filed the instant petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools governs the termination
of employment of teaching and nonteaching personnel of private school.
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a valid ground to
terminate her employment.
HELD
1. YES. The argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof, is
raised by the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the
proceedings before the LA, the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions
of MRPS.
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated claim of invalidity of
the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same untenable. Said regulation was issued by the
Secretary of Education pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 (BP 232). Section 70 thereof vests the
Secretary of Education with authority to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of
BP. 232. Concomitantly, Section 57 specifically empowers the Department of Education to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232. It is thus within the authority
of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and
nonteaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other
disqualification.
2. NO. The fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence
to establish that premarital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed
considered disgraceful or immoral.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave, the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of
conduct and applicable laws. If the conduct does not conform to what society generally views as
respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as disgraceful or immoral. Substantial evidence
must be presented, which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing
norms of conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral.
The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves two-step process:

first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an
assessment of the said circumstance vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society
generally considers moral and respectable.
In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct
can be considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction between public and secular morality on
the one hand, and religious morality on the other, should be kept in mind. That the distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
249
It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the
Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided
under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. When the law refers to
morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the
proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is
made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality. Accordingly, in
order for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be detrimental or dangerous
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
The Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would lead the Court to
conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that the
petitioner and her boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry.
Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her boyfriend, the father of the child.
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes
the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that neither does such situation
contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.
Admittedly, petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and

doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on premarital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and
taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is
anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing norms of
conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not
denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.
250
Pura, Valentin V
CUDIA v. SUPT. OF THE PMA
G.R. No. 211362, 24 February 2015
As the premiere military educational institution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
in accordance with Section 30, Article III of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,
Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (“Administrative Code of
1987”), the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) is an institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations
Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.However, after he submitted
his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for
her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English
teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit
late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said
that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class
late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class
was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on
record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them
(the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA
rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be
excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie
for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each
student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if
Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the
teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were
at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of saying that his class was
dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the
Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late
hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9)
cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and
with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The final vote
was 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
ISSUES
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Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia.
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code
violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No.
1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Suchpower by the President may be delegated to the
PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
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Public International Law
Ramo, Keif Khari M.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011
DOCTRINE/S:
Public International Law
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOSIII) has nothing to do with the
acquisition or loss of Territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, amongothers, sea-use
rightsover maritime zones (i.e., the territorialwaters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines],contiguous zone [24nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200nauticalmiles from the baselines]), and continental shelves thatUNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination ofdecades-long negotiations among United Nations
members tocodify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’soceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagicStates’ graduated authority over a limited span of
waters andsubmarine lands along their coasts.
 Baselines laws such as RA 9522 (Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines) are enacted by
UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) Statesparties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts fromwhich baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve asgeographic starting points tomeasure the breadth of the maritimezones
and continental shelf.
 Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ourscould not be any clearer: Article 48.
Measurement of the breadth ofthe territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zoneand the continental shelf.The breadth of the territorial sea, thecontiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continentalshelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselinesdrawn in accordance with article 47.
 Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanismsfor United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOSIII) States parties to delimit with precision the extent of
theirmaritime zones and continental shelves.In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
theinternational community of the scope of the maritime space andsubmarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-basedrights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorialwaters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources inthe exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf(Article 77).
 Congress’ decision to classify the Kalayaan Island Group(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as
‘Regime[s] of Islands’manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pactasunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.Under Article121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally
formed area of land,surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such asportions
of the KIG, qualifies under the categoryof “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their
ownapplicable maritime zones.
 UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like thePhilippines. UNCLOS III creates a
sui generis maritime space—the exclusive economic zone—in waters previously part of thehigh
seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States toexclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditionalfreedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zonebeyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
 Absent a United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant baselines
law, an archipelagicState like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationallyacceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zonesand
continental shelf is measured.This is recipe for a two-fronteddisaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powerstofreely enter and exploit the resources in the waters
253
andsubmarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakensthe country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippinemaritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.
 The enactment of United Nations Convention on theLaw of the Sea (UNCLOS III)- compliant
baselines law for thePhilippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of thebreadth of the Philippines’ maritime
zones and continental shelf.
 States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription,not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed
by the rules on general international law.
 The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal,
burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
 The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-
vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by
archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject
to their territorial sovereignty.
FACTS
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.This law followed the framing of the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),codifying, among others, the
sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left
undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960
(UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remainedunchanged for nearly five decades,
save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors
and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under
scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984.Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippinesand sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf.Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified
adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
"regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers or x xx legislators,"as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on
two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,embodying the terms of the Treaty of Parisand ancillary treaties,and (2) RA 9522 opens
the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
254
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands"
not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its
use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III,
preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522
does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
ISSUE
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
HELD
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcatethe Country’s Maritime Zones andContinental

Shelf Under UNCLOS III,not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national

territory"because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the
Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition
trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters,
beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded
to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description,
Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the
Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory.It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours provides that
“the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47”.
255
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or
other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or,
as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework ofRegime of Islands to Determine theMaritime

Zones of the KIG and theScarborough Shoal is not Inconsistentwith the Philippines’ Claim
of SovereigntyOver these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islandsframework to
draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG,
"weakens our territorial claim" over that area.Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough
Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss ofterritorial
waters,prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and
the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522
and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie
this view.RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total
maritime spaceby 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:
Extent of maritime area using Extent of maritime area using

RA 3046, as amended, RA 9522, taking into account
takingintoaccount the Treaty UNCLOS III (in square
of Paris’ delimitation (in nautical miles)
square nautical miles)
Internal or archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive Economic Zone - 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
While petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the
baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG, is negated by RA 9522 itself becauseSection 25
5SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
256
of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III
requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the
length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIGand the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance
from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago."
The amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the
outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by
Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of
islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 notIncompatible with the Constitution’sDelineation of Internal

Waters
Petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of the Constitution.
The Court said that whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the
Constitutionor as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III, the Philippines exercises sovereignty
over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the
political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent
and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
257
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS
III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to
the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.Significantly, the right of innocent passage
is a customary international law,thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from
the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental
coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the
right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for
their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance
from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the
recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one
cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these
waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of

Principles and State Policies)must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the
provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x xx."Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating
and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factorantreated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of
marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section
7), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living
resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since
the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates
a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high
seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found
within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of
navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
258
PIMENTEL, Jr. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 158088, 6 July 2005 (Puno, J.)
The President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend
or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations.
FACTS
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesf or its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21,
Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) which will have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in
UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state.
The petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international
law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the
signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.
HELD
NO.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has
the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.”
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the
concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures
259
a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
260
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION and MARK B. JIMENEZ

G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application
of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee.
FACTS
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S. a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the request were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with:
(a) conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; (b) attempt to evade or defeat tax;
(c) fraud by wire, radio, or television; (d) false statement or entries; and (e) election contributions in
name of another.
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent requested

copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers. However, the petitioner denied the foregoing
requests. One of the reasons was:
“Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a

preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We
merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law
and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are
therefore not available.”
ISSUES
a. Whether private respondent was entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings.
b. Whether private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under
the RP-Extradition Treaty.
HELD
a. Entitlement of notice and hearing in evaluation stage
YES.It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation

procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the
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extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: first, the provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request; and second, the temporary arrest of
the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court.
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during

the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself,
this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of
the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a
respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade
not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending
case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and
present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties.
b. Breach of RP-US Extradition Treaty
NO.The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The
observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution which provides that "the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under
the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land, no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of
the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision.
En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other.
There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as
regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are
clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or
the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
262
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective

extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum
state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right.
263
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP)
G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008
The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
FACTS
Petitioners, comprised of several groups, challenge the constitutionality of the Memorandum

of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) entered into between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines(GRP) and the MILF.
On August 5, 2008, the GRP and MILF were scheduled to sign the MOA-AD in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. However, upon the initiative of several groups, the Supreme Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD is challenged on several grounds, among which is the creation of a

“Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro people.
The MOA-AD seeks to introduce the concept of an “associative relationship” between the BJE
and the Central Government.
ISSUE
Whether or not the concept of association is recognized under the present Constitution.
HELD
In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have
passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE’s
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE’s
right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of
FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter
affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
XXX
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies
264
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
265
Tandoc, John Karol
WIGBERTO E. TANADA, ET. AL. vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et. al

G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997
FACTS
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiationsthe World Trade
Organization was created with the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the
ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members.
Secretary Navarro, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed
in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
Upon signing the same, it was thereafter submitted to the to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution and was subsequently concurred.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO
Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed.
ISSUES
(1) Do the provisions of the wto agreement and its three annexes contravene Sec. 19, Article ii, and
Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution?
(2) Do the provisions of said agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress?
(3) Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power by this court in
promulgating rules on evidence?
(4) Was the concurrence of the senate in the wto agreement and its annexes sufficient and/or valid,
considering that it did not include the final act, ministerial declarations and decisions, and the
understanding on commitments in financial services?
HELD
(1) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
NO.It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of
the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution.The
constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed
on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements.
They are mistaken.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies.These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
266
enforcement through the courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.he principles
and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.These broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to implement them. If the executive and the legislature failed
to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature
through the language of the ballot.
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in
relation to the other sections in said article
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al.,[31] this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and
commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph
of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT,
OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
NO.
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.[39] Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
They are again mistaken
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."[43] By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
267
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with
coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership
in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F.
Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over.
The age of interdependence is here.
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation.The
underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its
officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under
WTO-GATT.
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x
cooperation and amity with all nations.
(3) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF

JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
NO. Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)[49]
intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedures.
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS,[51] it will be fruitful to restate
its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the
rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of
a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in
at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced
without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable
through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
268
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph
(b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of
defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be
taken into account.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law,
provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model.
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable

presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a
substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has
not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two
provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue --
derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also.
(4) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE
THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE
UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but
not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO
Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the
document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the
President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senatewhich enumerated what
constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records the winding
up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of
treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference.
It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
269
LIANG v. PEOPLE
GR No. 125865, 28 January 2000
Immunity is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official
capacity."
FACTS
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. MeTC released him, after
fixing bail, to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an
"office of protocol" from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process
under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard
to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government.
HELD
NO. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs
advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latters right to due process was violated. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting
at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.
Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act
was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the
270
DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it
so desire.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming

petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.The commission of a crime is not part of
official duty.
271
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA v. VINZON

G.R. No. 154705, 26 June 2003
The establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. Thr establishment of a

diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy
and the living quarters of its agents and officials.
FACTS
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon
Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration,
maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the
Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipment covered by
the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective
for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by
giving thirty days prior written noticefrom the date of expiry.
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or
before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was
expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief
of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory
and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian
Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated 2 August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover,
that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners.Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,

alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from
suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the
Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn,
respondent filedan Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has
expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the
Maintenance Agreement:“Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.”
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
above-mentioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.
HELD
No. International law is founded largely upon the principles ofreciprocity, comity,
independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article
II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in
Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that
272
there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In
the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as
expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of
nations.”
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change.
The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of
sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis.
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private
party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct
of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and
in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an
act jure imperii.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A
sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is there fore clear that petitioner
Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract
with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the
official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
273
Onia, Steven Ralph
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP v. HON CESAR STA. MARIA
G. R. No. 185572, 7 February 2012
The doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, the

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
FACTS
On September 14, 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.(CNMEG),
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Railways Corporation(Northrail), for
the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando La Union.
A year after, they executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of the railway. Subsequently,
to finance the said project, the Philippine contracted a loan agreement with the EXIM Bank.
In the complaint, respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement
were void for being contrary to the Constitution, RA 9184, PD 1445 and EO 292.
CNMEG argue that it was an agent of the Chinese government and that the Northrail
Project is under an executive agreement, thus immune from suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before the
local court.
HELD
No.
The determining factor on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern , which shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law,
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
Relying on the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the

Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement.
As described by the Solicitor General, the non-surrender agreement is an assertion by the

Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. It is a recognition of the
primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws
and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
The Court ruled that persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome
Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the
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RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to
the Rome Statute have been met.
For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party
of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which
may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is
nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal
by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
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ARIGO v. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014, EN BANC (Villarama, Jr., J.)
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through
the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
FACTS
A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha
Reefs.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
The above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective

sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition
against respondent.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit
any pleading or manifestation in this case.
2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA applies
HELD
1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.
The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. The Court thus expects the US to bear “international responsibility under
Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
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In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA

to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court found it
unnecessary to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
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Angeles, George II
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION

(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA)
PCA Case No. 2013-19, 12 July 2016
China’s historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea were extinguished by
the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they were incompatible with the Convention’s
system of maritime zones.
The entitlements of a [maritime] feature depend on (a) the objective capacity of a feature, (b) in
its natural condition, to sustain either (c) a stable community of people or (d) economic activity that is
neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in nature.Islands generate an entitlement
to an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, while those considered
as rocksunder the Convention shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Low tide
elevations generate no maritime zones.
FACTS
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea in the western Pacific Ocean. It is a crucial
shipping lane, a rich fishing ground, home to a highly biodiverse coral reef ecosystem, and believed
to hold substantial oil and gas resources. The southern portion of the South China Sea is also the
location of the Spratly Islands, a constellation of small islands and coral reefs, existing just above or
below water, that comprise the peaks of undersea mountains rising from the deep ocean floor. Long
known principally as a hazard to navigation and identified on nautical charts as the “dangerous
ground”, the Spratly Islands are the site of longstanding territorial disputes among some of the
littoral States of the South China Sea.
By Notification and Statement of Claim dated 22 January 2013, the Philippines initiated
arbitration proceedings against China pursuant to Articles 286 and 287 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS/ Convention) and in accordance with Article 1 of Annex
VII of the Convention. The Philippines made 15 Submissions, requesting the Tribunal to find that:
1) China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines, may not
extend beyond those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea;
2) China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with respect to the
maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called “nine-dash line” are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the
geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements expressly permitted by
UNCLOS;
3) Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf;
4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not
generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and
are not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines;
6) Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that do not
generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, but
their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is measured;
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7) Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf;
8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of
the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf;
9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by
interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine
environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef;
12) China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef
a. violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installations and
structures;
b. violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under the
Convention; and
c. constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in violation of the Convention;
13) China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law enforcement
vessels in a dangerous manner, causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels
navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;
14) Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has unlawfully
aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:
a. interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and adjacent to,
Second Thomas Shoal;
b. preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas
Shoal;
c. endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at Second
Thomas Shoal; and
d. conducting dredging, artificial island-building and construction activities at Mischief
Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and
Subi Reef; and
15) China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the Convention, shall
comply with its duties under the Convention, including those relevant to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment in the South China Sea, and shall exercise its rights
and freedoms in the South China Sea with due regard to those of the Philippines under the
Convention.
The Philippines, however, stressed that it does not seek in this arbitration a determination of
which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a
delimitation of any maritime boundaries
China has consistently rejected the Philippines’ recourse to arbitration and adhered to a
position of neither accepting nor participating in these proceedings.In itsNote Verbalepresented to
the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on 19 February 2013, it stated that its position
on the South China Sea issues “has been consistent and clear” and that “[a]t the core of the disputes
between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea are the territorial disputes over some
islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands.” China noted that “[t]he two countries also have overlapping
jurisdictional claims over parts of the maritime area in the South China Sea” and that both sides
had agreed to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations and friendly consultations.In its
Position Paper, China advanced the following arguments:
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 The essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the territorial sovereignty over
several maritime features in the South China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the
Convention and does not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention;
 China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, to settle their relevant disputes through
negotiations. By unilaterally initiating the present arbitration, the Philippines has
breached its obligation under international law;
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-matter of the arbitration were concerned with
the interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject-matter would constitute an
integral part of maritime delimitation between the two countries, thus falling within the
scope of the declaration filed by China in 2006 in accordance with the Convention, which
excludes, inter alia, disputes concerning maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration
and other compulsory dispute settlement procedures.
ISSUES
a. Whether or not China’s historic rights over maritime areas falling within the “Nine-Dash
Line” have legal basis;
b. What are the status of the disputed maritime features and the entitlements to it under
UNCLOS?; and
c. Whether or not China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in the EEZ.
HELD
a. No. China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation
of rights and maritime zones in the Convention. China’s historic rights to resources in the waters of
the South China Sea were extinguished by the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they
were incompatible with the Convention’s system of maritime zones.This is apparent in the text of the
Convention which comprehensively addresses the rights of other States within the areas of the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and leaves no space for an assertion of historic rights.
It is also reinforced by the negotiating record of the Convention where the importance of adopting a
comprehensive instrument was manifest and where the cause of securing the rights of developing
States over their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf was championed, in particular, by
China.
Examining the historical records, there is evidence that Chinese navigators and fishermen,
as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea.
However, prior to the Convention, the waters of the South China Sea beyond the territorial sea were
legally part of the high seas, in which vessels from any State could freely navigate and fish.
Accordingly, historical navigation and fishing by China in the waters of the South China Sea
represented the exercise of high seas freedoms, rather than a historic right, and that there was no
evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the South China
Sea or prevented other States from exploiting their resources.
Accordingly, upon China’s accession to the Convention and its entry into force, any historic
rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’
were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, by the limits of the
maritime zones provided for by the Convention.
b. Article 121 of the Convention (Regime of Islands) provides:
“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is

abovewater at high tide.
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2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
Islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a
continental shelf, but “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
The Tribunal interpreted Article 121, particularly its paragraph 3, and concluded that the
entitlements of a feature depend on (a) the objective capacity of a feature, (b) in its natural condition,
to sustain either (c) a stable community of people or (d) economic activity that is neither dependent
on outside resources nor purely extractive in nature. It must be noted that the use of the word “rock”
does not limit the provision tofeatures composed of solid rock. The geological and geomorphological
characteristics of ahigh-tide feature are not relevant to its classification pursuant to Article 121(3).
Even if many of the features are currently controlled by one or other of the littoral States,
which haveconstructed installations and maintained personnel there and have been modified to
improve their habitability(by land reclamation and construction of infrastructure), the current
presence of official personnel on many ofthe features does not establish their capacity, in their
natural condition, to sustain a stable community of peopleand considered that historical evidence of
habitation or economic life was more relevant to the objectivecapacity of the features
Based on this interpretation, the status of the following features are as follows: that
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North) and
McKennan Reef are high-tide features. However, they are only considered as rocks as they cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life oftheir own and accordingly shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. They are only entitle to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. On
the other hand, Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal arelow tide
elevations for being submerged at high tide in their natural condition. They generate no maritime
zones. Finally, the Convention does not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to
generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.
c. Yes. Article 77 of the Convention provides that the “coastal State”—which in this case is
necessarily the Philippines—“exercises over the [EEZ] and the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.”The Tribunal found as a matter of
fact that China had (a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported
to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, (c) protected
and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone
at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed installations and artificial islands at
Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Philippines. The Tribunal therefore concluded that
China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to its exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf.Having found that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are
submerged at high tide, form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the
Philippines, and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, the Tribunal concluded
that the Convention is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to sea
areas in its exclusive economic zone.
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U.S. v. PURGANAN
G.R. No. 148571, 24 September 2002
An extraditee does not have a right to bail pending extradition proceedings.Extradition case is
different from ordinary criminal proceedings. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
FACTS
In accordance to the existing Extradition Treaty between the United States and the
Philippines, the U.S. Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale an extradition request of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon
receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Jimenez then sought and was granted a TRO to prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition which was later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court initially dismissed the
petition, but later on reverse its decision when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration and held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. In order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant
to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez then filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, praying for an

arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set a date for
hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted bail for his temporary liberty in the
amount of P1,000,000.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law) in support of their
arguments, to wit:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)

Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the
case.
ISSUES
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1) Whether or not the respondent entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
2) Whether or not the respondent entitled to bail.
3) Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law.
HELD
The petition is granted. The bail bond posted is cancelled. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
1) NO. On the basis of the Extradition Law, the word immediate was used to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and
arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.
When it requires a speedy action on the petition, the trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of
the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression—a prima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
On the basis also of the Constitution, Section 2 Article III does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Constitution only requires examination under
oath or affirmation of complaints and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to
notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.
2) NO. He is not entitled to post bail. Extradition case is different from ordinary criminal
proceedings. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Jimenez should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
3) NO. There is no violation of his right to due process. Potential extraditees are entitled to the
rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
To sum all up, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that
purpose.
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Balonkita, Christa
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG v. JUDGE OLALIA

GR No. 153675, 19 April 2007
Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.
FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
“Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons” that took effect on June 20, 1997.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the
offense "accepting an advantage as agent" and 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud.
Warrants of arrest were issued against him. DOJ received from the HK Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz.
Muñoz was subsequently arrested. The validity of his arrest was upheld by the Supreme Court when
he eventually questioned the same first through a petition for review on certiorari with the CA then
with the SC. The decision of the SC upholding the validity of his arrest thus became final and
executory.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent.
For his part, private respondent filed in the same case, a petition for bail which the petitioner
opposed. Judge Bernardo issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk.
The case was raffled off to the branch of herein respondent judge Hon. Felixberto Olalia Jr. when
Judge Bernardo Jr inhibited himself from further hearing the case. And when Muñoz filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail, respondent judge granted the same,
setting the bail at P750,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not a prospective extraditee can avail himself of the right to bail - YES.
HELD
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold
the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution... The Philippine authorities are
therefore under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to remedy xxx [and the remedies include] the right to be admitted
to bail.
While the SC in Purganan case limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, in the light of various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, the SC in this case re-examined the ruling in Purganan and declared that:
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1. The exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine have likewise been detained.
2. To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justifcation why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in
issue.
Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.
An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal

process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
constitution.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
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GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ

GR No. 207342, 7 November 2017
Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a
Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition.
Conformably with the dual criminality ruleembodied in the extradition treaty between the Philippines
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), however, the Philippines as the
Requested State is not bound to extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the
Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as an agentconsidering that the extradition
treaty is forthright in providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming within the
descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other
form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both
parties.
FACTS
For consideration and resolution is the petitioner's motion for reconsideration to seek the
review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 16, 2016, whereby the Court affirmed the
amended decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 1, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No.
88610, and accordingly denied the petition for review on certiorari.
Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of “accepting an advantage as an agent”, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a
common law of Hongkong.
ISSUE
Whether the offense concerned complied with the dual criminality rule.
HELD
Article 2 of the RP-Hong Kong treaty provides that surrender of the extraditee by the
Requested State to the Requesting State shall only be for an offense coming within any of the
descriptions of the offenses therein listed insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or
other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of
both parties. The provision expresses the dual criminality rule. The determination of whether or not
the offense concerned complied with the dual criminality rule rests on the Philippines as the
requested party. Hence, the Philippines must carefully ascertain the exact nature of the offenses
involved in the request, and thereby establish that the surrender of Muñoz for trial in the HKSAR
will be proper. On its part, the HKSAR as the requesting party should prove that the offense is
covered by the RP-Hong Kong Treaty, and punishable in our jurisdiction.
A perusal of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has lifted from the
dissenting opinion the arguments it now advances to support its insistence that Munoz must also be
extradited for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent. In the last paragraph of the motion
for reconsideration, the petitioner cites the ruling supposedly handed down by the Court of Final
Appeal of the HKSAR in the case of B v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against
Corruption to the effect that the term agent in Section 9 of the HK.SAR' s Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance (POBO) also covered public servants in another jurisdiction. 4 On the basis of such
supposed ruling, the petitioner prays that the exclusion of the crime of accepting an advantage as an
agent be reversed; and that the Court should hold Muñoz to be extraditable also for such crime.
286
The petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. To grant it would be to take judicial notice of the
ruling in B v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. Like all other
courts in this jurisdiction, however, the Court is not at liberty to take judicial notice of the ruling
without contravening our own rules on evidence under which foreign judgments and laws are not
considered as matters of a public or notorious nature that proved themselves.
Verily, foreign judgments and laws, if relevant, have to be duly alleged and competently
proved like any other disputed fact.
Worthy to remind in this regard is that the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by
the courts of the Philippines with caution, and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in the
negative.
Furthermore, the courts in the Philippines lacked expertise on the laws of the HK.SAR. This
precisely necessitated the hearing before the trial court to receive the opinion testimonies of qualified
experts on the laws of the HK.SAR. Not surprisingly, the legal experts shared the opinion that the
offense defined in Section 9 of the POBO was a private sector offense. The CA thus decided against
the petitioner's position. To extradite Muñoz also for the crime for accepting an advantage as an
agent would be devoid of justification if the Philippines did not have an equivalent crime of accepting
an advantage as an agent.
We thereby held that respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz could only be extradited to and tried
by the HK.SAR for seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, but not for the other crime of accepting
an advantage as an agent. This, because conspiracy to defraud was a public sector offense,
but accepting an advantage as an agentdealt with private sector bribery; hence, the dual criminality
rule embodied in the treaty of extradition has not been met.
287
Castillo,Jephthah
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should
be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
FACTS
Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND
SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered
into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In
connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply
with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed
in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain
meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and
facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply
applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has
been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate
treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall
not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
ISSUES
Constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the

Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
HELD
SC find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14]
Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to
the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the
obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, SC find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian
issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal
arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution
should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
288
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial
entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of
the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said
constitutional provision.
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an
absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.
289

CSC Ruling on Nepotism in Public Appointments

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University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

A. Law on Public Officers ......................................................................................................... 1

B. Administrative Law ............................................................................................................. 53

C. Election Law ........................................................................................................................ 86

D. Local Government.............................................................................................................. 154

E. National Economy and Patrimony .................................................................................. 227

F. Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports ....................................... 243

G. Public International Law ................................................................................................. 253

Law on Public Officers

The Civil Service

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

Whether Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of Nepotism.

Yes. The law defines nepotism as follows:

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in

Magtira, John Michael

No, it cannot be credited.

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. ODESLA-IAD, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

Manuel, Kenneth Glenn

RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF JUDGE MOSLEMEN T. MACARAMBON

In his letter, Judge Macarambon requested that he be allowed to retireunder Section 1 of

ELSIE S. CAUSING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

EVALYN I. FETALINO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Mendoza, Roland Joseph

MELINDA L. OCAMPO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR

A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando

We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of

B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan

C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso

Longevity Pay under Section 42

Magtira, John Michael

Hence, respondent De Leon in a Memorandum formally charged petitioner with Grave

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

WINSTON F. GARCIA, GM of GSIS v. MARIO I. MOLINA

Whether or not the conduct of Preliminary Investigation in Administrative proceeding is an

Perianes, Laurisse Marie

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.CRISOSTOMO M. PLOPINIO

Crisostomo M. Plopinio (Plopinio) respondent herein served as a COMELEC Election Officer

As a result, respondent sought the reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution.

Onia, Steven Ralph

The petition is partly meritorious.

Accountability of Public Officers

Ramo, Keif Khari M.

Office of the Ombudsman vs Court of Appeals

1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;

Accordingly,the Committee of Peers (COP) directedprivate respondent Mojica in OMB-0-00-0615

Is Deputy Ombudsman an Impeachable Official?

1) W/N De Jesus is liable as a public officer

Rosario, Patrica Mae

VILLANUEVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

San Gil, Kamille Bernadeth

MA. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

The House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.

a. Publication of the impeachment rules

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in

b. One-year bar provision

NO. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No

Solis, Patrick David

TRADE & INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP., v. MA. ROSARIO DEMEGILLO

Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly

The Board of Directors TIDCORP formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo