Catalyst Catastrophes

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Information contained in this publication or as otherwise supplied to Users is believed to be accurate and correct at time of
going to press, and is given in good faith, but it is for the User to satisfy itself of the suitability of the Product for its own
particular purpose. Johnson Matthey gives no warranty as the fitness of the Product for any particular purpose and any implied
warranty or condition (statutory or otherwise) is excluded except to the extent that exclusion is prevented by law. Johnson
Matthey accepts no liability for loss or damaged (other than that arising from death or personal injury caused by Johnson
Matthey’s negligence or by a defective product, if proved), resulting from reliance on this information. Freedom, under Patent,
Copyright and Designs cannot be assumed.

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1 Introduction
Catalysts are wonderful materials that enable us to perform the chemistry of our processes at ever
improving energy efficiencies whilst also reducing the environmental impact. For the most part they
do their work in a quiet sustained way and perform their tasks as we would like them to. This
however can beguile us into a false sense of security, and we forget about the other reactions that
they will perform if we give them the chance. Also our plants, equipment, and catalysts deliver
incredible reliability today. So we tend to see a long time between serious problems. This gives us
the problem of retaining corporate knowledge. We already have two full generations of experience
we need to keep alive.

Our attempt here is to capture some of the painful experience we have gained. All of the incidents
described here are based on real events. We hope that these reminders will help us avoid relearning
them the hard way.

We have structured our thoughts first by reactor and then included some generic considerations
including those related to loading/discharge.

The ‘lessons’ listed in each area are intended to be prompts for consideration of what might be
appropriate and are not to be taken as advice. Each plant will have individual circumstances and
these should be reviewed in the light of these ‘lessons’.

2 Purification
The main hazard here is the hydrodesulphurisation (HDS) catalyst, be it cobalt molybdenum (CoMo)
or nickel molybdenum (NiMo). We want it to hydrogenate the organic sulphur compounds to H2S.
However it also has the potential, given the appropriate conditions, to hydrocrack higher
hydrocarbons leading to temperature exotherms, or to reverse shift carbon dioxide (CO2) to carbon
monoxide (CO) and form carbon by the Boudouard reaction (1). Ultra-purification absorbents based
on copper also introduce additional requirements for safe operation due to exothermic reduction and
oxidation.

2.1 HDS

HDS catalysts need to be in the sulphided state to enable HDS activity and suppress hydrocracking
reactions. Johnson Matthey Catalysts has experience of retaining effective sulphiding down to 0.7
ppm sulphur in the feed. Laboratory experiments suggest that sulphiding is only lost slowly if sulphur
in the feed is removed. However effective sulphiding for first operation is critical to ensure that the
HDS catalyst is active for hydrodesulphurisation.

A hydrogen plant had both a high hydrogen containing feed and a butane feed. Both feeds had low
sulphur content (believed to have been well below 1ppm). The HDS system was heated to 350°C
(662°F) and the hydrogen feed commissioned. A temperature increase of 50°C (90°F) was observed,
but was not explained at the time. Two days later the butane feed was commissioned. Cracking
reactions started before sulphiding could take place.

The net result was an exotherm that ruined the catalyst. The catalyst, on discharge, contained
significant carbon confirming the cracking. Butane cracking has the potential to generate
temperatures of around 700°C (1292°F) with enough hydrogen present and hence can cause

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damage to equipment. The cracking reactions are more likely if the HDS catalysts become reduced
by high hydrogen partial pressures. This may have been the cause of the initial exotherm.

2.2 Ultra-purification

Ultra-purification catalysts are usually copper-based and hence introduce similar hazards to those of
LTS (see below). There is also the additional hazard from oxidation of copper sulphide to copper
sulphate on exposure to air.

2.3 Lessons
• Avoid high partial pressures of hydrogen over unsulphided HDS catalysts, particularly above
temperatures of 200-300°C (392-572°F).
• Recognise that higher hydrocarbons in feeds can hydrocrack if HDS catalysts are reduced
and if there is enough hydrogen present.
• Keep hydrogen concentrations below 2% and monitor temperatures while
commissioning/reducing ultra-purification catalysts.
• Keep oxygen away from copper based ultra-purification catalysts while in service and control
the exposure to oxygen during discharge.

3 Pre-reforming
The most serious potential hazards with pre-reforming catalysts are nickel carbonyl and oxidation
(see sections 10 and 12 respectively).

Some pre-reforming catalysts are sensitive to wetting and may fall to pieces when wet. This will lead
to a high pressure across the pre-reformer and can in some cases restrict the maximum plant rate. In
the worst case this can lead to a complete plant shut down to replace the catalyst. Johnson Matthey
catalysts are tolerant of wetting but must like all catalysts be dried carefully to avoid damage from
steam generation from within the pellet (see section 4)

3.1 Lessons

• If catalyst survives wetting incident then it should be carefully dried before putting back on
line.

4 Reforming
4.1 Tube failure on start-up

Almost every year a plant operator somewhere in the world has a reformer failure leading to loss of a
significant number, if not all, of their tubes (2). Invariably this happens during start-up or shut-down
due to an excessive imbalance between firing and heat removal by reforming. In all cases, the plant
operators deviate from the normal start-up or shut-down procedures and this is one of the root causes
of reformer burn downs. Quick recovery from a short trip condition is particularly hazardous. With
low flow down the tubes temperature readings (e.g. exit headers) are not representative of the
processes that are occurring within the radiant box. There is no substitute for having a look to check

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that the tubes are not being overheated! One must also take additional precautions for the increased
risk of localised positive pressure causing hot fluegas to be blown out of the inspection portholes due
to transient pressure changes within the radiant box.

Figure 1. Reformer tube failure

4.2 Catastrophic carbon formation

Carbon formation can lead to catastrophic catalyst failure. This is particularly the case for carbon
formation by the Boudouard reaction shown in equation 1.

2CO → C + CO2 Equation 1

Whisker carbon can form within the pores. The volume expansion associated with this phenomenon
can cause the outer layer of the catalyst pellets to spall off, not too dissimilar to metal dusting but
much faster. A low steam to carbon ratio (below around 1.5) is required to create the required
concentration of CO. So recognise the risk if you choose to bypass your low steam ratio trip. You will
not be the first to have to order a new charge of catalyst after doing so!

4.3 Wet catalyst

Wetting of reforming catalysts is unusual – although some plants used to load into tubes full of water.
So wetting is not so much of a problem. Your actions once you have wet catalyst can however have
a catastrophic result.

Recently an ammonia plant condensed a large amount of water on their reforming catalyst during the
early part of a start-up. Hoping all would be OK they continued as normal. The result was high
pressure drop caused by catalyst breakage. The breakage was caused by steam pressure built up
inside the catalyst pellets. In one section of the tube the breakage was limited to the parts of the

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pellets where the steam had longest path to escape. Details of the catalyst breakage are shown in
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Spalling of catalyst surface from steam generation from within the pores

4.4 Lessons

• Be super vigilant during reformer start-ups; ensure that a regular visual inspection of the
reformer tubes is conducted.
• Stop and think carefully if it is necessary to deviate from established plant operating
procedures.
• During start-up ensure process steam flow is established before the fluegas reaches 500°C
(932° F)
• Wetting catalysts tends not to be a problem.
• Rapid drying generates high steam pressures within the pellets that can even break
reforming catalysts.

5 Secondary reforming
5.1 Air contact with HTS

Adding air into the process via the secondary reformer without combustion is a major hazard. It has
the potential to generate an explosive mixture within the plant or to generate oxidation exotherms on
the high/low temperature shift catalysts that will easily cause vessel damage (3)(4). The exotherm
from oxidation of HTS catalysts can increase temperatures to over 800°C (1472°F). ICI philosophy,
which forms the basis for much of Johnson Matthey Catalysts experience, was to prevent air feed to
the secondary reformer until the temperature was greater than 650°C (1202°F). Also the trip isolation
was a double block valve system with high pressure steam injection between the valves to ensure
separation of air and process gas.

5.2 Burner problems

In operation, the main hazard for secondary reformers derives from the high pressure combustion of
hydrogen in the feed and oxygen in the air. Misalignment of the burner either during initial installation

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or during operation of the burner, burner failure or poor design can lead to hot spots on the shell or
within the catalyst bed(5). Refractory can then vaporize and coat secondary catalyst and/or form
rubies. A plant in the FSU suffered a burner failure, leading to the flame impinging on the refractory.
Alumina from the refractory was vaporized and coated the catalyst. The secondary reformer was
inspected during a shut down for a normal turnaround. There was concern because it was suffering
a poor approach to equilibrium and higher than normal pressure drop across the secondary reformer.
In another plant, in Europe, a burner failure led to a hot spot on the top of the vessel. The plant was
shut down for several months while the damage was repaired and a new burner was fabricated.
Johnson Matthey Catalysts offers a reliable secondary reformer burner, designed with sophisticated
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) as a retrofit (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Johnson Matthey Catalysts secondary reformer burner

5.3 Lessons

• Check that air isolation systems are in good working order and have high integrity
• Monitor the approach to equilibrium and pressure drop and look for evidence of burner
problems if these parameters rise above normal expected values
• Monitor the secondary shell temperature via heat indicative paint/ rate of water boil off.
• During turnarounds inspect the vessel walls and burner for damage
• If concerned use CFD to model the burner performance

6 High temperature shift

6.1 Start-up exotherms

Start-up exotherms on HTS catalysts were a mystery for several decades. Johnson Matthey
Catalysts finally identified this as being caused by dehydration of the catalyst where prolonged
nitrogen circulation had taken place (6). The exotherm occurs when steam is first admitted and
hydration takes place.

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6.2 Boiler leaks

The main failure mechanism for HTS catalysts is boiler leaks. As with the reforming example above it
is the drying process rather than the wetting itself that causes the damage. So if you have a serious
boiler leak that causes a shut-down make sure you dry the HTS catalyst out carefully before going
back on line. Smaller boiler leaks can build up solids on the top of the catalyst leading to build up of
pressure drop which can then reduce plant rate and eventually cause physical damage to the catalyst
and more rapid build-up of pressure drop forcing an unplanned shutdown.

6.3 Oxidation

This is covered in secondary reformers in section 5.

6.4 Lessons

• If you hold your fresh HTS catalyst under dry nitrogen for an extended period (days) it may
dehydrate – so introduce steam slowly and monitor temperatures.
• If you have a severe boiler leak thoroughly dry the catalyst bed before going back online.

7 Low temperature shift

The main risks in the LTS converter are reduction (7) and oxidation/discharge. Both reduction and
final oxidation are exothermic. The combined heat generated is equivalent to burning hydrogen.

7.1 Catalyst reduction

Catalyst reduction can be done safely with online hydrogen analysis and close monitoring of
temperatures. The temperature rise is roughly 30°C (54°F) per % of hydrogen with a nitrogen carrier
and 20°C (36°F) per % of hydrogen with natural gas carrier. Excess hydrogen has the potential to
raise temperatures by around 900°C (1652°F). Moderate excesses of hydrogen will certainly damage
the catalyst and large excesses of hydrogen with lead to damage of the vessel.

Reductions using natural gas as a carrier have the additional risk that a hot spot can initiate catalytic
oxidation of natural gas by the copper oxide and this can kick off a thermal runaway (8).

7.2 Oxidation

Oxidation has the potential to generate temperatures in excess of 900°C (1652°F). If a plant were to
lose the feed to the reformer but keep the air compressor on line, the eventual result would be an
exotherm guaranteed to rupture of the LTS vessel . However the HTS is likely to experience an
exotherm first, see section 5.

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7.3 Condensation

Condensation can be detrimental in two ways. Some catalysts are known to fall to pieces when wet.
Others will survive but the advice on careful drying applies. Condensation will also wash chlorides
down the bed deactivating the rest of the catalyst.

7.4 Lessons

• Closely monitor hydrogen concentration and temperature rise during reduction.

• When using natural gas as a carrier for reduction keep the bed temperatures below 230°C
(450°F).
• Make sure trip systems that prevent process air getting to the LTS converter are working.
• Ensure quench systems are controlling properly, with good atomisation.
• Make sure the isolation valves do not allow wet syngas to pass during front end start-ups.

8 Methanation
The hazard presented by nickel carbonyl is mentioned later.

8.1 Overheating

Methanation is exothermic. With high enough carbon oxides in the feed the temperature can
increase to a level that will damage the vessel.

The first line of defense against methanator overheating is the LTS and CO2 removal systems. The
second line of defense is its high temperature trip. The location of this thermocouple is important. If it
is too near the inlet and the catalyst is deactivated, the thermocouple may not see the exotherm and
the trip may not react. However if it is too near the exit the thermocouple may respond too late to
allow the trip to react fast enough. In each of these cases failure of the trip can allow excessive
temperatures which can lead to vessel failure. The thermocouple location should be reviewed in
relation to the plant operating exotherm profile.

Methanation catalyst is very tolerant and is happy operating over 500°C (932°F). The vessel limit in
many cases is 450°C (842°F). Total carbon oxides of approximately 4% will produce this temperature
at the exit of the methanator. Hence you may be able to run your plant with a complete LTS failure or
even change an LTS catalyst online. However a CO2 removal failure can quickly put the methanator
at risk potentially producing methanation temperatures of over 700°C (1292°F).

A hydrogen plant in North America suffered a plant trip due to an electrical problem, which was
quickly reset. All hands then went to get the plant running again. We can speculate that the CO2
absorber had drained during the trip and had not had time to establish normal hold-up when the
process gas was re-established. The result was high carbon dioxide to the methanator, leading to
overheating and failure of the vessel.

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8.2 Lessons

• Make sure CO2 removal and methanator high temperature trip systems are working and the
trip thermocouples are located correctly

9 Ammonia synthesis
This is one of the most reliable catalysts in the process. Normal reaction exotherms tend to be limited
by equilibrium. The main hazards are associated with pre-reduced material (see section 11), loading
and discharge and oxidation once the catalyst has been reduced.

Oxidation of ammonia synthesis catalyst can generate an exotherm of up to 1600°C (2900°F) (see
section 12).

Loop boilers and steam preheaters normally run at a lower pressure than the loop so leaks lead to
hydrogen/nitrogen in the steam rather than water on the synthesis catalyst. During shut-downs there
is the potential for the driving force to be the other way. Water can then leak into the process side
resulting in deactivation/oxidation of the synthesis catalyst.

9.1 Lessons

• Keep oxygen away from ammonia synthesis catalyst

• During shut-downs isolate and drain loop equipment containing water

10 Nickel carbonyl
Odourless, colourless and extraordinarily toxic, this is a chemical that we all want to avoid. The key
rule is keep CO away from all nickel catalysts below 200°C (392°F). The reactor most at risk is the
methanator but the same potential exists with pre-reforming and reforming catalysts.

A recent serious incident involved a reformer on a CO plant. There was a second source of CO.
During a reformer shutdown CO containing gas leaked passed an isolation valve into the reformer
tubes. Nickel Carbonyl formed and accumulated in the headers. The first symptom observed was a
black flare as the increased pressure was let down. A number of discussions were held with various
parties, including Johnson Matthey Catalysts. These raised Nickel Carbonyl as the potential cause of
the observed symptoms. What followed was an extensive and costly decontamination process.
Additional information on the hazards of nickel carbonyl can be found in reference 9.

In the early days of ammonia manufacture in the UK 6 men were injured from Nickel Carbonyl. The
plant was shut down because of a steam to gas leak in the secondary waste heat boiler. The leak
had reduced the temperature of the gas entering the HTS to the point that reaction had virtually
stopped. So to prevent an exotherm and trip in the LTS from the higher CO level: the LTS was
bypassed; make gas blown off; methanator isolated under nitrogen; and loop shut down. The
methanator temperature reduced to 25°C (77°F). It was then necessary to fit a slip-plate in the

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methanator exit line. During this operation the nitrogen purge was stopped and it is believed that
make gas entered the methanator via a passing isolation valve forming Nickel Carbonyl which, until
the joint was tightened, leaked into the surroundings. The men affected were those working on the
slip plate and in the vicinity. One analysis showed a carbonyl concentration of 5,800 ppmv in the
methanator. The OEL is 0.001 ppmv.

10.1 Lessons

• Never expose nickel catalysts to CO below 200°C (392°F)

• Consider using breathing apparatus when breaking into lines close to the methanator

11 Pre-reduced catalysts
These are a great for getting plants online quickly after a turnaround. However one needs to consider
the limitations of the stabilisation. Stabilisation is achieved by careful oxidation of the surface of the
catalyst. Sometimes CO2 is also used. The test for transport requires that a small sample does not
generate heat when heated in an oven to 130°C (266°F) for a short period of time. The risk of loss of
stabilisation increases as the package size is increased. Small packages have the advantage that
natural heat losses can halt a slow loss of stability. Also packaging in closed containers limits the
availability of oxygen. Our reactors are rather large containers! So we should limit oxygen availability
once a pre-reduced catalyst is loaded.

11.1 Some unplanned events:

A charge of pre-reduced reforming catalysts was loaded into socks, and then bulk packed into
wooden crates each containing a couple of tonnes. After a short while some oxidation started and,
with the larger mass, the heat was contained. The temperature rise was enough to melt the plastic
socks and render the charge unusable. The initiator of the initial oxidation is not known.

An ammonia synthesis converter had been loaded with catalyst, including pre-reduced for the first
bed. Following good practice this was then put under a nitrogen, fed from the bottom with an open
manway at the top. Some welding was then required on the exit pipework. This removed the
nitrogen purge and left the converter open both at the top and at the exit below. With the lighter
nitrogen in the vessel a chimney effect was created bringing fresh air into contact with the catalyst.
Self-heating started and with loss of the stabilization layer oxidation took off. Temperature indicators
went over 700°C (1292°F) and the catalyst had to be replaced.

Moisture in air has the potential to break down the stabilization layer. ICI used dehumidified air, not
flowing through the beds, to successfully load pre-reduced ammonia synthesis catalyst (10).

Another ammonia synthesis converter was being loaded, again with pre-reduced catalyst. Air was
being blown into the converter for the loading team. However this was blown upwards though the
bed, providing a plentiful source of oxygen to encourage removal of the stabilisation layer and heat
generation. During a break in the loading, with nobody in the vessel, the air above the catalyst got
hot enough for a rope to self ignite.

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11.2 Lessons

• Pre-reduced catalysts should be kept under nitrogen after loading – or at least with limited air
availability.

12 Discharged catalysts
The hazards here are oxidation causing exotherms, the impact of removal of oxygen from a confined
space and from water being used to provide cooling.

12.1 Asphyxiation

We are clearly aware of the hazards on vessel entry covered in the paper by Colin Lynas (11). An
incident in another industry reminds us of the hazards of asphyxiation by oxygen removal and the
need to take a broad view of what a confined space is,

• Spent material was being loaded into the back of a high-sided open truck.
• After a while this had accumulated at one end.
• So one of the team jumped into the back of the truck to shovel the material to the other end to
make space.
• A second contractor then entered to help. Ten minutes later they collapsed.
• A third contractor saw what was happening and jumped in to help.
• All three died.
• In this case the cause was H2S evolution from the spent material accelerated by dampening
to reduce dust.

However we believe a similar situation could occur with spent catalyst removing oxygen. The rule in
ICI was that any open pit where a person might put his head 1 m (3 ft) below the surface should be
treated as a confined space entry.

12.2 Discharging with water

Various discharging techniques use water – either to fill the vessel and discharge wet or dampen
catalyst on exit from the discharge manway. Recognise that the catalyst will take oxygen from the
water and generate hydrogen which will spontaneously combust using ignition from any dry catalyst
self-heating from oxidation with air.

12.3 In-situ oxidation/ passivation

This is a potentially dangerous operation. It is critical that a high inert circulation flow is used to
quench hot spots that will occur. If the flow is too low a hot spot can develop. As the temperature
rises the reaction speeds up and ‘sucks’ oxygen from the surroundings, and then runs away.

We have seen pearls of nickel, lumps of copper and in an ammonia synthesis converter the catalyst
had melted (1600°C, 2912°F) and partly flowed into an exchanger, which then had to be drilled out!
In none of these cases was there any sign of overheating from the process thermocouples.

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Figure 4. Ammonia synthesis catalyst fused from exothermic oxidation

Even after in-situ oxidation the catalyst may have the potential to self-heat. In one case a copper
absorbent was oxidized in-situ and discharged into 1 tonne bags. These were then transported to the
disposal site. The following day the bags had melted due to a hot spot propagating through the
material.

12.4 Discharge under Nitrogen

What gas has produced most fatalities on ammonia plants? Probably nitrogen. One breath delivers
unconsciousness and the next few result in death. Inert entry is a specialized job best left to the
professionals. A plant was doing an inert entry with normal air masks. An operator took his mask off
– maybe to wipe his brow, and died. The professionals have masks that cannot be removed.

12.5 Lessons

• Consider whether skips/ trucks are ‘confined spaces’ when used to dispose of ‘chemicals’.
• In-situ oxidation requires excellent flow distribution. Any unstabilized material can start to
heat and destabilize the rest.
• Only use professionals for inert entry.

13 Overall lesson
Serious incidents usually occur when one or two unplanned events happen at the same time and turn
the operation into an ‘Unfamiliar Task’. Then enthusiasm or panic leads to actions being taken
without proper consideration of the potential consequences. A cool head and a short ‘Time Out’ to
‘Stop and Think’ can save lives, equipment and loss of business. Following analysis of a number of
incidents ICI on Teesside introduced an ‘Unfamiliar Tasks’ procedure based on a 1 page form to
encourage this. A copy of the form is attached to show how simple it can be. However please note
that a detailed procedure and thorough training backed it up. Those with experience of its use swear
by its value. A risk assessment is needed when infrequent/unfamiliar tasks are encountered and

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when changes in intent happen during planned tasks. These situations occur at any time of day so
make sure your team has the best tools to manage them safely.

13.1 One liners

• Suspected air in natural gas feed (18%?) auto ignited in the convection section coil preceding
HDS catalyst damaging HDS catalyst and preheat coil.
• Use of reciprocating nitrogen booster compressor with faulty oil catchpots and using 60
gallons (230 litres) oil a day over a 9 day shutdown led to severe carbon formation within the
primary reformer on start-up.
• A Naphtha plant tried a quick restart after a trip. They had however not purged out the large
HDS vessel. The net effect was naphtha entering the reformer before the steam. It took
weeks to drill out the carbon formed.
• Cloud of discharged ammonia synthesis catalyst dust self ignites when being emptied out of
a truck onto open ground (alarming but no damage).

14 References
1) J Richardson and R Drucker: “High Temperature Operation of Hydrodesulphurisation Catalyst” AIChE
Ammonia Safety Symposium, San Francisco, CA, USA, September 1997

2) D H Timbres and Mark McConnell: “Primary Reformer Failure” AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, September 2001/Jan2002

3) M Nadzri Othman, K. Niwa, Per K. Bakkerud: “Downgraded High Temperature Shift Converter and
Explosion in Air Line to Secondary Reformer” AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium, Coronado Bay, CA,
USA, September 2002

4) Djoko Subagio, Listyawan Adi Pratisto and Mudji Slamet: “Failure and Damage of HT Shift Converter”
AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium, Coronado Bay, CA, USA, September 2002

5) Darius Pasaribu, Ivar I. Primdahl and Christian Speth: “Hot Spot and Ruby Formation in Secondary
Reformer” AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium, Coronado Bay, CA, USA, September 2002

6) I R Barton: “HTS catalyst Operational Issues” Nitrogen 1999, Caracas, Venezuela, 1999

7) I R Barton: “Problematic Low Temperature Shift Catalyst Reduction” AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium,
Tuscon, Arizona, USA, September 1995

8) J Richardson, J Wagner, R Drucker, H Rajesh: “Understanding Hydrocarbon reactions during LTS catalyst
reductions” AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium, Boston, MA, USA, September 1996

9) G Rogers and M Hancock: “Nickel Carbonyl – an Unwelcome Visitor on a Methanol Plant” IMTOF 2001,
London, June 2001

10) D P Wallace: “Loading Ammonia Synthesis Converter with Prereduced Catalyst” AIChE Ammonia Safety
Symposium, San Francisco, CA, USA, September 1997

11) Colin P Lynas: “Experiential Development of good Practice for Confined Space Entries” AIChE Ammonia
Safety Symposium, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, September 2001/Jan2002

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UNFAMILIAR TASK ASSESSMENT No ___________________

Area: Plant:

Brief Description of Task:

SCOre:
How SEVERE are the Hazards? (Not - Very) (0 - 6) ________
How COMPLEX is the Task? (Not - Very) (0 - 2) ________
How OFTEN is it done? (Often - Never) (0 - 2) ________
TOTAL SCOre ________

Planning Task: (Tick if 'Yes')

People involved: No-one else

People who will do the Task
Manager
Others (specify) ___________________
Job Safety Analysis done
Job Method & Risk Assessment checklist prepared/available and
checked*
Modification Form raised (Ref No _________________)
(*Delete as appropriate)

Instruction/Supervision: (Tick your decision)

None Verbal Detailed Job Supervisor Manager

Required Briefing Instruction Method & Present Present
Risk
Assessment
Checklist.

Signed ________________________________ Date_____________

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