40. Morigo y Cacho vs.

People of the Philippines

Facts:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for 
4 years.

After school year 1977-1978, they both lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio received a card from Lucia. After an exchange of letter, they
eventually became sweethearts.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to Lucio

to join her in Canada. Thus, they both agreed to get married on August 30, 1990.

However, on August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario

c o u r t , a petition for divorce against Lucio, which was granted and was to
take effect on Febuary 17, 1992.

In 1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Subsequently, he
f i l e d   a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that
no marriage ceremony took place.

He was charged with bigamy by the prosecutor of Tagbilaran City.

The Regional Trial Court found him guilty of Bigamy; stating L u c i o ’ s c l a i m t h a t h i s
f i r s t m a r r i a g e w a s v o i d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t n o marriage ceremony took
place is not a defense in a charge for bigamy.

He should have secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of
h i s marriage to Lucia first before he can be allowed to remarry.

Lucio filed for an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

While his appeal was still pending, the trial court declared his marriage t o L u c i a
void ab initio since no marriage actually took place.

S u c h decision became final and executory.

Despite the fact that Lucio’s first marriage was declared void,
t h e Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision in convicting Lucio with
bigamy.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucio committed bigamy.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court laid down the elements of Bigamy.

1.the offender has been legally married;

2.the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his oth e r   s p o u s e   i s   a b s e n t ,   t h e   a b s e n t   s p o u s e   h a s   n o t   b e e n   j u
d i c i a l l y declared presumptively dead;
3.he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4.The subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first. 

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must h a v e b e e n
legally married. Yet, the trial court found that there was
noa c t u a l   m a r r i a g e   c e r e m o n y   p e r f o r m e d   b e t w e e n   L u c i o   a n
d   L u c i a   b y   a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired
w a s   a   m e r e   s i g n i n g   o f   t h e marriage contract by the two, without the presence of
a solemnizing officer. The Supreme Court held that, the mere private act of signing
a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void
ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusionf o r   l e g a l   p u r p o s e s ,   p e t i t i o n e r   w a s   n o t   m a r r i e d   t o  
L u c i a   a t   t h e   t i m e   h e contracted the marriage with
Maria. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential e l e m e n t
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
41. Santiago vs. People

 RTC – convicted the petitioner and Santos of bigamy

 CA – affirmed the decision of RTC
 Hence a petition for certiorari

Facts:

1. Nicanor F. Santos and Estela Galang were married since June 2, 1974
2. Santos courted Santiago (43-year-old widow) and eventually they got married on
July 29, 1997 despite the advice of Santiago’s brother-in-law and parents-in-law
that Santos was already married.
3. After their wedding, they were both charged with bigamy
4. Petitioner argued that she could not be included as accused in the crime of
bigamy because she had been in the belief that Santos was still single when they
got married.
5. Petitioner also argued that for there to be a case of bigamy, her marriage with
Santos should be proven by prosecution to be valid; in this case, she argued that
her marriage with Santos was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
6. Estela Galang (Legal Wife) alleged that she had met the petitioner as early as
March and April 1997, on which she introduced herself to the petitioner as the
legal wife of Santos.
7. Petitioner denied Galang’s allegation and averred that she only met Galang in
August and September 1997, after she married Santos.
8. The RTC appreciated the more credible statement of Galang and rejected the
defense of the petitioner. RTC said that it was incredible for a learned person like
the petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.
9. RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance of Article 34 of
the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long
before the celebration of their marriage.
10. RTC find Santiago GUILTY of bigamy beyond reasonable doubt.
11. Santiago filed a motion for reconsideration and contended that her marriage was
void ab initio for not complying with the requirement of Article 34 of the Family
Code which is the five-year cohabitation period prior to their marriage. (Note: She
and Santos filed an affidavit of cohabitation before the celebration of their
marriage stating that they have cohabited for 5 years.)
12. The Court of Appeals stated that the petitioner’s claim was a vain attempt to put
the validity of her marriage to Santos in question thus affirming the RTC’s
decision.
Issue:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in its decision charging the petitioner of bigamy
despite her claim that her marriage with Santos was void ab initio.

Held:

1. NO. SC stated that it would be absurdity to allow the petitioner to use her illegal
action to escape criminal conviction. (that her marriage with Santos was null
because of lack of marriage license, but as clarified earlier, they have falsified
their certificate of marriage stating that they have cohabited for 5 years but when
in fact they haven’t). SC further added that it could not lend its aid to one who
has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded.

The SC concurred with the RTC’s decision, which was affirmed by CA, however
the SC disagreed with RTC’s imposition of the principal penalty on her. She
should not be charged as principal to the crime but only as an accomplice.
42. Vitangcol vs. People

Doctrine:

Persons intending to contract a 2nd marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their 1st marriage. If they proceed with the 2nd marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the 1st marriage.

Facts:

- On December 4, 1994, Norberto Vitangcol married Alice G. Eduardo at the Manila

Cathedral. She discovered that Norberto previously married his college girlfriend Gina
Gaerlan on July 17, 1987 so she filed a criminal case of bigamy against Norberto.
However, Norberto argued that he informed her before they got married that his
marriage with Gaerlan is a fake marriage and that she was having an affair.

- The RTC however found Norberto guilty of bigamy for contracting a subsequent
marriage while a prior marriage subsisted. Norberto argued that there was no record of
marriage license in the office of the Civil Registrar.

Issue:

Whether Norberto Vitangcol is criminally liable for bigamy.

Ruling:

Yes.
- Even if there is no record of marriage license in the office of the civil registrar, it does not
prove that the marriage is dissolved since it is just a mere certification. Even when this
case was pending, Norberto did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying
his first marriage.

- Norberto’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. The first marriage must be
judicially declared as void under the Family Code, otherwise it would lead to the crime of
bigamy upon contracting the subsequent marriage.
43. Diaz vs. People

Facts:

Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, managing editor and writer, respectively for
Bandera, were accused of conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation
of one Florinda Bagay. The accused were alleged to have feloniously written and
published an article about the sexual activities of certain “Miss S” and Philip Henson, in
which through the words and phrases used in the article meant and conveyed false and
malicious imputations that this “Miss S” is a sexual pervert and possesses lascivious
and immoral habits. Florinda Bagay, who happened to use “Patricia Santillan” as her
screen name, claims that she was this “Miss S” being referred to in the said article.

The RTC convicted the Diaz and Pichel of the crime of libel. The Court of
Appeals sustained the conviction of Diaz but acquitted Pichel.

Issue: Whether or not the article published by petitioners fall under the crime of
libel.

Held:

No. The elements of the crime of libel are the following: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim
must be identifiable.

In the case at bar, the first element is present. In determining whether a

statement is defamatory, the words used are to be constructed in their entirely and
should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood in another sense. In the instant case, the article in question details the
sexual activities of a certain “Miss S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic
liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character,
integrity, and reputation of “Miss S.”

As to the element of malice, since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a
presumption that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There was neither good reason
nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and injure
her reputation.

On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared
in the December 28, 1991 issue of Bandera, a local tabloid.

The last element of libel is that the victim be identifiable, although it is not
necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is
apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or
if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstance so that those knowing such
person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.

The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to show
that “Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.

Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay could not have been the person
defamed therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, where the requirement for an identified
or identifiable victim has not been complied with, the case for libel must be dismissed.

Judgment reversed and Petitioner acquitted.

44. Lopez y Aberasturi vs. People

Doctrine: Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of

constitutional rights. Free expression however, "is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."1 Libel stands
as an exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.

Facts:

On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31,
2003, the accusatory portion of which reads in full as follows:

That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the integrity, reputation and
putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G.
ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent to injure and
expose the said offended party to public hatred, contempt and ridicule put up
billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at
Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:

"CADIZ FOREVER"

"______________ NEVER"

thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from
the residents of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word
"NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein
private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word
"NEVER" thus making the billboard appear as follows

"CADIZ FOREVER"

"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"

For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce
the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was going on,
therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of Mayor Salvador
G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good
name, character and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said
billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of
persons, which caused damage and prejudice to the offended party by way of moral
damages in the amount [of]:
₱5,000,000.00 – as moral damages.

Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not guilty."
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused,
that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly
known by the nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the private complainant
"Bading." Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due course.

Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November
2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw
billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the
word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner
of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola
warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message
conveyed since it was incomplete.

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call
relating that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added
words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling
that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a
"tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer,
caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident
resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed
for damages.

Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things
happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in
conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he
has no intention whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. He
contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He
further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love
Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up
call for Cadiz City.

On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner of libel. The
trial court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution vìs-a-
vìs that of the defense, all the elements of libel are present. The fallo of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DIONISIO LOPEZ y
ABERASTURI (bonded) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel defined
and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant thereto hereby
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS
AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum as the minimum to TWO YEARS,
ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as the maximum
and a FINE of ₱5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of ₱5,000,000.00
by way of moral damages.

Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier,
rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the
RTC. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the presence of all the elements of
the crime of libel. It reduced however, the amount of moral damages to ₱500,000.00.
Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in
its Resolution6 dated April 7, 2006.

Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition. Per our directive, private
respondent filed his Comment7 on August 29, 2006 while the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) representing public respondent People of the Philippines, submitted a
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment8 on even date. After the filing of
petitioner’s Reply to private respondent’s Comment, we further requested the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. The OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Memorandum, adopting as its memorandum, the Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Comment it earlier filed. Petitioner and private respondent submitted their respective
memoranda as required.

Issues:

1. Whether the printed phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER”
is libelous; and
2. Whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication

Held:

We ought to reverse the CA ruling.

Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the
crime of libel are present in this case. Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded
from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case. However, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the
facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are constrained to apply one
of the exceptions specifically paragraph 4 above, instead of the general rule.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private
respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He avers that
there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the
character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.

The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that "there is
nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which
ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt.”

The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial court’s
finding of guilt on petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence holding that "[w]ords
calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective

to destroy reputation than false charges directly made" and that "[i]ronical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander," it argued that the words printed
on the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet
they were so deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against
private respondent’s honor and reputation.

A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead." For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be
given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable." Absent one of these elements
precludes the commission of the crime of libel.

Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the
words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a

crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
"whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety
and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense." Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to
impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public
ridicule.

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s
finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to
induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of
Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his
dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or
somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s integrity.
Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In
its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity
and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply
worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service,
it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction
on private respondent’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to
malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public
confidence.

Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the
billboards and gave a negative impression on what it says. They imply that the message
conveys something as if the private respondent was being rejected as city mayor of
Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of these witnesses is doubtful considering the moral
ascendancy exercised over them by the private respondent such that it is quite easy for
them to draw such negative impression. As observed by the OSG, at the time the
billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor of
Cadiz City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the
project of the city government. Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green
Program of Cadiz City; Jude was employed as a licensing officer under the Permit and
License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita held the position of Utility Worker II of
the General Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses, according to the OSG,
would naturally testify in his favor. They could have verbicide the meaning of the word
"NEVER." Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could have presented witnesses
within the community with more independent disposition than these witnesses who are
beholden to private respondent.

According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey
to the people of Cadiz that he is a tuta of Sagay City.

We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the
People. In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the
arguments of the petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him, vehemently
praying for his acquittal. We quote with approval the OSG’s analysis of the issue which
was the basis for its observation, thus:

During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject
billboards maligned his character and portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus:

Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards "BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER"?

A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only
require those "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" billboard[s], it was after which additional
billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of Sagay. I am being
maligned because of those billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz,
ginkuha sang Sagay", "Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it,
Zone 2, very small, very very small, you cannot see it in [sic] a glance.

xxxx

A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would like
to convey to the people of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or Puppet of
Sagay City.

Contrary to private respondent’s assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards

which state, either directly or indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of
Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single prosecution witness testified that
the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City.
The billboards erected by petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER", "BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER"

Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the
controversial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself.
"[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation," words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel
or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself," as the Court
ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’ Wah Council of the Phils., Inc.

Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the
prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of private respondent’s official duties as City
Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is
considered defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of
the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official
with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
As the Court held in United States v. Bustos, the policy of a public official may be
attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity
invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must not
be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts.
45. Borjal vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988
undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended
agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be
participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies
concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More
importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody
a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference
which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00
would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government
agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants.

On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent

Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between
May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous
activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private
respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates
they were published Issue :

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for
libel

Held:

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.

Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the
author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987
Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless
found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong
"private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks”
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that
while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial
that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public
interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao
shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and
mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his
position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the
FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and
coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost
honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the
right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference
itself. Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged
character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving
actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring
home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct.
46. Belen vs. People

Facts:

On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the
submission of the parties and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was
submitted for resolution. In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his
cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the request,
Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved
by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which later became the subject of this
libel case.

Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed
envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was
received by its Receiving Section on August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure,
motions filed with the said office are first received and recorded at the receiving section,
then forwarded to the records section before referral to the City Prosecutor for
assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.

ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael
Belen, the son of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also
informed about the motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo
City. She then asked the receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and requested
a photocopy of it for her own reference.

On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal

complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify). The complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before
the OCP of San Pablo City. Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its
office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited itself from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its records to the Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor.

On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order designating
State Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the
investigation of the libel complaint.

On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable

cause to file a libel case against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an
Information charging petitioner with the crime of libel.
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court entered a
plea of "NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses, namely: (1) complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son
and representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores
and Gayne Garno Enseo, who are part of the administrative staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City. For its part, the defense presented the accused petitioner as its sole
witness.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial court's decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the
defamatory matter was made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses
Flores and Enseo, who are the staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the
Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well as Michael, son and representative of Nezer
in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy
of the motion. Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged communication,
the CA ruled in the negative because the subject statements were unnecessary or
irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed by petitioner
against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the personality,
reputation and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.

In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be found
is guilty of libel.

Held:

No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication
of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation
though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he
has of himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a
defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes
sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can
be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous
communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before
reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel,
however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is
parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is hereby
exposed to be read or seen by third persons.
In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but
only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done,
petitioner conceded that the defamatory statements in it were made known to someone
other than the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was
contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than
the one defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely
because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer,
the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in
Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere
private communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the government
office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing
and service of his Omnibus Motion.

It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory

matters is not satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed
person. In this case, however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of
the Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative
of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed
person, ACP Suñega-Lagman. Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to
Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had read the contents of
the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a public
officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another
officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject
matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication."
Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff of the
OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with
respect to the subject matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the
dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman from the
preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical
procedure of transmitting the motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper
recipients.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED, and the Decision dated April 12, 2013 and the Resolution
dated January 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32905,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the penalty imposed upon petitioner
Medelarnaldo B. Belen to Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.
47. Co vs. Munoz

Facts:
The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner,
Elizalde S. Co, in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a
contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was... behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:
(a)
Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance
of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;
(b)
Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San
Francisco dredging project, and;
(c)
Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the
project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC. Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his
right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous... remarks against him.
Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of
public duty.
In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous
dredging project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases,... Muñoz claimed that
the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his statements.
He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters... of public interest and are,
thus, privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz
claimed, it failed to do.
RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
established the elements of libel.
In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held
that Muñoz' statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as
privileged... communication.
In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of
libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and
P297,699.00 for litigation expense. Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
he CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest
and Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the first
paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public
interest. Hence, the CA... reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel
charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal
aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double
jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court
(ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action. He also claims that the civil liability of an accused
may be appealed in case of acquittal.

The Respondent's Arguments:

Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the
offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the... present petition to
enforce the civil liability.

Issues:
Whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to
enforce the accused's civil liability; and
Whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from the libelous remarks despite
his acquittal.

Ruling:
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accused's civil liability.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from... which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party,... the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party,
may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal
by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did
not... reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is... a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the
court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the... crime of which the accused
is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged
communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the
crime.
The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; this... is referred to as malice in
law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the
imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved
that the imputation is true and published with good intention and... justifiable motive.
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article
354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other...
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of
the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were
fair... comments.
Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of
proving that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in
this respect.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution
to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the
crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the
present... petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.
48.Villanueva vs. People

FACTS:

The accused Villanueva (a municipal councilor) went to the Vice-Mayor’s office (herein

private complainant) for the application for monetized leave. As found by the court of
appeals, the petitioner’s application was not immediately acted upon by the petitioner
for no reason. This inaction on the part of the petitioner resulted to a barrage of insults
from Villanueva. The petitioner uttered the following "Ibuatdaka ken, inabudakakengawang, e
baling masukulnaku." (I will lift you from there and I will throw y o u o u t o f t h e w i n d o w a n d I
don’t care if I will go to jail), "Magmalinis ka, enaka man
m a l i n i s , garapalka." "Balamumansanaskangmalutu, pero king kilubularanka,
tiktakkarinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and
honest, you are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are
worm infested inside and extremely dirty).

V i l l a n u e v a   a l s o   m a d e   a   “ d i r t y   f i n g e r ”   t o   t h e   p r i v a t e respondent. These
circumstances prompted Castro to file a criminal case of grave oral defamation and
slander by deed against Villanueva. The MCTC ruled in favor of private respondent,

RTC and CA also ruled in favor of the respondent, with some modifications as to the penalty.

ISSUE: WON Villanueva is guilty of grave oral defamation and slander by deed

RULING:

As to the grave oral defamation; It is our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can
be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat
of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony.

In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid

justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension may have been vexing for
petitioner and may have been perceived byhim as provocation that triggered him to blow his
top and utter those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits
must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling akin to begging for money that he was
legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of complainant must havescarred
petitioner’s self-esteem too to appear as begging for money. But again, this is not an
excuse to resort to intemperate language no matter how such embarrassment must have wreaked
havoc on his ego. As to the slander by deed; Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the
phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance.
Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,
where the Court said that: "This is a common enough expressionin the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal
sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother."Following
R e y e s ,   a n d   i n   l i g h t   o f   t h e   f a c t   t h a t   t h e r e   w a s   a   p e r c e i v e d   p r o v o c a t i o n 
c o m i n g   f r o m complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes
simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was
employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating
the approval of his leave monetization.

While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not
of a serious nature. Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation and simple slander by deed.
49. Mari vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner
Quirico Mari for the offense of serious slander by deed and imposing a modified penalty
of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correctional, as maximum.

The Supreme Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious
slander by deed defined under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code but instead
sentenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

The facts of the case showed that complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico
Mari were co-employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao
del Sur, although complainant occupied a higher position. On December 6, 1991,
petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he
returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were
missing which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and
Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural
Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer, Honorio
Lumain, complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his
201 file was returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the
memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang
ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. With the
intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further
injuring complainant.

On January 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del
Sur a criminal complaint against petitioner for slander by deed. After trial, on September
22, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered decision finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged and sentenced the accused to five (5) months
and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days and to
pay private complainant the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages, FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS attorney’s fees and to reimburse her
the cost of suit.

In due time, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. After due proceedings, on
December 1, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Davao del Sur, Digos, rendered decision
adopting the trial court's findings of fact, and affirming the appealed decision in toto. On
June 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On
December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment a
quo convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed, but modifying the penalty to an
indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander. The petitioner assailed the
trial court's finding that petitioner shouted invectives at complainant in the presence of
several persons and then choked her. Petitioner submitted that the prosecution had
failed to prove that he choked the complainant; that the choking was an after-thought as
shown by inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

To these arguments, the Supreme Court, offhand, held that the issue raised
was factual, which would bar it from reviewing the same in an appeal via certiorari. It
held that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule, such as diverse factual findings of
the lower courts, or unless the findings are entirely grounded on speculations.

The Court took the opportunity to discuss the errors of the lower courts in the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. At any rate, the Court held that it would
serve the ends of justice better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of
imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by deed was “done in the
heat of anger” and was “in reaction to a perceived provocation”. The penalty for serious
slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine [Article 359, Revised Penal
Code.]. The Court opted to impose a fine.
50. Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

Facts:
Crime: grave slander by deed

Petitioner Amado B. Teodoro was vice-president and corporate secretary of the

DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young, was
treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner is the brother of the president of the
corporation, Donato Teodoro, while complainant is the daughter of the chairman of the
board of the corporation, Agustin Tanco. The Board Treasurer, Carolina Tanco-Young
questioned the propriety of having the document signed as there was, according to her,
no such meeting that ever took place as to show a supposed resolution to have been
deliberated upon. A verbal exchange of words and tirades took place between the
accused Secretary and the Treasurer. One word led to another up to the point where
Carolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer, either by implication or expressed domineering
words, alluded to the accused as a "falsifier" which blinded the accused-appellant to
extreme anger and rage, thus leading him to slap Tanco-Young — the alleged name
caller.
The MeTC found petitioner guilty of simple slander by deed and sentenced him
to pay a fine of P110.00. Petitioner appealed. It appears that the parties were required
to file their memoranda by the RTC, but petitioner filed instead a motion to withdraw his
appeal and paid the fine of P110.00 imposed in the judgment of the MTC. RTC denied
his motion and gave petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his memorandum, but
petitioner insisted on the withdrawal of his appeal, filing for this purpose a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying his motion to withdrawal appeal. RTC denied
reconsideration and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of grave slander by
deed. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the Court of Appeals dismissed. Hence
this petition.

Issue: Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for review?

Held: Yes

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled, the withdrawal of appeal is not a matter of right,
but a matter which lies in the sound discretion of the court and the appellate court. In
this case, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his appeal only on June 6, 1985, after he
had been required to file his memorandum and after his counsel had received the
memorandum of the prosecution. Apparently, he realized that his appeal was likely to
result in the imposition of a higher penalty and he wanted to avoid that possibility. The
prosecution in fact urged in its memorandum that petitioner be held guilty of grave
slander by deed (not just simple slander as did the MeTC) and demanded that the
maximum of the penalty be imposed on him considering the aggravating circumstances.
Under the present Rule, the withdrawal of appeal may be allowed "before judgment of
the case on appeal." However, as the Regional Trial Court said, even if no similar
limitation as to the period for the withdrawal of appeal is provided in the new Rule, after
the parties in this case had been required to file their memoranda and the memorandum
of the prosecution had been filed and a copy served on appellant, it was too late for
petitioner to move for the withdrawal of the appeal. It was apparent that petitioner's
motion was intended to frustrate a possible adverse decision on his appeal. That is what
exactly happened in this case. Withdrawal of the appeal at that stage would allow an
apparent error and possibly an injustice to go uncorrected. Justice is due as much to the
State — the People of the Philippines — as to the accused.
51. Rogelio J. Gonzaga vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Dionesio Sr. and his children were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc,
Bukidnon on their proper lane on the right side of the road when a Toyota Land Cruiser
driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction. 
Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried
to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction
and collided head-on with the motorcycle causing Dionesio’s death and his children’s
injury. Hence, this case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

Issue: Whether or not Rogelio is guilty of Reckless Imprudence.

SC Ruling:

YES. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must
be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a
willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless
disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has
been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts
which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable
lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under
the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may
himself be considered likewise at fault.
Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause
of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to
Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending
towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of
speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior.

Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at
a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable
for the material damages resulting therefrom.

52. Caminos Jr. vs. People

 

Facts:

1. On the night of 21 June 1988 at the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia
Street in Mandaluyong City a vehicular collision  happened involving the private
respondent Arnold Litonjua and herein petitioner Larry Caminos Jr.
2. That while the private respondent driving and preparing to turn left as he is
reaching the said intersection, petitioner suddenly came bump into his car from
his right hand side.
3.  Patrolman Ernesto Santos interrogated both the petitioner and the private
respondent and then after a traffic accident investigation report (TAIR) was
forthwith issued by P/Cpl. Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District,
indicating that the private respondent had “no right of way” and that the petitioner
“exceeding lawful speed”.
4. In lieu with the proceedings, petitioner entered with a not guilty plea on the
arraignment; however, he was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
damage of property before Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was affirmed
by CA but mitigated the award of civil indemnity.

Issue:

1. Whether the contribution of the offended party on the said collision is a defense
extinguishing from criminal liability?

Held:

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the

person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the
accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense. In fact, even where such driver
is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of
the accused.  In other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or
imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for
purposes of establishing the accused’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a
proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, will nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only
determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring
negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the
award of damages in favor of the private offended party.
But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise
negligent in executing the left turn? The answer is in the negative. It is as much unsafe
as it is unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the TAIR so indicated that he at the
time had no right of way, that Arnold had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection
in failing to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioner’s
bare and self-serving assertion that Arnold’s fault was the principal determining cause of
the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually Arnold’s car that came colliding
with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate
what the physical evidence in this case has established. Clearly, it was petitioner’s
negligence, as pointed out by the OSG that proximately caused the accident.

Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to
present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained
by Arnold’s car, the award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand.