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Iulian Apostolescu Editor
The Subject(s) of
Phenomenology
Rereading Husserl
Contributions to Phenomenology
Volume 108
Series Editors
Nicolas de Warren, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University,
State College, PA, USA
Ted Toadvine, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University,
State College, PA, USA
Editorial Board
Lilian Alweiss, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USA
Rudolf Bernet, Husserl Archive, KU Leuven, Belgium
David Carr, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Chan-Fai Cheung, Chinese University Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong
James Dodd, New School University, New York, USA
Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University, Florida, USA
Alfredo Ferrarin, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
Burt Hopkins, University of Lille, Lille, France
José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong
Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)
Dieter Lohmar, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
William R. McKenna, Miami University, Ohio, USA
Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, Ohio, USA
J.N. Mohanty, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA
Dermot Moran, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Junichi Murata, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Thomas Nenon, The University of Memphis, Memphis, USA
Thomas M. Seebohm, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany
Gail Soffer, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy
Anthony Steinbock, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA
Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA
Scope
The purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological
research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other
fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its
establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published over 100
titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy. In addition to welcoming
monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship, the series
encourages original work in phenomenology. The breadth and depth of the Series
reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal
questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of
phenomenological research.
All books to be published in this Series will be fully peer-reviewed before final
acceptance.
The series is published in cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in
Phenomenology.
The Subject(s)
of Phenomenology
Rereading Husserl
Editor
Iulian Apostolescu
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, my thanks go to Philippe P. Haensler and Vedran Grahovac for
their support and inspiring discussions at earlier stages of this project. I especially
appreciate the unusual patience of all the contributors to this volume, which has
been 3 years in the making. I am also grateful to Nicolas de Warren and the two
anonymous referees for their suggestions for revisions and constructive feedback.
This collection would not have the form it does if it were not for their input. I would
like here to extend my due thanks to Rodney K.B. Parker for generously lending his
time in helping with editing the introduction. Finally, I would like to thank Anita
van der Linden-Rachmat and Cristina dos Santos at Springer for their invaluable
editorial assistance.
Bucharest, Romania 2019 Iulian Apostolescu
v
Introduction
2018 marked the 80th anniversary of the death of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl.
While phenomenology “is now safely ensconced in the cultural firmament,”1 its
basic philosophical assumptions and invariant methodological commitments remain
thought-provoking, if not deeply enigmatic.2 For, as elegant as Husserl’s often cited
claim that we must return to the “things themselves” (Wir wollen auf die “Sachen
selbst” zurückgehen),3 may be, it is anything but simple. Both “orthodox” Husserlians
and phenomenology’s harshest critics will readily agree that the main subject matter
of Husserl’s philosophy is the subject or the pure field of transcendental subjectivity.
However, it is far from clear what precisely this implies. Considering the vast range
of themes covered in Husserl’s writings, as well as the immense complexity
underlying the development of his thought—from its Brentanian beginnings4 to its
1
Sokolowski, R. 2010. “Husserl on First Philosophy”. In: Mattens F., Jacobs H., Ierna C. (Eds.),
Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Phaenomenologica (Published Under the Auspices of the
Husserl-Archives), vol 200. Springer, Dordrecht, 3–23.
2
For a discussion of “the inner ambiguities of the phenomenological method” see Mertens, Karl.
2018. “Phenomenological Methodology”. In: Zahavi, D. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press, 469–491. See also, Luft S., Overgaard, S.
(Eds). 2012. The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, Routledge, 1–14. For a thorough treat-
ment of the phenomenological methodology, see especially the essays by Ludwig Landgrebe, Jan
Patočka, and Dieter Lohmar included in Drummond, John J., Höffe, O. (Eds). 2019. Husserl:
German Perspectives, Fordham University Press.
3
Husserl, E. 2001. Logical Investigations, Part I of Volume II, “Investigations into Phenomenology
and the Theory of Knowledge”, Trans. J. Findlay. London and New York: Routledge, § 2, 168. See
also Husserl, E. 1987. “Philosophie als strenge Wissenchaft”. In: Sepp, H.R., Nenon, Thomas
(Eds.), Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921), Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Gesammelte Werke,
Volume XXV, Springer, 21: “Weg mit den hohlen Wortanalysen. Die Sachen selbst müssen wir
befragen. Zurück zur Erfahrung, zur Anschauung, die unseren Worten allein Sinn und vernünftiges
Recht geben kann. Ganz trefflich!”
4
See Husserl, E. 2018. “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano”. In: Antonelli, M., Boccaccini, F.
(Eds.), Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Volume I: Sources and
Legacy, Routledge, 356–364. Originally published in Kraus, O. (Ed.). 1919. Franz Brentano. Zur
Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, Munich: Beck, 151–167; Rollinger, R. D. 1999. Husserl’s
Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Springer; Moran, D. 2000. “Husserl’s Critique of
vii
viii Introduction
transcendental reinterpretation5 and, last but not least, to its own “crypto-
deconstruction” in the revisions of his early manuscripts and in his later work—one
cannot but acknowledge the fact that “the” subject of phenomenology marks an
irreducible plurality of possible subjects. Thus, phenomenology’s imperative to turn
to the “things themselves,” today, indicates a task of re-approaching phenomenolo-
gy’s own linguistic framework and methodological strategy before anything else: to
return to the “texts themselves,” to re-engage with Husserl as a writer, with his
disciples and successors as readers.
Bringing together established researchers and emerging scholars alike to discuss
new readings of (readings of) Husserl and to reignite the much needed discussion of
what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about, The Subject(s) of
Phenomenology: Rereading Husserl sets out to critically re-evaluate (and chal-
lenge) the predominant interpretations of Husserl’s philosophy, and to adapt phe-
nomenology to the specific philosophical challenges and context of the twenty-first
century.
The chapters in this volume are arranged into three parts:
Brentano in the Logical Investigations”, In: Manuscrito, XXIII (2), 163–206; Moran, D. 2017.
“Husserl and Brentano”, In: Kriegel, U. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the
Brentano School, Routledge, 293–304; Fisette, D. 2018. “Phenomenology and Descriptive
Psychology: Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl”, In: Zahavi, D. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press, 88–104; Fréchette, G. 2019. “The Origins of
Phenomenology in Austro-German Philosophy”, In: Shand, J. A. (Ed.), Blackwell Companion to
19th-Century Philosophy, London, Wiley-Blackwell, 418–453.
5
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1997. Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental
Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press; Luft, Sebastian. 2011. Subjectivity and
Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press; Staiti,
Andrea. 2014. Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Zahavi, Dan. 2017. Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics,
and Transcendental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Livingstone, Paul M. 2018.
“Edmund Husserl: From Intentionality to Transcendental Phenomenology”. In: Lapointe S. (Ed.),
Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5,
Routledge, 232–248; Apostolescu, I., Serban, C. (Eds.). 2020. Husserl, Kant and Transcendental
Phenomenology, De Gruyter.
Introduction ix
The primary aim of Victor Gelan’s contribution is to show that Husserl’s idea of
rigorous science offers a fundamental contribution to the understanding, clarifica-
tion, and development of the idea of science in general, especially to the structuring
of the scientific character of the social and human sciences. Marco Cavallaro argues
that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an “I”: per-
sonal or self-identity and self-consciousness. He argues that they bear quite an odd
relation to each other, insofar as self-consciousness seemingly jeopardizes self-
identity. Cavallaro’s chapter elucidates this issue by situating it in the history of
transcendental philosophy beginning with Immanuel Kant. Re-evaluating and
applying the resources of Husserlian phenomenology, Saulius Geniusas aims at
shedding new light on the essential structures of productive imagination (produktive
Einbildungskraft). According to Geniusas’ working hypothesis, productive imagi-
nation is a relative term whose meaning derives from its opposition to reproductive
imagination. Rodney K.B. Parker focuses on the relationship between Husserl and
Theodor Celms, especially Celms’ criticisms of Husserl’s transcendental-
phenomenological idealism. Celms argues that, despite his account of intersubjec-
tivity, Husserl cannot escape the threat of solipsism. The relation of genetic
phenomenology and the project of phenomenological reduction is the primary con-
cern of Matt Bower’s chapter. Despite Husserl’s occasional loose references to
“the” reduction, performing the reduction implies numerous interrelated techniques.
x Introduction
Bower delves into these intricacies with the aim of determining the place of genetic
phenomenology within the whole of the phenomenological method. Putting Husserl
into dialogue with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Randall Johnson’s chapter turns to phe-
nomenology’s notion of “passivity.” According to Johnson, the inherent (self-)frag-
mentation of passivity forces philosophy to pay tribute to the problematic “space
between” noema and noesis and to reflect on the highly ambiguous status of a
“genetic” phenomenology trying to think its own origins.
xiii
xiv Contents
Jean-Daniel Thumser
1 Introduction
Contrariwise to the common and scientific language, which are both based on a
certain positive understanding of things, phenomenology’s aim is to describe the
essence of the experiencing life by practicing the phenomenological reduction
(ἐποχή or bracketing). This reduction tends to put into parenthesis the thetic under-
standing of life by focusing on how phenonality appears consciously. The phenom-
enological reduction permits to redirect our view on the subject’s constituent and
transcendental life – the antechamber of the subjective life from which the entire
world acquires a meaning. Therefore, the domain of phenomenology concerns
essences and idealities. Things are considered as phenomena, namely noematic
I would like to thank two persons who helped me improve this paper in English: Chih-I Chang and
Appoline Hontaas-Romanens.
The first Logical Investigation brings us to clarify the suitable terms used to express
any kind of thoughts, and permits us to apprehend “true objects of logical research”
within a “clarity that excludes all misundertanding” (Husserl 2001a, 165). It is there-
fore necessary to begin with a formal review in order to reach what pure logic is, or
what specifically belongs to a phenomenology which concerns the expressions cov-
ering the intimate experiences (innere Erlebnisse). We may then underline that
Husserl began an analysis of expressions and significations in the context of a gno-
siological research that would not be reduced to a simple formal logic but that which
already is a phenomenological pure logic. Consequently this analysis can’t be
reduced to “grammatical discussions, empirically conceived and related to some
historically given language” (Husserl 2001a, 166). Husserl indeed positioned him-
self as a phenomenologist who aimed to describe the essence of experiences by
employing a method that does not include the empirical experiences. He thus tried to
distinguish the terms that are used in order to depict a thought, but also thoughts
themselves by considering them only as phenomena while the mundane experiences
are reduced. It is then the intentional act that matters, not the object itself, but the
content of experience: “it is absolutely crucial to our interpretation of Husserl that
the claim that noemata and Sinne are meanings be understood only in conjunction
with the claim that they are contents, not objects, of acts” (Woodruff Smith and
McIntyre 1982, 155). This method offers the possibility to distinguish what concerns
the signification and the manifestation of things whenever it comes to lived experi-
ences. The same can be said when it comes to distinguishing what is meant, in other
words what falls sometimes in a direct relation with the object (Gegenstand) – the
filling acts –, and sometimes the signitive acts which may however lack an object,
even if this act confers a signification. It is in that sense that the imperative return to
the things themselves can be understood: it means a return to the pure subjective
sphere that always provides a sense to what is encountered. Then the question about
the relations linking terms in a linguistic structure has no importance for phenome-
nology, it leads us to a descriptive analysis of essential relationships which gives rise
to a “meaning-fulfilment” (Husserl 2001b, 184). Moreover, we can emphasize with
Alexander Schnell that what matters in any kind of expression concerns
the expression in specie that does not depend neither on the situation in which it is expressed
nor on the person who pronounces it. We must therefore clearly distinguish between the
ideal signification on the one hand, and the real acts, that are constitutive for the significa-
tion, on the other hand – the correlation that Husserl will name in the Ideen I the ‘noetico-
noematic correlation’ (Schnell 2007, 87).
Husserl discerns about the intersubjective link a crucial issue about the expression:
communication. Indeed, an expression is always based on an intention to signify
something to someone through words: “the articulate sound-complex, the written
sign etc., first becomes a spoken word of communicative bit of speech, when a
speaker produces it with the intention of ‘expressing himself about something’”
(Husserl 2001a, 189). We may also underline the fact that “expressing oneself” (sich
äussern) means “to externalize oneself” and refers likewise to the verb “äussern”
which means “articulate”. In that perspective the meaning of an expression of one-
self leads to an articulation of a thought, an articulation of the subjectivity which
intends to externalize itself. This dimension of the expression reflects the immeasur-
able need to express oneself on her/his experiences (Erlebnisse) and at the same
time the need to share knowledge in order to confront it to the authority of others
and make it valid – it is also the same need while the subject soliloquizes (Husserl
2001a, §8). Sich äussern here has the same value than existing (exsistere), that
means appearing, showing ourselves, as originally understood in Latin. In this case,
it means to share one subjective experience with another, as well as manifesting this
subjective experience within words. That is the way a communicating community
recognizes itself, because subjects share their ideas and their experiences, thanks to
sounds, gestures, and writings. The “tools” that are used are neither unarticulated
sounds, nor random behaviors and haptic movements, but expressions of a subjec-
tivity which externalizes itself. Furthermore, this communication between thinking
subjects is not limited to the recognition of others as reasonable beings, but includes
a communication of experiences that cannot be expressed with words. Thus, if
words may limit our understanding of other people’s experiences, they contribute in
their descriptive use to discover other people’s experiences. This new comprehen-
sive dimension illustrates how we share our emotions, our pain, etc. As Husserl
wrote, this linguistic dimension is referred to another kind of perception that is not
a perception like a taking-for-real (Warhnehmung). It participates to the presentifi-
cation (Vergegenwärtigung) that presents us other people’s experiences obliquely
and permits us to transpose those experiences to our own, but not identically:
Common speech credits us with percepts event of other’s people’s inner experiences; we
‘see’ their anger, their pain etc. Such talk is quite correct, as long as, e.g., we allow outward
bodily things likewise to count as perceived, and as long as, in general, the notion of percep-
tion is not restricted to the adequate, the strictly intuitive percept. […] The hearer perceives
the speaker as manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he also perceives
these experiences themselves: he does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an
‘inner’ but an ‘outer’ percept of them. Here we have the big difference between the real
An Analytic Phenomenology: Husserl’s Path to the Things Themselves 7
grasp of what is in adequate intuition, and the putative grasp of what is on a basis of inad-
equate, though intuitive, presentation” (Husserl 2001a, 190).
In fact, the indexicals “I”, “here” and “now” are commonly used to describe a per-
ceived situation, but the “I” may suggest more than that. For instance, “The indexical
“I”, not the philosophical anomaly, “the I” or “the eidos I” […], refers to the unique
individual who is self-present immediately in her unique essence and who may be
present for the listener “in the flesh”, (“registered”, as Sokolowski puts it), and not in
an empty intention” (Hart 2009, 67). In that sense, saying “I” suggests more than a
simple indexical, it is essential as it refers itself to a reasonable being. But Husserl
introduces another point in the Logical Investigations: the “I” is nothing that is uni-
versal or objective. The “I”, “here” or “now” are “essentially occasional” (Husserl
2001a, 218) terms, which are used to describe a punctual and unique situation:
Every expression, in fact, that includes a personal pronoun lacks an objective sense. The
word ‘I’ names a different person from case to case, and does so by way an ever altering
meaning. What its meaning is at the moment, can be gleaned only from the living utterance
and from the intuitive circumstances which surround it. […] It is the universal semantic
function of the word ‘I’ to designate whoever is speaking, but the notion through which we
express this function is not the notion immediately constitutive of its meaning (Husserl
2001a, 218–219).
8 J.-D. Thumser
Thus the signification of the expressed “I” finds its meaning only in the subjective
part of the subject. “I” means “I am here, present, thinking, speaking to someone on
something” and can only be distinguished from the things it speaks about by the use
of the “I”. Furthermore, if every human being is able to express his or her very own
subjectivity by the use of the “I”, even if it is under an implicit form, this “I” always
means another subjectivity and another concept of the “I”: “Each man has his own
I-presentation (and his individual notion of I) and this is why the word’s meaning
differs from person to person. But since each person, in the quest of himself, says ‘I’,
the word has the character of a universally operative indication of this fact” (Husserl
2001a, 219). But if Husserl brings here attention to the communication between dif-
ferent empirical egos, it is not necessary for him that each ego clearly understands
the notion of the “I”. That could indeed be the case for many individuals. The “I”
does not express the person entirely. We may also call it with Stéphane Chauvier a
certain “descriptive ingenuity of the I-thinking”, because “behind the ‘I’, likewise
behind the ‘here’ or the ‘now’, there is no description of anything and that is the
reason why the ‘I think’ […] does not include any knowledge of the thing which
thinks” (Chauvier 2009, 118). For instance, a brain damaged person is also capable
to say “I” without any need to know what it is to be an I: it is the same case for people
who suffer from Alzheimer or anosognosia. And Husserl does not say the contrary,
at least in the Logical Investigations, when he affirms briefly that “the word ‘I’ has
not itself directly the power to arouse the specific I-presentation ; this becomes fixed
in the actual piece of talk.[…] In its case, rather, an indicative function mediates,
crying as it were, to the hearer ‘Your vis-à-vis intends himself’” (Husserl 2001a,
219). As we see here, Husserl describes the “I” as a particular indexical, that has an
indicative function not similar to the other indexicals like “here” or “now” for the “I”
indicates a living reasonable being. Nevertheless Husserl does not give any further
explanation about the specific role of the “I”. He remains evasive on this issue, by not
mentioning anything that could be possibly linked to his later transcendental phe-
nomenology. We will consequently take into account the new horizons opened by
Husserl when he introduced the ego as the foundation of all apodictic knowledge.
certain novelty by saying that “Thinking is carried out from the very outset as lin-
guistic. What resides in our practical horizon as something to be shaped is the still
indeterminate idea of a formation that is already a linguistic one” (Husserl 2001c,
12). Indeed Husserl indicates that the expression of lived experiences is already
linguistic inasmuch as thoughts are always linguistic. This means that the antepred-
icative part of our life determines in a certain pre-linguistic way the expression and
the predication of our experiences within the use of words. As specified by Natalie
Depraz, “The primordial language of phenomenology is the language of the percep-
tion, of the perceived sense, in other words, Husserlian, it is a language which is
originated from the antepredicative” (Depraz 1999, 91). Then, contrariwise to what
we may think about the originarity of our experiences, the ego is always confronted
to a linguistic world which arises from the antepredicative experiences. Nevertheless,
Merleau-Ponty demonstrated this a bit further with the assimilation and the use of
words that may not be without interest. In fact, he highlights that the ego may be
surprised about the inner process of the language:
The speaking power that the child assimilates by learning the language is not the sum of the
morphological, syntactic and lexical significations: this knowledge is neither necessary nor
sufficient to acquire a language […]. Words and phrases that are necessary to lead to the
expression of my significant intention does only recommend to me, when I talk, by what
Humboldt called the innere Sprachform (and which is called by the moderns Wortbegriff)
[…]. There is a “linguistic” meaning of the language which accomplishes the mediation
between my intention still silent and the words, so that my words surprise me and teach me
my thought. Organized signs have their immanent sense which falls outside the ‘I think’,
and belongs to the ‘I can’ (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 110–111).
Thus, the idea that there is a certain “descriptive ingenuity” about the use of indexi-
cals may totally be true, for the ego is not completely involved in the inner linguistic
process, but is occasionally surprised by the words it uses. On that point, we may
emphasize the fact that more recent researches have come to the same conclusion:
the inner linguistic process takes place in the act of perceiving, and thinking cannot
be distinguished from the language for there is no thinking without words. But the
role of the ego in the determination of words is not primordial insofar as thinking is
already linguistic. In this case, Merleau-Ponty is right when he affirms that “orga-
nized signs have their immanent sense which […] belongs to the ‘I can’”, because
the inner linguistic process does not include, at least for the antepredicative part of
our understanding, any participation of an ego. As Jean Petitot also stated: “the non-
conceptual pre-structuration of the semiotic of the natural world is in a large part
perceptual” (Petitot 2004, 138).
underlying activity that is necessary to unify the diversity of the lived experiences.
“This synthesis, that the activity of conscience always finds as already done, can
also only be passive in relation to the activity [conscience as an activity of judging
logically], and in so far as it is strictly pre-logic, […] it is antepredicative” (Escoubas
and Richir 1989, 11). The passive synthesis is thus distinguished from the active one
for this latter deals with logical and empirical judgments, and more generally deals
with the field of the perception (Wahrnehmung). The active synthesis is a judicative
act, contrariwise to the passive synthesis which is the basis for the active one for it
is a principle of association from which “the Ego always has an environment of
‘objects’” (Husserl 1960, 79). In other words the passive synthesis is the activity
which permits the transcendental subject to constantly be in a world of objectivities
(Gegenständlichkeiten). Its process is to be a relation between different kinds of liv-
ing experiences and objects, between what is pre-given and what will later permit
the subject/object relation. Moreover, if the antepredicative life finds its ground on
the experience of the world in which we take part and in which the mundane ego is
not yet able to access its very own self-consciousness, the world must be understood
as a horizon that needs to be constantly constituted, and carries in itself an overture
of sense. It is the gap between the world and the subject that gives rise to any attribu-
tion of sense. This is how the passive dimension of experience matters that much,
because it takes place in the “environment” (Umgebung) necessary for knowledge
to that extent that it precedes any thetic act:
The environment (Umgebung) is copresent as a domain of what is pregiven, of a passive
pregiveness, i.e., of what is always already there without any attention of a grasping regard,
without any awakening of interest. All cognitive activity, all turning-toward a particular
object in order to grasp it, presupposes this domain of passive pregiveness. The object
affects from within its field; it is an object, an existent among others, already pregiven in a
passive doxa, in a field which itself represents a unity of passive doxa (Husserl 1973, 30).
This implies that the passive synthesis is the origin of all knowledge. It is the activ-
ity of the phenomenal conscience which permits the ego to actualize its field of view
concerning the objects (Objekte) so that these objects become, thanks to the reduc-
tion, categorial objectities resulting from the aware activity of the ego. This activity
of conscience is essential in many forms, but particulary permits us here to under-
stand the propitious modalities of the expression of living experience. Indeed,
Husserl underlines another aspect of the passive synthesis regarding its linguistic
role, the fact that the comprehension of words as “sounds of the language” comes
from the passive synthesis, not the conscious and active one:
in ordinary reading, we by no means have, combined with that, an accompanying articula-
tion of actual thinking, of thinking produced from the Ego, member by member, in syn-
thetic activity. Rather, this course of thinking properly is only indicated (by the passively
flowing synthesis of the sensuous verbal sounds) as a course of thinking to be performed
(Husserl 1969, 56).
We can see here that the production of sense, whether it is about the expression or
the entire thinking, is essentially linked to the passive synthesis as something to be
done. Husserl indicates in this passage that language and the whole activity of
An Analytic Phenomenology: Husserl’s Path to the Things Themselves 11
thinking is based on the passive synthesis – this latter is the unique necessary activ-
ity to acquire a conscious association. The antepredicative may also be compre-
hended as a primary form of linguistic, a proto-language based on the prejudicative
living, the perceiving living. Afterwards, when this process of passive association is
done, words acquire another level of meaning. Indeed, Husserl underlines the fact
that once the formatting of the linguistic and predicative thought is consciously
done, words, which originally have only a social and positive meaning, now bear a
soul as they are expressed by a thinking subject: “in speaking we are continuously
performing an internal act of meaning, which fuses with the words and, as it were,
animates them. The effect of this animation is that the words and the entire locution,
as it were, embody in themselves a meaning, and bear it embodied in them as their
sense” (Husserl 1973, 22).
We could eventually say that the passive synthesis is necessary to comprehend a
unity within the variety of different living experiences. It is also necessary to express
experiences through words inasmuch as thinking is a result of an experience that is
antepredicative. The passive synthesis is then the junction between the transcenden-
tal life and the world because the world “in its primitive ontological structure, it is
the preconstituted substrate of all meaning” (Derrida 2003, 110). But it constantly
needs to be consciously actualized within the process of the passive synthesis and,
furthermore, the reduction. Nevertheless, the expression of reduced living experi-
ences is still unexplained and needs to be clearly analyzed for it certainly is the most
difficult task of the phenomenologist. Indeed, how can a reduced experience be
expressible in a mundane language that is at the same time rejected during the
reduction?
4 T
he Expression of Reduced Experience:
The Transcendental Sprache
4.1 T
he Reduction and the Problem of the Mundane
Language
Within this last part of our article, we will try to answer this question: Under which
circumstances is it possible to express reduced experiences? If it is accepted that
every thought is developed through language, the phenomenological reduction
might hamper the expression of immanent experiences because it sets aside every-
thing that is related to the doxic terms of the mundane life to which the language
belongs. Moreover, as Husserl wrote first it in the fifth Logical Investigation, judg-
ments “elude complete conceptualization and expression, they are evident only in
their living intention, which cannot be adequately imparted in words” (Husserl
2001b, 88). It is then obvious that Husserl could not consider at this moment that the
inner experiences may be completely expressed within words, but the introduction
of the reduction has brought with it a major turnaround: the living experience can
12 J.-D. Thumser
Husserl could not assuredly accept a dualistic way to understand the expression of
the inner experience. For instance, there cannot be an inner and private language
that could be distinguished from a mundane language because the experience can-
not be divided into two: the first unspeakable and the other expressible. The reduc-
tion itself shows that there is a way to access the inner sphere of the subject and, as
we reach this sphere, the subject acquires the ability to make salient “the unnoticed
intrusions of empty verbal meanings” (Husserl 1983, 212). Therefore the phenom-
enological reduction permits to comprehend words in a non-mundane and scientific
way, because it gives prominence to the immanent originary life in which every-
thing is “seen” in a sheer way without any specific thetic acts. The intelligibility of
the inner experiences is thus egologically oriented. How could it be otherwise? As
Berthoz and Petit also stated: “the very notion of a ‘point of view’ refers to an ego:
‘an objective point of view’ is typically a contradictio in adjecto” (Berthoz and Petit
2006, 280). Moreover, as Husserl affirmed in an unpublished manuscript, the reduc-
tion allows the phenomenologist to give another content to his discourse, a transcen-
dental content for it is oriented by the ego:
In the return to the absolute subjective sphere, this one reveals itself as a field of experience
and of descriptive research. But jointly, it is given to us as a predicative truth which will be
An Analytic Phenomenology: Husserl’s Path to the Things Themselves 13
studied and expressed, a truth that might beside be, from a descriptive point of view, a truth
of fact or a truth of essence. Therefore we use here the language and its significations – but
the language will be egologically reduced and the words and the propositions will be
reduced to simple egological symbols which freely receive their meaningful content from
the ego, a content that, by means of the bracketting, will become a purely egological mean-
ing […]. As a transcendental ego, I shape symbols – transcendental symbols which exist in
my transcendental sphere and which are then intersubjectively ‘feelable’ in their intersub-
jective transcendental being, and which, as significations, symbolize transcendental states
of affairs. We need then, thanks to their signification, to set in general transcendental truths,
first by a descriptive way for my primordial sphere, secondly for my intersubjectivity that
is egologically oriented, for the world of experience in a transcendental apprehension in all
its strata. – It is on this that we potentially must ground in an indirect way a transcendental
knowledge: ‘a transcendental logic’. The logic of predicative truths, as transcendental
truths, the Logos of the transcendental. […] Of course, all of this is not contradicted by the
fact that the accomplished enunciation in words, in the German grammar already has a
meaning which refers itself to the German nation, and, consequently, that I immediately
contradict the transcendental epoch with my discourse, even in the discourse-that-I-have-
with-myself. Furthermore, it is sufficient here to return to the possibility to reduce by this
way my language, in order to repel any mundane meaning so that it could become a pure
expression of what I aim for, it means consequently that I do not put anything else in value
but the discourse originally conceived by myself (Husserl 1931, 19–20).
We see here that the use of language is totally different when we practice the phe-
nomenological reduction because the content of the expressions is transcendentally
oriented. Everything that we could say then expresses an intimate experience, an
egological experience. As Husserl’s disciple Eugen Fink also stated, the natural lan-
guage is not modified during or after the reduction, but receives another content that
is, this time, transcendentally modified. We do not speak about mundane, ephemeral
things, nor about Abschattungen, but about things themselves as they are perceived
within the inner transcendental sphere. “I always speak the natural language, but in
a transcendentally altered sense” (Fink 1995, 86). While the common language is
used to express things in a thetic way, to express them in their current actuality and
qualities, their hic et nunc, phenomenology has contrariwise in sight the originary
experience of the transcendental subject. And, even if there is nothing like a proper
phenomenological language, there is however a verification of the content of sen-
tences: “Phenomenological sentences can therefore only be understood if the situa-
tion of the giving of sense to the transcendental sentence is always repeated, that is,
if the predicatively explicating terms are always verified again by phenomenologiz-
ing intuition” (Fink 1995, 92). We are now able to understand that the transcenden-
tal Sprache is not a specific language with another structure, but a modification of
the sense of each sentence by the practice of the reduction. Thus the “language will
be egologically reduced”. And, at least but not at last, the use of inverted commas is
remarkable as well in Husserl’s corpus, because it underlines another understanding
of words and things. Indeed, in contrast to the scientific use of language, Husserl
uses the inverted commas to speak about things not as real components of nature,
but as correlates of conscious acts; it points out the redirection of the sight from the
thing simpliciter that is perceived and scientifically explainable to the thing idealiter
which is only reachable for the conscious subject:
14 J.-D. Thumser
‘In’ the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically pure mental process), we find, as
indefeasibly belonging to its essence, the perceived as perceived, to be expressed as ‘mate-
rial thing’, ‘plant’, ‘tree’, ‘blossoming’ ; and so forth. Obviously, the inverted commas are
significant in that they express that change in sign, the correspondingly radical significa-
tional modification of the words (Husserl 1983, 216).
Finally, we are now able to say that the phenomenological langage is grounded on
the passive synthesis because every thought is originally linguistic even if a lived
experience is not conscious at first. The passive synthesis is indeed an activity which
allows to organize thoughts and to actualize them within a underlying process which
can constantly become conscious. Furthermore, the phenomenologist discovers an
always new world as he practices the reduction – the transcendental life –, and real-
izes that she/he is the only constitutive part in the intersubjective constitution of
sense with other egos. “The transcendental life is given to me, that is also that I give
it to me. […] Living as a phenomenologist is also conquering in ourselves a self that
is more lively than the simple natural I” (Depraz 1991, 461). Nevertheless, as the
phenomenologist conquers another level of life, the expression of the inner living
experiences is still problematic for there is no proper transcendental language. The
only thing that changes is the content of sense that is given while the reduction is
practiced. Therefore, the linguistic way to express things themselves is modified
with the use of inverted commas, for example. But the important aspect of this lin-
guistic modification is not the use of this kind of tools, it is instead the egological
centration. Indeed, and as a conclusion to this paper, Husserl invites us to constantly
meditate about the transcendental and egological part of our lives where everything
makes sense. It is his goal to emphasize the fact that every discourse can be an ego-
logical discourse (Ichrede) insofar as the reduction is practiced. Suddenly as the
transcendental ego reflects on itself a “new understanding of life” can be revealed in
order to establish a “universal science” grounded on the transcendental
subjectivity:
We must now focus on the discourse of the I and each participant is the I, the I that is in
question. I, I say so as a beginner in philosophy, I want to start a new understanding of life,
a constant knowledge from an absolute legitimacy and that could in some way, I hope so,
neatly, become a universal science (Husserl 2002, 315).
An Analytic Phenomenology: Husserl’s Path to the Things Themselves 15
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Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological
Necessity
Adam Konopka
Abstract This chapter reconstructs the account of the organization of unified defi-
nite manifolds that Husserl developed in his early logic of parts and wholes. I argue
that Husserl’s conception of necessity gets fixed through the logic of fitness that is
operative in his account of unified definite manifolds that are organized by sym-
metrical part/whole relations. Husserl’s logical account of necessity finds its ulti-
mate justification in his theory of intentionality and is operative in his
phenomenological methodology generally. Through this conception of necessity of
the way in which manifolds are unified and organized, Husserl radicalized and
exploded the Kantian conception of the material a priori and distinguished among
several kinds of a priori, e.g., the correlational a priori, a priori bound to the empir-
ical, and pure material a priori. Husserl’s phenomenological account of the material
a priori further clarifies the important differences with Kant’s approach to the prob-
lem of necessity.
1 Introduction
The problem of necessity concerns the identification and clarification of the kinds
of invariant unities that can be known amidst the variant manifolds of a contingent
world. This problem can be initially highlighted through a reference to the
Copernican revolution and the historical shift from a geocentric understanding of
solar system variation to a heliocentric view. From a geocentric approach, the appar-
ent motion of heavenly bodies, e.g., sun, moon, and stars, are accounted for in terms
Portions of Adam Konopka’s chapter entitled “Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity”
were published in Ecological Investigations: A Phenomenology of Habitats (New York: Routledge,
2020), 126–138.
A. Konopka (*)
Xavier University, Cincinnati, OH, USA
e-mail: konopkaa@xavier.edu
1
Jansen, Julia. 2015. Transcendental Philosophy and the Problem of Necessity in a Contingent
World. Metodo: International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy, 1, 48.
2
Husserl, Edmund. 1975. Husserliana XVIII Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena
zur reinen Logik, ed. Elmar Holenstein. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, §63. Hereafter, Hua. XVII.
3
Ibid., §36.
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 19
formal and mathematical sense and Husserl’s conception of the objective correlate
of theoretical investigation finds its analytic expression as a theory of manifolds. It
was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who first envisioned the ideal of logic as a “discipline
of mathematical form and strictness” and the breadth of logic to include a mathemat-
ical theory of probabilities.”4 Leibniz’s notion of mathesis univeralis was the first
systematic attempt to unify the formal apophantics of Aristotle with the mathemati-
cal logic that historically developed after Franciscus Vieta. As Husserl states, “Our
relation to him [Leibniz] is relatively of the closest” regarding the understanding of
the relationship between logic and mathematics, a relation that finds its mature
expression in Formal and Transcendental Logic.5 In the Logical Investigations,
Husserl identifies Leibniz’s notion of a pure theory of manifolds with pure logic – a
discipline that investigates the necessary unities of synthesized manifolds.
Pure logic is a discipline that underlies the methodological and normative fea-
tures of logic in general and can serve as a formal theory of scientific reasoning. The
discipline of pure logic identifies and clarifies meaning-categories
(Bedeutungskategorien) and object-categories (Gegenstandskategorien) and the
lawful combination of the two. For example, pure logic identifies and clarifies the
laws governing combinations of meanings into propositions, arguments, and theo-
ries. The investigation into the meaning categories yield formal concepts that cor-
respond to the categories of formal ontology, e.g., concepts such as one, object,
quality, relation, number, plurality, whole, and part. These formal categories are
organized around the empty notion of “something” or “object as such” and are dis-
tinguished from the material concepts of object-categories. While the formal con-
cepts apply to any object whatsoever, material concepts such as color, brightness,
tone, intensity, plant, animal, and so on are organized around the highest regions
among various given objects. The investigation into these object categories yields a
study of unified definite manifolds.
Husserl’s Third Investigation is a study of the lawful relations among two formal
concepts of meaning categories – the essential necessity among parts and wholes.
He begins this investigation with the general distinction between simple and com-
plex objects. Simple objects have no parts, while complex objects do. Complex
objects, in other words, are wholes with parts. This distinction between wholes and
parts that arises in complex objects is primitive, which is to say, no other terminol-
ogy can provide a concept that is more basic nor can the relation between wholes
and part be clarified by a more primitive terminology as long as parts and wholes are
4
Hua. XVIII, §60.
5
Husserl, Edmund. 1974. Husserliana XVII Formale and transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer
Kritik der logischen Vernunft, ed. Paul Janssen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, §23. Husserl did not
think that Leibniz’s notion of mathesis universalis provided an adequate account of how the unity
that brings together apophantic logic and mathematical logic in a single science is achieved.
20 A. Konopka
6
In Peter Simons’ pioneering attempt to formalize Husserl’s mereology, he criticizes Husserl’s
seemingly arbitrary privilege of complex objects over simple objects. This criticism also arises in
Simons’ comment on Husserl’s concept of a pregnant whole, “The pregnant whole for the founda-
tion relation in question offers [Husserl] the promise of being neither too large nor too small. But
this concept is itself defined in terms of the relation of individual foundation, as we shall see below,
so it cannot be invoked without circularity. I do not believe that Husserl saw the threat of circularity
here…” Simons, Peter. 1992. Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski:
Selected Essays. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 90. This criticism is correctly applied to
the Third Investigation where Husserl does not provide this justification. However, it is ultimately
Husserl’s analysis of intentionality in the Sixth Investigation and eventual development of the
phenomenological reduction that provide the justification for the individual foundation of complex
objects and Husserl’s concept of pregnant whole. Husserl methodologically establishes his theory
of intentionality between the first and second editions of the Logical Investigations through his
non-psychologistic investigation of the relationship between consciousness and presentational
contents (sense – Sinn). Husserl understands presentational contents to be necessarily intentional
and intentionality to be necessarily content directed. See Husserl, Edmund. 1984. Husserliana XIX
Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der
Erkenntnis. ed. Ursula Panzer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Sixth Investigation, §48; Husserl,
Edmund. 1950. Husserliana III Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenlogie und phänomenlogischen
Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. ed. Walter Biemel.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, §2 and 88.
7
Hua. XIX, Third Investigation, §24. For a pioneering study of Husserl’s part/whole logic, see
Sokolowski, Robert. 1968. The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’s Investigations. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 28(4): 537–553. For an approach to the relationship between
Husserl’s part/whole logic and broader methodology, see John Drummond, John. 2008. Wholes,
Parts, and Phenomenological Methodology. In Edmund Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen, ed.
Verena Mayer, 105–122. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Hereafter, Drummond 2008a. For a critique of
Sokolowski, see Lampert, Jay. 1989. Husserl’s Theory of Parts and Wholes: The Dynamic of
Individuating and Contextualizing Interpretation – Übergehen, Abheben, Ergänzungsbedurftigkeit.
Research in Phenomenology 19(1): 195–212. For an account that explores the relationship between
Husserl and Heidegger in light of part/whole logic, see Øverenget, Einar. 1996. The Presence of
Husserl’s Theory of Wholes and Parts in Heidegger’s Phenomenology. Research in Phenomenology,
26(1): 171–197. For a criticism of Husserl’s part/whole logic through a notion of biological func-
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 21
Pieces, by contrast, are independent parts that can by their nature be presented
apart from the other parts forming a complex whole. Consider, for example, a tree
as a whole comprised of branches, trunk, bark, roots, and so on. These parts can be
presented separately – aspects of the tree branch can be presented in separation from
the other independent parts of the tree, e.g., extension, weight, and shape. Not only
can these parts be presented independently from the whole of the tree, e.g., the tree
weight and branch weight have separable sums, but the parts can be independently
presented from each other, e.g., the shape of the branches and trunk are not depen-
dent on each other. Husserl recognized that certain aspects of a part are altered when
removed from its whole while other aspects retain their identity. The fallen branch
is separated from its functional unity with the whole tree and its corresponding
functional sense is altered – the branch no longer functions in the nutritive dynamic
of its whole – and therefore the functional sense of the branch has a non-independent
relation (moment) to its whole. The fallen branch is a branch of the tree in name
only (homonymously), which is to say, abstractly. However, Husserl’s point is that
the phenomenally presentational aspects of the branch – e.g., extension, weight, and
shape – have senses that are independent in that they are not altered by their separa-
tion and are therefore not in need of supplementation. The independent branch can
be presented apart from its functional incorporation into the whole tree and can be
presented in its own unified right – as wood. Husserl thus defines a “piece” as any
part that is independent relative to the whole W of which it is a part.8
Husserl’s mereology develops out of this basic distinction between independent
and non-independent parts, a distinction that relies on a notion of necessity at work
in the supplementation involved in alteration. As we will see below, this notion of
necessity among part/part relations and part/whole relations is basic to his presenta-
tional account of dependence and has implications for the way Husserl’s conception
of necessity relates to Kant’s. The important point here is that the principle of rela-
tive dependency not only goes all the way down in Husserl’s conception of part/part
relations, but even extends to the basic part/whole relation itself. In other words,
parts exist only in a relative dependency to wholes and while some parts can become
tion, see De Preester, Helena. 2004. Part-Whole Metaphysics Underlying Issues of Internality/
Externality. Philosophica 73: 27–50. For additional approaches, see Lohmar, Dieter. 2000. Edmund
Husserls ‘Formale und transzendentale Logik’. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft;
Gurwitsch, Aron. 1966. Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press; Gurwitsch, Aron. 1964. The Field of Consciousness. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press; Seebohm, Thomas M. 1973. Reflexion and Totality in the Philosophy of
E. Husserl. Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology, 4:20–30; Fine, Kit. 1995. Part-whole.
In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, 463–485.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Willard, Dallas. 2003. The Theory of Wholes and Parts
and Husserl’s Explication of the Possibility of Knowledge in the Logical Investigations. In
Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered, ed. Denis Fisette, 163–182. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers; Drummond, John. 2008. Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy.
Lanham: Scarecrow Press. Hereafter, Drummond 2008b; and Moran, Dermot and Joseph Cohen,
Joseph. 2012. The Husserl Dictionary. New York: Bloomsbury.
8
Hua. XIX, Third Investigation, §17.
22 A. Konopka
presented as objects in their own right as wholes and thereby become a self-founding
concretum, this nevertheless presupposes a more original complex whole.
Husserl’s mereology proceeds from the distinction between (non)independent
parts (pieces and moments) to founding/founded relations, relations that Husserl
uses extensively not only in the Third Investigation, but in his later understanding of
constitution.9 Generally speaking, Husserl employs founding/founded relations
extensively in his subsequent articulation of the network of definitions and laws
governing the manifold of relationships that follow upon the piece/moment distinc-
tion. Husserl defines foundational moments as:
(A) founded moment – a moment for which another moment provides a foundation
in the formation of a whole;” such that founded moment A supposes and forms
a unity with moment B or whole W according to necessary association.
(B) founding moment – provides a supposition and forms a unity with another
moment and for the whole that it forms with its associated moments; such that
moment B founds moment A such that B is the supposition of and unified with
A or whole W according to necessary association.10
Consider a forest as an extended illustration of these founding/founded relations.
The forest has a manifold of moments that can be considered in various founding/
founded relationships. The populations of trees provide habitat for a manifold of
insects, birds, and other animals. The set of interactions involved in this habitat rela-
tion could be considered a specific type of collective according to relations of foun-
dation. If the habitat collective is merely a sum or aggregate with no founding/
founded relations, then it is merely a whole in a rather wide sense, that is, deter-
mined merely in terms of abstracted unifying moment such as number or content.
The habitat-as-whole would be merely a collective that lacks inherent organization.
If the tree populations interact in a meaningful relation with the insects, birds, and
other animals, this meaningful interaction can be expressed in various kinds of
founding/founded relations. Consider, for example, interactions involving nutrition
distribution. The tree provides nutrition for the insect, the insect is nutrient provi-
sion for the woodpecker, and so on. In this nutrient chain, one that has causal attri-
butes as well, the nutrient provision of the woodpecker is founded on the insect,
which in turn is founded on the beech tree. These founded/founding moments in the
constitution of the nutrient chain could further be organized according to several
additional distinctions that Husserl makes in his theory of foundation, e.g., immedi-
ate or mediate, remote or proximate, and so on. We could say, for example, that the
beech tree is a mediate founding moment to the nutrient provision of the wood-
pecker, while the insect is the immediate founding moment. It is according to found-
ing relations such as this that the nutrient fitness involved in a habitat is not merely
9
Edmund Husserl 1973. Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, ed.
Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Kart Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, §81. See also Sokolowski, Robert. 1970. The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of
Constitution. The Hague: Springer.
10
See Hua. XIX, Third Investigation, §14; Drummond 2008b, 82.
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 23
4 Multi-level Generalizations
The problem of necessity is also tied, more broadly, to the process of generalization
from the unified definite manifolds of perceptual sense to gradient kinds of general-
izations involved in conceptualization. The unified definite manifolds involved in
complex wholes can be distinguished according to the kinds of synthesis involved
11
Hua. XIX, §21.
24 A. Konopka
12
Husserl 1973, §81.
13
Ibid., 323.
14
Hua. III, §30. See also Drummond, John. 1995. Synthesis, Identity, and the A Priori. Recherches
husserliennes 4: 27–51.
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 25
The notion of necessity that is proper to the identity in a manifold of object catego-
ries and the synthesis of like with like involved in meaning-categories phenomeno-
logically clarifies the authentic distinction between analytic and synthetic necessity.
The degrees of increasing levels of generality progress according to an interest in
the unity proper to the synthesis of “like with like” (similarity) and are determined
according to the essential necessity of the eidetic sense of object-categories. The
necessary supplementation involved in the alteration of presentational sense is also
involved in both the determination of the various levels of generalization. We have
seen that the lawful relations of formal concepts such as object, quality, relation,
number, plurality, whole and part have an essential difference from material con-
cepts of object categories, e.g., color, brightness, plant, tree and so on. Analytically
necessary laws are operative in the formal concepts of meaning categories that are
independently founded on the indeterminate notion of “something” or “object as
such.” These analytically necessary laws are free from the determination of material
concepts and the explicit or implicit assertion of individual existence. By contrast,
synthetic necessity is determined by the material laws of object categories and the
specific nature of unified moments.
The essential distinction between formal categories and material spheres of
essence provide the authentic basis for the distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic propositions. An analytic necessity characterizes any proposition that is
unconditionally universal in that it is free from the specifications of particular mate-
rial content. The proposition “A whole has parts and parts have wholes,” for exam-
ple, has an analytic necessity that is merely determined by the formal concepts of
whole and part. Analytic necessity can be distinguished from the specifications
involved in material concepts when positing the relation among object-categories.
Consider, again, the relationship between color and extension. Propositions regard-
ing these material concepts do not involve an inherent relation to each other – color
and extension have meanings that are independent from each other. Nevertheless,
there is an essential necessity in the relation between color and extension. This
necessity among material concepts of object categories is synthetic in that the prop-
osition “Color is not presented without extension” relates different object-categories
that operate at different degrees of generalization. The relation between the sense of
the concept of color and extension not only relate different propositional meanings
but also relate varying levels of generalization – color is a lower level generality
than extension. Color does not analytically entail extension – analytic necessity is
free of material determination of object categories at whatever level of generalization.
26 A. Konopka
Synthetic necessity is defined, in contrast, as any law that identifies a founding rela-
tionship of material concepts through the clarification of the specific sense of uni-
fied moments. The synthetic or material a priori is the necessary lawfulness of the
determinate sense in which various objects are disclosed.
Husserl solidifies the conception of necessity that is operative in his notions of the
a priori lawfulness through the logic of fitness in his theory of parts and wholes. We
have seen that the necessary supplementation involved in alteration defines, in par-
ticular, Husserl’s conception of a material a priori law as the essential relations of
presentational dependence that organize unified definite manifolds. While Husserl’s
solution to the problem of necessity gets worked out in an eidetic analysis of the
formal concepts of meaning categories, he applies this solution extensively in his
broader philosophical project, e.g., in the investigation into the logic of grammar
and later theory of constitution. Husserl’s mature theory of intentionality provides
the ultimate justification for this conception of necessity. All consciousness is con-
sciousness of such and such – or more formally – the experience of an object and the
object of experience are internally related moments, not externally related pieces.
All objects are complex objects insofar as they are given, minimally, to a subject.
Husserl characterized this internal unity between subject and object as mutually
or reciprocally dependent moments of experience. This involves a departure from
the distinction between “being for us” and “being in itself” in that an “object that is,
but is not and in principle could not be an object of consciousness, is pure non-
sense.”15 Husserl thus rejects Kant’s distinction between the world as it appears and
the world as it is in itself and shifts explanatory emphasis to the correlational varia-
tion involved in the determinate sense through which objects disclose themselves.
It is thus possible to speak of a “correlational a priori” proper to the noesis-
noema correlate that characterizes the structures of intentionality.16 For example, the
variations involved in perception provide correlative unified definite manifolds – a
manifold of appearances proper to the perceptual object and a manifold of perspec-
tival orientation proper to an embodied noesis. The perceptual object, e.g., a tree,
obtains its identity in a synthesis of a visual manifold that is generated by bodily
variations, e.g., eye movements, neck movements, walking around the tree, and so
on. The identity of the tree is manifested in and through the visual manifold. This is
a significant point that can highlight another important difference between Husserl
and Kant. For Husserl, the unity that is achieved in the synthesis identity of
15
Husserl, Edmund. 1973. Husserliana II Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, ed.
Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19ff.
16
Hua. XVII, §72; Hua. III, §90. Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David
Carr, §46. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 27
p erception is inherent in the determinate sense of the object itself and not reducible
to the perceptual achievements of the cognizing and embodied subject. The unity of
identity is present in and through the manifold of contents such that the tree is one
individual that is persistent throughout the manifold – the perceptual contents of the
phases of the perceptual manifold necessarily supplement each other in an identity.
The unity here is discovered (not achieved by the knower) and it is disclosed by and
in the object in a “synthesis of coincidence” (Deckungssynthese).17 The necessity
here finds its justification in the lack of variation or alteration among the proposi-
tional attributes of the tree, e.g., extension, location, color, and so on. The object is
a definite manifold that is unified as an identity – an individual whole – according
to the essential necessity of its interrelated parts.
Kant, by contrast, maintained that the unity involved in objects of appearance is
produced by the achievements of the cognizing knower. Kant’s account of the unity
of a sensible manifold reflects his separation between the faculties of understanding
and sensibility. Unity presupposes synthesis that, in turn, is “an act of the [subject’s]
self-activity.”18 The unity that obtains through synthesis is an “act of the understand-
ing” because unity, unlike form, demands the understanding. On the one hand, the
unity of intuition is produced in the sensible synthesis and gives intuitions to objects.
On the other hand, the unity of concepts, produced by intellectual synthesis, gives
unified concepts to objects. In both cases, the unity is presupposed and conditioned
by a “higher” unity, that is, the “original synthetic unity of apperception.” The unity
of apperception is necessarily valid and guarantees the possibility of self-
consciousness, “The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations.”19
This necessity is objective in that it unifies the intuitions of sensible manifolds.
Indeed, Kant characterizes objectivity as “that in whose concept the manifold of a
given intuition is united” and this unity is the achievement of the understanding,
“that which itself is nothing more than the power to combine a priori and the bring
the manifold of given intuitions under the unity of apperception.”20 This unity of
apperception supervenes on objects in a sensible manifold as a one-sided relation
between the subjective condition to the conditioned object.
The principle of necessity in Kant’s conception of the a priori is asymmetrical
(one-sided) from the point of view of Husserl’s notion of the correlational a priori
proper to intentionality. The correlational a priori operates with a symmetrical
notion of necessity wherein the determinate senses of objects themselves obtain
unity and fit together in states of affairs. As we have seen, this difference between
Husserl and Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge is particularly evident in their
respective accounts of the synthesis of sensible manifolds.
17
Ibid., The Origin of Geometry, 360.
18
Kant, Immanuel. 1965. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, B130. New York:
Macmillan and Company.
19
Ibid., B131.
20
Ibid., B136.
28 A. Konopka
Husserl radicalizes and explodes Kant’s notion of the a priori according to the vari-
ous levels of generalization or universality. As we have seen, the formal objective a
priori involves investigations into formal and mathematical logic and formal ontol-
ogy. The material objective a priori is more complicated in that Husserl distin-
guishes between the a priori that is pure, exact, and “bound to the empirical.”21
Consider, in particular, the conception of necessity that is involved in the “a pri-
ori bound to the empirical.” As we have seen, objects take shape as synthetic unities
in the mode “they themselves” and not merely as appearances of objects. They have
the determinate sense of their material content that is not merely unified according
to the formal concepts of the meaning formations of objects in general. The material
attributes of objects include, as we have seen, characteristics that operate at various
degrees of generalization, e.g., species, genera, and region. In addition, these mate-
rial attributes have particular determination as contingent matters of fact. It is in this
sense that the material objective a priori is also a contingent a priori. The specific
core of material content finds its determination in contrast to the specificity of dif-
ferent subsets of contents and are thus relationally limited in contingent matters of
fact. Objects have relations with different objects and the extent of these differences
limit the possible variations in which the object’s specific attributes can be deter-
mined as an object of that type. The “a priori bound to the empirical” departs from
the contents realized in empirical generalizations and intuits these contents as pre-
sumptively necessary for objects of given type. It is a presumptive generalization
with an empty necessity that is waiting to be filled out in that it has not tested the
necessity of its relations and the universality of its generalizations. The “a priori
bound to the empirical” is distinguished from the “pure material a priori” that has
achieved its fulfillment in the essential necessity manifest through a process of
eidetic variation.
Even though the necessity-amidst-contingency involved in the “a priori bound to
the empirical” has not yet been fully clarified in reflection, this does not imply that
the necessity of unified manifolds is not proper to the objects themselves. Reflection
on the way in which determinate objects in the world present themselves as sensible
manifolds with necessary associations confirms that the world is pre-given with its
own unity of coincidence (Deckung). As Husserl stated,
“…there are breaks here and there, discordances; many a partial belief us crossed
out and becomes a disbelief, many a doubt arises and remains unsolved for a time,
and so forth. But ultimately, … if the world gets an altered sense through many
particular changes, there is a unity of synthesis in spite of such alterations running
through the successive sequence of universal intending of the world – it is one in its
21
Husserl 1973, 374.
Parts, Wholes, and Phenomenological Necessity 29
particular details … it is in itself the same world. All of this seems very simple, and
yet it is full of marvelous enigmas and gives rise to profound considerations.”22
The necessary unities of sensible manifolds are not merely the result of subjec-
tive accomplishments, but have pre-given associations that are passively synthe-
sized with a necessary unity proper to themselves.
Both Kant and Husserl share the conviction that transcendental philosophy
attempts to identify and clarify the necessity of the lawful regularities in a contin-
gent world through a reference to the necessary conditions of their knowability.
They differ, however, in important ways with regard to their accounts of these nec-
essary conditions. While Kant reasons from the necessary condition of the possibil-
ity of knowledge (unity of apperception – the “I think” that accompanies all my
representations) to that which is conditioned (unified manifolds), Husserl reasons
from the conditioned (organized unity of definite manifolds) to the condition (the
structures of intentionality). In other words, Kant accounts for the necessity proper
to the unity and organization of manifolds in a one-sided relation to the subjective
accomplishments of the knower. In contrast, Husserl account for necessary unities
of sense in terms of a two-sided relation of intentionality that is inclusive of lateral
unities of coincidence.
References
Husserl, Edmund. 1966. Husserliana XI Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und
22
Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926. ed. Margot Fleischer, 101. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
30 A. Konopka
———. 1975. Husserliana XVIII Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen
Logik, ed. Elmar Holenstein. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1984. Husserliana XIX Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur
Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, ed. Ursula Panzer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Jansen, Julia. 2015. Transcendental Philosophy and the Problem of Necessity in a Contingent
World. Metodo: International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 1: 47–80.
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———. 1970. The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution. The Hague: Springer.
Willard, Dallas. 2003. The Theory of Wholes and Parts and Husserl’s Explication of the Possibility
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ed. Denis Fisette, 163–182. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
The Early Husserl Between Structuralism
and Transcendental Philosophy
Simone Aurora
1 Introduction
This paper is consistent with a line of research that had its heyday in the 1970s and
that can be basically traced back to two pioneering works published by Elmar
Holenstein (Holenstein 1975, 1976. See also Kultgen 1975). The main thesis under-
pinning these investigations is that phenomenology and structuralism emerged as
pan-European and interdisciplinary approaches and, far from representing conflict-
ing or alternative schools, developed within a wide and complex network of mutual
influences at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even though these
S. Aurora (*)
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata (FISPPA), Università
degli studi di Padova, Padova, Piazza Capitaniato, Italy
e-mail: simone.aurora@unipd.it
investigations remained quite marginal – when compared with the main directions
of phenomenological and structural inquiries – and were gradually abandoned, they
have recently regained their vigour. Just to mention the most recent and detailed
outcomes of this renewed interest in the relationship between phenomenological
and structural approach, one can make reference to the two last special issues of
Acta Structuralica. International Journal for Structuralist Research (whose topics
are, respectively, Phenomenology and Structuralism and Merleau-Ponty and
Structuralism) as well as to fresh publications like Stawarska (2015), De Palo
(2016), Aurora (2017), Flack (2018).
Against this background, the present paper intends to show in which sense the
work of the early Husserl represents a privileged place for a discussion of the pos-
sible intertwining between phenomenological and structuralist research and, in
this way, to support to the above-mentioned new – or rather – renewed approach
to Husserl.
In a wider sense, the combination of the fundamental features of phenomenology
and structuralism, as found in many aspects of Husserl’s philosophical reflection,
outlines the twin idea that, on the one hand, phenomenology is essential to solving
the typical impasse of a certain kind of structuralism, namely its tendency to employ
too rigid a notion of structure and to rest on a naïve objectivism on the other hand,
structuralism is also revealed as essential to the typical impasse of many versions of
phenomenology with their tendency towards radical forms of subjectivism.
linguistics and, above all, by the structural linguistics developed by the schools of
Prague, Moscow and Copenhagen. In fact, however, the history of structuralism
begins much earlier and is not at all limited to the field of linguistics and social sci-
ences and still less to a particular period of French culture (cf. Flack 2016). On the
contrary, structuralism constitutes – using Thomas Kuhn’s classic formulation – a
scientific paradigm, that is a set of principles that “define the legitimate problems
and methods of a research field” or, as in the case of structuralism, of a wide range
of research fields, and that is moreover “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity […]
and sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of
practitioners to resolve” (Kuhn 1996, 10). “Structuralism”, as Ernst Cassirer
observes in Structuralism in Modern Linguistics (1945), is “no isolated phenome-
non; it is, rather, the expression of a general tendency of thought that […] has
become more and more prominent in almost all fields of scientific research”
(Cassirer 1945, 120). In short, structuralism can then be seen as a coherent, unitary
and integrated scientific endeavour, which emerges in opposition to the scientific
framework typical of the nineteenth century, according to which only those explana-
tions are truly scientific, which are causal and historical-genetic.
Mature structuralism, which will not be taken into consideration in what follows,
can then be seen as a modulation of this general “tendency of thought” via an often
original development and a productive complication of those distinguished features
that are the outcome of a well-defined epistemological rupture that took place in
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and that lies in the emergence, in many
disciplinary areas – such as mathematics, psychology and linguistics – of a scien-
tific paradigm of a structural kind (cf. Bastide 1962; Piaget 1970)
“A structuralist perspective”, Roman Frigg and Ioannis Votsis write, “is one that
sees the investigation of the structural features of a domain of interest as the primary
goal of enquiry.” “This vision”, they continue, “has shaped research programmes in
fields as diverse as linguistics, literary criticism, aesthetics, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, psychology, and various branches of philosophy” (Frigg and Votsis 2011, 227).
In other words, a structuralist approach seeks to identify and describe the specific
structures embedded in a specific class of elements, which evidently varies from
discipline to discipline. To provide a univocal and rigorous definition of the concept
of structure is not an easy task, though (see Boudon: 1971; Broekman 1974 and
Lepschy 1981). Nonetheless, I think that is possible to offer a definition of “struc-
ture” via a combination of two “standard definitions” of this notion, advanced by
Roger Bastide and Jean Piaget in the 60’s.
Bastide defines the concept of structure in the following way:
1) a bound system, such that the change made to an element implies a change in the other
elements; 2) this system (and this is precisely what distinguishes it from a mere organisa-
tion) is latent in the objects – hence the expression of ‘model’ used by the structuralists –
and it is precisely because it is a model that it allows predictability and makes the observed
facts intelligible; 3) models are ‘local’ – not only in the sense that they vary depending on
the disciplines – but also that every discipline may have to use variable models; 4) the con-
cept of structure is a ‘synchronic’ concept (Bastide 1962, 13, my translation).
34 S. Aurora
3 Phenomenology as Wissenschaftslehre
In the preface of the first edition of the Logical Investigations, Husserl claims that
he will focus on “discussions of a very general sort” that stretch far beyond “the
narrow sphere of mathematics” –which he had dealt with in his first philosophical
work published in 1891, namely Philosophy of Arithmetic – and that aspire to “a
2
In the text published by Husserl, one only finds the German term “äquiform”, while the term
“isomorph” is present in the working manuscript used by Husserl.
The Early Husserl Between Structuralism and Transcendental Philosophy 37
4 Wholes and Aggregates
After having argued for the ideal nature of meaning, in the First Investigation, and
having proposed the crucial distinction between individual and specific objects, in
the Second, Husserl devotes himself in the Third to a fundamental, formal study of
the possible relations that can obtain, in a priori fashion, among objects.3 These are
On the crucial role played by the Third Investigation within Husserl’s work (cf. Fine 1995;
3
4
According to the Third Investigation, we can only talk of relative independence and non-indepen-
dence. As Husserl indeed maintains, there cannot be objects that are absolutely independent to
each other, namely that have no relation whatsoever with other objects, nor objects that are abso-
lutely non-independent, namely that are connected with each and every object. Objects are always
independent or non-independent in relation to other specific objects. Thus, an object A can be rela-
tively non-independent in regard to B and, at the same time, relatively independent in regard to C.
The Early Husserl Between Structuralism and Transcendental Philosophy 39
the law which says that it is not merely so here and now, but universally so, and with a law-
ful universality. Here we must note that […] the ‘necessity’ relevant to our discussion of
non-independent ‘moments’ stands for an ideal or a priori necessity (Husserl 2001b, 12).
The general form that pertains to the necessary lawfulness that presides over the
foundational relations that obtain among non-independent objects is determined by
ontological inclusion-exclusion laws. An object or content A is thus non-independent
whenever it necessarily entails the existence or non existence of an object or content
B.
Against this background, Husserl then distinguishes between two different kinds
of sets of objects, namely aggregates and wholes. Aggregates are mere sums of
independent objects, which stand together accidentally, that is without implying a
relation of foundation, whereas by wholes Husserl understands a set of non-
independent objects, which are unified by a foundational relation, that is to say, with
Husserl’s words,
a range of contents which are all covered by a single foundation without the help of further
contents. The contents of such a range we call its parts. Talk of the singleness of the founda-
tion implies that every content is foundationally connected, whether directly or indirectly,
with every content (Husserl 2001b, 34).
5 Transcendental Structuralism
systematic description lies in the formal ontology developed by Husserl in the Third
Investigation. All the various specific structuralisms, like structural linguistics or
mathematical structuralism, must then be able to be deduced, in a priori fashion, via
the pure theory of manifolds developed by Husserl in the Prolegomena to a Pure
Logic. Every single science represents, in this sense, a specific manifold, that is a
domain of objects which is governed by a set of axioms and mereological laws that
are bound to the class of object specifically considered. For instance, in the case of
mathematics mathematical entities and their structural laws, in the case of linguis-
tics, linguistic signs and their structural laws, and so on.
Husserl’s structuralism is, moreover, a phenomenological structuralism. In the
first place, it is a general theory of knowledge and, in the second place, a general
theory of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, it could also be defined as a gnoseo-
logical or as an epistemological structuralism. From a phenomenological point of
view, the fundamental relation behind all possible knowledge lies in intentionality,
that is, in the mutual relationship between the structures of the consciousness and
the structures of different objectualities. However, there is no ontological priority
whatsoever between these two poles of the intentional relation. Although an episte-
mological priority pertains to consciousness, since it is consciousness that imple-
ments the process of knowledge, there could be no consciousness, and therefore no
knowledge, without the intentioned phenomenical objectualities which are pre-
given to consciousness. At the same time, no phenomenon could be experienced
outside the relation to a consciousness. Phenomenology aims to study not the psy-
chological rules of the relation between a specific consciousness and its particular
objects, but instead the conditions of possibility of this correlation, that is the gen-
eral, universal and structural laws of intentionality. As Giovanni Piana writes,
the general thesis of phenomenological research, which is at the same time its condition of
possibility, sounds as follow: in all its various manifestations, experience always reveals a
structure and phenomenological research must uncover with clarity all the joints and articu-
lations of this structure (Piana 2013a, 8, my translation).
Consciousness and objects postulate each other. Thus, to speak properly, what
are pre-given are not objective structures nor consciousness’s structures; rather,
what is pre-given is the intentional correlation itself. As Derrida writes further,
Husserl, thus, ceaselessly attempts to reconcile the structuralist demand (which leads to the
comprehensive description of a totality, of a form or a function organized according to an
internal legality in which elements have meaning only in the solidarity of their correlation
or their opposition) with the genetic demand (that is the search for the origin and foundation
of the structure) (Derrida 2005, 197).
This attempt to conciliate genesis and structure, which we find in the early
Husserl and, especially, in the Logical Investigations, represents the hallmark of
Husserl’s structuralism and, at the same time, the fundamental question which
Husserl attempts to answer in his mature works.
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Transcendental Consciousness: Subject,
Object, or Neither?
Corijn van Mazijk
1 Introduction
any kind of objective regional ontology, but instead as encompassing the totality of
being considered from an ultimate viewpoint. Transcendental consciousness as
region of inquiry includes the totality of being viewed from the transcendental
attitude.
In contemporary literature one can find a number of opposing views on the target
object of phenomenological inquiry. My aim in the next section will not be to pro-
vide a detailed overview of all these positions. Instead, I will give a broad outline of
three kinds of views on transcendental consciousness that are reflected in current
literature and briefly indicate reasons for maintaining them. I call these (i) the sub-
jectivist readings, (ii) the representationalist or objectivist (west coast) readings,
and (iii) the east coast readings. Out of the opposition between the last two an inter-
pretative problem then surfaces, which I address in more detail in the third and
fourth sections.
2 Three Readings
1
See: Føllesdal (1969), Dreyfus and Hall (1982), Dreyfus (1982), McIntyre (1986), McIntyre and
Smith (1989), Smith (2007, 2013).
Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? 47
which we acquire knowledge of things, and that nothing is thereby implied about the
being of those things. On this reading, consciousness and the existing object to
which it can be intentionally related are in fact ‘completely distinct entities’ (Smith
and McIntyre 1989, 162). In phenomenology, what is at stake is ‘the representa-
tional character of mind or consciousness’; how a ‘mental state or experience is […]
a representation of something other than itself’ (Smith and McIntyre 1989, 147).
The phenomenologist, in this respect, neither studies real objects nor clarifies the
being of those objects. Instead, phenomenology has its own region of objectivities,
its own regional ontology, namely the mental representations in consciousness and
the intentional processes that yield them.
Representationalist readers frequently maintain that for instance in an act of per-
ceiving, the acts and appearances in consciousness are ontologically distinct from
the real object that the act is directed at. Such a reading is supported by recurring
remarks of Husserl where he contrasts appearances with real things existing outside
of us. In both Logical Investigations and Ideas I, Husserl maintains that a ‘real tree’
as an object of natural-scientific scrutiny is distinct from a ‘real tree as appearance’
(Husserl 1983, 182–184; 1984, 359–390). Of the former notion of tree we say it can
be chopped or burned down; of the latter we do not. One can, Husserl thinks, formu-
late numerous propositions that one holds to be true about the real tree, yet none of
these have any bearing on the real tree as appearance.
Partially taking clue from such remarks, scholars such as Smith and McIntyre
hold that consciousness for Husserl is best understood as something distinct from
the kind of reality studied in science. As they put it, ‘the noemata [broadly speaking
the object reduced to its appearance] and objects are distinct’ (Smith and McIntyre
1989, 165). Although consciousness for Husserl indeed is a condition of possibility
for knowledge of objects, it does not give being to those objects. Husserl’s notion of
consciousness therefore has primarily an epistemological signification, which
makes transcendental phenomenology ‘an epistemological rather than a metaphysi-
cal doctrine (such as Berkeley’s idealism)’ (Smith and McIntyre 1982, 104).
The third reading worth demarcating stems from a school of readers which chal-
lenges the above west coast interpretation. These scholars understand transcenden-
tal consciousness in a more world-encompassing sense. The so-called east coast
readers, including Dan Zahavi and John Drummond2, point out that there are rea-
sons to hesitate in straightforwardly accepting a representationalist reading of the
object of transcendental-phenomenological inquiry. One reason for this is that
Husserl is himself dismissive of a representationalist account of consciousness
(Husserl 1983, 92–94). Also, Drummond claims that west coast readers misinterpret
the relation between phenomenology and ontology. They ‘ontologize’ the noema
and indeed consciousness itself, which, according to Drummond, ‘distorts Husserl’s
theory of intentionality’ (Drummond 2009, 593–94). By ontologizing, Drummond
means ascribing to phenomenology a region of objectivities distinct from and on a
par with the regions of natural scientific inquiry. The west coast readers, so east
coast readers claim, isolate consciousness from its world by making consciousness
and object distinct entities. According to the east coast reading, transcendental con-
sciousness is not distinct from its world; it is beyond the divide of subject and object
(Zahavi 2008, 371).
These are, in all too brief summary, three prominent readings of transcendental
consciousness as the phenomenological field of inquiry. First, the subjectivist read-
ings, which identify consciousness with (some part of) the subject or affiliate with
it an explicitly subjective mode of inquiry. Second, the representationalist readings,
which stress that consciousness for Husserl is a distinct ontological region, and thus
is a kind of object (or region of objectivities) of its own kind (which does not have
the privilege of clarifying other regional objectivities apart from our access to them).
Third, the east coast readings, which take consciousness in a more world-
encompassing sense and possibly as lying beyond the distinction of subject and
object altogether.
Notwithstanding the importance of subjectivist readings, the east and west coast
readings are, to my mind, philosophically speaking the most significant. Their
opposition is due to an actual tension found in Husserl’s writings. On the one hand,
Husserl frequently expresses his commitment to the idea that real objects and phe-
nomenologically reduced objects are not the same thing. In Logical Investigations
as well as in Ideas I, Husserl notes that whereas a real tree can burn, the tree as
appearance cannot. Again, in Ideas III, Husserl expressly states that the theme of
phenomenology has to be ‘a totally different one’ than the one central to natural-
scientific research. As he there puts it: ‘a “physical thing” as correlate [of conscious-
ness] is not a physical thing; therefore the quotation marks’ (Ideas III 72 my italics).
All of this serves the west coast readers well, as it suggests that consciousness is
indeed distinct from real objects.
On the other hand, however, Husserl also remarks in Ideas I that the ‘whole spa-
tiotemporal world […] is nothing’ beyond its ‘being for a consciousness’ (Husserl
1983, 112). It is altogether inconceivable, he further notes, that any object would
ever signify a ‘reaching out beyond the world which is for consciousness’ (Husserl
1983, 121). Every existent, everything ‘transcendent necessarily must be experi-
enceable […] by an actual ego’ (Husserl 1983, 108). Also, in Ideas III, Husserl
notes that pure phenomenology does not really have a distinct object of inquiry after
all, but rather ‘contain[s] within itself all ontologies’ (Husserl 1980, 66). Real
objects and objects for consciousness are not distinct: the ‘true being of nature is not
a second one next to mere intentional being’ (Husserl 2002, 276). Reality does not
somehow contain two types of being which would ‘dwell peaceably side by side’
(Husserl 1983, 111). All of this, in turn, supports the east coast reading, as it stresses
the world-encompassing nature of transcendental consciousness, beyond which
there would be nothing.
Over the course of the next section, I aim to develop a reading that provides a
new way of considering this apparent contradiction which has fueled debates about
transcendental consciousness (and the noema) for several decades. Because of the
limited length of this paper, I will put most energy in the development of just one
argument. The argument primarily serves to show that the kind of intuitions that
guide the west and east coast readers can be made compatible (which is not to say
Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? 49
both views are equally correct). The argument contains, to my mind, two interesting
features: (a) it subscribes to Husserl a kind of metaphysical commitment, and (b) it
considers transcendental consciousness as region of inquiry as encompassing the
totality of being viewed from an ultimate standpoint. While (b) might be shared by
some east coast readers, getting clear about (a) allows us to integrate the correct
intuitions underlying west coast readings.
3 Problem and Solution
First let me restate our interpretative problem clearly. For this we can return in a bit
more detail to the example of the two senses of the tree Husserl discusses. On the
one horn of our dilemma, Husserl claims that a real tree can burn down and tree as
appearance to consciousness cannot (Husserl 1983, 182–184; 1984, 359–390). As
Husserl generalizes the point in Ideas III, ‘to posit physical things as actually pres-
ent is not to posit something meant as a physical thing’ (Husserl 1980, 89). To
illustrate the point, Husserl suggests that if I want to know the chemistry of a burn-
ing tree, I should not go and study tree appearances. Reversely, if I want to under-
stand the appearance of trees in pure perceptual consciousness, facts about the
chemistry of trees will have no epistemic bearing. In both cases, ‘the theme is there-
fore a totally different one’ (Husserl 1980, 85).
There can be little doubt that Husserl maintained this separation of themes of
phenomenological and natural inquiry. If we follow this line of thought further, it
can be tempting to conclude that consciousness and real object must be altogether
‘distinct entities’ (Smith and McIntyre 1989, 162). No examination of conscious-
ness could then say anything about real trees. To be sure, phenomenology explains
the appearing of real trees, that is, of the ‘real tree as appearance’. It describes con-
sciousness’s access to reality. It does not, however, address reality itself. It is thus a
form of epistemological idealism, as Smith and McIntyre suggest (Smith and
McIntyre 1982, 104), which examines our knowledge of or access to things, but not
the very being of those things.
Yet there is an abundance of textual evidence that makes this reading unsatisfac-
tory to say the least. On the other horn of our dilemma, we find Husserl apparently
negating his separation of consciousness from reality, claiming that reality in fact ‘is
possible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure conscious-
ness’ (Husserl 1983, 115). As Husserl writes, ‘unities of sense presuppose […] a
sense-bestowing consciousness’ (Husserl 1983, 128–129). Reality does not lie
beyond consciousness: the ‘world […] is nothing’ beyond its ‘being for a conscious-
ness’ (Husserl 1983, 112).
So here is our dilemma: if we accept the first line of thought, we can maintain
phenomenology’s independent scientific status; phenomenology has its own distinct
object of study. Also, we avoid opening Pandora’s box and having to consider Husserl
some kind of eccentric idealist. On the downside, however, this reading leaves us
virtually no tools to make sense of Husserl’s recurring ideal of a transcendental phe-
50 C. van Mazijk
3
Melle (2010, 94) correctly points out that Husserl’s metaphysical claim, or argument as Melle
calls it, comes before the phenomenological reduction. The commitment at stake is therefore not
strictly phenomenological, but can be made prior to that in the natural attitude.
Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? 51
lacks a proper reality constituted in that. Consciousness, then, can be thought with-
out a world correlated to it. Husserl’s second – and much more crucial – step is to
show that the reverse thesis is not imaginable (Husserl 1983, 109–112). Husserl
claims that we cannot possibly conceive of world without consciousness. Now this
reverse thesis must be understood as a metaphysical thesis.
Husserl, then, suggests that consciousness is a priori involved in reality, while
the reverse does not hold. As Husserl puts it, ‘the world, every thinkable world in
general is only thinkable as relative, relative to the reality of consciousness’ (Husserl
2003, 78). This amount to a metaphysical thesis in the sense defined because it con-
cerns a claim about what all possible and actual being amounts to. To be sure,
Husserl himself does not so much consider this a metaphysical postulate, but rather
an a priori valid insight. That the real tree must ultimately collapse into the appear-
ing tree is plainly undeniable. For Husserl, there is no sense to the idea of an object
that excludes relations to apprehending consciousness – even the very idea presup-
poses a consciousness entertaining it.
For Husserl, it is not just accidentally the case that all being is tied to constituting
transcendental consciousness. It is no mere theory. Rather, we can ascertain ourselves
a priori that it cannot possibly be otherwise. It is this postulate Husserl accepts –
appropriated by him as an apodictically ascertainable insight – that we can character-
ize as metaphysical, as it is a postulate concerning all possible and actual being.
This metaphysical postulate is further not contingent to the phenomenological
enterprise, but strictly necessary for transcendental phenomenology to take off.4
Phenomenology is transcendental – addressing the ‘final source’ of things (Husserl
1976, 100) – only on the premise that ‘everything’ in its final sense can be ‘brought
back’ to transcendental consciousness (Husserl 1980, 69). Indeed, the material pos-
sibility of existence beyond consciousness must be excluded. Without this certainty,
there is no absolute guarantee that phenomenology can offer the final clarification
of ‘every imaginable sense, every imaginable being’ (Husserl 1960, 84).
The metaphysical commitment thus satisfies (ii): that appearance-reality and
reality are in a sense identical, i.e. that they do not ‘dwell peaceably side by side’
(Husserl 1983, 111); that the real world is not something apart from or beyond being
for consciousness (Husserl 1983, 112). So how does Husserl make this compatible
with the first (i) claim, that appearance-reality and reality must also be understood
as distinct?
The way he does so by claiming that in regional-ontological terms, the empirical
sciences study an objective reality which qua sense or qua theme is independent
from consciousness. This is, I think, the correct intuition underlying west coast
readings. In terms of themes of inquiry, phenomenology and empirical science have
4
Phenomenology as such does not demand this a priori thesis. Husserl’s statements about e.g.
physical thing constitution could still hold a priori within a certain region without it. More exactly,
the phenomenological laws of physical thing constitution could then hold a priori within the now
limited (ontological) region of consciousness. In short, an a priori phenomenology could do with-
out the metaphysical commitment. However, it would then be a ‘de-transcendentalized’ phenom-
enology, and hence not the phenomenology the mature Husserl envisaged.
52 C. van Mazijk
4 Further Discussion
My argument in the previous section was that phenomenology and natural science
genuinely study one and the same reality, even though they have different themes.
‘Real and intentional being’ thus do not ‘dwell peaceably side by side’ (Husserl
1983, 111). There is ultimately only one world, and it is the world experienced by
consciousness. The phenomenologist does not investigate a separate realm of con-
scious being; it investigates this very world: ‘the always presumed world, as and
how it is presumed, the always known and knowable world, precisely as it is
known and knowable’ (Husserl 1974, 43).
I argued that the fact that phenomenological and empirical-scientific investiga-
tions have a different theme does not demand positing distinct objects. Instead, the
Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? 53
separation of themes can also be accounted for in terms of attitudes to which cor-
respond different themes. Whereas the sciences simply leap over the constituting
activities of consciousness and the object as produced in it to the object as real,
which ultimately is only a constitutive accomplishment of consciousness, the phe-
nomenologist studies (metaphysically speaking) the same object, only now as con-
stituted appearance-reality in constituting consciousness. As Husserl puts it: the
‘transcendence [of the empirically real object] is part of the intrinsic sense of any-
thing worldly, despite the fact that [it] necessarily acquires all the sense determining
it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing’ (Husserl
1960, 26 my italics). This latter level of constituting experiencing is made thematic
in transcendental phenomenology. The real object of natural-scientific inquiry is
metaphysically speaking not beyond this level; only qua sense or qua theme of
inquiry does it acquire a separate status.
In the introduction I stated that this interpretation would have two implications
of particular interest. One concerns how to conceptualize transcendental conscious-
ness as a region of inquiry, the other the metaphysics underlying transcendental
phenomenology. Regarding the latter, I argued that transcendental phenomenology
strictly speaking is not metaphysically neutral. When Husserl remarks that ‘every
imaginable sense, every imaginable being […] falls within the domain of transcen-
dental subjectivity’ (Husserl 1960, 84), he does not merely make an assertion about
the scope of the phenomenological field of investigation. There is also a statement
implied about what all being, actual and possible, ultimately boils down to.
Moreover, as I showed previously, phenomenology can be transcendental only by
accepting this postulate. It must be impossible to even conceive of existence beyond
consciousness if we are to obtain a priori certainty that a science of consciousness
can be a first philosophy.
Let me now turn to the other point of interest, namely how the current account
affects how we ought to think about transcendental consciousness. On the present
reading, transcendental consciousness simply is the totality of being considered purely
for what it is at what I have called the metaphysical level. This means that instead of
leaping over the object as constituted toward the object as real, the phenomenologist
sticks to the former, which is ultimately (metaphysically, not ontologically) what the
latter amounts to as well. Transcendental phenomenology then has the endless task of
analyzing what all actual and possible being in its final sense (at the constituting-
constituted level) amounts to. As Husserl puts it, ‘by carrying out the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction, […] we make the world as such our theme together with
every natural consideration of the world, from an ultimate standpoint […] which
includes all critique of reason and all genuine philosophical problems’ (Husserl 1977,
170 my italics). The standpoint is ‘ultimate’ simply because it directly thematizes that
to which all transcendent being can ultimately be brought back to, i.e. transcendental
consciousness as final ‘source’ (or the final truth) of all being.
To conclude this section, we can juxtapose this reading here briefly to the subjec-
tivist, representationalist, and east coast readings discussed earlier. With respect to
them, it is my suspicion that the subjectivist readings, much like the representation-
alist west coast readings, rely on too strict a separation of consciousness and object.
54 C. van Mazijk
There is, to be sure, a sense in which the world’s unfolding is always an unfolding
for a consciousness, and to that extent a subjective characterization of phenomenol-
ogy seems justified. But to suggest that Husserl’s position is ‘firmly a first-person
perspective’ (Luft 2005, 152) which is not ‘beyond the distinction between first-and
third-person perspective’ seems to steer away from the a priori bond of the object
to consciousness Husserl subscribes to. Transcendental consciousness is not some
pure subject in opposition to the world, unaffected in its constitutive activity by the
real things and people it encounters. The social-objective world is part of the uni-
verse Husserl investigates (because everything is, which is precisely what the meta-
physical thesis specifies), and so is the self as a person in that world. Subject and
object are both sides belonging to transcendental consciousness, and phenomenol-
ogy is not restricted to the study of just one of them.
The representationalist readings, on the other hand, as I discussed already, fall
short for downplaying the metaphysical inclusion of the being of the object in con-
stituting consciousness. Husserl’s separation of reality and appearance-reality as
distinct themes of inquiry is misinterpreted as a distinction in ontological regions
that would be on a par and mutually grounding.
Thirdly, then, east coast readings generally do recognize Husserl’s idealist com-
mitments. Moran, for instance, argues that the notion of transcendental conscious-
ness involves a metaphysical claim (Moran 2005, 197), and so does Melle (2010,
94). Also, Zahavi believes that consciousness for Husserl is beyond the distinction
between inner and outer (Zahavi 2004, 52; 2008, 356–371). Zahavi, however,
although he accepts that phenomenology has some metaphysical implications
(excluding naïve realism, for instance), seems to object to reading Husserl as a
metaphysical idealist and to understanding transcendental consciousness as a meta-
physical notion (Zahavi 2010, 79–87). I tried to argue here that Husserl does accept
a postulate about all possible and actual being that could be characterized as meta-
physical. Moreover, this postulate is separate from and compatible with distinctions
in ontology Husserl makes while also necessary for ascribing a transcendental char-
acter to phenomenology. Getting clear about Husserl’s metaphysical commitment
thus contributes to dissolving apparent tensions that lie at the foundations of
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.
5 Conclusion
The debate about transcendental consciousness (and to a certain degree the noema)
is, I argued, to a large extent due to a tension in Husserl’s writings. This tension is,
however, only apparent. Husserl resolves it by making a positive assertion about
what all possible and actual being in its foundations amounts to. Crucially, this com-
mitment comes prior to distinctions in ontology and scientific themes or regions of
inquiry, and is therefore compatible with such distinctions. The understanding of
transcendental consciousness this account yields is thereby not ontological. For
Husserl, transcendental consciousness ‘contain[s] within itself all ontologies’
Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither? 55
(Husserl 1980, 66); it is that which all being can ultimately be brought back to – the
streaming life of consciousness which harbors the full sense of reality in itself, and
beyond which no existent would be conceivable.
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56 C. van Mazijk
Vedran Grahovac
Abstract I propose in this text that Husserl’s response to his contemporaries, crit-
ics and immediate predecessors in Logical Investigations consists in the develop-
ment of circular strategy. Husserl does not challenge psychologsim, empiricism or
neo-Kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy
over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl philosophically challenges these
positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical
distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him
to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward reference to the
theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it inves-
tigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process.
V. Grahovac (*)
University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada
1 Introduction
In this text I focus on Husserl’s relationship with psychologism, and how his
response to psychologistic logic informed his analysis of logical categories and
their constitution. Husserl proposes, as an alternative to psychologistic logic, a
groundwork for the analytical practice called the ideal science of logic. Husserl
reflects upon psychologism as a theory of logical relations in terms of their mental
correlates. He sees the alternative in an ideal science of logic that is focused on ideal
lawfulness and the genesis of logical categories. The seemingly obvious and strict
opposition between psychologism and the science of logic turns out being, I sug-
gest, a more complicated relationship of concurrence and conceptual complemen-
tarity. Husserl’s criticism of psychologism develops as a careful problematizing of
its philosophical justification and unfolds as a thorough investigation into the self-
evidential moments in its theory. The firm ground of the ideal science of logic is
achieved through its argumentative dependency on the psychologistic notion of
self-evidentiality.
Husserl criticizes the psychologistic tradition in the Prolegomena to the Logical
Investigations through the careful examination of the works of Mill, Sigwart,
Stumpf, Herbart, Erdmann, Heymans and Lotze. Martin Kusch points out in
Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge that
Husserl’s reflection upon logical psychologism offered praise for and levied harsh
criticism towards the authors he treated.1 I propose in this chapter that Husserl’s
criticism of psychologism unfolds as the inflation and the radicalization of its
accomplishments. I also suggest that, conversely, the philosophical success of the
1
“To begin with, Husserl found words of praise even for those philosophers that he criticized
harshly and at great length: Mill’s treatment of logic was ‘valuable’ ([1900] 1975:19); Drobisch
was ‘excellent’ (trefflich) ([1900] 1975:50); Lange’s logic ‘wise’ (geistvoll) ([1900] 1975: 101);
Sigwart ‘important’ (bedeutend) ([1900] 1975:106, 138), ‘excellent’ (ausgezeichnet) ([1900]
1975:107) and displaying ‘so much acumen’ (Scharfsinn) ([1900] 1975: 138); Heymans’ work
was ‘interesting’ ([1900] 1975:116); Erdmann ‘excellent’, ‘of outstanding merit’ (verdient)
([1900] 1975:149) and ‘outstanding’ (hervorragend) ([1900] 1975:157). Husserl also referred to
Brentano and Stumpf indirectly ‘as the men…to whom my scientific education owes most’ ([1900]
1975:7). Husserl even denied that ‘psychologism’ was meant as a term with negative connotations:
‘I am using the expressions “psychologicist”, “psychologism”, etc. without any derogatory slant’
([1900] 1975:64). And having chastised Erdmann’s ideas as ‘absurd’, Husserl went on to explain
that ‘absurd’ too was used ‘without any slant’ ([1900] 1975:153). Furthermore, at one point,
Husserl presented his anti-psychologism as a compromise formula between the earlier normative
anti-psychologism and psychological logic” ([1900] 1975:168).” (Kusch, Psychologism: A Case
Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, (New York, 203). This observation by Kusch
is also recalled by Andras Varga in his essay “Psychology as Positive Heritage of Husserl’s
Phenomenological Philosophy” in Studia Phaenomenologica X : 118.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 59
pure science of logic can only be measured against the background of its own hyper-
bolizing. The main distinction of Husserl’s relation to psychologism is reflected
neither in the frontal dismissal of the psychologistic theories, nor in the mere
replacement of psychologism with the theory of the ideal science of logic. The con-
frontation between the pure science of logic and logical psychologism cannot be
understood as a mere confrontation between the victorious side and the defeated
opponent. The reason why this wrestling cannot result in the brutal self-affirmation
of the victor is that the ideal laws of logic gain their purity only through the illumi-
nation of the completeness of the psychologistic concept of self-evidentiality.2 The
illumination of the main principles on which the concept of inner evidence, con-
ceived as a mental investment, rests provides insight into the inherent betrayal of its
obligatory and universal claim for truth. Husserl does not discover a particularized
problem in the argumentative structure of the psychologistic notion of inner evi-
dence but suggests that the ‘problem’ lies precisely in the seeming argumentative
success of psychologism. Husserl’s understanding of the pure science of logic col-
lapses the psychologistic distinction between logic as a theory of norms and logic as
a normative-regulatory discipline.
The psychological act of epistemological self-assurance culminates in mere com-
pulsion and calls for the intervention of the pure science of logic. Conversely, the
‘theoretical’ purity of the ideal science of logic consists in the ‘practice’ of the criti-
cal examination of the psychologistic inner-evidentiality. I address this relation
between pure science of logic and psychologism by tracing Husserl’s criticism of
psychologistic logic. According to psychologistic logic, every logical operation is
grounded in mental processes, and this is a self-evidential fact. The fact that logical
operations are mentally founded is supported by experiential evidentiality. This
means that because we have the capacity for psychological experience, logical laws
must be grounded psychologically. The self-evidentiality of the psychologistic notion
of inner evidence, as observed by Husserl, ends up in tautology. What seems to be a
sufficient psychologistic confirmation of the founded-ness of logical laws on mental
processes is revealed to be a mere self-repetition of its seeming experiential obvious-
ness and it is exaggerated as such under the lens of Husserl’s ideal science of logic.
The psychologistic tautology is visible in the seeming obviousness of the mutual
exclusion of contradictory modes of consciousness in one judgment. Husserl
describes the psychologistic notion of inner evidentiality by suggesting that the
“term ‘inner evidence’ stands for a mental character, well-known to everyone
through his inner experience, a peculiar feeling which guarantees the truth of the
judgment to which it attaches.”3 This inner experience, which is “well known to
everyone,” is fortified by the seeming obviousness of the fact that “mutual exclusion
enters into the definition of the correlative terms.”4 In other words, the affirmation
2
Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1, 86–87. I use the abbreviation LI 1 and LI 2 for the two
volumes of Logical Investigations in this paper. The emphasis in bold is mine throughout this
essay.
3
Ibid, 115.
4
Ibid, 57.
60 V. Grahovac
of one term in a relation is provided through the exclusion of its opposing term. The
indubitable authority of the feeling of certainty, or the lack thereof, which guaran-
tees acquisition of knowledge of the inquired phenomenon, is what prevails. This
feeling of certainty, however, makes possible the completion of the tautological
motion, where the psychological confirmation assumes the form of self-repetition.
In other words, the structure of the psychologistic insight into the impossibility of
two contradictory terms being joined in one observation – the weather is hot and
cold– develops in the following manner: the weather cannot be cold and hot at the
same time, as our mental capacity to confirm the unification between these two
terms will not provide us with the tranquility of a final decision. Furthermore, that
we experience mental fulfillment in our recognition that two opposing terms in rela-
tion exclude each other points back to the state-of-affairs to which our mental con-
firmation or dismissal refers. In other words, it is not hot and cold, because we
simply feel it cannot be otherwise. We feel satisfied with the argumentative structure
of our insight that it is cold or hot outside simply because it is not hot or cold at the
same time. The reason for this, of course, lies in the empiricist-psychologistic
assumption that consciousness is a flow and a combinatory host to its components.
We simply cannot feel hot and cold at the same time, as we reflect upon what is
available to us in terms of the ready-made components of the reflective predisposi-
tion of our consciousness. These mutually exclusive components cannot co-exist in
our consciousness, as the impossibility of the combination of the isolated parts
determines the flow of consciousness. The flow of consciousness confirms itself by
being able to choose between opposing terms, because it organizes the terms in rela-
tions in a way in which they do not exclude each other. In other words, the terms that
are supposed to be self-evidentially related within the mediation of consciousness
are already experienced as isolated, so that the subsequent relation of either inclu-
sion or exclusion of these terms can take place.
In this text I propose two main components of the relation between pure science
of logic and psychologism, namely two different modes in which tautology (psy-
chologistic logic) and circularity (pure science of logic) are related to exaggeration
and intensification. Both tautology and exaggeration (and, analogously, circularity
and intensification) should be treated as inherently connected, because they are
manifested only through their mutual reference. I shall describe these two different
types of circularities before I turn to the examination of Husserl’s text.
One could argue that psychologism justifies itself by openly promoting ‘particu-
larism’ over the ‘universality’ of logical laws. However, if we carefully approach
the argumentation employed by psychologism, we realize that it secures for itself a
peculiar position of ‘theoretical purity.’ The purification of logical laws from the
claims that these laws are not contingent upon mental processes is grounded in the
argumentative self-evidentiality of psychologism. Conversely, the pure science of
logic openly announces its purity apropos psychologism, while at the same time
acknowledging its argumentative indebtedness to it. The ideal science of logic is not
oblivious to the process of its constitution, which as a deliberate self-referentiality
serves as a mirror to the constitutive gaps in the seeming particularism or concre-
tism found in psychologistic logic or empiricism. The purification process in the
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 61
ideal science of logic is designed to address the problems involved in the distinction
between pure and contingent as it is found in both psychologistic logic and logical
absolutism. Circularity-intensification (the ideal science of logic) and well as
tautology-exaggeration (in psychologism), to sum up, provide an insight into two
complementary processes:
1. The psychologistic attempt to secure the ground of logic through the exclusion
of what it is to be purified of ends up in self-repetition, and the justification for
this self-repetition is that it opens up the possibility for further clarification of the
purification process by the ideal science of logic. The ideal science of logic sug-
gests that the stark opposition between the realm of the contingent and the puri-
fied realm of logical laws as found in logical absolutism is merely replicated in
psychologism under the guise of the mental foundation of logical laws. I propose
that Husserl develops his analysis of the relation between psychologism and the
ideal science of logic by insisting that what underlies psychologistic criticism of
absolute logicism is a reversal of epistemological authority. Instead of the pri-
macy of the universality of logical laws, psychologism advances the primacy of
their dependency on mental processes. Psychologism thereby secures its anti-
universalism through the insistence on the fact that the epistemological throne,
which used to belong to the authority of universal, is now reserved for the psy-
chologistic notion of inner evidence. I suggest that one sort of purification is
merely being substituted for another: logicism practices the purification of logi-
cal processes through the purgation of mental correlates, while psychologism
practices the purification of logical processes through the purgation of all of
them that are not located in psychological processes. Psychologism ends up in
self-repetition, and it turns its justificatory lack into a universal epistemic value.
The only philosophical justification of psychologism is in its calling upon its
capacity to guarantee the certainty of inner evidence. What appears to be the
reason for the ultimate argumentative success of psychologism, namely the
experiential evidentiality of its position, becomes the main target for Husserl.
Husserl’s finding is that psychologistic self-justification is not only tautological
but also proud of its self-referentiality. This makes the process of psychologistic
justification dominantly cynical through its own self-exaggeration. It is not only
that the claim “A (logical laws) is B (mental correlate)” is confirmed through the
fact that B underlies our experience of logic, but also through the claim that B is
B, or the psychological foundation of our experience of logic is always self-
evidential. In other words, not only A is B because B is A, but B is A because B
is B. Husserl’s pointing out of the mere reversal of the epistemological authority
in psychologistic anti-absolutism is crucial for the design of his pure science of
logic.
2. The ideal science of logic secures its legitimate position as a ‘science’ by dem-
onstrating its impossibility to be external to what it criticizes. The possibility of
the grounding of logical laws is found in the withdrawal of the pure science of
logic from the battle between universal objectivity of logical rules and the non-
universalist contingency of psychological laws. The grandiosity of its self-
62 V. Grahovac
trace of the psychological or the real. They are purely conceptual propositions, transform-
able, as in every like case, into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities…
(118) Though we stress the ideality of the possibilities of evident judgment which can
be derived from logical principles, and which we see to reveal their a priori validity in
cases of apodeictic self-evidence, we do not deny their psychologistic utility… If we take
a law that, out of two contradictory propositions, one is true and one is false, and deduce
from it the truth that, one only out of every pair of possible contradictory judgments can
have the character of inward evidence, we may note this to be a self-evidentially correct
deduction, if self evidence be defined as the experience in which the correctness of his judg-
ment is brought home to a judging subject, the new proposition utters a truth about the
compatibilities or incompatibilities of certain mental experiences. In this manner, however,
every proposition of pure mathematics tells us something about possible or impossible hap-
penings in the mental realm. No empirical enumeration or calculation, no mental act
of algebraic transformation of geometrical construction, is possible which conflicts
with the ideal laws of mathematics. These laws accordingly have a psychological use.
We can read off from each of them a priori possibilities and impossibilities relating to cer-
tain sorts of mental acts, acts of counting, of additive and manipulative combination etc.
These laws are not there made into psychological laws. Psychology, the natural science
(119) concerned with what we mentally live through, has to look into the natural conditions
of our experience. In its field are specifically to be found the empirically real relation-
ships of our mathematical and logical activities, whose ideal relations and laws make
up an independent realm. This latter realm is set up in purely universal propositions,
made up out of ‘concepts’ which are not class-concepts of mental acts, but ideal con-
cepts of essence, each with its concrete foundation in such mental acts or in their
objective correlates. ... The inward evidence of our judgments does not merely depend on
such psychological conditions, conditions that one might also call external and empirical,
since they are rooted not purely in the specific form and matter of our judgment, but in its
empirical context in mental life: it depends also on ideal conditions.6
6
Ibid, 119.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
64 V. Grahovac
concepts have their psychological foundation, their full epistemological scope is not
actualized in this way. Their indebtedness to the mental realm, in fact, testifies to the
fact that this is only one part of the story, so to speak. While the ideal laws of logic
have their psychological relevance, they are nevertheless not reducible to the realm
of psychologism. The psychological utility of a priori logical principles does not
impinge upon their ideality, but it does emphasize that their ideal component belongs
to a realm that lies outside the jurisdiction of psychologism. Husserl thereby con-
fronts the logical significance of psychologism by not dismissing the psychological
relevance of logical laws. This allows Husserl to suggest that propositions about
inner evidence (a psychologistic term) retain simultaneously both their a priori
character and their psychological relevance. Even though the propositions of pure
mathematics “tell us something about possible or impossible happenings in the
mental realm”, and a priori logical laws have the capacity to be relevant for the
realm of psychology, this does not render them exclusively psychological. I suggest
that this situation does not illustrate the epistemological primacy of the ideal science
of logic over psychologism, but it does complicate the process of epistemological
prioritizing. The ideal science of logic can have its relevance for logic - not despite,
but because of its relevance for psychology.
Furthermore, the less the ideal correlate of mental processes is concerned with
psychologistic logic, the less it is interested in dismissing psychology. The ideal
science of logic unfolds in its lawful purity when it looks back at the self-enclosure
of psychologistic argumentation. Husserl even suggests that each concept that
belongs to the realm of “purely universal propositions” has “its concrete foundation
in mental acts or objective correlates.”
At this juncture, one might raise two questions: why Husserl would emphasize
that “ideal concepts of essence” have their concrete foundation? Why would ideal
concepts need reference to a foundation that lies beyond their realm? I suggest that
it is due to the fact that concepts of the ideal science of logic have their psychologi-
cal correlate that they are able to reassert their ideal purity.
I further suggest that is not only that psychologism and the ideal science of logic
unfold in a mutual disinterestedness, but that their mutual independence is argu-
mentatively rooted in their complementarity. In other words, one term of this rela-
tionship calls for the other term, precisely because that terms is complete in itself:
as much as ideal logical laws are not reducible to psychologism because of their
psychological component, so too psychologistic logic can be re-articulated ideally
because of its mental concreteness with reference to its ideal possibility.
Husserl states that the conditions of the possibility of inner evidence “bear no
trace of the psychological or the real.”9 For Husserl, the “inward evidence of our
judgments” depends not merely on psychological but also on ideal conditions. He
further writes:
The laws of pure logic are truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts essen-
tially related to this concept. They state, in relation to possible acts of judgment, and on
the basis of their mere form, the ideal conditions of the possibility or impossibility of their
Ibid.
9
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 65
inner evidence… It is clear, for the rest, that the terms in question, and all such as function
in purely logical contexts, must be equivocal; they must, on the one hand, stand for class-
concepts of mental states such as belong in psychology, but, on the other hand, for generic
concepts covering ideal singulars, which belong in a sphere of pure law.10
10
Ibid, 119, 117.
11
Ibid, 119.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid, 120.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
This is a reference to Adorno’s reflection from Negative Dialectics: ”But it is not the purpose of
critical thought to place the object on the orphaned royal throne once occupied by the subject. On
that throne the object would be nothing but an idol. The purpose of critical thought is to abolish the
hierarchy” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 180–181).
66 V. Grahovac
In this passage Husserl clearly stresses that the ideality of the phenomenological
content of a true judgment not only persists “in and for itself” (regardless of whether
the mental component is attached to it or not) but that the “in and for itself” of this
ideality is measured against the background of “mental character.” The apparent
fixity of the ideal-phenomenological content of such a judgment is adequately con-
firmed by the certainty of inner evidence (or the lack thereof, where the accompany-
ing feeling is one of uncertainty). Furthermore, the mental activity of inner evidence
is a testimony to the constitution of phenomenological ideality, which prevails
regardless of the possibility or impossibility of its mental articulation. Logical truth,
therefore, can be experienced only insofar as any ideality can be reflected in the
completion of a ‘real’ act. The apparent fixity of the ideal phenomenological con-
tent is reflected in the mobility of the self-assertion of its psychological
counterpart.
18
LI, vol. 1, 121.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 67
The idea of the agreement between propositions in themselves and the self-
evidentiality of states of affairs is what is called truth. This does not mean that the
ideality of a proposition does not persist if its objective correlate is not established
in an agreement with it (this is why Husserl writes about both objectivity or validity
and its opposites). To the contrary, the ideal “sense of assertion” persists in a rela-
tion to its experiential validity. Validity and invalidity pertain to their respective
ideal correlates, which are concerned with their ideally lawful realm precisely
through a contradistinction to their objective correlates of the valid or invalid propo-
sition. The fact that objectivity does not stand in the “idea of agreement” (i.e. truth)
with its ideal correlate does not mean that the propositions in themselves are impos-
sible – they are simply not in a relation of adequacy with their experiential corre-
lates. The relation between ideality and objectivity is one of belonging in difference,
where one term in the relation points to another term with each term regarded indi-
vidually stands independent of the other(s).
In the next section of this article I shall suggest the following relation: the more
that psychological self-assertion assumes its indisputable fixity, the more it crystal-
izes itself as the constancy of the activity of its self-repetition in front of the
“phenomenological-idealistic” mirror. In other words, the more that psychologism
ignores its inability to provide what it promises, the more it tells us about the capacity
of ideal logical laws to emphasize the reversal of the fixity-mobility polarity inherent
to psychologism, but not recognized by it. If the ultimate ‘realization’ or completion
of the concepts of evidence, grounding and regulation is possible, then these con-
cepts must assume the form of the ideally lawful self-evidence or self-regulation.
19
Ibid.
68 V. Grahovac
Conversely, the full capacity for self-regulation of the ideal laws is reflected in their
‘insistence’ on the further clarification of the concept of regulation.
2 T
autology of Inner Evidence: Psychologistic Cynicism
as a Testimony to the Ideality of Logical Laws
Husserl emphasizes that Mill defines the logical law of contradiction by referring to
the “supposed facts of experience.”20 Mill, in response to Hamilton, suggests that the
constancy of logical law is obvious in the fact that “the appearance of any positive
mode of consciousness cannot occur without excluding a correlative negative mode:
and that the negative mode cannot occur without excluding the correlative positive
mode.”21 This obviousness rests on the existential conditions of the “coexistence or
succession of facts.”22 Logical laws, therefore, belong to the very facts that they are
supposed govern, as long as these facts are truths. Logical laws are measured by the
experience they are supposed to govern; in other words, that which grounds is
explained by what is grounded by it. Husserl sarcastically observes the following: “A
law would therefore ascribe a ‘coming and going’ to certain facts called truths,
among which, as among others, the law would itself be found. The law would
arise and perish in conformity with the law, a patent absurdity.”23 It is interest-
ing, however, to notice that Mill is not disturbed by the explicit tautology of logical
law. He is, in fact, convinced that the justification of logical law should be seen as an
“inherent necessity of thought” and as “an original part of our mental constitution.”24
According to Mill, the universality of logical laws is guaranteed by “the native struc-
ture of our minds.”25 He supports this claim by suggesting that the “conditions of our
experience deny us experience which would be required to alter them”26 even, or
especially, in the case where the subject who asserts a logical proposition is not expe-
rientially specified. For Mill, everything that conflicts with the law of experience,
turns into a case of impossibility. Husserl quotes the following observation by Mill:
They may or may not be capable of alteration by experience, but the conditions of our
experience deny to us the experience which would be required to alter them. Any assertion,
therefore, which conflicts with one of these laws, any proposition, for instance, which
asserts a contradiction, though it were on a subject wholly removed from the sphere of our
experience, is to us unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition is in the present con-
stitution of nature, impossible as a mental act.27
20
Ibid, 57.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid, 55.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid, 57.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 69
28
Ibid, 60.
29
Ibid, 61.
30
Ibid, 61.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 63.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid, 59.
70 V. Grahovac
expectations. In other words, the more determinately we are ready to admit that the
validity of logical laws is secured through psychological experience, the better we
can guarantee their lawfulness or purity. This perspectivalism, whose non-universalist
universalism must end in tautology, as Husserl suggests, is obvious in the following
insight:
Whatever pairs of opposed acts of belief we may select, whether belonging to one or to
several individuals, whether coexisting in the same time-stretch or separated by time-
stretches, it holds strictly, and absolutely, and without exception, that not both members of
each such pair are correct, or in accordance with truth. I do not think that even an empiri-
cist could question the validity of this norm.35
The last sentence might strike us as an unnecessary and slightly odd addition to
the reflection above. It seems that Husserl still feels a need to address psychologistic
concerns. We might wonder why it should even be important to consider what would
be accepted or rejected by psychologists if we have already agreed that they cannot
fulfill the promise of self-evidentiality. Husserl, however, regards the major problem
in psychologism to lie in its tendency to take pride in its unacknowledged universal
perspectivalism, rather than in its inability to secure its validity on universal grounds.
Husserl suggests that even the empiricist, in her desire to thematically secure the
universality of logic, indirectly discloses the problem in her notion of self-evidence.
Husserl observes that “there is no route of escape from the demand for definition
and proof by an appeal to the ‘self-confidence of reason’”, and he suggests that as
soon as the “thought content” of the logical laws is “seen as psychological, their
original sense, to which our insight into them attaches, has been wholly altered.”36
As Husserl further observes:
Exact laws have, as we saw, been turned into vague, empirical generalities: if their range
of indefiniteness is duly noted, they may claim validity, but they are quite removed
from self-evidence. Following their natural thought-trends, thought without a clear con-
sciousness of them, psychological theorists of knowledge no doubt at first understand the
laws in question in an objective sense – before, that is, their arts of philosophical inter-
pretation are brought into play. Then they make the mistake of thinking that they can
appeal to the self-evidence attaching to the properly interpreted formulae, a self-evidence
guaranteeing their absolute validity, even when subsequent reflection has imposed wholly
new senses on the logical formulae in question.37
Husserl ironically suggests that as long as psychologists stay within the silence
and the ‘modesty’ of their capacity for “philosophical interpretation”, as long as
they “follow their natural thought-trends” without any aspirations to provide the
ultimate ground for the laws of logic, they are not committing any major fault.
Psychologism is not mistaken if it simply confirms its own authority as a non-logi-
cal discipline, because it legitimately stays within the confines of its own discipline.
However, as soon as psychologism interprets its own ground within the imperative
of the universality of non-universal self-evidence, it will necessitate the ongoing
35
Ibid, 59.
36
Ibid, 61.
37
Ibid.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 71
38
Ibid, 63.
39
Ibid. 65.
40
Ibid.
72 V. Grahovac
41
Lange suggests that the mode of action of psychologistic justification is “objective, and it need
not first be brought to consciousness in order to act” (ibid).
42
Ibid, 63.
43
Luft (ed), The Neokantian Reader, 72.
44
Ibid, 66.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid, 67.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 73
world]”49 not only regardless of, but also in contrast to, the disharmony that is con-
cealed50 by the world as it is observed through the lens of scientific investigations.
The lawfulness that is prevalent in natural sciences is both contrasted to and
complemented by the ideal regularities of “inward experience.”51 The rigor of scien-
tific pessimism dissolves the harmonious picture of the world without affecting the
ideal framework that underlies that picture. Lange describes the relationship
between pessimism and optimism in the following manner:
[Pessimism] cannot do away with the act that our mind is so constituted as ever anew to
produce within itself a harmonious picture of the world: that here as everywhere it places
its ideal beside and above reality, and recreates itself from the struggles and necessities of
life by rising it thought to a world of all perfections … for even in the notion of the thing,
that stands out as a unity from the infinite coherency of existence, there lies that subjective
factor which, as a constituent part of our human reality, is quite in place, but beyond it only
helps to fill up, on the analogy of our reality, the gap for that which is absolutely incon-
ceivable, but which must at the same time be assumed (69) … Let us accustom our-
selves, then, to attribute a higher worth than hitherto to the principle of the creative idea in
itself, and apart from any correspondence with historical and scientific knowledge, but
also without any falsification of them.52
The first and the last sentences of this passage almost resemble Husserl’s sensi-
tivity for the mutual enclosure of the terms in relations, particularly within the con-
text of the epistemological struggle between the ideal science of logic and
psychologism. The terms are suggested to be not only “without any correspon-
dence”, but also without any tendency to replace or compete with each other. What
remains unclear in Lange’s analysis throughout this essay, however, is whether the
relation between speculative and scientific, ideal and real, spiritual and empirical is
one of interchangeability, complete replacement or co-existence. The second last
sentence in the passage above suggests that, even though the realms of spiritual and
scientific pursuit are strongly distinguished by the peculiarities of their respective
practices, they seem to compete for a position of primacy. This means that, although
the areas of religious (and, more broadly, speculative) and scientific experience are
carefully separated, they either spring from the same underlying ideality or are
above each other. The language of the struggle for primacy between the scientific
and the religious is especially visible in Lange’s analysis of the importance of inner
evidence for the development of religious ideas.53 Lange suggests that religious
doctrines are praised above other knowledges because they do not “rest upon greater
certainty, but upon a greater value, against which neither logic, nor touch of the
hand, nor sight of the eye can avail, because for it the idea, as form and essence of
the constitution of the soul, may be a more powerful object of longing, than the most
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid, 69.
51
Ibid, 72.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid, 71.
74 V. Grahovac
real matter.”54 Lange observes that the “trustworthiness of religious truths,” or rather
“the periphrastic expressions or confusions of an exalted mind for the stronger
impulse of the heart towards the living source of edification”,55 is contrasted with
the “sober knowledge which enriches the understanding with small change.”56 For
this reason “really pious mind” has always valued “inward experience as an evi-
dence of faith.”57 If we compare this analysis with Lange’s reflections upon logic we
realize that the peculiarity of both psychologistic logic and religious experience is
demonstrated by their ability to exclude and replace absolute logicism and scientific
investigation. Clearly, Lange’s emphasis on the uniqueness of religious experience
does not reduce this experience to the epistemological values that underlie the world
of the natural sciences. However, Lange proposes that religious speculation should
be treated with the same or with even deeper respect than the knowledge we attain
through the natural sciences.
Returning to Husserl’s criticism of psychologism, we notice that the “grave
ambiguity in the word ‘impossibility’” (when speaking of mutually exclusive judg-
ments participating in one proposition) is emphasized even more by the proponents
of psychologistic logic. The psychologistic logicians support the self-evidentiality
of the principle of contradiction by suggesting that the validity of this principle is to
be found in the instinctive and immediate experience58 of the impossibility of two
mutually contradictory judgments. Heymans, in the passage quoted by Husserl,
suggests that any justification of the self-evidentiality of the principle of contradic-
tion that fails to acknowledge the necessity that instinctive experience will encoun-
ter the problem of circularity: “If one seeks to show, independently of this fact [the
instinctive experience], that only the non-contradiction may be asserted, one finds
repeatedly that the proof always presupposes what it has to prove.”59 Heymans not
only proclaims that psychologistic naturalism fortifies its ‘universality’ exclusively
in the necessity of its tautology, but further suggests the universality of logical laws
is to be ‘located’ in the particularism of psychologistic self-justification. The logical
ideality of the law of contradiction (in psychologism) is reflected in the mental ten-
dency of “nisus,”60 i.e., the natural effort of thought to move towards non-
contradictory combination:
The thought that is directed to truth no doubt strives to achieve thought combinations that
are free from contradiction, but the value of these non-contradictory thought-combinations
again plainly resides in the circumstance that the non-contradictory alone can be
asserted.61
54
Ibid. 72.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
LI, vol. 1, 71.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 75
We realize that this quotation resembles the form of Husserl’s own criticism of
psychologism. The only difference between Heymans and Husserl is that the former
applauds what the latter finds dubious. Husserl, in a footnote to the passage just
quoted, recalls Sigwart’s suggestion in Logische Studien that the factual suppression
of contradiction is the only source of the ideality of logical rules. Husserl most cer-
tainly agrees with the form of Sigwart’s reflection, but he inverts the roles: the ideal-
ity of logical rules illuminates the factuality of the psychologistic definition of the
contradiction principle. This means that psychologistic factuality serves as a ground
for the possibility of logical laws through the demonstration of its own particular-
ism. However, the psychologistic self-enclosure is (for Husserl) the way of further
opening up the question of the logical lawfulness - not its conclusion.
The self-repetition in the construction of the psychologistic argument for self-
evidence is apparent in the concept of “irrefragable necessity.”62 Husserl suggests
that the “felt compulsion”, which is obviously the result of one’s “irrefragable
necessity” to hold the conclusion true if the premises are conceded, is, however,
occasioned in the cases of both true and false syllogisms. Husserl maintains that
“once it is felt,” it is “always the same.”63 The self-repetition of the psychologistic
self-evidence of felt compulsion in the completion of the syllogism results in its
own non-reflected exaggeration, while it simultaneously initiates the ideal ‘purifica-
tion’ of the notion of self-evidence:
This felt irrefragability so little proves real irrefragability that it may yield to the force of
new reasons, even in the sense of correctly drawn conclusions recognized as such. It should
therefore not be confused with the genuine logical necessity that pertains to every syllogis-
tic inference, which means, and can mean, nothing beyond the insightfully knowledgeable
(though not actually known by each judging person) validity of the syllogism, with its
governance by idea law… Circumstances which cannot be specified exactly, such as
certain ‘concentration of attention’, a certain ‘mental freshness’, a certain ‘prepared-
ness’ etc., are favorable conditions for the emergence of a logical act of inference. The
circumstance of conditions (in the strict sense), from which the inferential act of judg-
ment follows with causal necessity, are entirely hidden from us … Syllogistic formulae
do not have the empirical content men attribute to them: their true sense is plainest when
we state them in the equivalent form of ideal incompatibilities, e.g. it is universally the
case that two propositions having the forms ‘All M’s are X’ and ‘No P is M’ are not true
unless the proposition having the form ‘Some X are not P’ is also true. And so in every case.
Nothing is here said about a consciousness or the acts and circumstances of its
judgments.64
62
Ibid, 73.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid, 73–74.
76 V. Grahovac
the ultimate evidentiality, manifested in its own execution, can be paralleled with
Levinas’ observation below:
Being is not only itself, it escapes itself. Here is a person who is what he is; but he does
not make us forget, does not absorb, cover over entirely the objects he holds and the way he
holds them, his gestures, limbs, gaze, thought, skin, which escape from under the identity
of his substance, which like a torn sack is unable to contain them. Thus a person bears on
his face, alongside of its being with which he coincides, its own caricature, its pictur-
esqueness. The picturesque is always to some extent a caricature.65
Levinas points out that one’s path of grasping one’s essence is betrayed by the
endurance of that path. One’s coinciding with one’s own being already means one’s
own exaggeration in the attempt to thematize this coincidence. This exaggeration,
however, can turn only into cynicism – once the impossibility of its thematizing is
recognized – but it is nevertheless pursued under the pressure of that very
impossibility.
To return to psychologistic cynicism, we realize that the psychologistic notion of
inner evidence capitalizes on the falsity of the division between the purity of the
logical laws and the contingency of what is regulated by these laws. Psychologism
is entirely disillusioned with the ‘objectivity’ of the pure science of logic, and it
insists on the constitutiveness of experience for the principle of self-evidence.
However, its insistence on the importance of experience does not rid psychologism
of the very same problems surrounding the question of epistemological primacy
that it ascribes to absolute logicism. To the contrary, the new source of theoretical
purity is firmly fixed in the openly acknowledged psychological foundation of the
pure science of logic. Psychologism promotes an inverted ideality of logical laws by
carefully preserving the falsity of the division between logic and experience. In
psychologism, the particular enjoys primacy over the universal, but it suffers from
the inability to acknowledge its limitation and indebtedness to its other, thereby
exercising the same sort of exclusivism it ascribes to logical absolutism. It safe-
guards the authority of logical laws by locating it in the world of mental phenom-
ena. Husserl, by descriptively illuminating the psychologistic cynicism, contrarily
supplies the opportunity for experience of the ideal laws and successfully trans-
forms the division between logical absolutism and psychologism. The realm of the
ideal science of logic is opened through its tedious ‘practice’ of the illumination of
the psychologistic tautology. The ideal logical laws are not superior to psycholo-
gism, but they are inextricably connected to it as an exercise in its correction.
3 C
ircularity of Ideal Laws – The Irony of Purification
as a Testimony to the Self-Assurance of Inner Evidence
In this section I trace the strategy of circularity employed by Husserl in his justifica-
tion of the ideal science of logic. As explained above, psychologistic logic strength-
ens its inherent particularism, according to Husserl, by failing to transparently
65
Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 6.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 77
The circularity of the ideal science of logic is not a mere psychologistic tautol-
ogy, where self-repetition becomes a side-effect of the psychologistic tendency to
merely subvert the universality of pure logic. Even if psychologistic particularism is
acknowledged and cynically accorded positive value, the switching of the roles of
psychological and abstract-logical (by means of which the obvious disadvantage of
psychologistic justification is turned to its advantage) is clearly not recognized.
Since it is experientially absurd to look for the universality of logical laws outside
the laws of psychology, the psychological laws are selected as the only remaining
choice. However, the ‘obviousness’ of the self-repetition is never further explored.
For Husserl, on the other hand, the value of the ground of logical laws consists in
their withdrawal from any attempt to frontally disengage with psychologism. This
frontal attack on psychologism would lead towards the mere exchange of the pri-
macy of the psychologism and the ideal science of logic with respect to the ground-
ing of logical laws. Husserl reactivates psychologistic potential for the
self-examination that never fully came to the fore in psychologism. The self-activity
of the ideal science of logic is neither an undesired side-effect nor a cynicism of
self-evidentiality, because it is realized in a constancy of its ‘staring at the face’ of
psychologistic self-sufficiency. The tautology that is employed in the psychologistic
justification is transformed into the circular dynamics of the realm of ideal lawful-
ness. The circular motion in the justification of the pure science of logic exaggerates
the constitutive role of the perspectivalism in the psychologistic grounding of the
logical laws.
In the section 39 of Logical Investigations, Husserl criticizes Sigwart for his
anthropologism in defining logical incompatibility. The anthropological-relativistic
hypothesis is that there cannot be truth if its source is not confirmed through the
66
LI 1, 107.
78 V. Grahovac
mere evidentiality of the common human constitution. Husserl pressures this thesis,
suggesting what it states is that there would be no truth if there were no human
constitution. This means that this hypothesis is ideally-logically subverted by its
own propositional appearance, because its thesis has the following form: “There is
a truth that there is no truth.” Husserl suggests that the logical form of this proposi-
tion, as a negation of a valid statement, is one of the falsehood, and not of absurdi-
ty.67 However, if we follow the anthropologistic-relativistic argumentation, we
observe that the absurdity of the hypothesis (the existential impossibility of truth)
formulates the proposition of the thesis. The result is that “absurdity taints the whole
hypothetical statement, since it connects an antecedent having a coherent (‘logically
possible’) sense with an absurd (‘logically impossible’) consequent.”68 The skeptic,
precisely because she insists on the self-evidentiality of the anthropomorphic
ground of truth, ends up in the tautology discussed in the previous section:
The notion that the non-existence of a certain constitution should be based on this very
constitution, is a flat contradiction: that the truth-conditioning, and therefore existent con-
stitution should condition the truth (among other truths) of its own non-existence. The
absurdity is not greatly lessened if we substitute existence for non-existence, and apply our
arguments, not to an imaginary species from a relativistic standpoint is possible, but to our
human species. Our contradiction then vanishes, but not the absurdity associated with it. …
The truth that such a constitution and such laws subsist must then have its real expla-
nation in the fact of this subsistence: the principles of our explanation must be identi-
cal with such laws – again mere nonsense. Our constitution would be causa sui in respect
of laws, which would cause themselves in virtue of themselves etc.69
Husserl transforms this psychologistic tautology into the circularity of the ideal
laws by insisting on the ambiguity of the notion of the truth judgment. The logical
ideality of judgment, by recalling its own purity, simply rules out the possibility
where the truth is dependent on the differences between the agents of judgment. The
truth for one species does not mean as same as the truth of that species, but it
implies that the certain species (e.g. human) have an access “to the circle of truth.”70
The circle of truth is defined as the absolute authority to which one might or might
not have an access, not vice versa. Husserl’s circularly provides the definition of the
ideality of truth, while he simultaneously exaggerates the ‘reality’ which reflects
this circularity: “what is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the
same, whether men, or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it.”71
Furthermore, Husserl emphasizes that the ideal unity of truth is unbreakably “set
over against the real multiplicity of races, individuals and experiences.”72
Sigwart suggests, in his treatment of the ideality of logical truth, that even if we
agree that knowing something as it is in itself impossible without the existence of
67
Ibid, 80.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid, 81.
70
Ibid, 79.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 79
This passage is preceded by Husserl’s reflection that the idea of truth is given in
the act of ideation based upon intuition.76 We witness from Husserl’s observation
that the activity of ideality is performed as a certain demobilization of the activity
of the consciousness of inner evidentiality. This does not mean that inner evidence
is simply put out of play, but it is exaggerated in its own separation from the univer-
sality it replaces with its own self-evidentiality: “we are evidently clear as to truth’s
unity and identity over against the dispersed multitude of concrete, compared cases
of inwardly evident judgment”77. If we cannot consider ideal propositions within the
context of the agent who can experientially confirm or actualize them, then we
should see them through the lens of ideal lawfulness. The propositions are in this
case simply without any ‘fulfilling actuality’. This means that even though the agent
of thinking is presumably ruled out, the logical statements persist in their ideal pos-
sibility. The seeming existential impossibility of the reconciliation of two conflict-
ing statements merely exemplifies a situation where the logical laws do have no
psycho-physical or existential ‘realization’. The actualization of the judgment is not
dismissed or ruled out as a psychological impossibility, because this actualization of
the judgment is not categorially thematized within the frame of the ideal science of
logic. However, the psycho-physical impossibility is reflected, so to speak, in an
ideal-logical incompatibility. The circular grounding of the ideality of logical truth
ends up in an exaggeration of the psychologistic notion of inner evidence suggest-
ing the following: the fact that the truth of the proposition is ideal, because it is
what it is, is entirely proportional to the fact that the inner evidence is not what
it claims to be, because of what it is.
We can suggest that the self-activity of the logical law does not only critically
relate itself to the self-evidentiality of the psychological processes - it also stares at
what it criticizes, so to speak. The source of Sigwart’s confidence, the appeal to the
consciousness of necessity, is even more emphasized as it is pointed at by the
73
Ibid, 85.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid, 86.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
80 V. Grahovac
fulfilling actuality of the ideal logical laws (or the lack thereof). According to
Husserl, ideal meaning can be fulfilled or not, which means that, in the case of ful-
filling actuality, the relation between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment is
one of logical compatibility. The relation between meaning intention and meaning
fulfillment is one of incompatibility in the case where the ideal meaning is not actu-
alized. This insight radically challenges the notions of existential possibility (where
the correspondence between meaning intention and meaning fulfillment is psycho-
logically confirmed) and existential impossibility (the psychological impossibility
for the two contradictory judgments to ‘exist’ in one judgment).
The intuition of the ideality of truth proceeds in its unbridgeable difference from
the necessity of inner evidence. We can even suggest that the self-activity of the
ideal is measured by the full accomplishment of the self-evidentiality of the psy-
chologistic real. When Husserl suggests that the logical concept can be meant but
not “produced”78 by our thought, he most certainly does not dismiss Sigwarts’s view
of the universal as something inward that depends “on the inner power of our
thought.”79 Husserl does not challenge Sigwart’s claim about the necessity of inner
evidence, simply because the psychologistic concept of truth is not an ideal one. The
“what” of the psychological content, the ideality of the concept itself, further
emphasizes that the “conceptual presentation as a subjective act” has “this or that
psychological content.”80 We observe that the persistence of the circularity of logi-
cal truth strengthens its difference from tautology by openly recognizing the disci-
plinary importance of psychologism. Psychologism, to the contrary, unwillingly
necessitates the importance of the ideal science of logic by insisting on its own
self-sufficiency of its own tautology.
We can follow Andre de Muralt in The Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian
Exemplarism and suggest that the realm of the ideal, in fact, exemplifies the realm
of facticity (and vice versa) through its own persistence. For example, in the analy-
ses of the relationship between fact and essence (in reference to Husserl’s Ideas 1)
de Muralt suggests that both fact and eidos stand in a relationship of fissure, which
is at the same time a relationship of their radical community.81 This relationship is
developmental, because the facticity ‘reaches’ its fullness in the process of its
asymptotic progression towards the eidos. Conversely, the absoluteness of the
essence (as a measure of facticity) is completed through its predisposition to be a
measure of facts.82
78
Ibid, 87.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
This community, however, is embodied in the fact that “essence involves no factical element” [de
Muralt, Idea of Phenomenology: Husserlian Exemplarism, 33].
82
De Muralt further writes: “There is no measure without something being measured, and the eidos
turns out to be the measure of the individual thing. Continuity is thus reestablished, but in the
reverse direction. Whereas the fact was just seen to refer to the eidos as its essential type, here the
eidos measures the fact. Thus, it is important to define the points of view from which the fissure
appears and from which unity is reestablished” (ibid, 34).
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 81
Further, de Muralt insists that the traditional logic and the transcendental logic
are directly exemplified through each other. Their relationship is not to be found in
their mutual confirmation, reflection, reconciliation or causal dependency. To the
contrary, the absolute completion of one realm is visible and accessible to us only
through the ‘intensification’ of another:
He [Husserl] motivates transcendental logic as the intentional telos of traditional logic; and
conversely, traditional logic is motivated as the factical example is motivated, in the last
analysis, by the ideal exemplar, as the embryonic form is justified in the full-blown form…
It is therefore to be expected that Husserlian logic would integrate this first logic. On the
one hand, it does so by maintaining traditional logic within its proper limits and conse-
quentially retaining what is valid in it. On the other hand, it does so by taking it as point of
departure for a constitutive exemplary criticism which is intended to elucidate the latent
intentional sense of its immanent structures and to show its necessary outcome in a tran-
scendental logic.83
83
Ibid, 102.
84
LI, vol.1, 93.
82 V. Grahovac
secure the self-evidentiality of truth through its formal universality, without realiz-
ing that the abstract generalization will always be conceptually indebted to what it
excludes, namely to the concrete particularization.
The ideal science of logic is not merely pure so to speak: it can confront the
contingent, but it is contingent in its openly admitted relationship with psycholo-
gism, so it can achieve its purity. To the contrary, for the anti-psychologists, the
main role of the science of logic (its “essence”85 as Husserl points out) is a norma-
tive one. The difference between the science of logic and psychologism lies in fact
that the science of logic, contrary to psychologism, has a regulatory role. The purity
of the science of logic is achieved through its relation to the experience from which
it was instructed to stay away.
Husserl employs the method of descriptive analysis, where he entirely trans-
forms the polarity: contingency of experience – purity of its regulation. Ideal laws
are delivered by the very structure of experience, not beyond it or outside of it.
Further, the experience does not appear as merely contingent, because it urges the
need for its ideal purification through its own unfolding, through the crystallization
of the question of its own self-evidentiality. The so-called phenomenological
description in Husserl’s early texts is the initial form of bracketing, where the brack-
eted term and the term that does the bracketing are treated beyond the process of the
hierarchical prioritizing.
Husserl uses the example of the pure arithmetic law that the product of the sum
and the difference of two numbers is the difference of their squares. If we consider
this law in its normative-objective sense, this means that the law has the following
form: “To arrive at the product of the sum and difference of two numbers, one should
find the difference of their squares.”86 This poses a serious problem, because this
proposition assumes the form of the rule for the proper thought operation, instead of
a logical law. Husserl draws a direct parallel with the anti-psychologistic definition
of the ideal science of logic, which, being a law of thought, fails to differentiate
between the “proper content” of the logical laws and “their practical application.”87
The science of logic becomes the “methodology of the specifically human acquisi-
tion of knowledge”88 whether it is being treated as the science of the rules of correct
judgment or as the science of the justification of the meaningful possibility.
The pure science of logic, to the contrary, must abandon the falsity of the dual-
ism of anti-psychologism – psychologism by not merely ignoring what it is sup-
posed to be purified from. Husserl wonders, already in dealing with the
anti-psychologists’ view of logic as a normative discipline, whether it is possible to
see ideal logic’s normative capacities as a reflection of “the specific meaning con-
tent which gives them [logical laws] a natural right to regulate our thought.”89 He
inverts the position where logic gains its universality through the inner evidentiality
85
Ibid, 102.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid, 103.
89
Ibid, 102.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 83
of its capacity to regulate thoughts and suggests that the self-evidence of logic as a
regulatory power, by its own necessity, points to the type of universality which is
entirely distinct from it:
That science which deals with all sciences in respect of their form, should eo ipso deal
with itself, may sound paradoxical, but involves no inner conflict. The simplest example
will make this clear. The law of contradiction governs all truth, and since it is itself
truth, governs itself. To realize what such self-government means one needs only apply the
law of contradiction to itself: the resultant proposition is an obvious truism, having none
of the marks of the remarkable or the questionable. This is invariably the case where pure
logic is used to regulate itself.90
The ideal science of logic does not appear prior to psychology in order to regu-
late it, but it regulates itself so it can point out the self-defeat of psychologism in its
pursuit for subverted (or non-universal) universality. The pure science of logic
secures its own realm not through the safety of its universal-objective ‘fixity’ (in
contrast to the psychologistic ‘flux’), but through the deliberate dynamics of its self-
repetition. The pure science of logic, through the constancy of its self-encircling,
transforms the absolutist-logical notion of the eternity of logical laws into their
a-temporality. Husserl explicitly suggests that the eternity of logical laws means
that the judgments bounded by them are “without regard to time and circumstances.”91
If we treat eternity outside the context of the objective time flow (therefore ‘atem-
porally’), we easily avoid using the terminology generated within the: psychologis-
tic concreteness – absolutist-logical universality. The constancy of circularity of
logical laws is not affected whatsoever by the fact that the ideality of logical laws
can be psychologistically re-articulated. Husserl sarcastically remarks that the
“relation to mental creatures plainly puts no restriction upon universality: norms for
judgments bind judging beings, not stones.”92 The logical absolutists see the above-
mentioned eternity as opposed to the temporality of psychologism, because they see
the logical laws as “intrinsically and essentially prescriptive.”93 The purity of logical
laws, however, can be applied normatively, but this normativity cannot be used as a
tool for the interpretation of these laws. Furthermore, the logical laws can be norma-
tive because their self-referential ‘ideality’ makes them destined to regulate the
realm of ‘reality’. Husserl draws an important distinction between the formal-
logical approach to logical laws and their pure-ideal counterpart: the former focuses
on the prescriptive nature of logical laws, whereas the latter focuses on the specific
content of these laws:
To the extent that formal logicians, I their talk of normative laws, were concerned with this
purely conceptual, a priori character, their arguments hit on a point that was undoubtedly
correct. But they overlooked the theoretical character of the laws of pure logic, they failed
to recognize the difference between theoretical laws destined by their content to the
regulation of cognition, and normative laws which are intrinsically and essentially prescrip-
90
Ibid, 104.
91
Ibid, 93.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid. 106.
84 V. Grahovac
tive… The repugnancy consists basically in the fact that propositions relating to mere form
(i.e. the conceptual elements of scientific theory as such) were to be deduced from proposi-
tions having a wholly heterogeneous content. In the case of primitive principles like the law
of contradiction, the modus ponens etc., this repugnancy would plainly amount to a circle
in so far as the deduction of these principles would involve steps that presupposed them –
not in the form of premises, but in the form of deductive principles upon whose validity the
sense and validity of the deduction depends. One could, in this respect, speak of reflective
circle, as against the usual, direct circulus in demonstrando, where premises and conclusion
overlap. Of all sciences only pure logic escapes such objections, since its premises are
homogenous in respect of their objects with the conclusions they establish. Pure logic fur-
ther escapes circularity in that, in a given deduction, it never proves principles that every
deduction presupposes, but that it simply lays them down as axioms at the summit of all
its deductions. Pure logic therefore, has the extraordinarily difficult task of analytically
ascending to such axioms as are indispensable starting-point of deduction, and are also
irreducible to one another without a direct or a reflective circle, and then constructing and
arranging a deduction for the theorems of logic – of which the rules of the syllogism form
a small part – so that at each step, not only the premises, but also the principles of our
deductive transitions, are neither among our axioms, or among previously proven
theorems.94
The extraordinary difficulty of the ideal science of logic consists not so much in
dismissing or ruling out of both psychologism and formal logic, but in finding
appropriate modes to challenge the above-mentioned approaches to logic, thereby
fully disclosing their inherent circularity. The phenomenological bracketing of both
psychologism and formal logic happens neither through the replication of nor
through the expansion upon their methods, but through the continual demonstration
of the difference between the ideal science of logic and its counterparts. This differ-
ence is, as Husserl suggests, already necessitated, but not taken in its full scope, by
psychologism and formal logic. Therefore Husserl suggests that the ideal laws of
logic are “destined by their content” to have a relation of regulation to cognition, a
relation that is already acknowledged, but not respected, so to speak, by psycholo-
gism. This process of the continual re-assertion of phenomenological reduction, in
its capacity to point out psychologistic tautology, is what I have been referring to as
the circularity of the ideal science of logic. Husserl clearly critically engages with
the notion of circular movement in argumentation. However, his employment of
such phrases as the simple “laying down” of ideal laws, their ipseity and their self-
regulation in the face of psychologistic self-reference, suggests that the psycholo-
gistic staticism is fully revealed through the peculiar self-movement of the ideal
science of logic.
94
Ibid, 106–107. For psychologists, to the contrary, the logical laws are normative because they
claim their ideality only through their capacity to regulate what they are allegedly purified from.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 85
The persistence of the critical relation of pure science of logic towards psycholo-
gism, as the exaggeration of the latter through the self-regulation of the former,
secures, in fact, the fixity of its epistemological position. The emphasis on the con-
scious particularism of the logical claim for universality clearly remains a pivotal
concern for Husserl in the 1905–1907 lectures on Logic. The purified epistemology
openly states its reservation regarding the formalism of the polarity between truth-
fulness and falsity, and introduces itself as a self-performance:
In this investigation, I naturally constantly realize cognitions. It is indeed obvious and
grounded in the essence of knowledge that knowledge is needed to shed light on the
essence of knowledge. We already recently said that it would be nonsense to see some limi-
tation of human knowledge in this, since any, even divine, knowledge can only determine
the universal essence of knowledge in acts of knowledge, and that consequently any
theory of knowledge, even knowledge <of the> Absolute Spirit, is self-referential. . . Of
course, the acts of cognition, the acts of presenting, of judging, of conceptual fixing and
determining in which the investigation itself operates, in which it itself is constituted, and
which are not objects for it, are performed cognitive acts, not critically analyzed and
tested… Reflection is one of the absolutely evident basic facts of knowledge, and the abso-
lute certainty of the existence of actual phenomena of reflection provides the field and
everything we need for the solution of the problems. Implied in the nature of the problem is
that it must be realized purely within the sphere of absolutely, indubitable givens, of givens
that must be shown and seen as absolute there.95
The expression ‘the constant realization of knowledge’ can be also read as the
constant performance of knowledge: “In dieser Untersuchung vollziehe ich natürlich
immerfort Erkenntnisse.”96. The knowledge that sheds light on knowledge is possi-
ble only as an activity, or as the constancy of the acts of knowledge (vollzogene
Erkenntnisakte). The acts of cognition are literally carried out. These acts, however,
must be performed, not simply analytically fixed and analyzed. The phenomena of
reflection are actual because their givenness arises only within, and as, the act of
their showing themselves. We can certainly endorse Peter Varga’s attempt in
“Psychologism as Positive Heritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy” to
locate the similarity between Nelson and Husserl in their ability to establish the
“recognition of the necessary self-referential character (Rückbeziehung) and circu-
larity of any justification.”97 However, the final result of the insight into the circular-
ity of any justification is significantly different in these authors. While Nelson’s
depiction of circularity remains within the realm of the careful psychological delin-
eation of the self-assurance of reason, Husserl’s circularity of the ideal science of
logic, is ‘secured’ through the process of its self-regulation.
95
Husserl, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07, 195–196.
96
Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906/07, 199. For this pur-
pose, the better translation of the word Erkenntnis would be cognition, not knowledge, especially
as it captures the notion of mobility that is indicated in the understanding of the knowledge or
cognition as a performance.
97
Varga, “Psychology as Positive Heritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy”, 126.
86 V. Grahovac
Peter Varga also suggests in that same essay that the notion of Selbstvertrauen
der Vernunft (self-assurance or self-reliance of reason) in Lotze and Nelson resem-
bles Husserl’s treatment of circularity:
However, what is more important for our purposes is the circularity that Lotze is trying to
counter with resorting to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. In both cases this is an inherent
structure that involves presuppositions: the justification of our knowledge presupposes the
knowledge itself, and the basis for the refutation of scepticism is always contained in what
scepticism doubts. By introducing the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, Lotze intends to cut
through these circularities… Husserl rejects the principle of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.
It is clear from what we have learnt about his knowledge of this principle above and it is
also consistent with his opinion of Lotze’s epistemology: Just like his relation to Bolzano,
Husserl claims that he had learnt much from Lotze, but he always despised Lotze’s
Epistemology … However, it is one thing to reject a notion and it is another to solve the
underlying philosophical challenge that the rejected notion was supposed to resolve.
Thus Husserl has to address the problem of the circular presuppositions. This issue is
quite pressing for Husserl, as exactly before he involved (and then rejected) the
“Hypothese des berechtigten ‘Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft’“, he had to face a regress
endangering his phenomenological investigation… Nelson’s earnest attempts to work
out the foundational implications of the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft could have
contributed to the methodology of Husserl’s phenomenology. A particular example of the
methodological implications that could have been relevant for Husserl’s phenomenology is
Nelson’s recognition of the necessary self-referential character (Rückbeziehung) and circu-
larity of any justification – which is exactly the context that first led Husserl to consider the
notion of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.98
98
Varga, “Psychology as Positive Heritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy”, 111–112,
126.
99
Ibid, 113.
100
Varga quotes Nelson:
“Aber dieses Argument träfe nur den, der die logischen Sätze aus psychologischen beweisen
wollte; denn allerdings würde ein solcher Beweisversuch, da er die psychologischen Sätze
als Gründe der logischen in Anspruch nehmen müßte, an der modalischen Ungleichartigkeit
der angeblichen Prämissen und Schlußsätze scheitern. Damit ist jedoch die Möglichkeit
einer psychologischen Begründung der logischen Grundsätze noch keineswegs ausge-
schlossen. [...] Wohl aber gibt es eine kritische Deduktion der logischen Grundsätze, und
diese ist, da sie den Grund der zu begründenden Sätze nicht enthält, sehr wohl auf psycholo-
gischem Wege möglich.” (ibid, 116).
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 87
lem: the fact that logical laws can be justified psychologistically does not mean that
they should be exclusively justified in that way. Nelson suggests that logical laws
are not grounded on psychologistic premises, but they are derived through from
deduction from logical principles. He calls the deduction of these principles a psy-
chological deduction, and justifies it with the power of reason to assure itself
(Selbsvertrauen der Vernunft).101 In other words, he believes he avoids psycholo-
gism through the careful differentiation of the jurisdiction of logical deduction from
psychologistic justification, although does still claim that the self-assurance of rea-
son lies in the background of the ideality of logical laws. Husserl, for Nelson,
remains caught up in anti-psychologistic formalism when he criticizes psychologi-
cal foundation of logical laws for being circular. The formal fallacy of psycholo-
gism, according to anti-psychologists, maintains that if logical laws are based on
psychological conditions, then they bear the properties of psychological laws.102The
fact that logical laws are grounded in the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft concerns a
principle that needs no further legitimation. The Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft,
Nelson suggests, “figuriert also nur als Obersatz in der logischen Form der
Deduktion.”103 We must secure its subsets, Nelson suggests, in other possible ways.
Nelson accuses Husserl of being a craftsman of theory-less description, although
he acknowledges that the text of Logical Investigations is different from the
Prolegomena and that it brings Husserl into proximity with psychologism.104 He
believes that Husserl reduces the critique of logical absolutism to a mere
description,105 where each phenomenological statement is “already an application of
the founding principles on the mere material of inner perception.”106 Varga observes
that Nelson identifies Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition with intellectual intu-
ition. However, if we look at the Sixth Logical Investigation, we see that Husserl not
only differentiates between sensuous and categorial intuition, but he also recognizes
no relation of epistemological hierarchy between them. Husserl maintains that cat-
egorial intuition merely documents what is obtained by sensuous intuition. Husserl’s
101
Nelson writes the following: “Dies Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft ist das allgemeine Prinzip, das
die psychologischen Ableitungen aus der Theorie der Vernunft zur kritischen Deduktionen macht,
d. h. das es uns ermöglicht, in der inneren Erfahrung einen Leitfaden für die systematische
Begründung der Philosophie zu finden” (ibid, 115).
102
Ibid.
103
“Denn [der Grundsatz des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft] enthält die Legitimation aller Sätze,
die ihren Ursprung in der reinen Vernunft und mithin sich selbst als metaphysische Grundsätze
erweisen können. Welche Sätze aber aus reiner Vernunft entspringen, darüber vermag er nichts
auszusagen. Er figuriert also nur als Obersatz in der logischen Form der Deduktion. Ihre Untersätze
müssen wir uns auf anderen Wegen versichern.” (Ibid, 115).
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid, 122.
106
Ibid. This is the full text of Nelson’s observation as quoted by Varga: “… ob eine solche
Einschränkung überhaupt durchführbar ist, ob nicht vielmehr jeder Satz der Phänomenologie bere-
its eine Anwendung der zu ‘fundierenden’ Gesetzte auf das bloße Material der inneren
Wahrnehmung einschließt, und dies um so mehr, wenn die Phänomenologie nicht nur eine
‘Betrachtung’, sondern auch eine ‘Analyse’, ‘Vergleichung’ und ‘Unterscheidung’ der
Erkenntnisakte enthalten soll.”
88 V. Grahovac
stark differentiation between sensuous and categorial intuition calls attention to the
distance between the phenomenological definition of categorial intuition and its
psychologistic counterpart:
Where general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition, certain new acts are built on our percepts
and other appearances of like order, acts related quite differently to our appearing object
from the intuitions which constitute it. This difference in mode of relation is expressed by
the perspicuous turn of phrase employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself the
thing meant, but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general meaning. But if
expressive acts conform to these differences, their significative intention will not move
towards what is to be intuitively presented, but towards what is universal, what is merely
documented in intuition. Where this new intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying
intuition, it reveals its own objective possibility (or the possibi1ity or ‘reality’ of the
universal)107
It is important to notice that even the word ‘reality’ is placed within quotation
marks, and the reality of the universal counts as the ‘universality’ of the psycholo-
gistic mental reality. If Husserl had followed Nelson, Varga remarks, he would have
avoided to accuse him for working with (psychological) premise and (logical) con-
clusion. Nelson’s Husserl would be able to guarantee the integrity of logical laws by
grounding them logically; this grounding would have been secured through inner
perception of a “purely intellectual nature.”108 Varga suggests that, although Nelson
dismisses Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition, Nelson’s notion of psychologistic
deduction seems to resemble what he criticizes in Husserl. This similarity with
Husserl can be located even in Nelson’s observation:
Was Husserl von der psychologischen Kritik noch trennt, ist lediglich der Umstand, daß bei
ihm der Begriff der Deduktion fehlt und daß ihm infolgedessen in Ermangelung einer dem
Beweise koordinierten Begründungsmethode die bloße Berufung auf die innere
Wahrnehmung übrigbleibt.109
107
LI 2, 275.
108
Ibid, 121.
109
Ibid.
110
Varga makes the following remark on the similarity between Nelson and Husserl: “However, he
has also a profound remark coupled to this misunderstanding, namely that “every sentence of the
phenomenology already consist of an application of the laws that are supposed to be justified”
(Varga, “Psychology as Positive Heritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy”, 122).
111
Ibid.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 89
Although both Husserl and Nelson clearly indicate the importance of circularity,
they have in mind two substantially different processes. Nelson’s self-assurance of
reason operates in a manner that disallows description or analysis by both naïve
descriptive psychologism and abstract anti-psychologism. Husserl’s circularity, on
the other hand, achieves its full power only as a self-regulating activity that unfolds
as the exaggeration of psychologism. As I mentioned earlier, the circularity of the
ideal science of logic deliberately resembles the psychological tautology in order to
disclose the inability of psychologism to offer the universality it promises. The
seemingly self-evidential security of the psychologistic grounding of logical laws
delivers the dynamics of the internal struggle taking place within the purification
process itself. What is purified is, by the necessity of its own unfolding, already
immersed in what it is critically addressed by it. The inversion and the transforma-
tion of the roles of purity and contingency, movement and fixity, and even imma-
nence and transcendence, are crucial not only for Husserl’s construction of
phenomenological reduction, but also for some of the key concepts and strategies in
the work of Levinas (the self-inversion of the notions of enjoyment and responsibil-
ity), Heidegger (the concept of being-towards-death as well as the inherently
inverted structure of the forgetfulness of being), Patočka (the permeability of the
eidos-facticity, I-thou, self-world poles), Merleau-Ponty (the transformation of the
seer-visible polarity into the intertwinement of the poles).
Nelson defines psychological deduction as a reflexive activity of the self-
assurance of reason, as a “direct knowledge of the pure reason."112 The peculiarity
of the psychological deduction is echoed in the justification of metaphysical prin-
ciples, which can be neither proven (because then they wouldn’t be principles) or
demonstrated (because then they wouldn’t be metaphysical).113 The major differ-
ence between Husserl and Nelson lies precisely in Husserl’s open recognition of the
responsive character of the circularity of ideal laws, which, Nelson seems entirely
to ignore. This is why Husserl, as Varga recalls, observes that the formality of
Nelson’s argument has “a genuine philosophical shortcomings.”114 It is interesting
that Husserl locates Nelson’s major weaknesses, besides his being a “logic-head,”115,
112
Ibid, 114.
113
“Wie sollen wir aber die metaphysischen Grundsätze begründen? Beweisen können wir sie
nicht; denn sonst wären sie keine Grundsätze. Sie können aber auch nicht demonstriert werden;
denn sonst wäre sie nicht metaphysisch. Wir nennen ihre Begründungsweise Deduktion”(ibid).
114
Ibid, 124. Varga quotes Husserl’s remarks on Nelson: “Allerdings zeigt sich N<elson> bisher
nur als ein eminenter ‘logischer Kopf’, d.h. ausgezeichnet ist er in der formalen Stringenz seiner
Beweisführungen, sowie im Aufspüren von Inconsequenzen, Aequivocationen, Widersprüchen auf
Seiten der kritisierten Autoren. Seine Schwäche sehe ich in dem, was allen u[nd] im echten Sinne
Originalität ausmacht, in der Intuition: es fehlt, bisher wenigstens, der habitus der sich an den
Sachen selbst, s<o>z<u>s<agen> in directem Schauen u[nd] Analysieren bethätigenden Forschung.
Vielleicht erklärt sich dieser Mangel aus der einseitig polemischen Bethätigung N<elsons>. Es
scheint mir nicht ausgeschlossen, daß er sich noch zu einem in höherem Sinne selbstständigen
Denker entwickle” (ibid).
115
Ibid.
90 V. Grahovac
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid, 106.
119
Ibid, 109.
120
Ibid, 108.
121
Ibid, 109.
122
Lotze, Logic in Three Books: Of Thought, Of Investigation and Of Knowledge, 179.
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 91
at the reflection below, we realize that Lotze’s Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is miss-
ing what it unintentionally already proposes through its self-purification. It misses,
namely, to acknowledge the necessity of its relational indebtedness to skepticism:
For every argument which can be brought into the field against it [skepticism] can only rest
upon the self-evidence and necessity with which it is thought, and must belong therefore
to that sphere of necessities of thought as to which the old barren question can always
be renewed to infinity, whether after all things may not be in reality quite otherwise than
thought makes them … In the presence of this skeptical disposition we should fall back
for the purpose of science upon a principle from which in the ordinary affairs of life our
opponent himself cannot escape and does not shrink, - faith in reason. We should continue
to regard a necessity of thought as true until through the conclusions which it itself pro-
duces it proves itself to be no such thing, and compels us to declare it a ‘show of being’
only, which in such case would be not entirely a vain show but an appearance standing in
a definable relation to the truth with which it can no longer be identified. This attitude
towards the skeptic is that with which we find observed in life, for through the world’s his-
tory this groundless skepticism has always reappeared from time to time, but as often as it
has made its appearance men have simply turned their backs upon it.123
123
Ibid, 179, 181.
124
Varga, “Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy”, 111.
125
Lotze, Logic in Three Books: Of Thought, Of Investigation and Of Knowledge, 181.
92 V. Grahovac
knowledge exemplifies the inherent capacity of the ideal laws of logic to relate to
what they ought to distance themselves from:
Certainly, needed too is reflection upon the investigation in terms of performed investiga-
tion. Besides the elucidation of natural knowledge, an elucidation of epistemological
knowledge is needed too, deliberation as to whether it itself yields new cognitive occur-
rences and whether the elucidations of the first level already include everything permitting
elucidation of occurrences on the second level.126
Varga, contrary to what we have claimed, sees the reflection above as a sign of
Husserl’s concern that the phenomenological method itself can be endangered by
circular regress. Husserl, as I mentioned earlier, acknowledges the importance of
the psychologistic objections directed at the potential circularity of the pure science
of logic. I believe, however, that this passage is not the best example of that acknowl-
edgment. Husserl, precisely in this passage, suggests that it is impossible for one to
secure the theoretical elucidation of epistemological knowledge without being
aware that the question of its importance and legitimacy is already necessitated by
the elucidatory work within the constraints of the natural sciences. Varga notes that
Husserl does not define the above-mentioned epistemological elucidation he prom-
ises, suggesting that Husserl continues his investigation with “the familiar topic of
the relationship between psychology and epistemology.”127 I suggest, however, that
the importance of circularity in the ideal science of logic can be fully grasped pre-
cisely through the investigation of the immanent mutuality obtaining between epis-
temological and psychological investigations. The passage Varga quoted is preceded
by Husserl’s reflection that “the cognitive acts of epistemological investigation”128
need a peculiar kind of elucidation. The “cognitions performed”129 (volzogenne
Erkenntnisse) cannot be analyzed through the lens of “transcendent uncertainties.”130.
To the contrary, this elucidation performs itself (“vollzieht sich")131 on the ‘princip-
ial’ experience (“principiell erlebten”)132 and it is “constantly verified in this
126
Husserl, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, 196. The German original reads:
Sicherlich bedarf es auch der Reflexion auf die Untersuchung nach vollzogener Untersuchung.
Neben der AufkIarung der natiirlichen Erkenntnis bedarf es auch einer Aufklarung der erkenntni-
skritisch en Erkenntnis, einer Erwagung, ob sie selbst neue Erkenntnisvorkommnisse bietet und ob
die Aufklarungen erster Stufe schon alles enthalten, was die Vorkommnisse zweiter Stufe aufzuk-
laren gestattet. (Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906/07,
200).
127
Varga, “Psychology as Positive Herritage of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy”, 112.
128
Husserl, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, 195.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen , 199.
132
Ibid. “Die Erkenntnisse, die vollzogen werden, benutzen keine vorgegebenen und erkenntniskri-
tisch hinsichtlich ihrer Zulassigkeit ungeprueften Praemissen aus der Sphaere der transzendenten
Fraglichkeiten. Jeder Schritt vollzieht sich in einer prinzipiell erlebten und in dieser Hinsicht bes-
taendig nachgeprueften Sphaere. Die Cartesianische Fundamentalbetrachtung gibt das zweifelIose
Gebiet: das der Phaenomene, naher der Erkenntnisphanomene und nun gilt es, Fragen zu stelIen,
Philosophy as an Exercise in Exaggeration: The Role of Circularity in Husserl’s… 93
5 Concluding Remarks
By reviewing the strategies Husserl deployed in designing the ideal science of logic
I have demonstrated that Husserl’s phenomenological method, in his early writings,
is argumentatively indebted to psychologism. I have suggested that the relationship
between the ideal science of logic and psychologistic logic is characterized by two
types of circularities: (1) the tautological circle of the inadvertent self-referentiality
in psychologism, which is created by the psychologistic tendency to reverse the
relation of priority in the polarity between the absolute and the psychological foun-
dations of the science of logic and (2) the deliberate circularity employed by the
ideal science of logic in order to expose the self-referentiality of psychologism . The
strategy of ‘withdrawal’ from a position of epistemological priority made possible
for the pure science of logic, or phenomenology, to challenge not only psychologis-
tic logic but also the absolute logicism.
This approach to Husserl simultaneously recognizes that Husserl’s relation with
psychologism is one of overcoming-through-indebtedness, just as the relation of
post-Husserlian phenomenologists to Husserl is the one of indebtedness-through-
overcoming.
Analysen zu vollziehen und daraufhin zu klaeren. Darin figuriert aIle Wissenschaft nicht als
Gegebenheit schlechthin, sondern als Phaenomen, nicht als GeItung, sondern als
Geltungserscheinung, erscheinender Geltungs anspruch. Diese Erscheinung kann wie jede andere
analysiert werden. Freilich, die Akte der Erkenntnis, die Akte des Vorstellens, des Urteilens, des
begrifflichen Fixierens und Bestimmens, in denen sich die Untersuchung selbst bewegt, in denen
sie selbst sich konstituiert und die nicht fuer sie Objekte sind, sind vollzogene Erkenntnisakte,
nicht kritisch analysierte und gepruefte” (ibid).
133
Husserl, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, trans. Claire Ortiz Hill (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2008), 195.
134
Ibid.
94 V. Grahovac
References
Primary Texts
Husserl, E. 1975. Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der
1. und der 2. Auflage. Halle:1900; rev. ed. 1913. ed. Elmar Holenstein. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
———. 1985. Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, ed. Ullrich
Melle. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Secondary Sources
Victor Eugen Gelan
Abstract The main aim of this paper is to show that the idea of rigorous science,
elaborated by Edmund Husserl, makes a fundamental contribution to the under-
standing, clarification, and development of the idea of science in general, and espe-
cially to the structuring of the character of science itself for social and human
sciences. The first step of my approach is to outline a general theoretical framework
for discussing the thorny issues of methodology and epistemology in the social and
human sciences. I shall start by probing the way in which Husserl tried to give a
philosophical clarification of the sciences and sought to ground them through tran-
scendental phenomenology. Husserl’s idea of rigorous science proposed a new
understanding of the way science is constituted in general and led to important
developments which determined a re-evaluation of the scientific character of other
sciences, and in particular, the social sciences. The rich programme of grounding
the social sciences and the rigorous reconfiguring of their scientific character that
was developed by the Austrian phenomenologist and sociologist, Alfred Schutz, is
just one major exemplification of Husserl’s idea of rigorous science. In the second
part of my paper I shall show how the Husserlian idea of rigorous science influenced
the scientific understanding of, and approach towards social life. In this sense, I
shall direct my analysis towards the way Schutz understands and elaborates the idea
of social relations in a phenomenological manner, by which he tries to account for
the phenomenological constitution of the meaning of social action and the possibil-
ity of knowledge in social sciences. When shaping his programme, Schutz begins
with the Husserlian phenomenological reduction and theory of constitution of
meaning. But both the theory of the constitution of meaning, and the idea of the
phenomenological reduction itself, are made possible for Husserl precisely through
his idea of rigorous science.
V. E. Gelan (*)
Center for Phenomenological Studies, University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania
1 T
he Idea of Rigorous Science in Husserl and its Relevance
for the Human and Social Sciences
Edmund Husserl developed the idea of rigorous science as a critical reaction to the
philosophical trends of his time: naturalism (psychologism of logic, positivism,
etc.), historicism (which stemmed from Dilthey’s ideas), and philosophy as
Weltanschauung (a psychological-subjective or “private” perspective on the world).
By criticizing these three ways of thinking and debunking their unfounded claims to
scientificity and their reductive limits, Husserl came to elaborate the idea of philoso-
phy as rigorous science, in the sense of a phenomenological critique of reason,
conceived as a transcendental undertaking.
In a 1911 article published in the journal Logos, ‘Philosophie als strenge
Wissenschaft’ (‘Philosophy as rigorous science’), Husserl emphasizes that the most
serious error of naturalism consists in the naturalization of consciousness, and
moreover of ideas in general (on the ideal or ‘eidetic’ level). Consequently, the laws
of logic are deemed to be natural laws of thinking. Furthermore, the outcome of
such assumptions spells disaster for philosophy as logic is thereby considered as the
object of a naturalistic-positivistic science; this reductionist view of philosophy ren-
ders it unable properly to approach and grasp the universality and ideality of the
logical laws and principles of thinking.
With respect to historicism, Husserl’s main reproach is directed towards its atten-
uation of the rigour of philosophical reflection by neglecting the a priori and regula-
tive structures of human thinking. Finally, philosophy as Weltanschauung represents
an objectionable idea from Husserl’s perspective because it harbours the danger of
a psychological subjectivism that is incapable of explaining objective knowledge
and which encourages insufficiently grounded personal opinions.
Therefore, if philosophy aims to become a rigorous science, it cannot follow the
lead of naturalism, historicism or philosophy as Weltanschauung. According to
Husserl, these theoretical paths are more than misleading because they wrongly
invite a reductionist approach to reason and its genuine powers of knowledge. They
lead in fact to an enshrouding in confusion and falsity of any authentic sense of
philosophy and even its originary impulse –seeking the truth according the rigorous
laws of reason – becomes muddled and unrecognizable.
In opposition to these three erroneous trends of thought, Husserl develops the
idea of philosophy as a rigorous science which must find its own way as a reflective
science through a double delimitation, both in content and method, from the sci-
ences of nature (Naturwissenchaften) and from the sciences of ‘spirit’
(Geisteswissenschaften). Uncritically taking up methods and attitudes used by the
natural and ‘spiritual’ sciences within philosophy, and furthermore, within the
human and social sciences, represents for Husserl a faulty practice that leads to a
false naturalization or historicization and relativization of philosophy (and espe-
cially of practical philosophy, that is, ethics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of
law), and in particular, by extrapolation, of all the principles, norms, values and
ideas of the entire field of the human and social sciences.
Husserl’s Idea of Rigorous Science and Its Relevance for the Human and Social… 99
1
See, for example, Dermot Moran, ‘Making Sense: Husserl’s Phenomenology as Transcendental
Idealism’, in Continental Philosophy Review 41 (4): 401–425 (2008).
100 V. E. Gelan
2
See, for example, Bernhard Waldenfels, ‘Beyond Foundationalism and Functionalism:
Phenomenology in Exchange with the Human and Social Sciences’ (in Evans and Stufflebeam
1997). Other relevant studies include: Evan Thompson, Alva Noe, and Luiz Pessoa, ‘Perceptual
Completion: A Case Study in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science’ (in Petitot et al. 1999); Jean-
Luc Petitot, ‘Constitution by Movement: Husserl in Light of Recent Neurobiological Findings’ (in
Petitot et al. 1999); Maria Villela-Petit, ‘Cognitive Psychology and the Transcendental Theory of
Knowledge’ (in Petitot et al. 1999); and Giorgi 2005.
Husserl’s Idea of Rigorous Science and Its Relevance for the Human and Social… 101
3
Schutz states clearly, at one point, that the entire work of Husserl was an important influence in
the foundation of the social sciences (Schutz 1959, 93).
102 V. E. Gelan
relationships. The social world displays several dimensions of closeness and dis-
tance (in space and time), as well as intimacy and anonymity, among other factors,
from which we can extract, by in-depth analytical probing, the organizational struc-
tures of the social world and experience. In the social sciences, this issue appears
under the heading of social roles, which brings up the problem of the subjective and
objective interpretation of the meaning of social action (a problematic that Schutz
takes over from Max Weber and to which he allocates numerous analyses of his
own). The research object of phenomenological sociology consists in the common
knowledge that people have of themselves and of the society in which they live.
Through spontaneous, empirical constructs, people pre-select and pre-interpret the
ordinary, common world which they experience as the reality of their everyday life.
These empirical constructs determine and motivate their behaviour. The objects of
thought that the social researcher builds in order to understand social reality must be
erected upon these empirical constructs of ordinary thought, as distilled within the
everyday life of ordinary people. In this sense, the constructs of the social sciences
are “second degree” constructs or constructs about the constructs concretely called
into play by the “actors” of the social scene, whose behaviour the social researcher
should observe and explain. Through these second degree constructs, the researcher
from the natural sciences builds up “the general image of recurrent typologies and
models of social interactions” (Berger and Luckmann 1969, 56).
Schutz remarks justly that empirical social sciences have their true foundations
not in a transcendental phenomenology as such, but in a phenomenology constitu-
tive of the natural attitude and the natural world. This is precisely what Husserl
parenthesizes by using the phenomenological reduction and what he subsequently
tries to recover, although only at the end of his philosophical endeavours, by intro-
ducing the problematic of the life-world (Lebenswelt) – and this corresponds in fact
to the field of the social sciences. Husserl’s work on Lebenswelt is considered by
Schutz to be essential for the social sciences and for their rigorous foundation
through a fundamental philosophical anthropology. The fact that Husserl’s analyses
concern a mainly eidetic phenomenology (entailing the transcendental attitude and
a systematic application of several types of reduction) and that their crucial results
demand the use of the phenomenological reduction, does not diminish at all their
importance or their validity for the problematic of the natural world and the natural
attitude. On the contrary, their vital role in the foundation process is only better
underlined in this way.
3 Final Remarks
knowledge in the social and human sciences, and at the same time, a rejection of the
reification of psychical acts and the conception of individual behaviour and inter-
personal relationships in a deterministic-causal manner. Therefore, a blending of
quantitative methods of research with qualitative ones is embraced within the social
and human sciences. Knowledge in the social sciences is constituted as “second
degree” knowledge (as reflective knowledge in the Husserlian sense), which ensues
from the interpretation of the meaning of social actions and the ways in which
actors relate to their social space, as well as to the other actors. They range them-
selves in several typologies of action, from which the sociologist constructs an
objective image of the really-perceived world. Grounded in the inter-subjective
human accord (inter-subjective testing), this image renders the social sphere as a
regional ontology, within which the analysis of social actions leads to the definition
of regional typologies as “intersubjective structures of historical life-worlds”
(Schutz 1970).
Husserl understood that it was necessary to complete his analysis of transcenden-
tal intersubjectivity (in Ideas I) with an investigation of subjectivity at the level of
the natural world and attitude (elaborated in Krisis), from which the positive sci-
ences emerge. This is where Husserl and Schutz meet. According to the former,
there are certain invariant structures of the life-world (within which takes place the
multitude of the flowing subjective-relative processes), which must be excavated
before any other description and theoretical explanation via positive sciences is
given. In this approach, the life-world (Lebenswelt) is what originates and ulti-
mately grounds all the human and social sciences. Therefore, the relationship
between the sciences and philosophy should be regarded not as a part-whole rela-
tionship, but as a rapport of radical self-clarification (through a widespread and
sedulous critique of presuppositions and foundations) – i.e. a founding-founded
relationship. From this perspective, the Husserlian idea of philosophy as rigorous
science still keeps pace with our current time and can provide serious help for
research in the human and social sciences, at both a fundamental level (by using the
epoché or generalized reduction), and at the level of diverse studies and applied
investigations.4
Acknowledgements This paper was supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed by the European Social Fund and by the Romanian
Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675.
References
Barber, M., and J. Dreher, eds. 2014. The Interrelation of Phenomenology, Social Sciences and the
Arts. Cham: Springer.
Berger, P., and Th. Luckmann. 1969. La realta come costruzione sociale. Bologna: Il Mulino.
4
For applied investigations, see for example studies such as Englander 2016; McIntosh 1997;
Vandenberghe 2002; and Barber and Dreher 2014.
Husserl’s Idea of Rigorous Science and Its Relevance for the Human and Social… 105
Marco Cavallaro
Abstract In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that com-
monly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear
quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to
jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range
of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the
first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-
splitting. My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of
this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of
the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenom-
enology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the
phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but
also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental
thinking.
1 Introduction
There are two essential traits that, taken together, provide us with a general defini-
tion of being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness.1
The first is straightforwardly a necessary condition. Any object whatsoever must
be identical with itself to be thinkable or, more generally speaking, experienceable.
Even a squared circle must be identical with itself if I state its nonexistence. I-ness
partakes of this formal condition of every being whatsoever.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes from sources that are not available in English translation
are the author’s own translation. Quotes from sources available in English translation make refer-
ence only to the page number of the English translation.
M. Cavallaro (*)
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
2
Fichte expresses the same view as follows: “The self exists only insofar as it is conscious of itself”
(Fichte 1982, 98). From this Fichte draws the conclusion that it is contradictory to ask what I was
before I came to self-consciousness. The obvious answer is that I did not exist at all, for I was not
a self, i.e. an I in the full-blown sense.
3
Mohanty 1997, 53 makes a similar point by clearly distinguishing between consciousness and
subjectivity. Therefore, even the unconscious counts as subjective, as belonging to the I in this
specific sense.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 109
these sentences, and the one who reflectively observes this activity itself. In reflec-
tion, which is usually taken as the paradigmatic example of self-consciousness, the
I splits up, as it were, into two different I’s. These are, respectively, the I that reflects
upon the experience (the reflecting I) and the I that is reflected upon (the reflected I).
If one generally agrees with this insight, then the relation between self-con-
sciousness and self-identity becomes plainly troublesome. To put it straight, the
former seems to render the latter sheer impossible. It appears that an I cannot be
conscious of itself without splitting into two (or even more) I’s, that is, without los-
ing its (self-)identity. Hence, self-consciousness and self-identity seem to be two
incompatible conditions of being an I. This appears as more aporetic as one recalls
the initial thesis according to which self-consciousness and self-identity only
together define most properly what an I is.
If we maintain the initial premises and the subsequent argument, we end up with
serious repercussions for our understanding of the I and even for our belief that
something like an I can exist at all. Indeed, the I ultimately reveals itself close to a
self-contradictory entity, meaning an entity whose essential conditions of possibil-
ity contradict themselves. Here we face a concept, indeed a very important one
which we constantly employ in everyday life and in our natural thinking and speak-
ing, which nonetheless speedily betrays its untenable character as soon as philo-
sophical reflection seizes upon it. Therefore, it seems at this point that we would
have good reasons to sympathize with Ernst Mach’s famous saying, and admit that
“the ego must be given up”.4
This is a too hasty conclusion, however. There is in fact a strand of philosophical
thinking that takes into serious consideration this (as we will see) apparent contra-
diction embedded in the very essence of being an I. We are notably referring to
transcendental philosophy.
A transcendental philosopher would admit in general that every kind of
object-identity is the result of a specific form of synthesis actively or passively
carried out by a transcendental subject.5 The identity of an object throughout its
manifold of appearances is not a given datum that the subject simply acknowl-
edges, but the outcome of a “constituting” process in which the subject is actively
or passively engaged. This overall view is generally common among all forms of
transcendental philosophy. For instance, Kantian criticism and Husserlian phe-
nomenology share this basic insight – although it hardly needs saying that they
differ when it comes to determining the precise nature of the relationship between
the subject and the object of experiencing.6
4
Mach 1914, 24. Needless to say, the reasons that triggered Mach’s rejection of the I-concept do
not correspond to the ones laid out here.
5
I do not consider here the strand of transcendental philosophies which admit no space for a con-
stituting subject and that claim that the constitutional activity is performed (almost) exclusively by
asubjective synthetic accomplishments. Cf. for instance Patočka 1991/1971.
6
For an encompassing discussion of the relationship between the philosophies of Husserl and
Kant, see the classical volume of Kern 1964. Important for the topic of this paper is also the insight
set out by Kockelmans 1977.
110 M. Cavallaro
According to Kant, the reduplication of the I occurring in the Ego-splitting, i.e. its
being at the same time subject and object of experience, is primarily a “fact” whose
actuality the philosopher can do nothing but acknowledge without trying to explain.
The most commented Kantian passage on this topic stems from one of his late
7
Alfredo Ferrarin (1994) notices something similar in his reading of Husserl’s late reflections on
the historicity of the pure ego. He states that there must be a tension in the transcendental concep-
tion of the ego that Husserl cannot solve, i.e. “the fact that consciousness must both be the origi-
nary consciousness of inner time and be constituted or synthetically unified in time: synthesis and
the object of synthesis, activity and form”. To put it differently, the difficulty consists in the double
requirement that the ego be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be the object of its concrete
self-constitution in a history. If it has to constitute itself, it has in fact to be the subject of its self-
objectification – in which case it has to presuppose itself for its own constitution (Ferrarin
1994, 655). Personally, I do not agree with this interpretation of the Husserlian doctrine, as I hope
it shall gradually emerge between the lines of the present discussion.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 111
writings, Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, and reads quite elo-
quently as follows:
I am conscious of myself, is a thought that already implies a twofold I, the I as subject and
the I as object. How it is possible that I, being the I who thinks, be an object (of intuition)
for myself, and in what way I would be able to differentiate me from myself, is simply
impossible to explain, even though it is an unquestionable fact [Faktum]. (Kant 1902-, AA
XX, 270)
Kant’s thesis in this passage is threefold: (1) self-consciousness obtains, (2) it entails
an Ego-splitting, (3) the phenomenon of Ego-splitting amounts to a “limit” with
respect to any possible knowledge concerning the transcendental subject. In the fol-
lowing we will examine these claims one by one.
(1) Kant assumes that self-consciousness obtains, meaning that it is the case that
I (the I of transcendental apperception) am conscious of myself and my synthetic
activities. In this sense, he takes a similar view as the one Husserl expressed in the
passage quoted at the beginning, for which to be an I is to be conscious of oneself.
Accordingly, being conscious of oneself is not an accidental property of the I, a state
which the I now and then just happens to be in; on the contrary, it is part of its very
definition and characterizes the totality of its experiences.
Kant is referring here notably to transcendental self-consciousness and not to a
form of empirical, psychological self-consciousness. This cannot be predicated as
an essential and necessary attribute of an I, for we may from time to time lack
empirical self-consciousness. Kant refers in this sense to the example of reading.
While reading, the subject is thematically conscious of the meaning of the words
she is reading but not of the activity of reading itself, i.e. the grasping of the words
as bearers of meaning (Kant 1902-, AA II, 191). In other words, she does not
possess empirical self-consciousness of her grasping activity.
In a passage from the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant explic-
itly contrasts empirical self-consciousness or inner sense with transcendental self-
consciousness or apperception:
Inner sense is not pure apperception, consciousness of what we are doing; for this belongs
to the power of thinking. It is, rather, consciousness of what we undergo as we are affected
by the play of our own thoughts. This consciousness rests on inner intuition, and so on the
relation of ideas (as they are either simultaneous or successive). (Kant 1974, 39)
spontaneous, self-legislating, free subject of acts, as the doer of deeds and not just
as a passive receptacle for sensuous data and representations. In Kant’s words, “I
exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination”
(B158–159), of “the activity of the self” (B68).8
Apperception is thus characterized as a consciousness of mental activity – rather
than of mental states – so that one might interpret the distinction between empirical
and transcendental self-consciousness like the distinction between consciousness of
mental passivity and activity, respectively. In this view, apperception would obtain
only if the mind is actively involved in producing its own thoughts, whereas inner
sense would occur when the mind is guided by its own principles of association –
“consciousness rests on inner intuition, and so on the relation of ideas”.
This kind of reading would certainly hold true if the categories of activity and
passivity at stake here were thought of as belonging to the same level of foundation.
However, the activity of which transcendental self-consciousness is consciousness
of has nothing to do with the mental activity performed by an empirical subject (the
soul). Roughly speaking, the former is transcendental whereas the latter is empiri-
cal. The consciousness of the activity of counting the members of a given manifold
is not a form of transcendental self-consciousness, for counting is not in itself a
transcendental performance. If we hold with Kant that self-consciousness arises out
of a kind of self-affection representations, objects or activities exert on the mind
(Gemüt), one must notice that the self-affection which motivates and grounds tran-
scendental apperception stems from an array of transcendental (and not merely
mental) intuiting, synthetizing, and combining activities – i.e. those activities that
render experience possible, first of all the activity of synthesis which combines rep-
resentations given by sensibility in order to form concepts and judgments (cf. Kant
1998, A77–8/B102–3).9 Therefore, it is not astonishing to read Kant at A78/B103
noting that although acts of synthesis are indispensable for cognition, we are con-
scious of them “only very rarely [selten nur einmal]” and at A103–4 describing
consciousness as “feeble [schwach]” and lacking in clarity. Here Kant is most likely
referring to empirical self-consciousness and not to transcendental self-conscious-
ness. We do not normally experience transcendental synthetic activities but more
likely their products, i.e. the objects of representation and, through inner sense, the
representations themselves. Yet, transcendental activities are always apperceived,
that is, transcendentally, not empirically, self-conscious, so that apperception
amounts to a necessary condition for the possibility of cognitive experience and
8
This reading of the Kantian transcendental self as activity has been recently purported by Melnick
2009. Martin Heidegger already anticipated this trend of Kant’s scholarship in his lecture course
entitled Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason where he points out:
“thinking as acting is what is fundamentally in the manner of ‘I think.’ Thinking as such […] starts
‘from itself,’ from the self as itself. […] The ability character of my actions [thinkings] determines
the mode of being of the subject” (Heidegger 1997, 234).
9
For the meaning of transcendental, see Kant’s account in the appendix to the Prolegomena: “the
word ‘transcendental’ […] does not signify something passing beyond all experience but some-
thing that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience
possible” (Kant 2001, 106 f.).
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 113
thus a pervasive feature of the entire life of consciousness (see e.g. Kant 1998,
B132).10
The question that naturally arises is whether the (non-empirical) consciousness of
the transcendental intuiting, synthesizing, and combining activities of the under-
standing equates for Kant to the consciousness the transcendental subject has of
herself. There is little doubt that this must be the case. Kant believes not only that the
subject is always and necessarily (non-empirically) conscious of her own transcen-
dental activities; he also argues that this self-consciousness of representations entails
at the same time a self-consciousness of the subject. I am constantly conscious of
myself, meaning that I am conscious of being the bearer and doer of the transcenden-
tal activities which appear in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness of representa-
tional states always entails as inherent moment self-consciousness of the I.11
(2) Kant points out that self-consciousness essentially involves an Ego-splitting.
More precisely, he asserts that in the thought that corresponds to the judgment “I am
conscious of myself” the I figures as both subject and object. The splitting thus
amounts for Kant in the double characterization of the I as subject and object of a
self-reflective judgment – meaning a judgment that expresses an experience of self-
reflection, such as “I am conscious of myself”.
Kant’s characterization of self-consciousness as a judgment derives from his
peculiar usage of the term ‘experience’. Kant always takes experience to involve the
exercise of judgment (see e.g. Kitcher 1982, 57). Thus, having an experience of
oneself does not amount to simply being conscious of oneself but rather judging that
this is the case. The experience of self-consciousness entails the judgment “I am
conscious of myself”. This point is of paramount importance to characterize Kant’s
own rendition of the problem of Ego-splitting. The split of the I occurs in the self-
reflective judgment which accompanies every self-conscious experience; it is a con-
10
For a more detailed account of the meaning of transcendental self-consciousness and why Kant
regards it to be a necessary condition for cognitive experience cf. the refined analyses of Kitcher
1999. More extensive readings are to be found in Keller 1998 and Powell 1990.
11
Here lies the reason why Kant often equates transcendental synthesis with the transcendental
unity of apperception: “This amounts to saying, that I am conscious to myself a priori of a neces-
sary synthesis of representations – to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception” (Kant
1998, B135). Unfortunately, I cannot dig into this topic any further. I rely in my understanding of
Kant’s point here on Patricia Kitcher’s discussion in Kitcher 1982. Kitcher clearly points out why
Kant is committed to postulate self-consciousness of the I as a necessary condition for experience
and especially cognition. Due to its complexity, I shall not report the all argument here. It suffices
to mention the following fundamental steps. Kant regards a relation of synthesis between the sub-
ject’s mental states as the condition of their representational feature: “We are conscious a priori of
the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our
knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they
can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and
therefore must be at least capable of being so connected” (Kant 1998, A116, italics are mine). But
since for Kant a mental state is possible only as representational and I can acknowledge a relation
of synthesis only if it is there, then a synthetic unity of all my mental states is both necessary and
subsistent. This synthetic unity amounts to the possibility of ascribing every mental state to an “I
think”, that is, I must be able (which means that actually I do not do it all the time) to acknowledge
a relation between it and other mental states (Kant 1998, A116/B131–32).
114 M. Cavallaro
sequence of the fact that every kind of experience according to Kant involves
judgment, on the one hand, and that judgments contain a subject and a predicate
conjoined by a copula, on the other. Then, in a judgment the I is split into the subject
and the object (predicate) of judgment, respectively ‘I’ and ‘myself’. In a sense,
judgments accompanying self-consciousness may resemble judgments of identity –
such as the judgment “A is A”. Nonetheless, an important aspect allows us to draw
a distinction between the two forms. As far as self-consciousness does not necessar-
ily and directly entail a predication of the identity between subject and predicate, it
is the more legitimate here to raise the issue of the Ego-splitting.12
There seems to be a path that Kant could have followed to escape the problem of
the Ego-splitting in self-consciousness. This amounts in dismissing the view which
declares experiences of self-consciousness to be nothing but judgments of the type
“I am conscious of myself” or ego cogito (me cogitare).
In the passage from the Preisschrift quoted at the beginning of this section, Kant
plainly does not follow this path. The same happens in the Paralogisms in the first
Critique where he initially speaks of the ego cogito as a “judgment” involving a
“concept” (Kant 1998, A341/B399), while later negating that we can even have the
least concept of it (Kant 1998, A346/B404). Self-consciousness, considered on its
own, is not the representation of an object in particular, but “a form of representa-
tion in general, insofar as it is to be called a cognition” (ibid.). Accordingly, it does
not amount to any extension of our knowledge of reality – under this respect, self-
consciousness distinguishes itself specifically from self-knowledge (cf. Henrich
1982, 19).
A real alternative to the view which is more likely to denounce the Ego-splitting
is introduced in the Prolegomena. There Kant describes self-consciousness as
“nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the least concept” (Kant
2001, 334 n., emphasis added). Rudolf Makkreel (1994, 103 ff.) suggests consider-
ing the feeling of existence lived through by the transcendental Ego in terms of the
“pure aesthetic feeling of life,” which is introduced in the Critique of Judgment as
the “bare consciousness of existence” (Kant 1987, § 29) in opposition to the aes-
thetic feeling of pleasure/displeasure or the “feeling of the enhancement of life”.
Nor is self-consciousness, as a bare sensation (Empfindung) or feeling (Gefühl) of
my own existence, to be conflated with the moral feeling of respect (Achtung) set
out already in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Both self-
consciousness and respect are types of sensations not caused by the influence of an
outer object – they are both “non-referential” in the strict sense of not-being depen-
dent upon a sensuous affection of the subject by the object (see Kumar 2014).
However, the feeling of respect is “a feeling self-wrought [selbstgewirktes]” by
12
I am not negating that judgments predicating identity of something with itself generally do not
pose the problem of splitting. My observation, as simple as it is, refers merely to the fact that in
self-consciousness it is easier to become aware of the problem of splitting than it is referring to
identity judgments. On a related note, that the latter involve great difficulties and mediations when
rightly seized upon is most efficiently proved by the Fichtean system of the theory of science or
Wissenschaftslehre.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 115
means of a concept of reason, i.e. the moral law (Kant 1997, 14), therefore it does
refer to something, in the broader sense of the term: namely it is caused by an a
priori principle of the practical reason. Self-consciousness instead is not even linked
to a rational concept or principle which resides in the mind, since it fundamentally
lacks the referential or presentational power as such. Hence Kant more precisely
explains it as a “power [Vermögen]” which does not contribute anything to cogni-
tion, “but merely compares the given presentation in the subject with the entire
presentational power, of which the mind becomes conscious when it feels its own
state” (Kant 1987, 44). This is not at odds with what we noticed above, namely that
transcendental self-consciousness implies a consciousness of my activities, mean-
ing my “entire presentational power.” In this regard, self-consciousness as bare sen-
sation of existence represents for Kant the transcendental feeling of spontaneity that
the mind lives through in every (transcendental) activity it performs (see Klemme
2012, 207 ff.).
In such a manner, it seems the Ego-splitting would not be a problem at all. In the
feeling the subject lives through of her own existence and spontaneity, there is no
splitting of the I, no mediation, but rather an unmediated relation or “familiarity
[Vertrautheit]” (cf. Frank 2002, 49; Klemme 1996, 401) of the I with its own pre-
sentational power and transcendentally constituting activity. In other terms, if self-
consciousness needs to be conceived of as a feeling of bare existence, no
objectification of the I and a correspondent splitting between the subject (as experi-
encing) and this subject as its own object (as experienced) seem to occur.
Nevertheless, far from being uncontroversial, this thesis has been thoroughly
debated in the most recent Kantian scholarship.
In a famous article, Dieter Henrich blamed, among others, Kant for relying on
what he calls the reflection theory of the I. This theory assumes a subject of thinking
and emphasizes that this subject stands in a constant relation to itself. It then explains
this relationship as a result of the subject’s turning back into itself from its original
relation to objects, and thus of its making itself into its own object. The I is thus
ultimately regarded by Kant as that act in which the knowing subject becomes aware
of its constant unity with itself (Henrich 1982, 19). This conception is insofar ques-
tionable for Henrich as it falls into a vicious circle. If we understand self-conscious-
ness as reflection, the structure of reflection itself requests us to postulate an essential
duality, i.e. a split, between the reflecting I and the reflected I – Subjekt-Ich and
Objekt-Ich in Henrich’s terminology. What is then the nature of the first subject, the
subject-I? Properly speaking, it cannot be regarded as an I for one can only speak of
an ‘I’ where a subject has apprehended itself. Further, the sole function of reflection
consists in making explicit what was already there but concealed. Reflection there-
fore cannot explain the origin of the I, meaning that it is logically inadmissible to
explain the I in terms of self-consciousness.
The main premise of Henrich’s argument, which is more of interest for the topic
of this paper than the argument itself, is that self-consciousness qua reflection
entails a splitting of the I. As soon as reflection sets in, the I is not identical with
itself anymore and a duality in its essential core is produced. This is however not an
eventuality which pertains uniquely to those experiences in which the I grasps itself,
116 M. Cavallaro
In a recent article, Konrad Cramer argued for two theses concerning the problem of
Ego-splitting in Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. First, he argues, Husserl never
had the problem that we also encounter in Kant, which means that he never had to
account for a split of the I in self-consciousness. Second, even if he had had it, he
would have appreciated Kant’s ‘solution’ of it, that is, he would have agreed that we
simply must acknowledge the Ego-splitting without even trying to explain it –
“Husserl did not have this difficulty. But, if he had had it, he would have agreed with
Kant’s relinquishment of explaining this as well as any other ‘undoubtful’ fact”
(Cramer 2011, 25). I contend that neither of the two assertions Cramer supports here
are true. On the one hand, Husserl has indeed encountered the phenomenon of Ego-
splitting in his phenomenological analyses of reflection and representification. On
the other, he does not simply limit himself to acknowledging the occurring of the
Ego-splitting in common, natural experiences, but he takes it as characterizing the
essential core of the transcendental subject. Not for nothing, Jan Broekman once
stated that Husserl conceives of the Ego-splitting as the bedrock of his entire phi-
losophy (cf. Broekman 1963, 123). In what follows, I shall argue for my twofold
thesis with a reading of Husserl’s texts in which the Ego-splitting comes particularly
to light, that is, the texts in which Husserl considers the intentional structure of a
peculiar type of acts, i.e. representifications (Vergegenwärtigungen), and those that
deal with the nature of reflection. Secondly, I show in which sense transcendental
subjectivity harbors a fundamental split in its very core, which is, I shall argue, what
determines in turn its transcendentally constituting activity.
I follow Eduard Marbach (2012, 236) in translating the German Vergegenwärtigung and verge-
13
genwärtigen with “representification” and “to representify”, on the one hand, and Gegenwärtigung
and gegenwärtigen with “presentification” and “to presentify”, on the other.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 119
taurs. In all these cases, we relate to an object or event (the train, the last night meal,
the centaurs’ battle) which is not really here and now, but which is in this or that
manner representified.
Living in acts of representifications, we are not only able to call into presence, as
it were, objects and events that are no more, not yet, or that have never been and will
never be in the field of perception. According to Husserl, the representification of an
object involves a sort of reduplication or split of the I. A couple of examples should
clarify the essential structure of this phenomenon that we find at work in every act
of representification.
Let us begin with the case of what Husserl notably calls “reflections upon memory”
(Husserl 2019, 297; cf. Husserl 1983, 197 ff.). I recollect an event that took place in
the past, e.g. a fire. What I recall is not only the event in se, in its objective existence,
but also the event per se, that is, in the way I once experienced it. Therefore, the
activity of recollection can function only as long as it representifies both the recol-
lected object and the perception (or judgment, volition etc.) which once presentified
that object.14
Now, at least since the publication of Ideas I Husserl attributes to every experi-
ence a double polarization: towards the object-pole and towards the I-pole.15 Every
experience or act intends an object that is altogether “transcendent” with respect to
the act itself. The intending or “being-directed-to” (Gerichtet-sein) of the act has its
point of origin in an I-pole that is both transcendent and immanent with respect to
the act itself: in Husserl’s famous words, it is “a transcendence in the immanence”
(cf. Husserl 1989, 105–107; Husserl 1973a, 246; Husserl 1973b, 43; Husserl
1983, 109–112). This somewhat exotic expression serves Husserl to underline a
fundamental twofold character of the I-pole. As a structural moment in the inten-
tional act, the I is deemed to be “immanent” and to arise and perish along with the
singular act in the stream of consciousness. Notwithstanding, for Husserl the I
endures and remains identical by any real or possible changing of living experi-
14
Husserl’s analyses of recollection notably focus on one specific type of remembering, i.e. what
cognitive psychology nowadays calls “episodic memory”, the memory of an event I experienced in
the past. However, there are other forms of remembering like the so-called “semantic memory”,
which is the memory I have for example of the date of Caesar’s murder – an event I did not directly
experience. Cf. Fernández 2006 and critically Naylor 2011.
15
Husserl explicitly purports a non-egological conception of consciousness in his Logical
Investigations (1900–1901) in which the relation between the experiences or acts and the (phe-
nomenological) I – intended as the bundle of all lived experiences – is considered as not phenom-
enologically proven (Husserl 2001, 85 f.; cf. also Marbach 1973, 5–22). Later he changed his view,
when he realizes that the I represents an essential moment of every act of consciousness actively
lived through. For a recent reconstruction of the development of Husserl’s theory of the I, see
Lohmar 2012.
120 M. Cavallaro
ences. The I does not amount to a “really inherent piece” (reelles Stück) of the act,
nor to a “fixed idea” that stupidly accompanies every and each intentional experi-
ence (Husserl 1983, 132). Although the I needs to be distinguished from the acts in
which it lives and functions, it cannot exist independently of them. The I in this
specific sense “transcends” the current lived experience as an abiding dimension of
every form of manifestation (Hart 2009, 93; see Zahavi 1999, 148).
In the present context the latter insight allows us to explain the splitting of the I
in representifications. In the case of recollection, by representifying a past experi-
ence one eventually faces a reduplication of the I into the I-pole of the representify-
ing experience (in the previous example, the recollection of the fire) and the I-pole
of the representified experience (the perception of the fire I lived through in the
past). In Husserl’s own words: “In each memory lies in a certain sense a doubling
of the I [Ichverdoppelung], insofar as what I remember directly is not only in gen-
eral conscious as something past, but as something past as perceived by me [als von
mir wahrgenommenes Gewesen]” (Husserl 2019, 297; see also Husserl 2006b, 58;
Husserl 2006a, 366). The reason of doubling of the I, which as we will see is a
consequence of the Ego-splitting, lies in the fact that the content of recollection
belongs to my past I, i.e. the I that was there in the past and bore witness to the fire
(cf. Husserl 2019, 297).
However, the two I’s of the recollecting and recollected experience maintain
their identity despite the split and the temporal distance that separate them. This
identity is, in the case of recollection, an identity through time, i.e. persistence. The
persistence of the I through time is in no respect like the persistence of physical-
material objects through time. The latter is an objective duration that calls for a
constituting activity of the subject. The former, instead, implies what Husserl in §
29 of Ideas II calls “a kind of consequence of the Ego” (Husserl 1989, 120). This
means that the identity of the I through the manifold of (its) experiences depends
on the fact that I am a priori the same as far as I maintain consequence among all
my position-takings. Surely, I may become “unfaithful” and “inconsistent” to
myself – for instance, I may convert to a new religion and reject my previous stance
towards it. I nonetheless remain identical with myself insofar as it is me that carries
out this new decision and allows it to fit with the previous history of all my posi-
tion-takings. What preserves my identity through time is thus the gradual sedimen-
tation of my experiences and position-takings and their functioning in the present
field of consciousness as individual patterns of motivational force and affection (cf.
Cavallaro 2016).
The remembering and the remembered I’s have the same history of experience in
common. This entails two possibilities: either what motivates the remembering I is
akin to what has motivated the remembered I in the past or, even if the I has mean-
while changed its way of being motivated, i.e. the set of motivations the I allows
itself to be affected by has been modified, it is possible to trace the motives that led
the I to change its way of being motivated within the coherence of the same history
of the I. In both cases, the so-called “genetic” identity of the I is still preserved.
From a static point of view, the identity of the I through recollection is cherished
as well. It belongs to the intentional structure of recollecting an experience that the
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 121
16
This more static form of identity is due to an inner constituent of experiencethat Dan Zahavi
famously calls “minimal self” (cf. Zahavi 1999).
17
For a much broader assessment of the problems related to Husserl’s phenomenology of pure
phantasy, especially with regard to the phenomenon of the ego-splitting, see Cavallaro 2017.
In this section of the present paper, I mostly draw on the analyses laid down in that article.
18
In Ideas I Husserl defines phantasy “the neutrality modification of ‘positing’ presentification,
therefore of memory in the widest conceivable sense” (Husserl 1983, 260, translation modified).
Yet, the identification of phantasy with a “modification” of a pre-given act is highly problematic,
as Husserl himself will recognize in his later manuscripts published in Husserl 2005, 689–708. For
an assessment of this issue see Cavallaro 2017, 167–171.
122 M. Cavallaro
19
Would consciousness become conscious only dependently on a second intentional experience,
one would have to postulate a further intentional experience that makes the latter equally con-
scious, and so on ad infinitum. Hence, in order to forestall the regress one must consider self-con-
sciousness an intrinsic feature of any experience whatsoever.
20
Husserl himself reaches a similar conclusion in Experience and Judgment where he refers to the
specific character of phantasy time as detached from the absolute time of perception (cf. Husserl
1975, § 39).
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 123
In addition, the split involves a redoubling of the I who lives through the phan-
tasy experience. This difference of phantasying and phantasied I comes particularly
into the fore in Husserl’s references to the phenomenon of phantasy in the second
part of his lectures on First Philosophy. Here, Husserl introduces the famous exam-
ple of the phantasy experience of a centaurs’ battle. Phantasying the battle, Husserl
pinpoints, “it is also possible that I am not part of it [the phantasy world of the cen-
tarus’ battle, that I do not count. But upon closer inspection I am myself then in a
certain sense, and necessarily so, co-phantasized. For, how could I imagine such an
episode of the phantasy world with such determination, without imagining it in a
certain orientation?” (Husserl 2019, 319; cf. also Husserl 2005, 556). One could
argue that, in a certain respect, an analogy between phantasy and perception holds
true, for also in phantasy we cannot quasi-perceive an object if not from a given
viewpoint in the phantasy space. However, what is interesting here is the fact that
the phantasied I who observes the centaurs’ battle from a certain orientation is
detached from the I who lives through the phantasy experience. No reunification or
identification is possible between the two, otherwise, as Natalie Depraz correctly
observes, “one would face a case of madness due to multiple personality disorder,
schizophrenia in the literal sense” (Depraz 1995, 263; cf. also Bernet 2004, 112).
Phantasying I and phantasied I must remain separated if the I should maintain its
identity.
To take a step further, it can be argued that the impossibility of reunifying the
two I’s is justified by both static and genetic considerations. From a static point of
view, the phantasied I represents the I-pole of the quasi-perception reproduced by
the phantasy experience, whereas the phantasying I equals the I-pole of this experi-
ence itself. Thus, they belong to the inner intentional structure of two different acts
and as such must be kept separated. The possibility of a sheer identification between
the two I’s is ruled out by Husserl since they belong to two different fluxes of con-
sciousness, i.e. to two different temporal horizons. From a genetic point of view, I
cannot consider the phantasyzed I as myself since this one, together with the phan-
tasy experience that gives rise to it, is the product of an unmotivated act of subjec-
tive freedom in which phantasy ultimately consists (cf. Bernet 2004, 108, 115). I
cannot find so to speak a place for it in my genetic history since it does not fit with
my past sedimented experiences in which, to continue the example began earlier,
no centaurs occur and perform a battle in front of my incredulous eyes.
Does this ruling out the identity between the phantasying I and the phantasied I
jeopardize the self-identity of the I? Once again self-consciousness and self-identity
seem to clash here. It is namely self-consciousness that motivates us to draw the
distinction between the phantasying experience and the phantasied experience along
with their corresponding I’s. If self-consciousness was not obtaining, surely I could
not become conscious of living through a phantasy experience as I would not be
aware of the neutralizing character of the positing performed by phantasy.
Nonetheless, Husserl still admits here a “union of coincidence” (Deckungseinheit)
between the phantasying I and phantasied I, which means a sort of identity in differ-
ence. There is no strict difference, since the phantasied I does not resemble an alter
ego which I can perceive in the real world, but this I is nothing else than me as
124 M. Cavallaro
imagined in a phantasy world. At the same time, there is also not a straightforward
identity between the I’s. The split brought about by self-consciousness is a split
inasmuch as the consciousness of identity does not totally disappear but is still there
albeit modified, tantalized by difference. The I loses its sheer identity in order to
acquire a new level of identification which entails and harbors difference in itself. In
this sense, strictly speaking, the splitting of the I does not coincide with its redupli-
cation. A reduplication entails that at first there is one I, while thereafter there are
two I’s. On the opposite, a splitting does not bring to existence a new, second I,
which would be numerically distinct from the first. In this case, the I undergoes a
process, i.e. the splitting, which allows difference to enter its self-identity. At the
end of this process, there are not two I’s, but one and the same splitted I.
In sum, Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of recollection and phantasy expe-
riences expounded so far have shown us an intrinsic feature of the subject, namely
its distinctive aptitude of splitting itself without giving up its own identity. In the
case of phantasy, we further noticed that the identity of the I which follows the Ego-
splitting is of a different kind with respect to the sheer self-identity prior to it. Now,
these aspects of Husserl’s approach to the problem of the Ego-splitting find their
culmination in his analyses of reflection. We shall see in the next section how
Husserl reached a more advanced insight into the issue concerning the incompati-
bility between self-consciousness and self-identity in his inquiries into the phenom-
enological structure of reflective experiences. This will at the same time allow us to
draw a parallel with the Kantian approach set out in the first part of this paper.
The previous discussion about the role of the Ego-splitting in recollection and phan-
tasy has shown the centrality of this concept for the general understanding of acts of
representification. In every kind of representification, consciousness undergoes a
splitting that, on the one hand, seems to jeopardize the identity of the I, but, on the
other hand, renders it eventually possible to experience such an identity. As para-
doxical as it may sound, the condition of possibility for experiencing the identity of
the I rests on its original split. This is namely the general insight we can gather from
Husserl’s meditations on the phenomenon of Ego-splitting. Yet, before jumping to
this conclusion, we still need to examine a further type of acts, in which the charac-
teristic split of the I still plays a crucial role: we refer here to the acts of reflection.
Reflection for Husserl does not constitute a specific topic of phenomenological
analysis among others. Instead, it takes on a “universal methodological function”
since “the phenomenological method operates exclusively in acts of reflection”
(Husserl 1983, 174). Husserl distinguishes a kind of reflection that we commonly
perform in the natural attitude and the reflection peculiar to the phenomenological
method. In contrast to natural reflection – which may also assume the form of a
scientific enterprise such as in the case of the method of introspection as employed
by empirical psychology – phenomenological reflection brackets the positing of
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 125
21
It is thus not my intent here to unveil the much debated topic of the split between the phenomeno-
logical, natural, and phenomenologizing I first identified by Eugen Fink in Fink 1933. For a recent
valuable discussion of this topic see Varga 2011.
22
In the same vein, Zahavi interprets reflection as an act that, when it sets in, “initially grasps
something that has just elapsed, namely the motivating prereflective phase of the experience. I
remain affected by that which is no longer present, and I therefore have the possibility to react on
the affection and to thematize the backward sinking phase of experience” (Zahavi 1999, 117).
126 M. Cavallaro
This long passage is crucial for understanding the difference between the Ego-
splitting occurring in reflection and the one characteristic of the acts of representifi-
cation considered so far, that is, recollection and phantasy. Previously we observed
that the activity of recollecting a past experience entails a split between the recol-
lecting I and the I of the recollected experience. In this case, we clearly notice a
“temporal separation [zeitliches Auseinander]” between the two I’s: the I of recol-
lection belongs to the living present in which the recollecting act takes place,
whereas the I as immanent moment of the recollected experience settles in the tem-
poral horizon of the I’s past life.
The situation becomes more complicated when it comes to addressing the tem-
poral dimension of the Ego-splitting pertaining to phantasy experiences. In contrast
to the phantasying I, the phantasized I is in no sense part of this world with its objec-
tive time and space. This means that it would make little sense to localize it in a
temporal point instead of another, as long as these points are determined with
respect to the now-point (Jetztpunkt) of the I who lives through the phantasy experi-
ence. A sentence as ‘the adventures of Frodo Baggins took place in the year 496
A.C.’ immediately appears awkward since we do not usually pose the objective
existence of the happenings narrated in the fictional book of J.R.R. Tolkien while
reading them. As already argued above, phantasy world and real world do not share
the same modality of temporal experience – clearly, the same holds true for the
experiential dimension of space. A consequence of this is that also the respective I’s
with their corresponding experiences do not partake of the same temporal level. To
put it plainly, it goes against the set of eidetic laws for phantasy experiences to say
that the phantasying I is a step ahead or behind with respect to the phantasyzed I. In
fact, the phenomenological structure of the two temporal dimensions does not allow
any criterion of comparison for establishing what comes first and what comes
after.23
In reflection, on the contrary, we acknowledge a temporal relation between the
reflecting I and the reflected I, which is, first, incomparable with the one of phantasy
experience and, second, of a different sort than the one of recollection. The act of
reflection together with the reflected act join in a relationship of, to say, “temporal
chiasm [zeitliches Ineinander]” or “contemporaneity”. Thus, it turns out that what
makes reflection a peculiar act of its own, especially in contrast to recollection and
phantasy, is the simultaneity between the reflected and reflecting experience together
with their corresponding I’s.
Furthermore, it is clear, in this case as in the previous occurrences of the split,
that these two I’s must maintain their identity in spite of the split. Were this not be
the case, I would face an experience of the consciousness’ life of somebody else
(what is called by Husserl “empathy”) and not a reflection into my own life of con-
sciousness. The criterion that permits us to establish the fact that I am introspec-
23
Thus, also simultaneity between the phantasying and the phantasied experience and their respec-
tive I’s is ruled out. Temporal categories are relative categories of things (objects, events), which
means, they hold true only if they are taken all together as possible predicates of one individual at
a time.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 127
4 C
onclusion. The Split at the Core of the Transcendental
Subject
What is the significance of these analyses for the problem stated at the beginning?
We preliminarily observed that self-consciousness entails an Ego-splitting and
noticed that this is at odds with the prerequisite of self-identity we generally attri-
bute to every experienceable or solely thinkable object. The discussion in the first
section has shown that Kant was aware of this problem, albeit without seriously
tackling it. That by every act of reflection and self-consciousness the I can appear
both as object and subject is for him an “undoubtable fact” which is at the same time
“absolutely impossible to explain”. Husserl’s phenomenology has the merit of hav-
ing uncovered new aspects of this fundamental split of the I. For him every act of
representification, i.e. acts in which something absent comes into presence, may be
deemed responsible for a certain type of Ego-splitting. We see in fact that to any
form of representification corresponds a specific mode in which the splitting of the
I can occur. Furthermore, we noticed how this qualification of the Ego-splitting
basically depends on the relation between the temporalities of the representifying I
and the representified I characteristic for each case. In recollection both I’s belong
to the same temporal stream, whereby what principally differentiates them is their
‘position’ in the temporal continuum. In phantasy experiences the phantasying I and
the phantasied I are not parts of the same temporal stream. Hence, their difference
does not amount to the delayed location within a temporal continuum, but to the
heterogeneity of the temporal dimensions in which the two I’s, with their entire
egological life, are to be located. Finally, we noticed that reflection discloses a fur-
ther type of Ego-splitting due to the “temporal chiasm” between the reflecting and
reflected I. In this case, we have seen, one can speak of a simultaneous existence of
the two I’s in the living experience.
At the end of the previous section, it emerged how for Husserl reflection in gen-
eral can be regarded as the condition of possibility for every act of representifica-
tion. Husserl admits a sort of non-thematic self-consciousness which accompanies
each and every act of representification. Since self-consciousness involves an Ego-
splitting, we conclude that also the structure of this kind of act demands a split of
the I. In the same vein, Kant’s analyses of transcendental self-consciousness showed
that the latter is a fundamental ingredient of every experience and thus must always
be presupposed as a transcendental condition of all experiencing. Husserl’s analyses
further follow Kant’s in noticing in reflection or self-consciousness an Ego-splitting.
We can gather from this, the conclusion that the Ego-splitting itself must be regarded
as a transcendental condition of experience. For in order to experience something,
the I must ‘see’ itself experiencing, as it were. This involves a split between the I
who sees itself experiencing and the I who is seen.
Far from being the cause of an infinite regress, the splitting of the I is the condi-
tion for which an I can appear to itself, that is, in Husserl’s terms, can be “consti-
tuted” as an I. From a transcendental philosophical standpoint, self-manifestation
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 129
24
This is a central thesis in the works of Dan Zahavi. See for instance Zahavi 1999.
130 M. Cavallaro
25
Julien Farges (2015, 99) emphasizes how reflection according to Husserl opens up a verticality
in the essence of the I, a sort of original depth which produces a qualitatively infinite diffraction of
the original split. I agree that the Ego-splitting allows difference and thus verticality to penetrate
the essence of the I. However, I cannot see why this splitting should proceed ad infinitum, as Farges
seems to suggest. The split must be recognized as the condition of possibility of the self-themati-
zation of the I. This self-thematization, if we consider it in a non-methodological sense as self-
consciousness which accompanies (or must be able to accompany) every and each experience,
needs to be completed: in other words, its realization entails that the Ego-splitting finds eventu-
ally an end and becomes reunified by the synthesis of coincidence. In this precise sense, one might
draw a distinction between reflection as a methodological means for Husserl’s phenomenological
analyses and reflection as transcendental condition of possibility for experience. A distinction
Farges’ article fails to draw. Christoph Durt (forthcoming) correctly pointed out that the splitting
of the I is not a peculiarity of transcendental consciousness, but it occurs also in ordinary
consciousness.
Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s… 131
features of the I. Thus, to reframe our thesis in eidetic terms, we must conclude that
the splitting is a necessary character of the eidos ‘Ego’ along with self-conscious-
ness and self-identity.26
References
26
I am thankful to Tim Burns, Emanuela Carta, Christoph Durt, Nikos Soueljis, and Paul Zipfel for
their insights into a previous version of this paper. In particular, Emanuela motivated me to dig
much deeper into Kant’s philosophy of self-consciousness, whereas Nikos’ comments helped me
a lot to clarify in my mind some central issues in Husserl’s phenomenology of the I. I want to thank
also Andrea Staiti and the participants of the Writing Seminar at Boston College for their helping
suggestions in improving my argument. The work for this paper has been carried out in the context
of a Ph.D. program generously funded by the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities
Cologne: I am very much indebted for its support during this time. The English has been revised
by Penelope Allsobrook, to whom I finally wish to express my gratitude.
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What Is Productive Imagination?
The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s
Phenomenology of Phantasy
Saulius Geniusas
Abstract The paper strives to clarify the essential structures of productive imagi-
nation using the resources of Husserlian phenomenology. According to my working
hypothesis, productive imagination is a relative term, whose meaning derives from
its opposition to reproductive imagination. One thus first needs to clarify what
makes imagination into a reproductive mode of consciousness, and in this regard,
Husserl’s phenomenology proves exceptionally fruitful. My analysis unfolds in four
steps. First, I fix the sense in which phantasy is an essentially reproductive mode of
consciousness. Secondly, I argue that phantasy cannot be conceived as an ingredient
of perceptual consciousness. Thirdly, I show that both memory and phantasy gener-
ate patterns of sense, which can subsequently be transcribed into the field of posi-
tional experience. Finally, I conclude with a suggestion that the plurality of cultural
worlds can be conceived as diverse configurations of sense, which are the constitu-
tive accomplishments of productive imagination.
1 Introduction
S. Geniusas (*)
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
e-mail: geniusas@cuhk.edu.hk
1
As Paul Ricoeur has argued in his noteworthy studies of productive imagination, insofar as one
conceptualizes imagination alongside perception as a distinct type of intentional consciousness,
one inevitably ends up limiting imagination to its reproductive function. Ricoeur thus asks: “if an
image is not derived from perception, how can it be derived from language?” (Ricoeur 1991: 121).
So also, in the in the framework of his analysis of Husserlian phenomenology of imagination, John
Salis speaks of a “reorientation prompted by several of Husserl’s analyses … despite the massive
constraints that Husserl thus employs to restrict imagination to the horizon of perception. It is
preeminently a matter of reorienting the analysis to the site of appearing …. It is, then, at this site,
in the appearing of the image-object, that the hold of presence is broken and imagination is drawn
to spacing” (Sallis, 212–213).
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 137
2 W
hat Is Reproduction and What Is Reproductive
Imagination?
Productive imagination is a relative term whose meaning derives from its opposi-
tion to reproductive imagination. One thus first needs to ask: What exactly does it
mean to qualify imagination as reproductive? Think of Sartre’s Peter walking
through the streets of Berlin (Sartre 2004). When Peter was still in Paris, he was
given to me in flesh and blood. Yet when I now imagine him in Berlin, through his
image I intend his irreal presence; in Paul Ricoeur’s words, I relate to an image that
is “more or less a picture of something that already existed” (Ricoeur 1975, 15:1).2
Imagination thus seems to be reproductive in the sense that it replicates copies of
actual objects, which could also be given in actual experience.3 It will soon become
clear that such a conception of reproductive imagination, its widespread acceptance
notwithstanding, is not only questionable, but also unjustifiable.
Few other philosophers have been as attentive to reproductive imagination as
Husserl and few of them have been as sensitive to the far-reaching equivocations
that accompany the concept of reproduction.4 With the aim of clarifying the sense in
which imagination could be said to be essentially reproductive, I would like to turn
to Text Nr. XIV from Hua XXIII.5 Hardly any of Husserl’s other texts provides as
detailed a study of reproduction as this manuscript, whose central goal is to fix the
strict concept of reproduction.
Just like in many of his other manuscripts on time and imagination, Husserl
begins his analysis at the limits of language—in this case, by focusing on the act for
which “we do not have the right word” (Hua XXIII, 301/363). Husserl qualifies
such an act as “the act of mere apparency,” (“der bloss apparenziale Akt”) and “the
act of appearing” (“der Akt des Erscheinens”). These expressions refer to a merely
perceptual act, yet taken in isolation from any positing act of meaning. They refer to
mere perception, conceived as a substrate on which the act of meaning is founded.
2
Ricoeur’s Lectures on Imagination, which were delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975
and to which I am here referring, still remain to be published. The volume is scheduled to appear
in print in the near future. I am grateful to George Taylor, the editor of Ricoeur’s Lectures on
Imagination, for the permission to quote Ricoeur’s lectures. When citing this work, I will indicate
the lecture number before the manuscript page number.
3
Besides being merely reproductive, as in Peter’s case, imagination can also be combinatory, as in
the case of mermaids or unicorns. Yet combinatory imagination is essentially reducible to repro-
ductive imagination: its fundamental elements (a horse and a horn, in the case of a unicorn, or a
woman and a fish, in the case of a mermaid) are reproductive copies of pregiven reality.
4
In Text No. 20 in Hua XXIII, after indicating that “‘phantasy’ is already related to the sphere of
reproduction in Aristotle,” Husserl further remarks that the history of philosophy has not suc-
ceeded in clarifying the meaning of reproduction: “To be sure, the linguistic usage at present is not
entirely univocal” (Hua XXIII 575/692).
5
Here I will follow the established custom in phenomenological literature and quote Husserl’s
works, which have been published in the Husserliana edition, using the following abbreviations:
Hua + volume number + page number in the original German / page number in the English
translation.
138 S. Geniusas
To make sense of what Husserl has in mind here, consider the following scenario:
after a long and sleepless trip to another continent, you wake up in the middle of the
night in a pitch-dark hotel room. As your hand is searching for the light switch, it
touches various objects on the bedside table. However, you do not yet recognize
these tactually given objects for what they are. All you have are mere appearances
given in what Husserl here calls “the act of mere apparency.” These acts of mere
apparency are more original than and independent from the act of meaning. By
founding acts of meaning upon the act of mere apparency we constitute full-fledged
objects of experience.
In Appendix XXXIII Husserl further conceptualizes such an act of mere appar-
ency as time-constituting consciousness. Husserl suggests that the act of mere
apparency could be also qualified as an impression, yet only if we understand
impressions in a broad sense. In the narrow sense, the concept of impression applies
to those experiences in which an act of meaning obtains a present, a now, an actually
present process. In this regard, impressions must be distinguished from retentions
and protentions. In the broad sense, the concept of impression marks the unity of the
originary present, the originary just-having-been and the originary yet-to-come. In
this broad sense, the concept of impression excludes reproductions, conceived as
reiterations of impressions, retentions, and protentions.6 In this broad sense, the
concept of impression signifies the act of mere apparency.
In the manuscript under consideration, Husserl introduces such an unusual con-
cept as “the act of mere apparency” with the aim of analyzing its re-presentational
modifications (Vergegenwärtigungsmodifikationen). Moving within the sphere of
actuality, Husserl suggests that “memory in the widest sense” is the re-presentational
modification of the simple perceptual appearing. By extension, once we move from
the sphere of actuality to that of inactuality, phantasy in the broadest sense could be
qualified as the re-presentational modification of such simple perceptual
appearing.
“The question to be asked first here is: What does re-presentational modification
mean?” (Hua XXIII 305/367). We face here an ambiguous concept, first and foremost
because it can be understood both in a noetic and in a noematic way. It is by clearing
this ambiguity that Husserl introduces the concept of reproduction. “Normally we
say re-presentation with respect to something objective” (Hua XXIII 305/367). Let us
retain such a noematic conception of representation and let us supplement it with
noetically conceived reproduction. Thus in the case of a recollection of a perception,
we should say that we represent what was previously perceived and that we reproduce
the act of perceiving. In the case of phantasmatic perception (“seeing as though”), we
can further say that we represent the perceptual objects intended phantasmatically
while we reproduce the perceptual acts. In short, acts are reproduced, while objects
intended in these acts are represented. It thereby becomes understandable why in the
section of the manuscript, entitled “Definition of a Strict Concept of Reproduction,”
Husserl argues against the view, which suggests that reproduction is a new production
of the same objects which were once already given in experience, yet which now
reappear as their pale echoes or afterimages. On the one hand, the representation of
objects intended in experience should not be called reproductions. On the other hand,
“we still need a separate term for the separate re-presentation of internal conscious-
ness, and this re-presentation may be called reproduction” (ibid).
Such a sharp distinction between reproduction and representation suggests that
we draw a no-less sharp distinction between phantasy modification, on the one hand,
and empty presentations, on the other hand.7 We all know that a full-fledged percep-
tual act is not reducible to the act of mere apparency. When we are turned to the front
of a perceptual object, a determinate appearance awakens a series of non-given
appearances that belong to the object’s unseen sides. The question to be asked is
whether or not these unseen sides are given through an act of phantasy. Husserl,
much like Sartre after him, rejects such a view as nonsensical. Consciousness of the
rear aspects belongs to perception, taken in its unity with the act of meaning that is
founded upon it. To use Husserl’s own neologisms, when I prehend a profile of the
object, it is given to me within the horizon of apprehension: I intend the appearing
object through a direct act of apparency and I also emptily co-intend the object’s
non-given sides through the acts of “co-meaning.” This founding of the act of mean-
ing upon the act of mere apparency results in an enrichment of the intentional object’s
noematic sense. By contrast, phantasy is a reproductive modification of an original
act of mere apparency, a reproduction which is essentially noetic, not noematic.
Yet even such a noetic/noematic clarification of the concept of “re-presentational
modification” does not clear it of all ambiguity. In Appendix XXXV Husserl distin-
guishes between three different senses of reproduction. By reproduction, one can
either mean a reproduction of an object of experience (der intentionale Gegenstand
des Erlebnisses), say, a clear or vague memory of an object that was previously
given in original experience; or one can mean a reproduction of experience (das
Erlebnis), for instance, a clear or vague memory of an experience, which was given
originally; or, finally, one can also mean a reproduction of an act of experiencing
(das Erleben), say, a reproduction of an act of seeing, hearing, touching, thinking,
loving, hating etc., taken in isolation from the concrete flow of experience and from
the object of experience, to which it was previously intentionally related. This three-
fold distinction allows one to conceptualize the difference between memory and
mere phantasy as two different forms of reproductive modification. “Memory is a
reproductive modification of perception, but it has the remarkable peculiarity that it
is also re-presentation of perception and not simply re-presentation of what was
perceived” (Hua XXIII 305/367). That is, recollection is a reproductive form of
consciousness in the first two of the above mentioned senses: it is a reproduction of
an object of experience and of experience. By contrast, mere phantasy can be
(although, admittedly, it need not be) a reproductive form of consciousness only in
the third sense: it can be a reproduction of the mere act of experiencing, taken in
isolation from the full experience as well as the object of experience.
7
This distinction is essential not only to Husserl’s but also to Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of imagi-
nation, which we come across in Sartre’s The Imaginary.
140 S. Geniusas
3 Perception and Imagination
It is not by chance that virtually every theorist who has aimed to develop a model of
productive imagination agrees with Kant’s famous remark that “imagination is a
necessary ingredient of perception itself” (Kant 1996: A120, fn). By qualifying
phantasy as an essentially reproductive mode of consciousness, Husserl introduces
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 141
an indissoluble breach between perception and phantasy, which excludes any pos-
sibility of identifying phantasy as a moment of perceptual consciousness, and vice
versa. The question to be asked, then, is whether Husserl’s phenomenology of phan-
tasy necessarily proscribes the recognition and analysis of productive imagination.
In contrast to a large number of philosophers who argue that perception is “ani-
mated by,” “infused with,” “shot through with” or “soaked in” imagination (Kant
1996; Wittgenstein 1986; Strawson 1974; Warnock 1994; Nanay 2010), Husserl
retorts that such a view presupposes a passive and static notion of perception, which
lacks phenomenological justification. As Julia Jansen has insightfully remarked,
“there is no such passive and bare perception, which would require an infusion with
imagination, in the first place” (Jansen, unpublished, 6). As she argued elsewhere,
“contributions [that] make use of the phenomenological evidence … highlight the
differences between perception and imagination and thus reject the hypothesis of a
‘grand illusion,’” i.e., of the view that imagination might be an ingredient of percep-
tion” (Jansen 2010, 152). The analysis I have offered above clarifies why, from a
Husserlian standpoint, this hypothesis needs to be rejected.
Nonetheless, such a response leaves the relation between perception and phan-
tasy undetermined, and this is unfortunate, especially in light of recent neuroscien-
tific findings. Consider a recent study undertaken by Christopher C. Berger and
H. Henrik Ehrsson.8 In this investigation, which they qualify as “an unparalleled
example of how imagination can change perception,” these two neuroscientists
from Karolinska Institute in Stockholm have recently argued that imagining hearing
changes what one sees, just as imagining seeing changes what one hears. Their
study heavily relied upon three classical examples in psychology, which had dem-
onstrated that sensory information in one perceptual modality affects one’s percep-
tion in a different modality. First, consider the so-called cross-bounce illusion: this
experiment (which has its roots in Gestalt psychology) demonstrates that the pre-
sentation of an unrelated sound at the moment when two objects coincide promotes
the illusory perception that the objects collide (Sekuler et al. 1997). In their study,
Berger and Ehrsson turned to an intriguing modification of this classical experi-
ment: they substituted the actually heard sound with a merely imagined sound. This
modification resulted in the realization that not only actually heard sounds, but also
imaginary sounds modify visual phenomena. Secondly, consider the ventriloquist
illusion, which demonstrates the dominance of vision over other senses in sensuous
perception. In its classical presentation (Alais and Burr 2004), this experiment
demonstrates that consciousness determines the location of sound largely depend-
ing on visual stimuli, so much so that with each and every shift in visual stimuli, the
determination of sound’s location shifts as well. In short, visual variation transforms
the auditory stimuli one is exposed to. Berger and Ehrsson modified the ventrilo-
quist illusion by replacing actually perceived visual shapes with merely imaginary
ones. Such a modification resulted in the realization that the meaning of auditory
stimuli is co-constituted not only by actual visual perceptions, but also by imaginary
8
See Christopher C. Berger and H. Henrik Ehrsson (2013), “Mental Imagery Changes Multisensory
Perception,” in Current Biology, 23/14, 1367–1372.
142 S. Geniusas
visualizations. Finally, the third experiment they offered was a modified version of
“McGurk illusion” (McGurk and MacDonald 1976). In one of its classical presenta-
tions, an auditory stimulus of the phoneme “ba” was paired with a visual stimulus
of someone’s lip movements articulating “ga”, resulting in a fused illusory percept
“da.” Berger and Ehrsson modified this experiment by replacing an actually heard
phoneme with an auditory imagery of the same phoneme. The participants in this
experiment see the person’s lips uttering “ga,” they imagine hearing “ba,” yet they
end up hearing “da.” This means that auditory imagery can be integrated with visual
speech stimuli, thereby promoting illusory speech percept.
These recent neurological findings support the view that imagination is produc-
tive in the sense that it largely shapes our perceptual relation to the world at large.
In light of these findings one can maintain that what we see and what we hear is
largely shaped by phantasy. Nonetheless, these findings do not corroborate the
widespread view that “imagination is an ingredient of perception itself,” for clearly,
the participants in these experiments must have been conscious of the distinction
between phantasy and perception, for otherwise they would simply not have been
able to imagine sounds while being exposed to visual phenomena, or imagine visual
phenomena while being exposed to sounds. These participants must have been at
least implicitly aware that while perception marks their immediate access to actu-
ally existent phenomena, in phantasy they could only see as it were or hear as it
were. Thus strangely, Berger’s and Ehrsson’s experiments contest the view that
phantasy is a perceptual ingredient, while they nonetheless demonstrate that percep-
tion is largely formed by phantasy. How, then, is one to understand the intricate
relationship between phantasy and perception?
In this regard, Husserl’s passing remark in Text No. 20 in Hua XXIII proves
highly important: “perception as apperception is itself a particular sort of ‘memory’”
(Hua XXIII 582/700). This claim appears counterintuitive, given that for Husserl
memory is a type of reproductive consciousness, while perception is original experi-
ence. Yet Husserl here refers to perception as apperception, which means that in this
framework perception is not reducible to the act of mere apparency, since it also
incorporates the act of meaning that is founded in the act of apparency. This opens a
further and highly promising possibility to conceptualize the relation between phan-
tasy and perception: even though perception and phantasy are irreconcilable atti-
tudes of consciousness, phantasy can nonetheless affect perceptual consciousness
indirectly, viz., by constituting those resources of sense from which the founded act
of meaning draws its sustenance. Thus even though I cannot both perceive and quasi-
perceive the same object at the same time, nonetheless, imagination can supply
dimensions of sense, which are subsequently transferred from the field of phantasy
to the field of actuality. To return to Berger and Ehrsson’s modified version of the
cross bounce illusion, the participants in the experiment do not take the imagined
sound for a real sound; they are fully conscious that the sound is irreal, for otherwise,
they could not participate in the experiment. Nonetheless, as they imagine the sound
of a crash at the moment when one visual body crosses the other, they transfer the
meaning of the sound form the field of phantasy into the perceptual field and on this
basis they transform the meaning of the visual phenomenon: what they see is a crash.
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 143
4 Memory and Phantasy
One might object that in my foregoing interpretation, I was too quick to interpret the
claim that “perception as apperception is itself a particular sort of ‘memory’” as a
claim that perception is a particular sort of phantasy. To be sure, Husserl qualifies
144 S. Geniusas
9
Transformation of this nature can take place in the framework of perceptual consciousness, while
when it comes to analogical apperception, which is constitutive of the Other, such a transformation
is in principle excluded. The constitution of intermonadic community will be the focus of the next
section.
10
For a detailed analysis of the concept of motivation in phenomenology, see Ideen II, 56.
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 145
new type of object is permanently prescribed, in terms of which other objects simi-
lar to it will be apprehended in advance” (Husserl 1973b, 38). It thereby becomes
understandable why perception, conceived as apperception, is a particular type of
“memory”: as apperception, perception reawakens the “memory” of the preconsti-
tuted types of experiences, which in their own turn determine the sense of appearing
objectivities.
Thus Husserl’s phenomenology of typifying consciousness corroborates the
view that consciousness bridges the gaps that separate diverse fields of experience
by means of transference of sense, which occurs not at the founding level of the acts
of mere apparency, but at the founded level of the constitution of meaning. In the
case of consciousness of typification, what is at stake is not a concrete memory of a
particular event that took place in past experience but the reawakening of a horizon
of sense, whose origins derive from past experience. It is thus not by chance that
when Husserl qualifies apperception as a type of “memory,” he uses the term “mem-
ory” in quotation marks. What is reawakened is not a set of concrete experiences,
but a more or less general sense that seems to fit the currently given experience.
This realization, however, introduces some doubts concerning my claim that
phantasy is productive in the sense that it constitutes dimensions of sense, which are
subsequently carried over into the field of actuality. Is it not obvious that conscious-
ness of typification can only originate in positional and not in neutralized experi-
ences? Clearly, the mere fact that I like to phantasize mermaids or unicorns might
affect how these magical creatures are given in my phantasy in the future, yet they
will not form a typifying consciousness, which will absorb my subsequent posi-
tional experiences. Thus when I see the back of the head and the moving arms in the
water, I will quite likely apperceive these appearances as the movement of a human
body, yet I will not apperceive them as appearances of a mermaid. The world of
phantasy is cut off from the world of actual experience. How, then, can phantasy be
productive in the sense of co-constituting the world of actual experience?
A twofold response is in place. First, this objection presupposes a restricted con-
ception of phantasy. It seems obvious that besides “seeing” mermaids or unicorns, I
can also “see” Peter wandering the streets of Berlin; besides “seeing” unicorns, I
can also (as the modified version of the ventriloquism illusion demonstrates) “see”
various shapes that will affect my apperception of actually heard sounds. Just as it
is incontestable that phantasy can intend objectivities, which have never been and,
most likely, never will be given in actual experience, so it is also undeniable that
phantasy can intend appearances, which are, at least in principle, actualizable.
Secondly, the outlined objection is largely an instance of a misplaced criticism. I do
not claim that phantasy is productive in the sense that it shapes phantasmatic appear-
ances, which can be subsequently transferred into the field of actuality. Rather, my
claim is that phantasmatically formed unities of sense can be transferred from the
field of phantasy into the field of actuality in that they can co-constitute the sense
that absorbs actually appearing objectivities.
In this regard, Text No. 20 from Hua XXIII once again proves highly helpful.
After drawing a sharp distinction between acts of phantasy, conceived as purely
neutral acts, and perceptual acts, conceives as positional experiences, Husserl goes
146 S. Geniusas
on to suggest that “there are, however, mixed experiences, and they are very com-
mon” (Hua XXIII 578/696).11 According to one type of these mixed experiences
(gemischte Erlebnisse), “every phantasy consciousness, hence every pure phantasy
consciousness as well, can be converted into a positional act…” (ibid). Conversions
of this nature occur when one transforms a neutralized experience into a conscious-
ness of pure possibility. Under such a scenario, what was initially given phantas-
matically (as something fundamentally neutral) is subsequently converted into a
positional experience (as something fundamentally possible). To this one can fur-
ther add that while all phantasies can be transformed into pure possibilities, some of
these possibilities are conceived as actualizable (as in the case of Peter wondering
the streets of Berlin), while others as non-actualizable (as in the case of mermaids
swimming in the sea).
I should especially stress that such mixed experiences do not result from an inter-
mingling of acts of phantasy and perceptual acts. Rather, mixed experiences occur
at the level of meaning-constituting consciousness. They are accomplishments of
what I have called above a transference of sense. In the case under consideration,
the sense of a phantasmatic object is transferred from the field of phantasy into the
field of actuality. Unities of sense, which derive from meaning constituting acts,
form the bridge that binds perception to phantasy, and vice versa.
Yet what sense are we to make of Husserl’s claim that such mixed experiences
“are very common?” In the next section, I want to defend a perspective, which I
believe Husserlian phenomenology motivates one to support, even though, admit-
tedly, Husserl has not explicitly presented such a perspective himself. Arguably,
such mixed experiences, which derive from a transference of sense from the field of
phantasy into that of actuality, perform an essential and irreducible role in the con-
stitution of personalistic worlds, conceived both as homeworlds and alienworlds. To
put my thesis otherwise, in the absence of productive imagination, consciousness
could not constitute intersubjective cultural worlds, within which we always already
find ourselves. This means that it is not perception, conceived as peculiar form of
consciousness, but rather the experienced world, conceived as a constitutive accom-
plishment of consciousness, that is soaked in productive imagination.
5 T
he Role of Phantasy in the Constitution of the Cultural
Worlds
The proposed thesis sounds not only paradoxical, but also dubious. How can imagi-
nation, conceived as a capacity of consciousness to neutralize reality, perform a role
(and not just any role, but a fundamental and irreducible role!) in the constitution of
actual reality? Yet what exactly is actual reality, when conceptualized in the frame-
work of Husserlian phenomenology? It is well known that Husserlian
11
For a detailed discussion of such mixed experiences, see Ferencz-Flatz 2009.
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 147
12
As Husserl remarks in §26 in the Third Cartesian Meditation, “we can be sure something is
actual only by virtue of a synthesis of evident verification, which presents rightful or true actuality
itself” (Hua I 95/60). As he further remarks, “it is evidence alone by virtue of which an ‘actually’
existing, true, rightly accepted object of whatever form or kind has sense for us” (ibid).
148 S. Geniusas
to be the most narcissistic act imaginable, which one could liken to an act of “tran-
scendental enslavement”: it would equal the reduction of the Other’s life to a
moment of one’s own selfhood. Thus the Other’s experiences cannot be lived
through, but can only be appresented: they are given in the manner of transcending
the field of one’s own givenness. The Other is thus accessible as originally inacces-
sible: the Other’s physical givenness appresents a psychical life, which transcends
the boundaries of my original experience. The Other is thus constituted not as a
duplication, but as a modification of my own sphere of ownness: The Other is con-
stituted precisely as Other.
Insofar as any object is constituted in the unanimity of my own original experi-
ence, it cannot yet be qualified as an actual object existing in an actual world, since
such a qualification presupposes the object’s givenness not just to me, but also to
other subjectivities. Every object, insofar as it is an actually existing object, must
transcend my sphere of ownness in that it must entail a dimension of sense, which
derives from an appresentative level of constitution—that level, which lies in the
synthetic unity of synthesis between what is given to me in original promordiality
and what is given to other subjectivities. Thus to claim that an actual object exists in
the actual world is to maintain that the object in question, whatever it might be, is
given not just to me, but also to other subjectivities. Yet let us not forget that the
Other’s experiences are given as originally inaccessible. Despite its fundamental
original inaccessibility, I must nonetheless presuppose some kind of access to these
experiences of the Other if I am to qualify any object as an actual object, existing
actually in the actual world. What, then, is this non-original access that is presup-
posed in the process of world-constitution?
With regard to the constitution of a common nature (Gemeinsamkeit der Natur),
which Husserl conceives as the first form of Objectivity, one is right to maintain that
mere communication suffices as a non-original point of access to the Other’s expe-
riences.13 Here mere communication refers to the function of corroboration, in the
absence of which the constitution of a common nature would not be possible. The
natural objects actually experienced by the Other are the same natural objects that
are actually or potentially experienced by me: what is actually given to the Other is
potentially given to me “as if I were standing over there, where the Other’s body is”
(Hua I 152/123). Moreover, as far as the constitution of mere nature is concerned,
the world of Others, that is, “the world belonging to their appearance-systems, must
be experienced forthwith as the same as the world belonging to my appearance-
systems; and this involves an identity of our appearance-systems” (Hua I 154/125).
Thus the constitution of a common nature is to be understood as the establishment
of a sense of identity between my own primordial nature and that nature, which is
constituted in the Other’s experience. Even though I cannot originally access the
Other’s experience, I can nonetheless establish a synthesis of identification on the
basis of communication. In virtue of such a synthesis of identification, every natural
Fur Husserl’s own discussion of the significance of communication in the constitution of a com-
13
the objects given in the founding acts with configurations of meaning, which are
fundamentally not of our own making. We constitute ourselves as members of cul-
tural communities when our founded acts project dimensions of sense, which are
appropriated from other subjectivities. This means, however, that my elementary
capacity to see objects as filled with axiological and practical qualities already pre-
supposes my appropriation of particular systems of value, which guide my subse-
quent experience. Yet how exactly can these systems of value, conceives as systems
of appearances, be appropriated?
Such an act of appropriation cannot be clarified on the basis of mere communica-
tion, even though communication provides the foundation for it. While communica-
tion transcends the boundaries of intuition, the act of appropriation is conceivable
only as an intuitive capacity, namely, as the capacity to see the world the way a
particular community sees it. Communication must therefore be supplemented with
a further point of access to the Other’s experience, which would be intuitive, even
though it cannot be originary. What could such a non-original yet intuitive access
be? I would contend that there are only four possibilities to consider: such supple-
mentary access could be provided either by perception, or by memory, or by antici-
pation, or by phantasy. It is clear that perception cannot provide access to the Other’s
experience for the simple reason that it is an original form of consciousness. Yet it
is just as clear that neither memory, nor anticipation can provide such access either.
Memory cannot fulfill such a function since it is bound to my own former experi-
ence; anticipation cannot fulfill such a function either, since while the act of appro-
priation relates to the past and the present, the act of anticipation is linked to the
future. When so much is said, it becomes clear that imagination must be this supple-
mentary point of access to the Other’s experience, a point of access without which
transcendental subjectivity could not appropriate particular systems of value, con-
ceived as systems of appearance and thereby constitute itself as a member of a
particular community.
While through communication I am exposed to how the Others see the world,
when communication is supplemented with imagination, I am capable of intuitively
reproducing their way of seeing it. Fundamentally, this capacity to reproduce, no
matter how accurately or inaccurately it is carried through, already entails the capac-
ity to apperceive intuitively given phenomena within a specific configuration of
sense—apperceive phenomena as suitable for this or that use or as beautiful,
enjoyable, admirable, etc. So as to constitute higher levels of intermonadic com-
munity, subjectivity must recognize itself as a member of an intersubjective com-
munity, and this recognition already rests upon one’s capacity to transfer the
reproduced configuration of sense from the field of phantasy into the field of one’s
actual experience. Put otherwise, I am capable not only of understanding as well as
intuitively reproducing how the Others see the world; I am also capable of appropri-
ating this manner of seeing, that is, of transferring the apperceptive layers of sense,
from the field of Others (as it is given through my own imagination) into the field of
my own experience.
One might object that while the proposed conception of “transcendental social-
ization” clarifies how subjectivity appropriates the established systems of appear-
What Is Productive Imagination? The Hidden Resources of Husserl’s Phenomenology… 151
6 Conclusion
On such basis rests my claim that phantasy is productive not because of its alleged
capacity to permeate perceptual consciousness, but rather because it can generate
patterns of meaning, which can subsequently shape our subjective and intersubjec-
tive experiences of things and the world at large. It is this transference of meaning
from the field of phantasy to the field of actuality that justifies the Wittgensteinian
insight that seeing always involves “seeing as,” yet without abandoning the Sartrean
claim that phantasy and perception represent two incompatible attitudes of
consciousness.
In his early works, Husserl held the view that Kant’s concept of productive imag-
ination lacked phenomenological justification. However, by the time he turned to
genetic phenomenology, and especially when he was working on the Paris Lectures
and subsequently on the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl explicitly spoke of Kant’s
great discovery of the “twofold operations of understanding” (cf. Jansen 2010, 145).
In the genetic framework, Husserl reinterpreted Kant’s distinction between sensibil-
ity and understanding as the distinction between passive and active synthesis. No
less importantly, Husserl’s reflections on the constitution of monadic intersubjectiv-
ity open the possibility to claim that in the absence of productive imagination tran-
scendental subjectivity would remain largely enclosed within its sphere of ownness
in the sense that it could not constitute higher level objectivities, conceived as uni-
ties of sense that arise in the unanimity of intersubjective experience.
Thus the approach I have here presented opens the possibility of interpreting the
plurality of cultural worlds as diverse configurations of meaning, which are the
constitutive accomplishments of productive phantasy. Despite Husserl’s explicit
worries that Kant’s transcendental imagination cannot find phenomenological justi-
fication, his phenomenology of productive phantasy provides a highly intriguing
reinterpretation of the Kantian insight, which invites us to view imagination as the
secret power hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations is to be
divined from the cultural world itself.
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Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism
Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing
the Criticism by Theodor Celms
Rodney K. B. Parker
1 Introduction
Among Husserl’s early critics, one of the most important is his Freiburg student
Theodor Celms. In Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls (Celms 1928),
Celms argues that transcendental-phenomenological idealism cannot escape the
solipsistic starting point from which it begins. This text was warmly received by the
Munich phenomenologists (Pfänder 1929; Beck 1930; Geiger 1933) and the
Southwest Neo-Kantians (Kreis 1930; Zocher 1932),1 and arguments similar to
1
Other references which speak to the reception and influence of Celms book are and others at the
time (Muth 1931; Folwart 1936; Osborn 1934). A Spanish translation of the text by José Gaos was
published in 1931 (Celms 1931) and influenced the reception of Husserl in the Spanish speaking
world.
R. K. B. Parker (*)
Faculty of Philosophy, Dominican University College, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
e-mail: rodney.parker@dominicanu.ca
those presented by Celms are still pervasive among critics of Husserl today (Bell
1990; Mulligan 2003; Smith 2003). Focusing on Ideas I §§46–55 (Husserl 1982)
along with Husserl’s then unpublished manuscripts and lecture notes, Celms argues
that Husserl’s theory of empathy either (1) reduces other pure egos to nothing more
than constructions of my own consciousness, or (2) results in a pluralistic solipsism.
According to Celms, Husserl might be able to escape this dilemma by positing the
existence of other transcendental egos and endorsing a form of Leibnizian idealism,
but in doing so transcendental phenomenology fails to be the metaphysically neu-
tral, rigorous science it proports to be.
This paper begins with a brief explanation of the charges of solipsism leveled
against Husserl. Following this, I sketch the relationship between Celms and Husserl,
and present an overview of the main criticisms of Husserl’s transcendental-
phenomenological idealism put forward in Der phänomenologische Idealismus
Husserls. In short, Celms writes that Husserl believes empathic experience motivates
us to posit other psycho-physical subjects, just as ordinary perceptual experience
leads us to posit external objects. This entails that other egos exist as immanent tran-
scendencies – that is, as things which are constituted in one’s consciousness as tran-
scendent – which may not actually exist. In fact, since they are merely empirical
unities on Husserl’s own account, other egos have no absolute existence. Hence,
Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity faces a problem. If, as Celms maintains, any
“true” account of intersubjectivity must demonstrate the existence in-themselves of
other subjects, then the transcendental-phenomenological account of other subjects
fails. Husserl has, at best, only explained “one’s own consciousness of other subjects.
The other subject as transcendent […] has remained, as in all purely phenomenologi-
cal reflection, completely disregarded.” (Celms 1928, 396)2 Husserl has accounted
for the empirically founded existence of other subjects as things in the world, but not
their existence in-themselves. He thereby reduces others to harmonious unities of
experience, which are constituted in and by consciousness. “Everything that [Husserl
has] said about intersubjectivity,” Celms writes, “is true in fact only of intersubjectiv-
ity as presented in the solus ipse.” (Celms 1928, 397) Thus, Husserl’s transcendental-
phenomenological idealism has not, and in principle cannot, escape solipsism.
In light of Celms’ criticisms, my aim is to argue in favor of the following two
theses – one historical, and one philosophical. First, I suggest that there is evidence
to support the hypothesis that Husserl’s Fifth Meditation is a response to Celms – if
not directly, then indirectly. If this is the case, then reading Celms puts us in a better
position for interpreting the Fifth Meditation and evaluating the success of Husserl’s
argument therein. Second, in defense of Husserl, I show that the transcendental
theory of intersubjectivity presented in the Fifth Meditation is an attempt to neutral-
ize the threat of transcendental solipsism, though it does not necessarily preclude
2
References throughout will be to the original 1928 edition of Celms’ text, rather than Der phän-
omenologische Idealismus Husserls und andere Schriften 1928–1943, ed. Juris Rozenvalds (Celms
1993). I have chosen to refer to the 1928 edition since citations of Celms by Husserl’s contempo-
raries use the original pagination, which is not preserved in the 1993 edition. All translations of
Celms are my own.
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 157
It is widely known that many of Husserl’s students were critical of and rejected the
“idealist” elements of his phenomenology. However, few know the specific details
of these criticisms or what motivated them.3 A quick survey of the writings by
Husserl’s early critics reveals that problems arose within the phenomenological
movement in the wake of the publication of Ideas I in 1913, wherein Husserl
endorses a form of transcendental idealism.4 This led to a deep and protracted divi-
sion among the early phenomenologists. Heidegger explains the shift in Husserl’s
thinking, and the schism that ensued, as follows:
The thematic domain which had been designated with the term “consciousness” and thereby
included the totality of the real and intentional content of the stream of experience was held
fast. The horizon for posing questions about it and the basic approach to it came in from
elsewhere: what came from the Marburg school was the posing of epistemological questions
(characteristic of both is a return to Descartes), and Dilthey was consulted on the issue of
laying the foundation of the human sciences (nature and mind). Thus transcendental idealism
entered into phenomenology. And the countermovement to this also arose in phenomenology
by taking up traditional realism. These opposites became the guiding foci for academic dis-
cussions within the different directions phenomenology took. (Heidegger 2009, 57)
With its motto “back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl 1901, 7), the Munich
Circle had understood phenomenology as it was presented in the first edition of the
Logical Investigations (Husserl 1900/01) as a type of descriptive psychology and
science of essences compatible with metaphysical realism. To them it represented
“an object-oriented phenomenology that holds that we are in possession of a pri-
ori […] knowledge relating to certain fundamental structures in a wide range of
different spheres of objects (for example, colors, tones, values, shapes)” (Embree
1997, 586). The pure phenomenology of Ideas I, bearing the influence of Kant’s
critical philosophy, was met with resistance by this group. These realist phenom-
enologists interpreted Husserl as now rejecting the existence of a real external
3
Rudolf Bernet writes that “no critical appraisal of the validity of these earlier critiques of Husserl’s
transcendental philosophy has been developed [...and this] neglect threatens the continuation of
Husserlian phenomenology.” (Bernet 2015, 115)
4
The publication of Ideas I neither marks Husserl’s first acceptance of transcendental idealism, nor
the first criticisms of phenomenology among Husserl’s followers. Husserl does not explicitly dis-
cuss his phenomenological idealism in transcendental terms until 1918, though we can trace his
acceptance of transcendental idealism back to at least 1908 (Husserl 2003, ix). The students who
attended his lectures were well aware of this. But the appearance of Ideas I in the middle of this
decade long conversion marks Husserl’s first attempt to publicly articulate his phenomenology as
a form of transcendental idealism.
158 R. K. B. Parker
world. While not himself a member of the Munich Circle, it is in this milieu that
Celms’ criticism of Husserl takes shape.
According to the standard interpretation, Husserl’s transcendental idealism can
be summarized as the thesis that, “the existence of real objects, and thus the exis-
tence of the real world, is unthinkable without reference to a consciousness which
is currently experiencing them” (Husserl 2003, ix).5 The purpose of transcendental
phenomenology is, therefore, “a radical epistemological clarification of our con-
sciousness of the world [des erkenntnistheoretisch radikal aufgeklärten
Weltbewusstseins]” (Husserl 2003, xix). Dan Zahavi helps to clarify the upshot of
this position when he writes: “Husserl’s transcendental idealism doesn’t deny the
existence of mind-independent objects in the uncontroversial sense of empirical
realism, but only in the controversial sense of metaphysical realism. The fact that
transcendental idealism has more affinities with (a certain form of) externalism than
with internalism should be less of a surprise the moment it is realized how little in
common it has with any garden variety of idealism” (Zahavi 2008, 372).
However, the form of idealism we get on the standard interpretation is not uni-
versally accepted as a tenable position. For instance, David Bell writes, in an overtly
pejorative tone, that the overall framework of Ideas I is “transcendental solipsistic
idealism. It concerns […] the a priori conditions of the possibility of objective
experience in general; and, it turns out, the conditions on which that possibility
depends make no essential ineliminable reference either to the independent exis-
tence of an extra-mental world, or to the existence of a plurality of conscious beings”
(Bell 1990, 198). Husserl’s effort to rectify this situation in the Fifth Meditation is
the unconvincing and impossible attempt at “a solipsistic escape from solipsism”
(Bell 1990, 215). In a similar vein, Arthur David Smith asserts that the Cartesian
Meditations culminate in “an out-and-out idealism […] with which very few today
will have any sympathy at all” (Smith 2003, 107).
Husserl’s confrontation with the problem of solipsism is inextricably linked with
his interest and epistemological questions. As Heidegger correctly points out, his
epistemological concerns and his re-reading of Kant prompted his move toward
transcendental philosophy on the one hand, and philosophical idealism on the other.
In his attempt to establish philosophy as a rigorous science, Husserl saw the prob-
lem of the relationship between the external world and cognition, or the problem of
objectivity in general, as the fundamental problem concerning transcendental phi-
losophy. In his 1924 lecture Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,
Husserl writes that we unquestioningly believe that “the being-in-itself of the world
is an indubitable fact” (Husserl 1974, 23), by which – according to the transcenden-
tal philosopher – we can mean nothing other than that the world is constituted in
experience as existing in-itself. Like all objects of cognition, the world receives its
sense from cognition. “But how is the ‘being-in-itself of the world’ to be understood
now,” Husserl asks, “if it is for us nothing other, and can be nothing other, than a
5
This interpretation is endorsed by Roman Ingarden (1975), Iso Kern (1964), and Dermot Moran
(2005).
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 159
The notion that the existence in-itself of an external world is nonsensical is one that
the Munich phenomenologists found troubling, and which Husserl attempted to
clarify and defend through his career.
Husserl’s early critics had difficulty accepting both the phenomenological reduc-
tion and the theory of constitution. According to Husserl, these reservations stemmed
from a confused attempt to reconcile the theory presented in Ideas I with the Logical
Investigations. Attempting to clear up these confusions, Husserl penned an Epilogue
to the Ideas.6 In the Epilogue, Husserl admits that Ideas I lacked a proper discussion
of the foundations of his phenomenological idealism, as well as “an explicit taking
of a position on the problem of transcendental solipsism, the problem of transcen-
dental intersubjectivity” (Husserl 1989, 417). In other words, it lacked any substan-
tial account of the objectivity of the world, and thus appeared to collapse into a
dogmatic and subjective form of idealism. Because of this, Husserl’s work was
understood as falling victim to what Kant had called the “scandal of philosophy”,
i.e., the inability to offer a satisfactory proof of the existence of an external world
(Kant 1998, 121–22). Husserl lamented that the “scandal” caused by the idealism
nascent in Ideas I and its alleged solipsism “considerably impeded [its] reception”
(Husserl 1989, 417). In the face of this, Husserl insisted that, “the objection of solip-
sism would never have been raised, given a deeper understanding of my presenta-
tion, as an objection against phenomenological idealism itself; the objection would
only be against my incomplete presentation of it” (Husserl 1989, 418). Husserl uses
the Epilogue as an occasion to assert that the objection of metaphysical solipsism
against his theory lacks any intelligible meaning given a proper understanding of
the phenomenological-transcendental reduction.
The controversial claim of transcendental-phenomenological idealism is that the
phenomenological reduction, or the “bracketing” of our naive acceptance of the natu-
ral world, reveals that the world and its objects have no absolute or “real” existence.7
6
Husserl’s Epilogue or Nachwort was originally published in the Jahrbuch (Husserl 1930), and
then later added as a foreword to W. R. Boyce Gibson’s English translation of Ideas I (Husserl
1931).
7
“Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something else;
rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no ‘absolute essence’ whatever; it has the
160 R. K. B. Parker
The reduction does not bring into doubt the “factual being” of the world. It merely
sets aside, or neutralizes any judgments about this factual being: “we parenthesize
the realm of the in-itself and everything in itself” (Husserl 1982, 61 n29). From this
standpoint, all objects have an intentional existence, insofar as they are immanent
objects of experience and thus they exist for a subject, but they are nothing beyond
this, or, at least, nothing that we can cognize. Here we see the basis for what Roman
Ingarden calls the “fundamental thesis” of Husserl’s transcendental idealism:
what is real is nothing but a constituted noematic unity (individual) of a special kind of
sense which in its being and quality (Sosein) results from a set of experiences of a special
kind and is quite impossible without them. Entities of this kind exist only for the pure tran-
scendental ego which experiences such a set of perceptions. The existence of what is per-
ceived (of the perceived as such) is nothing “in itself” (an sich) but only something “for
somebody,” for the experiencing ego. “Streichen wir das reine Bewusstsein, so streichen wir
die Welt” (“If we exclude pure consciousness then we exclude the world”) is the famous
thesis of Husserlian transcendental idealism which he was already constantly repeating in
lectures during his Göttingen period. (Ingarden 1975, 21)
In other words, the radical aspect of the phenomenological reduction consists in the
observation that all being is nothing other than intentionally constituted being. All
objects receive their entire being-sense from consciousness.
Husserl writes that pure phenomenology is the “final form of transcendental phi-
losophy” (Husserl 1970, 70), where transcendental philosophy is defined as the
epistemological endeavour of inquiring back into the ultimate source and ground of
all formations of knowledge, the ego, and investigating its relation to the world
(Husserl 1970, 97–98). Thus, the foundation of pure phenomenology is transcen-
dental subjectivity – “the primordial locus of all meaning-giving and validation of
being” (Husserl 1989, 406) – which the reduction lays bare. The task of Ideas I is to
outline a science that investigates the a priori structures of transcendental subjectiv-
ity, by arguing from appearances – factual being taken first in phenomenological
reflection as “pure possibilities” and then as “transcendental clues” – to the univer-
sal conditions of the possibility of all objects of cognition (Husserl 1989, 409). This
results in a radical clarification of the meaning-bestowing intentional structures out
of which consciousness constitutes its objects.
Husserl is charged with being a solipsist due to his denial that there is any mean-
ingful sense to the notion of a mind-independent external world – a claim at the
heart of his phenomenological idealism. In particular, Ideas I §49 fuelled many of
the criticisms aimed at Husserl’s phenomenological idealism. Herein we find the
notorious passage where Husserl argues that the external world is nothing more than
a unified multiplicity of appearances for some conscious.
[C]onsciousness considered in its “purity” must be held to be a self-contained complex of
being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing
can slip, to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot [itself] be within any
spatiotemporal complex, which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise
causation upon any physical thing – it being presupposed that causality has the normal sense
of causality pertaining to Nature as a relationship of dependence between realities.
On the other hand, the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes [the] human being and
the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional
being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being
posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined
and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appear-
ances: beyond that it is nothing (Husserl 1982, 112).
Here Husserl makes numerous bold claims that seem to commit him to some form
of solipsism. First, the transcendental ego is characterized as a monad, that is, a self-
contained unit into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape.
Second, he bolsters this remark by asserting there is no “outside” of consciousness
from which something could penetrate or into which anything could escape. He also
argues that the transcendental ego itself is not a part of the world – it is prior to the
world. The world, along with me myself in the world as a human ego and a human
being, is the harmonious achievement of constituting consciousness. Finally, Husserl
claims that the external world and all the objects in it have merely intentional being,
that is, they exist for a consciousness as essentially unified multiplicities of appear-
ance.8 Beyond this, worldly objects are “nothing,” by which he means that such
objects having being beyond being-for-a-consciousness is “a countersensical
thought” (Husserl 1982, 112). Only the pure, transcendental ego exists absolutely,
since its existence is not contingent upon the existence of some other real entity, as
his thought experiment concerning the annihilation of the world demonstrates.
What is radical in Husserl is, as Dermot Moran puts is, “the recognition of sense-
giving [Sinngebung] and constitution everywhere at work, and this recognition is
possible only through rigorous and vigilant application of the epoché” (Moran
2005, 187). Rather than shrink away from the controversial position presented in
Ideas I, Husserl insists on its truth. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic, he
writes:
Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something that […] has received its whole
being-sense for me from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains
excluded from my effective intentionality. Precisely this I must consult, I must explicate
systematically, if I intend to understand that sense and consequently to understand also
what I am allowed, and what I am not allowed, to attribute to an object. (Husserl 1969, 234)
It is hardly necessary to say that this whole many-leveled problem of the constitution of the
Objective world is, at the same time, the problem of dissolving what may be called the
transcendental illusion that from the outset misleads, and usually paralyzes, any attempt to
start a consistent transcendental philosophy: the illusion that such a philosophy must lead
to a transcendental solipsism. If everything I can ever accept as existent is constituted in my
ego, then everything that exists does indeed seem to be a mere moment of my own transcen-
dental being. (Husserl 1969, 241)
8
The appearances are said to be constituted rather than caused, since the latter implies the exis-
tence of mind independent things-in-themselves.
162 R. K. B. Parker
While this may invite the spectre of solipsism, Husserl argues that instead of fleeing
from such a thought, we should instead investigate this phantom for what it really
is.
The Epilogue attempts to explain why the charge of solipsism against the posi-
tion outlined above is absurd. Transcendental phenomenology neither aims at nor
needs to provide a proof of the existence in-itself of a mind-independent external
world. It is not a skeptical position with respect to the external world per se.
Husserl’s phenomenology aims to systematically uncover the sense of the external
world taken as phenomena, as a constitutional achievement of intentional con-
sciousness. It seeks to do so as a genuinely presuppositionless and autonomous
science of phenomena, the science proper to philosophy, something he felt none of
the various philosophical “systems” and “trends” before his were able to do (Husserl
1989, 428–29).
One point which critics seemed to overlook is that transcendental phenomenol-
ogy is not at all concerned with traditional metaphysical questions (Husserl 1989,
419–20). Problematically, the charge of solipsism against phenomenology rests on
a dichotomy between realism and idealism that the epoché dispels. Disregarding
this point led to the characterization of phenomenology as an out-and-out idealism,
rather than transcendental idealism – which Husserl believes is primarily an episte-
mological endeavor (Husserl 1982, 66). Husserl writes:
[W]e must not fail to clarify expressly the fundamental and essential distinction between
transcendental-phenomenological idealism versus that idealism against which realism bat-
tles as against its forsworn opponent. Above all: phenomenological idealism does not deny
the actual existence of the real world […] as if it maintained that the world were mere
semblance […]. Its sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world, pre-
cisely the sense in which everyone accepts it-and rightly so-as actually existing. That the
world exists […] is entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter to understand this
indubitability […] and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy. (Husserl 1989, 420)
9
“The result of the phenomenological sense-clarification of the mode of being of the real world,
and of any conceivable real world at all, is that only the being of transcendental subjectivity has the
sense of absolute being […] whereas the real world indeed exists, but has an essential relativity to
transcendental subjectivity, due, namely, to the fact that it can have its sense as being only as an
intentional sense-formation of transcendental subjectivity” (Husserl 1989, 420, translation modi-
fied). When discussing the being-sense of objects, Husserl is not always clear on the distinction
between the conditions of the possibility of experience of that object and the conceptual categories
that individual object of cognition is subsumed under. However, this distinction need not concern
us here.
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 163
over the other (Husserl 1960, 86). If Husserl’s critics have not properly understood
the phenomenological reduction, then they have not understood the sense of this
transcendental idealism. As a result, no matter how well motivated or researched
these critics might consider their arguments against transcendental phenomenology
to be, Husserl finds that he “cannot acknowledge any kind of justification” to their
objections (Husserl 1989, 407), including the metaphysical problem of solipsism.
David Carr refers to an “imaginary critic” (Carr 1987, 50–51) lurking in the pas-
saged quoted here, who charges Husserl with adopting a form of solipsism, and to
whom the Cartesian Meditations is a reply. What I aim to show now is that Husserl
is not responding to some imagined interlocutor, but to his student Theodor Celms.
Celms’ Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls has been cited as one of the
best early criticisms of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (Mulligan 2003,
283),10 and was read by both Husserl and his contemporaries.11 While there is no
explicit evidence that Husserl was responding specifically to Celms in the Fifth
Meditation, there is good reason to believe that Celms was the intended target.
There does not appear to be any earlier publication labelling Husserl a solipsist or a
Leibnizian as Celms does.
After presenting the case for regarding Celms as the unnamed critic that the Fifth
Meditation is meant to address, I argue that while Husserl can easily avoid the tra-
ditional problem of solipsism, his transcendental theory of intersubjectivity does
not necessarily preclude some form of pluralistic-epistemological solipsism. That is
to say, Husserl’s theory of empathy does not entail that I have knowledge of other
10
Along with Celms, Mulligan considers the arguments in Ingarden’s Schriften zur Phänomenologie
Edmund Husserls (Ingarden 1998) and Carl Stumpf’s “Kritik der Husserlschen Phänomenologie”
(Stumpf 1939, 188–200) the best early criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism.
11
Along with Celms’ book, Mulligan considers the various essays included in Roman Ingarden’s
Schriften zur Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls (Ingarden 1998) and Carl Stumpf’s “Kritik der
Husserlschen Phänomenologie” (Stumpf 1939, 188–200), to be the best early criticisms of
Husserl’s phenomenological idealism.
164 R. K. B. Parker
concrete subjects as they are in-themselves. However, unlike Celms, I do not believe
this is a problematic result for Husserl. In fact, experience seems to corroborate this
result in Husserl’s favour. Moreover, re-reading Husserl’s response to the problem
of solipsism helps us to better understand his Objectivity, which is his lasting con-
tribution to transcendental idealism.
While Celms’ Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls was widely read
soon after its appearance, and was endorsed by figures such as Alexander Pfänder
and Maximilian Beck,12 history has not been so kind. With the exception of a hand-
ful of book chapters and papers (Seebohm 1962; Kūle 1996, 1998; Buceniece 1996,
2002; Rozenvalds 2000; Vēgners 2012) – most of which are by Latvian authors –
prolonged discussions of Celms’ critique of Husserlian phenomenology are scarce.
Despite the lack of attention paid to Celms in contemporary literature on Husserl, in
his work we find the first systematic presentation of one of the most common criti-
cisms of pure phenomenology, namely, that it cannot escape the solipsistic starting
point from which it begins. As the Fifth Meditation shows, Husserl’s response to
this threat, even if he rejects the conclusion, is quite subtle.
Celms began his philosophical career in Moscow from 1913 to 1920. During this
time, he studied first under the Moscow Neo-Kantians Pavel Novgorodcev and
Georgii Chelpanov (Kūle et al. 2009, 37–38).13 He quickly developed an interest in
philosophical idealism, particularly the works of Plato and Kant. Around 1917,
Celms was introduced to Husserl’s thought via the Russian translation of the Logical
Investigations (Husserl 1909). He immediately took an interest in phenomenology,
and eventually relocated to Freiburg to study with Husserl. Celms attended Husserl’s
lectures from the summer of 1922 through to the summer of 1923, most notably his
seminars on Lotze’s Logik and Einleitung in die Philosophie (Schuhmann 1977,
259).14 In 1923 Celms received his doctorate from the University of Freiburg with
the thesis Kants allgemeinlogische Auffassung vom Wesen, Ursprung und der
Aufgabe des Begriffes (Celms 1923) under the supervision of Joseph Geyser, and
Husserl serving as Korreferat.
In the summer of 1925, Celms returned to Freiburg to conduct research for his
habilitation thesis. He attended Husserl’s lectures on Phänomenologische
Psychologie (Husserl 1962),15 and was given access to the manuscripts for Husserl’s
12
In his review of Celms’ book, Pfänder writes: “Phenomenology, as a science of pure conscious-
ness, explicitly and according to its essence, forbids any judgment about what might be transcen-
dent to consciousness. However, Husserlian idealism performs just such judgment in declaring that
the physical world transcendent to consciousness has no being in itself, but only a being for a
consciousness; beyond that, it is nothing. This idealism does not necessarily follow and cannot
follow from phenomenology; on the contrary, it forsakes its necessary foundations.” (Pfänder
1929, 2049. My translation.) Here Pfänder clearly refers to Ideas I §49.
13
Chelpanov is perhaps better known for being the teacher Gustav Shpet. Before studying with
Husserl in Göttingen, Shpet attended Chelpanov’s lectures on phenomenology from 1902–05.
Novgorodcev was the teacher of Ivan Ilyin, who studied with Husserl briefly as well.
14
See also the Appendix to this article.
15
Cf. (Schuhmann 1977, 290; Celms 1928, 254). In Husserl’s Nachlass, Celms’ name seems to be
the third entry found in the list of participants in the Übungen in der Analyse und Deskription rein
geistiger Akte und Gebilde (im Anschluß an die Vorlesungen über phanomenologische
Psychologie) in the summer of 1925 (see X VII 4 – Quästurakten der Universität Freiburg).
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 165
16
Aside from the London lectures, the other manuscripts Celms read are referred to only by date.
However, we can deduce that the lectures from October to November of 1910 are The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology (or GPP) by the following passage from the Celms book: “Oder, wie
Husserl selbst das in seinen Vorlesungen vom Okt.-Nov. 1910 formuliert hat: ‚Mögliche Einfühlung
ist die »Spiegelung« jeder Monade in jeder anderen und die MögIichkeit dieser Spiegelung hängt
an der Möglichkeit einer übereinstimmenden Konstitution einer raum-zeitlichen Natur, eines in
alle Iche hineinreichenden Index für entsprechende Erkenntniskonstitutionen‘” (Celms 1928, 404).
This passage is from a revision Husserl made to GPP §39, found at (Husserl 1973, 229). As for the
lectures from WS 1923/24, there is ample evidence in Celms’ book that he had read the manuscript
for Erste Philosophie II. For instance, compare his discussion of patent and latent acts (Celms
1928, 290) with (Husserl 1959, 90), and the distinction between actual and habitual validities
[Geltungen] (Celms 1928, 297) corresponds to that which we find throughout (Husserl 1959).
Lastly, Celms quotes the manuscript: „nichts anderes als eine klärende Herausbildung der in den
scheinbar so trivialen ersten Meditationen des Descartes verborgenen, und Descartes selbst verbor-
genen tiefen Gehalte“(Celms 1928, 300–301; Husserl 1959, 80); „In seinen Vorlesungen im W. S.
1923/24 bezeichnete Husserl diese Idee des »An-sich-Seins« der Welt als ‚ein in der universalen
Verlaufsgestalt der Erfahrung motiviertes und solange diese Gestalt gegeben ist, notwendig zu
setzendes und nicht abzulehnendes Ideal‘“(Celms 1928, 359; Husserl 1959, 48); and „Die Welt
braucht nicht unbedingt notwendig zu sein, braucht nict gewesen zu sein, und braucht selbst wenn
sie war und ist, nicht weiter zu sein“(Celms 1928, 369; Husserl 1959, 67).
17
Historism here refers the idea that an argument or concept can only be understood by considering
it within its historical context, and cannot be properly evaluated based on its form or content alone.
166 R. K. B. Parker
points made by Jirgens.18 But it might well be that these critical remarks merely
calcified worries that had been in the back of Celms’ mind for some time which he
had inherited from other sources. Celms later aligned himself with the realist phe-
nomenologists, particularly Pfänder, to whom he dedicated Lebensumgebung und
Lebensprojektion (Celms 1933).
Despite the widespread influence of Ideas I, Celms opens Der phänomenolo-
gische Idealismus Husserls by noting that, due to its basic and decisive idealist
tenets, “many researchers on opposing sides (even some supporters of phenomenol-
ogy) have wanted to reject it” (Celms 1928, 251). He then argues that because of the
impact of Husserl’s work, philosophers have a duty to correctly grasp the nature of
pure phenomenology. This is the task Celms sets for himself. He then outlines three
main questions that will guide his assessment of Husserl’s work:
1. Does Husserl’s phenomenological idealism follow with logical necessity from
the phenomenological method alone?
2. Does this idealism meet Husserl’s goal of being the one true philosophy, that is,
a rigorous science of pure and absolute cognition?
3. Is Husserl’s transcendental idealism consistent with, or does it correspond to, the
transcendental idealism of Kant? (Celms 1928, 251–52)
Drawing on Ideas I and Philosophy as Rigorous Science (Husserl 1911), as well as
the unpublished works he had accessed while visiting Freiburg, Celms attacks
Husserl on two fronts. First, he argues that there are two distinct senses of the phe-
nomenological reduction, and that one leads phenomenology to subjective idealism.
Second, he argues that Husserl’s theory of empathy either reduces “other pure egos”
to nothing more than constructions of my own consciousness, or a “pluralistic solip-
sism.” Husserl might be able to escape these problems by stipulating the existence
of other monadic transcendental egos, and by adopting the Leibnizian doctrine of
pre-established harmony, but at the cost of being dogmatic and unscientific.
Let us briefly consider the first argument. Following Husserl, Celms identifies
the phenomenological reduction as the main pillar of phenomenology. This radical,
universal application of the epoché is “nothing more” than a clarification of the
method laid out by Descartes at the beginning of his Meditations (Celms 1928,
300–301; Husserl 1959, 80). But Celms thinks there is a “dangerous equivocation”
in Husserl’s use of the phenomenological reduction. This is not simply a termino-
logical problem, but one that has serious metaphysical consequences. James Mensch
summarizes Celms’ distinction between the two senses of the phenomenological
reduction as follows:
18
While no copy of Celms’ habilitationschrift seems to have survived, there is a draft of Jirgens’
review. The handwritten manuscript, which consists of 13 sheets and 2 addendum sheets, is kept in
the Rare Books and Manuscripts department at the National Library of Latvia, in the signature
“Atsauksmes par citu autoru (T. Celma, A. Mesera u.c.) darbiem, 1926/27,” A 240, V. Škiltera
fonds N 26. This manuscript is in the process of being edited and translated into English by Uldis
Vēgners and myself.
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 167
As first noted by Theodor Celms, the reduction has two senses. It is “a leading back of every
objectively (transcendentally) directed consideration into a consideration of the corre-
sponding modes of consciousness.” It is also “the leading back of objective (transcendent)
being to the being of the corresponding modes of consciousness” (Der phenomenologische
Idealismus Husserls, Riga, l928, 309). In its first sense, it signifies a reduction of our con-
sideration of an object to a consideration of the experiences and experiential connections
through which the object is given to consciousness. As Celms writes, the second sense sig-
nifies “the denial of any positing of what is reduced” - i.e., objective, transcendent being –
“as absolute” (Mensch 1988, 11–12).
19
The passage from Ideas I §47 reads: “It must always be borne in mind here that whatever physi-
cal things are – the only physical things about which we can make statements, the only ones about
the being or non-being, the being-thus or being-otherwise of which we can disagree and make
rational decisions – they are as experienceable physical things. It is experience alone that pre-
scribes their sense […]. As a consequence, one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the
physical thing as transcending consciousness or as “existing in itself.” The genuine concept of the
transcendence of something physical […] can itself be derived only from the proper essential con-
tents of perception or from those concatenations of definite kinds which we call demonstrative
experience. The idea of such transcendence is therefore the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this
demonstrative experience. This is true of any conceivable kind of transcendence which could be
treated as either an actuality or a possibility. An object existing in itself is never one with which
consciousness or the Ego pertaining to consciousness has nothing to do” (Husserl 1982, 106).
Moran identifies passages near this that commit Husserl to idealism as well (Moran 2005,
178–79).
168 R. K. B. Parker
20
The inscription in the front of Husserl’s copy of the text – preserved as item BP 31 in Husserl’s
personal library preserved in the Husserl Archives in Leuven – reads: “Herrn Prof. Dr. Edmund
Husserl, in tiefster Verehrung und herzlichen Liebe.” I would like to thank Prof. Julia Jansen, direc-
tor of the Husserl Archives in Leuven, for allowing me to publish Husserl’s marginal notes from
this book, and to Dr. Thomas Vongehr for his assistance with their transcription.
21
Long before Celms wrote his book, Husserl was aware that solipsism posed a threat to his phi-
losophy. It was an established problem concerning the “principle of consciousness” in post-Kan-
tian philosophy (Staiti 2016, 135–37). It is possible that Celms based his criticisms on worries that
Husserl had expressed in his unpublished manuscripts. That said, if anyone prior to Celms charged
Husserl with being a solipsist in print, I have not found evidence of this. Another possible candi-
date for being Husserl’s unnamed critic is Georg Misch, but the mention of the problem of solip-
sism by Misch is quite brief (Misch 1930, 214–15). If the Cartesian Meditations were meant as a
response to Celms, he was certainly not convinced by Husserl’s attempt at rephrasing his position.
In 1939, Celms writes that “the Cartesian Meditations do not present anything new but confirm
once again how close Husserl is to Descartes” (Kūle 1998, 298–99).
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 169
4 C
elms’ Claim that Phenomenological Idealism Leads
to Solipsism
22
Cf. (Husserl 1959, 190); (Husserl 1962, 216–17); and (Husserl 2002, 280–84), all of which
Celms read. As Luft notes (Luft 1997, 63), Celms also believes that Husserl’s position is similar to
Berkeleyan idealism (Celms 1928, 337; 435), but we will not discuss this here.
23
Cf. (Husserl 1969, 233).
170 R. K. B. Parker
24
In the margin next to this passage, Husserl has written “388”, referencing an earlier section from
Celms’ book which he has annotated. It reads: „Die Gewissheit des Dingrealen ist, Husserls ideal-
istischer Überzeugung nach, nur als die Gewissheit eines im eigenen Bewusstsein konstituierten
Seins anzusehen. Demnach kann auch die Gewissheit des fremden Ich, als eines auf Grund der
eigenen Wahrnehnmng des fremdem Leibdinges »eingefühlten« Ich, nur die Gewissheit eines im
eigenen Bewusstsein vorgestellten Ich sein. Wie es sich mit der Gewissheit eines as sich, d. h.
unabhängig vom eigenen Bewusstsein bestehenden fremden lch verhalten mag, bleibt noch
offen.“(Celms 1928, 388)
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 171
If the transcendental ego is not reified, Celms argues that “it cannot possibly act
on other pure streams of experience, nor can it possibly be influenced by others. An
interaction between the individual subjects would only be possible if they suppose
a substantial being, which would, however, abandon the absolute character of pure
consciousness.” (Celms 1928, 398–99)25 Celms goes on to write that taken in the
absolute sense:
consciousness is a ‘windowless and doorless’ monad. All action and interaction, all causal-
ity and so on, is then only possible on the part of intentional objects of consciousness, and
therein only with one another as a relationship between intentionally constituted moments.
In other words, it is clear that, for Husserl, consciousness ‘must be regarded as a self-
contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate
and out of which nothing can escape (Ideas, §49, S.93). (Celms 1928, 399)
Husserl makes two comments here. First, he writes that while at the beginning of
phenomenological investigation it seems that my consciousness and Ego are solip-
sistic, it turns out that “‘windowlessness’ means only that something lying outside of
transcendental intersubjectivity is nonsense.”26 Second, regarding the passage cited
from Ideas §49, Husserl writes that consciousness must be considered in two senses:
first egologically, and then intersubjectively.27 While these statements anticipate and
are elaborated in the Cartesian Meditations from §41 onward, we will turn our
attention instead to the lectures on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Husserl
2006, hereafter abbreviated as GPP) and Husserl’s discussion of empathy and inter-
subjectivity therein, to contextualize both Celms’ remarks and Husserl’s response.
In GPP §38, Husserl describes empathy as “a special form of empirical experi-
ence. In empathy, the empathizing I experiences the inner life [Seelenleben] or, to
be more precise, the consciousness of the other I. He experiences the other I, but no
one will say he lives it and perceives it in inner perception […] just like his own
consciousness” (Husserl 2006, 82–83). Empathy is therefore an empty intention,
not an intuiting of the inner life of another subject. Neither the other Ego in-itself
nor the contents of its consciousness are directly experienced by the empathizing
I. In the immediately ensuing section, Husserl goes on to state that we can perform
the phenomenological reduction in a twofold manner with respect to empathy. First,
we can investigate empathy in-itself as a mode of consciousness, like perception,
remembering, etc. Second, given that “empathy is experience about an empathized
consciousness,” we can investigate this empathized other consciousness as a phe-
nomenological datum – in terms of the noesis and noema of an intentional act – and
the conditions on the possibility of this experience. Husserl warns, however, that we
25
On these points, Celms seems to be aware of Husserl’s discussion of ‘causation’ at Ideas I §52.
Here Husserl denies that presentifications are “caused” by things-in-themselves, and insists that
causation is a concept that only applies to the objects of experience.
26
„zuerst scheint das mein solipsistisches Bewusstsein und sol<ipsistisches> Ego zu sein – dann
aber zeigt sich, dass die,Fensterlosigkeit‘nur der Intersubjektivität zu kommt und die Bedeutung
hat, dass ein ausserhalb der transz<endenten> Int<ersubjektivität> ein Unsinn ist?“(Husserl, BP
31, 399)
27
„Derselbe Sinn für das Ego und in einem anderen Sinn für die Int < ersubjektivität>“(Husserl,
BP 31, 399).
172 R. K. B. Parker
should not confuse my empathic experience with the other stream of consciousness
posited in empathy. The concrete contents of that other stream of consciousness
cannot, in principle, belong to mine (Husserl 2006, 84–85). Nor is the other Ego
some inherent part of my own consciousness. What Husserl then needs to explain
how one’s own consciousness and the other consciousness posited in empathy both
constitute and share the same Objective spatio-temporal world. It seems that this is
the question which the transcendental theory of empathy, rather than a descriptive
analysis of “empirical empathy,” must strive to answer.
When I perform the phenomenological reduction with respect to the existence of
the thing-world [Dingwelt], and therefore also other lived-bodies, all being is
reduced on the one hand to:
one (to “my”) phenomenological I […] and, on the other hand, to other I’s, posited in
empathy, and posited as looking, remembering, and perhaps empathizing I’s […]. [T]he
empathized I’s are posited as belonging to their lived bodies, as center-points of the thingly
surroundings, which expand towards the universe at large (Allnatur). This universe is the
very same that exists for me, too, which I too perceive and also experientially posit. (Husserl
2006, 86)
Every ‘thing’ which I consider from the phenomenologically reduced standpoint “is
also an index for the empathized I, an index of the experiential contexts and possi-
bilities of experience belonging to it, and which are empathized in it by me – and so
it is for every I” (Husserl 2006, 86).28 Of course, as Husserl states in Ideas I, there is
no countersense in the thought that my own transcendental I might be the only one.
Husserl’s remarks about empathy from GPP seem to corroborate at least part of
Celms’ argument. The empathizing subject does not experience the concrete inner
life of the other subject. Also, in empirical empathy the other I is posited based on
my experience of another lived-body, just as, in ordinary perception, I posit the
object of perception. But when I consider these objects of intentional consciousness
from the phenomenologically reduced standpoint, the existence of these objects
which I posit as transcendencies existing in-themselves is put in brackets. All of this
is, in fact, a discussion of other subjects from the solipsistic standpoint characteris-
tic of the initial phase of phenomenological enquiry.
However, Celms is wrong if he believes that other transcendental I’s are thereby
reduced to nothing more than some (inherent) part of my own ego. This is not what
Husserl claims, nor does it follow from what he has written. (Husserl 1960, 26) His
point has been to uncover the being-sense of other subjects as they are constituted
in empathy. What we discover is that they are constituted as subjects related to a
lived-body as I am to my own, themselves capable of performing the
phenomenological reduction, and with whom we share an intersubjective, Objective
world which we mutually constitute. As Husserl remarks in the margin of Celms’
28
In an appendix to GPP §39, Husserl writes: “Each particular stream of consciousness is some-
thing completely separate, a monad, and it would remain without windows of communication if
there were no intersubjective phenomena, etc. This is also the condition for the possibility of a
world of things that is one and the same for many I’s.” (Husserl 2006, 158) Celms read this excerpt
(Celms 1928, 404), and takes issue with precisely the claim Husserl alludes to in his marginal note.
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 173
book, insofar as the Objective world is itself constituted in this way, something
lying outside of transcendental intersubjectivity, not just transcendental subjectivity,
is nonsense. There is no world “outside” of the world constituted in transcendental
intersubjectivity.
Even if we grant all of this to Husserl, the spectre of solipsism, in some form, still
seems to loom over his phenomenological idealism. Let us suppose that there are
other subjects which exist absolutely, in- and for-themselves, just as my own ego
does. Celms continues by stating that, if we assume, as Husserl does, that it is
impossible for other subjects to be given in immediate intuition, and only come to
be given in empathic experience grounded in the perception of other living-things,
and if we also assume that this perception depends on hyletic data which is present
to consciousness without being caused by the influence of another ego on my own,
then we can only get beyond solipsism by positing a Leibnizian pre-established
harmony. According to Celms, it is obvious that, “only with the help of the meta-
physical presupposition of a pre-established harmony can we get beyond the solus
ipse, namely a harmony as a predetermined agreement [Übereinstimmung] between
the ideas of other subjects formed in one’s own absolutely closed ego through empa-
thetic experience, with these subjects themselves, which exist “in-themselves.”
(Celms 1928, 399)
Again, we can find support for such an argument in the manuscripts which Celms
would have read in Freiburg. In the third London Lecture, Husserl writes that the
only conceivable absolutely and independently existing thing is the ego, that is, the
concrete transcendental subject, which we might refer to by the Leibnizian name
“monad”. It is the subjectivity for which everything else is an Object. No other thing
can possibly exist in and for itself. (Husserl 2002, 334–35) Husserl also claims that
pure phenomenology is a monadology, and that there is an essential “harmony”
among monads, whereby each monad necessarily constitutes the same world, with
and for each other. But, at the same time, he is clear that he rejects the metaphysical
monads in the Leibnizian sense. (Husserl 2002, 304) Husserlian monads are not
substances, they are transcendental egos constrained by certain categorial forms
such that they each constitute and share the same Objective world. Their apparent
harmony is explained by these forms. In a sense, the world, and all possible perspec-
tives on it, exist in each pure monad potentially or ideally, while each concrete ego
is absolutely unique. In Celms’ defense, this is an aspect of Husserl’s theory that he
had not yet fully explained.29
29
If we consider the Cartesian Meditations to be Husserl’s final word on this issue, it is clear from
his later publications that Celms was not satisfied by this response. Nor was Nikolai Lossky, who
had likely read Celms’ book. With the theory of intersubjectivity from the Fifth Meditation in
mind, Lossky presents an argument very similar to that of Celms: “The failure of Husserl’s episte-
mological idealism is […] clearly revealed in his theory of other egos. He places great importance
on the notion of the alter ego and the related concept of “an intersubjective world, actually there
for everyone, accessible with respect to its Objects for everyone.” (CM, <123>) “Without this
idea,” says Husserl, one cannot have the experience of “the Objective world.” (CM,
<127>) […] [Husserl] began with the requirement that philosophy be built on the basis of evi-
dence, which <in his theory> consists in the fact that an object [предмет] is present to conscious-
174 R. K. B. Parker
While Husserl stops short of denying the existence of other transcendental egos,
his theory of intersubjectivity only addresses the sense of other subjects as they are
given in empathic experience, not their existence in themselves. In Celms’ mind,
Husserl’s position seems to not only deny that we can know the particular concrete
contents of the mental lives of others, but that we can even know with certainty that
genuine other subjects exist. Empathic experience forces us only to conditionally
posit the existence of other psycho-physical subjects based on the perception of
lived-bodies. Supposing that there are other subjects that exist in- and for-themselves,
independent of my own ego, lest they be “merely imagined subjects in one’s own
consciousness,” Celms repeats that Husserl must assume pre-established harmony.
(Celms 1928, 400) However, the results of “pure” phenomenology are meant to
apply universally; not only to my own phenomenologically reduced ego, but to any
ego whatsoever. If these supposed other egos were to perform the reduction, they
would see that they constitute the same world as I do in the same manner, and they
too would posit my existence based on the experience of my lived-body. Even with
this harmony, at best what we get then from Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is,
according to Celms, nothing more than a pluralistic solipsism. For Celms, this does
not represent a “true” theory of intersubjectivity at all.
Celms refers to Ideas §48 where Husserl writes that certain conditions on the
possibility of cognition for the pure ego guarantee that every concrete ego – an
“open plurality [offene Vielheit]” of monads (Celms 1928, 402)30 – constitutes the
ness originarily [подлиннике] and attests to itself; but he ends his Cartesian Meditations with the
assertion that without the idea of intersubjectivity it is impossible to have the experience of the
“Objective world”. At the same time, Husserl immediately announces that an alien monad and its
mental life cannot be given to me directly in experience: if it were given originarily, then “it would
be merely a moment of my own existence, and ultimately it itself and I myself would be the same.”
(CM, <139>) If this is the case, how is it possible for a presentation of the other I to appear and do
we know anything about it with certainty? Without this, the idea of intersubjectivity vanishes into
thin air. We have already discussed above what Husserl thinks about this: another monad is “con-
stituted in my monad,” (CM, <154>) by way of an apprehension by analogy, transcendental inter-
subjectivity “is constituted purely within me, the meditating ego, purely by virtue of sources
belonging to my intentionality.” (CM, <158>) And this merely imaginary intersubjectivity, con-
structed by means of empathy, is a condition for the idea of Objectivity [объективности]!”
(Lossky 1939, 54–55, translated from the Russian with the help of Uldis Vēgners).
30
Celms’ reference to an “open plurality” of monads is likely a reference to Ideas §151, which
reads: “The next higher level is then the intersubjectively identical physical thing – a constitutive
unity of a higher order. Its constitution is related to an open plurality [offene Mehrheit] in relation
to subjects ‘understanding one another.’ The intersubjective world is the correlate of intersubjec-
tive experience, i.e., <experience> mediated by ‘empathy.’ We are, as a consequence, referred to
the multiple unities of things pertaining to the senses which are already individually constituted by
the many subjects; in further course we are referred to the corresponding perceptual multiplicities
thus belonging to different Ego-subjects and streams of consciousness; above all, however, we are
referred to the novel factor of empathy and to the question of how it plays a constitutive role in
‘Objective’ experience and bestows unity on those separated multiplicities” (Husserl 1982, 363).
In his ‘Copy D’ from the fall of 1929, Husserl uses the phrase offenen Vielheit in an addition to
Ideas I §48, suggesting that, perhaps, he was reading or had read Celms’ book at the time. Husserl
also uses this phrase in the outline of his London Lectures (Husserl 2002, 373) and in an appendix
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 175
same world, although each subject has a unique perspective on the world. Husserl
writes:
what is cognizable by one Ego must, of essential necessity, be cognizable by any Ego. Even
though it is not in fact the case that each stands, or can stand, in a relationship of ‘empathy,’
of mutual understanding with every other […] nevertheless there exist, eidetically regarded,
essential possiblities of effecting a mutual understanding and therefore possibilities also
that the worlds of experience separated in fact become joined by concatenation of actual
experience to make up the one intersubjective world, the correlate of the unitary world of
mental lives […]. When that is taken into account the formal-logical possibility of realities
outside the world, the one spatiotemporal world [of experience...] proves to be a counter-
sense. If there are any worlds, any real physical things whatever, then the experienced moti-
vations constituting them must be able to extend into my experience and into that of each
Ego. (Husserl 1982, 108–9)31
Husserl claims here that while the actual experiences of each individual monad are
essentially separated, they somehow join to create the Objective world. But Celms
is suspicious of how this process is supposed to occur in fact. Not only has Husserl
argued that no two subjects can share the same individual moments of mental-
content, but if the transcendental egos are not reified, they cannot possibly commu-
nicate at all. If this is true, then the Husserlian concept of the transcendental ego not
only deserves to be called a monad, but his conception of monads is, according to
Celms, even stronger than that of Leibniz (Celms 1928, 403–4).32
Finally, Celms refers to a note Husserl added to GPP §39. Husserl writes that:
“Any possible empathy is the ‘mirroring’ of each monad in the other, and the pos-
sibility of such mirroring depends on the possibility of a concordant constitution of
a spatial-temporal nature, as an index for the respective constitutive lived experi-
ences which extends into all I’s.” (Husserl 2006, 156)33 Celms takes this as an open
acknowledgment of the fact that the possibility of the constitution of a single spatio-
temporal world in each absolutely closed ego depends on pre-established harmony.
Intersubjectivity is simply an illusion: “Only with the help of the metaphysical
assumption of pre-established harmony is Husserl able to achieve his phenomeno-
logical monadology. This is, strictly speaking, no overcoming of solipsism, but only
an extension of ‘monistic solipsism’ to ‘pluralistic solipsism’.” (Celms 1928, 404)
For Celms, Husserl has argued for the possibility of an open plurality of completely
isolated and independent monads. For Husserl, the “real” world is much broader
than the world as it directly perceived or constituted by each individual conscious-
ness. However, he fails to show that the supposed “community” of monads is a
community in the “truest sense.” Husserl’s monads to not depend on each other for
their existence, nor do they depend on each other in order to constitute the world.
to GPP (Husserl 1973, 234). So, while Celms would have seen this phrase used by Husserl in a
number of places, its inclusion at §48 in ‘Copy D’ is conspicuous, or at least an interesting
coincidence.
31
Cf. (Celms 1928, 403)
32
Husserl takes note of this passage in BP 31.
33
Cf. (Celms 1928, 404)
176 R. K. B. Parker
Rather than go line-by-line through Husserl’s arguments from the Fifth Meditation
and show how they correspond and respond to Celms, I will sketch a brief defense
of Husserl. The main misunderstanding on the part of Celms is his conviction that
Husserl’s theory of experiencing someone else is in any way meant to prove the
existence in-themselves of other subjects, or that Husserl’s project requires such a
proof. This is the sort of claim which Husserl’s Fifth Meditation is meant to correct.
In the Fifth Meditation Husserl is concerned first with explaining the sense of some-
one else, and then with constructing some sort of transcendental argument, based on
empathy, for the possibility of Objective knowledge. This becomes a critical junc-
ture in Husserl’s philosophy, as such an integration of intersubjectivity is a major
advancement upon the Kantian project of transcendental idealism. But these are
transcendental problems, not metaphysical ones. Questions concerning the actual
existence of other subjects in-themselves is beyond the scope of a transcendental
theory of empathy or a transcendental theory of intersubjectivity.
In his first criticism of transcendental phenomenology, Celms touts the opinion
that any “true” philosophy needs to take a stand with respect to the metaphysical
reality or ideality of transcendent things. Celms’ argument against Husserl is based
Does Husserl’s Phenomenological Idealism Lead to Pluralistic Solipsism? Assessing… 177
precisely on this dichotomy. If we are forced to choose between these two possibili-
ties, and if we choose idealism, then Husserl’s pure phenomenology leads to solip-
sism – either monistic solipsism or pluralistic solipsism. Assuming Celms is correct,
what we need to show is that Husserl is not an idealist, or more precisely, that tran-
scendental idealism does not entail a form of metaphysical idealism. Celms also
assumes the natural – and metaphysically loaded – sense of “genuine” or “true” other
subjects, and of a “true” theory of intersubjectivity in advance. Insofar as he remains
bound to the natural attitude here, it is no wonder that he is never satisfied with
Husserl’s responses. Celms’ insistence that other subjects must be things-in-
themselves in the usual sense is question begging. Celms is assuming the proposition
that other subjects are things-in-themselves exist, and demanding that Husserl dem-
onstrate their existence, when this is the very proposition which Husserl is calling
into question.
It may well be that Husserl’s transcendental idealism leads to a type of epistemo-
logical solipsism, and that his claim that “‘windowlessness’ means only that some-
thing lying outside of transcendental intersubjectivity is nonsense,” does not disarm
the threat of such a solipsism but only qualifies it. However, it is not clear why this
position is inherently problematic or philosophically unpalatable. According to
Celms, it is one thing to have a plurality of subjects, but it is quite another to have
intersubjectivity. This pre-established harmony among monads does not establish
the possibility of any real “community” of monads. Husserl’s monads, even if they
constitute the same world, do not “share” this world in any sense that we would
want. For Celms, this is no theory of intersubjectivity in the “true sense”. Solipsism
is a problem of isolation, and Husserl has not solved this. But this presupposes that
we are not isolated, and that Husserl needs to account for this non-isolation.
Celms has not established that Husserl’s account has failed to accommodate
some indubitable phenomena, but only that it does not get the results we might
want/expect. In particular, it does not account for the existence of other subjects as
“genuine transcendencies.” While we may indirectly posit other subjects as possible
given our empathetic experiences of other lived-bodies, we still do not know others
exist, and even if they do there is still no way to engage them directly. The assump-
tion here is that this is either inherently problematic, or that it is problematic in that
it leads to skepticism. But Husserl’s theory is not a form of skepticism. In respond-
ing to the problem of solipsism, Husserl is forced to tease out an important subtlety
in his theory. While pure phenomenology might start from a solipsistic standpoint,
if Husserl’s theory of transcendental intersubjectivity is tenable, then it can still
account for Objectivity and explain the sense of other subjects. Perhaps we might
still call this a solipsistic theory, but it is not solipsism in any familiar sense of the
word. Husserl is able to maintain that the objection of metaphysical solipsism
against him has no intelligible meaning. He has an account of an Objective and
intersubjective world, and of other subjects, even if they might not mesh nicely with
traditional metaphysics. But the sort of epistemological or transcendental solipsism
that we might still want to level against Husserl is a different problem, or perhaps
no real problem at all from Husserl’s standpoint.
178 R. K. B. Parker
6 C
onclusion: The “Special Sense” of Transcendental
Idealism
sense of our questions.” (Ingarden 1975, 27) From this standpoint, it is not only
awkward to ask about what the world might be like in-itself, it is complete non-
sense to do so. As I have argued, in Husserl’s framework, the physical objects we
encounter in the external world through sense perception do not belong to a mind-
independent sphere of “autonomous being in-itself; they are only something that
exists […] ‘for’ the conscious subject performing the perceptive acts. They are only
intentional units of sense and beyond that ‘ein Nichts’ (nothing)” (Ingarden 1975,
32). In other words, one cannot conceive of the existence of an object without refer-
ence to some conscious subject for whom it exists. Even those objects that we
constitute as essentially transcendent receive their entire being-sense from inten-
tional consciousness.
While the standard interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not
wrong, it needs to be elaborated in more detail. Some work has been done in devel-
oping our understanding of Husserl’s transcendental idealism by way of comparing
and contrasting his writings to those of Kant and various Neo-Kantians. However,
this work also needs to be supplemented by research into Husserl’s exchanges with
other peers and students, such as Theodor Celms. The lack of such discussions has
had a negative effect on contemporary literature regarding Husserl’s theories of
empathy and intersubjectivity.34 All too often these discussions lapse into either
disputes about psychological theories of empathy, or attempts to prove the existence
of other subjects in-themselves. As I have argued above, those disputes are not ones
in which Husserl is engaging. Husserl himself recognized the importance of under-
standing his special sense of transcendental idealism for interpreting his work in
these areas, i.e., in order to understand his transcendental theory of empathy (the
conditions of the possibility of experiencing someone else), and transcendental
intersubjectivity (as a condition for the possibility of Objectivity). I hope that amidst
the largely historical and exegetical discussions above, these points have been
brought to the forefront.
Let us now consider a definition of transcendental idealism that Husserl himself
offers in a text from 1921 which bears the title Argument für den transzendentalen
Idealismus.
Transcendental idealism means: a world [Natur] is not thinkable without co-existing sub-
jects of possible experience of it; possible experiential subjects are not sufficient. If we
leave it at merely possible subjects of possible world-experiences [Naturerfahrungen], then
infinitely many incompatible worlds are equally possible. (Husserl 2003, 156)
In light of what I have argued above, I take the meaning of this passage to run as
follows: the existence of other subjects is a condition of the possibility of experienc-
ing an Objective world. This is not an explanation of what it means to be an object
of consciousness, but to be the sort of object that we label from the standpoint of the
natural attitude as “real.” One cannot conceive of an object actually existing in
34
Even if Husserl’s Fifth Meditation was not written as a direct response to Celms, we would cer-
tainly do well to read it in light of Celms’ criticism. All too often, the Fifth Meditation is regarded
by commentators as either an outright failure or entirely opaque. When juxtaposed with Celms’
criticism neither of these two interpretations are fair.
180 R. K. B. Parker
Sommer-Semester 1922
Geschichte der neueren Philosophie – Edmund Husserl
Phänomenologische Übungen – Edmund Husserl
Geschichte der Philosophie von Hegel bis Bergson – Georg Mehlis
Einführung in die Philosophie – Georg Mehlis
Erkenntnistheorie – Joseph Geyser
Metaphysik – Joseph Geyser
Die Religionsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus – Richard Kroner
Psychologische Arbeiten – Jonas Cohn
Winter-Semester 1922/23
Phänomenologische Übungen – Edmund Husserl
Einleitung in die Philosophie – Edmund Husserl
Geschichtliche Grundtypen der Philosophie – Joseph Geyser
Übungen über Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft – Joseph Geyser
Psychologische Übungen – Jonas Cohn
Praktische Nationalökonomie auf wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Grundlage – Gerhart
von Schulze-Gaevernitz
Besprechen zur Weltwirtschaft und Aussenpolitik – Gerhart von
Schulze-Gaevernitz
Sommer-Semester 1923
Logik und Erkenntnistheorie – Joseph Geyser
Die Englische Empiristen – Joseph Geyser
Übungen über die phänomenologische Religions-Philosophie der Gegenwart –
Joseph Geyser
Psychologische Arbeiten – Jonas Cohn
Weltwirtschaft und Aussenpolitik – Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz
Das ökonomische System des Marxismus – Eduard Heimann
References
This list is based on the Abgangszeuignis for “Herrn Theodor Zelms” held at the Universitätsarchiv
35
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Finding a Way Into Genetic
Phenomenology
Matt E. M. Bower
1 The Reduction(s)
From the very early introduction of the technique of reduction in Ideas I, Husserl
maintains that there is not just one reduction. In that text he explains that phenom-
enological practice is to be carried out in numerous reductions which together form
a “systematic doctrine of all the phenomenological reductions” (Hua III, 115/139).
Despite the plurality of reductions, some undertaken and some merely projected,
there are certain general characteristics of proper phenomenological technique that
M. E. M. Bower (*)
Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, USA
give the practice of multiple reductions a kind organization and systematic coher-
ence while at the same time legitimating phenomenology’s transcendental stance.
The first trait is universality. Carrying out reductions has a universal aim. That
means they must cover the whole of mental life, all possible forms of consciousness.
This is achieved by making the radical and in principle distinction between the
immanent and the transcendent, or what belongs to consciousness and what belongs
to the world. This universal distinction is a hallmark of all forms of the reduction. It
means not just that there are two kinds of things that exist, which would be an unre-
markable assertion. It means that the two stand in a particular relation, an “a priori
of correlation.” This correlation is a constitutive correlation: Consciousness consti-
tutes, the world is constituted. Thus formulated, the validity of this distinction
implies the validity of the transcendental stance, since consciousness has to perform
constitutive accomplishments in order for the world to be given, to have any sense
or meaning to it. Any blurring of the consciousness/world distinction – like the psy-
chologistic theories of logic or the naturalistic accounts of the mind that so vexed
Husserl – would amount to a compromise of the transcendental stance.
The second trait of the reductions is that they disclose how this mental life func-
tions constitutively, providing precise details about how in each instance something
can be “given” to consciousness by virtue of certain lived-experiences. All manner of
constitutive functions are uncovered in this way, e.g., those having to do with percep-
tion, interpersonal experience (“empathy”), and judgments about what exists, what
is valuable, what is practical. These functions can form a system to the extent that
one is sensitive to the dependence (or “founding”) relations that hold among them.
Proceeding in this way is essential because it supports the pretention of univer-
sality, allowing one to proceed from the simplest kinds of experience that depend on
no others (i.e., original time-consciousness) up to the most complex (perhaps the
“higher-order personalities” of social institutions), (ideally) leaving nothing out
along the way. The generic distinction between constituting consciousness and the
world is made in vain if it is not accompanied by analyses that show how the world
is actually constituted by consciousness.
To the extent that one carries out each reduction under the guidance of these
principles, one can justly speak in general of the various operations undertaken as
the practice of “the” reduction. There is, however, another sense in which there are
multiple reductions. As Husserl begins to show less than a decade after the publica-
tion of Ideas I, one can do “the” reduction in more than one way. That is, the prin-
ciples just described are really somewhat loose parameters within which one can
operate in various ways.
The way Husserl initially proposed (famously (more or less) repeated in the
Cartesian Meditations) comes to be called the “Cartesian way.” This way of doing
the reduction is supposed to be of singular pedagogical value because it allows one
to achieve the aim of universality in “one stroke” (Hua VI, 154). It rests on a
Cartesian inference drawn from the observation that consciousness is essentially
different from things in the world (whatever sort of entities these may be). Things in
the world are always given in a piecemeal fashion. They are “adumbrated.” I see an
object by observing it from various sides. I secure a mathematical truth through a
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 187
demonstration that requires multiple steps. Because such entities are necessarily
adumbrated, their givenness in consciousness is fallible. It is in principle true that
further steps could reveal error in previous steps. The same is not true of conscious-
ness. What is adumbrated can turn out to be otherwise, but not the adumbrations
themselves. That I had such and such a perceptual experience or reasoned in such
and such a way will remain true even if the experience turns out not to be veridical
or the argument fallacious.
This move is universal in that it guarantees in advance the nature of any lived-
experience or form of consciousness. Consciousness is absolutely (wholly, without
remainder) given. It is not given in adumbrations. No further investigation is neces-
sary to clarify the essential nature of consciousness. Universality is achieved at
once, but at the expense of gaining insight into the shapes constitution can take. The
work left to do therefore consists of a series of further reductions that fill in the
details by exploring determinate forms of consciousness, explaining their constitu-
tive characteristics above all (i.e., the details of just how they adumbrate things that
are experienced).
Husserl never gives up on this way of doing the reduction. That is manifest from
its very late repetition in the Cartesian Meditations (1929), a text, moreover,
intended for mass consumption. Nevertheless, Husserl discusses other ways to carry
out the reduction. These alternate ways of performing the reduction differ from the
Cartesian reduction in being epistemologically (relatively) lax. As Robert
Sokolowski (2010, 16–21) has argued, this is possible because Husserl distinguishes
two kinds of evidence: adequate and apodictic (Hua I, §§5–6). The Cartesian reduc-
tion provides both forms, revealing consciousness without remainder (adequacy)
and beyond the shadow of a doubt (apodicticity). The other reductions become pos-
sible when Husserl holds them to the standard of apodicticity without adequacy.
They must compel one to the transcendental stance, but not with the pretention of
total transparency and exhaustive clarity.
Among these alternatives, Husserl proposes a psychological reduction in the
Crisis.1 Where the Cartesian reduction begins by achieving universality in one sim-
ple step followed by an infinite series of steps that explicate the constitutive func-
tions of consciousness, the psychological reduction runs in the opposite direction. It
begins with a focus on the details of constitution, since intentionality is what is
characteristic of the mind, examining the variety of shapes conscious experience
can assume. This focus, consistently maintained, is transformed into a universal
project to clarify all constitution.
Psychology – in the sense idiosyncratic to Husserl of the methodical description
of intentional experience from the vantage point of first person reflection2 – has
consciousness for its subject matter. Thus, the exhaustive consideration of its sub-
1
See also Hua VIII, §§44–48. Cf. Bernet et al. (1993), 72–75 and Welton (2000), 158–160.
2
See, for instance, the Amsterdamer Vorträge (in Hua IX) on phenomenological psychology, Sect.
3 (“The method of pure psychology (intuition and reflection). Intentionality as the basic character-
istic of the psychical.”).
188 M. E. M. Bower
Such an approach thus lands, after its even more elaborate journey, at the same des-
tination as the psychological reduction and the starting point of the Cartesian
reduction.
This is the title of section A of Part III of the Crisis (Hua VI).
3
Cf. Bernet et al. (1993), 69–72, Steinbock (1995a), 79–85, and Welton (2000), 160–164.
4
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 189
All of these forms of reduction are ways into the transcendental attitude. Yet none
of them have any obvious special light to shed on the issue of genetic constitution.
In fact, two of them are especially ill suited for that. The Cartesian and the ontologi-
cal reduction are carried out with a special kind of interest that especially precludes
them from getting into the genetic problematic. To see why, it is first necessary to
state a general truth about genetic phenomenology. Genetic phenomenology is
interested in the genesis not of things in the world, but the genesis of consciousness,
of various structures of experience. This forces a distinction within constitution.
There is, on the one hand, the constitution that makes possible various forms of
experience of the world. When one examines this kind of constitution, one is inter-
ested in consciousness insofar as it constitutes the world. On the other hand, genetic
constitution is consciousness’ self-constitution, consisting of the transformations it
undergoes in acquiring new forms for experiencing the world. These transforma-
tions also take place by means of certain conscious interactions with the world. Yet,
to be concerned with such constitution is to be primarily occupied with develop-
ments within consciousness, which shed light on consciousness more than on the
world, even if the world is a part of the equation. Genetic constitution is thus primar-
ily an intra-consciousness affair. It is due to this fact that the “ways to the reduction”
tend to obscure the problem of genetic constitution.
The Cartesian reduction misses the realm of genetic constitution because of its
epistemological pretensions. The motivation for this reduction is not just to lead to
the transcendental attitude, but to highlight the epistemological superiority of con-
sciousness over things in the world. Consciousness is known adequately, and things
in the world are known inadequately or fallibly. Due to this epistemological bent,
the Cartesian reduction has a one-sided view of constitution. Consciousness is
defined exclusively by contrast to things in the world. If this path is taken, one will
learn much about the correlation between consciousness and the world, but one will
miss out on the constitutive relations within consciousness. In other words, one will
miss out on the whole of genetic constitution. Indeed, the very idea that conscious-
ness is itself constituted is anathema to this reduction, since it only understands
constitution as givenness through adumbration. Saying consciousness is constituted
would then be the same as saying it is like any other thing in the world. The genetic
constitution of consciousness, as we will see, is not adumbration, but it is constitu-
tion all the same.
The ontological reduction suffers from essentially the same one-sidedness. It
begins from ontology, from the structures of the world, and discovers from there
how consciousness necessarily gives the world its sense. The motivation for this
reduction is to make sense of the constitution of the world. The work of this reduc-
tion is over when one has considered all ontological structures of the world and
found the correlative constitutive functions of consciousness. All that matters to
inaugurate this reduction is to transform the world into a phenomenon, to d emonstrate
190 M. E. M. Bower
that consciousness is needed to constitute the world. That means it will not have
anything to say about genesis, because its sole aim is to make a claim about con-
sciousness’ relation to the world. Intra-consciousness matters are unnecessary
details that do not connect with the driving motive of the ontological reduction.
One might suppose that psychology would include an account of psychological
development, so that the psychological reduction would make good on the deficien-
cies of the others and become the methodological stance needed for undertaking
genetic analysis. And, of course, outside of the present context it is primarily within
the field of actual psychology that development is of interest. The psychologist can-
not avoid the empirical fact of that development: Children are born lacking the abil-
ity to exercise many cognitive feats that adults perform as a matter of course.
Gradually, they come to acquire these abilities. Since each one of us began in the
same way, the problem is a universal one. Indeed, before Husserl himself ever took
development to be a phenomenological problem, he was familiar with it as an
empirical issue for a “genetic psychology.”5 One will not be surprised, then, that in
his to-do list for phenomenological or descriptive psychology, Husserl gestures at6
and explicitly includes the problem of development and, hence, genesis. As to the
latter point, Husserl remarks in the Crisis:
Thus it appears obvious that a necessary universal reduction has in advance the significance
of a resolve henceforth to reduce all of men’s ways of behaving, one by one, so as to
describe scientifically […] the psychic sphere of acts according to its empirical types […].
Will anyone become somehow doubtful if we remark here that the notion of ‘ways of
behavior’ must ultimately include […] all associations and also the variations of acts which
can indeed be followed descriptively in their obscured forms, sedimentations – and even all
instincts and drives, not to mention the ‘horizons’? (Hua VI, 246, translation modified)7
Nevertheless, the psychological reduction does also exhibit the same one-
sidedness of the other two kinds of reduction. It is, after all, only interested in con-
sciousness in order to show that consciousness is a realm distinct from the world it
constitutes. The pattern that has emerged with the other kinds of reduction contin-
ues with this one as well. This time the problem is not that it has some epistemologi-
cal bias, as with the Cartesian reduction, or that it has a subject matter that makes it
5
Hua XXXVIII, 204 (my translation): “It could be that at the beginning of psychical development
sensations form a chaos, [or] we [could] say better, form a loose unity in which, as concerns the
intimacy of the connection, no connection would be preferred over the others, and only in the
course of ‘experience’ <Erfahrung>, the process, would [a connection] develop into an apprehen-
sion, [and then,] by means of the unity of apprehension, fusion of the sensation into particular
unities would occur in such a way that ultimately the sensation has unity that is induced by the
apprehension or through the process by means of which the apprehension developed, but [which]
does not simply consist of it. These two questions however belong to genetic psychology. But it
seems that the first question must be affirmed.”
6
Hua VI, 239 (translation modified): “Here we construe the concept of a descriptive psychology
just as broadly as that of the other descriptive sciences, which after all are not bound only to the
data of direct intuition, but make their inferences to those things which cannot be made present as
actually existing through any actually experiencing intuition but which must be capable of repre-
sentation through analogous variations of intuition.”
7
See also Hua IX, §§42–43.
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 191
The way to genetic phenomenology is indirect, and is at least one step removed
from the familiar “ways to the reduction.” What needs clarification, then, is the
nature of this remove. While the Cartesian reduction is an absolute dead end, insofar
as it insists on adequate evidence, either of the other two ways to the reduction may
serve as a springboard into genetic phenomenology.9 The ontological reduction, on
the one hand, leads indirectly to genetic constitution through a consistent “regres-
sive inquiry” (Rückfrage), and the psychological reduction finds its way there
through its depth analysis of consciousness as concrete personality. This indirect-
ness is not at all a characteristic unique to the project of genetic phenomenology,
since Husserl often speaks of a need to advance beyond the work of the initial reduc-
tions. They are means for taking up the transcendental stance in the first place and
not its consummation.
8
Hua VI, 253–254: “The psychologist will naturally have to carry out the epochē and reduction
from his own vantage point […]; he must begin with his original self-experience and his own origi-
nal world-consciousness […]. [H]e has original consciousness of all this, consciousness which, as
reduced, is primary; and it includes his world-consciousness in its flowing particularity and its
historicity, with everything that he attributes to the world and by way of spatiotemporality and
content through his acts of meaning. Through this reduction, this world… becomes a mere phe-
nomenon for him.” Equivalently, Hua VI, 258 has it that: “But if the universal epochē, which
encompasses all having-consciousness-of-the-world, is necessary, then the psychologist loses, dur-
ing this epochē, the ground of the objective world. Thus pure psychology in itself is identical with
transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental subjectivity.” See also Hua IX, 461.
9
I thus cannot entirely agree with Lee that it is the psychological reduction in particular that leads
to the genetic analysis of the instincts. For this view, see Lee (1993), 65. By the same token, I
cannot agree with Steinbock either, when he suggests that it is the ontological reduction in par-
ticular that leads to genetic phenomenology. For his presentation of that view, see Steinbock
(1995a), 79–85.
192 M. E. M. Bower
10
See also Lohmar (2012).
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 193
The ontological reduction only succeeds if it takes the “psychical” into account.
One reflects on ontological concepts, then, in critiquing these concepts, finds one-
self in the narrower project of an intentional psychology that, fully carried out,
ultimately takes one into the transcendental stance. In short, the only difference
between the ontological and the psychological reduction is that, whereas the descrip-
tive psychologist is interested from the start in intentional consciousness, when one
theorizes about other ontological regions one first has to discover their “insuffi-
ciency” (Hua VIII, 223–224). Only then is one referred necessarily to the subject
matter of the descriptive psychologist and subsequently carried over into the tran-
scendental stance.
To get to genetic constitution is then a matter of making a distinction within con-
stitution. There are multiple possible motives for making such a distinction.11 A quite
general motive would be simply the need to draw out the implications of the fact that
conscious life evidently develops and reconcile that with the transcendental stand-
point. This development of consciousness has to be recast from its modest empirical
beginnings in the simple observations of the descriptive psychologist about individu-
als within the world into a theory of how consciousness comes to constitute a world
in the first place and of the major transformations in which particular constitutive
domains arise. Genetic phenomenology is really a matter of revealing the transcen-
dental significance of events commonly recognized in descriptive psychology (Hua
Mat VIII, 155).12 It lets us move from asking about the general constitutive condi-
11
For instance, Husserl introduces genetic phenomenology in texts like Hua XI and Hua XVII in
order to clarify the nature of evidence within the theory of judgment (e.g., Hua XVII, Appendix II,
§§1–4). In other instances, Husserl will often engage in discussions of genesis without considering
the motive for doing so. This is typical of the texts collected in the C-Manuskripte (Hua Mat VIII)
and some of the texts in Hua XXXIX, where Husserl has a simpler, more elegant approach to the
static/genetic constitution distinction, but one lacking in motivation. In those texts Husserl speaks
of two broad steps of performing the reduction. First, one does an “Abbau-Reduktion” (Hua Mat
VIII, No. 23, 394, Hua XXXIX, Nos. 26, 40). This is strikingly similar to the regressive procedure
of the ontological reduction, but with more systematic overtones. One takes the regional categories
and gradually analyzes these categories one at a time, beginning with the most complex and going
back to the constitutively simplest components, the hyletic data in the primal present. Then one is
in a position to turn around and ascend that same path in an Aufbau (Hua Mat VIII, Nos. 16, 17,
49, 74). This theme not only lacks motivation, but also lacks concreteness, since it leaves out of
consideration problems of normality/abnormality and operates as if it is describing “consciousness
in general.” Understanding the Abbau/Aufbau analyses in this way, which seems the most natural,
I have to disagree with Georgy Chernavin’s view that the Abbau reduction itself is already a pro-
cedure of genetic reconstruction. It certainly sets the stage for the latter, but surely one has not truly
entered the field of genetic analysis until one analyzes, in the Aufbau, the temporal linkages of the
different strata first disclosed in the Abbau reduction. See Chernavin (2011), especially 34–40.
12
I am taking a somewhat narrow perspective on genetic phenomenology due to the problems that
are presently of interest. Genesis is not just a matter of individual development. It is also about
society, whether it be the society of scientists, of practical agents, of ethical agents, of political
agents, etc. This is clear from texts like the Kaizo articles, the Crisis, and the “Origin of Geometry.”
194 M. E. M. Bower
tions for experiencing reality to asking about the constitutive conditions of those
very conditions, i.e., about how they can possibly come into being.
The attempt at such a reconciliation is signaled by Husserl’s frequent claim that
genetic phenomenology gives us a more concrete understanding of subjectivity, an
understanding that has to follow an initial, more abstract understanding carried out
in “static” terms. In one later manuscript, Husserl has problems of genetic constitu-
tion as the final of four phases of carrying out the reduction (Hua XXXIX, No. 13,
especially 118–120). The first is the initial “bracketing” of the world, drawing the
great contrast between the world as constituted and consciousness as constituting. A
second step consists of a critique of the (relative) apodicticity of various forms of
consciousness. A third step embraces the analysis of the correlation of conscious-
ness and world, categorizing such structures and clarifying the manners of given-
ness that comprise these forms of constitution. These analyses are characteristically
eidetic, and would encompass both a comprehensive ontology and descriptive psy-
chology. Lastly, in the fourth step one tackles issues of genesis. This step is final
because the others are its “presupposition”: “I must first have the a priori of the
static correlation in order to be able to inquire about the ‘genesis of this a priori”
(Hua XXXIX, 120; my translation).
The analytical blockage that keeps one from making this step consists of a spe-
cial naïveté. When one initially performs the reduction and takes up the transcen-
dental stance, there is a natural tendency to model that stance (i.e., the kinds of
constitution one takes into account) in the light of a certain picture of normal con-
scious life, of which one is oneself, presumably, an exemplar. This picture, Husserl
states, is one’s self-conception as a “mature, normal, rational, scientific person
[Menschen]” (Hua XXXIX, 485, my translation; cf. Hua Mat VII, 107–108). Here
is how he summarizes the issue:
The initial path of the explication of the world as world of experience abstractly reveals
only one level. Experience as self-giving has in a necessary way the significance of normal-
ity, at first the “normal person” [Menschen]. But horizonal [types such as that] of the hori-
zon of ‘abnormal’ people, that of children, [and] finally of animals also belong to the ontic
sense [Seinssinn] of the world. The inclusion of this as ‘intentional modification’ reveals [a]
second level. (Hua XXXIX, 466; my translation)
13
For a discussion of Husserl’s notion of normality and abnormality (Husserl often uses the word
Anomalität and its cognates), see Steinbock (1995a, b), Wehrle (2010), and Taipale (2012). The
sense of “normality” at play in the present discussion is intimately related to that explicated in the
just-cited authors, namely, as an optimum governing, e.g., perception by defining its success or
failure. For instance, if I want to read a book, I must situate myself in suitable lighting conditions,
pick it up and hold it at the right distance for the words to appear clearly and distinctly, and such
(admittedly vague) parameters as lighting, bodily position, distance of the book, etc., all figure in
the optimum or normal perceptual condition involved in reading a book. In the present context,
normality concerns not an individual perceptual act (or even a norm governing some relatively
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 195
e xamination of such forms of consciousness is carried out, not only is “the phenom-
enon ‘world’ not explicated in its full concreteness” (certain “regional structures”
belonging to the “psychical” are missing) (Hua XXXIX, 485, my translation), but
the full transcendental community has not been accounted for (Hua XV, 612). For,
as Husserl states, “the constitutive significance of animals is not to be forgotten. As
intentional modifications of world-constituting people in the first level of normality
[Normalstufe], they co-function in the further constitution of the world” (Hua Mat
VIII, 395; my translation).14 We thus begin to see, although the point needs clarifica-
tion, what a way into genetic phenomenology might look like.
Now, introducing the problematic of abnormality does not immediately lead to the
problem of genesis. The study of animals, “primitives,” and those who suffer severe
mental illness,15 for instance, does not necessitate that shift. The problematic of
abnormality is first a more general topic that can be approached statically (Hua I,
108/74 and Hua XXXIX, 478). Of course, it is primarily with infants and young
children that the developmental problem really shows up, although Husserl flirts in
one manuscript with the idea, perhaps only of metaphorical significance for Husserl,
of a Leibnizian theory of “involution and evolution,” of human consciousness
emerging from animal consciousness (Hua Mat VIII, 169). The reflection on the
“abnormal” periods of infancy and early childhood open up a uniquely systematic
inquiry when one takes note of the obvious but curious fact that they are predeces-
sors of normality, that in conscious life first there is abnormality, then normality.
That observation need not remain a singular empirical one, if taken as the start-
ing point for a special kind of static investigation within the problematic of abnor-
mality that expressly prepares the way for the analysis of genetic constitution. This
investigation concerns the “compossibility” of different forms of consciousness
narrow class of acts), but a conscious being’s total subjective make-up. The concept here applies to
the entire subject at a given point in time or a given time-period and concerns how the subject’s
capacities enable a certain way of life, cognitive, practical, emotional, social, ethical, etc. A sub-
ject’s normality is determined by the way its various capacities make possible a more or less coher-
ent and “rational” way of engaging its environment (in the sense of Umwelt). A subject is abnormal
just in case it fails to participate in or is in some respect deficient in participating in a form of life
guided by ideals of reason. See Heinämaa (2013) for a discussion of normality/abnormality at this
level.
14
For a clarification of the constitutive role of animals and other “abnormal” varieties of conscious
subject, see Heinämaa (2013).
15
Mental illness and other forms of abnormal experience do usually presuppose a preceding condi-
tion of normality, so inquiring about such cases may lead to genetic considerations, but not neces-
sarily in the encompassing and systematic manner that taking infancy and early childhood into
account does. See Hua IV, 276/288. The psychology of personality in general can also lead to a less
systematic genetic inquiry (Hua IV, 270–276/282–289).
196 M. E. M. Bower
(Hua I, 107–108/73–75). This normality reduction, as it were, exploits the fact that
normal constitution is but one way of constituting a world. Analyzing normality and
its abnormal variants can then be considered in their compatibility (or lack thereof).
A single subject cannot be both normal (i.e., rational) and abnormal (e.g., an infant,
a non-human animal) at the same time. These ways of constituting the world are
mutually exclusive, since the abnormal cases are missing (partially or altogether)
something essential to normal constitution, namely, full possession of their rational
abilities. (That means not just logical reasoning, but also, perhaps, practical and
ethical reasoning.)
Likewise, normal consciousness inevitably lacks something present in abnormal
constitution. Non-human animals, for instance, have their own forms of inter-animal
relations and are guided by their own species-specific instincts (Hua Mat VIII, 172).
It is more than likely that there are positive features to the conscious life of children
and abnormal adults, as well, that elude normality.16 Husserl at least recognizes that
certain individuals can be marked by a “facticity, in itself beyond our comprehen-
sion,” thanks to which they see the world in a different way (e.g., “This child takes an
original joy in sounds, that child does not. One is inclined toward temper, the other
toward patience.” (Hua IV, 275–276/288, translation modified)).
But, more interestingly, one can ask not only about compatibility at a given
moment, but also about compatibility over time, sequentially. In the span of one
conscious life, the consciousness of a non-human animal cannot give way to that of
a mature human, but that of an infant or young child can, and that of a mature human
can give way to that of any of a range of abnormalities peculiar to humans. Summing
up the principle behind this observation, Husserl states that “in a unitarily possible
ego not all singly possible types are compossible, and not all compossible ones are
compossible in just any order, at no matter what loci in that ego’s own temporality”
(Hua I, 108/174). The turn to sequential compossibility is necessary because the
various states of human normality and abnormality are essentially phases, moments,
periods within a life. Some abnormal states have the sense of being periods of a life
leading up to normal conscious life, while others have the sense of being excep-
tional cases stemming from a prior normal state. In short, childhood makes no sense
without reference to “normal” adulthood, and mental illness makes no sense with-
out reference to normal or “healthy” mental life. The eidetically derived concepts
themselves point the way to the genetic investigation.
It allows one to arrange the shapes of abnormal consciousness into a series of
states that are not simultaneously compatible, but are sequentially compatible,
yielding an ontogenetic index for investigations into the genetic links and transfor-
mations from phase to phase. This index will remain ambiguous for two reasons
(Hua XI, 339, Hua XV, 608–609). First, because we are only interested in general
structures, like those implicated in the abilities to perceive, remember, expect, eval-
uate, understand other people, intervene practically in the world, etc. The index, for
132), and the idea also features in current empirical work on development. See, for instance,
Alessandro Minelli (2011).
Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology 197
our purposes, will only include these sorts of broad consciously exercised abilities
and leave out the myriad other details of what goes on in any factual process of
cognitive development. The index will not reflect all the refinements of these abili-
ties or the development of other abilities not essentially connected with these, let
alone any individually idiosyncratic traits. Second, for that same reason the index
does not aim to track and reflect the actual timing of the development as an event in
the world. The only time that will count here is “immanent time,” which simply
refers to the general kinds of dynamic processes leading from phase to phase in
consciousness without any reference to the measurement of chronological time.
The turn to sequential compossibility, tracking the single thread of a conscious
life, finally brings us fully into the realm of genetic constitution. Indeed, one of
Husserl’s earliest and most important manuscripts on static/genetic constitution puts
great stress on how we get to genetic constitution when we shift our interest to the
concrete unity of conscious life (Hua XIV, 34–42, appearing in the English transla-
tion of Hua XI, 635–645). The task is to understand the general laws of sequential
compossibility, which just are the laws of genesis, the forms of genetic constitution
(Hua I, 109/175). Now we can consider what is peculiar about genetic constitution.
Instead of being about the givenness of the world, genetic constitution is about the
relations between successive conscious experiences.17 And it concerns not princi-
pally the dynamics of how particular experiences relate to one another over time, but
the dynamics at work in the emergence of types of experience, of whole domains of
conscious life (Hua XI, 338–339/627). The relations or laws that govern such occur-
rences are motivational laws. Relating this back to the problematic of normality, we
can analyze the sequential compossibility of these different states by discerning the
possible relations of motivation between them, “the relation of conditionality obtain-
ing between the motivating and the motivated” (Hua IV, 41/644).
Motivations, taken as the impulse propelling conscious life forward and the tis-
sue holding it together in its peculiar temporal unfolding, are of essentially two
types, namely, passive and active. Let us only summarily delve into the phenome-
non of motivation here. Beginning with the latter, active sort, Husserl provides
some simple examples to illustrate the nature of motivation in active genesis: “in
collecting, the collection [is constituted]; in counting, the number; in dividing, the
part; … in inferring, the inference” (Hua I, 111/77; see Hua XI, Hua XXXI and
Husserl 1973).18 In all these cases, one’s actions engender new constitutive possi-
bilities. Laying out a series of well-understood premises motivates the inference of
a certain conclusion. In a much different context, there are certain motives within
one’s life (the way one conducts oneself) that might motivate an act of “ethical
renewal” and self-transformation (Hua XXVII, 29–33, Hua XXXVII, 244–258,
339–341). Or, again, there are particular practical endeavors (e.g., in architectural
practices) that motivate the enterprise of geometry (“The Origin of Geometry” in
17
Hua XIV, 41, in the English translation of Hua XI, 644: “But attending to constitution is not
attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution.”
18
The theory of purely cognitive motivation and genesis is developed more thoroughly in Hua XI
and Husserl (1973).
198 M. E. M. Bower
Hua VI, 365–386/353–378). These are all characteristically active forms of motiva-
tion because they are deliberate acts carried out with insight into the norms that
lead from the motivating terms to the motivated term(s).
Passive forms of motivation, by contrast, lack this deliberateness and insight into
norms. They are forms of indication embodied in associative experience (Hua I,
113–114/80–81, Husserl 1973, 72–76). As an example, we can consider how the
experience of one thing recalls another, or perhaps points ahead to some anticipated
experience. Motivations of this sort from one experience to another are associative
in that the similarity (primarily) or contiguity of the former with the latter awakens
one’s interest to include the latter or perhaps turn to it as an exclusive theme.
Associative motivation not only governs these small-scale events, but also the large-
scale ones whereby the faculty for memory or expectation, to keep with the preced-
ing examples, are first instituted by means of associative motivations stemming
from the perceptual present. The same is true, Husserl claims, for all passive forms
of intentionality (Hua XI, 339/627, Hua XIV, 38/640).
The normality reduction is the way into genetic phenomenology. It broadens the
phenomenologist’s horizons to encompass a plurality of types of conscious life,
both normal and abnormal (in Husserl’s specific sense). With the abnormal and
normal conditions both in view, the question can finally be raised of their interrela-
tion, not just statically (which states are incompatible with which), but genetically,
i.e., by ascertaining which conditions – which broad shapes of conscious life – have
the sense of engendering which other states. With both the various forms of human
normality/abnormality as an ontogenetic index and the general principles of motiva-
tion, one can conduct a systematic investigation that will track the development of
conscious life from infancy to maturity, and perhaps developments of other abnor-
malities as well. All of this is carried out eidetically and within the transcendental
stance. In fact, what Husserl does in turning to this problematic, as we have seen, is
a necessary refinement and advance of the reduction.
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200 M. E. M. Bower
Randall Johnson
Abstract Any effort to think passivity to some extent undoes itself by its own
intentional activity. This inevitable and ambiguous paradox is explored by a reading
of the allure of passivity in Husserl’s passive synthesis lectures and is paired with a
reading of Merleau-Ponty’s course notes on passivity and his late course on Husserl.
The uncanny fragmentation of passivity, and indeed of the efforts of any genetic
phenomenology to think its own origins, brings to the forefront for thought the
problematic space between noema and noesis. Borrowing Merleau-Ponty’s charac-
terization, we will suggest calling this a diaphragmatic relation of a center of egoic
activity that cannot hold, that fragments. The essay concludes with a brief fragment
on love that shatters in its passivity.
1 Introduction
R. Johnson (*)
Psychiatry, Private Practice, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
2 Birth
Is passivity written on the body? Is the umbilicus, perhaps, the ultimate (a word
risked even though it invites closure) corporeal mark—material trace of some imag-
ined immaterial, temporal point in the genesis of the singular life of each of us in
our own anonymity—the lived but not experienced phenomenal trace of emergence
from passivity? This abyssal invagination of skin, which at best catches lint, seems
to evoke the experience of body-as-thing rather than the sublimity of the phenome-
nal body of living flesh loving. And if the “belly button,” as this more than symbolic
quilting point of embryonic temporality is often named for children, appears in its
less frequent manifestation as a protruding healed mass of cut skin, it seems even
more an alien, uncanny marker as Thing for an origin to which this singular one
cannot return. There is a mournful aspect to passivity—loss of that which we never
had.
3 Death
1
Maurice Blanchot’s The Writing of the Disaster is a text which comes perhaps as close as possible
to writing passivity itself and is haunting in its beauty. While I do not refer to it directly, it is a
writing which no doubt lurks in my own thinking and its fragmentation. In addition, Thomas Carl
Wall’s Radical Passivity, which has as interlocutors not only Blanchot but also Levinas and
Agamben, is a text which is beautifully evocative of passivity and is also no doubt in the back-
ground of my thinking.
The Allure of Passivity 203
cliff or similar scenes in cinema. Perhaps skydiving is a way both to experience and
to gain some mastery of the allure of the passivity of the pull of gravity.
4 Sleep
In one of those moments of congruency, which can only be felt as uncanny, during
the odd time-out-of-time duration of a singular therapy, a patient who had been in
treatment for about two years revealed, in a session which occurred during my day
job between the weekends of writing—another time-out-of-time—these words on
passivity, a phantasy with the purported purpose of aiding the hypnogogic transition
to sleep. This phantasy, which seems to have remained in that murky realm of the
pre-conscious until the week prior to the session, had originated with the collective
trauma of 9/11, as it has become named. The phantasy, at that edge of sleep always
peculiar to us when we allow ourselves to think about it and only now for this
patient allowed to approach an attentive level of conscious awareness, is of jumping
out of one of the Twin Towers and falling—with the intervening moments of ter-
ror—to death. And, if the phantasy is successful in its psychic labor, the liminal
moment to sleep arrives—as if, literally, one falls to sleep. I will not go into any
particulars of how this comes to have sense in the singularity of this life; and while
I experience qualms of this stealth of phantasy out of what must remain a safe, as
well as safeguarded, relation, the intensity of its demonstration that the simultane-
ous repulsion from/pull towards passivity persists in us into our sedimented adult-
hood seems to invite, again uncannily, its sharing.
5 Husserl on Passivity
2
Jean-Luc Marion has written such a phenomenology, The Erotic Phenomenon. At its best, it is a
beautifully expressed, even sensuously so, phenomenology of the erotic. However, perhaps in its
need to be Catholic, it manages quietly to express the requisite anti-homosexuality and anti-abor-
tion stances of that theology, which in my opinion are not judgments that a phenomenology that is
practiced with integrity would make. And, not dissimilar to his earlier major work, Being Given,
which at times is an illuminatingly original phenomenologizing, this text does not fully bracket
God and seems, finally, to become an onto-theology rather than to remain a phenomenology.
However, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that Marion’s astute writing on the call had
attuned me to noticing this aspect of Husserl’s writing. I would also be remiss if I did not acknowl-
edge my use of his term intergivenness as an elucidation of intersubjectivity.
206 R. Johnson
ine a certain seductive sexiness in the words Husserl gives this unidentified, generic
object: “And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications [and while
the as it were lets us know that these implications are metaphorical, Husserl plays
with the phantasy to the point of giving quotes to the words which the object says]:
‘There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze
run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking me
over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You will get to know me like this,
all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible qualities,’ etc.” (Husserl
2001) Sparing us the full jouissance of (impossible) merger, Husserl ends with the
polite “etc.” outside of the object’s appeal to us.
In describing that an object may exert its “rays of force”—to employ a Husserlian
phraseology which, if irreducible, invites a deconstructive reading—towards a
belief in some certainty rather than towards the always becoming possibilities of
openness, Husserl, not disavowing another passion which may dwell in any call,
states: “…we also speak here of enticements to be, which is to say that affection
issues from the side of the object, that the object exerts on the ego an enticing
demand to be, just as if the object were its hostile partner.” (Husserl 2001) The sud-
den appearance in the lecture of this hostile partner, who demands rather than gen-
tly awakens, surprised me, and it seems uncharacteristic of Husserl to speak so
directly of the darker side of emotions. However, it does underscore that this increas-
ingly abyssal gap is passional as well as pulsional and may be as aggressive as it is
erotic. (This not so subtle reference to the thinking of psychoanalysis—that other
great realm of thought of the previous century with desires of science—presages our
comments on Merleau-Ponty’s making use of Freud’s writing in his lectures on
passivity.)
This affection as allure is characterized by Husserl as both the very vivacity of
lived-experience in its ongoingness as well as the salience of affection itself, which
“has the special sense of a specific affection on the ego, and in doing so meets the
ego, excites it, calls it to action, so to speak, awakens and possibly actually rouses
it.” (Husserl 2001) The Husserlian call, then, in its very happening as the awakening
of this variously described center, begins the undoing of the passivity as primordial
source from whence it arises. As manifest in this awakening by the call, receptivity
itself is at this liminal interface of passivity and the activity which emerges from it.
This now motivated ego has the liberty to be in active play with self-giving percep-
tion, which Husserl interestingly characterizes as having its own intentionality. For
this play between not to remain at the skeptical, sheer surface of consciousness,
remembering must happen, including “memories of the future,” as he describes
expectation; and this temporality as manifest in the capacity for remembering is
interwoven at this interface of passivity and activity. (Husserl 2001) He also dis-
cusses in these lectures the process of the formation of associations into a dormant
horizonal field of sedimentations which await awakening by rememberings. These
associative unities may perhaps be described as the very sense-giving of this cre-
ative play between the awakened center and its givenness within this “original
passivity,” as he names it, of sensibility. (Husserl 2001, his emphasis) From the
workings of this original passivity, Husserl’s thinking continues forward with phe-
The Allure of Passivity 207
nomenological analyses of active synthesis along the way to the wished for clarity
of a transcendental logic as the basis for all sciences. I will refrain for now from any
adjudicative commenting on this always repeating wish which already seems to be
undoing itself in the striving towards it.
6 Merleau-Ponty on Passivity
Based on H. L. Van Breda’s account of Merleau-Ponty’s visit to the Husserl Archives
in 1939 and documentation of which manuscripts were available to him while they
were being housed in Paris from 1944 until 1948, as well as those he later borrowed,
it seems unlikely that Merleau-Ponty was able to read the passive synthesis lectures.
(Van Breda 1992) However, he read Ideas II, which Husserl continued to re-work
during the years of the passive synthesis lectures, and in addition, he had access to
a number of later works, including the Crisis manuscripts, which further the think-
ing of genetic phenomenology. The translators write in the introduction to the
English version of Ideas II: “Merleau-Ponty was a very reserved man, but one of us
can remember clearly a conversation with him in which he, with sudden animation,
spoke so rapturously of the second Ideas and described his study of it as ‘une expéri-
ence presque voluptueuse.’” (Husserl 1989) There is no doubt that Husserl’s think-
ing called to Merleau-Ponty—a call received viscerally at the edge of the
voluptuous—and it is clear that Freud’s thinking called to him as well.
It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty is the first thinker to dwell in and write from
that interwoven realm of the openings revealed by the thinking of Husserl and of
Freud. “Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel,” he says in the preface
to Hesnard’s text, “much better, they are both aiming toward the same latency.”
(Merleau-Ponty 1993) And perhaps only a soul (if I dare use this word) as open and
generous as Merleau-Ponty seems always to be would have the ongoing endurance
to think the intersecting hinge of these two great realms without having to choose
between them and without having to become a disciple—whether positively by
remaining an adherent or negatively by disavowing the master—of either. And per-
haps Merleau-Ponty could just as well have chosen the term passivity as the aim of
these two ways of thinking which, at their best, retain a capacity to un-do them-
selves: latency as that very passivity which inheres in the strivings of both phenom-
enology and psychoanalysis to understand passivity, as well as to protect themselves
from it, as perhaps manifest in the shared wish of science of these disciplines which
are now “too easily accepted in an ‘idealist’ form,” as Merleau-Ponty phrases it.3
The need is to un-sediment the form and to return to the singular risks in the writ-
ings of Husserl and of Freud—reviving the very risks of latency.
3
While in the context of the essay Merleau-Ponty is referring only to psychoanalysis in expressing
this concern, it seems that inasmuch as phenomenology has become an institutionalized discipline
of study that it also may be at times accepted too easily in some idealist form.
208 R. Johnson
4
Perhaps, given the year in which this preface was written, the intensity of the statement may be
associated with Husserl’s disenchantment with Heidegger and, given his distress over what he felt
to be the misdirection of phenomenology in Being and Time, may even be aimed particularly and
intentionally at Heidegger. There seem to be so many lines to read between in philosophy.
210 R. Johnson
absolute Ego, cannot hold. In the essay from which we borrowed the term, Merleau-
Ponty already describes this as “the point where all is in suspense, the center of
indetermination.” (Merleau-Ponty 2003) Merleau-Ponty’s writing seems always
fully at play within the allure of passivity.
7 Love
It has dawned on me, in these necessarily vain efforts to think the passivity which
undoes us, that one reason the working notes of Merleau-Ponty have such an allure
for me and are experienced in the reading with such joy, if not voluptuousness, is
that they function as fragments—they are, as written, the always already passivity
which fragments. In one of the notes dated November, 1959, this simple and direct
statement provoked one of those rare moments in the jouissance of reading thinking
during which it is as if one suddenly needs to remind oneself to breathe: “…it is not
I who makes myself think any more than it is I who makes my heart beat.” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968) And I would want to add: It is not I who makes myself love any more
than it is I who makes my heart beat. Love shatters.5 The at times too ready for activ-
ity body of love, even if phenomenal, can all too quickly become an alien, foreign
body to be extruded if the allure of the horizon of passivity goes un-experienced,
un-acknowledged, un-able to be endured. It is no wonder that there are so many so-
called fallings in and out of love. And at the level of intersubjectivity, a politics that
wishes to employ love as a concept, as so much of the thought of religions has
demonstrated, is at risk of losing the tie to this anonymous, shared horizon of pas-
sivity and at risk of having love become an ideal and, therefore, alienating form.
However, any politics that disavows the shared as the intergivenness of this horizon
of love in its ongoing originating passivity may be an even greater risk for us in our
plurality.
References
5
Here, if there were time, we would read Jean-Luc Nancy’s essay, “Shattered Love.” Love in its
shattering has perhaps never been written so sublimely.
The Allure of Passivity 211
———. 1993. Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard (trans: Fisher, Alden L.).
In Merleau-Ponty and Psychology, ed. Keith Hoeller, 67–72. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities
Press.
———. 2002. Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology (trans and ed: Lawlor, Leonard with
Bettina Bergo). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
———. 2003. L’Instituion, la passivité. Paris: Belin. My translation.
Van Breda, H. L. 1992. Merleau-Ponty and the Husserl Archives at Louvain (trans: Michelman,
Stephen). In Texts and Dialogues: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ed. Hugh J. Silverman and James
Barry, Jr., 150–161. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Part III
At the Limits of Phenomenology: Towards
Phenomenology as Philosophy of Limits
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological
Study on Oblivion
Benjamin Draxlbauer
1 Introduction
B. Draxlbauer (*)
Universität Wien, Wien, Austria
e-mail: benjamin.draxlbauer@univie.ac.at
retentionally modified. It is “held in grip” until the whole melody has been fully
given. This “consciousness of the past” is constituted by the retentional modifica-
tion of a former given impressional stock (within primordial-presentation). As long
as we do not access our consciousness of the past by remembering certain experi-
ences, the formerly present stock is forgotten and immersed in retentional con-
sciousness. In the first part of the analysis I will investigate Husserl’s early view on
this process of forgetting. I will then proceed to his later view.
After some big changes within Husserlian phenomenology, which can be
summed up as the switch from static to genetic phenomenology, Husserl gives a
different description of the role of retention with regard to oblivion. The last part of
the paper consists of a critical evaluation of Husserl’s view on the consciousness of
the past and oblivion. I will argue that phenomenologically speaking the past is an
incomplete horizon, which is full of holes and obscured areas. Husserl’s construc-
tion of the past as a complete and universal horizon misses the point of this phenom-
enological insight.
3 H
usserl on Oblivion: The Finiteness of the Retentional
Process
Husserl’s remarks on the topic of oblivion are neither systematically developed nor
final. Generally speaking, one can find these remarks only within footnotes or at the
end of some broader considerations of topics connected to time-consciousness
within his manuscripts. Early views can be found in Husserl’s Lectures on Internal
Time-consciousness (Husserl 1991, called Lectures henceforth) but remain rather
preliminary. In later manuscripts3 Husserl tries to give some new answers to the
1
Cf. Husserl 2001a, §18. and §27.
2
For a detailed description of the notion of the living-present cf. Held 1966, Kortooms 2002,
231–237 and Brand 1969, 75–101.
3
These are mainly the L-manuscripts (Husserl 2001b), Experience and Judgment (Husserl 1939),
the C-manuscripts (Husserl 2006) and the recently published Grenzprobleme (Husserl 2013).
218 B. Draxlbauer
problem, but as far as I can see, he never managed to give a consistent and final
answer or develop any systematic approach to the problem of oblivion.
In his Lectures Husserl is mainly concerned to outline the triadic structure of
internal time-consciousness and explain how it is able to constitute temporal-
enduring objects (like a melody), which transcend the now-phase of the actual giv-
ing consciousness. At the heart of the analysis is the relationship between
primordial-impression and retentional consciousness, which he also calls “primary
memory”.4 A primordially given tone in the “now” (a currently perceived tone) is
transformed into the recent past, where the tone is held in consciousness by a reten-
tional modification. This modification “ensures” that the tone does not step out of
the present into the forgotten past, which would lead to a loss of the connection to
the actual now-presence of perceiving consciousness – intentionality could not be
established.5 Every now-phase within perception is accompanied by a comet’s tail
of retentions. The process of retentional pushing-back is starting immediately after
the now-givenness of the tone and leads the tone from the present into recent past
and further on into a remote or “forgotten” past. It implies a weakening until the
tone-retention has entirely disappeared. “The original temporal field is manifestly
limited, precisely as in perception’s case.” (Husserl 1991, 32) Hence, the problem of
oblivion starts beyond this realm of the original field of time, when a retentional
stock is entering the remote past.6 The only thing which Husserl tells us about the
“fate” of the retentions within this remote realm is the following:
The limitation of the temporal field is not taken into consideration in the diagram. No end-
ing of retention is foreseen there, and idealiter a consciousness is even possible in which
everything remains preserved retentionally. (Husserl 1991, 32)
This gives us a more or less clear picture on how Husserl thinks about totally
forgotten stock which has no connection to the present anymore. Such totally for-
gotten stock might for example be a melody I was listening to in a concert a year
ago. This experience has no connection to my actual conscious, as long as I am not
remembering it or a sudden association pops up. The passage quoted above leads to
the view that – despite being “inactual” or “forgotten” – these retentions are related
to the original presence in the sense, that the retentional modification is idealiter
still at work. In principle, a long forgotten retention of a tone is still retentionally
modified. This is the case because the process of retentional pushing-back princi-
pally has no end. With each new moment a new retentional modification is taking
place, which is also a retention of its preceding retentions. This phenomenon is
called the interlacing (German Verschachtelung) of retentions.7 It does ideally not
4
Cf. Husserl 1991, 33f.
5
Of course the matter is not as simple as described, but for the present purpose this description
should suffice. For the topic of retentionality as intentionality cf. Husserl 1991, 33f., 55f and 122ff.
6
Husserl will later find a new terminology for this temporal field of original givenness – the living-
present. Cf. footnote 2.
7
Cf. Husserl 1991, 84ff. As to the topic, that our factual consciousness has contingent limitations
cf. Husserl 2001b, 45–47. Husserl states quite clearly in this passage, that all the factual limitations
to consciousness are nothing more than mere contingent limits.
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 219
stop beyond the original field of time, because in each moment a new now is appear-
ing, which is pushing all the preceding retentions further back into the past. This
leads to the early view of Husserl, that the retentional process is unlimited and
stretching back into the remote past ad infinitum. On the other hand Husserl seems
to be quite aware that the original field of time is factually limited and that the reten-
tional pushing-back is accompanied by a continual weakening until its disappear-
ance. It would seem that Husserl holds the opinion that the weakening of the
retentional modification is a contingent phenomenon which is not essential to con-
sciousness. On the other hand the infinite pushing-back process is essential to time-
consciousness. The phenomenon of oblivion seems to be unproblematic to Husserl,
because time-consciousness is the universal and endless horizon of original given-
ness and memorizing. Everything which has ever been given to consciousness is
retained and thereby “stored” within time-consciousness. The foundational moments
are memory and primordial-givenness, which founds the retentional process and its
remote mode in the past, oblivion.8
Via this conception Husserl manages to explain the possibility of recollecting a
certain past experience.9 But let’s be clear on the point, that this view of Husserl is
an ideal view and derived from his principal considerations concerning time-
consciousness. In principle (and for a god-like creature) the retentional process is
endless, implies, that everything which has ever been given is retained in conscious-
ness. Of course for us imperfect beings, there are contingent limitations to this pro-
cess, which lead to the irreproducible loss of memories and oblivion.
In my view it was the relationship between retentionality and intentionality that
lead Husserl to rethink his view on oblivion and in particular his description of reten-
tional consciousness being a form of intentional consciousness. If we consider the
problem of oblivion, we do not see an intentional relation to the actual presence. On
the contrary if a certain stock has stepped out of the original field of time, this stock
seems to be “deintentionalized”, although it must still have a certain relation to the
present consciousness, because it can be “intenionalized” when we recollect a retained
stock (if we are able to). So on the one hand Husserl is saving the possibility of recol-
lection by assuming that the retentional modification is still at work in the remote
past, but on the other hand, it is unclear to what extent retentionally modified experi-
ences in the remote past are still intentionally related to the present consciousness,
when we are currently in no way engaged with these past experiences. If a certain past
experience is truly forgotten, this seems to imply, that our current consciousness-of is
8
Cf. Held 1981, 205f. Klaus Held criticizes Husserl for attributing the foundational mode to mem-
ory. Held argues that the foundational mode is oblivion and not memory, because the original field
of time is not just factually but principally limited. Due to the finiteness of the field of presence we
can memorize a certain content again. Hence oblivion, and not memory, is founding the possibility
of reproduction in his view. Generally speaking, Held is trying to give an (rather Heideggerian)
account on time-consciousness in his paper. He is doing this by replacing the center-mode of pri-
mordial-impression. What I find difficult in Held’s approach is that it sometimes lacks concrete
phenomenological description. Rudolf Bernet also criticizes Husserl for his metaphysics of pre-
sentism. Cf. Bernet 1983, 45ff.
9
Cf. for example Husserl 1991, 37f.
220 B. Draxlbauer
not a consciousness-of this experience anymore and this would mean, that it is not
retentionally modified anymore (if retentionality is a form of intentionality, which I
hold to be true). But how is this past experience “stored” within consciousness, when
it seems to be out of intentionality? On my view, such crucial questions show that
Husserl’s early view raises serious questions to our intentional consciousness and
some of them are addressed in his later view, which I now present.
3.2 H
usserl’s Late View: The Finite Retentional Process
and Sedimentation
Husserl’s late view on the process of sinking into oblivion differs in two major
points from his early view. Firstly, he arrives at the conclusion that the retentional
modification comes to an end. Secondly, he differentiates between different types of
retentionality and, doing so, this directly addresses the topic of oblivion.10 This shift
in opinion clearly is embedded in some major changes in the broader framework of
his phenomenology.11 A first step in the direction of his new view can be found
within the L-manuscripts. At the end of “Text No. 7” where Husserl is concerned
with the modalities of time12 and time’s flow, Husserl directly asks himself:
The primordial presenting process and its correlate, the primordial presence. How do we
know, that the modification of the past is extending ad infinitum? The primordial presence
is on the contrary limited, although “floating“ in its limits. How does it happen, that we
come to regard time’s flow, the flow of the modalities of time and time itself infinite?13
(Husserl 2001b, 141, author’s translation)
10
Cf. Kortoom 2002, 243 f.
11
These changes and the new framework will only enter the forthcoming discussion if they are
relevant to the current topic.
12
Husserl distinguishes between the temporal form of a given tone in perception and how the given
tone is given through the temporal modes of retentional, primordial and protentional conscious-
ness. In short: the tone might be given now, an hour ago or yesterday, meaning, that the tone is
embedded in a temporal system which has a fixed and non-streaming form. But the givenness of
the tone within the original field of time or within the living-present, as Husserl calls it, is tempo-
rally modified through the triadic structure of constituting time-consciousness from the
L-manuscripts on. A perceived tone is protended, primordially given in the present now-point and
retentionally modified in the past tone-points. The modalities of time in contrast to temporal forms
or tenses are stream-forms. Cf. Husserl 2001b, “Text No. 7”, §3.
13
“Der ursprüngliche präsentierende Prozess und sein Korrelat, die ursprüngliche Präsenz. Woher
wissen wir, dass die Wandlung von Vergangenheit ins Unendliche reicht? Die ursprüngliche
Präsenz ist doch begrenzt, obschon “fließend” den Grenzen nach. Wie kommen wir dazu, den Fluss
der Zeit, den Fluss der Zeitmodalitäten und die Zeit selbst unendlich zu setzen?”
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 221
As far as I can see, it was Husserl’s “genetic turn” and the introduction of the ego
and its activity, which lead him to the opinion that the retentional process comes to
an end. If we consider closely the possibility within formal time-consciousness,
which Husserl had already developed before his “genetic turn”, it seems impossible
that the stream of the living-present should come to an end at some point in the
remote past. The stream is endless in its formal proceeding, because every new now
is pushing all the preceding retentions further back into the past. But as Husserl
sometimes mentions, this abstract-formal view is something that must be elabo-
rated by a more concrete view within genetic phenomenology.16 The role of the ego
and its acts within the living-present leads to a different view on oblivion and reten-
tionality. Within the living-present the ego is striving for the full17 givenness of a
certain object. Its acts are directed towards the givenness of the object and therefore
object-formation itself is in progress. Anticipations are formed within protentional
consciousness and become fulfilled in primordial presence as long as the ego is
interested in a certain object. The object in all its aspects comes alive in this process.
But not only expectations or protentions are formed within the actual givenness of
14
Of course, that does not mean that Husserl is not gaining some new and very important insights
with regard to the interweaving of retentional and protentional consciousness for example, but his
phenomenological style is mainly within the style of the Lectures. Hence genetic topics (like asso-
ciation, affections and actions etc.) are just peripherally discussed.
15
Cf. footnote 7.
16
For the difference between an abstract-formal and a concrete analysis of the living-present in its
temporality cf. Husserl 2002, 384–387. The topic of affectivity in particular required new concrete
analysis of the constitution. Cf. Husserl 2001a, §34 and §35.
17
On my view, we should better speak of “optimal” than “full”, because a certain apprehension of
an object is led by the interest of the ego. As long as the ego is interested in grasping the object in
different aspects, the object-apprehension has not come to the optimal givenness of the object. Our
consciousness is satisfied by the actual givenness of the object, when the object is given
optimally.
222 B. Draxlbauer
the object, but also retentions and the retentional past. Within the stream of the
living-present, certain aspects of givenness of the actual object are already acquired
by the ego and held in grip within retention. This acquisition which is retained
within “active retentionality” is still alive and within the living-present.18 It is still
holding for the present moment and its object-apprehension – the living-present in
its breadth is a unity of validity:
In the retained [stock] lies the retained directedness, and every persisting validity contains
a modified mode of attention as a direction of the ego in the manner of a persisting directed-
ness in itself. But it is not merely a being-directed, as if that would be anything on its own,
as little as the contentful conscious of passive retentionality is acquisition on its own, but in
the streaming of the living now-accomplishment of the act lies a continual now-being-
directed and [in addition], via off-streaming, a continual past-accomplishment and a still-
being-valid – a having-been-directed and a being-still-directed. The concrete living act is,
as a concrete one, a directed accomplishment. In activity is the ego attending the valid
[…].19 (Husserl 2006, 311, author’s translation)
All the past moments of givenness are retained and in grip within retentional
consciousness, they are still valid for the present object-apprehension. Through this
whole active ego process, consciousness constitutes all its objects in their manifold
aspects.20 But the interest of the ego comes to an end and by this the constitution and
givenness of the object is completed. The directedness of the ego is dissolving at
some point.21 It is exactly at this point that Husserl’s early view would claim that
retentional modification would still proceed beyond the living-present, although the
apprehension of the object has already been completed. The completed object is not
in formation (or retentionally modified) anymore but has become a required stock
for consciousness. The whole process of primordial givenness of the object within
the living-present has stopped and the required object is preserved but not formed
anymore. I think this is the central idea which lead Husserl to the view that the
retentional process itself is stopping at some point. The given object is not modified
anymore and hence the retentional modification has come to a standstill just as the
process of the constitution of the object itself. We will now further describe this
standstill in line with Husserl’s thought.
If we take the genesis of the object within the living-present into account, we see
that it offers a concrete analysis of the fully fleshed out object in its becoming as
18
Cf. Brand 1969, 96.
19
„Im Behaltenen liegt das behaltene Gerichtetsein, und jede Noch-Geltung enthält den modifi-
zierten Aufmerksamkeitsmodus als Richtung des Ich in der Weise des Noch-Gerichtetseins in sich.
Aber es ist nicht bloß Gerichtetsein, als ob das etwas für sich wäre, so wenig das in passiver
Retentionalität noch als inhaltlich Bewusste Erfassung für sich ist, sondern im Strömen des leben-
digen Jetzt-Vollziehens des Aktes liegt ein stetes Jetzt-Sich-Richten und verströmend ein stetiges
Vollzogen-Haben und Noch-in-Geltung-Haben, Gerichtet-gewesen-Sein und Noch-Gerichtetsein.
Der konkret lebendige Akt ist als konkreter, gerichteter Vollzug. Aktuell ist das Ich bei dem
Geltenden […]“.
20
Of course, a certain passive background is required in this process, but this is not relevant for the
present purpose.
21
In my view this is the point of optimal givenness. The object is fully given and nothing is
demanded from the object anymore.
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 223
Analogous to the judgment, completed objects are also released into this dark
realm of unconsciousness. But if they are not retentionally modified anymore, it
raises the question of how they reside within this remote past. On the one hand, they
must still be available for consciousness (due to the possibility of recollection) but
on the other hand they are invalid for the actual living-present and their modification
has come to an end. Husserl tries to master this complexity by introducing the con-
cept of sedimentation.
That, which has become, is continuously sinking back into the nil-horizon, each phase of
the finite liveliness which has become a nil-phase is “sedimented”, entering the reservoir of
sedimentation, which remains entirely without transformation in its already existing sedi-
mented stocks.23 (Husserl 2013, 63, author’s translation)
Within total oblivion, a formerly given stock is sedimented into the dead realm,
where it rests for as long as it remains untouched by association or reawakened by
the living-present. As a sediment a former stock rests on all previous stock and
forms the substrate of the actual consciousness. Our life of consciousness with all
its habitualities and developments rests on the unconsciousness and its forgotten
22
“Das Urteil kann […] in seinem retentionalen Abklingen aus dem Griff gelassen werden. Es
sinkt dann immer weiter zurück in den Hintergrund und wird in eins damit immer verschwom-
mener […] bis es schließlich ganz dem Bereich des aktuellen Bewußtseins entschwindet, “verges-
sen” wird. Es ist nun dem passiven Hintergrund, dem “Unbewußten” einverleibt, das kein totes
Nichts, sondern ein Grenzmodus des Bewußtseins ist, und kann von daher wie eine andere
Passivität wieder affizieren in Form von Einfällen, vorschwebenden Gedanken usw.” Cf. also
Husserl 2002, 472f.
23
“Das, was geworden <ist>, sinkt kontinuierlich in den Nullhorizont ein, jede Phase der endlichen
Lebendigkeit, die zur Nullphase geworden ist,” sedimentiert“<sich>, eingehend in das Reservoir
des Sedimentierten, das völlig wandellos verharrt in seinen schon sedimentierten Beständen.” Cf.
also Husserl 2001a, §37.
224 B. Draxlbauer
stock of sedimentations, which form the phenomenon of the remote past.24 Beyond
the living-present with its apperceptions, apprehensions and intentional acquisitions
lies a temporal underground, which is forming the shore of the vivid stream of
consciousness. Analogous to the background of our visual field, certain stimuli can
affect the ego’s interest and hence awaken former experiences (i.e. memories). But,
in contrast to the visual background, the realm of sedimentation seems to be more
akin to an underground than a background.
Elsewhere Husserl describes the process of sinking back into the remote past as
an internalization of the patent being into its intentional modification, the latent
being. The patent being is the living-present, where the objects are fully disclosed
in their phenomenal givenness. Their fate is to vanish into the latent past:
The unconscious is not modified through inclusion of a still valid stock, because no active
validities originate from the ego, from its actuality, which would proceed as modes of the
unconsciousness. Within the waking-period we have – expressed in a wordplay – onstream-
ing “memory”, the process of streaming into the “inwardness” of the unconscious from the
active “outwardness” (from patency into latency).25 (Husserl 2006, 307, author’s
translation)
Before we take a closer look at the limes and its correlate the nil-horizon let us
compare Husserl’s late view with his early remarks. What hasn’t changed is that all
latency and forgotten stock is a modification of a preceding patency or the primor-
dial presence. In his Lectures this was already mentioned, when Husserl states that
every retention is derived from a primordial impression. The constitution of the
latent past is bound to the center-mode of the living-present, the realm of patent
being.26 All oblivion is derived from this center-mode, which– as a primordial
mode – is intentionally unmodified and originally given. Furthermore, everything
which is given to consciousness stays within consciousness and does not become a
nothingness (or step out of consciousness). The primordial givenness within the
living-present and its retentional modification is also held within consciousness in
its extreme limit-mode the unconsciousness or the realm of sedimentation.
In contrast to these continuities in Husserl’s remarks on oblivion, the limes-
construction and the constitution of the nil-horizon has replaced the old concept of
endless retentional pushing-back. When the retentional modification has reached its
24
It might be worth pointing out that Husserl’s conception of sedimentation seems to be compatible
with the notion of imprinting used in psychology (behavioural science) and genetics. Especially if
one is thinking of the sedimentation of experiences, which form habitualities. Cf. Husserl 1939,
§24 and §25.
25
“Das Unbewusste wandelt sich nicht durch Aufnahme von Fortgeltungen, da keine aktiven
Geltungen vom Ich, von seiner Aktualität ausgehen, sich als Unbewusstheitsmodi fortsetzend.
Innerhalb der Wachperiode haben wir also, in einem Wortspiel gesprochen, fortströmend
“Erinnerung”, den Prozess des in die “Innerlichkeit” des Unbewussten Hineinströmens aus der
aktiven “Äußerlichkeit” (aus der Patenz in die Latenz).“Unfortunately it is hard to find an appro-
priate translation for „Erinnerung“(memory/recollection), which would fit in the German word-
play. Maybe something like “interiorimemorization” (interiorization by memorization). Cf. also
Husserl 1973: 608f.
26
Cf. Husserl 1973: 608f.
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 225
extreme value, the modification preserves its mode with a nil-value. It stays within
retentional consciousness but without being modified into the past anymore. It rests
on the limes without modification. The unconsciousness would then be a liminal-
consciousness with the modification value 0. This liminal-consciousness cannot be
exceeded into a realm of the unconsciousness, which is principally independent
from consciousness and the living-present. All sedimentation and its deep-structure
must be built up within this form of liminal-consciousness.
If we go back to the question of intentionality, we can conclude that a de-
intentionalization of any past stock within the remote past still seems impossible.
Although retentional intentionality has come to its nil within the limes, it has not
vanished or degenerated. The remote past and total oblivion is then identical with
the liminal-consciousness. Oblivion is a true limit-case for Husserl which means
that we are dealing with appearances on the extreme limit of givenness.27 Our whole
experience, which is bound to the center-mode of the living-present, is on its limits
within liminal-experience.
If we compare the above mentioned limit-phenomenon of oblivion with Anthony
Steinbock’s the general description of limit-phenomena we find that oblivion in
Husserl’s sense is not a limit-phenomenon in Steinbock’s sense. Steinbock gives the
following description of limit-phenomena:
By limit-phenomena, I understand those matters [Sachen] that are on the edge of accessibil-
ity in a phenomenological approach to experience, and not simply those matters that have
historically been at the border of phenomenological discourse […] I will characterize limit-
phenomena as those “phenomena” that are given as not being able to be given. (Steinbock
1998, 275)
27
Cf. Husserl 2013, XXIII.
226 B. Draxlbauer
the edge of the phenomenal field and consciousness, but it is not a givenness that is
principally unable to be given. Husserl’s endeavor is to make the limit-case of obliv-
ion as clear as possible.28
So far, I have not touched on the topic of Husserl’s own struggles with the prob-
lem of the unconsciousness, sedimentation and oblivion. I tried to give a coherent
answer on the basis of recently published manuscripts, but in fact, if one runs
through Husserl’s writings, it leaves the impression, that Husserl was never fully
satisfied with his answers to the questions posed by the limit-case of oblivion.
Confusion, unclarity. It is said that it is impossible for the retentional modifications to carry
on ad infinitum, they reach their nil, and by this the momentary liveliness of the stream […]
is completed: it terminates retentionally in the nil, which enters into the reservoir of all nils,
into the nil-horizon of sedimented stocks.29 (Husserl 2013, 62, author’s translation)
28
On the one hand it is true for oblivion that it is on the edge of accessibility, as Steinbock calls it,
but on the other hand, oblivion in Husserl’s terms seems to be more a limit-case (German Grenzfall)
than a limit-phenomenon (German Grenzphänomen). In my view Husserl does not think of a phe-
nomenon or a givenness, when he is speaking of oblivion. He hardly ever speaks of limit-phenom-
ena (German Grenzphänomene) but usually uses the term limit-cases (German Grenzfälle). A
detailed analysis of this topic would go beyond the scope of the present paper.
29
“Verwirrung, Unklarheit. Man sagt, die retentionalen Abwandlungen können nicht ins Unendliche
gehen, sie kommen an ein Null, und so ist die jeweilige momentane Stromlebendigkeit […] endlich
abgeschlossen: Sie endet retentional im Null, das eingeht in das Reservoir aller Null, in den
Nullhorizont, den des Sedimentierten.”
30
“Hat es überhaupt einen Sinn, ist es denkmöglich, dass die intentionale Modifikation
verschwindet?”
31
Cf. Galán 2014, 260.
32
Cf. Husserl 2001a, 57: “An object that is, but is not and in principle could not be an object of a
consciousness, is pure non-sense.” I conclude from statements like this, which can be found in
Husserl from time to time, that a true limit-case is not possible and hence non-sense. It would be
non-sense, to hold, that a former given experience can become a totally forgotten and hence inac-
cessible experience.
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 227
idealist).33 To me, it seems that Husserl was unhappy about the fact that oblivion
poses serious questions to intentional consciousness and the living-present, being
the primordial field for phenomenological analysis and demonstration. In the end,
intentionality seems to be the answer for him. A forgotten stock does not lose its
intentional modification, but the modification arrives at a nil-value. As to the ques-
tion of intentionality, it is indeed the specific complexity of oblivion and
liminal-consciousness that they cannot be put into the center of the phenomenal
field and be phenomenologically investigated. To capture its characterizations we
need to focus on the fringes of consciousness. In the end, Husserl’s best attempt to
answer the problem of oblivion is the construction of the nil-horizon which, as we
will see in the last part of this paper leads to a problematic account on the conscious-
ness of the past and oblivion.
The picture of the consciousness of the past, which Husserl offers, is that of a con-
tinuous and dense past. The continuity of the stream of consciousness in the living-
present is adopted for the realm of retentional consciousness, which is a form of the
consciousness of the past. Be it the limes-construction or its correlate, the nil-
horizon, this construction (and the construction of a limit 0 of retentionality and its
affective force is certainly a construction) leads to the impression, that the past is a
universal horizon on our demand. If we want, we can remember a certain experi-
ence within this dense and complete structure. Oblivion and forgetting is just a
contingent weakness of our imperfect consciousness. But, following Mead’s argu-
mentation in his paper The Nature of the Past, it is hard to find continuities in the
past and even harder to recover them in their details.34 To me it seems to be a mis-
take in Husserl to assume that our consciousness of the past has the same continu-
ous form as the living-present. On the contrary, the past seems to be a holey figure
and in no way continuous, complete, and gapless. Most of it falls prey to oblivion
and remembering certain experiences is a function within the living-present, which
is trying to reconstruct a specific past evoked by the current living-present. It is not
the one retentional past which is constructed out of the present, but our current
engagements require our consciousness to form a specific past-line which is meet-
ing a special requirement of the present. The missing front door key in the present
33
That means, that the problem of oblivion cannot appear in a transcendental sense. Of course the
problem can be formulated in transcendental terms. Cf. Eugen Fink 1966, 11f, where he is talking
about the reduction being a suspension of the natural attitude. The reduction is a reversion of the
oblivion of the natural attitude and by this opening the field of transcendental subjectivity.
34
Mead is mainly arguing against Bergson’s conception of the imagination as a vast and enormous
storage of past “images”. Of course Husserl is clearly distinguishing image-consciousness from
memory and other forms of consciousness, but I think that Mead’s argumentation also holds for
Husserl’s conception of retentional consciousness. Cf. Mead 1929, 238.
228 B. Draxlbauer
References
Bernet, R. 1983. Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger. Freiburg: Alber.
Brand, G. 1969. Welt, Ich und Zeit: Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Fink, E. 1966. Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Galán, I. 2014. Generative Sinngenesis und konstruktive Phänomenologie. Eikasia: revista de
filosofía 56: 255–261.
35
This might imply, that phenomenological construction and its abstract (or “substruct”) character,
may easily seduce the phenomenologist into speculative explanations remote from the phenomenal
field. On the other hand, arguing for the conception of past-lines, which seems to me closer to the
phenomenon of the past, it seems difficult to explain coincidence within the reproductive mode.
How can we be sure that the memory of a friend’s face from yesterday’s meeting is actually a
memory of yesterday’s experiencing and not a mere product of imagination? Husserl’s abstract
option of the one retentional past seems tempting for this case, because it retains not just the con-
tent of the experience but also its time position. Via time positions, our consciousness would then
be able to re-identify the past position of a certain experience. Cf. Husserl 1991, §30.
36
For this argument cf. Husserl 2001b, 45f.
37
Held also criticizes Husserl with regard to this point. Cf. Held 1981, 205f.
Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion 229
Christian Sternad
C. Sternad (*)
Husserl Archives, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: christian.sternad@kuleuven.be
1 Introduction
Heidegger’s analysis of death in Sein und Zeit is one of the most influential and
controversial topics in phenomenology and existential philosophy. Many of the
most important figures of phenomenology have taken a theoretical position on this
topic. However, an analysis of death entails more than just a phenomenological
analysis of death itself. It also raises the deep and vexing question of how death can
be a subject of a phenomenological investigation at all if it is precisely death that
disrupts the fundamental correlation between the subject and the object.
Already Husserl struggled with this seemingly irresolvable phenomenological
problem. How can phenomenology account for a certain phenomenon within con-
sciousness if it is precisely this phenomenon itself which interrupts the constant
stream of consciousness? Given this, it is no wonder that Husserl in his late manu-
scripts from the 1930s designated birth and death (and further: sleep and uncon-
sciousness) as “limit-phenomena” (Limesgestalten),1 which from the point of the
subject seem to be phenomenologically inaccessible.
It is interesting, however, that death as a phenomenon becomes phenomenologi-
cally attainable again through Martin Heidegger’s transformation of Husserlian
phenomenology, laid out in the introduction of Sein und Zeit.2 This hermeneutic
phenomenology and its departure from the transcendental subject as the unshakable
basis of all knowledge, enabled a different take on the problem. Rather than focus-
ing on how death is given to consciousness as an experience, death now appears in
the complex hermeneutical structure of human mortality, i.e. the very way in which
man relates to this experience, which in the narrow sense is never experienced as
such.
In his Heretical Essays, Jan Patočka saw very clearly this deep transformation
and enhancement of the phenomenological method when he accused Husserl of
being incapable of going beyond the inner sphere of the constitutive subjectivity and
meaning-bestowing intentions.3 In Patočka’s account, it becomes apparent that the
things which show and reveal themselves by and through themselves necessitate a
hermeneutic approach in which non- or even a-subjective phenomenal structures
can be captured. Husserl’s “mentalism”, as he calls it, does not allow for properly
situating the constitutive subject within a-subjective structures of meaning.
Even if one moves away from the – narrowly understood – foundational sphere
of subjectivity and takes into account a transformation of the phenomenological
method as such, the phenomenon of death still proves itself to be an evanescent
“subject” of investigation. Emmanuel Lévinas put this paradox very clearly into
perspective when he stated that death is “a movement opposed to phenomenology”.
Whereas phenomenology is concerned with appearances and the meaningful pre-
conditions in which these appearances take place, death seems to be the “reversal of
1
Husserl 2006, 154ff.
2
Heidegger 1977, § 7.
3
Patočka 1996, 7.
On the Verge of Subjectivity: Phenomenologies of Death 233
4
Lévinas 2000, 50.
5
Ricoeur 1967, 4.
6
Husserl 1982, § 24, 44.
7
See Scherer 1985, Chapter 1.
8
In fact, one could argue that all medical explanations are ways to render visible death for our
human experience. Here again, the “causes” of death do not define death’s nature or essence – if
there is any. For a discussion of this issue, see Schumacher 2011, Chapter 1.
234 C. Sternad
This does not mean that these concepts do not contribute to our understanding of
death, but it means that we do not consider them as primary but rather as an addi-
tional stance or attitude towards the problem whose premises and preconceptions
have to be rendered visible.
Phenomenology deals with death as a phenomenon. This generates the problem
that phenomenology has to think about how to bring death into its phenomenality.
Death is not one phenomenon among others, it is a phenomenon on the borderline
of being phenomenal at all. In one of his late manuscripts, Husserl found the very
apt description of a “total phenomenon”9 (Totalphänomen) which he attributed to
phenomena that neutralize phenomenality as such. Here, he focusses on the so
called “limit phenomena”10 (Limesphänomene), such as birth, death and sleep. What
theses phenomena have in common is that they, from the first-person perspective, do
not appear to consciousness at all or, put differently: the appearance of these phe-
nomena eradicate the possibility of every other phenomenon to appear. These phe-
nomena pose as some kind of hiatus in consciousness in which the constant
streaming of consciousness is either inhibited or totally interrupted. In birth, con-
sciousness is not yet (fully) there; in sleep, especially in dreamless sleep, conscious-
ness is temporarily inhibited; and in death, consciousness is irrevocably interrupted.
The complex interrelations between these phenomena are the subject of Husserl’s
ponderings in these manuscripts. Without going further into the question of their
respective features or their differences to one another, it should be kept in mind that
they all share a common problem: these somewhat “a-phenomenal” phenomena put
into question the constitutive subjectivity which is the cornerstone of every phe-
nomenological analysis. However, these limit-phenomena cannot be ignored since
they nevertheless seem to have a constitutive role for human existence.
3 Death as a Phenomenon
Husserl’s reflections in his manuscripts seem to echo the main insights and prob-
lems of Heidegger’s analysis of death in Sein und Zeit. Although Heidegger shifts
the focus of the phenomenological analysis from the transcendental phenomeno-
logical approach (Husserl) to his hermeneutics of Dasein, he still struggles with the
question of how to deal with death in an adequate manner. In paragraphs §§46–53,
Heidegger proceeds in his typical propaedeutic manner by ruling out how we do not
get to the bottom of the phenomenon of death. He first discusses the problem that
death is never an experience of Dasein since death interrupts the very relation to the
object in question itself. As seen later in Husserl too, Heidegger very quickly dis-
misses a narrowly understood “experience of death” from the first-person perspec-
tive as a starting point. Instead, and this is the starting point of a long discussion in
Provocatively put, one could say that there is nothing to learn from the death of the
other, beyond the fact that it is inadequate for gaining phenomenological insight
into what death means for us or for furthering Heidegger’s endeavor into the ques-
tion of being.
Whereas the death of the other thus seems to be an inadequate starting point for
Heidegger, for Husserl it is precisely the death of the other and the death of others
in general from which we are even introduced to death. For him, it is clear that death
is a problem that enters into our lifeworld through others. In the manuscripts col-
lected in the volume Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Husserl writes:
“My death as worldly incident can only be constituted for me after I have experienced the
death of others […]. The death of others is the death which is constituted prior.”13 (ger.
“Mein Tod als Weltvorkommnis kann erst für mich konstituiert sein, wenn ich Tod von
Anderen erfahren habe […]. Der Tod der Anderen ist der früher konstituierte Tod.”)
For Husserl, death is an experience which takes place in a generative and not in a
static context. This is also the case for our birth. Although we do not experience our
own birth/death, we experience this ownmost possibility through others. We experi-
ence people being born and growing up, and we experience ourselves as perceiving
ourselves in hindsight as going through the same experience of aging and getting
older. In the same manner, we see others age and eventually die, and we perceive the
same process happening to us. Thus, death is present in our experience through the
death of others.
11
One of the earliest critiques was put forth by Dolf Sternberger who in 1931 wrote his dissertation
Der verstandene Tod under Paul Tillich solely on §47 in which the question of the death of the
other becomes virulent. See Sternberger 1981.
12
Heidegger 2001, 282.
13
Husserl 2014, 3.
236 C. Sternad
It was Lévinas in his lectures from 1975 to 1976 Dieu, la mort et le temps who
took Husserl’s idea even further against Heidegger and claimed that there is no rela-
tion to my own death which is not always already marked by the death of the other.
Lévinas writes: “The death of the other: therein lies the first death.”14 Lévinas’ claim
that the death of the other is the first death rids the discourse on death from the idea
that something like a neutral theoretical stance towards death is even possible. In
turn, my understanding of my own death depends on the experience of the death of
the other, hence my understanding of my own death is my understanding of the
death of the other. Without paying much attention to Lévinas’ crucial further claims
(e.g. the responsibility of the survivor(s), etc.), it is vital to remember what ontologi-
cal consequences follow from Husserl’s idea that we experience death only through
the death of others.
Although Husserl’s analysis certainly anticipates many arguments which later play
an important role, first and foremost in the French context, he fails to account for
some principal arguments already made before him by Scheler and Heidegger –
arguments with which he was familiar. In Scheler’s rather short text Tod und
Fortleben, which he started in 1911 and finished during the First World War, Scheler
develops the idea that death is not given to us in the way of a solid form of knowl-
edge derived from experience. He argues that “for consciousness, death is given in
a manner completely incomparable to every knowledge based on experience.”15
(“[So] ist auch für das Bewußtsein der Tod in einer mit allem Erfahrungswissen
unvergleichlichen Art gegeben.”) For Scheler, death is not a form of knowledge; it
is, what he calls an “intuitive certainty” (intuitive Gewißheit). This expression cap-
tures the idea that even though we are not aware of death theoretically, we are nev-
ertheless certain of it. We do not have to know about death in order for death to grab
us and hence to be an integral part of our finite life. Instead of merely knowing about
death as an empirical fact, we deal with death, and in this manner, death is a part of
every aspect of our lives. Or as Scheler writes:
In the form of this certainty, death is not at the real end of life, or would not be only one
anticipation of this end which is based on the experience with other beings, but death rather
accompanies the whole life as constituent of all of its moments.16 (ger. In der Form dieser
Gewißheit steht der Tod nicht am realen Ende des Lebens, oder wäre nur eine auf die
Erfahrung an anderen Wesen gegründete Erwartung dieses Endes, sondern er begleitet das
ganze Leben als ein Bestandteil aller seiner Momente.)
It is precisely this model of a knowledge of death that comes under attack by many
phenomenologists. Nevertheless, Scheler’s lucid study seems to mark the birth
14
Lévinas 2000, 43.
15
Scheler 1957, 26.
16
Scheler 1957, 26.
On the Verge of Subjectivity: Phenomenologies of Death 237
place of the idea that death is not so much a fact of knowledge but rather given in
the form of a certainty that does not need empirical facts in order to be given to us.
Heidegger follows up on this when he differentiates between the empirical knowl-
edge of the “case of death”17 (Todesfall) and death in its existential understanding as
a possibility of Dasein. The case of death belongs to knowledge, but knowledge has
little to do with our relation to our own death. For Heidegger, the amount of knowl-
edge about death does not correlate with the certainty about death, rather the oppo-
site is the case. In our everyday lives, we witness deaths in manifold ways, but we
(choose to) treat them as cases of death which in the end do not belong to us but
“happen” to others. One could even make the claim that the more knowledge we
have about death and the deaths of others, the more we tend to treat death as an outer
fact and decouple it from the horizon of our own life. Since these experiences are
exterior cases of death, they do not necessarily relate to our own mortality. In
Metaphysik und Tod, Eugen Fink formulated this argument very clearly:
Man does not understand himself as ‘mortal’ by accident. Not because all humans have died
since, it is expected that also in the future humans will die. Mortality is not an exterior, only
trailing determination of human existence; it rather defines the being of that entity which we
always already are in its essence.18 (ger. Der Mensch versteht sich nicht zufällig als ‘ster-
blich’. Nicht weil bisher alle Menschen gestorben sind, steht zu erwarten, daß auch künftig
alle Menschen sterben werden. Die Sterblichkeit ist keine äußerliche, bloß anhängende
Bestimmung des Menschseins, sie macht vielmehr das Sein des Seienden, das wir je sind,
wesenhaft mit aus.)
Scheler, Heidegger, Fink and many other phenomenologists have made the case that
our relation to death does not depend upon a factual knowledge of death, be it
through analogy, empirical probability or simply the death of others. In turn, they
claim that we have an intuitive relation to death which explicates itself in all of
life’s areas and not only in isolated moments where death is present or to be
experienced.
What makes this argument remarkable is not so much the rejection of an empiri-
cal relation to death but rather the fact that they shift the very meaning of the “phe-
nomenon” of death in this case. In the passages above, the question was how death
could become an experience when it is precisely death that interrupts the correlation
between the subject and the object of experience. This problem arose since the very
character of the phenomenon of death consists in the permanent interruption of the
stream of consciousness, i.e. death removes the possibility to experience the phe-
nomenon of death. As also seen above, the death of the other shows the problem of
an exterior viewpoint which does not allow for an inner insight into death but rather
an outer observation of the process of a person dying. In the present case however,
the notion of phenomenon shifts insofar as the experience of death is decoupled
from the experience of death itself. Rather, what is the case here is that death
17
Heidegger 2001, 296.
18
Fink 1969, 110f.
238 C. Sternad
19
Some commentators, as for example Bernard N. Schumacher, argued that this lazy use of the
term “death” creates a semantic confusion which has to be cleared up terminologically. He pro-
poses to differentiate between “dying”, “mortality”, “passing away” and “death as a state”. See
Schumacher (2011), Chapter 1.1. However reasonable this demand of terminological clarity might
seem, I would argue that one loses the complexity of the problem in respect to what – phenomeno-
logically considered – is precisely given. I would hold that we do not experience “dying” in dying,
“mortality” in mortality, etc. but we do in fact experience death in its many facets. Hence, the
seeming clarity in terminology obscures the complex hermeneutic matrix in which death is given.
20
Sartre 1971, 545.
21
Sartre 1943, 590.
22
Husserl 2014, 18.
On the Verge of Subjectivity: Phenomenologies of Death 239
Weltvorkommnisse ‘Geburt und Tod’ transzendentale Idizes für eine unweltliche, über-
natürliche Seinsweise der Monaden, für einen Übergang in einen Seinsstil, der in den
Methoden der weltlichen Erkenntnis prinzipiell unzugänglich ist?)
These thoughts from Husserl and Sartre show an effort to “preserve” the subject
from death in some way or the other. The reasons for this differ. Whereas Sartre
wants to hold on to the idea of a free subject which is not determined by “outer”
facts such as death (for Sartre, this of course also has political implications), the
reasons for Husserl are more complex. Firstly, Husserl is driven by his methodic
rigor. What cannot be made clear by what is originarily offered to us in experience
and also only within the limits in which it is presented there, should not be obscured
by strategic or impatient reasoning. In a manuscript from 1936 with the title Die
anthropologische Welt, he explicitly turns against Heidegger and his treatise on
death in the fundamental-ontological framework. Husserl writes:
Death will hardly acquiesce in the marvelous and profound ways in which Heidegger deals
with death.23 (ger. Die blendenden, tiefsinnigen Weisen, in denen Heidegger mit dem Tod
umspringt, wird sich der Tod schwerlich gefallen lassen.)
It is in this very same text, were one gains insight into a second reason for why
Husserl does not want to let the transcendental subject slip into an all-encompassing
mortality. There, Husserl clearly differentiates between the worldly and the tran-
scendental subject. Whereas the worldly subject can die, the transcendental subject
cannot. As Husserl writes:
Man cannot be immortal. Man dies inevitably. Man has no worldly preexistence; in this
tempo-spatial world, he once was nothing and he will be nothing thereafter. But the tran-
scendental life, the ultimately world-creating life and its ultimate ego cannot come from
nothing and pass over into nothing; it is ‘immortal’ because dying has no meaning for it,
etc. (ger. Der Mensch kann nicht unsterblich sein. Der Mensch stirbt notwendig. Der
Mensch hat keine weltliche Präexistenz, in der zeit-räumlichen Welt war er früher nichts,
und wird er nachher nichts sein. Aber das transzendentale Leben, das letztlich weltschaffende
Leben und dessen letztes Ich kann nicht aus dem Nichts werden und ins Nichts übergehen,
es ist ‘unsterblich’, weil das Sterben dafür keinen Sinn hat etc.)
Taking both quotes together, one can now understand Husserl’s effort to prevent his
analysis from immersing itself in Heidegger’s all-encompassing mortality. First, his
methodic rigor prevents him from positing an all-encompassing mortality given the
fact that death itself is not to be captured by the phenomenological method without
severe problems. Secondly, the fact that the worldly subject dies does not imply that
the transcendental subject also vanishes. Speaking from the viewpoint of generativ-
ity, it is the case that human lives reach past death and create a world which sur-
vives24 the deaths of its individuals. Scheler too puts a special emphasis on this
genuinely human act of reaching beyond death which he called the “reaching out
and further”25 (Fort- und Hinausschwingen).
23
Husserl 1993, 321-338, 332.
24
Derrida 2007.
25
Scheler 1957, 47.
240 C. Sternad
To briefly recapitulate: it was the aim of this section to show that the attempt to
phenomenalize death brings about a serious transformation of the very phenomenon
of death. Whereas Husserl held on to a narrow view of death, which only accepts
how death is given to us within experience and should only be investigated within
the very limits of this experience, other phenomenologists such as Scheler,
Heidegger and Fink broke loose from these methodological restraints and tried to
develop an understanding of death which focusses on the very ways in which death
is impending on us and what that impending means for our relation to death. Rather
than focusing on the exact moment in which death is given – with all the problems
that such an approach entails –, they analyze the very ways in which death is given
and what that permanent givenness means for the meaningful structures in which
our lives take place.
26
Cf. Fink 1969, 9.
27
Derrida 1993, 70.
On the Verge of Subjectivity: Phenomenologies of Death 241
wrenches all meaning from life: “[D]eath is never that which gives life its meanings;
it is, on the contrary, that which on principle removes all meaning from life.”28
Hence, Derrida approaches death in terms of an aporia which he does not want to
resolve; he instead wants to analyze the ways in which one lives with this aporia
and further how we live with this aporia together.
This aporia is confronted in a war between denial and acceptance and it shows
itself in a very human sentiment that we all know too well, and that is mourning. In
turning against Sigmund Freud’s very influential study Trauer und Melancholie,29
Derrida tries to show that this mourning is in fact twofold and does not merely fol-
low death but also precedes it and structures the very way in which we relate to
death. In one of his many obituaries, he writes:
This clandestine war of denial would thus be waged in the shadows, in that twilight space
of what is called mourning: the mourning that follows death but also the mourning that is
prepared and that we expect from the very beginning to follow upon the death of those we
love. Love or friendship would be nothing other than the passion, the endurance, and the
patience of this work.30
This “originary mourning”31 as he also calls it, manifests itself in a certain gravity
of life which does not treat life’s events indifferently. The chain of events, of actions,
of relations, etc. is not arbitrary but belongs to the very structure of a mortal life. As
Derrida shows in the case of friendship, it is this gravity which is always at play and
shows itself in the very bond between friends.
Taking up the loose ends of Husserl’s generative approach to death, the conse-
quence that someone has always died before me and that I will die before somebody
else, introduces a radical asynchronicity into the intersubjective sphere. In his obitu-
ary to Hans-Georg Gadamer, he puts the inevitability of this asynchronicity into
words when he writes:
As always with friendship, […] this melancholy no doubt stems from [tenait à] a sad and
invasive certainty: one day death will necessarily separate us. Fatal and inflexible law: one
of two friends will always see the other die. The dialogue, as virtual as it may be, will for-
ever be wounded by an ultimate interruption. Comparable to no other, a separation between
life and death will defy thought right from a first enigmatic seal, that which we will end-
lessly seek to decipher.32
What makes this quote so interesting is that it ties together everything that has been
thematized so far. Derrida interprets the certainty as a certainty that not only belongs
to my relation to my own death but reaches over to the death of the other. I confront
this opaque event of the death of the other with a certain kind of gravity which
expresses itself through the sentiment of mourning and which bestows the full
existential meaning to my relation to the other, as for example in friendship, love,
28
Sartre 1971, 539.
29
Freud 1975, 193-212.
30
Derrida 2001, 146.
31
Derrida 2007, 26.
32
Derrida 2004, 3-19, 7.
242 C. Sternad
family and any other human relation in proximity. As inevitable as it is, the event of
death still rests in its opaqueness but the focus of this question has turned. Now, the
question is not so much how death is given or what exactly is given with this enigmatic
event of death, but rather how this enigmatic event impacts our meaningful life.
Death is one of the most difficult problems in phenomenology. Although every phe-
nomenological description wrestles with specific problems of how to adequately
account for the nature of the phenomenon, it is in death that the whole method of
phenomenology is at the verge of being operable. Death seems to fundamentally
interrupt the basic correlation between the subject and the object of experience and
hence puts a method based on experience in question. Thus, the question has to be
raised how one could account for a phenomenon if that phenomenon does not show
itself through the method of phenomenology.
In the course of a rich debate which now stretches over 100 years, the question
of death still remains one of the limit-problems (Grenzprobleme) of phenomenol-
ogy. It is not only different descriptions of this phenomenon that seem to be at odds
with each other but also different conceptions of the phenomenological method as
such. Here, the fundamental difference between Husserl’s transcendental and
Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach seems to be only one of the many aspects in this
complex debate. The more difficult and vexing question seems to be how one could
conceptualize the phenomenological subject in order to account for these funda-
mentally constitutive but strangely opaque phenomena without putting everything
into question that the phenomenological method has established through long and
intensive work.
However one approaches this question, one is confronted with certain problems
dependent on the respective approaches. It was the aim of this article to show how
these different approaches reverberate and what consequences they have on our
(phenomenological) conceptions of subjectivity. The further aim of this article was
to show that, as in almost all phenomenological thinkers, the question of subjectiv-
ity is tightly connected to the question of intersubjectivity. As I tried to show above,
I would hold that the question of death in phenomenology only gets its full momen-
tum and richness if it is connected to the question of intersubjectivity, i.e. the mutual
sharing of the permanent threat of death in love, friendship, family and other forms
of intersubjective relations. The question of how death is given in experience and
what definitive form it might take is theoretically interesting but the specifically
human dimension is only added when the whole question gets grounded in the inter-
subjective sphere.
On the Verge of Subjectivity: Phenomenologies of Death 243
References
Derrida, J. 1993. Aporias: Dying--Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth”. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
———. 2001. The Work of Mourning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2004. Uninterrupted Dialogue: Between Two Infinities, the Poem. Research in
Phenomenology 34 (1): 3–19.
———. 2007. Learning to Live Finally. The Last Interview. New York: Melville House.
Fink, E. 1969. Metaphysik und Tod. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Freud, S. 1975. “Melancholie und Trauer”, in: Studienausgabe (Band III), 193–212. Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer.
Heidegger, M. 1977. Sein und Zeit, (GA 2). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
———. 2001. Being and time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Husserl, Edmund. 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijjhof.
———. 1993. Die anthropologische Welt. In Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und
die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband: Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934–1937,
321–338 (Hua XXIX), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
———. 2006. Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte (Hua M VII).
Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2008. Die Lebenswelt. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937) Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen
der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937) (Hua
XXXIX). New York: Springer.
———. 2014. Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und
der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1937). Vol. Hua
XLII. New York: Springer.
Lévinas, E. 2000. God, Death, Time. Trans: Bettina Bergo. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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Open Court.
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Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1943. L’être et le néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique. Paris: Éditions
Gallimard.
———. 1971. Being and nothingness. New York: Citadel Press.
Scheler, M. 1957. Tod und Fortleben. In: Schriften aus dem Nachlass. Band I: Zur Ethik und
Erkenntnislehre, 9–64. (GW 10). Bern: Francke Verlag.
Scherer, G. 1985. Sinnerfahrung und Unsterblichkeit. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft.
Schumacher, Bernard N. 2011. Death and Mortality in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sternberger, D. 1981. Über den Tod. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise
of Phenomenology
Neal DeRoo
Abstract This paper argues for the centrality of expression for the project of phe-
nomenology. It shows, first, that the concept of expression grows out of the debate
with Frege concerning meaning that led to Husserl’s distinct phenomenological
project. Specifically, expression is Husserl’s first attempt to more rigorously define
‘sense’ as the essential connection between subjective acts of meaning and ‘objec-
tive’ meanings. This account of expression is then taken up in Husserl’s later work
on spirit, which thereby makes expression central to Husserl’s entire analysis of the
lifeworld. Insofar as Husserl saw phenomenology growing out of his dispute with
Frege on meaning, and working toward the ability to clarify the sense of all scien-
tific knowledge, expression names the promise inherent to phenomenology itself,
that which defines the very project of phenomenology.
1 Introduction
This paper has three interrelated goals: (1) to begin to articulate a phenomenological
account of expression; (2) to sketch an argument that such an account of expression
is the promise1 of phenomenology; and (3) to suggest what implications this might
have on the proper subject(s) of phenomenology. My hope in doing so is to revive
an old Husserlian term (expression) for the future of phenomenological research.
Once expression is understood on an ontological level—and not merely as a matter
for philosophy of language—it will become apparent that, in order to remain true to
the spirit of phenomenology, a substantial engagement with expression is a
For why I prefer to speak of ‘promise’ here rather than essence, see DeRoo 2013a.
1
N. DeRoo (*)
The King’s University, Edmonton, AB, Canada
e-mail: neal.deroo@kingsu.ca
2
For a detailed attempt to support this claim, see Hartimo 2006.
3
Good, accessible introductions to the Frege-Husserl debate can be found in the first chapter of
Cisney 2014 and the first chapter of Chase and Reynolds 2010. More academic evaluations of the
debate are offered in Cobb-Stevens 1990; Dummett 1991, 1993; Duke 2015.
4
For simplicity’s sake, I have followed normal precedent in translating Frege’s Sinn-Bedeutung
distinction by the English terms sense-reference. It must be noted, of course, that Bedeutung is, in
most contexts, translated simply as ‘meaning.’ For more on the difficulty of translating this term in
the Fregean context, including an argument for why meaning is not the best translation of
Bedeutung as Frege uses it, see Bell 1980.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 247
were not identical in formulation. For Frege, this is the result of a “confusion of
form and content, sign and thing signified” (Frege 1891, 131). To combat this con-
fusion, Frege’s insists on the distinction between a sign’s reference (Bedeutung) and
its sense (Sinn). This distinction is then developed further in his famous essay
“Sense and Reference.” There, “that to which the sign refers—which may be called
the referent of the sign” must be distinguished from “what I would like to call the
sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained” (Frege 1948, 210).
The referent of the two preceding equations is clearly identical: it is the number 7.
What distinguishes the two equations is how that number is presented, determined,
or picked out—each equation’s respective sense.
In “Sense and Reference” that distinction between sense and referent is expanded
to include all linguistic expressions.5 This is easy when the expression is a proposition
with a “definite object” as its referent (Frege 1948, 210).6 In such cases, the ‘sense’
of that proposition is simply what we understand when we understand the proposi-
tion. Frege calls this a “thought,” which is “not the subjective performance of think-
ing but its objective content” (Frege 1948, 214). Frege is therefore adamant that a
‘thought’ in this particular sense—i.e., as the sense of an expression—must be distin-
guished from a ‘conception’ or an ‘idea’. The former “may be the common property
of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind,” while the latter
“is subjective: one man’s conceptions is not that of another” (Frege 1948, 212).
There is, then, for Frege a three-fold distinction one must make when thinking
about what a term or proposition ‘means,’ in the broad sense: (1) the referent as “the
object itself which we designate” by means of the term; (2) the “conception, which
we thereby have” and which is “wholly subjective”; and (3) “in between lies the
sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the conception, but is yet not the
object itself” (Frege 1948, 213). He uses the analogy of viewing the moon through
a telescope to help explain this tripartite distinction: the moon itself is the referent,
“the object of observation mediated by the real image projected by the object glass
5
We must be careful here to note that Frege uses ‘expression’ often in this sense, to mean a broader
category that could include propositions, predicates, etc. within it. But he also uses it in a more
precise way to speak specifically of the relation between a name and its sense, as opposed to its
referent. Both senses are captured in the following quotation: “A proper name (word, sign, sign
combination, expression) expresses its sense, refers to or designates its referent. By means of a
sign we express its sense and designate its referent” (Frege 1948, 214).
6
Clearly, not every linguistic expression (nor, for that matter, every mathematical expression) is of
this type. Some, Frege notes, have as their referent a “concept”; indeed, a concept is simply defined
logically as “the Bedeutung of a grammatical predicate” (Frege 1892, 182). While an object is a
singular entity, a concept is universal insofar as it can stretch over multiple cases. For example, the
concept of “square root” can be used in multiple cases (i.e., when filled out or ‘completed’ in dif-
ferent ways) to yield different objects: “the square root of 4” has, as its referent, the object “2”; “the
square root of 9” has, as its referent, the object “3”; etc. But the referent of the expression “the
square root (of X)” is the ‘concept’ of a ‘square root’ itself. A concept, then, is the referent of a
predicate in which at least one term is missing and must be filled out if the predicate is to become
a proposition that can have an object proper as its referent. In cases where the predicate has mul-
tiple terms in need of being filled out, the referent is known as a “relation.” For example, the refer-
ent of the expression “X > Y” is the ‘relation’ of “being greater than.”
248 N. DeRoo
in the interior of the telescope, and by the retinal image of the observer.” The retinal
image is analogous to the conception/idea, while the real image projected by the
object glass is analogous to the sense, since it “is indeed one-sided and dependent
upon the standpoint of observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be
used by several observers” (Frege 1948, 213).
The need to rigorously distinguish between the sense and the conception/idea is
indicative of a broader Fregean concern, one he names explicitly in his The
Foundations of Arithmetic. There he elucidates some “fundamental principles” guid-
ing his work, one of which is to seek “always to separate sharply the psychological
from the logical, the subjective from the objective” (Frege 1950, x). Husserl’s account
of meaning, on the other hand, is concerned precisely with the relation between the
subjective and the objective. His attempt to explain this connection—and thereby the
methodological refusal to keep them wholly distinct—is what occasions the charge
of ‘psychologism’ from Frege.7 The point of difference here lies in an understanding
of ‘psychology,’ its relation to logic, and ultimately the basis of the concepts of num-
ber, of logic, and of philosophical and conceptual thought more broadly. To root
these in psychology is, for Frege, to ignore the possibility of thought (i.e., of sense),
and to reduce everything merely to ideas, to conceptions, to the purely subjective
(Frege 1956, 308). Rather, for Frege, logic, mathematics—indeed the entire scientific
enterprise—must be rooted in thought, that is, rooted in the (objective) sense of sen-
tences. To reduce logic and mathematics to psychology is to confuse the individual’s
act of thinking with the content of what is thought. It is to reduce concepts to ideas,
thereby removing any possibility of objectivity whatsoever.
Husserl, on the other hand, is adamant that “It is only with reference to the phe-
nomena that insight into the essence of the concept of number is to be won” (Husserl
2003, 136). The difference here is stark. For Husserl, as we will see, the concept of
number—and, indeed, idealities more generally—are ‘constituted’ by individuals in
their subjective acts of thinking. As scientists, we ‘make sense’ of the world.8 For
Frege, this is anathema: “we do not produce thoughts but we apprehend them”9;
7
The charge is, perhaps, understandable even if, ultimately, it is debatable. Considering the subtitle
of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic is Psychological and Logical Investigations, Frege might
have thought his critique of Husserl as ‘psychologistic’ to be wholly uncontroversial.
8
The term ‘making sense’ is not used loosely here. Instead it names one of the principle differences
between Husserl and Frege: while for Frege we discover the truth, for Husserl we make sense of
(‘constitute sense within’ is probably a more accurate formulation) the world. The focus on sense
as ‘made’ or ‘constituted’ is crucial in Husserl’s project of better understanding the relationship
between the subjective and the objective.
9
The phrase ‘apprehend’ is, as Aquila puts it, “somewhat ambiguous” here (Aquila 1974, 380).
Frege himself deems the phrase “metaphorical,” comparing it to the equally metaphorical “content
of consciousness.” In the latter case, the pen in my hand can be seen as the ‘contents’ of my hand,
but is so in a very different way than the bones and muscles which make up my hand (Frege 1956,
307n.1). But if apprehension is analogously similar to ‘content of consciousness,’ then what is
holding what? It is seemingly not a case of individual minds holding thoughts; perhaps it is “the
mind” holding thoughts (see Frege 1956, 308), but then we must ask what is ‘the mind’ (as opposed
to individual minds), and also what is a ‘thought’ (as opposed to the content of individual acts of
thinking)?
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 249
“The work of science does not consist of creation but of the discovery of true
thoughts” (Frege 1956, 307).10 Yet these ‘thoughts’ are “not something which it is
usual to call ‘real,’” at least in part because the ‘real’ world is a temporal world,
while thoughts are timeless (Frege 1956, 309)—though “even the timeless, if it is to
be anything for us, must somehow be implicated with the temporal” (Frege 1956,
310). While I certainly come into a relation with a thought that I apprehend, a rela-
tion that must therefore be temporal insofar as it occurs at and in time, this does not
alter the “essential properties” of the thought, which acts only passively, that is, “by
being apprehended and taken to be true” (Frege 1956, 310).
Frege’s attempts to rigorously separate the subject and the objective, then,
appears to work only by the invocation of a third term—sense—that operates in a
vaguely termed and poorly explicated manner: ‘apprehension.’ Without further
explanation, this either: avoids entirely the problem of how I (as an empirical agent)
mean something (objective) when I speak11; answers it via recourse to precisely that
which Frege claims never to do (i.e., by connecting the subjective an the objective);
or posits meaning as something that is not accomplished (at least not ‘really’) by
empirical and subjective agents.
For Husserl, by contrast, the invocation of the phenomena as providing insight
into the essence of the concept makes clear that he cannot answer this issue by
defining meaning as essentially distinct from the operations and actions of empirical
agents. We mean things when we speak, when we do mathematics, when we negoti-
ate our lives in the world. If our account of meaning cannot answer how it is that we
do so, then we have failed to provide an adequate account of meaning. As such,
Husserl is compelled to try to explain—rigorously and scientifically—the relation
between the subjective and the objective. He tries to do this, already in the Philosophy
of Arithmetic, through what he calls a “phenomenologico-constitutional analysis”
(Husserl 1969, § 27a; see also Hartimo 2006, 328). Indeed, providing such an
account of the relationship between the subjective and the objective seems to be the
project of phenomenology itself.
This attempt to explain the connection between the subjective and the objec-
tive—and, in some sense, to ground the objective in acts of the subject—explains
why Husserl seeks, in Philosophy of Arithmetic, to provide an account of the ‘ori-
gin’ of the concept of number, an account that begins from the (for Husserl “com-
pletely rigorous”) concept of number and multiplicity as it operates in everyday
living (Husserl 2003, 16). Taking this unproblematic12 use of number as a given,
Husserl goes on to analyze the way in which such a concept is ‘constituted’ by a
subject. ‘Constituted’ here does not mean ‘constructed’ (a distinction without which
10
Though it is said that Frege himself sought to construct a notion of number solely within the
Bergriffschrift; see Hartimo 2006, 335. How this notion of construction (within the concept-script)
fits with Frege’s own claims of merely “apprehending” or “discovering” true thoughts is not our
concern here.
11
As Aquila argues; see Aquila 1974, 381.
12
“Unproblematic” insofar as if I, e.g., ask for two pancakes at a diner, there is no confusion from
anyone involved over what I mean by ‘two.’
250 N. DeRoo
In this quote we see clearly that Husserl is trying to make (categorial) objectivities
understandable “on the basis of the ‘constituting’ intentional activities” of the sub-
ject. Indeed, it is in those intentional acts that objectivities first appear with the “full
originality of their sense.”
The first such objectivity to be analyzed by Husserl in Philosophy of Arithmetic
is that of multiplicity. In intuiting a multiplicity, we “abstract” some common char-
acteristic from a multitude of objects before us, such that we see them precisely as
a multitude of a particular object. That is, “in that abstraction the isolating interest
is not directed upon the contents, but rather exclusively upon their linkage in
thought—and that linkage is all that is intended” (Husserl 2003, 83). In intuiting a
multiplicity, we come to take a series of objects precisely as a collection or combi-
nation of some type of something. When that multiplicity can be given a definite
delimitation—when we can answer precisely the question of ‘how many’—we
employ the concept of number (Husserl 1970, 83).
Now, certain numbers (those less than 12, for Husserl) can be intuited directly.
That is, with some numbers, the definite number itself can be immediately given in
our experience: I can intuitively grasp that there are three chairs in front of me, but
I cannot intuitively grasp—I am not intuitively given—the number of keys on a
piano. In Philosophy of Arithmetic, the former are called ‘authentic representations,’
while the latter can be given to us only via ‘inauthentic’ or ‘symbolic’ presentations.
Through the latter, things are given to us “only indirectly, through signs that univo-
cally characterize” them (Husserl 2003, 205). Through these signs, we are able to
talk about objects in their absence—as well as to grasp and deal with numbers larger
than we could ever hope to intuit directly. But we are able to do this only because
13
But this understanding comes later—the quote comes from Formal and Transcendental Logic
talking about his earlier work in Philosophy of Arithmetic.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 251
we are able to intuitively grasp the signs, and then take them to ‘characterize’
numbers.
Husserl then sets these up as parallel systems of concept (number) and sign
(numeral).14 The way in which we use each system varies; the two systems ‘give
themselves’ in different ways. We interact with concepts via conceptualization and
with signs via calculation. Any mathematical
solution obviously decomposes into one calculational part and two conceptual parts:
Conversion of the initial thoughts into signs—calculation—and conversion of the resulting
signs back into thoughts. In the domain of numbers where the conceptualization and separa-
tion of the concepts (disregarding, of course, the few ‘authentic’ ones) rests upon the sym-
bolization running parallel to it as its indispensable support, that first step consists merely
in this: that in the complexes of concepts and names that are given in each case, one abstracts
from the former and only holds to the latter (Husserl 2003, 273–274).
Husserl very quickly became unsatisfied with this account of ‘calculation’ espoused
in Philosophy of Arithmetic, especially in regards to its logical implications. In that
work, he defines calculation as “Any rule-governed mode of derivation of signs
from signs within any algorithmic sign-system according to the ‘laws’—or better:
the conventions—for combination, separation, and transformation peculiar to that
system” (Husserl 2003, 273). In time, Husserl came to see the need for even logic to
be grounded in experience (as Experience and Judgment and Formal and
Transcendental Logic make plain).
But this insight is already available in the first part of Philosophy of Arithmetic.15
The invocation of ‘abstraction’ in the first part of Philosophy of Arithmetic has been
described as “an early version of the attempt to clarify the tacit or passive achieve-
ments of our intentionality due to which we can talk about the concept of number”
(Hartimo 2006, 328). As such, it highlights again the difference between Husserl and
Frege in regards to the very fundamentals of meaning. For Frege, meaning can only
be accessed when we ‘rigorously’ keep separate the subjective and the objective and
ensure that our focus remains solely on the latter. It is only in the objectivity of con-
cepts—and ultimately in the purely formal logic of the concept-script—that mean-
ing is to be discovered. However, this commitment did not keep Frege from
highlighting the distinction between sense and reference, and positing ‘sense’ as a
crucial part of meaning. Insofar as ‘sense’ is objective, this is not problematic for
14
The extent to which this early set of parallel systems remains influential on how Husserl deploys
the concept of expression—especially vis-à-vis indication—is worth pursuing, though we cannot
do so here. To put it briefly, I would contend that, while this “parallel system” account seems
operative in the Logical Investigations, it does so primarily as a linguistic theory, that is, as a theory
of the relation between signs and meanings. As we will see, this is the context in which ‘expres-
sion’ first emerges as a significant concept for Husserl—but it does not exhaust the significance of
the concept of ‘expression.’ Indeed, some of the significance of the concept of expression is lost
when it is couched in the (seemingly representational) account of language employed in the
Logical Investigations. It is only in the later adoption of expression in and as spirit that the true
significance of expression emerges for the phenomenological project.
15
Even if it, perhaps, is subordinated in the more Weierstrassian-inspired second part. For more on
the relation between Weierstrass and the second half of Philosophy of Arithmetic, see Hartimo
2006, 333–334.
252 N. DeRoo
Frege; but insofar as sense cannot be wholly separated from subjects either (think of
how he acknowledges, in the ‘moon analogy,’ that sense is “indeed one-sided and
dependent upon the standpoint of observation” though it “is still objective, inasmuch
as it can be used by several observers”; Frege 1948, 213), Frege himself seems to
raise the necessity of a deeper exploration of the connection between the subjective
and the objective if one is to provide a truly rigorous basis for logic and for meaning.
It is precisely in trying to understand this relationship between the subjective and the
objective that Husserl’s phenomenological project arises.16 We must now turn to the
crucial role expression plays in Husserl’s account of that relationship.
In the Logical Investigations, Husserl sets as his task “to give firm clarity to notions
and laws on which the objective meaning and theoretical unity of all knowledge is
dependent” (Husserl 2001a, I, 166).17 He takes it as a given that one of the funda-
mental units of knowledge—at least of scientific knowledge—is “verbal expression
or complete statement[s]”: “it is at least plain,” Husserl claims, “that judgements
stemming from higher intellectual regions, and in particular from the regions of sci-
ence, could barely arise without verbal expression” (Husserl 2001a, I, 166–167). By
the Logical Investigations already, then, Husserl is willing to claim that “the objects
which pure logic seeks to examine […]come before us embedded in concrete men-
tal states which further function either as the meaning-intention or meaning-
fulfillment of certain verbal expressions […] and form […] a phenomenological
unity with such expressions” (Husserl 2001a, I, 167; emphasis original). Here
already we see, cloaked in several ambiguities, the kernel of Husserl’s account of
‘expression’: expression is a fundamental element of meaning insofar as it presents
itself as a phenomenological unity with either meaning-intention or meaning-
fulfillment and thereby allows the mental states of a particular knower to become
something ‘objective’, i.e., to transcend merely the subjective act (the ‘idea’ or
‘conception’ in Frege’s terminology) and “become an abiding possession of sci-
ence, a documented, ever available treasure for knowledge and advancing research”
(Husserl 2001a, I, 166), that is, to become something like a ‘thought’ in Frege’s
terminology. Expression, then, is precisely the mechanism of sense,18 that which
16
Though he is clear that the ‘subjective’ cannot be equated with the naively empirical when it
comes to the kind of phenomenology that is a necessary precursor to a logical examination of
meaning. This type of phenomenology “has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seiz-
able and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived
and treated as real facts” (Husserl 2001a, I, 166).I
17
All references to Logical Investigations are cited by Investigation number and then page number
from the Findlay translation. Hence this citation is to Investigation I, page 166.
18
Which Husserl describes, at this early stage, as “indwelling” in mental states; Husserl 2001a,
168.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 253
relates the subjectivity of the knower with the objectivity of what is known.
Expression is Husserl’s rejoinder to Frege.
But this rejoinder is not without its ambiguities, especially in the Logical
Investigations. Two such ambiguities appear in nuce already in the quote above. The
first is the failure to radically distinguish between an expression as a semantic unit
(e.g., as Husserl uses it above synonymously with “complete statement”) and
expression as a function or act carried out by those semantic units (this function, as
we will see, comes to be something like ‘forming a phenomenal unity with’).19
Second is the failure to consistently mark the relationship between expression and
meaning-intention. Above, expressions—as a semantic unit—are said to be united
with certain mental states which “function either as the meaning-intention or the
meaning-fulfillment” of the (verbal) expression. Here, it is mental states that make
up both meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, and expressions seem merely
to be the ‘vehicle’ by which those mental states are carried into language.20 However,
a few pages later, Husserl seems to equate meaning itself primarily with meaning-
fulfillment, while expression is used synonymously with meaning-intention (Husserl
2001a, I, 173).
It is the task of the Logical Investigations to clarify some of these ambiguities,
since it is “an important matter for logic that the relation between expression and
meaning should be made analytically clear” (Husserl 2001a, I, 173). An essential
element of this task, as carried out through those investigations, is “to see what
essential phenomenological or logical distinctions apply a priori to expressions”
and to describe and “place in pure categories, the experiences—to deal first with the
phenomenological side of expressions—that have an a priori fitness for the mean-
ing function” (Husserl 2001a, I, 173). He begins to carry out this task, as is well
known, by explaining that ‘expression’ and ‘sign’ cannot be used synonymously.
While “[e]very sign is a sign for something,” Husserl is adamant that “not every sign
has ‘meaning’, a ‘sense’ that the sign ‘expresses.’” (Husserl 2001a, I, 183).
Expressions are unique insofar as they bear a unique relation to meaning, a relation
that is characterized predominantly by a certain task or function (expressing sense).
This is different from another subset of signs, indications.21 Indications do not
‘mean’ anything, properly speaking, though it is certainly the case that most of the
time22 meaning is “bound up with such an indicative relation” (Husserl 2001a, I,
19
An ambiguity that also befalls Frege, as we noted already; cf. note 5.
20
This would echo Frege’s understanding of how sense functions; see, e.g., Tito 1990, 229–231.
21
Though not all indications are signs, properly speaking (Husserl 2001a, I, 184). Therefore, indi-
cation as a subset of signs is itself only a subset of indications, more broadly speaking.
22
Derrida will argue ‘all of the time’; see Derrida 2010.
254 N. DeRoo
183). Rather, an indication is something that merely motivates belief in the reality
of something else, whether this motivation is purposeful (as in indicative signs) or
not purposeful (as, e.g., when the discovery of fossil vertebrae motivate in us the
belief that prediluvian animals existed). This motivation provides a “descriptive
unity” between the indicator and the thing indicated, a unity that, as “a unity of
judgement,” is “taken as a descriptively peculiar way of combining acts of judge-
ment into a single act of judgement” (Husserl 2001a, I, 184). The indicative func-
tion, then, “amounts to just this: that certain things may or must exist, since other
things have been given” (Husserl 2001a, I, 184).
Expressions, on the other hand, are “meaningful signs.” What marks expressions
as expressions, strictly speaking, is that an expression is “phenomenally one with
the experience made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who mani-
fests them” (Husserl 2001a, I, 188). This account of phenomenal unity (vis-à-vis the
“unity of judgement” found in indications) helps us understand the first ambiguity
named above: it is common for us to use ‘expression’ to refer both to a semantic unit
and to the act or function of ‘being-phenomenally-one-with-an-experience’ pre-
cisely because the act or function of ‘expressing’ constitutes a phenomenal unity
between the expression and the expressed. The essence of expression is found in the
act of constituting a phenomenal unity, an act which results, necessarily, in the exis-
tence of something that is, in and of itself, inherently meaning-full. Meaning does
not here merely attach to a separately existing physical substrate or ‘vehicle.’ Rather,
the meaning is phenomenally one with the expression which expresses it. The
expression can be called an expression, properly speaking, if and only if it expresses,
that is, if it constitutes a phenomenal unity with what is expressed.
Here, one could argue, is the entirety of Husserl’s difference from Frege, in a
nutshell. For Frege, sense is merely a ‘vehicle,’ a way of presenting the Bedeutung,
the referent (Frege 1948, 210), which remains essentially distinct from both the
referent and the sign. Husserl is interested in the “phenomenal unity” that makes the
‘vehicle’ metaphor no longer tenable. Explaining why that metaphor is no longer
tenable requires a great clarification of the elements involved in sense and meaning.
For example, the “phenomenal unity” of expression is a unity between what?
Traditionally, one is inclined to think of an expression as the phenomenal unity
between “the expression physically regarded” and “a certain sequence of mental
states, associatively linked with the expression, which makes it to be the expression
of something” (Husserl 2001a, I, 188). We then call these mental states “the ‘sense’
or ‘meaning’ of the expression” (Husserl 2001a, I, 188). But this distinction between
“physical signs and sense-giving experiences is by no means enough” (Ibid.).
Instead—and here, at least in part, Husserl seems to be building on Frege—
Husserl distinguishes between: (1) what an expression “‘shows forth’ (i.e. mental
states)”; (2) what it means; and (3) “what it names (the object of that presentation)”
(Husserl 2001a, I, 188), what Frege would call the referent. Husserl further
distinguishes, within meaning, between “the meaning-conferring acts or the mean-
ing intentions” and the “meaning-fulfilling acts” which become fused with the
meaning-conferring acts only in “the unity of knowledge or fulfillment” (Husserl
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 255
23
Indeed, this seems to be a primary difference between expressions and indications: in the former,
only meaning-intentions are essential, while meaning-fulfilling acts “constitute the inmost core of
intimation” insofar as, in an indicative sign, that is, in communicative speech, the fulfillment of my
meaning intention is essential to my meaning-intention—in communicative speech, I speak with
the “prime aim” of being understood by another; Husserl 2001a, I, 193.
24
Husserl sometimes calls the unity of expression “phenomenological” and sometimes “phenom-
enal.” While the unity is brought to reflection only through phenomenology, it seems to me more
accurate to call the unity “phenomenal” insofar as the unity occurs distinct from the (phenomeno-)
logical reflection that makes it explicit in reflection.
25
These acts must be kept logically distinct from “the whole experience in which a meaning-
intention finds its fulfillment in its correlated intuition” (Husserl 2001a, I, 192). That is, meaning-
fulfilling acts are not the same as intuitive fulfillment.
256 N. DeRoo
It remains now to clarify precisely the nature of the type of unity that is characteristic
of expression. The “phenomenal unity” of expression is seen most clearly in the
experienced unity of a sign, in which our interest is drawn through the physical
appearance of the sign given in the perceptual presentation to another presentation—
that of the sense-giving act—and through that presentation “our whole interest cen-
tres upon the object intended in our intention” (Husserl 2001a, I, 193). Hence, the
elements of the unity are asymmetrical: the physical appearance of the expression is
“lived through,” but it is the meaning-intention and possible meaning-fulfillment, or
rather the enacting of the sense contained therein, that are “lived in” (Husserl 2001a,
I, 193; see also Husserl 1952, 236). One essential characteristic of the phenomenal
unity of expression, then, is the asymmetry of the parts, manifest in the fact that we
live through one part so as to live in the (sense enacted by) the other part.
The second essential characteristic of expression is that this asymmetry is not
experienced as asymmetrical—as A motivating one to live in or enact B—but rather
as a unity. I do not experience the two parts of the expression as two parts, but rather
precisely as one. That I can later, through reflection, distinguish the parts is essential
to the nature of this unity—the unity I experience is precisely an experienced unity,
not an ontological unity or a unity of substance. “To be an expression is rather a
descriptive aspect of the experienced unity of the sign and thing signified” (Husserl
2001a, I, 193).
The relation between these two essential characteristics of the expression are
what mark the meaning-intention as the primary—indeed, in a certain sense the
constitutive26—element of expression, vis-à-vis its physical appearance or the act of
meaning-fulfillment. For an expression is marked primarily by the change in inten-
tion by which the physical appearance is no longer taken merely in its perceptual
intuitive sense but rather is taken to mean something that is intuitively bound up
with that physical appearance by an intuitive act that is not merely perceptual, but
expressive. That is, in expression our intention points “exclusively to the thing
meant in the sense-giving act” (Husserl 2001a, I, 193) without that sense-giving act
being distinct from the intuitive presentation of the physical appearance (for if the
physical appearance and the sense-giving act are wholly distinct, we have an
instance of indication rather than expression).
Perhaps it is best to let Husserl explain himself at some length here, to help
clarify rigorously the phenomenological nature of expression:
[P]henomenologically speaking […] the intuitive presentation, in which the physical
appearance of the world is constituted, undergoes an essential phenomenal modification
when its object begins to count as an expression. While what constitutes the object’s appear-
ing remains unchanged, the intentional character of the experience alters. There is
constituted (without need of a fulfilling or illustrative intuition) an act of meaning which
26
See, for example, Mohanty 1964, 37: “a genuine expression qua expression is constituted by a
meaning-intending act.” This is not to say that Mohanty thinks the meaning-intending act is suffi-
cient to make something an expression, as the rest of his analysis makes clear.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 257
finds support in the verbal presentation’s intuitive content, but which differs in essence from
the intuitive intention directed upon the word itself. (Husserl 2001a, I, 193–194)
To summarize, then, we can say that expression is that in which a physical appear-
ance is phenomenally united with a sense such that the sense is intuited in and
through the physical appearance itself,27 though later reflection is able easily to
distinguish the physical appearance from the sense intuited thereby. An expression
therefore causes an intentional shift whereby my intention is directed not at the
object appearing but at the sense that is intuitively presented with or ‘in’ the object
appearing; hence, the primary intention attaching to expression is not perceptual,
but rather a “meaning-intention.” However, this intention occurs immediately in the
intuitive presentation of the object and decidedly not as a distinct intuition requiring
a distinct act of “fulfilling of illustrative intuition” (Husserl 2001a, I, 194).28 There
is not a perceptual-intention that leads us to a distinct meaning-intention—in expres-
sion, the two are given as one, in a phenomenal unity.
27
Husserl seems to suggest a strong relationship between expression and a presentation in margi-
nalia of a manuscript of Ideas II (Husserl 1952, 341n.). While further study is needed to examine
this relation in more detail, ultimately the difference seems to involve the role of meaning/sense in
expression; see Flynn 2009, section 3.4. Likely, this difference is tied in some essential way to the
asymmetrical relationship of the two terms in the unity.
28
Though we do not have time to pursue this at any great length here, Husserl argues for this notion
in the second chapter of the first investigation by arguing against the conception that equates
‘sense’ with some type of ‘mental imagery’ such that an expression would be that in which a physi-
cal appearance causes me to intend a distinct intuitive appearance (i.e., the mental image). While
such a fulfilling act often accompanies sense in an expression, Husserl is at pains to show that
sense requires no such mental picture.
29
One notable exception here is the work of Merleau-Ponty; see Foti 2013; Landes 2013.
258 N. DeRoo
Evidence of this oversight can be found in the fact that Husserl’s later account of
spirit receives very little attention in the phenomenological literature.30 Once we see
that Husserl’s account of spirit is the outgrowth of his earlier account of expression,
we can see that spirit and spiritual expression (which, I posit, are synonymous terms
for Husserl) ought to be seen as central to Husserlian phenomenology.
Husserl’s account of spirit is laid out most explicitly in the Vienna Lecture. There,
‘spirit’ refers to the life, accomplishments and products of human living. Such
‘spirit’ is therefore personal (insofar as it pertains to persons), but also communal
(Husserl 1970, 270). This personal, communal spirit is not merely reducible to the
physiological lives of individual human bodies, though it is operative in and upon
the “surrounding world” in which humans live, and which “is the locus of all our
cares and endeavors,” and as such “is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical
life” (Husserl 1970, 272). In saying this, Husserl is making manifest at least two
claims: first, that spirit is not merely produced by us, but is also in us, constituting
us even as it is constituted by us31; and second, that spirit is the driving force of our
lives, determining both what we care about and what we do.
It is, therefore, through spirit that “character is given to the persons” (Husserl
1970, 273). This ‘character’ is not merely a set of personal character traits, moods,
or dispositions, however. It is the outgrowth of a spiritual teleology (Husserl 1970,
273),32 the acting-out of an inherent entelechy33 that actively guides development
“toward an ideal shape of life” (Husserl 1970, 275). In this way it is analogous to an
Idea in the Kantian sense34—an infinite regulative ideal that “has [not] ever been
reached or could be reached,” but which rather provides “an infinite idea toward
which, in concealment, the whole spiritual becoming aims, so to speak” (Husserl
1970, 275).
The two seemingly parenthetical insertions in the last quote cannot be over-
looked or dismissed if we are to properly grasp the notion of spirit at stake here:
first, spirit, while deeply constitutive of persons in their personal and communal life,
30
One notable exception to this is the work of the “Subjectivity, Historicity, Communality” research
community at the universities of Helsinki and Jyväskylä.
31
Those interested in a deeper understanding of what I mean by the phenomenological subject as
constituting and constituted should consult DeRoo 2010b, 2013a, b.
32
A teleology that cannot be divorced from the notion of sense; see Husserl 1970, 269.
33
The intensive interest in modern philosophy at work in other parts of the Crisis suggests that
‘entelechy’ should here likely be read more in its Leibnizian than in a strictly Aristotelian sense.
Such a reading further reinforces the vitality and relation to life that are characteristic of spirit, in
its Husserlian sense.
34
For more on the use of the Kantian Idea in the work of the later Husserl, see Derrida 1989.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 259
35
There are clear resonances here with the Heideggerian notion of ‘concealment’ elaborated in
Being and Time (Heidegger 1996); see also Marion 1998.
36
For a more thorough account of this complex temporality and its implications for philosophical
investigation, see DeRoo 2013a.
37
Though the “word life here does not have a physiological sense; it signifies purposeful life
accomplishing spiritual products: in the broadest sense, creating culture in the unity of a historical
development” (Husserl 1970, 270). For more on Husserl’s use of ‘life’ as a philosophical trope, see
Derrida 2010.
38
And here we must be careful to avoid contradiction: we have already said that fulfillment is not
essential to Husserl’s theories of meaning and expression. But in epistemology we are talking
about knowledge, not merely about meaning, and Husserl has always maintained the significance
of fulfillment for any act of knowledge.
39
I explore the relationship between fulfillment, intentionality and intuition in Husserl’s thought in
much more detail in DeRoo 2010a, 2013a.
260 N. DeRoo
modes seeks to clarify, picture, or pre-figure the intended objective sense (Husserl
2001b, 79–80). This clarifying mode helps narrow the range of possibilities via the
horizon of expectations out of which we operate. By filling some of the emptiness
of the intended object, the clarifying mode enables the intended object to coincide
with a confirming-fulfilling intuition in a synthesis. The second mode of bringing to
intuition, then, is “the specific fulfillment of intuition” that is the “synthesis with an
appropriate perception” (Husserl 2001b, 79). Here, “the merely expected object is
identified with the actually arriving object, as fulfilling the expectation” (Husserl
2001b, 79). It is in this fulfilled expectation that the object is not only constituted as
an object, but is constituted as this particular object of my experience: in fulfillment,
I encounter this thing before me as a desk that, like other desks I’ve previously
encountered, I am able to work at, place things upon, etc.40
It is in the first of these modes of bringing to intuition, the clarifying mode, that
we see the epistemological significance of pre-figuring or of presentiment, which,
as pre-objective [Gegenstandlich; see Husserl 2001b, § 28 and Husserl 1969, 69], is
a pre-condition of rational or theoretical thought and is therefore more felt then
thought, more a product of passive than active synthesis (Husserl 2001b). In calling
spirit a “vital presentiment,” then, Husserl is saying that spirit is an active, dynamic
force that shapes how we bring the world to intuition. This possibility of experience
always occurs in a horizon of expectations that is not always confirmed, but that is
always operative in any and all experience. Without such pre-figured expectations,
experience would simply not be possible. Hence, “presentiment is the felt signpost
for all discoveries” (Husserl 1970, 276), and spirit, as “vital presentiment,” is a
necessary element of any and all experience.
To speak of “spirit,” then, is to talk of a dynamic, vital force that shapes our pre-
theoretical horizons in a way that is necessary for experience itself, but of which we
may not be consciously aware, even as we are being guided by it.
40
This is doubly true when we account for the temporal nature of my experience: I not only
encounter this thing as a desk, but as a desk that I come across after having walked into my office
and before I pull out my computer and place it upon the desk. Husserl’s essential breakthrough was
in explaining that temporality is not added on to my experience proper (i.e., I have an experience
[‘desk’] and then work that experience into the stream of my temporal life [‘I encounter the desk
after I enter my office’]), nor is my experience secondary upon the ‘form’ of my temporal life (I
am just a temporal stream into which some experience or other must come into and occupy).
Rather, Husserl’s notion of double-intentionality (as both transverse and horizontal) gives him the
means to explain how my experience is always already inherently constituted as temporal. This
double-intentionality is essential to Husserl’s notion of ‘absolute consciousness,’ and hence to his
entire phenomenological approach to philosophy (see Husserl 1991, 380–381; Kortooms 2002).
And the notion of fulfillment is what makes possible that double intentionality: in fulfillment, what
I expect is simultaneously experienced as itself and as what was expected (or what disappointed
the expectation, etc.), thereby uniting the stream of experienced objects with the stream of tempo-
ral experience. And this fulfillment is only possible with the two modes of bringing to intuition
discussed above: the clarifying and the confirming. See DeRoo 2010a. A similar account of dou-
ble-intentionality may be at work also in Husserl’s account of expression and sense, though there
is no time to pursue that hypothesis here.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 261
But we must acknowledge, in what has already been presented, the continuation,
and indeed the further clarification, of the problematic of sense, meaning, and
expression. By tying spirit to sense and to the clarifying mode of bringing to intu-
ition, we have at least suggested how Husserl thinks sense functions in the constitu-
tion of knowledge. By providing the narrowed range of possibilities that allow an
object to be intuited as this or that particular object, we see one possible explanation
of the function of a meaning-intention—perhaps even of meaning itself—in the
constitution of knowledge: meaning or sense is that which paves the way for
knowledge,41 making possible the fulfilling act of intuition by creating the intuitive
conditions whereby an intuition can fulfill a pre-figured expectation.
By equating spirit with such a presentiment, Husserl not only deploys spirit
explicitly within the realm of sense, but also shows the inherently communal nature
of such sense. Even as it is constituted within an individual act of consciousness,
any act of knowledge, as drawing on clarifying intuitions, must thereby deploy
sense in its act of knowing. And because this sense is drawn from the surrounding
world, and more specifically from the vital functioning of spirit in and upon that
surrounding world, any individual act of knowing necessarily draws upon tools that,
in principle, are available to other individual knowers as well. Here, we see spirit
playing the key role of connecting individual, subjective acts to the ‘objective’—
Husserl might prefer “suprasubjective” (Husserl 1970, 270) or perhaps even ‘spiri-
tual’—claims necessary for scientific or mathematical objectivities. That is, here we
see spirit playing the role that Husserlian phenomenology was launched to play:
exploring and explaining rigorously the connection between the subjective and the
objective.
41
This is obviously different from an account in which our expressions merely ‘give form to’ what
we first ‘know’—an account that seems, at times, to be at work in the Logical Investigations.
However, the entire problematic of sense in Husserl is much more complicated than any simple
equation, even that between ‘sense’ and ‘meaning.’ Despite the fact that Husserl himself uses Sinn
and Bedeutung interchangeably, D. Pradelle has shown that “It is necessary to draw a sharp distinc-
tion between the sense that rests on the pre-logical or pre-conceptual stratum and the meaning that
belongs to the logical stratum in the strict sense” (Pradelle 2016, 190). But the ‘pre-logical’ here
is not non-logical or non-conceptual. Rather, sense must be understood as initiating the entire
project of the ‘genealogy of logic’ carried out in Experience and Judgment, a project hinted at
already in Ideas I’s discussion of the need for a “‘systematic and universal doctrine of the forms of
sense [Formenlehre der Sinne],’” whose aim is to distinguish between different fundamental spe-
cies of sense and, in particular, between ‘senses of the first and higher levels [Sinne erster und
höherer Stufe]’” (Pradelle 2016, 194; see also Husserl 1976, § 133). The full elaboration of
Husserl’s concept of sense, then, must lie outside the scope of this paper. For now, I remain content
to offer one suggestion of how sense rests on the ‘pre-logical or pre-conceptual stratum’; a further
engagement between Pradelle’s account of phenomenological sense and the account of sense at
work in Husserl’s notion of spiritual expression must be put off, for the time being.
262 N. DeRoo
That spirit plays this role will not surprise us, if we pay proper attention to
Husserl’s use of expression.42 In Formal and Transcendental Logic, for example,
Husserl claims that the ideality of expression is that of an “objective spiritual entity”
(Husserl 1969, 19). If expression is ideal—that is, universal, objective, iterable
across multiple subjects in multiple times and spaces43—as an “objective spiritual
entity,” this is perhaps because spirit is itself inherently expressive. Recall our defi-
nition of expression: something is expressive when a physical appearance is phe-
nomenally united with a sense such that the sense is intuited in and through the
physical appearance in such a way that one’s intentional focus is directed, through
the appearance, to the sense that is intuitively presented with or ‘in’ the object
appearing. To claim that spirit is inherently expressive, then, is not to say that
through it something else is made manifest. Nor is it to say that spirit is made mani-
fest through something else. As ‘inherently expressive,’ spirit can be equated with
neither the ‘physical appearance’ nor the ‘sense’ of an expression, for no single
element of an expression is itself inherently expressive—it is only the whole of the
expression that can be called ‘inherently expressive.’ There is, e.g., nothing inher-
ently expressive about the physical appearance of a word (as mark, phoneme, graph-
eme, etc.). Certainly, such an appearance can be expressive, when it is united with
the sense-giving act and the sense-fulfilling act (Husserl 2001a, I, § 9)—but the
appearance is not itself inherently expressive. The sense-giving act—the meaning-
intention—is sometimes used synonymously with ‘expression’, and we have seen
both why it is significant for expression, but also why it is not, properly speaking,
expression itself. As such, we cannot even say that the meaning-intention is ‘inher-
ently expressive.’ Rather, it is only the expression as a whole, functioning expres-
sively, that can be said to be ‘inherently expressive.’
As such, to say that spirit is ‘inherently expressive’ would be to say, not only that
spirit always functions expressively, but that this expressive function is an essential
part of spirit’s very being.44 That is to say, spirit must be the kind of thing in which an
appearance and a sense-giving act (or a meaning-intention) are presented simultaneously
42
I do not mean to suggest that Husserl’s notion of expression remains static throughout his oeuvre.
There are certainly changes in how he deploys the concept of expression (as Flynn 2009 clearly
shows), but I think in large part this is because he perhaps initially fails to appreciate the signifi-
cance of his own account of expression in Logical Investigations. Though there isn’t time to do so
here, I think something like Flynn’s project of tracing the notion of expression from the
Investigations to the later works (in her case Ideas II, though I have tried to use others here as well)
can help us see that Derrida’s criticisms of Husserl’s concept of ‘expression’ in Voice and
Phenomenon are neither incorrect nor fatal to Husserl’s account of ‘expression.’ If anything, they
reveal a deeper, ontological notion of expression—a use of expression “beyond signification in
general” (Flynn 2009, 68) that Husserl already seems to employ in the concept of spirit in his later
works.
43
See Husserl’s claim that “persons bound together in direct mutual understanding cannot help
experiencing what has been produced by their fellows in similar acts of production as being identi-
cally the same as what they themselves produce” after having already made clear that these acts of
production of sense in understanding can occur “in any number of acts of production by one person
or any number of persons”; Husserl 1970, 278.
44
A point Husserl makes explicitly about words as expressive entities; cf. Husserl 1973, 268.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 263
in intuition (even if it is possible to later separate them via various acts of thematic
judgment, i.e., various reductions). Such a claim is consistent with Husserl’s use of
spirit in the Crisis, the “Vienna Lecture” and other works from that time. For example,
the notion of the inherent expressivity of spirit helps make sense of Husserl’s claims of
a “spiritual meaning” that is “embodied” in the environment of the lifeworld (Husserl
2008, 427).45 This meaning is embodied especially in cultural objects such as “houses,
bridges, tools, works of art, and so on” (Husserl 1959, 151) that he sometimes calls
“spiritual products” (Husserl 1970, 270). These objects, according to Husserl, are not
merely “present to us,” they “address themselves to us” in the context of our lives, and
hence are said to have a “spiritual” meaningfulness (Husserl 1962, 111; 118; 384f.;
408f.; see also Husserl 1952, 236 ff.). As such, Husserl claims that, for these cultural
objects “a reference to subjectivity belongs to that ownmost essential substance of the
object with which it is meant and experienced” and therefore “a relatedness to personal
community belongs to the very sense of all cultural objects” (Husserl 1962, 118; see
also Pulkkinen 2013, 124). This sense, this “spiritual meaning,” is “not externally
associated, but internally fused within as a meaning belonging to [the cultural object]
and as expressed in it” (Husserl 1962, 112; Pulkkinen 125).
Here we see clearly Husserl describing spiritual meaning as being ‘expressed’ in
cultural objects. Both the ‘meaning’ and the ‘products’ or objects are deemed “spiri-
tual” and are experienced, not distinctly, but as “internally fused,” that is, in an
experiential unity. And this unity is not merely a matter of some particular attitude,
some particular intention. That is, spirit is not merely the meaning-intention, nor is
the expressive quality of spirit merely one possible way in which spirit can function,
nor is it tied explicitly to its reception by a particular subject. Spirit is not expressive
because I take it to be such, since “the attitude [in which spiritual meaning is seen]
does not itself constitute the spiritual entity, the material-spiritual is already precon-
stituted, prethematic, pregiven” (Husserl 1952, 238 n. 1; see also Pulkkinen 2013,
127). Rather, spiritual expression is at work communally, in the suprasubjective
horizons in which particular subjects operate.
For Husserl, then, spirit is essentially expressive insofar as its very being is constituted
in and by expression, and through this expressive nature of spirit we get the ultimate
answer to Frege. Mathematical expressions are meaningful insofar as they are cultural
artifacts, and therefore spiritual products. Their meaning is a product of culture—but
this is not merely subjective, or even intersubjective. It is spiritual, and as such, it is
objective—but spiritually objective, which is to say, suprasubjective and expressive.
45
This theme is examined at much greater length in Pulkkinen 2013 than I can do here. I think the
notion of expression would be a helpful addition to Pulkkinen’s analysis. I draw heavily on
Pulkkinen’s translations of material from Husserl 2008; unless otherwise cited, all translations
from that volume are Pulkkinen’s.
264 N. DeRoo
46
Namely, as transcendental, in the phenomenological sense.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 265
This last claim regarding subjectivity itself needs much more exploration. On the one hand, as
47
Flynn shows, Husserl thinks that the individual spirit is expressed through the living body, but in a
way distinct from how it is expressed through words, and precisely on this issue of the relation of
sense or meaning to its being; see Flynn 2009, 69. On the other hand, it’s not clear how Husserl’s
266 N. DeRoo
later, more communal analysis of spirit might interrupt or problematize this distinction, a point
seemingly anticipated in the phenomenological work of Levinas, from his early accounts of the
“reversal of Sinngebung” [see Levinas 1969, 1998a) to its implications for our views on subjectiv-
ity [1998b].
48
For more on the significance of this claim, and of Dooyeweerd’s thought more generally, for
phenomenology, see DeRoo 2016.
49
For an example of the latter, think of the increasing number of people who demographically
identify as “spiritual but not religious” (a phenomenon whose rise is especially notable in America;
see Fuller 2005).
50
For the debate concerning the latter claim, see, e.g., Simmons and Minister 2012.
51
For an example of this discussion, see Crockett and Robbins 2012.
Spiritual Expression and the Promise of Phenomenology 267
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See note 14 above.
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Individuation, Affectivity and the World:
Reframing Operative Intentionality
(Merleau-Ponty)
Elodie Boublil
Archives Husserl de Paris, Marie Curie Actions – To carry out her research, the author has received
funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the
Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 657712. The author is sole responsible for the views
defended in this essay.
E. Boublil (*)
University of Cologne, Köln, Germany
1 Introduction
1
Merleau-Ponty delves into Husserl’s concept of operative intentionality in order to recast percep-
tion independently from consciousness. What is at stake is twofold: (1) deconstructing the positive
identity sought by the theory of intentionality as fulfillment (on this topic, see the analysis of
Emmanuel Lévinas in “Intentionalité et sensation”); and (2) rejecting as well the understanding of
consciousness in terms of nihilation offered by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, according to
which consciousness is defined by its “lack of identity” and its capacity to introduce negation in
the opaque world of the “in-itself” and in the other’s fundamental project thanks to the possibilities
it constantly creates for itself.
2
The process of passive synthesis is part of what Husserl describes in his later texts as “operative
intentionality,” along with genetic constitution and unconscious processes. It cannot be thematized
as such even though its products are ultimately constituted by the ego: “What is constituted for
consciousness exists for the ego insofar as it affects me, the ego. Any kind of constituted sense is
pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the
allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it.” Husserl, Analysis Concerning Passive
and Active Synthesis, §34, 162. On this topic, see J. N. Mohanty, “Husserl’s Concept of
Intentionality.”
274 E. Boublil
sumes embodied experience and operative intentionality under the gaze of transcen-
dental consciousness to account for subjectivity’s individuation in the world,3
Merleau-Ponty wants to look beneath this constituting process in order to reveal a
field of perception which explores the ways in which the world and others affect and
color one’s being in the world, and influence the sense of one’s individuation before
any kind of conscious synthesis takes place. Merleau-Ponty’s innovative approach
to individuation therefore consists in rethinking the phenomenological constitution
of subjectivity—that is, the process through which consciousness gives meaning to
itself and to its world—as a phenomenological embodied expression that cannot be
objectified but that is yet to be described. Merleau-Ponty’s deconstruction of inten-
tionality consists in ontologically reinterpreting this phenomenological concept4 as
the perceptive process responsible for the advent of meaning and the development
of the body-subject. Consequently, in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty draws on a criticism of idealism and empiricism, which both seem to have
missed the phenomenon of perception, and notably the fact that all perceived quali-
ties are perspectival and already overlaid with meaning in a way which structures
our perceptual experience.5 The “phenomenal field” is an “ambiguous domain” in
which embodied subjects are situated; it is not a background laid out for conscious-
ness to merely survey. Reflection is therefore always tied to the concrete and to the
prereflective movement of my own body (corps propre) and rooted in the perspec-
tival and more fundamental situation that exceeds the grasp of my reflective con-
sciousness. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “In fact, the thinking Ego can never abolish
its inherence in an individual subject, which knows all things in a particular per-
spective” (PP, 71). Such a sentence blurs the distinction between ipseity (self-
identity of the thinking Ego) and haecceity (concrete thisness that makes an
individual different from all others), by suggesting that these two characteristics are
intertwined in a third dimension that relies on a kind of “knowledge” or vision pro-
vided by my bodily perspectives. How does Merleau-Ponty account for this third
dimension and how does he recast operative intentionality in a new conception of
individuation?
3
In Ideas II, §64, Husserl distinguishes between absolute and relative individuations. The former
refers to the act-intentionality and the constituting activity of the transcendental ego while the lat-
ter are expressions through attitudes and life-styles of the more fundamental one. Merleau-Ponty
tries to think here the self-grounding nature of expressions and individuations where Husserl made
sense of subjectivation processes.
4
Despite having in common an emphasis on life and affectivity, Merleau-Ponty takes here a differ-
ent path from Michel Henry, who disqualified the concept of intentionality by claiming that even
in its “operative” form one might see the traces of representational thinking—the latter annihilat-
ing life’s auto-affection. See “Hyletic Phenomenology and Material Phenomenology,” in Material
Phenomenology, 7–42.
5
The first section of the Phenomenology of Perception notably provides a criticism of the con-
stancy hypothesis that presupposes the objective world and a constant connection between ele-
ments of it and a sensory perception apparatus that records them. According to Merleau-Ponty our
perceptions always fail this consistency and science errs in conceiving of the body as an object of
experience instead of an active embodied participant engaged in the process of experiencing.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 275
By criticizing both empiricist and idealist approaches to the subject and the
world, Merleau-Ponty moves away from Cartesian ontology. Merleau-Ponty blurs
the dichotomy between res cogitans and res extensa and weaves in the woof of my
corporeity the intentional threads that achieve the immanent and necessary unity of
my own body. Understanding perception itself as operative intentionality through
my corporeal experience of the world leads him to consider individuation as a con-
tingent and independent concrete process that does not rely on a transcendental
principle, and to locate in bodily movements the sense of unity and difference expe-
rienced on a prereflective level: “The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and
having a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment,
to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them” (PP,
94). Far from opposing its natural movement to an objectified world of constituted
norms, my own body’s action in the world creates meaning and opens up a field that
is a kind of “existential praxis” as Merleau-Ponty says in 1953,6 and that ties together
the individuation process of my own body and the practical—rather than theoreti-
cal—visions and perspectives I have of the world. Influenced by the Gestalt theory
and the works of Paul Schilder, Merleau-Ponty calls this third dimension “body
schema”7 (schéma corporel).
The notion of body schema refers to the configuration and expression of one’s
own individuation since it guarantees my unity and structures my identity in the
different places I inhabit: “My whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs
juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my
limbs is through a body schema in which all are included” (PP, 112–113). This
schema is not representational but rather relies on my own capacity (je peux)8 to
constantly correlate and adjust the motility of my body to its meaningful expres-
sions. The meaning radiated by the body schema is more similar to the “infrastruc-
ture of a landscape” (MSME, 49) than it is to a set of predetermined dispositions.
This architectural metaphor shows that Merleau-Ponty is working out a concept of
capacity that pertains more to the virtual than to the possible, should the latter be
conceived as something that would need to be actualized in order to be operative. In
this sense, individuation is not the instantiation or the particularization of an essence
or a kind but the ongoing expression of a concrete generality that is the “individual
subject.” Therefore, understanding the plasticity of the body schema calls for an
6
“The body schema is essentially the back of a praxis, pre-objective spatiality and the background
from which take shape actual objects of action.” Merleau-Ponty, Le monde sensible et le monde de
l’expression, 159 (my translation). Hereafter MSME.
7
On the influence of the works of Paul Schilder on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of schéma corporel, see
Weiss, Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeity, Chap. 1.
8
Such conception reflects the influence of Maine de Biran on Merleau-Ponty as shown in his lec-
tures: “[Maine de Biran] introduces the motor subject as a subject capable of having thought: the
motor subject is thinking, ‘we find in ourselves the intelligence which operates through the will.’
Willing and understanding cannot be dissociated. Therefore, we can acknowledge that Biran
wanted to show that the presence of the body was necessary for thought itself.” Merleau-Ponty,
“Biran and the Philosophers of the Cogito,” in The Incarnate Subject: Malebranche, Biran, and
Bergson on the Union of Body and Soul, 76.
276 E. Boublil
exploration of the world of the subject—in the double sense of the genitive—and
urges us to replace the correlational phenomenological paradigm (constituting
subject/constituted object) with a description of what Merleau-Ponty calls the
“intentional arc” which coordinates and links together the diverse and reversible
expressions of my existence: “The life of consciousness is subtended by an ‘inten-
tional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting,
our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being
situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of
senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility” (PP, 157).
There is no discrepancy between the domain of life and the comprehensive
dimensions opened up by perception. They belong to the same circular movement
and circulation of meaning that the metaphor of the arc illustrates by insisting on the
curves, the plasticity of my bodily attitudes, the reversibility of my expressions and
their individuated significance. The comprehension of my relation to the world is
entirely corporeal and perceptive and it is vain, according to Merleau-Ponty, to
oppose two kinds of intentionality, to contrast life and desire to the intellect and its
representations. In his later works, Merleau-Ponty elaborates on this integrative pro-
cess by extending the plasticity of the body-subject to the plasticity of the world
itself through a phenomenological description of the analogical structure of percep-
tion that aims to supplant any teleological9 pattern of consciousness.
2.2 T
he Analogical Structure of Perception
and the Differentiations of the Flesh
9
In this sense, and in light of Merleau-Ponty’s working note of The Visible and the Invisible (here-
after VI), titled “Teleology,” it seems problematic to maintain the teleological terminology to
describe the generativity that is here described as Ted Toadvine does in his article “Singing the
World in a New Key: Merleau-Ponty and the Ontology of Sense.”
10
Some comparison could be made between Merleau-Ponty’s notion of vision and Nietzsche’s
perspectival seeing and the way they are both sustained by the intertwining of Apollonian and
Dionysian forces. See Johnson, “Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty: Art, Sacred Life, and
Phenomenology,” in Nietzsche and Phenomenology.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 277
11
In a working note of The Visible and the Invisible, dated February 1959, Merleau-Ponty writes:
“One cannot make a direct ontology. My ‘indirect’ method (being in the beings) is alone con-
formed with being – ‘negative philosophy’ like ‘negative theology’ […] What is philosophy? The
domain of Verborgen (philosophy and occultism).” VI, 183.
278 E. Boublil
The point of his thematization12 of the own body (corps propre), and later on of the
flesh, consists in breaking up with these artificial and Euclidian delimitations of
space in order to come up with a topology of the figures that appear on life’s stage
(VI, 210) and constantly remodel the space of opportunities. As exposed in Eye and
Mind (hereafter EM), world is characterized by depth and its “reversibility” (EM,
13), which immediately puts down the intransitive nature of the metaphysical gaze.
Truth is therefore connected to flesh’s visibility and manifestation. In the Visible
and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty defines the flesh as follows:
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we would need the
ancient term “element,” in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth and fire, that is,
in the sense of a general thing midway between the spatiotemporal individual and the idea,
a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of Being, wherever there is a fragment of
Being. The flesh is in this sense an “element” of Being.” (VI, 89)
The truth of being lies in its very peculiar and “elemental” phenomenality. This
phenomenality relies on being’s epiphanies, on its shimmering through the flesh
“and even that of the world, that radiates beyond itself.”13 What is the significance
of this shimmering? What kind of perceptual imagination should be implemented?
To what extent would this “elemental” truth aim to restore life’s sacrality through
individuation and self-creation? The consequences of such a revaluation of truth and
such praise of the perspectival nature of life lie in Merleau-Ponty’s rehabilitation of
“the oniric world of analogy” (EM, 170) covered by Cartesian ontology. Thanks to
an ontological characterization of the unconscious and the imaginary that surpasses
Freud’s causal framework, Merleau-Ponty’s operative intentionality is better con-
ceived as a configurative process that intertwines the “operative finitude”14 of the
plastic force that makes the individual, an infinite that is indeterminate, and the non-
teleological creativity that sustains the carnal subject’s “immanent sense of meta-
morphosis” (MSME, 166).
Before understanding individuation as style, in light of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis
of literary expression as manifesting “lateral relations,” we have to delve into what
he calls the “imaginary texture of the real”15 in order to explain the projective nature
and phenomenal features of the flesh that is “an element, a concrete emblem of a
general manner of being” (VI, 147). In the next sect. I will argue that Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of the imaginary can be understood in light of Corbin’s notion
of “mundus imaginalis” and as a reinterpretation of the Freudian unconscious as an
ontological and projective dynamism rooted in the flesh.
12
On the non-representational or non-objectifying kind of thematization worked out by Merleau-
Ponty, see Khan, “The Time of Flesh and the Memory of the World,” 238.
13
Merleau-Ponty, Eye and Mind, 17.
14
“For me the infinity of Being that one can speak of is operative, militant finitude: the openness of
the Umwelt – I am against finitude in the empirical sense, a factual existence that has limits, and
this is why I am for metaphysics. But it lies no more in infinity that in the factual finitude.” The
Visible and the Invisible, May 1960, 251.
15
Merleau-Ponty writes: “It gives vision that which clothes it within, the imaginary texture of the
real.” EM, 124.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 279
3.1 F
rom “The Imaginary Texture of the Real” to the
Mundus Imaginalis
16
See Sartre, The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination.
17
In a working note of The Visible and the Invisible, dated November 1960, Merleau-Ponty explic-
itly refers to Bachelard’s notion of elements in order to challenge Sartre’s ontology of the
imaginary.
18
On the relation between Bachelard and Corbin, see Cheetham, All the World an Icon, 84.
Referring to Terre Céleste, Bachelard wrote to Corbin in May 1956: “It is the élan of verticality
that I receive from each page of Terre Céleste. […] Reading you, I imagine that I yet could have
the power to speak of the dynamicity of human verticality” In a note working note of The Visible
and the Invisible dated April 1960, Merleau-Ponty refers to Bachelard’s notion of the imaginary—
a notion that Bachelard himself defined as the “power of deforming the images given by the
senses” in L’air et les songes, “Introduction: ‘Imagination et mobilité,’” 5
280 E. Boublil
mysticism and his comparative philosophy were largely influenced by the phenom-
enological and hermeneutic method he learned during his education and developed
throughout his life. Although he has been relatively forgotten by French and German
phenomenologists, Corbin became one of the most influential thinkers of the twen-
tieth century in the field of Oriental Studies. He spent his career between the Middle
East and Paris where he taught at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE)
while Merleau-Ponty was teaching at the Collège de France. Although it seems
plausible to think that Merleau-Ponty and Corbin met each other, there is no textual
evidence of a direct communication between the two thinkers. Comparing their
thoughts would not so much lead to asserting an obvious historical connection, as it
would help us to see the possible paths along which Merleau-Ponty’s late philoso-
phy might lead. Islamic mysticism is not to be assimilated with Merleau-Ponty’s
ontology, but Corbin’s hermeneutics might help uncover a way to accurately portray
the kind of unity and individuation, based on the notions of écart and Ineinander,
that Merleau-Ponty is trying to depict.
Henry Corbin’s approach to hermeneutics shows that his method, influenced by
his reading of Heidegger, may resonate with that of Merleau-Ponty in the sense that
it aims to uncover, as he said, a “(prophetic and poietic) active pathos,”19 meaning
that truth and the sacred are, first of all, to be experienced. For both Corbin and
Merleau-Ponty, the seer and what she sees (the visible) are fundamentally bound
together and reflect back into one another. Their diagnosis about the world and its
Cartesian ontology (the division between res cogitans and res extensa) also clearly
converge. According to Corbin, “phenomenology consists in telling what is hidden,
in telling us about the invisible which is beneath the visible.”20 It is therefore mis-
leading to think being either in terms of a positive totality (theism), or in terms of an
inaccessible and ineffable realm that could only be pictured aesthetically.21
19
“Hermeneutics does not consist in deliberating about concepts, it essentially unveils what goes
on inside us, what makes us build up such conception, such vision, such projection when our pas-
sion becomes action, an active pathos, prophetic and poeitc.” Corbin, “De Heidegger à Sohravardî,”
25 (my translation).
20
Corbin, Philosophie iranienne et Philosophie comparée, 23.
21
Two different interpretations of this ontological discourse have been presented in a collection
published in 2010 entitled Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of Art, Perception and Religion. In this
volume, Richard Kearney and Joseph S. O’Leary discuss the notion of sacrality in Merleau-Ponty
and how it relates to Being’s life. According to Richard Kearney (158): “By relocating the moment
of sacred transcendence in the immanence of nature, Merleau-Ponty is restoring logos to the flesh
of the world. Deus sive Natura.” In his contribution Kearney offers a picture of the sacrality of
Being as a fleshing out of transcendence in immanence, as a sort of pantheism (affirmed by the
reference to Spinoza) reflecting the presence of God among beings thanks to what he would call a
“relocation.” On the other hand, Joseph S. O′ Leary argues that Merleau-Ponty’s esoteric sugges-
tions about Being should be limited to an aesthetic interpretation which puts the emphasis on depth
as the existential pattern of the creative activity of life as Being. We argue here that the ontological
and the aesthetic dimensions are not mutually exclusive and converge under the notion of “coher-
ent deformation.”
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 281
Corbin describes what he calls the paradox of monotheism. There are three steps
in this paradox.22 The first step consists in the exoteric form of monotheism, which
leads to metaphysical idolatry (positive Being). The second step is that of the eso-
teric form of monotheism that focuses on Being, but therefore risks mistaking its
meaning and turning it into a substance (negative Being—paradoxically reified).
The only viable way would be the last step, which solves the paradox and which
Corbin called “integral ontology,” an ontology that is able to think being in beings,
and which would be an antidote to nihilism. If the solution to this paradox seems
dialectical, we will see after defining his notion of “mundus imaginalis” that the
hermeneutic movement he described was a better fit with what Merleau-Ponty
would call “hyperdialectic”—that is, “a thought that on the contrary [to a bad dia-
lectic] is capable of reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the plu-
rality of relationships and what has been called ambiguity” (VI, 144). This short
description of Corbin’s diagnosis of the Western world and philosophy relies on its
research on Islamic philosophy and Sufism (mostly Ibn’Arabi). According to the
latter, as Corbin explains, there are not two worlds (the mind and the body, the spirit
and the matter) but three: the sensitive world of matter, the intelligible world of
ideas and, in-between, the world of perceptual and creative imagination, that is, the
world of the soul which gives life and connects the two other dimensions. As Corbin
states, there is therefore a “multidimensionality of being, whose levels are articu-
lated vertically.”23 Let’s turn now more specifically to Corbin’s description of this
third level, the mundus imaginalis.
Corbin’s entire interpretation of the modern world draws on the concept of
“mundus imaginalis” which for him refers precisely to that “in-between” within
which Being and God hides and reveals itself. Commenting on Esoteric Islam and
notably the works of Ibn’Arabi, Corbin writes:
We observe immediately that we are no longer reduced to the dilemma of thought and
extension, to the schema of cosmology and a gnoseology limited to the empirical world and
the world of abstract understanding. Between the two is placed an intermediate world,
which our authors designate as “alam-al-mithal”, the world of the Image, mundus imagina-
lis: a world as ontologically real as the world of the senses and the world of the intellect, a
world that requires a faculty of perception belonging to it […] this faculty is the imaginative
power, the one we must avoid confusing with the imagination that modern man identifies
with “fantasy” and that, according to him, produces only the “imaginary.”24
22
See Le paradoxe du monothéisme, 14.
23
See Corbin, Philosophie iranienne et philosophie comparée, 17.
24
Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam, 9.
25
“A second postulate, evidence for which compels recognition, is that the spiritual Imagination is
a creative power, an organ of true knowledge. Imaginative perception and imaginative conscious-
ness have their own noetic (cognitive) function and value, in relation to the world that is theirs – the
world, we have said, which is the “alam al-mithal,” mundus imaginalis, the world of the mystical
282 E. Boublil
to life and is precisely that which allows “being” and “thought” to be brought
together at the pre-reflective level of existence to which genuine philosophy con-
fronts itself. It gives birth to an ontology that is “negative,” that is perpetually chal-
lenging itself, that is a gnosis, which, according to Corbin’s specific definition in an
article meaningfully titled “Eyes of Flesh and Eyes of Fire,” is “knowledge that
changes and transforms the knowing subject.”26 In light of Corbin’s description, it is
then possible to think that the phenomenological interpretation of sacred being and
the ontological one reflect back into one another when philosophy works out, as
Merleau-Ponty writes: an “ontology from within” (VI, 237). Sacrality, displayed by
the imaginary, is therefore another name for depth. Human life is individuated
through flesh, but its meanings are individuated by human expressions and cre-
ations, the latter being guaranteed by the fundamental depth that characterizes the
world and existence. In a working note of the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-
Ponty states that “the problem “self-other” is a Western problem” (November 1959,
270). For Corbin, commenting on Islamic mysticism: “It is the corporeal substance
that resides in the spiritual substance; it is the soul that encloses and bears the body.
This is why it is not possible to say where the spiritual place is situated; it is not situ-
ated, it is, rather, that which situates, it is situative. Its ubi is an ubique.”27 For
Merleau-Ponty as well, the flesh as mundus imaginalis and expressive world (the
spiritual substance Corbin is talking about) appears again to be the very realization
of truth rather than what resists it and the style that makes its expression meaning-
ful. Far from disrupting individuation as in Nietzsche’s preliminary interpretation of
Dionysian forces in The Birth of Tragedy, the imaginary, through the activity of
what appears to be the unconscious, participates fully in the subject’s individuation
as “coherent deformation.”
The role of imagination in the “deformation” not only relies on ontological and
phenomenological descriptions but is also tied to the structure of intersubjective
relations and affectivity. Indeed, individuation is not only a metaphysical and philo-
sophical category, it is also a psychological one used by Freud (and most notably
Jung, who inspired Corbin’s works) to describe the genesis of personality and the
way the individual becomes aware of its own self and separates itself from the other.
Merleau-Ponty’s interest in Freud’s theory of the unconscious and his analysis of
the role of imagination in love relationships reinforces our understanding of
cities such as Hurqalya, where time becomes reversible and where space is a function of desire,
because it is only the external aspect of an internal state.” Corbin, “Mundus Imaginalis, or the
Imaginary and the Imaginal,” 16
26
Corbin, “Eyes of Flesh and Eyes of Fire,” quoted in Cheetham, The World Turned Inside Out, 47.
27
Corbin, Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam, 14.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 283
28
“In order to bestow a name upon the piece of sculpture, he had called it to himself Gradiva, ‘the
girl splendid in walking.’” From Jensen’s “Gradiva: a Pompeiian Fancy,” quoted in Freud, Delusion
and Dream, 148.
29
Merleau-Ponty is reversing here the Freudian phrase according to which dreams achieve desires.
30
Merleau-Ponty writes: “Here we will truly see that oneirism is not non-being of the imagining
consciousness qua imagining, but just beneath the surface of perceptual consciousness.” Lectures
on Institution and Passivity, 161.
284 E. Boublil
See Saint Aubert, Du lien des êtres aux éléments de l’être, 64.
31
“Thinking ‘operationally’ has become a sort of absolute artificialism, such as we see the ideology
32
of cybernetics, where human creations are derived from a natural information process, itself con-
ceived on the model of human machines.” Merleau-Ponty, EM, 122. Merleau-Ponty’s approach
differs here from Simondon’s conception of individuation.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 285
4.1 A
rtistic and Literary Expressions as “Interrogative”
Ontology of Individuation
In a working note of the Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty writes: “Being is
what requires creation of us for us to experience it. Make an analysis of literature in
this sense: as inscription of Being” (June 1959, 197). The emphasis he puts on the
imaginary and its role in ontological and intersubjective relations already confirms
such a perspective. Nonetheless, it is to be stressed that literature—and not only
painting—plays an important role to achieve this creation. Consequently, it is not
only what Malraux writes in Le Musée Imaginaire about artistic expression that
interests Merleau-Ponty in the Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence, but also
his perspective, as a writer, on creative dynamics, and the kind of ontology that
sustains the latter. If Merleau-Ponty agrees with Malraux that the painter exhibits
through his works a “coherent deformation” that is a transfiguration conferring an
irreducible meaning to the world, he also radicalizes this thought by criticizing the
metaphysics of individuality that lies beneath Malraux’s interpretation. Rephrasing
Malraux’s argument, Merleau-Ponty writes:
The classical painters were unconsciously themselves; the modern painter wants first of all
to be original, and for him his power of expression is identical to his individual difference.
Because painting is no longer for faith or beauty, it is for the individual. “It is the annexation
of the world by the Individual. The artist is thus supposed to be “in the tribe of the ambitious
and the drugged,” and like them devoted to stubborn self-pleasure, to daemonic pleasure—
that is, to the pleasure of all in man which destroys man. It is clear, however, that it would
be hard to apply these definitions to Cézanne or Klee, for example. (ILVS, 51)
33
In the preface to the Phenomenology of Perception (xxiv), Merleau-Ponty states: “If
Phenomenology was a movement before becoming a doctrine or a philosophical system, this was
attributable neither to accident, nor to fraudulent intent. It is as painstaking as the works of Balzac,
Proust, Valéry or Cézanne—by reason of the same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same
demand for awareness, the same will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that mean-
ing comes into being. In this way it merges into the general effort of modern thought.”
34
Merleau-Ponty quoting Cézanne’s words, in “Cézanne’s Doubt,” 68.
35
The lectures titled “Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage” (1953–1954) were given at the
same time as the lectures titled “Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression,” which focus on
the body schema. Even if the course on literary expression aims to address the issues at stake in
Sartre’s theory of literature (1947), it is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty examines this con-
cept in light of his developing ontology of the imaginary and his theory related to the body schema,
motility, and expression. The description that Derrida gives of the Implex could well apply to
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression in spite of the criticism addressed by post-structuralist
thinkers (notably Foucault in chapter 9 of The Order of Things) to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of
expression. On this topic see Lawlor, “Eschatology and Positivism: The Critique of Phenomenology
in Derrida & Foucault.” Concerning the “implex,” Derrida writes that the concept “marks an impli-
cation that is not one, an implication that cannot be reduced to anything simple, an implication and
complication of the source that in a certain way cannot be disimplicated: this, the IMPLEX.”
Margins of Philosophy, 303.
Individuation, Affectivity and the World: Reframing Operative Intentionality… 287
to preserve the very possibilities of its meaningful genesis. Consequently, the con-
junction of creations is less to be found in an “imaginary museum” than it is to be
experienced through the diacritical genesis of style that writers and painters exhibit
in and through their lives. It is therefore not by chance that Merleau-Ponty mentions
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics36 and his concept of the “diacritical” on
the opening page of The Language Indirect and the Voice of Silence. This notion
helps explain what makes the deformation of the “implex,” resisting objectification,
“coherent.” Indeed the notion of the diacritical shows that we “cannot base language
upon a system of positive ideas. The unity [Saussure] is talking about is a unity of
coexistence, like that of the sections of an arch which shoulder one another” (ILVS,
39). The diacritical points to a process of differentiation from which could emerge
meanings that cannot be defined or conceived a priori and independently from the
structure to which they belong. This differentiation of meanings repeats the move-
ment of individuation that constantly differentiates the individual from herself and
from others while confirming the common structure of experience and the genesis
of sense that is to be shared and created. This confirms our interpretation according
to which the analogicity produced by operative intentionality is expressive rather
than imitative or representative. Speaking therefore of “coherent deformation” as
diacritical style is not simply a metaphor but rather the accurate phenomenological
description of the way one relates to oneself and to others by tracing the sense of our
experiences in the flesh of the world.
36
Merleau-Ponty provides a detailed analysis of Saussure’s theory in The Prose of the World. His
unpublished lecture on speech contemporary to his work on literary language (1953–1954) has
extensive passages on Saussure.
37
In the conclusion of the preface of Signs (35), Merleau-Ponty makes this implicit reference to
Camus and Sartre: “The remedy we seek does not lie in rebellion, but in unremitting virtù. A
deception for whoever believed in salvation, and in a single means of salvation in all realms.”
288 E. Boublil
We have with our body; our senses, our look, our power to understand speech
and to speak, measurants [mesurants] for being, dimensions to which we can refer
it, but not a relation of adequation or of immanence. (VI, 103).
These “mesurants” direct our sight to a particular meaning without objectifying
it precisely because they strive to maintain the irreducible “écart” and depth from
which only a subjectivity free and able to compose itself could emerge: “What is
proper to the visible is, we said, to be the surface of an inexhaustible depth: this is
what makes it able to be open to visions other than our own” (VI, 143). The ethical
possibilities involved here come from the precedence of the sacrality of being and
its invisibility over the metaphysical setting of the life-world. The generativity and
obliquity that sustain individuation as desire and metamorphosis bring to light a
radical and innovative approach to contingency and therefore to social and political
relationships. The intertwining of my existence and that of the other does not repre-
sent a relation of exchange between two separated entities, but rather indicates the
possibility to undertake common projects whose lack of firm and transcendental
grounds and conditions, whose vulnerability is also the promise of an imaginal
coexistence which must be lived by every one.
In light of Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the imaginary texture of the real, it
can be said that individuals should be considered as emblems, insisting again on the
paradoxical non-representational structure of the visibility we all share. The gener-
ality of the flesh and the contingent directionality of its generativity seem to be an
ethical necessity in order to endure life’s adversity. One has to struggle against the
crystallization and petrifying figurations of consciousness and resist against the sys-
tematizations, which risk to reduce us to our factual existence and to congeal the
creative freedom of our corporeal existence. By implicitly describing a new under-
standing of individuation, philosophy itself becomes “not the reflection of a pre-
existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being” (PP, xxiv). In the last
lines of “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty portrays this concrete individual whose
existence is ruled by the lateral and invisible expressions of the world’s promise,
which he calls freedom:
Just as we may observe the movements of an unknown animal without understanding the
law that inhabits and controls them, so Cézanne’s observers did not divine the transmuta-
tions he imposed on events and experiences; they were blind to his significance, to that glow
from out of nowhere which surrounded him from time to time. But he himself was never at
the center of himself: 9 days out of 10 all he saw around him was the wretchedness of his
empirical life and of his unsuccessful attempts, the debris of an unknown celebration. Yet it
was in the world that he had to realize his freedom. […] We never get away from our life—
we never see ideas face to face.” (75).
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Husserl and America: Reflections
on the Limits of Europe as the Ground
of Meaning and Value for Phenomenology
Ian Angus
1 Introduction
I. Angus (*)
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Canada
e-mail: ian_angus@sfu.ca
European crisis that characterized Husserl’s last period grew from letter, to lectures,
to an unfinished book-length manuscript, representing an increasing depth and
extent of reflection that remained incomplete during his lifetime.
I want to address phenomenological philosophy as the critical consciousness of
modernity, and what phenomenology must become now, beginning from one of the
most well-known and problematic aspects of Husserl’s late work: that point in the
Vienna Lecture where he discounts Papuan people, the Inuit, the indigenous peoples
of the Americas, and the Romani, and includes America, in defining spiritual Europe
in the sense that he wishes to recover. As I will argue, this discounting and inclusion
cannot be simply dismissed or ignored but constitutes a fundamental gesture in his
critique of the crisis into which European reason has fallen. Insofar as the crisis of
which Husserl spoke not only remains with us, but has in some respects intensified,
the capacity of phenomenological philosophy to address it, and also to reform itself
in order properly to address the crisis, depends upon a fundamental constitutional
analysis of this gesture of exclusion and inclusion.
As we know, the crisis was for Husserl a crisis of reason. Husserl claimed in the
last period of his work in the 1930s, that Europe had entered into a crisis that went
to the heart of its conception as the home of reason. Modern reason, due to the hege-
mony of the paradigm of the mathematization of nature, had become a “relative,
one-sided rationality, which leaves a complete irrationality on necessary opposite
sides” (Husserl 1969b, 16–7). Such one-sided rationality “measure[s] the life-
world—the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life—for a
well-fitting garb of ideas, that of the so-called objectively scientific truths” (Husserl
1970a, 51). The crisis is thus internal to reason in that it is an insufficient conception
of reason that provokes the crisis, but such a crisis of reason pertains, neither to the
internal progress of a special science nor its technical efficacy, but to the foundation
of such special sciences in philosophy, and thereby to the capacity of phenomeno-
logical philosophy to restore meaning and value in the experienced lifeworld. The
crisis is provoked by the hegemony of Galilean science but manifested by its failed
value-relation to the lifeworld. The fundamental problem posed by the crisis is that
of objectivism and the solution to the crisis lies in the recovery of subjectivity in a
new phenomenological form of reason.
This is not to say that this was the first time that the problem of Europe and its
current problems had appeared in Husserl’s work. In 1923 he had already referred
to the need for a renewal of European culture, tracing the malaise back to the First
World War, and seeking the solution in the “value-creating significance” that reason
offers to humanity (Husserl 1981, 327). Indeed, his concern with devastation, decay,
crisis and renewal can be traced back to the period of the First World War itself
when Husserl began to re-think the tradition of German Idealism in order to con-
front “the exigency of our times … [with] the divine spirit of the Idea” (Husserl
1995, 131). It is not too much to say that the theme of crisis had been growing in
significance within Husserl’s work since the First World War alongside and a philo-
sophical diagnosis of the European failure to address its devastation with a cultural
renewal of meaning and value.
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 293
We may make several observations about this statement: First, Husserl’s claim for
the uniqueness of Europe depends upon no comparative data. His claim that the
infinite task of the idea of philosophy is immanent in the history of Europe may well
be established by an inquiry into Greek philosophy and its Renaissance renewal, but
the notion that it is a breakthrough into a new human epoch requires that it also be
shown that philosophy, or something essentially equivalent or comparable to phi-
losophy, is not equivalently immanent in other cultural unities. Indeed, he would
1
Both Gregory Cameron and Rodolphe Gasché emphasize that Husserl’s concept of Europe as the
institutionalization of the entelechy of reason functions as a critique of actual Europe (Cameron,
107; Gasché, 21–2).
294 I. Angus
2
Insofar as Husserl’s 1935 letter to Levy-Bruhl indicates that his anthropology was one of the
sources of Husserl’s concept of lifeworld, this concern gains greater justification. Levy-Bruhl’s
conception of non-Western people as “pre-logical,” “primitive” and “without history” suggests a
hierarchical relation that Husserl might have seen himself as giving a philosophical foundation
with the idea of Europe as philosophy’s home (Husserl 2008). In historical-intellectual terms, it is
probably some such combination of 19th and early twentieth century anthropology with the nine-
teenth century idea of progress that motivated Husserl’s view. But no such ease is available to us at
this juncture.
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 295
“Europe,” rather than any of the separate nations or cultural regions of Europe,
Husserl is, without stating it as such, moving to a higher level of universality than
the prevailing aggressive nationalism of Nazi Germany. It would not have been suf-
ficient to appeal, as he had in his Fichte lectures during the First World War, to “the
divine spirit of the Ideals which have found in our German people these most noble
and sublime representatives” (Husserl 1995, 131). It is, even as inquiry and not yet
as result, a posing that hooks the crisis of reason to a shared European destiny at a
higher level of universality. Second, the distinctiveness of a cultural unity requires
that some other such cultural unity not be included. The exclusion, or border, of the
essence is intrinsic to its definition. Husserl’s reference to Eskimos, Indians and
Papuans to make this point is somewhat unsettling, not least since a few years later
the Nazis would justify their treatment of Gypsies, or Roma, because of their sup-
posedly lesser human form. While different does not necessarily mean lesser, when
difference is combined with Husserl’s other statement that European spirit consti-
tutes a universal, epochal human breakthrough, some hierarchical ordering seems to
be a necessary consequence. Last, there is what we might call an external inclusion
of the former colonies of the British Empire that, as settler societies, have displaced
and marginalized the aboriginal inhabitants. Husserl’s inclusion of settler societies
into spiritual Europe fails to interrogate the colonial history of this integration and
thereby invites the question of whether it is being awarded philosophical justifica-
tion by phenomenology.3
To put the point baldly, this passage demands that we ask whether Husserl’s
notion of the spiritual essence of Europe commits phenomenology to a Eurocentrism
that necessarily denigrates other cultures and attempts to justify philosophically a
claim to European superiority.? If the claim to Europe as the home of reason is
essential to the recovery of reason, it might serve at one point in time—the 1930s
and the Nazi threat—to criticize destruction and irrational ethno-centrism only by
establishing an idea of phenomenology that at another point seems to justify philo-
sophically the hegemony of Europe, the denigration of supposedly lesser peoples
within its borders, and its colonial expansion beyond them (Moran, 42, 63, 300;
Derrida 2003, 154–7; Cameron, 107, 111). What would phenomenology look like if
it were explicitly to shed such justification? This question must be asked if we are
to take seriously Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as self-responsibility and
the philosopher as the functionary of humanity. In contrast to most investigations of
this problematic passage, my inquiry does not focus directly on Europe but rather
on the inclusion of the United States and the English Dominions. But, before that,
we need to consider what happens to these issues when they advance in Husserl’s
reflection beyond the level achieved in his lecture to that of the Crisis of the
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
3
Rodolphe Gasché goes so far as to assert that all critique of Eurocentrism depends on a European
concept of critique, a position that not only fails to address directly the issue at hand but re-asserts
the Husserlian position as if it were unproblematic (Gasché 7).
296 I. Angus
The Crisis thus goes much further than The Vienna Lecture in specifying loss of
meaning and value through mathematical, or formal, abstraction. Formal abstraction
is not simply abstraction from species to genus, from a specific chair to the idea
“chair,” for example, or from a chicken to “bird.” It consists in a specific emptying-
out to what Husserl calls an “anything-whatever” (Husserl 1969b, 77, 87, 93). If I can
empty the concepts of a pencil, a chicken, and the idea of friendship to consider them
anything-whatevers, then I can count them as three. For this reason, Husserl consid-
ers the European crisis of reason to be inherited necessarily from Galilean science
since “the arithmetization of geometry leads almost automatically, in a certain way,
to the emptying of its meaning” (Husserl 1970c, 44). The recovery of meaning and
value by phenomenology consists in the reverse movement of grounding whereby the
technical results made possible by formalization are returned to “concretely intuitive
thinking actually directed at the subject matter itself” (Husserl 1970c, 46).
This introduction of the Renaissance mathematical science of nature into the
diagnosis of crisis immediately requires several additions to the analysis of The
Vienna Lecture. The appeal to “Europe” in the prior analysis is broken into two
stages of Greek philosophy and Renaissance universal science that, while certainly
related, pose different issues for the crisis. The concepts of “crisis” and the recovery
of meaning that are simply used in The Vienna Lecture are accounted for by the
formal abstraction of modern mathematics. This inquiry motivates Husserl to intro-
duce the concept of institution (Urstiftung) to account for the sense in which mod-
ern formal reason is an inescapable fact for contemporary philosophy that transforms
the meaning and role of history in the investigation.4 In Husserl’s words, “[a] defi-
nite ideal of a universal philosophy and its method forms the beginning; this is, so
to speak, the institution (Urstiftung) of the philosophical modern age and all its lines
of development” (Husserl 1970c, 12; Husserl 1954, 10). Institution is a concept
required by genetic phenomenology to refer to the constitution of an original phe-
nomenon as an identity that allows of further predications and modalizations. The
inquiry into modern mathematization of nature, for example, requires a reference
back to its primal institution in the Renaissance such that its non-existence prior to
then, its constitution at that time, and its inescapable perdurance locate the inquiry
in a certain historical moment. Institution is an intrinsically temporal form of
constitution according to the inner temporality of the phenomenon rather than its
placing within a wider historical context.
4
Urstiftung may also be translated as “primal institution” or simply “institution” as it was by
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1970, chapter 5; Merleau-Ponty 1962, 59). Aron
Gurwitsch used the term “institutive inception” (Moran, 61, n23). The advantage of the term “insti-
tution” is that it can be used in two senses, both of which are relevant to the concept: it is both an
establishing and a persisting structuring. Something is “instituted” in the primal sense of being
brought into being and something is an “institution” in the sense of a persistent organized structure
within which intersubjective relations and material culture are organized. In his Guide for
Translating Husserl (1973) Dorion Cairns suggests that Urstiftung should be translated as “primal
instituting” or “primal institution” in distinction from Stiftung for which he suggests “institution,
instituting, something instituted, origination” but not “foundation” (Cairns, 119).
298 I. Angus
Husserl’s early work rejected historical explanation due to the essential contin-
gency of historical events in favour of transcendental constitution through necessary
structures of ideal meaning. This judgment is never revoked. His later studies of
genetic constitution introduce a way around the empirical-transcendental dualism.
The use of mathematized geometry in Galilean science refers us back to its begin-
ning in the Renaissance and the conditions for its development henceforward, which
in turn refers us back to a first geometer who inaugurated the eidetic intuition of
limit-shapes from empirical objects.
If Husserl were to mean, at this point in his analysis of the institution of modern
science, that the ideal meanings inherent to that science depend upon an empirical
history of writing, then not only would he contradict his earlier assertion that his
philosophy of history does not reduce transcendental history to the factuality of
contingent history, but also the sphere of ideal meaning itself would be undermined;
ideal meaning would be reduced to factual history such that science itself would no
longer contain a claim to truth but would be as contingent as any other historical
event. This is not Husserl’s claim, but the fact that the manuscript of The Origin of
Geometry, in which this crucial claim is made, was not integrated into the main
manuscript of Crisis means that the exact status of this claim is not clear in the
larger context of his account of the institution of the mathematization of nature.
Consequently, the majority of commentators analyze the question of Eurocentrism
in The Vienna Lecture with reference to the empirical-transcendental, or contingent-
necessary, distinction, usually in order to defend Husserl since his sense of Europe
has a transcendental meaning, thus failing altogether to see the new concept of his-
tory that is introduced by Husserl in accounting for the geometry taken over by
Galileo through the concept of institution (Urstiftung).5 In contrast, I want to sug-
gest that Husserl’s concept of institution is a crucial addition to the empirical-
transcendental alternative in approaching history.
Husserl points out that the forward development of a science requires the accu-
mulation and sedimentation of ideal meanings that can be reactivated in subsequent
research. Such “sensibly embodying repetitions” (Husserl 1970b, 357) are possible
through language in its historical capacity of recollection through documentation.
In short, writing. Writing enables the repetition of prior investigation and its match-
ing to present inquiry such that the history of inquiry produces, not a simple multi-
plicity of insights, but an ordered and progressive field of research.6 Writing, and all
5
Such as, for example, Gregory Cameron and Rodolphe Gasché (Cameron, 107; Gasché, 57). The
work of Jacques Derrida has been significant, and highly influential, in arguing that an equivoca-
tion between reason as constituted in history and given only as its telos defines Husserl’s turn to
history. This argument for equivocation rests on the duality of empirical-transcendental, or contin-
gent-necessary, that the concept of institution overcomes (Derrida 2003, 176–8; Derrida 1978,
121).
6
Derrida’s argument for an equivocation in Husserl is one the bases for his claim that such equivo-
cations are unavoidable for philosophy and an entry into his own philosophy through the concept
of “delay.” He analyzes the supposedly necessary equivocation between empirical and transcen-
dental as delay, connects delay and repetition to writing (as did Husserl), argues that Husserl is
caught in a metaphysics of presence based on an auto-affection of the spoken voice, and introduces
his own connection of delay to writing and difference (Derrida 1978, 150–3; Derrida 1973, 80–2).
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 299
that writing suggests for the actual pursuit of modern science, is what solidifies the
institution as an institution through its temporal uniting of differently-placed intu-
itions into a continuous progress of evidence. A contemporary inquiry into the crisis
of the sciences is thus referred backward to their primal institution in the Renaissance
and the Renaissance reformation and use of geometry in the mathematization of
nature refers us back to a first geometer.
This first geometer need not be a single person, and we may be unable to locate
in empirical history the invention of geometry, but the idea of a first geometer is an
essential concept for the understanding of the ongoing institution of science. The
first geometer is thus not a concept of empirical history, but neither is it a purely
transcendental concept because it is concerned not only with ideal meaning as such
but with the historical ground that makes ideal meaning possible as an infinite task
of ongoing research. Husserl’s inquiry into the origin of geometry is oriented
toward, as he says, a “historical beginning [which] … must have an origin in an
accomplishment: first as a project and then in successful execution” (Husserl 1970b,
356). It is this “must have” that is crucial in indicating that there is a third concep-
tion of history at work here. Husserl never gave it a name as such but I think that it
is appropriate to call it an “event,” thereby bringing it into dialogue with contempo-
rary philosophical language that aims at a similar, or at least comparable, concept.
Empirical history consists of contingent facts that can never explain the genesis
or sense of ideal meanings. Transcendental inquiry into ideal meaning deals with
necessary structures whose instantiation in empirical history always remains arbi-
trary. The concept of institution, which pertains to the genetic constitution of that
which is necessary to ideal meaning, is oriented to those events which must have
taken place for ideal meaning to have come into being. Galilean science is an event
instituted in the Renaissance but referring back to a first geometer. The crisis of
modern science refers us both to the event of primal institution (Urstiftung) and to
its completion (Endstiftung). It is through the event which persists in transcendental
history that we are “assigned a task” in the diagnosis and recovery of reason (Husserl
1970a, 72). Factual, empirical history is thus lifted out of its contingency, so to
speak, because an event must have occurred within factual history due to the struc-
ture of transcendental history. The event is the prior to which the diagnosis of crisis
and the task of recovery refer. Meaning and value are recovered within the institu-
tion in question, and not newly invented, due to this prior event.
It is with this sense of prior that we must address Husserl’s concept of Europe to
measure the advance that the Crisis makes, and the further advances that it may
imply, over the formulation in The Vienna Lecture. Europe becomes a question,
rather than an answer, about the event of reason in its Renaissance and Greek
moments inherent in the diagnosis of crisis and the task of phenomenological recov-
ery. In Part I of the Crisis, Husserl says that if it had been shown that the entelechy
of modern philosophy had become fully conscious of itself, “only then could it be
decided whether European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather than
being merely an empirical anthropological type like ‘China,’ or ‘India’” (Husserl
1970a, 16). While there is still no comparative evidence to justify the relegation
of others to merely contingent history, the claim of Europe to universality is now
300 I. Angus
postponed until the full establishment of European reason itself—in other words,
until after the resolution of the crisis.
When the vague allusions to irrationality in The Vienna Lecture are rooted in
their origin in Renaissance mathematization of nature, the concept of institution is
introduced to show the primal establishment and continuing progress of that sci-
ence. Institution requires a prior event that confers a continuing task, so that
“Europe” becomes a question about the borders and location of this prior commit-
ment to reason. Let us now return to the issues posed by The Vienna Lecture in the
light of these advances made in the Crisis.
3 T
he Conflation of America with Europe
in the Vienna Lecture
Husserl’s claim in The Vienna Lecture that “[i]n the spiritual sense it is clear that the
English dominions, the United States, etc., clearly belong to Europe” (Husserl
1970c, 273) does not appear in the Crisis. The inclusion of the Renaissance math-
ematization of nature alongside the Greek origin of philosophy poses a question for
the crisis and recovery of European reason such that only the resolution of this crisis
could settle the issue of whether Europe is distinct from other civilizational types
due to bearing within itself an “absolute idea” (Husserl 1970a, 16). One conse-
quence seems to have been that America and the remnants of the British Empire are
no longer mentioned at all. But, logically speaking, we can say—parallel to Husserl’s
remark about China and India—that their inclusion in the European entelechy of
reason should also become a question pending resolution by the overcoming of
crisis. So, we may ask, in what sense does the European crisis of reason implicate
America and the British Commonwealth?
From now on, I will use the name “America” for all of these new nations and
states on the continent once called the New World. Mexican historian Edmundo
O’Gorman has shown that the idea of the discovery of America is incoherent, since
one cannot discover what one is not looking for, and that the invention of America
refers us to the European cultural heritage within which it took on meaning.
America was no more than a potentiality, which could be realized only by receiving and
fulfilling the values and ideals of European culture. … This way of conceiving the historical
being of the new lands found expression in the name of ‘New World,’ … The meaning of
these two designations is now evident. If World in its traditional sense means that part of the
earth providentially assigned to man for his dwelling, America was literally a ‘new’ world,
which offered the possibility of enlarging man’s old cosmic home by adding a new portion
of the universe conceived as capable of becoming another Europe (O’Gorman, 139).
Clearly, to the extent that these regions were, are, and remain European in the spiri-
tual sense, they must share in Husserl’s analysis of both the European entelechy of
reason and its crisis. And, to the extent that they are not, they do not share—or do
not necessarily share—either.
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 301
If 1492 is the instituting event of European modernity, as Dussel argues, then the
Aboriginal people of the New World could be written out of the spiritual meaning of
America, so that it constitutes merely a repetition of Europe, only by a denial of an
entelechy of reason to non-European cultures. Mignolo (2002) calls this an
302 I. Angus
Let us state this question in a universal manner, emphasizing that which pertains
specifically to the European ‘prior’ that grounds Husserl’s diagnosis of crisis: Does
a new cultural context add nothing to a prior task elaborated elsewhere? Specifically,
does America not add anything essential to the European entelechy of reason?
Previously, we postponed the question of the status within phenomenology of the
great historical fact of displacement, and even genocide, of the Indigenous people
of America by which its history is inseparable from that of Europe. If it is merely a
contingent historical fact, then it does not affect the essence of the European com-
mitment to reason, which would be understood as an internal European institution.
Husserl, in tracing the European entelechy of reason to the Renaissance mathemati-
zation of nature and the Greek beginning of philosophy, silently treats “the disaster”
as contingent and therefore unworthy of discussion. And, we may also say, so do
subsequent Husserlian phenomenologists, especially in America, who use the anal-
ysis of the Crisis but do not investigate its implications.
Furthermore, this historical fact could not be considered transcendental since in
that case it would be an essential, constitutive aspect of the historical genesis of any
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 303
7
Enrique Dussel objects to the term “encounter” because “the new syncretistic, hybrid, predomi-
nantly mestizo culture was born neither from a freely entered alliance nor from steady cultural
synthesis, but from an originary trauma of being dominated” (Dussel 1992, 55). While Dussel is
correct to say that “encounter” does not capture the essence of the historical event insofar as it was
not an “encounter” of equals, I have used it as a way of opening up a free variation of the possibili-
ties of the event without denying the originary trauma in order to open contemporary rethinking
and, perhaps, alternatives.
304 I. Angus
ancient man forms himself with insight through free reason. For this renewed ‘Platonism’
this means not only that man should be changed ethically [but that] the whole human sur-
rounding world, the political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew
through free reason, through the insights of a universal philosophy. (Husserl 1970a, 8)
Philosophy in this sense means “the science of the totality of what is,” but contains also an
“elevation of the meaning of this universality” to include “all meaningful questions in a
rigorous scientific manner, with an apodictically intelligible methodology, in an unending
but rationally ordered progress of inquiry”. (Husserl 1970c, 8–9)
In this spirit we may return to our original question: in what sense does the
European crisis of reason implicate America? We may answer: the event of conquest-
disaster constitutes an event for reason insofar as the encounter includes elements
previously absent in the European entelechy with the consequence that America
cannot be simply included within Europe; the crisis of reason stems from the
European side of the encounter; thus, while America cannot be straightforwardly
included in Europe, neither can it be simply excluded. Perhaps, to somewhat over-
reach the evidence yet presented, one might attribute the exogeny of the encounter
and the recovery of reason to the process of inclusion of the outside—less the draw-
ing of a border to define a interior location of reason’s entelechy, than the permea-
bility of this border in an exogenous renewal of reason.
5 Conclusion
The concept of institution (Urstiftung) that Husserl introduced to diagnose the crisis
of reason and propose its renewal through phenomenology required him to develop
an idea of a prior commitment to reason that he found in the concept of “Europe.”
The absence of any comparative evidence in Husserl’s claim for the distinctiveness
of Europe’s “breakthrough” for humanity in its entelechy of reason, which means
that the claim cannot in principle be validated as such, suggests that the comparative
relation of ideas and claims instituted in one lifeworld to those of another must
become a fundamental part of the phenomenological diagnosis of crisis.8 This task
necessarily requires a double-pronged approach.
One aspect is analysis of the European entelechy. In this context it pertains espe-
cially to the systematic institutionalization of Renaissance universal science with an
infinite teleology toward complete knowledge. In the diagnosis of crisis, it is not so
much the level of progress that is at issue but rather, at any level of scientific articu-
lation, the pertinence of science to the lifeworld for meaning and value. This sug-
gests that a comparative reflection on crisis requires a shift from an encyclopediac
toward a Socratic conception of philosophy. What is the human knowledge—not the
progress toward an infinite completion of science that reflects the mind of God
(Husserl 1970a, 66)—through which currently available knowledge can be re-
grounded in the lifeworld? When Socrates distinguished divine wisdom from human
wisdom to explain the course of his questioning in the public places, it was precisely
to define philosophy, in distinction from divine knowledge of the whole sway of
Being, as the search for knowledge that is embedded in human action (Plato
Apology, 22–3, 20d-e).
The second aspect is the question of the institutionalization of reason in non-
European cultures, especially in the context of its relation to meaning and value. A
comparative study of the relation of the prior entelechy of reason to meaning and
8
Jan Patočka agreed with Husserl’s conception of the entelechy of reason as essentially tied to the
European spirit but went on to claim that the export of reason might therefore do a violence to other
civilizations (Patočka, 221–2).
308 I. Angus
9
As Dermot Moran has shown, Husserl does not in principle deny the possibility of critical reason
to non-European peoples. Rather, “Husserl undoubtedly embraced the view that all cultures begin
in some kind of non-historical, practical mythic stage before becoming historically differentiated.
… there is no evidence that Husserl thinks that Indian or Chinese civilizations are essentially inca-
pable of making the breakthrough from myth to the theoretical attitude, originally performed by “a
few Greek eccentrics.” It is the great and irrational “fact” of history that this breakthrough took
place only in Greece” (Moran 493–4).
Husserl and America: Reflections on the Limits of Europe as the Ground of Meaning… 309
The encounter between Europe and aboriginal that defines the New World has
now become the becoming-planetary of the crisis of reason. This planetary crisis
refers to the reason understood as technology that is based on formal-mathematical
science as the origination of crisis and phenomenological reason as the renewal of
meaning and value through a recovery of a relation to the lifeworld. Meaning and
value must be generated, not simply from looking back to prior institutions, but
from events constituted by the planetary encounter of cultures that motivate an
appeal upward one step toward greater universality.
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Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology
After Merleau-Ponty
Keith Whitmoyer
1 Introduction
It almost goes without saying that Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to Husserl has been
a subject of debate. Merleau-Ponty is often accused of infidelity by Husserl schol-
ars: of providing a mere caricature of Husserl’s philosophy by seeing in his texts a
more existential thinker than Husserl was and of providing an image of Husserl’s
thought that is too closely tailored to suite Merleau-Ponty’s own philosophical
interests.1 Furthermore, unlike figures in the phenomenological tradition like
1
As Zahavi has noted, some of these readings come from Merleau-Ponty scholars, Madison and
Dillon in particular, who tend to view Husserl unfairly as a solipsist, and he persuasively argues
against reading Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to Husserl as overly critical. Others have claimed that
Merleau-Ponty’s reading is largely cherry-picking, and that Merleau-Ponty finds an existential
philosopher where there has only ever been a transcendental one. See the essays collected in
K. Whitmoyer (*)
Social Sciences Department, New York City College of Technology, Brooklyn, NY, USA
to the Korean War.5 Levinas’s essay is easily legible as a response to Sartre, Qu’est-ce
que la littérature? and L’imaginaire being two clear points of reference.6 What may
seem strange is that Merleau-Ponty should choose a debate about engaged literature
and art to frame his discussion of Husserl.7 What, after all, could combing through
the pages of Husserl’s Ideen and the ensuing discussion of phenomenological
method have to do with the questions of freedom, responsibility, authorship, and
criticism that concern Sartre and Levinas? The answer, I believe, is everything, and
from another angle, Merleau-Ponty’s decision to frame his discussion of Husserl in
this way already tells us a great deal about how we are to receive it. It is, I think,
eventually a Nietzschean thought: to say that the philosopher must bear his shadow
is to speak about the affirmation of life, of experience, and of πάθος. Husserl, in his
own way, was a thinker of life which, as Derrida reminds us, is “defracted into all
the fundamental concepts of phenomenology (Leben, Erlebnis, lebendige
Gegenwart, Geistigkeit, etc.).”8 These references to life, what eludes the reduction
in its flight, constitute a darkness that haunts the luminous space of Husserliean
phenomenology, a darkness that Merleau-Ponty retrieves from Levinas, but which
nonetheless marks out a territory for thinking for which it is up to readers of Husserl
today to explore.
Philosophical concern with the shadow of course hearkens back to Plato, who in his
εἰκών ἄτοπος, place-less image of the cave, insists that the prisoners, like us, would
only see the σκιαί, the shadows: of themselves, each other, and the likenesses of the
visible things that stage the θαύματα, the wonders, that capture their gazes.9 Plato,
of course, places special emphasis on the play of σκότος and φῶς, darkness and
light, and the difference—the distance—between the σκιαί and τὸ ἀληθὲς as such,
truth disclosed in and by the light proper to it. The σκιά, the shadow, is only the
dimmest reflection, the φάντασμα, the lingering trace of what lies above, outside, in
the fullness of the light. As Heidegger points out, this provides the perhaps seminal
moment in the history of Western metaphysics: the identification of the persona of
the φιλόσοφος as the bearer of light and thus as the one who struggles, even in the
5
Levinas, Les Temps Modernes, 38 (1948), 771–89.
6
Qu’est-ce que la littérature? was published in its entirety in 1948, but the individual essays that
constitute it had appeared earlier. The first installment appears in Les temps modernes in 1947.
L’imaginaire was published in 1940.
7
Merleau-Ponty’s own response to Qu’est-ce que la littérature? begins as La prose du monde,
which he abandoned and then published later in part as “Le langage indirect et les voix du silence”
in Signes.
8
Merleau-Ponty, Signes, 290/178. All references to this text will be abbreviated as S using the
French followed by the English translation; Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 9.
9
Plato, 514b.
314 K. Whitmoyer
10
Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 66 ff.
11
Plato, 595b.
12
Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 104 ff.
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 315
simply cease to be philosophy, as Plato seems have feared? Levinas does not answer
these questions in detail in this text; he only provides indications but ones worth
considering. It is this invitation to dwell upon the shadow that I believe is eventually
taken up by Merleau-Ponty. This is particularly important when we note that it is
this Levinasian gesture that frames the latter’s reading of Husserl.
Levinas’s concern with art and truth, particularly as it is dramatized by Plato, is
evident, and it is this concern that organizes the essay as well as his response to
Qu’est-ce que la littérature?. Levinas wishes to allow for the darkness that is, that
was, and that is yet to come, which lies “coiled like a worm,” as it were, in the heart
of truth and its light.13 As he says,
Art does not know a particular type of reality; it contrasts with knowledge. It is the very
event of obscuring, a descent into the night, an invasion of shadow. To put it in theological
terms, which will enable us to delimit however roughly our ideas by comparison with con-
temporary notions: art does not belong to the order of revelation.14
At first glance, Levinas’s position seems to be typically Platonic: the work of art
marks the event of concealment since its currency is the εἰκών, the image, which it
substitutes for the object—“an image and not a concept,” an image which “signifies
above all a blindness to concepts.”15 There is a coincidence, a grasping and holding
in the relationship of the philosopher to the concept, a final consummation of her
attempt to penetrate and overcome the darkness in the fullness of the light.
Philosophy, according to Levinas, is thus about activity and power, and which,
therefore “does not involve Heidegger’s ‘letting-be,’ Sein-lassen, in which objectiv-
ity is transmuted into power.”16 The image, by contrast, “marks a hold over us rather
than our own initiative, a fundamental passivity. Possessed, inspired, an artist, we
say, harkens to a muse. An image is musical.”17 There is a Platonic motif here, but is
from the Ion rather than the Republic, and Levinas must surely have it in mind.18 It
is only on the basis of this passivity that the divine beauty of the work of art is able
to shine forth through the body of the poet. Neither the artist nor the audience pos-
sess the image—it is we who are possessed by the image and through it the gods
show their faces among the mortals. As Levinas says, “they [the images, the gods]
impose themselves on us without our assuming them.”19 Art is a pathology: we
undergo it; we are taken up by the ῥυθμός of the image; in becoming possessed we
go out of our minds as our capacity for reason steals away. Rhythm, Levinas says,
“represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, assumption, ini-
tiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried away by it … in
rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from oneself to
13
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 21.
14
Levinas, “Reality and Its Shadow,” 132. Abbreviated RS henceforth.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Plato, 533e4-534d5.
19
RS, Ibid.
316 K. Whitmoyer
20
Ibid., 133.
21
Ibid., 135.
22
This is of course an allusion to Levinas’s Otherwise Than Being and what both Levinas and
Merleau-Ponty preferred to call “transcendence.” Levinas seems to find something like this in
Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on Husserl in Le philosophe et son ombre, which he read as we know
from a small text called “On Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty.” At the end of this reflec-
tion, Levinas says: “In its excellence, which is probably that of love, the laws of being and its unity
do simply continue to rule. The spirituality of the social would seem to signify precisely an ‘other-
wise than being’” (80).
23
Ibid. This is clearly an allusion to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 139, trans. modified.
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 317
I believe it is this Levinasian sense of the shadow that Merleau-Ponty invokes in his
1960 essay, Le philosophe et son ombre. The title already reads as an homage to
Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty was present on the editorial board of Les temps mod-
ernes in 1948 when La réalité et son ombre was published. The question of Merleau-
Ponty’s essay—said to be the “introduction” to his incomplete ontology of la
chair—is what does it mean to read a thinker? We may imagine that to interpret a
philosopher and to assume the tasks of a tradition would require the reader to access
the essence of the writer’s thought. Taking one’s place within the history of phe-
nomenology would mean to touch that one true Husserl who was and who set forth
a modality of thinking that would echo through twentieth century philosophy and
beyond. But this is not the case, for the idea of laying hold of the thinker through his
writings, to coincide with the author in the heaven of his ideas in their absoluteness
assumes that the thinker is always identical with himself, that the writings left
behind are points of access to his essence, and that to read is to pass outside of our-
selves and meld into the author and his texts. But there is no such essence, according
to Merleau-Ponty, for Husserl was not only Husserl, and the writings he left behind
were never meant to constitute a canon. Phenomenology was not meant to be a
doctrine or even a system of philosophy: it has only ever been, at best, a method, an
entry way and invitation into a territory for thinking that has not yet been thought,
an opening onto the thinking yet to come. Husserl, insofar as he was ever himself,
was also his avatars, his images, and his shadows, and like being, the philosopher is
perpetually delayed behind himself in a process of self-withdraw.26 It is in this sense
that Merleau-Ponty will speak of the task of interpretation in a well-known
passage:
At the end of Husserl’s life there is an un-thought of Husserl, which is wholly his and yet
opens out on something else. To think is not to possess the objects of thought; it is to cir-
cumscribe through them a domain for thinking that we do not think yet. As the perceived
world endures only through the reflections, shadows, levels, horizons between things,
which are not things and not nothing, but on the contrary themselves delimit the fields of
possible variation in the same thing and the same world—so the works and thought of a
philosopher are also made of certain articulations between things said, for which there is no
dilemma of objective interpretation and arbitrariness, since they are not objects of thought,
since, like shadow and reflection, they would be destroyed by being subjected to analytic
observation or to insulating thought, and since we can be faithful to and find them only by
thinking again.27
26
For a more developed account of the themes of lateness and delay in Merleau-Ponty’s thought,
see my The Philosophy of Ontological Lateness: Merleau-Ponty and the Tasks of Thinking.
27
S 260-261/160. Translation modified.
318 K. Whitmoyer
think, and at this point must been seen as nothing other than a betrayal. Such accusa-
tions, however, assume a great deal about the meaning of interpretation: that reading
is an act of piety and that to engage with a thinker is to construct the monuments of
praise and remembrance we call interpretations. As Merleau-Ponty understood,
however, “any commemoration is also treason.”28 To become preoccupied with the
“correctness” of a reading, with orthodoxy, for Merleau-Ponty, is to misunderstand
the tasks of reading and interpretation. For the phenomenologist, it is not a question
of “correctness” but the point at which engaging with a thinker opens us onto new
paths of thought as of yet unexplored. The text is not a gospel but a Zeichen, a
marker that points beyond our present manner of thinking, outside of the now
toward what we have not yet imagined. To read Husserl in a way that reduces his
thought to a dogma that we either grasp or fail to grasp is, for Merleau-Ponty, the
grossest misunderstanding of what he invited us to undergo.
This is the framework within which we must understand what might otherwise
seem to be a selective reading of the Ideen. Merleau-Ponty dwells mainly on §18,
“The subjectively conditioned factors of the constitution of the thing; the constitu-
tion of the Objective material thing,” and §49, “The personalistic versus the natural-
istic attitude.” The texts cited by Merleau-Ponty are chosen in order to problematize
the strictly idealist interpretation of the Ideen and find there another Husserl, one
whose thought was more inconsistent, less sure of itself, and free to stray from the
line of its own intentions.29 As Husserl makes clear in the Introduction to Ideen I, the
tasks of this work include the constitution of a pure science of phenomena, which
requires the reorientation of all subordinate attitudes toward being and beings—the
naturalistic attitude in particular—in accordance with the primacy of the phenome-
nological attitude.30 This reorientation of the sense of the world and its regions of
possible articulation requires the demonstration of the possibility of a pure phenom-
enological perspective from which one could then see and account for the naturalis-
tic attitude and its attendant modalities of sense: things, realities, indeed, the whole
of nature as it appears to the scientific gaze. Securing the possibility of the pure
phenomenological perspective and thus the possibility of a pure science of phenom-
enology against the contamination of a subordinate attitude is the anxiety that seems
to motivate Husserl over the course of the Ideen, particularly volume II, which was
28
Ibid., 259/159.
29
For his part, Levinas, in his note on Merleau-Ponty, seems to have approved of the reading of
Husserl offered by Merleau-Ponty in Le philosophe et son ombre: “It is difficult for me to find
terms adequate to express my admiration for the subtle beauty of the analyses in Merleau-Ponty’s
work of that original incarnation of mind [esprit] in which Nature reveals its meaning in move-
ments of the human body that are essentially signifying, i.e., expressive, i.e., cultural; from gesture
to language, to art, to poetry and science: that original incarnation in which Nature reveals its
meaning (or its soul?) in Culture. The French philosopher’s own quest doubtless permitted him to
say the non-said (or at least the non-published) of Husserl’s thought, a thought whose ‘possibili-
ties’ require an attentive ear throughout, despite the apparent immobility or restating of the main
theses” (“On Intersubjectivity, 77).
30
See Husserl, Ideen I, especially the first chapter of part II, “The Positing Which Belongs to the
Natural Attidude and Its Exclusion.”
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 319
31
The course, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, would be offered the following academic
year of 1959–1960.
32
Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 66. Translations of this text by the author. This will be abbrevi-
ated as NC henceforth. In a footnote here Merleau-Ponty remarks: “Husserl seems to have ignored
Nietzsche and all irrationalism.”
33
See, for example, the documents he submitted as part of his candidacy to the Collège de France,
“Un inédit de Maurice Merleau-Ponty,” as well as the lecture given at the Société française philos-
ophique, Primat de la perception. Both of these are translated in the volume, The Primacy of
Perception and Other Essays.
34
NC, 68.
35
Ibid, 68.
320 K. Whitmoyer
activity,” and hence, according to Merleau-Ponty, we are brought before the prob-
lematic of hyle and morphe, matter and form, as it figures in Husserl’s thought. This
problematic, accordingly, necessitates the recovery of an “Urerlebnis [originary
lived experience] which is not Auffassungsinhalt-Auffasung [concept-content and
concept], which is not objectification,” but is rather an “encounter with the non-
thetic at the heart of consciousness,” “that which is before acts: act intentionality
and operant or latent intentionality,” which of course does not disburden itself of all
the “problems of passive syntheses.”36 It is not a question, with respect to such
remarks, of calling into question the point at which or the extent to which Husserl
was a thinker of an active, thetic, and positional consciousness for whom the world
is the intentional correlate: Husserl was precisely this kind of thinker. What is
important, for Merleau-Ponty, is that in spite of being such a thinker, Husserl none-
theless brings us to a point beyond that: his own thought already inscribes within
itself something else, something other than what it perhaps meant to be.
The mutation that develops within Husserl’s thought, the perpetuation of this
tension between the active and the passive, matter and form, the thetic and pre-
thetic, reverberates throughout his work to the very tasks assigned to reflection,
thinking, and philosophy. Reflection, within the methodological auspices of the
transcendental reduction, is no longer coincidence and fusion with its absolute
source but peels back and discloses an infrastructure of intentional layers in which
our reflections are immersed, indeed, which composes them and renders them pos-
sible as reflection in advance of our assumption of an attitude with respect to them.
As Merleau-Ponty notes,
[R]eflection or transcendental reduction … cannot be adequation with a universal constitut-
ing Mind, nor consist in replacing us in it, nor that which gets carried away with coinci-
dence with it. It knows itself second. It discloses an unreflected which is not outside of its
grasp, in principle, but which it neither reabsorbs. All reduction is eidetic: it does not put us
in possession of our existence…. The subject escapes itself in seizing itself or seizes itself
in its escape.37
It is in this sense that transcendental reflection carries itself to the outside. It does
not consist in arriving at the scene of the advent of sense or being—nor should it be
conceived as reflection’s absolute possession of itself. In returning to the subject, to
the interior, the subject escapes, the inside finds itself on the way to the outside: it is
a process of evisceration. Phenomenological reflection, in this way, only arrives
insofar as it does not arrive, is able to take hold of some truth only at the point where
such truth nonetheless remains beyond its reach.
Across the pages of the Ideen, Husserl will insist over and over again on the
primacy of absolute consciousness, its purity, and necessity for phenomenology—
and yet, as Merleau-Ponty will insist in his lectures as well as in Signes, there is a
thought functioning there, even if it only murmurs, that brings us closer to that
fundamental passivity in which such consciousness is immersed, a scene of sense to
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 321
which it arrives late.38 This passivity, this delay, is crystalized, for Husserl, in the
experiential body, the living body that functions as the “zero point” of my orienta-
tion and perceptual experience.39 The living body is oriented within a world with
which it interfaces, that constitutes for it an environment and context to the point
where the possibilities opened up for it through its organs respond to worldly
indexes: vision, for example, does not set itself forth in a vacuum but, we “see in
air,”40 which constitutes for us a level to which all subsequent deviations refer; if we
were to wear colored lenses, if we were to suffer from jaundice, or take some santo-
nin, the rose or yellow colored field of vision would count as new level, and our
modified experience would eventually come to constitute the norm, the “orthoaes-
thetic” world from which all subsequent changes would deviate.41 The world in this
way appears to bodies: along their contour, in accordance with their demands and
the possibilities they open up as bodies, and in this way the world’s sensicality is the
mirror of the primordial, material sense that our bodies already are. What is more,
in referring itself to living bodies, the world appears intersubjectively to the point
where even a ghost requires an ephemeral body that manifests itself to others besides
myself.
It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty will argue that Husserl’s texts lead in oppo-
site directions: “On the one hand, it descends toward Nature, the sphere of the
Urpräsentierbare; whereas it is drawn on the other hand toward
the world of persons and minds.” Phenomenological method does not merely
take us to the interiority of immanence, but such an attempt at return is already an
excursus in the sense of excurrere: to project, extend, to run
out of. Its centripetality” that manifests itself to others besides myself.42
It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty will argue that Husserl’s texts lead in oppo-
site directions: “On the one hand, it descends toward Nature, the sphere of the
Urpräsentierbare; whereas it is drawn on the other hand toward the world of per-
sons and minds.”43 Phenomenological method does not merely take us to the interi-
ority of immanence, but such an attempt at return is already an excursus in the sense
of excurrere: to project, extend, to run out of. Its centripetality is already centrifu-
gality. As Merleau-Ponty notes in Signes, transcendental reflection thus results in
the realization that the movement of return to ourselves—of ‘re-entering ourselves,’ St.
Augustine said—is as if torn apart [déchiré] by an inverse movement which it elicits [qu’il
38
In a draft of the chapter of The Visible and the Invisible published under the title, “Interrogation
and Reflection,” a brouillon d’une rédaction, Merleau-Ponty notes: “too late for knowing the naive
world which was before it and too early for knowing everything precisely as initiative, optional
operation, critical enterprise, and cultural second” (NC, 358).
39
Husserl, Ideen II, 56/61.
40
Ibid., 60/65.
41
Ibid., 62/67. Santonin is an old drug used to eliminate parasites, a side-effect of which is “yellow
vision.”
42
Ibid., 96/101.
43
S 287/178.
322 K. Whitmoyer
suscite]. Husserl rediscovers that identity of ‘re-entering self’ [rentrer de soi] and ‘going-
outside self’ [sortir de soi] which, for Hegel, defined the absolute.44
In its sortir, the egress aroused by its own reflexivity, transcendental phenomenol-
ogy, already in Husserl, becomes an inquiry into the sense of that which can appear,
that which can take shape and make itself known since, as Husserl says, “all real
unities are unities of sense.”45 But this inquiry into unities of sense, into the articulate,
that which could be, could become, δύναμις, is nothing other than the task of ontol-
ogy: an inquiry into nature, into φύσις.46 It is this project that, according to Merleau-
Ponty, is foreshadowed in the Ideen even in spite of Husserl’s insistence on the
purity and primacy of transcendental subjectivity.
But all this is to say that the Ideen is a series of texts, meditations, even experi-
ments, that lack the systemeticity and coherence the reader may have expected from
them. The same could be said of all of Husserl’s writings, and that we have a per-
petuation of preliminary studies and introductions for good reason. As Merleau-
Ponty notes, “These adventures of constitutive analysis—these encroachments,
reboundings and circularities—do not, as we were saying, seem to have bothered
Husserl very much,”47 and, after all, why should we readers of Husserl be bothered
by the spectre of inconsistency or by the author’s apparent need to perpetually begin
the phenomenological project from scratch ad perpetuam? The disappointment we
encounter in our search for the proper Husserl, for a Husserl finally divested of his
flesh, “delivered from his life, given up to conversation with his peers,” is a spurious
one: spurious because phenomenology, even as a discourse of essences, was never a
search for the quietude and tranquility of the answer. In Husserl, phenomenology
was always a diligent but restless searching, a constant call for rigor, not a solution
but only ever “a question for itself.”48 As Merleau-Ponty notes in a famous
passage,
The ultimate task of phenomenology as philosophy of consciousness is to understand its
relationship to non-phenomenology. What resists phenomenology within us—natural
being, the ‘barbarous’ principle Schelling spoke of—cannot remain outside phenomenol-
ogy and should have its place within it. The philosopher must bear his shadow, which is not
simply the factual absence of future light.49
44
Ibid., 263/161.
45
Husserl, Ideen II, 106/128. Italics Husserl.
46
See Aristotle, Physics, 200b.
47
S 288/179.
48
Ibid., 289/178.
49
Ibid., 290/178.
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 323
and empty contact of being with itself, its silent self-identity, changeless, eternal,
without color, depth, and ambiguity, and we could probably only say of such pure
being that it was nothing. Phenomenology, in opposition to this Platonism, is a
making-visible that opens itself to light only at the point where it allows for the
occlusion of darkness, shadow, and depth. It only makes way for truth, τὸ ἀληθὲς,
at the point where it welcomes its other, and thus only becomes philosophy as such
in the hospitality it shows toward non-philosophy.
Merleau-Ponty’s reference to non-phenomenology in Signes is no coincidence
but recalls the preoccupation with philosophy and non-philosophy in his lectures La
philosophie aujourd’hui and Philosophie et non-philosophie depuis Hegel, 1958–
1959 and 1960–1961 respectively. In the former course, which includes the discus-
sion of Husserl already touched upon, Merleau-Ponty speaks of “Our state of
non-philosophy,” a reference to the crisis of rationality that worried Husserl at the
end of his life, that concerned Merleau-Ponty decades later, and that should perhaps
still concern us today. The crisis for Merleau-Ponty, as it was for Husserl, is signaled
by the alienation of the sciences from their birth in the Lebenswelt but more broadly
is also a crisis of relationships between people (Marx) as well as a crisis in our rela-
tionship to nature. Our state of non-philosophy today thus designates the “deca-
dence of express, official philosophy,” on one hand, but at the same time,
this decadence of philosophy is inessential; it is a certain manner of philosophizing (accord-
ing to substance, subject-object, causality). Philosophy will find help in poetry, art, etc., in
a much closer relationship with them, it will revive and reinterpret its own metaphysical
past—which is not past. But, it remains that, for the moment, it is in crisis. What is taking
shape is either stammering, or quasi-silence, or even what expressly presents itself as
non-philosophy.50
Here in these lectures non-philosophy names what have historically been desig-
nated as philosophy’s others: literature, painting, music, and psychoanalysis. The
express and official philosophy that holds sway today has abandoned the tasks of
thinking, and this is what Merleau-Ponty has in mind when he refers to “academic
forms of nihilism.” Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, Husserl encountered this nihilism in
the rise of fascism in Germany; Heidegger’s career coincides with “the development
of public nihilism,” and Sartre “is already a child of the nihilistic period which
begins with the war of 1914.”51 There is nonetheless hope for philosophy to stand in
the face of this nihilism even if it is as of yet merely stammering or quasi-silence.
It is this kind of hope that Merleau-Ponty finds a year later in what he calls
“a-philosophy.” As he says at the beginning of the course on Hegel,
It is not a matter of struggle between philosophy and its adversaries (positivism), but of a
philosophy which wants to be philosophy by being non-philosophy—a ‘negative philoso-
phy’ (in the sense of ‘negative theology’), which opens access to the absolute, not as
‘beyond,’ second positive order, but as another order which must be on the other side, the
double, only accessible through it—true philosophy mocks philosophy, is a-philosophy.52
50
NC, 39.
51
Ibid., 156–57.
52
Ibid., 275. For commentary on this text and Merleau-Ponty’s later thought, see Carbone.
324 K. Whitmoyer
A-philosophy, the reverse, the negative of express and official philosophy, includes
the modes of non-philosophy that assume the tasks of thinking abandoned by posi-
tivism: painting, literature, music, and psychoanalysis. It takes this thinking further,
however, as Merleau-Ponty elaborates through reference to a series of passages
from the preface of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science.53 In his remarks on this text,
Merleau-Ponty says that
true philosophy is beyond: great suspicion, abyss, a-philosophy by fidelity to what we live;
this is ended not by ‘knowing everything’ (new positivism) and not by depression, but by
will to appearance—cf. Hegel: appearance and depth are not contraries—Nietzsche holds
to the quality of the ‘philosopher:’ the absolute of appearance.54
Art and philosophy assume the tasks of thinking at the point where they demon-
strate their fidelity to life, to the experience undergone, to the πάθος, the suffering
of our dwelling here on Earth. Where the old philosophy longs to die easily,
a-philosophy holds its feet to the surface of the earth and wishes only for breath and
life; where philosophy longs to give itself over to the absolute outside, a-philosophy
sees that the absolute is not beyond but that thought is already enveloped within
it—not the absolute of the unchanging divine, but the absolute of that which makes
itself manifest, the absolute of the phenomena. If phenomenology is a return, it is
the return to the breath, to ψυχή, and to its experiri and its flight.55
It seems to be this Nietzschean worry—a worry about philosophy’s predilection
with the outside of life, what is beyond the vicissitudes of generation and decay—
that provokes Merleau-Ponty’s encounter with Husserl and the Ideen specifically.
Already in these texts we see the tension that would increasingly come to the fore-
ground in the later texts in the period of the Krisis: the Husserl who is a thinker of
strenge Wissenschaft, in his commitment to scientific rigor, to clarity and precision
in his commitment to philosophical absoluteness, and the Husserl who was a thinker
of Erlebnis, of the necessity and primacy of the living—in its Ablauf, its flow, and
perhaps even in its chaos. These two Husserls mark out the play between the “tran-
scendental” and “empirical” in his thought, though these terms are almost certainly
inadequate. Merleau-Ponty’s perhaps agonized engagement with Husserl insists
that we not occlude the latter Husserl while paying attention to the former, even if
at some point the former is the one professed by the letter of his writings. In spite of
the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism, in spite of the death of his son in the First
World War, in spite of himself, Husserl manages to not give up on life. Derrida elo-
quently articulates this the tension between these two Husserls, even though there
are almost certainly more than two, in the careful reading he offers in Voice and
Phenomenon:
53
The Preface to the Second Edition.
54
NC 278.
55
I have developed this motif more elsewhere. See Whitmoyer, “The Sense of the Transcendental:
Ψυχή in Heraclitus, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty.” Chiasmi International, Mimesis/Vrin/Penn
State, 2016.
Husserl and His Shadows: Phenomenology After Merleau-Ponty 325
‘Living’ is … the name of what precedes the reduction and escapes finally from all the
distributions that the reduction brings to light. Life, however, is its own distribution and its
own opposition to its other. By determining ‘living’ in this way, we just therefore named the
resource of the insecurity of discourse, the point at which precisely it can no longer re-
secure its possibility and its rigor in the nuance. This concept of life is then grasped in an
agency which is no longer that of pre-transcendental naiveté, in the language of everyday
life or in the language of biological science. But if this ultra-transcendental concept of life
allows us to think life (in the everyday sense or in the sense of biology) and if has never
been inscribed in any language, this concept of life perhaps calls for another name.56
56
Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 13.
57
Derrida, On Touching: Jean Luc Nancy, 19.
58
This phrase is now invariably associated with Deleuze and Difference and Repetition. What we
have tried to indicate under the name “shadow” here Deleuze names “encounter,” and I place this
here as a provocation: “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not
of recognition but of a fundamental encounter…. It is not an aistheton but an aistheteon. It is not a
quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that
by which the given is given” (Deleuze, 140).
59
Toadvine, 94.
60
RS, 139.
326 K. Whitmoyer
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Phenomenological Crossings: Givenness
and Event
Emre Şan
1 Introduction
E. Şan (*)
Istanbul 29 Mayis University, Istanbul, Turkey
First of all, I’d like to interrogate the phenomenological reason defined by an ideal
of adequation which thematizes the intentionality with reference to a lack or excess
of appearance in the doctrine of givenness by adumbration (Abschattungen). In §41
of Ideas I, Husserl points out that all spatial things can only be seen through chang-
ing adumbrations (Husserl 1962: 87). Rudolf Bernet reformulates this argument:
“This well-known Husserlian insight can be further articulated in terms of a ‘lack’
and an ‘exces’ that characterize all intuitive givenness of perceptual things. Such a
lack and exces make that the relation between a perceiving subject and perceived
thing is never ‘quite right’. Despite their intentional ‘correlation’, perceiver and
perceived never perfectly match or mirror one another. This non-coincidence or dif-
ference is what Husserl means by the ‘inadequate intuitive fulfilment’ of all thing
perception. According to this first scenario, the lack is entirely on the side of the
givenness of the thing perceived and the excess is on the side of the intentions of the
perceiver” (Bernet 2012, 565). From this point of view, Husserl understands intu-
ition as the presence of the thing in itself, as proof of an adequacy; in contrast with
empty intentionality, Husserl’s intuition is grasping of the thing according to the
plenitude of its determinations, and therefore excludes any kind of lacuna or inde-
terminacy. Fulfillment in this context is ‘filling up’ an emptiness. This relation of
emptiness and fulfillment possesses a dynamic structure that corresponds to the
fundamental orientation of intentionality toward knowledge. On that basis, the non-
intuitive is pure and simple absence and the emptiness is non-givenness rather than
a specific mode of givenness. The non-intuitive moments (strictly speaking: ‘non-
sensed’) implied in perception—everything about the thing which is not given—
could have only a subjective existence, as if the subjective were the index of the
non-intuitive. Such is without question the deepest root of the subjectivation of
appearance in Husserl’s world: the inability of conceiving of absence or deficiency
as a constitutive moment of phenomenality and as an “objective” moment. Husserl
understands absence as the reverse of presence rather than as constitutive of pres-
ence; put in another way, emptiness is what cannot be, what does not have a reality,
which is why an absence from the objective point of view can only refer to a subjec-
tive reality. In effect, to deprive emptiness of the status of a mode of given is to
postulate that a thing is not present if it does not present itself (so to speak, exhaus-
tively) in its manifestations; it is to posit that there is fulfillment only as adequate
possession of the object. Thus the denial of the phenomenological positivity of emp-
tiness is merely an expression of the assimilation carried out by Husserl between the
structural relation of empty intentionality and fulfillment. It is also an expression of
the contrast between the deficient mode of givenness and the presence of the object.
To conceive of fulfillment as the presence of the thing itself is ipso facto to interpret
all partiality or indetermination as a deficient mode of givenness. It is to understand
the focus on emptiness as a lack, to deny any positivity to absence.
330 E. Şan
From this, it is clear that for Husserl perception is submitted to the horizon of a
givenness in the flesh and adequate to the thing which maintains the primacy of
form over matter and of meaning over sensation. Thus, givenness is restricted to the
determination of presence in the interdependent figures of intuition and objectivity.
He supposes a reciprocity between existence and adequate donation, intuitiveness
and originarity. It is vital to emphasize that Husserl refuses to juxtapose non-
givenness with phenomenology, because for him perceptive inadequation is always
caught within the horizon of a full adequation functioning as a regulatory idea for
perception. This ideal pole requires a telos of a process which, in principle, is end-
less. By doing so, intentionnality has been conceived from the outset as intending
an ideal object. In other words, by locating lack on the side of givenness of the
thing, Husserl requires further givenness of the experienced object to describe the
structure of our experience by a theoretical relation to the world allegedly estab-
lished through intuition.
But there is also another way. What shows itself to the subject is always more
than what he/she can grasp. Rudolf Bernet adds, “the thing shows qualities and
meanings the subject did not expect and its shining appearance carries a ‘comet tail’
of other possible appearances and other things possibly appearing. In this second
scenario, the lack is thus on the side of the perceiver and excessive richness on the
side of the appearing phenomena” (Bernet 2012, 565). In my opinion, this second
scenario calls for a critical deconstruction of the Husserlian concept of givenness.
The specificity of this phenomenological approach resides in the fact that it defini-
tively gives up the certainty of progress, a certainty that for Husserl was nourished
by the hope that, even if it is in the name of the ideal regulator, the plenitude of
givenness is accessible. This new phenomenological movement moves toward a
description of a hyper-phenomenon or counter-phenomenon which exceeds the
field of appearance. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “that to see is always to see more than
one sees” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 247). Merleau-Ponty characterizes the visible
through its intrinsic invisibility, an invisibility which is not a negation but a syn-
onym of visibility. Thus the seen always remains withdrawn from its manifestation
and therefore its transcendence is constitutive of its phenomenality.
The task of this post-Husserlian phenomenology consists in the conception of
the structure of phenomenality with respect to its originality. It imposes a disjunc-
tion between originarity and the horizon of adequation and deals with all phenom-
ena whose originarity excludes fulfillment and implies a constitutive dimension of
non-presence. Being interested in this constitutive dimension of non-presence is
thus, precisely, being concentrated on what exceeds and what is prior to intentional-
ity: an originary subjectivity for Henry and an originary anonymity for Merleau-
Ponty. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and that of Henry seem to be opposed
just like the radical needs for transcendence and for immanence are opposed, lead-
ing to the destruction of the Husserlian matrix of transcendence within immanence.
Nonetheless, they share the intimate proximity of the obverse and the reverse. It
should be pointed out that the significant progress made by the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty (no subjective self-givenness would be possible without worldly
hetero-givenness) and by the phenomenology of Henry (no worldly hetero-givenness
Phenomenological Crossings: Givenness and Event 331
3 T
he Problem of Givenness as the Problem
of the Phenomenality of the Phenomena
way as to render it possible in its essence” (Henry 1963, 312). In his view, imma-
nence has two fundamentally connected characteristics: its absence of distance from
self and, thus, its inability to show itself in any sort of ‘outside’. Contrary to tran-
scendance which has a relative phenomenality, immanence is defined by Henry as
an autonomous and irrelative form of manifestation: one that does not depend on
another form of manifestation to be manifested; one that is identical with its own
manifestation (Henry 1963, 289–290). He notes that: “Life is not affected first by
something else, by objects or by the horizon of a world. It is affected by itself. The
content of its affection is itself, and it is only in this way that it can be ‘living’. To
live is to experience oneself and nothing else. The phenomenality of this pure expe-
rience of oneself is an original affectivity, a pure ‘pathos’ that no distance separates
from oneself” (Henry 2015, 120). This is indeed what Henry has in mind when he
qualifies his phenomenology as material phenomenology, in other words, it owes
nothing to form or to essence. Henry does not place himself beyond intentionality
but arrives at its limits in and through phenomenology. He displays the limits of
Husserlian intentionality, incapable of revealing the hyper-phenomenon of life as
pure presence. From this viewpoint, Henry clearly pushes phenomenology and its
central theme, intentionality, to their limits. As François-David Sebbah noticed,
Henry has exceeded intentionality in the direction of a Self older than the knowl-
edge of intentionality (Sebbah 2012, 6).
Similarly, the Husserlian idea of intentionality is absent from Merleau-Ponty’s
vocabulary, and within his frame of thought, intentionality can no longer be
described only as a derivative phenomenon. In other words, intentionality is revealed
to itself in the dissolution of what it thought it was. The aim of this a-subjective
phenomenology is to obtain the autonomy of the phenomenal field by freeing the
transcendence of the world from every form of objectivity and freeing the existence
of the subject from every form of immanence. It is on this sole condition that the
autonomy of the phenomenal field can be guaranteed. If the Husserlian language of
transcendence were to be translated into ontological language, it would be possible
to speak, with Merleau-Ponty, of an “intentionality within being” (Merleau-Ponty
1968, 244) which is the ante-predicative relation between the world and our life.
Thus the incarnation of sense in the sensible supposes the incarnation of the subject
who apprehends this sense. The dimension of the subject’s belonging to the world
is immediately considered in terms of corporeality. As he writes: “the flesh of the
world is of the Being-seen, i.e. is a Being that is eminently percipi, and it is by it that
we can understand the percipere” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 250). The phenomenon—
that is, the flesh—is pregnant with all possible perceptions, hence, the being-seen
makes it possible to understand the perceiving, the percipere. We can no longer tie
the meaning of being back to a consciousness; on the contrary, the meaning of the
being of consciousness depends on the meaning of being of phenomenality.
Transcendence is no longer a transcendence of a transcendant de jure accessible
through knowledge. Transcendence is assumed as such; absolute invisibility is a
“pure transcendence without an ontic mask” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 229): that is, as
nothing of the present (and consequently as no part of a presence to self, of con-
sciousness). From now on, it is the irreducible excess of the world over the moments
Phenomenological Crossings: Givenness and Event 333
which composes it. It is clear that, qua phenomenal being, the world cannot exist
like a thing, fully positive and self-identical. More precisely, if it is true that the
whole is nothing more than its parts without being the sum of them, we must
acknowledge that nothingness has a certain reality. If that which is nothing more
than its parts has an efficacy, we can no longer contrast nothingness to being, and
we must admit that the phenomenal totality is a singular form of nothingness, a
negativity that is not absolutely opposed to positivity. For if the world is nothing
more than the parts, that is to say, a totality immanent in the parts, it follows that it
is not different from things, because it is not another thing. What we call world is
this difference without distance or duality, transcendence in Merleau-Ponty’s lan-
guage. The totality reveals a transcendence that is not the transcendence of a tran-
scendent, or a reducible distance, and conversely the transcendence of the world is
understood as an inexhaustible whole. The ultimate determination of the phenome-
non of the world implies not to be, but to appear as anti-phenomenon or dephenom-
enalisation instead of an over-phenomenon. This fact is described by Merleau-Ponty
as specifically ontological: “[T]he transcendence of the thing compels us to say that
it is plenitude only by being inexhaustible, that is, by not being all actual under the
look—but it promises this total actuality since it is there…” (Merleau-Ponty 1968,
191). Even if the relation is intentional, it signifies that the total actuality exists only
as a promise, the zero degree of visibility, opening of a dimension of visible. It is
therefore a promise without a promiser, a totality in a non-positive sense. This is not
a promise made with an intention on the promiser’s part to convince a hearer, or to
give up going back to the things themselves. On the contrary, this is a call to give to
the things what essentially belongs to them. “Givenness as promise is not limited to
the determination of presence in the interdependent figures of intuition and objec-
tivity” (Şan 2012, 302). The invisible is not beyond the visible, nothing other than
the visible.
Henry’s hyper-phenomenon of life and Merleau-Ponty’s counter-phenomenon of
world escape the distinction between presence and absence in their Husserlian
sense. It is not a statement of intention because it is not ordered by the telos of
adequation or fulfillment. Unlike Husserl who presupposes a possible fulfillment,
Henry and Merleau-Ponty integrate a new dimensions into givenness (space of ‘Ur-’
or over-presence for Henry and an irreducible absence for Merleau-Ponty).
According to Henry, the horizontal givenness, the object-manifestation is possible
only on the basis of a self-revealing life. It is only because we are already given to
ourselves that we can be affected by the world. Life is affectivity and it is an event
which is strictly non-horizontal and non-ekstatic. Affectivity reveals the absolute in
its totality because it is nothing other than its perfect adherence to self, nothing other
than its coincidence with self, because it is the autoaffection of Being in the absolute
unity of its radical immanence. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty argues that, as an inex-
haustible totality, the world cannot be present in itself (otherwise, it would no longer
be a totality, but a worldy thing among others): it is, to be precise, present as absent.
That which manifests itself, that which comes to light in every concrete perception,
at the same time withdraws from its presence: it presents itself by remaining absent.
334 E. Şan
Phenomenology is governed by rules that are completely different from those that
are applied to the object or to being because the world of phenomena, the world of
any phenomenally lawful order, is independent from the world of realities and the
world of actuality. This rupture with the horizon of the object and being requires a
new perspective for understanding the phenomenality of the phenomenon. Thus we
need a change of paradigm for understanding the unity of phenomenality. The lead-
ing idea of this kind of phenomenology is that we cannot determine phenomena
according to prior conditions but rather we can determine conditions according to
phenomena.
It is striking to observe how Marion differs from Henry and Merleau-Ponty by
relating the discoveries of this pathos of thought to the phenomenon as such and not
just to certain special hyper-phenomenon or counter-phenomenon. If for Henry and
Merleau-Ponty, the description of a hyper-phenomenon or counter-phenomenon is
a state of exception in Husserlian phenomenology, Marion confers a philosophical
significance and legitimacy to this state of exception and universalises it.
The strength of Marion’s thinking is based on his description of saturated phe-
nomena as part of his project to extend phenomenality “as far as possible”—an
ambition that he justifies by an injunction: “[I]n phenomenology, even the least pos-
sibility obliges” (Marion 2002, 199). This widening is not an excessive use of the
method of phenomenology. In opposition to both poor and common phenomena
(phenomena whose weakness in intuition is compensated by the strength of the
concept to fill it out), Marion describes phenomena that are rich in intuition (phe-
nomena without concepts, the intuition of which surpasses intention). He calls these
phenomena “saturated phenomena,” where the “intuition sets forth a surplus that the
concept cannot organize, therefore that the intention cannot foresee” (Marion 2002,
225). In this sense, he shares an affinity with Henry. As Marion writes: “one must,
without question, attribute the elaboration of a phenomenology appropriate to the
Phenomenological Crossings: Givenness and Event 335
and that which appears, appearing is not considered as a datum for the conscious
subject but as “the givenness of what appears.” In this sense, givenness precedes
both intuition and intention because the sense they make is only for and through an
appearance. Since givenness precedes everything, for Marion intuition is a mode of
givenness and it does not contradict the autonomy of signification established by
Husserl. Marion’s radical reading of Husserl harmonizes the primacy of intuition
with the autonomy of signification by way of the more originary notion of given-
ness. In this regard, the subject, l’adonné, does not expect the given from the outset
but discovers itself as given at the very same moment as it discovers the given itself.
Thus, to say that in the saturated phenomenon, more is given than it is aimed, it is
certainly not to subtract such a phenomenon from the aim and therefore from the
order of meaning. It is rather to affirm its belonging to an irreducible plurality of
meanings, to place it under the horizon of an open multiplicity of aims. The experi-
ence of saturation is a saturation of meaning. Therefore, the dimension of meaning
is not the exclusive monopoly of a transcendental subjectivity in Husserlian sense.
The ego can no longer maintain its transcendental pretension of origin, but must be
limited to receive what is given, without setting the conditions of possibility of
experience.
In this way, attributing primacy to givenness means accepting phenomena as
given rather than in any way constituted, and excluding any suggestion of phenom-
ena appearing under conditions imposed on them by a subject. Thus Marion asserts
that givenness must free itself from the justification and limit of the horizon of
phenomenality and from any attempt on the part of the I at positing itself as subject
and condition of experience in the constitution of the phenomenon. As Marion
writes: “[I]n order that any phenomenon might be inscribed within a horizon (and
to find its condition of possibility there), it is necessary that that horizon be delim-
ited (it is its definition) and therefore that the phenomenon remain finite. In order
for a phenomenon to be reduced to an obviously finite I who constitutes it, the
phenomenon must be reduced to the status of finite objectivity. In both cases, the
finitude of the horizon and of the I is indicated by the finitude of the intuition itself”
(Marion 2008, 31). Marion’s work goes a step further and claims that unconditioned
and irreducible phenomena could become possible only if a nonfinite intuition
ensured their givenness because givenness is the ultimate principle of phenomenol-
ogy. In the case of a saturated phenomenon, its excess of intuition prevents it from
being limited by a subject or a horizon. Such a phenomenon, which is “uncondi-
tioned (by its horizon) and irreducible (to an I),” is given simply as itself, and is
therefore “a phenomenon par excellence” (Marion 2002, 189). It is the saturated
phenomenon which saturates intention; that is to say, the intended concepts are
saturated by intuition; it gives much to intention, so the concept cannot bear this
excessing of limits which reduce and condition intuition. Marion seeks to push
Kant’s fundamental assertion in the Critique of Pure Reason that “thought without
concepts are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,” demonstrating that
knowledge obtained through the union of intuition and concepts does not suffice as
the true measure of the phenomenality of all possible phenomena. Super-presence
of saturated phenomenon (idol, icon, flesh and event) is not comparable to my sense
Phenomenological Crossings: Givenness and Event 337
of it: it can no longer be measured; excess and plenitude coincide in it. In one of the
more emphatic statements from Being Given, Marion declares: “my entire project,
by contrast [to metaphysics], aims to think the common-law phenomenon, and
through it the poor phenomenon, on the basis of the paradigm of the saturated phe-
nomenon, of which the former two offer only weakened variants, and from which
they derive by progressive diminishment. For the saturated phenomenon does not
give itself apart from the norm, by way of exception to the definition of phenome-
nality; to the contrary, its own most property is to render thinkable the measure of
manifestation in terms of givenness and to recover it in its common-law variety,
indeed in the poor phenomenon” (Marion 2002, 227). With Marion’s meditation on
givenness, the pure phenomenality of phenomena, “what metaphysics rules out as
exception (the saturated phenomenon), phenomenology here takes for its norm”
(Marion 2002, 227).
An event is a one type of saturated phenomenon, the phenomenon saturated
according to quantity. The event saturates the category of quantity insofar as it gives
itself. By showing itself (without recourse to any measure of visibility) as much as
it gives itself (without recourse to any horizon of meaning or being) the event
ensures for itself a quantity, the quantity of givenness as measure of its own phe-
nomenality. The event saturates the category of quantity by giving too much, more
than could ever be measured, its parts infinitely exceeding their sum by continually
being given. By imposing itself or giving itself absolutely—landing by surprise—
the event cannot be anticipated, thus cannot be aimed at, measured, nor intended. As
such it is ‘unforeseeable’ according to quantity. As Marion writes: “the saturated
phenomenon is attested first in the figure of the historical phenomenon, or the event
carried to its apex. It saturates the category of quantity” (Marion 2002, 228). The
phenomenon of the historical events gives too much information, it can never be
quantified, never be recreated. The event allows the phenomenon to appear without
being limited to a finite horizon or reduced to concepts that are imposed by a sub-
ject. However, it might be justly objected that it is an exceptional phenomenon, and
it is limited to a region lying at the margins of phenomenality.
Marion’s discussion of events is not limited to their saturation. He argues that the
event escapes metaphysics, inasmuch as it is not subjected to any principle of suf-
ficient reason. This is because we cannot recognize the event, or more precisely the
original eventfulness of the phenomenon, for as long as we think according to meta-
physics, since metaphysics always speaks in the name of the cause. In the case of
the event, comprehension always arrives late, but above all comprehension itself
constitutes this delay, producing it and provoking it. The event cannot be foreseen
or made intelligible. Event-ness characterizes phenomena more profoundly than
object-ness. It is precisely because it accomplishes its actuality more perfectly than
the object, with more autonomy, clarity, and better results, and because it proves
itself to be infinitely more actual than the object. Marion argues that, “[I]n fact, the
event appears only by already disappearing, since it becomes visible only with, and
thus after, its bursting forth: we only discover the event as having always-already
happened, ex eventu, when it is already too late to catch sight of its bursting forth.
Consequently, possibility, which does not precede the event in our intentionality
338 E. Şan
toward it, comes as a result of the event’s effect on us: even when it is still incom-
prehensible (although known, or rather precisely because clearly and distincly
known and seen), the event decides sovereignly upon the possibles that will hence-
forth be imposed on us. The impossible and the unforeseeable for us open our only
and unforeseen possibles: their facticity possibizes us” (Marion 2015, 186). An
event is that which precedes any determination of its cause. It surges forth without
expectation, radically changes the given order of things, then disappears, leaving its
mark without return.
An event exceeds the laws of cause and effect. Effects produce as much as —
often more than— the cause. Effects can never be fully absorbed by the cause. The
effect is preeminent to the cause. It is the effect that grants status to the cause as an
object of inquiry: without effect, no reason to go looking for the cause. The effect
imposes itself, arrives unpredictably on its own terms, and in so doing, permits iden-
tification of the cause as an after effect. Consequently, transcending any measure and
all understanding, the event exhibits three general characteristics. First, the event is
unrepeatable. According to Marion, “[I]f it comes from itself and without precedent,
the event of unknown cause remains a found event, absolutely unique” (Marion
2002, 170). An event comes upon us only once, without sufficient antecedents and
without recurrence. To be sure, there are circumstances that may have led up to the
event. But the event stands out from whatever came before it; hence its second char-
acteristic, excessiveness. The event stands out, posits itself at a distance from all
possible causes—“ex-sists,” in the Heideggerian sense—gives itself in excess of all
possible attributes. Giving too much ever to conceive the whole in terms of the sum
of its parts, the event is excessive, and as such, unrepeatable. The final characteristic
of the event is its possibility. The event is impossible from a metaphysical point of
view because its possibility is not exercised in relation to any essence (the event ex-
sists outside of all that precedes it), nor can it be actualized according to a concept
which allows us to foresee it. However, the metaphysical impossibility of the event
points paradoxically to the absolute possibility of it as given as a saturated phenom-
enon. Giving itself without cause, concept, or essence other than itself, the event is
possible in as much as it shows itself by imposing itself on a gaze which receives it.
As a result, the event achieves the destruction of the a priori conditions or principles
and the evenmentality of the phenomenon brings together the spontaneous forma-
tion of meaning, the nonobjective excess (ungegenständlicher Überschuss) at the
heart of the phenomenon, and the paradoxal character of given.
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Press.
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler
and the Politics of Epochal Suspension
Ben Turner
1 Introduction
B. Turner (*)
School of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford College, University of Kent,
Canterbury, UK
e-mail: b.turner@kent.ac.uk
for Stiegler, requires the re-founding of a political economy and of social systems
capable of establishing the conditions of a new ‘epoch’.
To understand Stiegler’s apocalyptic proclamation we must view ‘epochality’ in
a double sense, entailing a politicisation of what Edmund Husserl introduced into
phenomenology as a methodological principle (Husserl 2002, 51–59). Stiegler
rethinks the epokhé as part of what he calls an ‘epokhal redoubling’ (Stiegler 2013b,
34–36). On the one hand, this encompasses the suspension of reference to any natu-
ral attitude found within Husserl’s original formulation. On the other, it requires us
to draw conclusions that are only implicit within Husserl’s strictly methodological
consideration of the epokhé. Not only must we re-enter into these worldly condi-
tions, but we must also engage in their re-constitution and re-invention. Hence,
Stiegler develops the notion of suspension to include both the Husserlian epokhé
and the reconstitution of an epoch understood as the ideas, institutions and social
norms that form a particular period of time. The political challenge of the epoch
without epoch, therefore, is to follow suspension with a judgement on what social
systems should be implemented in the face of their possible liquidation.
To understand how Stiegler politicises the epokhé, we must first come to terms
with how his philosophy of technics draws on Husserl to condition his thinking of
epochality. Stiegler re-reads Husserl’s understanding of retention from a
Heideggerian perspective in order to conceive of technics as the condition of both
senses of the epoch. Technical systems support social systems, as epochs, but can
also disrupt these established ways of life, suspending them in an epokhé. Stiegler’s
relationship to Husserl is thus twofold. It is characterised, first, by a philosophical
engagement with the phenomenological tradition–particularly the work of Husserl,
Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida–in order to situate the conditions of experi-
ence within technical objects. However, this philosophical mediation on the nature
of the relationship between technics and experience is subordinate to a broader
political project. Thus, the second aspect of Stiegler’s relation to Husserl is the
development of political consequences from his work regarding the capacity for the
manipulation of experience that arises from its external, technical foundations.
Our aim will not be to explore the basis of this argument by reconstructing the
former, philosophical aspects of Stiegler’s reading of Husserl alone.1 Rather, it will
be to show that it is the politicisation of the epokhé that plays a key role in Stiegler’s
political thought, and that this involves drawing conclusions that are latent within
Husserl’s own writing. Our methodological approach, then, will not be phenomeno-
logical, but instead reconstructive. We will trace how Stiegler draws political con-
clusions that are latent but not fully present in Husserl’s work. If, according to
Stiegler, ‘[t]he consequences of a thought, if it is genuine thought, which is to say a
conceptual invention, always extend beyond the person who thought it’, then our
approach will be to trace how he draws these political conclusions from Husserl’s
work in this way (Stiegler 2015b, 5). In particular, we will see how this contributes
to the pharmacological character of technical objects. As pharmaka they are both
These have been well established by a number of authors (Crogan 2012; Bradley 2011, 132–33;
1
Hansen 2012; James 2010, 210–17; Lechte 2007, 60–70; Ross 2013, 250–52).
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension 343
poisonous and curative, the condition of social systems but also the agents of their
destruction. In Stiegler’s words: ‘the pharmakon is at once what enables care to be
taken and that of which care must be taken…its power is curative to the immeasur-
able extent that it is also destructive’ (Stiegler 2013b), 4). What this pharmacologi-
cal condition means for the epokhé is that suspension disrupts social systems. But,
the exposure to otherness in the suspension of established patterns of behaviour can
lead to the redoubling of the epoch; re-establishing social systems on the basis of
the encounter with otherness. Stiegler’s politicisation of Husserl founds a politics
that is charged with producing social systems that can incorporate the encounter
with the otherness that engenders the suspension, the epokhé, of existing forms of
life. Crucially, it is by developing themes that Husserl left untapped that Stiegler
generates such an understanding of epochality.
The Heideggerian perspective that Stiegler adopts to reconsider Husserl is far from
orthodox, taking place through a fundamental reconsideration of the basis of tempo-
rality and facticity within the existential analytic. Stiegler’s reading can be under-
stood by way of his modification of the central point of the Heidegger of Being and
Time (Stiegler 1998, 234). The basis of Dasein is its facticity, its existence is condi-
tioned by its outside, and as such it only exists outside itself. It experiences tempo-
rality through tradition and a system of factical supports of its being-in-the-world
(Heidegger 1962, 174). For Stiegler this facticity is based upon an originary pros-
theticity; the factical basis of Dasein is found in systems of technical objects which
act as external forms of memory through which time is experienced. There is no
authentic time outside of the inauthentic time of the factical; the indeterminacy of
Dasein’s running ahead of itself is conditioned by its situating of itself within the
determinate.2
Stiegler re-interprets the exposition of facticity in Being and Time through
Heidegger’s 1924 lecture published as The Concept of Time, in which the temporal-
ity of Dasein is understood in reference to clock-time. In this lecture Heidegger
begins the existential analytic of the who by reference to the fixing of the now by the
what of the clock (Heidegger 1992, 2E–5E). While Heidegger eventually separates
the authentic temporality of the who (Dasein) and the inauthentic temporality of the
what (Heidegger 1992, 21E), Stiegler takes from this that the existential analytic
begins from a consideration of the who in reference to the what. He attempts to fix
what he sees as Heidegger’s retreat from the ramification that Dasein ‘can only test
its improbability pro-grammatically’ (Stiegler 1998, 234). The indeterminacy of
temporality is only possible on the condition of determined programs of time,
2
This exposition of Stiegler’s reading of Heidegger is, due to limitations of space, brief. For more
extensive and critical engagements, see the work of Richard Beardsworth (1995) and Tracy Colony
(2010).
344 B. Turner
Primal impressions that have just passed take on the character of primary retentions,
receding into a field of temporal perception. This shading of experienced instants
constitutes the perception of time as a continuum of receding impressions, retained
in the horizon of perception rather than being reproduced by consciousness.4
Correlative to retentions are protentions. Primal impressions are received only on
the condition of an already existing continuum of instants: ‘every process that con-
3
For example, he anticipates this discussion of retentionality in the second volume of Logical
Investigations (Husserl 2001, 86).
4
Here Husserl is reacting against Brentano, who claimed that the experience of temporality arises
from the reproduction of past instants in consciousness, rather than a gradual shading into the past
(Husserl 1991, 13–20).
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension 345
stitutes its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what
is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it towards fulfillment’ (Husserl 1991,
54). Any intuition is perceived within an anticipation arising from a series of already
perceived retentions. As such, the large now is constituted on the basis of the com-
position of the just-past (primary retention), now (primal impression), and the future
(protention) that makes up the experience of temporality.
Husserl’s second discovery is the secondary retention, referring to the reproduc-
tion of temporal duration within perception: ‘the phantasied now represents a now
but does not give a now itself’ (Husserl 1991, 43). While primary retentions refer to
the fading into memory of just past primal impressions, secondary retentions refer
to the reproduction of these instants within consciousness. A secondary retention is
a reproduction of a particular now-point in the flow of consciousness, with its ante-
cedent primary retentions and protentions adjoined to it. This forms the flow of
time, signifying that the unity of the subjects experience of temporality is consti-
tuted rather than given (Husserl 1991, 54). The past, as opposed to the just per-
ceived, is reproduced. A secondary retention is the memoration and reproduction of
the temporal field that surrounds an intuition, made up of primary retentions and
protentions. It is the memory, rather than perception, of an intuition which retains
its identity as it sinks into the past (Husserl 1991, 64–65).
Stiegler’s intention in his reading of Husserl on these points is to establish that this
constitution of the temporal flux:
begins with a failure that leads to the draft of an effectively finite conception of retention,
introducing passivity into a temporal synthesis, which also becomes transcendental history.
Such a constitution is thus always already the already as such: it can only be a (re)constitu-
tion (Stiegler 2009b, 191).
5
I have published a more extensive engagement with Stiegler’s relationship to Derrida elsewhere
(Turner 2016). For other important work on their relation, see Ben Roberts (2005) and Daniel Ross
(2013).
346 B. Turner
Primary retention is not so much the shading into the past of primal, pure impres-
sions, but rather the originary modifications of these impressions on the basis of
just-past impressions. No impression is pure, but reproduced on the condition of its
insertion within a stream of primary retentions.
Stiegler deviates from Derrida, however, by maintaining the Husserlian distinc-
tion between primary and secondary retention. Rather than opposing perception and
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension 347
Primary retentions are the composition of the experience of the impression with
past-impressions, whereas secondary retentions are the reproduced forms of these
experiences which impact upon the formation of primary retentions. Primary and
secondary retentions differ insofar as they compose together to receive primal
impressions. The forming of a tail of primary retentions that follow primal impres-
sions is composed under the influence of a bank of secondary retentions and their
respective protentions. Primary and secondary retentions are distinguished to better
understand how they compose to form experience.
As primary retentions are always articulated within these compositions, there is
no ‘pure’ instant that sinks back into memory but rather an originary selectivity that
constitutes the experience of time. Memory is selection, and, as such, forgetting
(Stiegler 2009b, 227). It is this originary finitude that is brought to bear on the sec-
ond problem of presence in Husserl; the absolute subjectivity of the constituting
flux. If forgetting and selectivity are the basis of the experience of time, then a con-
stituting subject or a-temporal flux would break this selectivity. Instead, the com-
mencement of temporal experience is predicated on a technical support of memory
which supplements this forgetting. Stiegler refers to Husserlian image-consciousness
to think this. Tertiary retentions are the exteriorisation of lived experience, which
when experienced again, become image-consciousness, something not lived by the
subject yet reproduced by it (Stiegler 2001, 244). Image consciousness is the condi-
tion of the intersubjective sharing of meaning, for it allows the passing on of experi-
ence beyond the limits of perception, something which Derrida will go on to call
writing, influenced by Jean Hyppolite’s ‘subjectless transcendental field’ (Derrida
1989, 88–89). For Stiegler, this field is a historical system of technical, tertiary
retentions which form the basis for the composition of primary and secondary reten-
tions as an exteriorised set of retentions and protentions (Stiegler 2009b, 222–23).
The very possibility of lived experience is not a transcendental flux, but a technical
system of sedimented tertiary retentions which compose with primary and second-
ary retentions to form the subject. The experience of temporality is conditioned by
these archi-protentions, technically supported memories which compose with the
memories of individuals (Stiegler 2013b, 62–63). As such, Stiegler takes on
Derrida’s critique of Husserl by using it to develop two themes that are not drawn to
their full conclusion in the lectures on the consciousness of internal time. These are,
first, the composition of retentionality in a manner that prevents the purity of impres-
sions. It is only on the basis of the anticipation formed by secondary retentions that
primary retentions are formed. Second, that this very field of anticipation is not
reliant on a transcendental flux, but rather a materialized set of memories or tertiary
retentions arising from collective experience, internalised by individual subjects.
348 B. Turner
4 T
echnics, Organology and Pharmacology Within the
Epoché
This collective ground of memory means that for Stiegler all who’s are conditioned
by a system of what’s, this system being the sum of externalised retentions of indi-
vidual who’s. The technical default at the basis of memory, that memory is forget-
ting and needs a support, means the experience of time is communal. Commenting
on The Origin of Geometry, Stiegler argues that the sedimentation of the experience
of individuals is the condition of the disciplinarity of geometry, providing a fund of
experience which is transmitted beyond their individual deaths (Stiegler 2001),
246). These memories are in turn intuited by individuals through their own particu-
lar experiences (as a bank of primary and secondary retentions), singularising a
group memory while contributing to it. Unity, of the I and the We, is always pro-
jected, expected through protentions but never reached, due to this constant process
of differentiation in the experience of tertiary memory (Stiegler 2009a, 4–5).
Drawing on the work of Gilbert Simondon, Stiegler calls this a process of trans-
individuation: that the individual and the collective are constituted in a dynamic
relation, a process that takes place upon a fund of technically supported memories
(Simondon 2009; Stiegler 2006). This is the significance of epochality for the expe-
rience of time; new forms of tertiary retention open up new modalities of temporal
experience, which inform primary and secondary retentions, and the trans-
individuations which can occur.
To return to our discussion of epochality, the first sense of the epoch is developed
by Stiegler in this adoption of the Husserlian theory of temporal experience. The
technical support of finitude makes a history of forms of consciousness possible:
‘memory in general always supposes some technological modalities of its inscrip-
tion’ (Stiegler 2014b, 77). This default is the condition of law, understood not in
purely juridical terms, but rather as the system of retentions that direct collective
experience, individualised through differentiation in individual temporal experience
(Stiegler 2009a, 35). Technics conditions epochality, making possible, for example,
the literal revolution and the legal and historical practice specific to the Western
philosophical tradition. Importantly, Stiegler’s understanding of law is of a unity
that is always to come, projected into the future, precisely because of the default at
the basis of temporal experience (Stiegler 2001, 258–60). Law does not confine
individuals to a strict, determined set of conditions within a particular epoch, but
instead opens this epoch up to transformation because of the inadequation at the
heart of temporal experience.
Here we reach Stiegler’s second understanding of epochality, which is closer to
Husserl’s use of the epokhé. The epohké refers to the disruption and suspension of
established systems of retentions and the social relations that they support. Stiegler
describes the epokhé as ‘the suspension of the world, of the thesis of the world, that
is, of the spontaneous belief in the existence of the world, which constitutes in
Husserl’s language the natural attitude’ (Stiegler 2009a, 22). This is not a method-
ological premise, but rather the condition of history: ‘Epokhé…is first the very
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension 349
a ctuality of historical time’ (Stiegler 2014b, 84). It refers to the suspension of estab-
lished behaviours by some form of disruption by technical innovation which inter-
venes within an established epoch. It stems from the encounter between an
established technical system, and the disruption of this system:
epokhé is always double and always supposes an epokhal techno-logical ground. Tekhnē
suspends an epoch from tekhnē; tekhnē makes epokhé, and, in this suspension, there is an
improbable response, a linkage, a making of time: it is epokhé that makes an epoch (Stiegler
2014b, 85).
There are three key points to be unpacked here. First, the existence of an established
‘techno-logical ground’ upon which all human existence is built, which forms
epochs. Second the suspension of tekhnē by tekhnē, the disruption of these systems
by new technical innovation. Third, the ‘improbable response’ or linkage that con-
stitutes an epoch is improbable because the intuition and perception of instants is
always within a particular arrangement of primary and secondary retentions, inad-
equate to themselves. Stiegler utilizes these three claims to argue that the very con-
dition of epochality is a form of prior disruption, debunking any claim to purity or
to origins.
This duality of the sense of epochality, as systematicity and suspension, can be
expanded upon with reference to two terms integral to Stiegler’s philosophy of tech-
nics. The first is that these epochs of technical organisation are understood through
a general organology. This is that all human existence is structured by successive,
epochal adjustments and disadjustments between biological, social and technical
organs (Stiegler 2014c, 5). The memories that structure the experience of temporal-
ity are understood in conjunction with an understanding of the biological as a sys-
tem of traces of memory. Symbolic (social) memory and genetic (biological)
memories play out within specific epochs structured by technical systems. Literal
tertiary retentions provide a good example of this principle. The invention of writing
provides the basis for new forms of social organisation, making possible social sys-
tems grounded in particular exteriorisations of memory. It also makes possible an
alteration of the circuits of the brain which learns to read (Stiegler 2014a, 193–94).
Circuits of tertiary retention impact upon synaptogenesis, displacing any possibility
of a purely cerebral or biological understanding of the human, in favor of one that
can only be understood within the context of its technical supports (Stiegler 2013b,
67–70). As such, writing (as technique) displaces and suspends existing social sys-
tems, making space for new interpretations of the law of inheritance. This is pre-
cisely because memory, whether it be genetic or phenomenological, only ever
unfolds within the constraints of a technical system (Stiegler 2001, 258–59).
General organology is supplemented with what Stiegler refers to as pharmacol-
ogy. Each technical object is considered as both a poison and a cure, with each
technical system actualising these tendencies in distinct ways. The pharmakon
refers to the simultaneous possibilities of the singularisation of collective funds of
memory, or their homogenisation (Stiegler 2010a, 29–36). It makes possible long
circuits of individuation, where an individual can singularise the collective funds of
an epoch, while also providing the conditions for the short circuiting of this possi-
350 B. Turner
It is the possibility of technical objects to both allow and bar this second moment of
re-integration that politicises the epokhé. While the suspension of existing social
systems is part of the motor of history, the political question is whether these
6
Stiegler leans heavily on Derrida’s reading of the Phaedrus in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (Derrida 1981).
7
Stiegler understands this operation as central to ideology (Stiegler 2013a). I have explored this
theme and provided a longer exploration of Stiegler’s relation to Deleuze and post-stucturalism
elsewhere (Turner 2017).
Politicising the Epokhé: Bernard Stiegler and the Politics of Epochal Suspension 351
particular suspensions act only to induce stupidity, or whether they make possible
the integration and invention of new forms of existence (Stiegler 2015a, 60–61).
The epokhé must give rise to the institution of a new epoch, which will always be
the projection of a unity of individuals who experience it in a particular manner.
What Stiegler refers to as the contemporary epoch without epoch is an epoch which
homogenises retentions through the spread of marketing and its naturalisation of
behaviours. The experience of the impossibility of the unity of consciousness is
eradicated by the manipulation of the collective bank of tertiary retentions through
the hegemony of the culture industries (Stiegler 2010a, 58–60, b, 2011, 82–130,
2015b, 46–49).8 The attempt to calculate the experience of individuals, in the name
of profit, reduces the projection of law to a naturalised condition of fact, occluding
the possible singularisation of collective funds of memory.9 It is this poisonous
pharmacological possibility that Stiegler argues we must fight, in order to open up
a new future defined by the improbability, and undecidability of the ideas of a par-
ticular epoch.
Thus, while Stiegler’s reading of Husserl is limited to certain texts and themes
(Hansen 2012), this politics is deeply influenced by his development of Husserl’s
accounts of phenomenological temporality and the epokhé. Crucially, Stiegler
draws these aspects of Husserl’s work to conclusions that he himself does not make.
In closing, these influences can be summarised before showing how they contribute
to a particular form of politics. First, Stiegler utilises Husserl’s phenomenology of
time to establish tertiary retentions as the basis of epochs of human existence, and
the impossibility of unifying either individual consciousness or the collective. It is
this inadequation which makes the incompletion of ideas originary, and therefore
open to transformation. Second, the epokhé is understood as the intervention or
disruption of an existing state of affairs by technical innovation. This can either
make space for the establishment of a new epoch, by keeping ideas open, or homoge-
nise epochal retentions by short-circuiting existing organological systems and posit-
ing themselves as natural. Stiegler’s position can be seen as a modification of
Husserl’s in The Crisis of The European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology: merely fact minded technics make merely fact minded people,
rather than opening up the conditions of a new epoch.10
The double use of epochality, as epokhé and epoch, politicises it so as to argue
for the implementation of new social systems which make space for the indetermi-
nation at the heart of temporal experience, rather than exploiting its technical basis
to impose the hegemony of marketing. The indetermination of temporal experience
means individuals are always in a condition of being ‘myself-an-other,’ finding their
8
For analyses of Stiegler’s critique of consumerism, see the work of Abbinnett (2018), Stephen
Barker (2012) Miguel de Beistegui (2013) and Roberts (2013).
9
The pharmacological analysis of retentions is influenced on this point by Theodor Adorno and
Max Horkheimer’s famous claim that the culture industry turns reason against itself, by externalis-
ing and eliminating the powers of reason through the calculation of culture (Adorno and
Horkheimer 1972).
10
‘Merely fact minded sciences make merely fact minded people’ (Husserl 1970, 6).
352 B. Turner
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Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical
Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion
of Phenomenology
David M. Peña-Guzmán
Abstract While there are important tensions between French historical epistemol-
ogy and classical phenomenology as modes of thought, fixation on these differences
has obstructed recognition of their similarities. Using the writings of Jean Cavaillès
and Gaston Bachelard as case studies, this chapter shows that historical epistemol-
ogy may be read as simultaneously critiquing and expanding the phenomenological
project originated by Husserl in the early twentieth century. The author rebuffs the
widespread conception that historical epistemology is phenomenology’s ‘Other’
and calls for further research on their historical and philosophical relationships.
1 Introduction
French historical epistemology often presents itself before the broader philosophi-
cal community as the negation of classical phenomenology, which is to say, as
phenomenology’s ‘Other.’1 According Cassou-Noguès (2010), this aversion to phe-
nomenology is so deeply engrained in the self-understanding of French historical
epistemology that that the latter might very well be defined “by the very existence
of this opposition” (217). While it cannot be denied that historical epistemologists
1
By ‘historical epistemology,’ I have in mind a loose association of Francophone authors who
specialized in the history and philosophy of the sciences. This includes, most notably, Gaston
Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault. Other figures connected to
this tradition include Abel Rey, Léon Brunschvicg, Alexandre Koyré, Louis Althusser, and Jean-
Toussaint Desanti.
D. M. Peña-Guzmán (*)
School of Humanities and Liberal Studies, San Francisco State University,
San Francisco, CA, USA
e-mail: davidmpena@sfsu.edu
from Jean Cavaillès to Michel Foucault spent a great deal of energy distancing
themselves from the phenomenological project first initiated by Edmund Husserl
and subsequently embraced by the ‘gods’ of 1960s French thought (Jean-Paul
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-
Luc Nancy, among others), we should not view the differences between these
camps—that is to say, between an épistémologie indigenous to France and a
Phänomenologie born in Germany—as insurmountable. As this chapter demon-
strates, it is possible to read historical epistemology as a particular approach to
phenomenology rather than as its indisputable negation. On this view, the strength
of historical epistemology cannot be solely a function of the distance that separates
it from phenomenology; it is also a function, at least in part, of its proximity to it.
This, to be clear, is not to say that there are no substantive disputes between these
traditions. There are plenty. For instance, historical epistemology and phenomenol-
ogy generally adopt diametrically opposed interpretations of the foundations of
knowledge and of the relationship between knowledge and subjectivity.
Phenomenologists typically approach epistemology from the double-standpoint of
the philosophy of consciousness and transcendental philosophy, seeing all knowl-
edge as constituted by a transcendental ego. By contrast, historical epistemologists
reject transcendental subjectivity and frequently admonish those who defend it.
Unlike their phenomenological counterparts, they adopt a fervidly anti-subjectivist
approach that foregrounds the role of history rather than subjectivity in the constitu-
tion of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. As such, they denunciate proj-
ects, Husserl’s included, that ground the knowledge relation on the faculties of the
knowing subject, such as the faculties of intuition and imagination.
This chapter explores the relationship between phenomenology and historical
epistemology and argues that although the latter sees itself as the antithesis of the
former, it cannot fully sever its historical and philosophical ties to it. In spite of its
denunciation of the philosophy of the subject, historical epistemology remains a
phenomenological project of sorts, albeit one purged of the subjectivist inclinations
of the Husserlian approach.2
The argument is divided into five sections. Section one explains the importance
of transcendental subjectivity for classical phenomenology. Section two looks at
two philosophical reactions to phenomenology that emerged in the second half of
the twentieth century: ‘the detractors’ (who rejected phenomenology wholesale
because of its commitment to transcendental subjectivity) and ‘the naturalizers’
(who sought to salvage phenomenology by re-aligning it with naturalist philoso-
phies). On my reading, historical epistemologists belong to neither of these camps
as they strive to neither naturalize nor, technically, abolish phenomenological
inquiry. Instead, they critique phenomenology’s infatuation with transcendental
subjectivity while expanding the horizons of phenomenological theory itself.
Sections three and four develop this insight in more detail, looking at how historical
2
Thompson (2008) recognizes important similarities between historical epistemology and phe-
nomenology, especially in the works of Foucault and Cavaillès.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 357
2 Phenomenology’s Primitive
This chapter suggests that while the death of the subject might entail the death of
the author and the death of the transcendental ego, it need not entail as a correlate
the death of the phenomenologist as well. The death of the subject, the obituary of
that “most originary originality” (Husserl 1960, 19), need not render phenomenol-
ogy obsolete, although it does summon us to reimagine what phenomenology can
become. In the works of historical epistemologists we catch a glimpse of what such
re-envisioning might look like. To be clear, my aim here isn’t to argue that historical
epistemology is a simple continuation of classical phenomenology. My aim is to
consider how historical epistemology can be said to bring some aspects of phenom-
enology to a halt while still keeping alive the overall spirit of phenomenological
inquiry. My interest, in other words, is to follow historical epistemology in
its attempts to present itself as the ‘Other’ of phenomenology while documenting,
along the way, its failure to rid itself of the phenomenological influences that color
its frame.
4 H
istorical Epistemology as Critique of Phenomenology:
A Case Against the Transcendental Subject
3
Althusser’s reading of Marx hinges on an anti-subjectivist interpretation of the nature of capital-
ism. For Althusser, Marx becomes Marx only when he liberates himself from Hegel’s anthropo-
logical concepts (e.g., ‘consciousness,’ ‘alienation,’ and ‘experience’) and replaces them with
structuralist ones (e.g., ‘norms,’ ‘systems,’ ‘forms’) (Althusser and Balibar 1997).
4
Readers should consult Badiou (1998) for an analysis of Canguilhem’s work in this respect.
5
Foucault rejects phenomenology for its emphasis on experience and intentionality, and for giving
“absolute priority to the observing subject” (Foucault 1994), xiv). For an analysis of Foucault’s
criticisms of phenomenology, see May (May 2005).
360 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
In a series of books devoted to the history and philosophy of the sciences published
between the 1920s and 1950s—including Essai sur la connaissance approchée
(1928), Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934), La formation de l’esprit scientifique:
contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective (1938), Le
Rationalisme appliqué (Applied Rationalism, 1949), L’activité rationaliste de la
physique contemporaine (1951), and Le matérialisme rationnel (1953)—, Bachelard
developed a way of thinking about the nature, structure, and limits of knowledge
that differed in meaningful ways from Husserl’s.6 While Bachelard hadn’t yet read
Husserl when he began working in this direction in the 1920s, he stumbled upon his
works in the 1940s and immediately recognized the tension between his historical
approach to scientific reason and the Husserlian approach that sought, as Levinas
(1979) put it, “[to] re-discover our naiveties.”
Bachelard locked horns with Husserl in various ways,7 but the core of his opposi-
tion to Husserl was expressed in his critique of the universal ambitions of the
Husserlian philosophy and in his critique of Husserl’s assertion that all objects of
scientific experience spring forth from the faculties of intuition and imagination
and are therefore transcendentally constituted by consciousness. These positions
quickly gave Bachelard a reputation not only as one of France’s leading philoso-
phers of science in the postwar period, but also as one of Husserl’s most avid critics
west of the Rhine.
6
For an extended discussion of Bachelard’s critique of Husserl, see Barsotti, Bernard. Bachelard
critique de Husserl: aux racines de la fracture épistémologie, phénoménologie (Editions
L’Harmattan, 2002); and Vydra, Anton, “Gaston Bachelard And His Reactions To Phenomenology”
Continental Philosophy Review 47.1 (2014): 45–58.
7
Bachelard, for example, offers a materialist interpretation of systems of scientific knowledge. For
him, these systems include (a) ideational objects without spatio-temporal identities (concepts,
ideas, hypotheses, principles) and (b) material objects with spatio-temporal identities (measure-
ment machines, observational apparatuses, laboratory equipment, experimental techniques, and so
on). These two kinds of scientific objects, moreover, are inseparable. The meaning of even the most
abstract/ideational objects is shaped by their material conditions of discovery, while the meaning
of even the most rudimentary of scientific tools (such as an abacus or a petri dish) reflects the theo-
retical principles that aided in its discovery and construction. All scientific ideas are materialities
idealized; all material objects are theories materialized. See Lecourt Dominique, Marxism and
Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault (Vrin 1975), 75ff.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 361
all-purpose tool that can be applied to any and all facets of human experience,
including perceptual, cognitive, embodied, aesthetic, political, and religious
experiences.
As early as The Formation of the Scientific Mind: A Contribution to a
Psychoanalysis of Objective Knowledge (1938), Bachelard challenged this univer-
salism by claiming that there is a region of human experience that exceeds the limits
of classical phenomenology and reveals the poverty of its method. This is scientific
experience.
Bachelard posits a radical ‘break’ (Fr. décalage) between scientific and subjec-
tive experience. Subjective experience is the experience we have of everyday objects
like chairs, tables, and cups, and which can be explained in terms of the interaction
between two basic forces: the force of the subject (our cognitive and embodied
capacities) and the force of the world (our being-affected by something external to
ourselves). Subjective experience occurs when the external world acts upon the
senses of a subject and this subject, in turn, transcendentally orders sensible content
in a rule-bound manner, thus conjuring up a phenomenal world. But, according to
Bachelard, the interaction of these forces is not sufficient to give birth to scientific
experience, which requires the introduction of a third force: the force of a “ratio-
nal system of knowledge”. For a subject to experience the world scientifically means
for that subject to find itself spread out between a world that exerts its own pressures
on the cogito’s sensory organs and an established system of knowledge that helps
the cogito navigate this world but that is ultimately irreducible to the cogito’s own
generative activity (its sensory organs, its faculties, its capacities, etc.).8 Unlike sub-
jective experience, then, scientific experience is constituted by the triangulation of
three terms: the subject that thinks and acts, the world in which this subject is
embedded, and the system of knowledge through which the subject-world relation
acquires epistemological significance. Because his thought is circumscribed on all
sides by the philosophy of the subject, Bachelard says, Husserl cannot comprehend
this third element and, as a result. His philosophy is useless as a philosophy of
science.9
8
Davis (2000) differentiates between ‘lived’ and ‘scientific’ experience by observing that the for-
mer is a conversation with mid-sized, three-dimensional, physical objects, whereas the latter fre-
quently involves “intangible phenomena far outside common experience.” Hyder (2003) says “we
inherit both the vocabulary and grammar of the languages we speak, including those of formal
scientific languages. And this fact puts pressure on the transcendental theorist: since a speaker of
these languages may never consciously have fixed their meanings, the theorist must explain where
the meanings of such expressions are to be found, and such explanations run the risk of extrava-
gance” (115). “It is evident that the fields of ideal objects that make up scientific ontologies are not
given in immediate experience” (ibid.). This is why Bachelard says that the objects that appear to
the scientific mind, such as the appearance of certain patterns of lamination on a backboard in a
double-slit experiment, do not have the same status as the things that appear to a Husserlian ego.
“The point is that a quantitative organization of reality has more, not less, content than a qualitative
description of experience” (Bachelard 1984, 68).
9
Goldhammer (1984) notes that, for Bachelard, “phenomenology is not enough” (xx). The system-
atic description of lived experience must be accompanied by “a way of producing experience of the
right kind” (ibid.).
362 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
10
Tiles (1984) claims that scientific domains are “independent […] of the constitution of the sub-
ject” (49–50). By shifting the foci of concept-formation from the cogito to rational domain,
Bachelard reverses phenomenology’s critical formula concerning the relationship between science
and experience. As Pariente (1987) notes, it is from science that we derive experience and not from
experience that we derive science.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 363
(i) Start with an actual or imagined instance of the sort under consideration. This
arbitrarily chosen example will serve as the model for projecting
(ii) an infinitely open multiplicity of variants upon it, which are to be produced in
imagination voluntarily and arbitrarily.
(iii) As step ii proceeds, a unity, an invariant structure shows itself as that but for
which the example arbitrarily chosen as example (of the sort of thing under
consideration) would not be thinkable as an example of its kind (Mohanty
1991).
Eidetic variation appears here as a purifying process. Through it, the phenomenolo-
gist carries out “the all-embracing transition from the factual to the essential form,
the eidos” (Husserl 1999, 326). The phenomenologist begins from an instantiation
of a phenomenon and then imaginatively generates other instances ‘like’ the first.
This process continues until the phenomenologist attains a “non-empirical intu-
ition” of the eidos on account of which the first instance of the phenomenon and all
subsequent variations of it can be said to belong to the same universal or kind
(Husserl 2012). Notice that this method hinges on the faculties of imagination and
intuition. Bachelard believed this reliance on the operations of subjective facul-
ties enshrined the kind of subjectivism that the philosophy of science should actively
evade. On his view, any philosophy that professed to describe or explain scientific
experience had no choice but to steer clear of this kind of subjectivism, especially
because recent developments in the history of science demonstrate that the knowing
subject doesn’t hold scientific progress on a leash. The opposite is, in fact, the
case. It is the historical progression of science that holds the subject (and its facul-
ties) on a leash—and a relatively tight one.
Elsewhere, I have argued that Bachelard was profoundly influenced by what I
call the ‘second scientific revolution.’
The second scientific revolution is a period of European history, spanning roughly from the
1830s to the 1920s, in which science acquires unparalleled cultural capital and […] bears
witness to a succession of scientific revolutions that shatter the classical frame of almost
every branch of science, including mathematics, biology, chemistry, geology, physics, and
even logic. […] In direct defiance of philosophy’s self-appointed legislative authority,
[these revolutions] disfigure philosophical conceptions of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ ‘substance,’ and
‘causality’ and show speculative thought to be incapable of accommodating the latest
achievements of the sciences. (Peña-Guzmán 2016, 171–2)
grasp their meaning using the phenomenological method. The only way to under-
stand the meaning of scientific concepts and discoveries, especially those that are
particularly counter-intuitive, is by tracking their movement within larger economy
of scientific thought, which the Husserlian method cannot help us do.
Consider the discovery of particle-wave duality in physics at the start of the
twentieth century. The double-slit experiment that prompted the articulation of the
theory of light as complementarily particle-like and wave-like upset core tenets of
modern epistemology from Descartes to Hegel, including the notion that reality is
observer-independent and the notion that all theories of nature must presuppose
some concept of ‘substance’.11 To illustrate how Bachelard mobilizes this scientific
discovery against Husserl, let us as a relatively straightforward question: Can we
intuit the meaning of complementarity? Can we have an intuition of light as simul-
taneously particle-like and wave-like? Husserl, it seems, would have to answer yes.
But Bachelard (1951) puts pressure on this answer by arguing that this concept can-
not be intuited at all. Even if limited ourselves to trying to intuit the meaning of just
one side the complementarity hypothesis (the meaning of, say, the concept
of ‘wave’), the entire exercise would keel over before setting sail because our sub-
jective faculties are simply not strong enough, not fast enough, and not dynamic
enough to follow physics into the uncanny world of micro-objects.
To understand Bachelard’s point, let’s play this scenario out in more detail. What
would a Husserlian phenomenology of the physical concept of wave look like?
Schematically, it would look something like this:
Step 1: Bracket any positive belief in the existential reality of waves and re-channel
our attention to our experience of waves.
Step 2: Bring to mind the image of a particular wave and, using the productive
imagination, start the process of eidetic variation.
Step 3: Attend to the process of eidetic variation until reaching an intuition of the
essential form (eidos) of wave.
Step 4: Once in possession of this essential form, perform a second bracketing
operation that will eventually disclose the world-constituting power of the transcen-
dental ego, revealing the latter as the ultimate source of all meaning, including of
the meaning of the concept of wave.
According to Bachelard, this exercise will crash and burn as soon as the faculty
of imagination enters the scene to produce an image of a wave (at step 2), and it will
crash and burn once more when the faculty of intuition is asked to extract an essence
from the hyletic data (at step 3). Either way, the procedure stalls.
Whenever we imagine a wave, we imagine a movement. In itself, this isn’t
a problem since, from the standpoint of physics, waves are motions. But alas, when-
ever we imagine a movement we spontaneously imagine the movement of a body
from one place to another, even if this body is merely an ideal point in space. We
In the 1940s, Niels Bohr argued that the complementarity thesis makes impossible “any sharp
11
demarcation between the behavior of atomic objects and the interaction of the measuring instru-
ments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena occur” (Bohr 1949, 209).
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 365
find it nearly impossible to imagine a movement “in which there is no body that is
displaced” (Bachelard 1951, 253). A Husserlian phenomenology of the wave-like
character of light, therefore, culminates in the intuition not of a wave (as understood
by contemporary physics) but of a substance in motion. And therein lies the prob-
lem! To represent a wave as the displacement of a substance is to misunderstand the
scientific meaning of the concept of wave and to miss what is truly groundbreaking
about the scientific claim that light is “wave-like”—namely, that it problematizes
the assumption that light is a ‘substance’ or a ‘thing’.12
If we wanted to visualize the wave-like character of light in pictorial terms (and,
on some readings, Husserl’s method would require this), our best strategy would be
to summon an image of a ‘dynamized milieu’ rather than a picture of a ‘body dis-
placed.’ Unfortunately, it is not clear that the imagination can generate this image
without surreptitiously sneaking into it a substantialist component once more.13 For
Bachelard, a scientific wave is literally un-imaginable. It cannot be represented pic-
torially because it isn’t an image. It is a concept, which is to say, a site of experimen-
tal and inductive significance whose meaning comes from the place it occupies in an
epistemological field. This concept, as Bachelard (1968) says, is a “non-
image” (139).14
Just as imagination fails us when it comes to scientific concepts, so does intu-
ition. Even if our imagination were strong enough to generate the right kind
of images needed to get the process of eidetic variation off the ground, Bachelard
believes this phenomenological exercise would still miscarry because the faculty of
intuition would never be able to extract from the series of images produced by the
imagination the meaning or essence (eidos) these images share in common.
And the reason is that Husserl’s philosophy is, when it comes to the relationship
between intuition and essences, viciously circular. It assumes that we intuit the uni-
versal from the particulars, but it does not explain how the imagination generates the
particulars prior to having the universal. How can the phenomenologist know
whether a particular is a legitimate member of a series before having access to the
series’ principle of unification? And how can she, in turn, get her hands on this
principle before going through the process of eidetic variation that, according to
Husserl, produces it? To intuit an essence, we must already have the eidos so we can
discriminate between members and non-members; yet we cannot have this eidos
12
When the physics teacher tells her student that light can be viewed as a wave, what she means is
not that there is some Aristotelean ousia (οὐσία) that moves in a wave-like pattern. What she
means is that wave-like behavior is one of light’s various experimentally realizable properties, a
property that (like its complementary ‘other’) is only revealed under specific experimental
conditions.
13
The imagination is ridden with prejudices that yield aberrant intuitions. Substantialism is one of
these prejudices, but certainly not the only one (Bachelard 2002).
14
Bachelard (1968) also uses the term ‘sur-object’ to describe those objects of contemporary sci-
ence that, like the physical concept of wave, are “non-images.” For an analysis of the Bachelardian
notion of ‘sur-objects’, see Caws (1993).
366 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
until after have created the series and intuited the former from the latter. Husserlian
intuition presupposes what it claims to produce.
Additionally, Bachelard belongs to a group of thinkers who view intuition as a
derivative phenomenon that can never give us access to genuinely universal essences.
Intuition is derived from natural language and is shaped by the categories afforded
by the natural language in which we are socialized and habituated.15 When we intuit
an essence, what we are actually intuiting are linguistic categories and the culturally
specific (but always arbitrary) pictorial representations associated with them.
Husserl’s philosophy has no mechanism to ‘de-linguistify’ intuition and thus ensure
its reliability as a generator of objective essences. At the root of his philosophy,
therefore, we find a ‘latent nominalism’ that Husserl cannot openly embrace but that
he also cannot fend against.
Like Bachelard, whom he met at conference in Prague in 1934, Jean Cavaillès never
accepted phenomenology’s pretensions as a theory of science.16 In Sur la logique et
la théorie de la science (1947), he outlined his reasons for rejecting the phenomeno-
logical approach to scientific rationality and, more specifically, the theory of math-
ematics that Husserl sketched out in his 1929 book Formale und transzendentale
Logik. In this text, Husserl argued that only transcendental subjectivity can found a
theory of science. “A theory of science that explicates on all sides the essential pos-
sibility of genuine science as such and is therefore able to guide the development of
genuine science can grow up only in the nexus of a transcendental phenomenology”
(Husserl 1969, 13). This meant that any successful theory of science, including any
theory of mathematics, would necessarily have to “go back to noetic intentionality
(since, after all, logical formations originate from [subjective] activity)” (11).
Cavaillès (1986) believed that this flight to noetic intentionality, this retreat into
what Husserl calls “transcendental inwardness” (16), undermined the articulation of
a truly objective theory of mathematics. To do justice to the dynamic and emergent
properties of mathematical systems, the philosophy of mathematics would have to
oppose the egological and transcendental tendencies of Husserlian phenomenology.
It would also have to supersede, in its internal organization, the two philosophical
frameworks that have dominated debates about the nature of mathematics ever since
the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781: formalism and
intuitionism.
15
Bachelard offers a version of the ‘Sapir–Whorf hypothesis’, except that he focuses on the impact
of language on intuition rather than thought or perception.
16
At the time Cavaillès met Bachelard, Cavaillès was only 31 years old but had already done exten-
sive work on the history of mathematics. By 1934, he had also met Heidegger and Husserl and had
begun thinking more seriously about the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 367
Neither lineage is superior to the other in all respects; each has its vices as well as
its virtues. For instance, intuitionism allows mathematical reason to be historical
and generative, but it also mystifies mathematics’ claim to objective necessity. If
mathematics derives its content from the workings of the structures of subjectivity,
as Kant affirms in the Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science, then its content would have to be contingent upon these structures
and would lack objective necessity. One could argue that mathematical content
could still claim objective standing if the subjective structures from which it ema-
nates turned out to be objective necessities themselves. But this doesn’t seem to be
the case. The structures involved in the generation of mathematical content under
intuitionist frameworks may be necessary at the level of rational thought (since we
cannot, or at least Kant couldn’t, imagine rational agents who don’t possess them),
but they aren’t necessary at the level of being (since we can easily imagine a world
without rational thought and without rational subjects). Intuitionism inherits this
ambivalence concerning the status of mathematics from Kant’s ‘Transcendental
Aesthetic’ and offers no viable solution to it.
Formalism, by contrast, frees mathematics from the chains of the philosophy of
the subject, but it faces a problem of its own. Formalist philosophers safeguard the
objectivity of mathematics by conceiving of mathematical reason as a closed and
368 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
For Husserl, mathematical relations are the most elementary properties of any
and all possible objects of subjective experience, which is to say, of any and all
objects possibly constituted by subjective ‘acts.’ These objects, to be sure, can have
properties beyond those captured by pure mathematics, but these other properties
would be a function of judgment (not object-attainment) and thus fall under apo-
phantics. The determinations captured by pure mathematics remain only these
objects’ most basic conditions of possibility, the conditions to which any object in
any mode of subjective appearance is necessarily subject. They are, as Husserl
would say, the a priori conditions of subjective object-presentation itself.
Although he recognized the originality of the Husserlian position, Cavaillès ulti-
mately rejected it on the grounds that defining mathematics as the science of the
most abstract and general properties of presentive objects denied mathematics its
rightful objective status by transforming it into a tentacle of the philosophy of con-
sciousness. In Formale und transzendentale Logik, mathematics only exists as “an
analysis of all the claims and all the acts of knowledge, […] of all the contents
aimed at or intended by consciousness” (Cavaillès 1986, 394). This leads Cavaillès
to accuse Husserl of basing his philosophy upon a problematic ‘principle of reduc-
ibility’17 that folds the philosophy of mathematics under the philosophy of con-
sciousness, thereby reducing mathematical content to the acts of a transcendental ego.
In a sense, Cavaillès’s thesis is that Husserlianism is worse than formalism and
intuitionism since it exhibits all the defects of both. On the side of formalism,
Husserlian depicts mathematics as a closed system similar to the mathesis universalis
The ‘principle of reducibility’ ensures the reduction of and of mathematics to a priori rules of
17
18
Husserl (1969) differentiates himself from Leibniz by noting that the latter failed to take the
transcendental turn. Transcendental logic, therefore, “does not intend to be a mere pure and formal
logic—conceived most broadly, in the Leibnizian sense, a mathesis universalis” (16). However,
one could argue that what Husserl does is recapitulate Leibniz’s formalism within the sphere of the
transcendental since mathematics remains a closed system of rules that doesn’t change with time
and whose only function is to determine the most generic properties of presentive objects.
19
Cavaillès (1986) says that in Husserl’s framework mathematics can only exist either in an applied
mode (as mathematical physics) or in a theoretical mode (as formal ontology), but in neither is it
truly autonomous. “Mathematics, conscious of it original meaning, of what truly is, divides itself
into two parts: applied mathematics which is physics, and formal mathematics which is logic. It is
only because he has forgotten his vocation that the mathematician can claim to be self-sufficient”
(393).
20
Speaking of Husserl’s formal ontology, Cavaillès (1986) says: “This is really the idea of a uni-
versal syntax as Carnap tried to describe it in a single stroke” (403).
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 371
recourse to this line of defense since his project also pivots on the faculty of intu-
ition. For him, all objects of mathematical experience are transcendentally intuited.
“The possibility of objectivities belonging in [the mathematical] sphere must be
established by intuition,” he says (Husserl 1969, 12). This traps phenomenology
between the Scylla of formalism and the Charybdis of intuitionism, leaving it unable
to claim the benefits of either.
Another effect of Husserl’s denial of history is that, according to Cavaillès, it
puts his theory of mathematics at odds with the actual development of mathematics.
Recall that in the early twentieth century, various neo-Kantian philosophers realized
that Kant’s interpretation of time and space as pure forms of intuition was incompat-
ible with developments in post-Newtonian physics that called into question the
separation of time and space. These developments had such a radical impact on
philosophy that many philosophers felt they had to choose between (a) keeping the
intuitionist doctrine outlined in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ of the first Critique
and dogmatically rejecting any scientific findings that contravened it or (b) embrac-
ing the findings of positive science and tossing out those parts of the architectonic,
especially the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic,’ that clashed with new scientific knowl-
edge. Most neo-Kantians chose (b) as the best way of reconciling the spirit of
Kantian critique with, in this case, the body of Einstein’s theory of space-time. Yet,
it seems as if Husserl, confronted with the same choice in relation to mathematics,
repeatedly chooses (a), which Cavaillès says is always the wrong choice.
To highlight the tension between Husserl’s intuitionist philosophy of mathemat-
ics and post-Kantian developments in mathematics, Cavaillès points to Georg
Cantor’s discovery of set theory in 1874.21 Although an extended discussion of this
subject is beyond the scope of this chapter, Peden (2014) explains that set theory
introduced into mathematical discourse a number of ideas (e.g. the idea that there
are infinities of different magnitudes) that intuitionist philosophies couldn’t handle.
“Set theory […] drove a rift between demonstrable justification and intuitive experi-
ence by privileging the conceptual, and interminable, development of mathematical
knowledge over the fixed categories, be they transcendental or existential, of a priori
intuition,” he writes (31).
By the time Cavaillès started writing Sur la logique in the 1940s, he had already
written a whole book about set theory, entitled Remarques sur la formation de la
théorie abstraite des ensembles (1938), in which offered a piercing critique of math-
ematical intuitionism and argued that the proper method of modern mathematics is
not ‘intuition’ but ‘construction.’ In this work, he note that there are plenty of scien-
tific innovations that do not depend upon the faculty of intuition and that scientists
accept in spite of the objections of intuition. One example is the infinitesimal calcu-
lus of Newton and Leibniz, which rests on the counter-intuitive concept of infini-
tesimal change. Another is Cantorian set theory, whose concept of transfinity sends
our intuitions into a tailspin. Intuitionist frameworks only render these develop-
Cantor (1874) altered the landscape of mathematics by showing that a fully articulated theory of
21
sets could serve as a foundational theory in mathematics. For an account of the history of set the-
ory, see Ferreirós (2008) and Grattan-Guinness and Bos (2000).
372 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
ments incomprehensible and create false philosophical problems (e.g. “Are there as
many pairs of numbers as numbers in an infinite series?”). In 1938, Cavaillès argues
that the only solution was to abandon intuitionism altogether (Ferrières 1950). A
few years later, in Sur la logique, he recycled this basic argument from Remarques
to argue that, because it rested on intuitionist principles, Husserl’s philosophy of
mathematics could never make sense the actual progressive arc of mathematical
thought, Cantorian set theory included (Peden 2014, 59). Cantorian set theory
did not merely challenge Husserl’s assertion that all mathematical objects are the
children of intuition. It empirically refuted it.
In Sur la logique Cavaillès offered two additional criticisms of Husserl’s tran-
scendental logic: one dealt with the nature of logic; the other, with the nature of
subjectivity. Formale und transzendentale Logik was written in the hopes of bring-
ing to historical fruition Western philosophy’s dream of unifying all science under a
single doctrine of logic that would serve at the ‘antecedent norm’ to all the sciences
and thus as the ground of scientificity itself.22 To fulfill this mission, however,
the doctrine of logic would have to prove its absoluteness, which is to say, it would
have to prove that it grounded everything while being grounded by nothing.
According to Husserl, classical logic couldn’t succeed in this regard because it is
puerile and immature (Peden 2014, 13). But according to Cavaillès (1986), Husserl’s
transcendental logic couldn’t either because it gets stuck in the following dilemma
(398). Logic is either (a) transcendental (in which case it depends upon conscious-
ness and cannot be absolute) or (b) absolute (in which case it cannot depend upon
consciousness and cannot be transcendental). But logic could never be (c) tran-
scendental and absolute (which is exactly what Husserl’s logic claims to be). “If
transcendental logic really founds logic, there is no absolute logic (that is, govern-
ing the absolute subjective activity). If there is an absolute logic, it can draw its
authority only from itself, and then it is not transcendental” (400–401).
Cavaillès (1986) also observed that Husserlian phenomenology leads to an infi-
nite regress. Husserl never tired of saying that transcendental subjectivity grounds
all possible experience and all possible knowledge, but he never explained what
grounds transcendental subjectivity itself. Since he believed that only subjectivity
has “grounding” power, it would seem as if transcendental subjectivity could itself
be grounded only by a higher-order subjectivity, and this higher-order subjectivity
would itself have to be grounded by a subjectivity of an even higher order, and so on
ad infinitum. This creates yet another dilemma. Either Husserl lets the infinite
regress run its course and accepts the conclusion that phenomenology itself is un-
grounded (which he would find intolerable), or he puts a stop to this regress by
embracing a non-idealist (e.g. evolutionary, psychological, anthropological) theory
22
Husserl (1969) argues that after the seventeenth century classical logic lost its unifying power
and “became [merely] a special science.” As a result, all the sciences, which had turned to logic for
a goal or a sense of purpose, “lost their great belief in themselves” (5). They became autonomous
and mutually isolated fields of human action, rather than parts of the great journey of human rea-
son. Husserl hoped that his transcendental logic would fill the conceptual vacuum left behind by
the implosion of classical logic.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 373
of the origins of subjectivity itself (which would violate some of his most deeply
held idealist commitments). Of these two options, the second is arguably the only
viable one, but Husserl never took it up as a task at any stage of his career. As a
result there is a question mark that hovers over his entire project: What founds the
being that founds? What constitutes the being that constitutes? “What is […]
needed,” Cavaillès writes, “is a logic to give norms not only for the constitution of
the constituted being but also for the constitution of the constituting being” (400,
my emphasis). Who grounds the grounder?
5 F
rom Critique to Expansion: Historical Epistemology
as Phenomenology?
investigation of our experience of it. Khalfa (2013) has taken this claim to mean that
Foucault’s archaeological method “is phenomenological” since “its avowed object
is a particular experience, that of the other as mad.” For Foucault, “specific struc-
tures of power determine experience differently at different moments” (xiv); it is
just that these structures are historical rather than transcendental. In a similar vein,
Cortois (1996) says that Cavaillès’s core objective always was to describe the
experience of mathematical proofs and demonstrations rather than the anatomy of
the proofs and demonstrations themselves. By looking at the “mechanisms of math-
ematical abstraction,” he hoped to make intelligible “the very character of mathe-
matics as an experience.” The same hope motivated Bachelard, except he chose to
target the physical sciences. Tiles (1984) has said of Bachelard what Cortois (1996)
says of Cavaillès—that if we peel off the top layers, the only thing that remains is a
burning desire to “understand the ways in which experience and theory are intercon-
nected in scientific thought” (11). Just as Foucault’s object in History of Madness is
the experience of the other as mad, Bachelard’s object in all his early writings is the
experience of “striv[ing] towards rationality” (27).
Aside from focusing on the description of experience, historical epistemologists
expose what Thompson (2008) calls their “phenomenological heritage” in their
constant use of phenomenological concepts such as ‘constitution’. While their inter-
pretation of the meaning of this concept isn’t the same as Husserl’s, they seem to
agree with Husserl that the philosophical investigation of experience should ideally
shed light on the process responsible for the constitution of objects of experience,
which is to say, on the various kinds of ‘acts’ that make objects of experience appear
as objects. Where they depart from Husserl is in refusing to view these ‘acts’ as
synthetic-subjective acts that take place inside the sphere of noetic intentionality.
For historical epistemologists, the acts that give rise to objects of scientific experi-
ence are historico-objective events that occur in the sphere of scientific history.
They are acts of an epistemic field, not of consciousness.23 This interpretation of
object-constituting acts allows historical epistemologists to stress the pliability of
scientific experience—because, for them, this experience is forged in archaeologi-
cal rather than egological time (Kockelmans and Kisiel 1970, 318).
Some readers, of course, may grant that historical epistemology resembles phe-
nomenology by virtue of its attentiveness to experience and its use of concepts that
have a clear phenomenological ring to them, but they may still refuse to call it ‘phe-
nomenological’ on the basis that this title should be strictly reserved for intellectual
endeavors that take as their object the experience of a subject. Aside from being
possibly question-beggining, this position is inconsitent with how contemporary
phenomenologists carve at the joints of their own discipline. If one were to insist too
strongly on excluding from the domain of phenomenology any project that chal-
lenges the primacy of subjectivity, one would have to exclude projects that are
already recognized as belonging to the phenomenological canon, including those
Khalfa (2011) says Cavaillès’s theory of mathematics anticipated “the post-World War II replace-
23
24
Although Reinach studied under Husserl in Gottingen and helped found the Yearbook for
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, he rejected Husserl’s idealist interpretation of ‘phe-
nomena’ in favor a realist one in which the phenomena are not subject-dependent. This was a
direct attack against Husserl’s declaration that the transcendental ego is arche and telos of all that
is.
25
Mensch (2016) argues that Patočka’s oeuvre gives us an ‘asubjective phenomenology’.
26
In his early works such as Being and Time (1927), Heidegger deemphasizes the role of transcen-
dental subjectivity, while in his late ones he seems to discard it altogether to make room for an
outlook rooted in the world-disclosing power of poetic language (Gosetti-Ferencei 2004).
27
Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior (1947) is guided by a materio-evolutionary concep-
tion of organisms in which experience is organized by material principles, not transcendental ones.
His late works, especially the Nature lectures, a chiasmatic nature supersedes the transcendental
subject as the ultimate source of meaning in the world (Mazis 2016).
28
Historical epistemologists sometimes frame their disagreement with phenomenology as a con-
flict between two ethical characters: one that acts in the world like a war hero (the French episte-
mologist) and one that is politically apathetic like Hegel’s ‘beautiful soul’ (the French existentialist
phenomenologist). In a speech given at the inauguration of L’Amphithéâtre Jean Cavaillès at the
Sorbonne in 1967, Canguilhem mobilizes this framework to suggest that there is something inher-
ent to historical epistemology (he hints at its emphasis on necessitation, normativity, and struc-
tures) that turns its followers into agents of action, while there is something inherent to existentialist
phenomenology (its focus on contingency, subjectivity, and radical freedom) that turns its disciples
into passive figures who cannot leap from political consciousness to political action. Speaking
about Cavaillès’s participation in the French resistance movement, Canguilhem polemically says:
“Let the supporters of phenomenology and existentialism do better than Cavaillès did, next time,
if they can!” (Peden 2014, 21).
29
The Normal and the Pathological bears an uncanny resemblance to the writings of Henri Bergson
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For a comparison of Canguilhem’s work and Merleau-Ponty’s, see
Peña-Guzmán (2013). For an analysis of Canguilhem’s ‘reckoning’ with Bergson, see Feldman
(2016).
376 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
entirely at bay.30 At one point, he even directly binds himself (and Bachelard and
Canguilhem) to Husserl by tracing the origins of French historical epistemology to
the début of Husserlianism in France in the 1920s.
6 Further Research
For much of the late twentieth century, the story of the relationship between histori-
cal epistemology and phenomenology was told monotonously as one of tensions,
splits, and divergences, which is to say, as one of inimical opposition. While this
isn’t false, it is one-sided. The narrative I prefer to tell is one of tensions and affini-
ties, splits and commonalities, divergences and homologies—one, in short, with a
more nuanced understanding of how these pedigrees flourished alongside, fed off
of, and competed with, one another from the 1930s onward. In this story, there are
real tensions between them, but these tensions acquire significance only against the
backdrop of a complex matrix of historical, conceptual, and biographical connec-
tions that cannot but give rise to similarities, parallelisms, and isomorphisms. When
these traditions are interpreted through the lens of this matrix, it becomes clear
that historical epistemology isn’t ‘the Other’ of phenomenology. It is simply ‘an
other’ that happened to be contemporaneous, and in constant close dialogue, with it.
The benefit of this narrative is that it enables us to pose new questions about the
relationships (historical, biographical, institutional, conceptual, etc.) between these
modes of thought. From a historical point of view, for instance, is it significant that
some historical epistemologists, such as Alexandre Koyré, were first trained as phe-
nomenologists31 and, conversely, that some vocal critics of phenomenology, such as
Jacques Derrida, were first trained under French epistemologists?32 How did these
thinkers whose intellectual formation took place between these frameworks negoti-
ate their doctrinal and methodological differences? And how did they understand
both of these discourses in relation to the numerous other traditions that were part
of the philosophical landscape at that time, including the logical positivism of the
Austrians, the neo-Kantianism of the Germans, the empiricism of the British, and
even the Annales-style historicism of the French? Pushing this one step further, how
should we interpret the works of second- and third-generation historical epistemolo-
gists, such as Suzanne Bachelard, whose work cannot be pigeonholed into any one
30
Two of Foucault’s most important concepts—the ‘historical a priori’ and ‘philosophical archae-
ology’—were first coined by Husserl.
31
Alexandre Koyré was a Russian-born, Francophone philosopher who studied directly under
Husserl from 1908 to 1911, during Husserl’s famous ‘Göttingen period.’ When Husserl (along
with David Hilbert) rejected his dissertation on Zeno’s paradoxes in 1912, Koyré left Göttingen for
Paris, where he became a student of Leon Brunschvicg and went on to play a critical role in the
French tradition of epistemology.
32
Derrida was Canguilhem’s assistant from 1960 to 1964.
Not Phenomenology’s ‘Other’: Historical Epistemology’s Critique and Expansion… 377
category precisely because it blurs the line between historical epistemology and
phenomenology?33 Taking these questions seriously may illuminate what McCumber
(2014) calls “the history of continental thought” and give us some new ideas about
how to approach contemporary philosophical debates (in epistemology, the philoso-
phy of science, phenomenology, etc.) that require epistemic, historical, and phe-
nomenological considerations.34
I conclude by noting that although it is impossible to ‘de-phenomenologize’ his-
torical epistemology on account of the many ligaments that tie it to the phenomeno-
logical movement, it is also impossible to ‘phenomenologize’ it through and
through. Nothing in this chapter is intended to suggest that historical epistemology
is a straight-forward application of Husserlianism to the history of science. Historical
epistemology represents a way of thinking about scientific knowledge and scientific
experience that, at least on the reading I am advocating, can be reasonably described
as phenomenological. It is a phenomenology of scientific rationality, albeit a phe-
nomenology that due to the demands and exigencies of its object has been purged of
transcendental subjectivity or, to quote Foucault (1989), “cleanse[d] of all transcen-
dental narcissism” (203). Tracing, documenting, and processing the ramifications of
this cleansing operation, however, remains a task to be achieved.
33
Like her predecessors, Suzanne Bachelard is critical of Husserl’s theory of science and attempts
to go beyond “the horizon of transcendental research that has marked the originality of Husserlian
phenomenology.” Unlike many of her predecessors, she seems to be more aware of the extend to
which this ‘going beyond’ is more of a reformation than a rejection. In La conscience de la ratio-
nalité. Étude phénoménologique sur la physique mathématique (1958), she calls for the articula-
tion of a “phenomenological epistemology” that recognizes, on the one hand, that subjectivity
cannot be eliminated from the study of science (since “the experience of rationality” is essential to
the unfolding of scientific history) and, on the other, that scientific subjectivity often effaces itself
in its own results. The philosophy of science must, therefore, be conversant with, but ultimately
independent from, the philosophy of the subject (6). This results in a non-classical phenomenology
that nonetheless has a claim to phenomenological status. In fact, she claims that any phenomeno-
logical project that speaks about science must become epistemological in order to be truly phe-
nomenological. In what amounts to a philosophical coup d’état, Bachelard defines as
‘phenomenological’ only those phenomenologico-epistemological projects that overcome the
crude subjectivism of Husserl and the equally crude anti-subjectivism of first generation French
epistemologists. “If we effect an ‘eidetic variation’ of the possible forms of phenomenology, we
see that among the invariant characters that subsist in this variation the following one offers itself:
a phenomenological inquiry must be an inquiry with a double orientation, it must have an objective
orientation and a subjective orientation” (5).
34
Various debates in the philosophy of science highlight the importance of blending epistemologi-
cal, historical, and phenomenological insights, including debates about the nature of mathematical
beauty (Montaño 2012; Rota 2008; Wells 1988), debates about the nature of historical experience
(Díaz-Maldonado 2019), and the now decades-old debate that continues to shape theoretical dis-
cussions in social sciences about whether supra-individual structures jeopardizes the freedom of
the individuals who come to grief with them (Dreyfus and Rabinow 2014).
378 D. M. Peña-Guzmán
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