CRAMER v.

UNITED STATES
65 S.Ct. 918, 89 L.Ed. 1441, April 23,1945
JACKSON

Facts:

On the night of June 12, 1942, several specially trained saboteurs were put ashore from a
German submarine near Amagansett, New York, with orders to disperse throughout
the United States and to sabotage the American war effort. Anthony Cramer, a
naturalized American citizen of German background, befriended two of the saboteurs,
met with them, and was suspected of assisting them in their mission. However, the only
overt acts to which two witnesses could testify were two meetings between Cramer and
one of the saboteurs, who was an old friend of Cramer's. The prosecution was unable to
produce the testimony of two witnesses concerning what took place at the meetings or to
establish that Cramer gave information, encouragement, shelter, or supplies to the
saboteurs. Cramer was tried for and convicted of treason, and he appealed his
conviction to the Supreme Court.

The Cramer case marked the first time that the Supreme Court passed on the meaning
of the treason clause of Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. Justice robert h.
jackson, for a 5–4 Court, held that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses must be
sufficient, in their setting, to sustain a finding that actual aid and comfort was given to
an enemy of the United States. Although there was other evidence of Cramer's Nazi
sympathies and of his assistance to the saboteur, the overt acts—the meetings—were not
in themselves treasonable, and the conviction could not stand.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an overt act in convicting of treason

Ruling:

"Overt acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention, and tend towards the
accomplishment of the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is manifested
and the means by which it is intended to be fulfilled. [Footnote 4]"

The Government, however, contends for, and the court below has affirmed, this
conviction upon a contrary principle. [Footnote 5] It said:

"We believe, in short, that no more need be laid for an overt act of treason than for an
overt act of conspiracy. . .. Hence, we hold the overt acts relied on were sufficient to be
submitted to the jury, even though they perhaps may have appeared as innocent on their
face."

A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Fricke; [Footnote 6] it is: "An overt
act, in itself, may be a perfectly innocent act standing by itself; it must be in some
manner in furtherance of the crime."
As lower courts thus have taken conflicting positions, or, where the issue was less clearly
drawn, have dealt with the problem ambiguously, [Footnote 7] we granted certiorari,
[Footnote 8] and, after argument at the October 1943 Term, we invited reargument
addressed to specific questions. [Footnote 9] Since our primary question here is the
meaning of the Constitutional provision, we turn to its solution before considering its
application to the facts of this case.

The Cramer case marked the first time that the Supreme Court passed on the meaning
of the treason clause of Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. Justice Robert h.
jackson, for a 5–4 Court, held that the overt acts testified to by two witnesses must be
sufficient, in their setting, to sustain a finding that actual aid and comfort was given to
an enemy of the United States. Although there was other evidence of Cramer's Nazi
sympathies and of his assistance to the saboteur, the overt acts—the meetings—were not
in themselves treasonable, and the conviction could not stand.