World Politics Interests Interactions

Institutions 2nd Edition By Jeffry A.

-David A- Test Bank

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Sample Test
Chapter 3

Why Are There Wars?

Concept Map

1. Introduction
2. War
3. Purpose of War
4. Why Fight?
5. Bargaining and War
6. Compellence
7. Deterrence

III.  Incomplete Information

1. Resolve
2. Credibility
3. Coercion
4. Brinkmanship
5. Audience Costs
6. Paying for Power
7. Commitment Problems
8. Future Bargaining
9. Prevention
10. Preemption
11. Indivisible Goods
12. Preventing War
13. Costs
14. Transparency
15. Outside Enforcement
16. Dividing Indivisibility

Multiple Choice

1. Which is true of World War I?

2. Leaders expected the war to be the longest war in history.
3. Leaders thought the war would be average length and prepared for it.
4. Leaders expected the war to be short.
5. The war itself was mostly characterized by inactivity.
6. The war claimed more lives than any other war in human history.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Page 81  TOP: War MSC: Factual

2. What is perplexing about the Mexican-American war?

3. That the United States wanted the southwest territories in the first place.
4. That Mexico valued the territories beyond $25 million
5. That the United States won the war.
6. That the two states did not find a bargain to avoid the costs of war.
7. That the United States only paid $15 million at the end of the dispute.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 82  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Applied

3. Given the strict definition of war, all of the following are wars EXCEPT a
conflict between:
4. North Korea and South Korea in which 1,700 soldiers are killed.
5. Peru and Ecuador in which 1,500 soldiers are killed.
6. Rwanda and Congo in which 900 soldiers are killed.
7. Honduras and El Salvador in which 1,000 soldiers are killed.
8. India and Pakistan in which 2,000 soldiers are killed.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Page 84  TOP: War MSC: Factual

4. Which is an example of interstate war?

5. A government committing acts of genocide against an ethnic group, where
several thousand civilians are killed.
6. A government fighting a well armed rebel group within its territory, where
several thousand soldiers have died on the battlefield.
7. Two governments fighting each other, where several hundred soldiers
have died on the battlefield.
8. Two governments fighting each other, where several thousand soldiers
have died on the battlefield.
9. A government engaged in counter-insurgency activity against an
international group that employs terrorism, in which several thousand people
on both sides of the conflict have died.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Page 84  TOP: Purpose of War MSC: Applied

5. What is NOT a broad school of thought that offers a causal explanation as

to why war occurs?
6. Realism.
7. Bargaining theory.
8. Misperceptions and mistakes by actors can lead to war between states.
9. Leaders are irrational.
10. Substate actors disproportionally benefit from war, do not bear the costs
of war, and drive policy towards war.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 84–85  TOP: Purpose of War MSC: Conceptual

6. Why do states fight wars?

7. Most states are inherently aggressive.
8. They have a conflict over something they value more than the cost of war
and are unable to come to an agreement short of war.
9. They have too much information about other states and realize they could
win.
10. War restores the status quo.
11. They disagree over the rules of war.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Page 86  TOP: Why Fight? MSC: Conceptual

7. Which of the following is the most common reason a state would go to

war?
8. Two states claim the same territory.
9. A state resents another state’s high tariffs on its imports.
10. The populations of two states are composed of two conflicting ethnic
groups.
11. A state wants a neighboring state to change into a democratic
government.
12. A state thinks another state is cheating on an arms-reduction agreement.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 86  TOP: Why Fight? MSC: Applied
8. States have conflicts over territory for all of the following reasons
EXCEPT:
9. the population of one state has ethnic ties to land controlled by another
state.
10. the land in dispute has large oil reserves that either state could use.
11. the states depend primarily on agricultural production.
12. the land includes access to a river that is important for regional trade.
13. a key mountain pass in the territory would make invasion of either state
easier.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Pages 86–87  TOP: Why Fight? MSC: Applied

9. Why would a state use war to change another state’s policies?

10. War is the only way to change another state’s foreign policy.
11. War is the first option considered by many states.
12. The other state would not expect an attack because of its policies, so the
war would be successful.
13. One state’s policies significantly harm another state’s important interests.
14. War is a quicker way to resolve disputes than waiting for international
organizations to send peacekeepers.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 87  TOP: Why Fight? MSC: Conceptual

10. Why would a state go to war to change another state’s regime?

11. A state would not attempt to change another state’s regime, because that
would be a violation of its sovereignty.
12. International law allows states to attack another state whose government
makes threats against its neighbors.
13. War is the only way democratic states can change authoritarian regimes
into representative governments.
14. States will use war, when possible, to remove a regime in another country
that is hostile to it.
15. A state would change a regime that refused to trade with other states.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 88  TOP: Why Fight? MSC: Conceptual

11. When two states decide to bargain:

12. they agree to divide the disputed good equally.
13. they will both end up better off than if they had not agreed to bargain.
14. both are inherently agreeing to reject taking intransigent, “all or nothing,”
positions while negotiating.
15. both are inherently agreeing to reject the option of going to war over the
conflict.
16. one state might end up giving in to all of the demands of the other.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 89  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Factual
12. Which of the following describes a crisis?
13. A state rejects an international agreement that most other states have
ratified.
14. A state threatens military force to achieve its bargaining goals.
15. Two states decide to bargain over territory that both claim.
16. A weaker state has to bargain with a stronger state.
17. International organizations have to mediate a dispute between two states.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 89  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Factual

13. Crisis bargaining is also known as:

14. deterrence
15. credible commitment
16. rejecting ideal points
17. interstate war
18. coercive diplomacy

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Page 89  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Factual

14. A state that provokes a crisis would most prefer:

15. to go to war to achieve its goals.
16. that the other state capitulate completely.
17. that the other side agree to negotiations over the dispute.
18. that an international organization would agree to mediate the dispute.
19. that a more powerful country intervene in the dispute.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Page 117  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Applied

Use the following figure to answer questions 15–17.

15. In the figure, what set of deals does A prefer to war?

16. Those to the left of p − a.
17. Those to the right of p − a.
18. Those between p − a and p + b.
19. Those to the left of p + b.
20. Those to the right of p + b.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: Page 90 (Figure 3.2)  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC:
Applied

16. In the figure, what set of deals does B prefer to war?

17. Those to the left of p − a.
18. Those to the right of p − a.
19. Those between p − a and p + b.
20. Those to the left of p + b.
21. Those to the right of p + b.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Page 90 (Figure 3.2)  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC:
Applied

17. In the figure, what is the bargaining range?

18. The distance to the left of p − a.
19. The distance to the right of p − a.
20. The distance between p − a and p + b.
21. The distance to the left of p + b.
22. The distance to the right of p + b.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 90 (Figure 3.2)  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC:
Applied

18. A state’s preferred outcome or settlement of a dispute is known as:

19. an ideal point.
20. a crisis.
21. a bargain.
22. coercion.
23. diplomacy.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 90  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Factual

19. Why would a state agree to a dispute settlement it did not like?
20. It wants to win sympathy from other states.
21. An international organization forced the state to accept the settlement.
22. It lost its case in the World Court and had to comply with the decision.
23. The cost of going to war over the dispute would be more costly than
accepting the settlement.
24. It expects the other side to reconsider and agree to a better deal.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 91  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Conceptual

20. Which of the following accurately describes the “bargaining range”?

21. The possible outcomes that states can agree to without going to war over
a dispute.
22. The number of demands a state makes in a crisis.
23. The types of demands a state makes in a crisis.
24. The number of actors involved in a dispute.
25. The amount of territory states claim in a dispute.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 91  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Factual

21. Which of the following statements about compellence is true?

22. Compellence is an effort to preserve the status quo by threatening to use
force.
23. Compellence is an effort to force other actors to accept international
mediation.
24. Compellence is an effort to change the status quo by threatening to use
force.
25. Compellence is the effort to force other actors to fulfill their alliance
obligations.
26. Compellence is the effort to create an effective international peace
agreement.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 92–93  TOP: Compellence MSC: Factual

22. Which of the following is an example of compellence?

23. The Soviet Union refusing to return control of the Kurile Islands to Japan.
24. The United States invading the Dominican Republic in response to a
military coup.
25. The Soviet Union invading Afghanistan in order to support its allies in the
Afghan government.
26. The Soviet Union threatening to attack Europe.
27. The United States threatening Cuba if it did not remove Soviet missiles
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 92–93  TOP: Compellence MSC: Applied

23. Which of the following statements about deterrence is true?

24. Deterrence is an effort to preserve the status quo by threatening to use
force.
25. Deterrence is an effort to force other actors to accept international
mediation.
26. Deterrence is an effort to change the status quo by threatening to use
force.
27. Deterrence is the effort to force other actors to fulfill their alliance
obligations.
28. Deterrence is the effort to create an effective international peace
agreement.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 92–93  TOP: Deterrence MSC: Applied

24. Which of the following is an example of deterrence?

25. The Soviet Union cutting off trade with Western countries so that they
could not use economic sanctions as leverage in arms agreements.
26. The United States threatening to attack Iraq if it does not destroy its
weapons of mass destruction.
27. The Soviet Union placing missiles in Cuba so that it could threaten the
United States.
28. The United States threatening to increase tariffs on another country’s
imports if that country first increases tariffs on U.S. products.
29. China attacking when the United States sent its troops into North Korea
during the Korean War.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 92–93  TOP: Deterrence MSC: Applied

25. How is extended deterrence different from general deterrence?

26. Extended deterrence continues for a long time.
27. Extended deterrence applies to a large amount of territory.
28. Extended deterrence applies to a state’s allies rather than the state itself.
29. Extended deterrence applies to a country’s economic, political, and
military infrastructure.
30. Extended deterrence became possible only after the development of
nuclear weapons.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 93  TOP: Deterrence MSC: Factual

26. Which of the following is an example of extended deterrence?

27. The United States threatened to attack Moscow if the Soviet Union
attacked West Germany.
28. The United States threatened to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the
Soviet Union attacked New York.
29. West Germany threatened to attack East Germany if the Soviet Union tried
to block the railroads and highways connecting West Germany to West Berlin.
30. France obtained its own nuclear weapons, so that it could retaliate if the
Soviet Union attacked Paris.
31. China threatened to attack if the United States entered China from North
Korea.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 93  TOP: Deterrence MSC: Applied

27. In the case of the threat by the United States to attack Afghanistan in
2001, the status quo was:
28. the attack by the United States on Afghanistan.
29. Taliban control of Afghanistan.
30. the United Nations approving an attack on Afghanistan.
31. a continuing insurgency after the war.
32. the defeat of the Taliban.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 97  TOP: Bargaining and War MSC: Applied

28. All of the following were reasons for Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990
EXCEPT:
29. Iraq’s economy was devastated by its war with Iran.
30. Kuwait was pumping more oil than the limit it had agreed to, which
decreased the price for Iraq’s oil.
31. Iraq claimed Kuwait was pumping Iraqi oil near the border between the
two countries.
32. Kuwait refused to forgive the loans that it had made to Iraq.
33. a fundamentalist Islamic group was on the verge of taking control of
Kuwait’s government.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Pages 97–98  TOP: Incomplete Information MSC: Factual

29. How did incomplete information cause Kuwait to make a mistake when
Iraq threatened to attack in 1990?
30. Kuwait did not have diplomatic relations with Iraq and therefore did not
have an opportunity to make concessions to Iraq.
31. Kuwait did not know that Saddam Hussein was willing to wage war and
decided not to make sufficient concessions.
32. Kuwait did not know that Saddam Hussein had moved many of his troops
to the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
33. Kuwait had decided to make the concessions that Saddam Hussein
wanted, but the message to Iraq was not properly sent by Kuwaiti
bureaucrats.
34. Kuwait did not know that the United States would come to its aid if a war
were to occur.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 97–98  TOP: Incomplete Information MSC:
Applied

30. All of the following are reasons that it is difficult to know how likely an
adversary is to go to war EXCEPT:
31. information is often incomplete.
32. many actors have private information.
33. determining the capability of an adversary is difficult.
34. keeping international organizations from getting involved in disputes is
difficult.
35. discerning the resolve of an opponent is difficult.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Pages 100–103  TOP: Resolve MSC: Conceptual

31. A state’s capabilities comprise all of the following EXCEPT:

32. the number of troops that a state can mobilize.
33. the quality of its armaments.
34. its willingness to suffer many battle deaths in order to win a war.
35. its economic resources.
36. the number of other states that will ally with the state.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 101  TOP: Resolve MSC: Factual

32. A state’s resolve consists of:

33. the length of time it has spent negotiating with its opponents.
34. the outcome of protracted negotiations.
35. the superiority of its armaments.
36. the quality of its military leadership.
37. the willingness of a state to bear the costs of war in order to achieve its
goal.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 99  TOP: Resolve MSC: Factual

33. Which is the best definition of total war?

34. A state mobilizes its entire military and economic resources.
35. Most of the states in the world are involved in the war.
36. Most of the states in one region are involved in the war.
37. The war lasts more than three years.
38. The war results in at least 1,000 battle deaths.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 95  TOP: Resolve MSC: Factual

34. Why is resolve difficult to measure?

35. Resolve depends on the intervention of international organizations.
36. Resolve depends on the quality of a state’s military training.
37. Resolve depends on how much a state is willing to pay and risk to achieve
a particular goal.
38. Resolve depends on how much a state trusts the other side.
39. Resolve depends on how well a state can obscure facts about its armies
from opponents.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 99–100  TOP: Resolve MSC: Conceptual

35. A risk-return trade-off is the idea that:

36. there is always a risk to selling weapons to other states.
37. states can get the best deal by threatening all-out war with another state.
38. states can minimize the chance of war by exchanging diplomatic missions.
39. states can reduce the risk of war during a crisis by returning diplomatic
messages quickly.
40. states have to minimize the chance of war while at the same time getting
the best deals they can.

ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Page 96  TOP: Resolve MSC: Factual

36. What is a credible threat?

37. A threat that the target of the threat believes will be carried out.
38. A threat made by a reliable ally.
39. Any attempt to intimidate opponents by making threats.
40. A dangerous crisis.
41. A threat that could possibly be carried out, even if it is unlikely.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 96  TOP: Credibility MSC: Factual
37. Why is it difficult to make a threat of attack seem credible to an
opponent?
38. States rarely have the capability to actually attack another country.
39. The opponent can easily tell when the threatening state is bluffing.
40. Opponents have access to enough information about the other state to
discredit its threats.
41. The threat of such a war can seem too costly to be a reasonable option.
42. The opponent may not realize how costly war can be.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 96–97  TOP: Credibility MSC: Conceptual

38. All of the following are reasons that the United States failed to convince
Saddam Hussein that the attack on Iraqi troops in Kuwait would be successful
EXCEPT:
39. the United States kept its troop movements secret.
40. the United States knew its attack strategy had a high possibility of
success, but could not reveal details to Saddam Hussein without jeopardizing
its plan.
41. the United States failed to make sufficient statements about the
importance of freeing Kuwait from Iraqi control.
42. Saddam Hussein thought the United States would entail enormous costs
by directly attacking Iraqi troops where they had the strongest defenses.
43. Saddam Hussein could not believe that United States society would
accept a large number of battle deaths.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 97  TOP: Credibility MSC: Applied

39. When leaders attempt to convince others that their state is stronger than
it really is, it is called:
40. deterrence.
41. compellence.
42. bargaining.
43. incomplete information.
44. bluffing.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Page 98  TOP: Credibility MSC: Factual

40. The United States did not believe China would intervene in the Korean
War, because:
41. the Chinese government had been an ally of the United States.
42. the Chinese had no apparent strategic interest in protecting North Korea.
43. China obviously lacked the capability to effectively launch an attack
against U.S. troops.
44. the Chinese government sent its threat message indirectly through India,
which did not indicate a large cost to making the threat.
45. United States troops were acting under the authority of the United
Nations.
 ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 99  TOP: Credibility MSC: Applied

41. Why do states use brinkmanship?

42. States are always on the verge of going to war.
43. States can signal a high level of resolve by making a threat that appears
likely to trigger extraordinary costs.
44. States can make significant threats but know they will always be able to
hold back from starting a war.
45. States know that there is no possibility of a crisis escalating into a
devastating nuclear war.
46. A state can pretend to be taking a tough stand to please domestic groups
while secretly negotiating a peaceful settlement with other states.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Page 100  TOP: Brinkmanship MSC: Conceptual

42. A brinkmanship crisis resembles which type of game (from game theory)?
43. Prisoner’s Dilemma.
44. Stag Hunt.
45. Battle of the Sexes.
46. Turkey Shoot.
47. Chicken.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 100–101  TOP: Brinkmanship MSC: Conceptual

43. Which of the following is an example of tying hands?

44. A leader accompanying a threat with troop movements near its rival’s
borders.
45. A leader, during private negotiations, promising war if an adversary does
not back down.
46. An elected leader publicly promising war if an adversary does not back
down.
47. A threat being accompanied with covert action that undermines a rival.
48. A leader accompanying a public threat with increased military spending.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 102  TOP: Audience Costs MSC: Applied

44. Why might audience costs affect the possibility of war?

45. The states in a dispute may decide to hold secret negotiations so that
privileged information will not become public.
46. Members of the United Nations Security Council may feel peer pressure to
vote in favor of an intervention to prevent war.
47. An elected leader may make a threat and be compelled to carry it out in
order to get reelected.
48. A state might be delayed in beginning a war, because other countries may
compel it to have the dispute heard by the World Court.
49. Third-party countries observing a conflict may decide to become involved.
 ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 102  TOP: Audience Costs MSC: Conceptual

45. What is paying for power?

46. Buying a political office.
47. Investing more money into an international organization.
48. Offering financial incentives to a major power to join you in an alliance.
49. Mobilizing and deploying a large military force.
50. Bribing a rival state.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 103–4  TOP: Paying for Power MSC: Applied

46. All of the following could change future bargaining power EXCEPT:
47. Israel retaining control of the strategically important Golan Heights.
48. China’s economy growing at a more rapid rate than the U.S. economy.
49. Iran beginning a nuclear weapons program.
50. Libya giving up its nuclear weapons program.
51. North Korea’s current leader dying and a military junta taking control.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 105–6  TOP: Future Bargaining MSC: Applied

47. Which of the following statements about credible commitments is true?

48. States often trust the other side to comply with their treaty obligations.
49. A state believes that the other side will not use force to revise the terms
of a deal.
50. A state makes convincing threats to compel states to comply with an
agreement.
51. States trust other states to negotiate in good faith while the bargaining
process continues.
52. States are never able to prove to other states that they will honor their
agreements.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Page 105  TOP: Commitment Problems MSC: Factual

48. Which country has the United States NOT tried to convince to abandon its
Weapons of Mass Destruction programs in recent years?
49. China
50. Libya
51. North Korea
52. Iraq
53. Iran

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 106  TOP: Future Bargaining MSC: Factual

49. Why is bargaining over future power especially difficult in international

relations?
50. States do not have reasonable expectations about the future power
distribution.
51. States have secret sources of power that cannot be observed.
52. It is impossible to verify if a state is abiding by such an agreement.
53. A state strengthened by such a deal cannot make a credible commitment
to not use its newfound power to make further demands.
54. A state will make up the power loss by forming new alliances instead.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Page 106  TOP: Future Bargaining MSC: Conceptual

50. Which is NOT a reason why states traditionally fight over territory?
51. Cyber control reasons.
52. Security reasons.
53. Ethno-religious reasons.
54. Economic reasons.
55. Natural resource reasons.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 107  TOP: Preventing War MSC: Factual

51. What has made negotiations with North Korea over its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs difficult?
52. The leadership of North Korea is irrational.
53. North Korea refuses to make any concessions.
54. Other states are generally not interested in North Korea, due to its
poverty.
55. The demands made by other states have been unclear to North Korea.
56. North Korea is unwilling to sacrifice the security that comes with
developing nuclear weapons.

ANS: E DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 108–9  TOP: Future Bargaining MSC: Applied

52. What is a preventive war?

53. A war launched to prevent human rights abuses in another state.
54. A war that begins when deterrence fails.
55. A war begun by a state to prevent an adversary from being a stronger
threat in the future.
56. A war launched by a state that fears an adversary is about to attack.
57. A war authorized by an international organization to eliminate aggressive
states that could threaten world peace.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 110–11  TOP: Prevention MSC: Factual

53. Why might preventive war appear attractive to a declining state?

54. A rising power will never agree to any bargain short of war.
55. Rising powers historically have always gone to war against declining
powers.
56. A rising power will likely acquire WMD in the future and pre-emption is the
only way to stop them.
57. The rising power cannot credibly commit to not using its force in the
future to revise any bargain struck in the short term.
58. A war now will eliminate the rising power from ever being a concern in the
future.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 110–11  TOP: Prevention MSC: Applied

54. What is a first-strike advantage?

55. There is a significant benefit for a state to be the first to attack.
56. A state can easily repel a surprise attack by another state.
57. A smaller state attacks a larger state first.
58. A state launches the initial attack in any war.
59. A state has an incentive to wait for another state to initiate a war.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 112  TOP: Prevention MSC: Factual

55. What is a preemptive war?

56. A war initiated by a state because it anticipates an imminent attack from
an adversary.
57. A war initiated by a state because it anticipates its adversary will become
stronger in the future.
58. A war initiated by a state because another state has refused to honor its
treaty commitments.
59. A defensive war fought by a state after it has suffered a surprise attack.
60. A war fought over the restriction of trade during a crisis between two
states.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 113  TOP: Preemption MSC: Factual

56. Which of the following best describes why World War I began?
57. Belgium feared a German attack and destroyed the railroad tracks on its
border.
58. Russia mobilized its troops in order to protect its ally, France.
59. Austria launched a preventive war against Russia, before it could mobilize
its troops.
60. France launched a preventive war against Germany.
61. Germany launched a preemptive war against Russia, before it could
mobilize its troops.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 114  TOP: Preemption MSC: Factual

57. What was the Schlieffen Plan?

58. The German plan to avoid fighting a war simultaneously with France and
Russia.
59. The German plan to retake the Rhineland by bluffing.
60. The Austrian plan to punish Serbia for the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand.
61. The Swiss plan to remain neutral during World War II.
62. The Belgian plan to destroy key bridges to prevent a German attack.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 114  TOP: Preemption MSC: Factual

58. Which of the following problems make states more likely to go to war?
59. Problems arising from complete information.
60. Problems arising from conflicts over goods that are easily split between
two states.
61. Problems arising from the difficulty of committing to honor a deal.
62. Problems arising from international organizations forcing states to comply
with an agreement.
63. Problems arising from states having relatively unchanging amounts of
power.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 115–16  TOP: Commitment Problems MSC:
Factual

59. Why might an apparently indivisible good actually be divisible?

60. No goods are completely indivisible: there are ways to divide any goods.
61. The good concerned is territory, which is difficult to divide.
62. States are willing to ruin an indivisible good by splitting it rather than
allow another state to win the whole good.
63. Sometimes states falsely claim that a desired object is indivisible in order
to strengthen their bargaining position.
64. Sometimes leaders think an asset like future military power is indivisible,
because of misperception.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 120–21  TOP: Indivisible Goods MSC:
Conceptual

60. All of the following are ways to make war less likely EXCEPT:
61. increasing the costs of going to war.
62. increasing transparency.
63. outside enforcement of commitments.
64. increasing the number of actors involved in a conflict.
65. dividing apparently indivisible goods.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 121–22  TOP: Preventing War MSC: Conceptual

Essay

1. Why is war a relatively rare occurrence?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: War
2. What is the bargaining model of war? How does it explain why war occurs?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Bargaining and War

3. How does poor and incomplete information contribute to the likelihood of

war?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Incomplete Information

4. Explain how incomplete information contributed to mistakes made before

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Incomplete Information

5. Explain the risks and benefits of engaging in brinkmanship.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Brinkmanship

6. Are democratic or autocratic leaders more capable of “tying their hands?”

Explain your answer, using concepts of interests, interactions, and
institutions.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Audience Costs

7. How do commitment problems affect the likelihood that war will occur?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Commitment Problems

8. China unsuccessfully attempted to convince the United States that it

would intervene if the United States sent its troops into North Korea in 1950.
Explain how this example demonstrates the difficulty of communicating
resolve to an opponent.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Incomplete Information | Commitment Problems

9. What makes a good indivisible, and how do indivisible goods affect the
possibility of war?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Indivisible Goods

10. What is the difference between a preemptive war and a preventive war?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Prevention | Preemption

11. Explain how the 2003 war with Iraq was a preventive war rather than a
preemptive war.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Prevention | Preemption

Chapter 4

Domestic Politics and War

Concept Map

1. Introduction
2. Interests: War and Peace
3. Domestic Actors
4. National Interests
5. Particularistic Interests
6. Influence

III.  Diversionary War

1. Falklands/Malvinas War
2. Assassination
3. Leader Preferences
4. Rally Effect
5. Fate of Leaders
6. Special Interests
7. Bureaucracy
8. The Military
9. Economic Lobbies
10. Small Groups
11. Bargaining
12. Democratic Peace
13. Democracy
 Multiple Choice

1. In 1982, what event changed popular discontent in Argentina into

widespread support for the government?
2. Argentina democratized.
3. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
4. The government adopted significant economic reforms.
5. The United States invaded Argentina.
6. Argentina nationalized industries held by multinational corporations.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 125  TOP: Domestic Actors MSC: Factual

2. What action did the Arbenz government take in 1954 that the United Fruit
Company opposed?
3. It expropriated lands held by the United Fruit Company.
4. It made business-provided health care mandatory.
5. It disallowed foreign companies from investing in Guatemala.
6. It invited the CIA to partake in domestic operations in Guatemala.
7. It banned the purchase of military weapons from foreign sources.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 125–26  TOP: Domestic Actors MSC: Factual

3. What is the unitary state assumption?

4. The belief that a state’s leaders have the most impact on foreign policy
decisions.
5. The examination of states that do not have a federal system of
government.
6. The supposition that states act as if they have a unitary, rather than a
federal, system of government.
7. The treatment of states as coherent actors with a set of interests that
belong to the state.
8. The belief that one domestic actor can control the foreign policy of a
state.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 126  TOP: Domestic Actors MSC: Factual

4. Which of the following is the best example of using the unitary state
assumption?
5. The Soviet Union attacked Hungary in 1956 because the single communist
party pushed for the attack.
6. Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 because Hitler hated Slavic
people.
7. El Salvador attacked Honduras in 1969 because the Salvadoran public was
at risk.
8. France mobilized quickly against Germany in 1914, because it had a
unitary, rather than a federal, system of government
9. Japan attacked China in 1931 because of the aggressive Japanese
military leadership.

ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Page 126  TOP: Domestic Actors MSC: Applied

5. The following statements are all consistent with realism EXCEPT:

6. States pragmatically recognize that territory is unimportant in the era of
the Internet.
7. A main state interest is to preserve its sovereignty.
8. The external international environment dictates what states’ interests are.
9. States seek to expand their own power in order to protect their territory.
10. States’ main national interests do not change.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 128  TOP: National Interests MSC: Applied

6. Which of the following is an example of a national interest?

7. The desire of important corporations to make a profit.
8. The aspiration of the armed forces to create a larger military organization.
9. The need for a country to maintain economic growth.
10. The need for a company to expand its oil exploration.
11. The expectation of the public that public officials will pay attention to its
needs.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 128–29  TOP: National Interests MSC: Applied

7. Which of the following explanations of the United States’ wars with Iraq
relies on a particularistic interest explanation?
8. The United States government undermines regimes that threaten the
profits of U.S. oil companies.
9. Oil is an important component of military power, and the United States
must safeguard its supply.
10. Oil is critical for the smooth functioning of the economy, and the United
States must avoid abrupt changes in oil supply and price.
11. Stability in the Middle East would make the United States more secure.
12. Spreading democracy in the Middle East would make the threat of war less
likely.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 128–29  TOP: Particularistic Interests MSC:
Applied

8. War could further the particularistic interests of all of the following

EXCEPT:
9. political leaders.
10. the general public.
11. ethnic lobbies.
12. the military.
13. business lobbies.
 ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 129–30  TOP: Particularistic Interests MSC: Applied

9. How does the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala illustrate

the problem of collective action?
10. Large group protests may provoke a backlash by the rich and powerful.
11. The combined effort by domestic actors such as the military can change
unpopular governments.
12. Actors who share similar views are usually able to coordinate their efforts
and achieve their goals.
13. A small group such as international investors can obtain large benefits
while the costs of intervention would be spread out among many taxpayers.
14. Expecting other leaders to come to his aid, Arbenz discovered too late
that Fidel Castro and others would not act to save him.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 131  TOP: Particularistic Interests MSC: Applied

10. Why is it important to examine the interests of state leaders when

attempting to explain the likelihood of war?
11. State leaders always have the sole power to determine whether a state
will go to war.
12. The public needs to know what those interests are before an election, so
they can elect a good leader, since there is no way to influence the leader’s
decisions after an election.
13. The interests of a leader may not be obvious, since organized interest
groups always influence a leader’s decisions.
14. The likelihood of war decreases as the age of a leader increases.
15. Leaders have the authority to make foreign policy decisions, even if other
actors influence them.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Page 133  TOP: Influence MSC: Conceptual

11. What is a bureaucracy?

12. Any agency in a government with more than fifty employees.
13. The different organizations of the state apparatus.
14. Formal organizations that form outside of the state apparatus.
15. An entrenched interest group
16. A branch of the government excluding the military, diplomatic corps, and
intelligence agencies.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 131  TOP: Influence MSC: Factual

12. Which of the following is not a part of a bureaucracy?

13. The leader of a country.
14. The military leadership.
15. An intelligence agency.
16. An interest group.
17. The diplomatic corps.
 ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 131  TOP: Influence MSC: Applied

13. What is an interest group?

14. A group of academic experts studying a particular issue.
15. A focus group the government creates to test possible policy changes.
16. A group of individuals that pushes for policies that benefit the group’s
members.
17. A faction of the government that pushes for economic and political
changes.
18. A faction of the government that provides information and advice to its
leaders.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 131  TOP: Influence MSC: Factual

14. Which of the following would be considered an interest group in the United
States?
15. ExxonMobil, a United States oil company seeking profits.
16. The United States Department of State, which seeks better relations with
other countries.
17. The Pentagon, which provides information to the president.
18. The Cuban American National Foundation, a Florida-based group seeking
increased democracy in Cuba.
19. The Iraq Study Group, which prepared a report on the 2003 Iraq War for the
government.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 131  TOP: Influence MSC: Applied

15. Why was the war between Argentina and Britain over the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands surprising?
16. The Falklands/Malvinas Islands were strategically important for Britain,
and Argentina should have known the British would rigorously defend them.
17. The Falklands/Malvinas Islands were densely populated, and Argentina
could anticipate a grueling fight to take over the territory.
18. The British had signaled a lack of commitment to the islands shortly
before the war, and Argentina did not expect the British to fight over the
territory.
19. The Argentine military junta was unpopular at the time and should have
known that a war would only decrease its popularity further.
20. Argentina knew Britain’s economy was strong and it could easily wage a
war over islands that were extremely far away.

ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Page 132  TOP: Falklands/Malvinas War MSC: Applied

16. Why did Argentina attack the Falklands/Malvinas Islands?

17. The Argentine government expected that taking control of the islands
would improve its ability to stay in power.
18. The Argentine public pressured the government to retake the islands.
19. Argentine business groups pushed for the government to safeguard their
economic interests in the islands.
20. Argentine military officers needed combat experience in order to be
promoted to the highest ranks.
21. The Argentine government felt it had to launch a preemptive war.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 132  TOP: Falklands/Malvinas War MSC:
Conceptual

17. Why did Britain react so strongly to the Argentine attack on the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands?
18. The discovery of oil near the islands made the territory vital to its security.
19. The British public opposed Argentina’s attack and supported the prime
minister’s aggressive response.
20. The British public felt that the Falklands were vital to their economic well
being.
21. The islands’ location was strategically important to Britain.
22. Britain’s economy was growing rapidly at the time, and it could afford to
go to war with a weaker country.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: Page 132  TOP: Falklands/Malvinas War MSC:
Conceptual

18. In which country did the United States find and kill Osama bin Laden?
19. Afghanistan.
20. China.
21. Pakistan.
22. Kazakhstan.
23. Iran.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Page 134  TOP: Assassination MSC: Factual

19. International and U.S. law forbid which of the following?

20. The assassination of foreign heads of states.
21. The assassination of terrorist leaders.
22. Sanctioning other states.
23. Declaring war against other states.
24. Going to war against a terrorist group.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Page 134  TOP: Assassination MSC: Factual

20. Why might assassination attempts change the calculations leaders make
when considering war?
21. It would demoralize the troops within their armies and make them less
effective.
22. Voters are likely to vote for a different party if the current head of state is
assassinated.
23. The costs of conflict would be concentrated on the leader.
24. Assassinations have historically drawn more states into war.
25. Assassinations tend to cause economic downturns

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 134–35  TOP: Assassination MSC: Conceptual

21. Why might assassination NOT have an effect on deterring war?

22. Policy choices are not purely made by leaders and the targeted state will
maintain the policy it had previously.
23. Leaders are not concerned about their personal costs.
24. Leaders are willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the population.
25. It is too difficult to carry out a successful assassination in the
contemporary period.
26. A country partaking in an assassination will lose more ground than it
gains.

ANS: A DIF: Easy REF: Pages 134–35  TOP: Leader Preferences MSC: Conceptual

22. Which of the following statements best describes the possible constraints
leaders face when considering whether to go to war?
23. Most leaders do not concern themselves with how many resources
interest groups have.
24. A leader rarely has to worry about the interests of military officers, since
they must be obedient to the chief executive.
25. Most leaders have to consider the response of the public when thinking of
going to war.
26. A leader would never risk going to war just to improve the chances of
reelection.
27. A leader’s options improve when the amount of information given to the
public is increased.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 136  TOP: Rally Effect MSC: Applied

23. Which of the following is an example of the rally-round-the-flag effect?

24. A leader begins a war to show how patriotic he is.
25. A leader begins a war to reclaim territory that has historically belonged to
his country.
26. The citizens of a country pressure the government to go to war, even when
its leaders are reluctant to do so.
27. The citizens of a country unite to support their country when a dramatic
international event occurs.
28. The citizens of a country unite to reduce immigration and foreign
involvement.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 136–37  TOP: Rally Effect MSC: Applied

24. Why does the rally-round-the-flag effect occur?

25. Members of a group feel greater loyalty when they come into conflict with
outsiders.
26. Individuals feel a greater sense of community at mass political rallies.
27. Average citizens feel that their leaders in government will finally hear their
collective voice.
28. Citizens usually want to help protect people who share ethnic and
historical ties with their country.
29. A leader knows starting a war will prove to the public that he is a loyal and
responsible leader.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 136–37  TOP: Rally Effect MSC: Conceptual

25. What is a diversionary incentive?

26. A temptation to switch trading partners to get a better deal.
27. An opportunity to change international agreements while other states are
preoccupied with a conflict.
28. A payoff for avoiding war.
29. An attempt to avoid war by creating a distraction.
30. A temptation to start an international crisis to create public support at
home.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 138  TOP: Rally Effect MSC: Factual

26. According to the most recent studies, when would a leader attempt to
“gamble for resurrection”?
27. Right after an election.
28. When the leader’s popularity is extremely low.
29. When the country is in an economic recession.
30. When the country is experiencing high unemployment.
31. Right before an election.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Page 138  TOP: Rally Effect MSC: Applied

27. Why are diversionary incentives less common than once thought?
28. The overall domestic costs of a war can be extremely high.
29. Political leaders are too cynical to think that the public will believe them.
30. There are too many benefits to starting a war.
31. Other states are unlikely to become preoccupied with a war.
32. There is little advantage to switching trading partners.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 138  TOP: Fate of Leaders MSC: Conceptual

28. Which of the following is most likely to lose office after leading his or her
country into war?
29. An autocratic leader whose country loses a short war.
30. An autocratic leader whose country loses a long war.
31. An autocratic leader whose country wins a short war.
32. An autocratic leader whose country wins a long war.
33. A democratically elected leader.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 142  TOP: Fate of Leaders MSC: Applied

29. What is the most likely result for a leader after the outcome of a war?
30. An autocratic leader who wins a war is likely to lose power.
31. An autocratic leader who loses a war and loses power will go unpunished.
32. A democratic leader who wins a war is likely to lose power.
33. A democratic leader who loses a war is likely to lose power.
34. A democratic leader who loses a war and loses power is likely to be
punished

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Page 142  TOP: Special Interests MSC: Conceptual

30. What was the military-industrial complex that U.S. President Dwight
Eisenhower warned about?
31. A geographical concentration of weapons productions facilities which
made them vulnerable to attack.
32. The collusion between military leaders and weapons builders that would
promote more aggressive foreign policy actions.
33. The difficulty of demobilizing the military effort at the end of World War II.
34. The superiority of Soviet weapons that put the United States at risk.
35. A secret weapons manufacturing plant in the closed Soviet city of
Magadan.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Page 143  TOP: Special Interests MSC: Factual

31. Which of the following is an example of how bureaucratic organizations

affect decision making?
32. Halliburton and other companies providing information to the United
States government that increased the pressure on Iraq.
33. United Fruit pushing the United States government to overthrow the
Arbenz regime in Guatemala.
34. The Iraq Study Group report leading to changes in the Bush
administration’s strategy in Iraq.
35. AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) urging the Bush
administration to stand firm in its support of Israel.
36. The United States making mistakes after the 2003 Iraq War because the
Defense Department and the State Department fought over strategy.

ANS: E DIF: Easy REF: Pages 143–44  TOP: Bureaucracy MSC: Applied

32. What does the expression “where you stand depends on where you sit”
mean?
33. The power of a state depends on its geographic location.
34. An advisor’s bias becomes more obvious when the advisor takes a strong
position on an issue.
35. The status of a bureaucratic agency depends on the quality of its offices.
36. The power of an advisor is reflected by how close the actor sits to the
leader in important meetings.
37. Leaders of bureaucratic agencies often advocate policies that reflect their
organizations’ needs.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 144  TOP: Bureaucracy MSC: Factual

33. All of the following are examples of when the military can be an important
domestic actor EXCEPT when:
34. a group of military officers took direct control of the Brazilian government
from 1964 to 1985.
35. a single general was the dictator of Chile from 1973 to 1990.
36. the Argentine military junta was forced from office in 1983.
37. the civilian president of Ecuador was forced from office with support from
the military in 2000.
38. the Mexican government used the military to shoot student protesters in
1968.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Pages 143–45  TOP: The Military MSC: Applied

34. Which of the following statements about hawkish narrow-interest groups

is true?
35. Their interests are so narrow that their views are drowned out by other
voices.
36. They are more likely to influence the government when more domestic
actors are participating in public debates.
37. Through their activities they often can single-handedly compel a country
to go to war.
38. Their interests usually coincide with the national interest.
39. Their activities create more opportunities for conflict.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 143, 152  TOP: Special Interests MSC:
Conceptual

35. All of the following are reasons that members of the military would be
predisposed to an aggressive foreign policy EXCEPT:
36. military leaders may be ideologically inclined to prefer military solutions to
foreign policy problems.
37. military leaders may overestimate how efficient the use of force will be,
compared to other possible solutions to foreign policy problems.
38. military officers do not care if they put their troops into dangerous
situations.
39. the military can receive larger budgets when a country is facing the
prospect of international conflict.
40. military officers usually need combat experience for promotion.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 144  TOP: The Military MSC: Conceptual

36. Which of the following statements about military actors is true?

37. Military officers always advocate military solutions to international
conflicts, because they are predisposed to war.
38. Military officers can be reluctant to advocate war, because they are more
appreciative of the costs of war than civilian actors.
39. Military officers usually advocate war as a solution to international
conflicts, because they always overestimate the strength of their own troops.
40. Military officers are reluctant to advocate war unless their forces are part
of larger international coalitions.
41. Military officers tend to advocate war because, as officers, they are
usually not in danger during battles.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Page 145  TOP: The Military MSC: Factual

37. Which of the following best describes how the military can influence
decision-making?
38. Leaders of democratic countries largely ignore the military.
39. The military has the most credible information about a country’s own
capabilities and is more likely to be sensitive to the costs of war.
40. The military strongly advocates a policy of “shoot first, gather intelligence
later.”
41. A military is only influential in democracies and has little influence in
other types of regimes.
42. Typically the military keeps its contingency plans secret from the leader,
so that the information is not leaked to enemies.

ANS: B DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 144–45  TOP: The Military MSC: Applied

38. In which of these cases would an interest group be most likely to push a
government into a conflict?
39. When a large group of investors lobbies the government to ban luxury
imports from another country.
40. When a small number of investors wants the government to use a covert
operation to protect their oil wells in a foreign country.
41. When taxpayers want the government to reduce its deficit.
42. When a group of arms manufacturers presses the government to reject
international weapons standards.
43. When an ethnic lobby pushes for a war with a much stronger country.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 148–49  TOP: Economic Lobbies MSC: Applied

39. In which of these cases would the influence of interest groups make
conflict less likely?
40. A small number of investors want the government to protect its diamond
mines in a country with an unfriendly government.
41. A small number of arms manufacturers build weapons that deter other
countries from attacking.
42. Immigrants want the government to impose a trade embargo on goods
manufactured in their homeland.
43. A group of manufacturers wants the government to increase tariffs on
imports.
44. A small group of investors wants to increase trade with another country.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 148–49  TOP: Economic Lobbies MSC: Applied

40. If war is costly, why would domestic actors be willing to risk a conflict?
41. They usually expect the war to take place on foreign soil.
42. The compulsory draft has ended in most countries, so only those who want
to fight are in the military.
43. No one expects war will become too destructive in the nuclear era.
44. The costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among domestic actors.
45. They can put their assets in Swiss bank accounts before a war begins.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Page 149  TOP: Small Groups MSC: Conceptual

41. Interest groups can influence political leaders by all of the following
EXCEPT:
42. providing bribes to a political leader.
43. conducting congressional hearings.
44. financing a political leader’s election campaign.
45. promising the support of their voters.
46. Providing expert information.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 149–50  TOP: Small Groups MSC: conceptual

42. Which of the following is an example of an interest group successfully

pushing a state into a conflict?
43. Japan attacking Pearl Harbor because the United States was impeding its
supply of oil.
44. The United States sponsoring a failed invasion of Cuba because the Cuban
leaders were Communists.
45. The United States removing Guatemalan President Arbenz to protect
United Fruit’s assets.
46. The Soviet Union invading Afghanistan after an anti-Soviet government
took power there.
47. India attacking Pakistan because Pakistani military forces crossed the
Line of Control in Kashmir

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 149–50  TOP: Small Groups MSC: Applied
43. Domestic actors can affect the likelihood of international conflict in all of
the following ways EXCEPT:
44. domestic actors alone determine whether a state will go to war.
45. domestic actors can widen or narrow the scope of goods over which
leaders might wage war.
46. domestic actors can influence when and how often a state’s interests will
come into conflict with other states’ interests.
47. domestic actors can determine the size of the demands that states make.
48. domestic actors can influence how much risk the state is willing to take.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Pages 150–52  TOP: Bargaining MSC: Conceptual

44. How can the level of influence an interest group has had in making a
foreign policy decision be determined?
45. Usually there is no other reason for the policy other than benefiting an
interest group.
46. One can assume that, since a policy decision benefited a group, the
decision must have been made in order to benefit that group.
47. In democracies, interest groups have to make their campaign
contributions public, so one can link the amount of money with policy
decisions that benefit a group.
48. Measuring the influence of an interest group is difficult, because usually
one cannot directly observe the connection between a group and the ultimate
decision.
49. Scholars find out how much influence an interest group has had when
official records are made public long after the decision has been made.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 150  TOP: Small Groups MSC: Conceptual

45. What effect do influential, dovish interest groups have on the bargaining
model of war?
46. They make war between states more likely.
47. They decrease the acceptable bargaining range for the state they are in.
48. They increase the acceptable bargaining range for the state they are in.
49. They decrease the acceptable bargaining range for the opposing state.
50. They increase the acceptable bargaining range for the opposing state.

ANS: C DIF: Moderate REF: Page 152  TOP: Small Groups MSC: Conceptual

46. Which of these domestic actors is most likely to benefit from a war?
47. Citizens who pay taxes.
48. Companies that manufacture weapons.
49. Male citizens who are over eighteen years old.
50. Businesses that import luxury goods.
51. Organizations pushing for more public services.

ANS: B DIF: Easy REF: Pages 152–53  TOP: Economic Lobbies MSC: Applied
47. What is the “democratic peace”?
48. Countries with democratic governments are less likely to experience civil
unrest than countries with autocratic governments.
49. The increase in international organizations with democratic procedures
has decreased the likelihood of war.
50. Autocratic countries avoid going to war with democratic countries.
51. Democratic countries are less likely than autocratic countries to go to war
with any country.
52. Countries with democratic governments are less likely to go to war with
other democracies, but as likely to go to war with autocratic countries as any
other country.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 154  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Factual

48. Which of the following definitions best describes the current conception of
democracy?
49. A system in which all citizens are free to make their own political
decisions.
50. A system in which all citizens meet together to discuss and vote on laws.
51. A system in which candidates compete for political office through
frequent, fair elections in which most of the adult population can vote.
52. A system in which representatives are selected in elections.
53. A system in which a few representatives are allowed to make decisions
for the many, as long as they preserve basic individual freedoms.

ANS: C DIF: Easy REF: Pages 154–55  TOP: Democracy MSC: Factual

49. Which of the following is an example of contestation?

50. A government allowing all citizens over eighteen years old to vote.
51. A country challenging the voting rules in an international organization.
52. A government limiting the number of parties that can organize.
53. A country allowing all groups or citizens to run for elected office.
54. Domestic interest groups competing to influence the government.

ANS: D DIF: Moderate REF: Page 155  TOP: Democracy MSC: Applied

50. Which of the following countries would be considered a liberal democracy?

51. A country with a democratically elected government that prohibits
religious minorities from holding public office.
52. A country with a democratically elected government that gives a
particular ethnic minority a preference when hiring public workers.
53. A country with a democratically elected government that creates a media
consulting board to ban stories that unfairly criticize public officials.
54. A democracy that limits the number of political parties that can form, in
order to reduce confusion for the voters.
55. A democracy that allows newspapers and television news to publish
stories that are sometimes inaccurate.
 ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 155  TOP: Democracy MSC: Applied

51. Why would there be a democratic peace?

52. People who want to be leaders of democracies are always more peaceful
than leaders of autocracies.
53. Citizens of democracies are able to use a domestic institutions system to
resolve their differences.
54. The positions of autocratic leaders are always more tenuous than those of
democratic leaders, so autocratic leaders are less likely to go to war.
55. The citizens who bear the costs of war restrain leaders from beginning
international conflicts.
56. International organizations have increased the number of opportunities for
transparent negotiations between countries.

ANS: D DIF: Easy REF: Pages 154–55  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Conceptual

52. Why does accountability reduce the likelihood of democracies going to

war?
53. Citizens will voice their disapproval of reckless wars during public debates
before a war can begin.
54. The responsibility of elected governments to reduce deficit spending will
also inhibit their ability to launch costly wars.
55. Democracies face more liability from international organizations for
violating the rules of war.
56. Through elections, voters will remove leaders who start imprudent wars.
57. Voters are more likely to elect leaders who refuse to participate in
conflict.

ANS: D DIF: Difficult REF: Page 157  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Conceptual

53. Why is losing a war more costly for nondemocratic leaders than for
democratic leaders?
54. Since nondemocratic leaders are more insulated from public input, they
are more surprised by the vehemence of public criticism after the war.
55. Nondemocratic leaders are more likely to overestimate the capabilities of
their own military and experience much worse losses than occur in wars
begun by democratically elected leaders.
56. Spending money on waging a war but not getting any resources in return
means that an undemocratic leader will have less money than democratically
elected leaders, who usually have a steady salary.
57. Wars are generally financed personally by nondemocratic leaders.
58. Nondemocratic leaders are more likely to be jailed if they cause a war that
their country loses.

ANS: E DIF: Moderate REF: Page 160  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Conceptual

54. How do democratic institutions help reduce informational problems?

55. Democratic governments make all information public, so allies and
enemies know their capabilities.
56. Policy decisions are usually debated in public, so foreign governments can
obtain more information about resolve.
57. Citizens can easily ascertain how well a conflict is handled and can vote a
leader out of office at the next election.
58. International organizations with no suppression of information can freely
monitor states to make sure they are not cheating on their agreements.
59. Interest groups in democratic countries can provide valuable expert
advice on how to deal with possible conflicts.

ANS: B DIF: Difficult REF: Page 161  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Factual

55. How do democratic institutions help solve commitment problems?

56. Citizens can better scrutinize government actions before a conflict occurs.
57. Citizens can vote directly on whether their country should go to war.
58. Elected leaders face greater costs if they back down from threats.
59. Elected leaders will have to campaign longer and harder if they lose a war.
60. States are more likely to follow through on their obligations if an
international organization has fair voting procedures.

ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Page 161  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Applied

56. All of the following are reasons for doubting the democratic peace
EXCEPT:
57. democratic states may not have had a chance to fight with each other in
the nineteenth century, because there were few democracies at that time.
58. the major democratic states did not go to war against each other during
the nineteenth century, but they did experience many crises that nearly led to
war over colonies.
59. too many democracies have actually fought against each other since the
end of World War II.
60. democratic states in the twentieth century may not have fought with each
other because they were allied against a more powerful nondemocratic enemy.
61. rather than democracy causing peace, some other factor may cause both
democracy and peace.

ANS: C DIF: Difficult REF: Pages 164–65  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC:
Conceptual

57. How does the Kargil War illustrate the influence of the military in foreign
policy decision-making?
58. The civilian leader of Pakistan did not know that Pakistani troops would be
involved in the attack.
59. The autocratic leader of Pakistan at the time was a general.
60. The Pakistani military had to comply with the president’s order to support
Kashmiri insurgents with training and weapons.
61. The Indian military failed to provide adequate information and was taken
by surprise when it discovered Pakistani troops crossing the Line of Control.
62. The Indian military provided biased information to the civilian leader of
India to justify its attack on Pakistani forces.

ANS: A DIF: Moderate REF: Page 166  TOP: Democratic Peace MSC: Applied

Essay

1. It has been said that how much the general public matters in foreign
policy decision making is a question of how much democracy matters. Why
would this be the case?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Interests: War and Peace

2. Why do states refrain from assassinating other heads of states? Elaborate

on your answer by noting the costs and benefits of such policies.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Assassination

3. When is it likely that interest groups will influence foreign-policy

decisions?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Special Interests

4. Explain how and to what extent the military can influence foreign policy
decisions.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: The Military

5. How are leaders’ interests and options different in democratic and

nondemocratic countries?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Diversionary War

6. How do hawks and doves affect the bargaining range of states?

ANS: Answer will vary.

 TOP: Special Interests

7. How do interests, institutions, and interactions explain why the

Falklands/Malvinas War occurred?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Falklands/Malvinas War

8. Explain how the democratic peace theory encompasses institutions,

interactions, and interests.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Democratic Peace

9. Why might the democratic peace be simply a coincidence?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Democratic Peace

10. Explain why a world without democracies would not necessarily be a

world without war.

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Democratic Peace

11. How does the Kargil War between India and Pakistan demonstrate the
limitations of democratic peace theory?

ANS: Answer will vary.

TOP: Democratic Peace