Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 32, No.

3, 1998

How Should We Teach Sex?

DAVID ARCHARD

In the face of differences about how sex should be taught to

young persons, and consistent with a liberal principle of
neutrality, educationalists can adopt one of two strategies.
The `retreat to basics' consists in teaching only a basic agreed
code of sexual conduct, or a set of agreed principles of sexual
morality. The `conjunctive±disjunctive' strategy consists in
teaching the facts of sexual activity together with the various
possible evaluations of these facts. Both strategies are beset
with significant and insuperable difficulties. Perhaps one
should presume only to teach sex in a way that maximises the
foundational liberal ideal of autonomy.

Let me start with a claim to which I shall return at the end of this article.
It provides an obvious starting point for any discussion of the issues
raised by the article's title question. We should teach sex in school.
Saying this presumes that if sex ought to be taught to young persons it is
better, all things considered, at least to teach it in schools. This view will
be defended by an appeal to the likelihood of parents defaulting on any
obligation to teach their children about sex and a belief that a school
based sex education possesses values Ð consistency, pedagogical
adequacy, resources Ð not possessed by a home based education. Let
us concede this presupposed view. Why should we teach sex at all?
There are, it will be said, good reasons to do so. The reasons which
have been offered are of various kinds and some at least are open to
dispute. But they fall Ð for the sake of simplicity Ð into three broad
categories: prudential, social, and evaluative. There are prudential
reasons why a young person should be adequately informed about
sex Ð to be free of guilt and embarrassment, to obtain pleasure from
any sexual encounters; there are social reasons why young persons
should be taught about sex Ð to avoid the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases, to minimise unwanted pregnancies; and there are
evaluative reasons why young persons should learn about sex Ð to
enable them to make their own fully informed and reasoned choices in
sexual matters, to understand the proper place of sex in their lives.
There will be arguments about the relative importance of these
various reasons and about whether some that are offered ought to count
at all. I shall take it, however, that most people could agree that sex
should be taught and that each who so agreed would do so for some set

& The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108
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437
438 David Archard

of the reasons offered. Unfortunately this only means that people agree
that sex should be taught but do not necessarily agree as to why it should
be taught. It is also further true that the different reasons why people
think sex ought to be taught will make a difference to their views as to
how sex ought to be taught. Moreover it is just true that people have
different views about sexual morality and are, in consequence, likely to
have different views about the appropriate way to talk about sex to
young people.
It is obviously possible to provide various typologies of sexual
ideologies, of general outlooks on sexual morality. But the two views
offered here are recognisable instances of what one author has
characterised as the principal division between a Permissive and a
Restrictive sexual ideology (McKay, 1997). The first is a libertarian view
that anything sexually goes so long as it is in private, between consenting
adults, and harms no-one else. This view would commend teaching sex
to young persons in such a way that they understand what, as a matter
of mere fact, is involved in each activity on a comprehensive listing of
possible sexual activities and that they learn the centrality of consent Ð
what it involves, what signifies it, and how wrong it would be to ignore
it. No further values would need to be communicated. The second view
is the traditional Christian view that, amongst other things, sex is
properly confined to marriage and should be an expression of conjugal
love, that homosexuality, and indeed some heterosexual sexual practices
such as oral sex, are wrong because unnatural. This view would
commend teaching sex to young persons in such a way that they come to
see sex as only properly associated with love, and recognise the
wrongness of homosexuality and other unnatural sexual behaviours.
I here endorse neither view. I simply offer them as evident examples of
how differences in sexual morality entail differences in views as to how
sex ought to be taught. It is important to acknowledge both that
`Western culture is deeply divided in its moral perspectives towards
human sexuality' and that this is not a `mere difference of opinion,
but . . . a conflict between divergent sexual ideologies' (McKay, 1997,
pp. 285 and 286). How are we to deal with these differences of view? Well
of course we Ð and by `we' I mean here those of us who would be in a
position to determine educational policy Ð could simply opt to override
the differences. We could do so, for instance, by prescribing some
particular view as the only acceptable view on sex. However, I am going
to presume, at least initially, that there are no reasons, congenial to
someone of liberal sensibilities, for prescribing that one view, and one
view only, of sex should be taught.
Here one might enter familiar remarks about a liberal principle of
neutrality, that is the principle that the liberal state should not, in its
policies and laws, presuppose the superiority of any particular moral
viewpoint (or `conception of the good').1 Thus an educational policy
maker is enjoined not to favour (or disfavour) any educational practice
on the grounds that its underlying moral viewpoint is correct (or
incorrect). So one could not, as a liberal educationalist, urge the teaching

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 How Should We Teach Sex? 439

of Ð to take one of the two examples instanced earlier Ð a Christian

sexual morality because one believed that the Christian account of sex
and sexuality was morally superior to the alternative accounts.
It might be questioned why the principle of neutrality applies to
educational policy as an instance of official policy. It cannot, I believe,
do so via parental rights by means of the argument that a parent's
bringing up of her child in some particular way of life is just an extension
of the parent's right to pursue, for herself, that way of life. Just as the
state is forbidden to advance, or obstruct, any conception of the good
life Ð so the argument continues Ð it is, by extension, forbidden to
advance or obstruct any parental inculcation of that way of life in her
children. It cannot do so simply because it is a mistake to view the child
and its life as no more than an extension of the parent's.2 Rather, the
argument will proceed by means of a claim about the kind of life which
will be pursued by someone educated in a particular way, and by a
further claim that people have a legitimate interest in the state not
allowing (or preventing) the emergence of adults leading certain kinds of
life. Thus, in sum, it should not be argued that a Christian parent has a
right to see her child become a Christian and can object to any official
educational policy which makes this more unlikely. Rather, a Christian
citizen has a right to expect that the state will not do anything to make it
more unlikely that there will, in the future, be fewer Christian citizens.3
The principle of neutrality is, however, subject to the following
difficulty. Most commentators draw a distinction between `consequen-
tial' and `justificatory' neutrality, between a neutrality of outcome and
one of procedure (Kymlicka, 1989). Most defenders of a principle of
neutrality favour the first over the second. The distinction operates in
the following way. A policy or law might not be neutral in its effects even
whilst the justification of that policy, the procedure whereby the policy
was determined, was strictly neutral. If this was the case then, most say,
it would still count as consonant with the principle of neutrality.
Imagine then that our educational policy maker instituted a policy of
the mandatory teaching of traditional Christian views on sexual
morality but justified this policy by arguing that such teaching would
serve indisputably valuable social ends. By reducing the levels of sexual
activity amongst young people such teaching would diminish the
number of unwanted pregnancies and the incidence of sexually
transmitted diseases amongst young people. Correlatively, it might be
argued that teaching libertarian views of sexual morality would promote
these unwelcome outcomes. The prescribed policy is not neutral in its
effects Ð it very evidently favours an outcome in which one particular
view about sex is taught and others are not Ð but it is neutral in its
justification. For the justification of the policy of only teaching
traditional Christian views about sex is not that these views are
correct but that teaching these views is socially beneficial. And that is a
strictly neutral justification of the policy. Thus, for example, `abstinence-
only' sex education programmes may be favoured by those who hold
traditional, `restrictive' views on sexual morality. But the programme

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itself might be defended by strictly neutral considerations of the social

utility of such a programme, namely the reduction of social harms.
However, the fact is that defenders of any particular view of sexual
morality are most likely to argue that its teaching will not have the
alleged socially harmful effects. On the contrary they will insist that it will
be maximally beneficial, and that it is the alternative views which have
the harmful effects. So I am just going to assume that there are no
reasons, acceptable to all and congenial to a liberal, which could be given
for favouring the teaching of one view of sexual morality over another.
I am considering the question of how one should deal with the
problem of differences in views as to how sex ought to be taught. I have
argued that there are familiar liberal reasons for not discounting these
differences by, for instance, straightforwardly favouring one view over
the others. But, before I move on, there is one further question that
needs to be addressed. This is, quite simply, whether the educational
policy maker should take seriously, that is count or not discount, all
views on sexual morality. The principle of neutrality, as it is standardly
defended by liberal political philosophers, operates between views that
may be described as `reasonable'. A view is reasonable for a liberal like
Rawls in at least three senses: it is an exercise of reason; it is a view that
does or can acknowledge the fact that there is reasonable disagreement
between views; and it accommodates a willingness to moderate the claim
made on its basis for the sake of co-operation with others.4
Now could some views on sexual morality be discounted because they
are in themselves unreasonable or rest upon unreasonable comprehensive
doctrines? I can think of at least two instances of sexual views which one
would want to be able to rule out in this way. One is paedophilia; the
other is Sadean sadism. The problem is that both views can, in principle,
be given rational defences. A principled defender of paedophilia (for
instance O'Carroll, 1980) could concede that his own defence of
paedophilia coexists with critiques of the practice. He could further
express a willingness to moderate the claims made on behalf of
paedophiles Ð in terms of legal regulation, age of consent, etc. Ð for
the sake of co-operation with others. Indeed it would be important for
him to acknowledge the views of others as the price of gaining recognition
for his own. Parallel comments could be made to apply to Sadean sadism.
This is embarrassing for the liberal who would surely want to think
that there are liberal reasons for refusing to regard the advocacy of
paedophilia and Sadean sadism as properly falling within the compass of
tolerable `reasonable' views. One move the liberal might make is to deny
that paedophilia can be rationally defended. This might take the double
form of denying that the reasons advanced by the defenders of
paedophilia are good ones, and further arguing that these `reasons'
are in fact rationalisations of baser, more mundane motives (Speicker
and Steutel, 1997). The problem is that the determination of whether
reasons are good or bad is itself a matter for rational discussion, and
open, in principle, to unresolvable disagreement between sincere,
conscientious reasoners. Making the further claim that `reasons' are

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 How Should We Teach Sex? 441

no more than rationalisations compounds the problem by adding the

requirement that a contestable psychological claim be established (and
this can only be done by the provision of further reasons).
The liberal may, as a distinct move, insist that the reasonable is
subject to the constraints of justice and right. A reasonable view is one
that does not have commitments which violate prior and delimiting
moral principles. These principles are constitutive of the right and the
just. This evokes the familiar Rawlsian claim about the priority of
the right over the good: the principles of justice legitimately constrain
the pursuit by individuals of their conception of the good. Now the
liberal might argue that the paedophile's pursuit of his view of the sexual
good must violate the rights of the child at whose expense the
paedophile's pleasure is obtained Ð either by discounting the child's
own objections or by refusing to acknowledge that a child is incapable in
virtue of his immaturity, of giving valid consent. Similarly a Sadean
sadism Ð and it is Sadean in virtue of ignoring the wishes of those
against whom the sadism is directed Ð violates the rights of those
whose unconsented pain is the corollary of its pleasure.
This is all well and good. However, note that the questions of who has
rights and what principles are properly constitutive of justice are not
uncontentious. Consider thus the following problems: Is the proper
scope of application of a general principle of equality given by the
statement that every person, whatever their sexual orientation, should be
entitled to pursue their own sexual good, thus according homosexuals
the same rights as heterosexuals? Is not a disagreement about the age of
sexual consent a fundamental disagreement about who has and who
does not have liberty rights in respect of their own consensual sexual
choices? Does not someone who denies that there is any right to hurt
others thereby deny to consenting sadomasochists the right to engage,
even in private, in their preferred sexual practices?5
The difficulties posed by the existence of fundamental differences in
sexual moralities therefore go very deep. It is inappropriate for a liberal
to discount these differences. And, as we have just seen, there may be
differences as to what differences we must count. How Ð to pose the
question again Ð should we deal with these differences? Let me suggest
that there are at least two very obvious basic strategies. I will outline
each and then explore their problems. The first, which one might entitle
a `retreat to basics', advocates the teaching only of a minimal, agreed
sexual morality, the lowest common denominator amongst the different
views. The second, which one might entitle the `conjunctive±disjunctive'
strategy, advocates combining a strictly neutral description of possible
sexual activities with a listing of the alternative moral outlooks on each.
Let us take the `retreat to basics' first. This strategy consists in the
adoption and communication to young persons of an agreed, basic code
of sexual morality, a set of uncontroversial prescriptions and proscrip-
tions. Of course it might be the case that, if the concern is to retreat to the
teaching of only what is non-controversial, the resultant sex education
contains no evaluative elements, being restricted merely to empirical facts

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442 David Archard

of `biology' and `virology' (McKay, 1997, p. 290). However, let us assume

that some basic, non-contentious moral code or set of judgements can be
found. One might in this vein take `rape' as an unproblematic, non-
contentious, clear sexual wrong. It would be appropriate to teach
youngsters that rape is immoral because everyone can agree, if they agree
on nothing else, that rape is immoral. How successful is this strategy? Its
failings can quickly be identified by recognising two facts.
The first is that if there is agreement on the wrong of rape it is a case
of an `overlapping consensus'. People with very different comprehensive
outlooks on sexual morality nevertheless converge on this judgement.
There is convergence on the same condemnation of rape but from
different perspectives. The second fact is that it would be inadequate
simply to communicate the wrongness of rape without some attempt to
demonstrate the reasons for its wrongness. To teach the wrongness of
rape it is not enough simply to say that it is wrong; one must give an
indication of why it is wrong. But then these two facts are in conflict. For
one cannot maintain the unanimity of outlook which is manifested
merely by the judgement Ð that rape is wrong Ð when attention shifts
to the justification of that judgement.
Let me illustrate this point further. In a recent book on rape Keith
Burgess-Jackson (1996) has argued that there are at least three different
theories of rape, that is three distinct understandings of what makes rape
morally prolematic. He labels these `conservative', `liberal' and `radical'
theories. The `conservative' theory `views rape as a kind of trespass to
property' (ibid., p. 44). An act of rape is an affront to the woman's
proprietor, be it husband, brother or father. It is a contamination, a
despoilation of what rightfully belongs to him. The rape trespasses upon
the authority and consent not of the woman but of him who owns her.
The `liberal theory' sees the wrongness of rape in the unconsented battery
of an individual woman. The rapist treats the woman merely as a means
to his own sexual ends and refuses to see her as an end; he fails to respect
her autonomy. What would be permissible with her consent is utterly
wrong when that consent is refused. The `radical theory' `views rape as a
kind of degradation, as an instance of class-based . . . subordination'
(ibid., p. 53) of the class of women by the class of men. Rape is systemic,
not occurrent; it is not an individual act but a paradigm of the patriarchal
oppression of one gender by the other. It exemplifies and reveals what
men do to women, not just what one man has inflicted upon one woman.
Once again, I do not endorse any one of these views. I cite them to
make the point that the judgement that rape is wrong can be made from
very different comprehensive outlooks on sex and sexuality. Further,
these outlooks are not merely different but also incompatible. Neither
the liberal nor the radical can concur with the conservative in regarding
a woman as a man's property. Equally the radical and the liberal will
disagree over whether the appropriate agency to which wrongdoing
attaches is to be regarded as a collective Ð the gender Ð or an
individual member of the class. Each view may also be likely to have
some account of why the other views are mistaken. The radical will, for

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 How Should We Teach Sex? 443

instance, indict the liberal of a culpable individualism which allegedly

afflicts all of his judgements.
How does this leave the teaching of the wrongness of rape? As I
suggested it would be inadequate to communicate the brute wrongness
of rape Ð as part of the teaching of a basic sexual code of ethics Ð
without attempting to provide a warrant for that judgement. But, as the
example shows, one cannot show why rape is wrong, as opposed to
simply declaring that it is wrong, without broaching the issue of which of
the views outlined is correct. In this way, unfortunately, the problem
initially raised of how one deals with a plurality of conflicting views is
met again but at the level of justification for an agreed judgement. One
avoids a conflict of fundamental outlooks by opting to teach a basic
code of sexual ethics but only finds that this same conflict of outlooks
lurks behind the `agreed' code.
I think in fact that the problem is even worse. Grant that all can agree
that rape is wrong. Consider, now, the question of how one should
define rape, that is the issue of which acts may properly be counted as
instances of rape and which are not. The three theories will give different
answers to this question and do so precisely in the light of their own
theoretical presuppositions. A liberal who privileges consent and
autonomy will likely see rape as occurring if and only if a woman
does not give her consent to an act of sexual intimacy. A radical who
sees rape as a paradigmatic instance of the patriarchal subordination of
women will likely see rape as occurring whenever a woman's sexual
integrity is violated by what is viewed as characteristically male
behaviour towards her gender. Just think of the difficult and irresolvable
disputes about whether `date rape' really is rape.
Even if it is argued that rape is only to be defined in terms of non-
consensuality there remains the problem of how consent is itself to be
defined. Different outlooks on the relationship between men and
women, on issues of power and authority, forms of communication, the
significance of silence, the meaning of coercion, the fear of conse-
quences, and so on, will yield different answers to the question of
whether some problematic instance of compliant behaviour is or is not
really consensual.6 A sex educator who maintains that `[c]onsent is as
culturally defined, as is sex' (Lamb, 1997, p. 308) concedes that there is
no fixed point from which even the apparently simplest of judgements of
sexual impermissibility can be generated.
I do not think that things go any better if `the retreat to basics' is
accomplished by means not of the teaching of a `basic' code of sexual
ethics but instead by means of a `thin' set of universal and agreed ethical
principles. Imagine then that one teaches sexual morality by appeal to
some such precept as `respect for persons'. Now consider how a liberal,
conservative and radical will render that precept. The liberal thinks that
respect for persons requires Ð indeed translates into Ð respect for the
autonomy and freely given consent of individual agents. The conserva-
tive thinks that respect for persons, where that person is a woman,
means respecting the particular sanctity of her womanhood as a wife,

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444 David Archard

sister or daughter. The radical believes that respect for persons must
involve recognising and protecting the integrity of women as a gender.
Patricia White offers as her interpretation of `respect for persons' `a
concern not to obstruct others in their purposes and a concern to do
what one can to help them to flourish' (White, 1991, p. 406). The
problem here is that whilst the first half of this conjunctive definition
sounds impeccably liberal, the second half is open to varying
interpretations. These depend on whether one believes that someone
flourishes only if she pursues her own chosen objectives or one thinks
that someone may flourish in doing or being that which she does not
choose to be or do. A traditionalist who believes that the lifestyle of a
practising homosexual is not a flourishing human existence shows
respect for the homosexual's person in a very different way than does a
libertarian. This problem afflicts the use of all general, and consequently
imprecise, normative language. Using the example of the injunction to
`promote responsible sexual behaviour' J. Mark Halstead comments
that any apparent consensus is `not very helpful if one person's
understanding of responsibility involves wearing a condom and
another's includes not being in the same room as a member of the
opposite sex without a chaperone' (Halstead, 1997, p. 327).
The problem for a strategy of a `retreat to basics' remains. This is that
one cannot retreat far enough to secure a position that is free of the
division of views that prompted the retreat. Wherever one goes to there
will still be a conflict of outlooks. Let me then now turn to the second
strategy for dealing with the fact of differences between sexual
moralities. This is what I entitled the `conjunctive±disjunctive' strategy
and it advocates combining a strictly neutral description of possible
sexual activities with a listing of the alternative moral outlooks on each.
The strategy is constituted formally as: (a) S1 is D1; and (b) S1 is E1 or
E2 or E3. S1 denotes the particular sexual activity or practice. D1 is the
evaluatively neutral but sufficient descriptive specification of S. E1, E2,
and E3 are the various possible evaluations of S1. The strategy is
conjunctive because it conjoins a description of the sexual activity with
an evaluation; it is disjunctive because it offers a disjunction of
alternative evaluations. As an example consider: homosexuality is
sexual activity between persons of the same sex; and it is either
unnatural, perverted and sinful; or it is a legitimate life choice; or it is a
(possibly remediable) sickness whose effects are wrongful but whose
sufferers should not be blamed for their wrongdoing.
One can readily understand the educational motivation for such a
strategy. Teaching young persons exactly what is involved in various
forms of sexual activity, and doing so in a manner which is non-
prejudicial and informative, clearly serves valuable educational ends Ð
for instance, giving young persons enough knowledge about sex to allow
them to make informed choices and to avoid certain harmful
consequences. At the same time making young persons aware of the
variety of different moral judgements about any sexual activity also
serves valuable ends. It is faithful to the facts of people's own familial

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 How Should We Teach Sex? 445

and cultural backgrounds. It acknowledges that parents, within a liberal

multicultural society, might expect their children to learn about their
own community's values and way of life. But the strategy accomplishes
this in a way that is tolerant of all views and is fair-minded in its
treatment of each.
However, I think that this strategy is beset by considerable difficulties.
These afflict each half of its conjunction. In the first place there is a
question as to the range of sexual activities of which a neutral
description should be provided. Ought the nature of each and every
possible sexual activity be communicated to young persons? And will
not the very inclusion of some descriptions of sexual activities Ð even if
conjoined with a strong condemnation amongst other evaluations Ð be
unacceptable to, for instance, a traditionalist or conservative in sexual
outlook? A factual listing of sexual activities in advance of any
evaluative comment suggests their moral equivalence in some sense.
Saying to young people, `Sexually, one can do A and one can do B and
one can do C, and here is a morally neutral description of each' (and the
`can' is that of physical possibility not moral permission) implies that A,
B and C are not (yet) to be morally distinguished from one another or
from any other sexual activity. Condemnation of A, B, and C is, as much
as is their licensing, without any persuasive force. For any account of the
impermissibility (or permissibility) of A, B, and C is, on this strategy,
quoted not endorsed. The account given is of what is believed, not what
ought to be believed. Substitute for A, B, and C paedophiliac sex,
necrophiliac sex, and bestiality, and this approach to the teaching of sex
will certainly be grossly unacceptable to those who hold certain clear
views on sexual morality. If, as a parent, you think something is deeply
wrong, indeed depraved and beyond the pale, you will strongly object to
your children being taught exactly and completely what doing that thing
involves, its condemnation being merely one possible view about the
doing of that thing.
Turning now to the second half of the conjunction Ð the disjunction
of possible evaluations Ð the difficulties just broached are further
compounded. The strategy requires that each disjunct is offered in a
neutral and non-prejudicial manner, that is by judiciously describing
each evaluative viewpoint without arguing for, suggesting, or presup-
posing its correctness (or incorrectness). To do otherwise would be
counter to the previously described liberal principle of neutrality. Now
there is a problem of whether a neutral description of all evaluative
views can be offered. There is the related issue of whether supplying
information about who holds a given evaluative belief and why they do
so may amount to a prejudicial or preferential characterisation of the
belief. Consider, for example, the case in which a teacher says, `The view
that homosexuality is unnatural, perverted and sinful is held by very few
people' or `The view that homosexuality is unnatural, perverted and
sinful is held only by those with traditional religious beliefs'. And so on.
Let us say that it is possible to offer neutral, that is unbiased, accounts
of evaluative views about various sexual practices (with no tendentious

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446 David Archard

asides about their prevalence or which cite features strictly irrelevant to

their defensibility). There is a still further issue. This is whether one
should cite all possible evaluative views and whether, in the spirit of
neutrality, one should ensure a proper balance of pro and con. Take the
case of homosexuality. One has provided a factual description of what
homosexuality is. One then turns to the disjunction of evaluations. Is
one obliged to balance a strongly condemnatory view about homo-
sexuality with one that is strongly permissive, one that is mildly
condemnatory with one that is mildly permissive, and so on?
A familiar critique of the BBC doctrine of `balance' has been that
officious and blind observance of its requirements can skew debates in
inappropriate ways. The doctrine appears to require that whenever
anyone publicly defends a view, P, the BBC should find someone to
defend *P, or Q (a contrary of P). The absurdity of this requirement is
manifest when one considers that were someone to condemn child abuse
it would apparently be necessary to find someone who supports it.
Something very similar surely operates in the case of the `conjunctive±
disjunctive strategy'. Is it being suggested that for each and every
possible sexual activity one is obliged exactly and precisely to balance
any condemnatory view with a permissive view? Think about how this
works with paedophilia, necrophilia, and bestiality.
If one does not feel under any such obligation of balance what criteria
may warrantably be adopted for the selection of the evaluative views
that are taught? It cannot be in terms of the measure of social support
these views receive. For this would suggest that the justifiability of any
moral view is a function of its popularity. Philosophers are always keen
to point out that the dependence goes the other way: views are generally
supported because correct and are not to be thought correct because
generally supported.
On the other hand the criteria for selection of evaluative views to be
taught cannot itself be evaluative. One is not allowed to discount some
views on the grounds that they are evidently mistaken; nor to present
some views as more or less persuasive then others. For to do so would
be, once again, to violate the liberal principle of neutrality. To someone
who says, `But surely no reasonable defence of paedophilia can be
offered', I respond `Some have claimed to do just that. Moreover there
are those at least who would maintain that, if no reasonable defence of
the permissibility of paedophilia can be offered then neither can any be
offered for the permissibility of homosexuality or oral sex, and so on'.
I conclude that the two strategies for meeting and dealing, as
educationalists, with the fact of disagreement about sexual morality are
both beset with serious and disabling difficulties. I have painted my
canvass with very broad philosophical brush strokes. I have sought, in
rather simple and direct ways, argumentatively to disable two opposed
strategies. There may of course be other strategies or modifications of
these two. There may be ways of accommodating the fact of
disagreement which do not encounter the kinds of difficulties I have
suggested lie in wait for the two strategies.

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 How Should We Teach Sex? 447

However I have not invented difficulties which do not exist and there
are surely good reasons for thinking that something like the two
strategies represent the only options on offer. They are the only two
options if one wishes to teach sex and remain liberally neutral in the face
of the fact of disagreement about sexual morality. There are, thus, two
further options if one refuses to teach sex or does not stay neutral about
how to do so. One might, first, choose not to teach sex. The answer to
the question `How should we teach sex?' is `One shouldn't'. If one does
embrace this option one is under an obligation to show that not teaching
sex has more benefits, or less costs, than teaching it in the face of the
difficulties enumerated. I imagine that most will find that this is a hard
obligation successfully to discharge; and precisely because of the various
valued ends served by sex education which I instanced at the outset of
this article.
The second remaining option is to abandon liberal neutrality in the
face of disagreement about sex. The answer to the question `How should
we teach sex? is `In the morally right way'. The characteristic feature of a
principle of neutrality is that it represents an attempt to deal with first-
order moral disagreement by adopting a second-order procedure for
dealing with the disagreement Ð by not preferentially or prejudicially
discriminating between the terms of the disagreement. One might, by
contrast, seek to remain at the level of the first-order disagreement and
advocate the teaching of a particular moral view. Of course this is just
the presupposition which one might expect to see made by those
teaching within denominational schools. A Christian or an Islamic
education would surely comprise a religious approach to the teaching of
sex. But that cannot, it will be said, be the case for a common curriculum
within a liberal society. However, let me conclude with some brief
thoughts on the centrality of autonomy to a liberal education.
It is a now familiar criticism of philosophical liberalism that its
principle of neutrality does not, as it were, go all the way beyond. The
liberal presumes that a certain kind of life Ð namely that in which the
individual exercises her rational autonomy in the choice of ends Ð is
the preferred and valuable life. Neutrality operates so as to maximise the
opportunities for individuals to lead what, for the liberal, is the good
life, namely the freely chosen life. To the extent that this is so the liberal
ought to create and sustain the conditions under which autonomy is
maximised (Raz, 1986, Part V). Education Ð both within the public
sphere of the school system and within the private sphere of the
family Ð plays a critical role in the creation of independent autono-
mous citizens.
If autonomy is the proper end of a liberal education Ð and if not `the'
(only) end at least a principal end Ð then this makes a difference to the
way in which the teaching of sex is conceived. For one should teach sex,
as one should teach everything else, with a view to maximising the future
citizen's autonomy. This means at least two things for how sex is taught.
First it means the provision of the maximum amount of information
relevant to the making of sexual choices. And inasmuch as the making of

& The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998.
448 David Archard

such choices should be free, it means representing all choices as possible

in principle. Second it means according a central role to choice in the
legitimation of sexual conduct. Implicitly or explicitly the sexual
morality endorsed will be a version of that previously characterised as
libertarian: anything sexually goes so long as it is in private, between
consenting adults, and harms no-one else.
This is contentious, but is intended only as a very brief sketch of a
defence of what might be presumed. If we believe ourselves to live within
a society which privileges liberty so long as its exercise by an individual
is consistent with a like exercise of liberty by all then there should be no
sphere of our lives which is exempt from the scope of that liberty
principle. We should be as free in our sexual lives as it is alleged we
should be in every other part of our life. And we should teach sex in a
way that is consistent with that ideal. The onus is on the critic to show
why it should not be thus.7

Correspondence: David Archard, Department of Moral Philosophy,

University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL

NOTES
1. Good outlines and critical evaluations of the liberal principle of neutrality can be found in
William A. Galston (1991), Part II and Sher (1997).
2. The mistake made is that of seeing children in proprietarian terms as owned by their parents. See
Archard (1993), pp. 98±106.
3. For a nuanced and balanced critique of parental rights to educational choice see Callan (1997),
Chapter 6.
4. For a useful discussion of these various senses of `reasonable', and the relationships between
them, see Attracta Ingram (1996).
5. The reference here to the recent celebrated case of R. v Brown is deliberate. Here the issue
precisely at stake was whether a principle of consensuality is constrained by a prior principle
forbidding the in¯iction of serious harm upon another person. For the details and discussion of
this case see Archard, 1998, pp. 110±115.
6. These problems are explored further in Archard, 1998.
7. I am very grateful to Terry McLaughlin for starting me thinking about the issues of sex
education and for providing me with a clear sense of the current debate.

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& The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998.