T545 To IDF Tiran 45

T-54/5
TO IDF TIRAN 4/5:

THE BIRTH OF
A B A S TA R D TA N K
CAPTURED VEHICLES IN IDF SERVICE SERIES VOL. 2
A Historical Review
1967 – 1973
Photo on cover page:
May 1973: Tiran 5sh and crew in Preparation
for the Independence Day parade in Jerusalem.
(Shlomo Harel)
I WILL PURSUE,
I WILL OVERTAKE,
I WILL DIVIDE THE SPOIL
EXODUS 15:9
MA’OR LEVY
T-54/5
TO IDF TIRAN 4/5:
THE BIRTH OF
A B A S TA R D TA N K
CAPTURED VEHICLES IN IDF SERVICE SERIES VOL. 2
A Historical Review
1967 – 1973
Acknowledgments
This book is dedicated to my three sons: Yehonatan, Itamar and Gid’on-Ori, and to
the brotherhood they share.
A central element in the research for this book was obtained in the Yad La’shiryon
Association’s library (YLA) and the Israel Defense Forces Archives (IDFA). The staff
of the Yad La’shiryon Association was especially helpful and welcoming. The support
of the staff at the Yad Izhak Ben Zvi (YBZ) library, where most of the writing took
place, was also important. My friends, Dirk Wendtorf, Yogev Elbaz and Mark Pulver
offered helpful remarks on the book’s draft. Amnon Tishler, Mike Eldar and Brigadier
General (ret.) Yo’el Gonen permitted me to use excellent photographs from their
personal archives. Finally, without a doubt, the support of my wife and family was
essential.
I would also like to thank my friend Michael Mass for his advice and guidance and for
his help in the making of the first volume of this series.
Ma’or Levy
Photographs:
Avraham Almog, Altshuler family, Mike Eldar, Avner Gagin, Yo’el Gonen, Baruch
Harel, Shlomo Harel, Israeli Government Press Office (GPO), the Jewish National
Fund Photo Archives (KKL-JNF), Michael Mass collection (MM), Zvi Maimon, Yosef
Pasternak, Aharon Shatz, Amnon Tishler, Yad Izhak Ben Zvi photo archives (YBZ),
Yad La’shiryon Association (Armored Corps Museum) Data Center (YLA), Yosef
Youdovich.
All rights reserved to Abteilung 502. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of
research, private study, criticism or review, this book may not be partially or fully
reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical,
mechanical, chemical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
prior written permission of the copyright owner.
Every effort has been made by the publisher to secure all necessary permissions to
use the images in this publication. If mistakes have occurred in this matter, we would
be happy to rectify them in any future editions of this book.
Author: Ma’or Levy

Art Director: Tomek Wajnkaim
Editing: Helene Hart
Executive Editor: Maciej Góralczyk
IN COOPERATION WITH
CONTENTS
Introduction 6
An Unplanned Treasure at the End of the Six Day War 8
“This Might Be One of Our Best” 18
Potential, Deficiencies and Modifications 29
Pictures from the Conversion Line (1968-1973) 34
Mine Sweeping, the “Bonus” and Special Operations 41
The 274th Brigade—a Tiran Brigade 54
Water and Steel— pictures of Tiran Training for Amphibious Warfare 64
Plans for an Odd Future 74

INTRODUCTION
THEREFORE, WHEN IN CHARIOT FIGHTING, MORE THAN TEN CHARIOTS ARE

CAPTURED, REWARD THOSE WHO TAKE THE FIRST. REPLACE THE ENEMY’S
FLAGS WITH YOUR OWN, MIX THE CAPTURED CHARIOTS WITH YOURS, AND
MOUNT THEM. Zun Tzu,
The Art of War
The
T-54/5 first arrived in the Middle East in the late 1950s, and was gradually added
to the Syrian and Egyptian armies as their top-of-the-line, main battle tank.
It was one of the formidable instruments being finetuned for the next run-in
with Israel, and it bolstered the violent rhetoric: the countdown to the destruction of the Jewish
entity. This rhetoric was considered very reliable by Israel. The tank was known to be relatively
lightweight and fast, and it carried plenty of armor and an advanced 100-mm gun—features that
affected the development of the Israeli tank fleet. It could be outmatched by only the best IDF
tanks. The board was set up—and the game began on the fifth day of June, 1967.
The war, however, did not play out as expected, historically proving that weaponry and rhetoric
are not sufficient for victory. The three Arab armies were not ready to face Israel in combat and
declared their retreat very early in the fighting. The intimidating T-54/5 did not get a chance to
pull its full weight in battle. Moreover, during the campaign, some 280 T-54/5s were left in the
conquered battlefields, comprising almost a third of the total number of tanks captured by Israel
in the war.
6 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

The prime tank was now not only the enemy’s. It was available, it was free—but it was not necessarily
usable or suitable for the IDF. It was a bastard, different from the IDF tank fleet in almost every
possible aspect. However, its potential could not be overlooked; not during the ongoing arms
race in the Middle East; not while all parties were preparing for the next round of war. And thus,
the IDF tried to introduce the foreign tank into service—a task that was between improbable and
impossible even for much larger armies.
Over time, the IDF learned that making a bastard legitimate was much harder than originally
expected, as introducing the tank required resources and time, but it also opened up new
possibilities and combat tactics.
The IDF put these Soviet tanks to use like no others—as a low grade “bonus” to be used in war and
as a mine-clearing tank, a unique tool for special operations, and an artillery cannon designated
for destroying SA-3 anti-air missile batteries. After many modifications, the tanks were eventually
incorporated in a T-54/5 (Tiran 4/5) brigade as part of a special tactical task force designated to
conducting an armored maneuver in the Egyptian flank.
Allegedly, this was just another tank in service, but actually, it was a unique tank used by a unique
army under abnormal circumstances. This book describes the starting point of the tank’s service
in the IDF, or in other words, it is a tale about the birth of a bastard. And although its IDF service
was not filled with combat activity, its technology was harvested, and in some cases, copied for
various purposes. This book is also the first part of a story that in some aspects has not yet ended:
the use of captured Soviet tanks by the IDF.
All the data in this book is supported by official IDF documentation and interviews, and is based
on academic research.
T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 7

AN UNPLANNED
TREASURE
AT THE END OF
THE SIX DAY WAR
E
uphoria, nothing less. Although it is not exactly clear when it began, it was there,
that sweet taste of an unimaginable victory. This was not just another win; it was
one for the history books. In six, short days, three enemies were defeated. Israel
had conquered more than threefold its original territory: the Golan Heights, Sinai, the
Gaza strip and the West Bank. Moreover, the sacred remains of the Second Temple—the
Western Wall and Temple Mount—were once again under Jewish sovereignty. Was this a
prophecy fulfilled after 2,000 years in exile? Only time would tell.
This outcome could not have been anticipated. Just before the war, Israel feared total
annihilation and expected a combined attack of at least three Arab armies. Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s aggressive statements were considered reliable and Egypt alone had enough
military strength to make the rhetoric a reality. Although Israel had already defeated
the Egyptian army twice in the past, her prime enemy was now significantly larger and
better equipped with advanced Soviet weapons and training. While Egypt was the
primary threat, the Syrian and Jordanian armies were dangerous additions. In the tense
atmosphere created before the fifth of June, the young state was convinced that a
preemptive strike was essential for saving Tel Aviv, as if its survival were at stake.
The actual results were beyond anyone’s grasp. It was not just about how Israel had won
the war; it was also about how its enemies had lost it. The majority of the Arab armies’
fighter planes had been destroyed; failed retreats left long enemy convoys of vehicles
on the main roads, some of them abandoned, and some destroyed; Egyptian soldiers
dropped their heavy army boots in the Sinai dunes and fled home barefooted. Enemy
military equipment was everywhere: tanks and artillery cannons, armored personnel
carriers (APC), jeeps and trucks, assault rifles, grenades and pistols, tents and field beds,
combat rations, fuel and ammunition—in other words, everything.

Sinai, June 1967: Destroyed and abandoned Egyptian vehicles on the sides of the main
roads at the end of the Six Day War. (YLA, Avner Gagin collection)
Generals as well as field soldiers were starting to asking questions: What should be done
with all that weaponry? Was it usable? Could it be sold? Some of it was surely useful
and even better than what the IDF had, such as AK assault rifles, anti-aircraft artillery
and combat engineering equipment. Some of the equipment was needed to cope with
the vast, newly-acquired territories and to gather damaged IDF weaponry from the
battlefields, such as ZiL and Praga trucks, command vehicles and recovery vehicles. In
theory, part of these had the potential to reinforce the IDF in both quantity and quality,
but would it be feasible?
The concept of using captured enemy equipment was, in a sense, traditional. From
the dawn of history, the spoils of war had always been an important part of warfare,
a built-in part of the adventure. Sometimes they were a primary objective, at others
an added bonus, but they were always nice to have. The captured weapons could be
used against its previous owners and displayed as part of a victory in military parades
and town squares. However, in the modern age, reusing captured weaponry was not
always easy, especially advanced weaponry such as tanks, aircraft and artillery. In
the long run, those needed advanced mechanical maintenance and the production
of ammunition. They required the investment of considerable resources for a limited
number of captured items. However, in the short run, they were a potentially good
source of technology and intelligence and could be used to gain small tactical
advantages.
The Soviet Union and Germany had plenty of experience with the same dilemma. Both
countries had advanced industrial capabilities; both were manufacturing all kinds of
weaponry; both were searching for ways to increase the size of their armies. Even though
vast amounts of weaponry changed hands in World War II, no considerable number of

captured tanks or artillery was added to either side. Exceptions such as the SU-76i were
not used for long. Apparently, it was no easy task, and perhaps not worth the effort to
begin with. So, if giants had failed in this complicated endeavor, why would tiny Israel
succeed?
As it turned out, using enemy weapons to increase its strength was not foreign to the
IDF. During the 1948 War of Independence, much and more of the IDF and the Hagana’s1
arsenal consisted of stolen and captured equipment, mostly from the British army. There
were not many viable alternatives for a subversive militia or a young state’s military. The
field soldiers and company commanders of that war were now brigade commanders
and generals. They knew exactly how the 1948 victory had been achieved; they knew
of the international arms embargo that was imposed on Israel following the War of
Independence; and they knew that an abundance of weaponry and military equipment
should not be taken lightly.
Sinai, June 1967:

Two Praga trucks, a
T-54/5 and a SA-2
guideline missile
transport trailer.
(Zvi Maimon)
Sinai, June 1967:

Notice the colors
of this destroyed
vehicle column,
the burned, black
asphalt road
covered in soot, the
amber-brown signs
of damage and the
camouflage colors,
all contrasting with
the virgin Sinai
sand dunes.
(Zvi Maimon)
New Potential
Some seven years later, the 1956 Sinai War did not provide a substantial amount of
captured weaponry, though a new potential was starting to be revealed. The young state
that had just defeated Egypt, its strongest enemy, tried to sweeten the victory. Sinai was
fine-combed, and not just military equipment was taken but anything of value: bags
of tobacco, cash, cooling containers, mobile structures, cranes, even a large shed was
dismantled and transferred back home. “Fifty Million Dollars’ Worth of Spoils were Taken,”
a front-page headline of one of the popular newspapers gave the public a quantitative
taste of victory. Reading such a headline, when basic commodities such as eggs, butter
and milk were being rationed out to the Israeli public was not an achievement of little
importance. However, truth be told, not all of it was actually usable or valuable, and
getting rid of some items took a good few months.
The captured weapons were considered quite a bonus. The largest item was the Ibrahim
el Awal warship, and a MiG-15 fighter aircraft was also captured. The other equipment
was pretty diverse, and some of it was clearly obsolete, although that could also be said
of some of the IDF’s best weapons at the time. The tanks and AFVs captured included
1) The Haganah was a Jewish paramilitary organization at the time of the British Mandate in
Palestine. In 1948, after the establishment of the State of Israel, it became the core of the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF).

16 T-34/85 tanks, 4 SU-100 tank destroyers, 36 Sherman tanks of different models, 41
Valentine-Archer (self-propelled 17-pdr, Valentine, Mk. I Archer) tank destroyers, 56
BTR-152 APCs, 231 Bren carriers, a few dozen command tanks, ARV tanks, dozer tanks
and tank-based APCs. Some of the captured items were no more than charred scrap
remainders. Even though the number of
reusable vehicles was not substantial,
seeing them in IDF hands was very Kfar HaNassi, 1967: Israeli
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan,
exciting.
observing a captured Syrian
A short time after the fighting ceased, T-54/5 tank. The inscription
the IDF Chief of the General Staff Moshe ( ‫ ) ده غمر عقيل‬on the side of the
Dayan conducted a tour in Sinai in order turret mentions the name of a
to personally examine what had been Syrian shahid (fallen soldier),
accomplished. One stop included an probably Muhammad Shehyda
inspection parade of captured items. Umar A’qily ‫محمد شحيدة عمر عقييل‬
Deep in thought, Dayan walked along the who was killed during combat
line of tanks and armored vehicles and on July 16, 1948 near Rosh-
Pina. (YBZ)
then said to his deputy, “Is this what the
bunch of them grabbed?” as if it were
June 1967: An Egyptian

Sherman M4A2 heavily
damaged and scorched.
This photo was probably
taken in the Gaza-Rafah
sector. About 55 Sherman
tanks were captured in
the war—36 M4A2s and 19
M4s with an (AMX-13)
FL-10 turret. (Zvi Maimon)

1948 again, stealing was a legitimate part of warfare, and the tanks were nothing more
than a couple of chickens taken from the neighboring henhouse.
For a few years, the IDF tried to use those captured vehicles, but most of their attempts
were unsuccessful. After a few months, the IDF realized that the Valentine-Archers
were nothing more than scrap metal, due to a lack of spare parts. It was also clear
that no unit wanted to use the Bren carriers, and so they were scattered to different
border settlements for their local defense teams, who received no spare parts or serious
training and guidance. The few SU-100s captured were unusable to begin with, although
captured 100-mm ammunition was abundant. All of the above items were used for
propaganda purposes and weapons displays, and some were used for nothing more
than target practice.
The T-34 and Sherman tanks were awarded a different fate, and that of the Sherman
tanks was the easiest to decide on: Due to the IDF’s extensive use of Sherman M4 tanks,
most of them were put into service after a few alterations, while others were used for
spare parts. However, the more interesting vehicle of the two was the T-34. At that time,
this was one of Egypt’s most powerful and advanced tanks. The IDF tried to make the
most of this opportunity by studying its technological and mechanical features and
training a number of soldiers to drive them and use the main gun, while others practiced
shooting at them. By the eve of the Six Day War, the IDF had become reasonably familiar
with the tank, its features and capabilities. Some of the maintenance crews even had
technical operation manuals for Soviet tanks, an unusual advantage when it comes to
booty.
In addition to the experience gained by the IDF, if the young Israeli army had any clear
advantage when it came to Soviet vehicles, his name was Arkadi Timor. Timor was a
unique, tenacious character, an old warhorse and a true Zionist. Timor immigrated to
Israel after a significant military career in the Red Army during World War II and after. As
a tank officer and mechanical engineer, he rose through the ranks and became a colonel
(a polkovnik). At the end of World War II, after five different injuries in the campaigns
over Leningrad and Moscow, he served as a T-34 brigade commander, and was then
assigned to lead a project of refurbishing tanks that were damaged in the war. Timor had
the rare ability to make friends with every soldier or general he encountered. He was a
true tank expert, and as such, he joined the IDF Ordnance Corps in the mid-1960s where
he was known to have intimate knowledge of armored vehicles—specifically, with Soviet
tanks.
June 1967: A Czechoslovak-built

RM vz. 51 multiple rocket launcher
based on a Praga V3S truck. (YLA,
Avner Gagin collection)

Sinai, June 1967: A captured ISU command
tank being towed by the IDF after the
war. The officer inside the vehicle is Yo’el
Gonen, the future commander of a Tiran
tank battalion, brigade and division. (Yo’el
On the forth day of the Six Day War, Gonen)
Timor was called in for a meeting with
Yizhak Rabin, the IDF Chief of General
Staff. “Arkadi,” Rabin asked in his slow,
deep voice, “can we use the abandoned tanks left in the battle fields?” To which Arkadi
replied, “We sure can. Two Stalin (IS-3M) tanks are already being used to clear obstacles
off the roads and as recovery vehicles.” “Excellent,” Rabin answered with a grin, knowing
that a new potential had just been revealed. Arkadi understood the meaning of that grin
better than anyone. From that point on, Arkadi knew that, if all went well, he would be
able to deliver a special gift to his country, a gift of such magnitude that only few could
give—the ability to use enemy tanks. This was his new destiny.
At that point, both Arkadi and Rabin still did not know the full extent of the spoils: It
was still just the tip of the iceberg. As time passed, more and more enemy tanks were
discovered. The IDF progressed fast with absolute control over the skies. While the three
enemy armies were trying to retreat, the IDF fighter planes tried to shoot down as many
of the moving targets as possible.
The Egyptian army announced a retreat early on the 6th of June, the second day of com-
bat. Within 24 hours of that declaration, the IDF maneuvered deep and fast into Sinai,
blocking some of the main roads to the Suez Canal from the northern and central parts
of Sinai. Although for a few days, the IDF deliberately avoided taking the eastern bank
of the canal, they did so on the fifth day of the war. From that point on, all that was left
behind was lost to Egypt, specifically, two thirds of the Egyptian initial tank force in Sinai.
That included more than 550 tanks and tank-based armored vehicles: 256 T-54/55s, 127
T-34/85s, 56 SU-100s, 55 Sherman tanks (two different models), 19 IS-3Ms, 14 PT-76s, 8
Centurion Mk. 3 and 2s, around 20 T-34-based command vehicles, and ARVs.
The Jordanians announced their retreat on the night of June 6th, after most of their
armor and fighter planes were destroyed, and most of the West Bank was under Israeli
control. Here, too, the Israeli air force assured a difficult retreat for the Jordanians. About
190 of their 255 tanks were left behind, including 129 M48 Pattons, 30 M47 Pattons, and
30 Centurion Mk. 3s.

Sinai, June 1967: An
abandoned ZSU-57-2
SPAAG. (Avraham Almog)
Sinai, June
1967: Another
ZSU-57-2 next
to its fallen
Egyptian
operator. (YLA,
Avner Gagin
collection)
In Syria, things were a bit different. On June 7th, the Syrian array reorganized from an
attack to a defensive formation, and a considerable part of the military was taken back
to protect the capital, Damascus. Israel noticed the change and decided to use the
momentum gained on other fronts for another accomplishment. On June 9th, Israel
invaded Syria, and on the morning of the next day, a Syrian withdrawal was declared.
This allegedly enabled some of the Syrian forces to retreat, but at almost six-thirty that
evening, the Israeli attack was completed and the Golan was conquered. Of the 190
tanks that were in position on June 9th, about 120 remained in Israeli hands. Some of
these were wrecks even before the war began. Captured tanks included 55 T-34/85s, 25
Panzer IVs, 20 T-54/5s, 15 SU-100s and several Sturmgeschütz IIIs and AMX-13s, tank-
based command vehicles and recovery vehicles.
Long before Israel had decided on the fate of the newly acquired territories or the
thousands of prisoners of war, one thing was clear—most of what had been left in the
battlefields had to be collected and inspected.

All in all, some 860 tanks were
abandoned, equivalent to
Sinai, June 1967: Bedouin/Egyptian POWs
approximately 80 percent of
surrendering to Israeli soldiers in front of a T-54/5
the Israeli tank fleet during the tank. (Yosef Youdovich)
war. Along with the tanks, about
390 APCs, 740 artillery and anti-
air guns, 4,000 trucks, 28,700
light weapons, assault rifles and
machine guns and 18,000 tons
of ammunition were also left
behind. Locating all that treasure
was not a simple task. It required
thousands of man-hours and
several months to conclude,
mounted and aerial patrols,
storage facilities, transportation
and other resources. In certain
cases, it was difficult to remove
the items. Some tanks had been
left under camouflage nets and
were hard to detect, while some
of the vehicles fuel tanks had
been filled with sand, making
their recovery more difficult. Others were found in trenches alongside the roads. A
considerable number were damaged and needed towing, and naturally, just counting
and defining the specific types and models of the previously-unknown equipment
constituted another obstacle.
The IDF was now ready to face these challenges, equipped with an established and
well-developed appetite for weaponry and equipment, and with highly motivated
and talented personnel. Arkadi Timor was just one of these—there were others just as
committed to tipping the balance of power in the Middle East by using this unplanned
treasure. This was just one of the complex challenges Israel needed to deal with after
the Six Day War.
However, no matter how many enemy guns belonged to Israel at the time, the rest would
not stay silent for long.
Sinai, June 1967: Three Egyptian T-54/5s on the side of the road after the war,
awaiting recovery and a new destiny. The tanks were probably abandoned on the
road and then pushed to the shoulders by the Israeli army to enable mobilized
forces to move more quickly. (YLA, Avner Gagin collection)

Sinai, June 1967: A
flaming Egyptian
T-54/5. This was also
a part of the catch—
destroyed tanks.
Some of them were
not collected after the
war, and were left in
the battle fields and
sometimes used for
target practice. (YLA,
Avner Gagin collection)

Sinai, June 1967:
A typical post-war
Sinai scene, with four
clearly destroyed
T-34-85s in the
Sinai sands. (Baruch
“Pinko” Harel)

“THIS MIGHT
BE ONE OF
OUR BEST”
A
fter the tumult of war had quieted, new challenges were at hand. It was clear
that the IDF would need additional resources to cope with the new territories,
establish a new borderline and enlarge and improve its abilities. It soon became
clear that Israel’s enemies would not accept the results of the war and would surely arm
themselves with new and improved Soviet weaponry. It was also clear that the next
campaign would include armored warfare, and that its results would be determined
by the quantity and quality of the tanks in service, the most important component of
ground warfare in the eyes of the IDF.
It took some time for the IDF to get reorganized and start dealing with those challenges.
The main problem was resources: The IDF was composed primarily of reserve units and
a small regular army. After the war, most of the reserve soldiers were needed back in
civilian life to restore Israel’s small economy. This left the regular army with four times the
territory than before the war. This was of great relevance when it came to introducing
new weapons into the IDF, because even though hundreds of “new” tanks were now
potentially available, there were no physical resources or manpower to establish new
tank units. After a long, few months, mandatory and reserve services were prolonged,
and the security budget increased. The IDF started restoring the army to pre-war
condition, established the new borderline and deployed new military bases and soldiers
to man them. New options became possible and ambitious plans were coming together.
This was all part of a new security agenda that had been put into motion. Regardless
of the political aspects of the new conquered territories, their geographical features
offered an improved defense strategy and position for Israel. The baseline for this new
agenda was called strategical depth, meaning that Israel was now planning to fight off
each enemy within the new territories and then defeat them on their own land. As such,
initiating a preemptive strike, such as in the 1956 Sinai War and in the Six Day War, was
no longer necessary. The practical meaning of this new agenda meant building a much
bigger army, both regular and reserve, and developing new capabilities to enable it to
cross the Suez Canal, the Jordan River and perhaps the Mediterranean or the Red Seas.
The next war, as the IDF General Staff saw it, could end with conquering an Arab capital,
probably Cairo, perhaps Damascus, or maybe even both.

Sinai, 1967: These pictures were
taken by Captain Zvi Maimon,
an ordnance officer of the 60th
Armored Brigade, in the northern
Sinai sector. It is relatively hard to
find quality color photos from the
Six Day War, because most of the
pictures at the time were printed
in black and white. Look how well
the tank colors fit the yellow-white
sands of Sinai. (Zvi Maimon)
Sinai, June 1967:

Three Egyptian
T-55 tanks
collected after
the war for future
use. Notice that
the two Israeli
soldiers standing
on the tank are
holding captured
Carl Gustav m/45
submachine guns.
(YLA, Avner Gagin
collection)
The Armored Corps was a very important part of those plans. Over the next six years,
the number of tanks and tank brigades in use would double and their combat abilities
would improve. Hundreds of new tanks would be put into operation, and a significant
portion of the tanks in service would be upgraded or replaced. An attempt to achieve
standardization was also in progress, from eight different tank models in the Six Day
War (about five gun calibers and five engine types)2, to a tank fleet based primarily
on first-line Shot (Centurion) and Magach (Patton) tanks, both equipped with a 105-
mm gun. The rest of the (low quality) Sherman tanks would be used by second-line
reserve mechanized infantry brigades. The plan was to reorganize all tank units under
permanent tank divisions (ugdot) pre-designated for a specific front. The IDF was also
planning to upgrade the headquarters, supply and armament vehicles and to improve
2) On June 5th 1967, the IDF had 1,093 tanks in active service: 283 Shot (105-mm) tanks, 10
Centurion (20 pdr) tanks, 102 Patton M48A2C (90-mm) tanks, 15 M48A3 (105-mm) tanks, 179
Sherman M50 (75-mm) tanks, 175 Sherman M51 (105-mm) tanks, 151 Sherman M1 (M4A1 76-mm
HVSS) tanks and 178 AMX-13 (75-mm). Some additional 200 tanks were not operational.

communication systems. All this would enable a faster, more powerful armored attack,
precisely the kind needed to deal with the neighboring countries.
Planning the future Armored Corps was not just about having more tanks to use in
combat. The war made it clear that about a third of the tanks in service were unsuitable
for the IDF’s future needs, as some of these were initially purchased as World War II
surplus, second-grade or obsolete weapons, including some 178 AMX-13 and 151 Sherman
M4 tanks. Allegedly, every single tank was important in the great balance of power,
although every tank also had financial and manpower repercussions, and maintaining
second-grade abilities was considered a waste of good resources. Gradually, The AMX-13
tanks were sold and some of the Sherman tanks were re-purposed for mobilizing artillery
or improving the mobility and armor of support vehicles—a specialty that the IDF had
developed in the sixties. The IDF was also planning to bring in some 200 Centurion and
Patton tanks that at that time were in the process of being upgraded or converted to
IDF Specs.
Identification page from a tank

commander’s pocket book. The
Centurion tank was prioritized for
introduction to the IDF because
similar models were in service at
that time, making the introduction
process relatively simple. In
this pocket book edition, it was
expected of soldiers to recognize
tank movement by identifying the
tanks track tread. (MM)
Characteristics:
• Crew: 4
• Weight: 50.8 tons
• Maximum speed:
35 km/h
• Operational range:
184 km
• Firing range main gun: 1,300
meters
• Communication system
details
• Width: 3.35 meters
Armament:
• 20-pdr gun + 64 shells
• A browning 7.62-mm coaxial
machine gun + 3,000 bullets
• A 0.5’’ anti-air machine gun +
660 bullets
• Smoke grenade launcher—12
dischargers (+24 extra
grenades)

What Were the Options?
More tanks were needed, and the IDF started to reexamine their options. The main
alternative was to purchase them from one of the big Western manufacturers, but that
always involved complicated diplomacy, and was in a sense a fickle procedure. Just to be
clear, there were not too many Western manufactures to begin with, and making such a
deal was less about money and more about influence and reputation.
One optional supplier was the United Kingdom. In 1965, Israel began to examine the
British Chieftain tank, as her future first-line main battle tank. Although Israel wanted to
purchase hundreds of them and perhaps manufacture them locally, the UK evaded the
transaction, and in 1969, it was officially canceled. On the other hand, Israel was able to
buy additional Centurion tanks, and bought about 1,000 between 1959 and 1973. After
June 1967, the IDF took the post-World War II surplus, equipped with a Rolls-Royce
Meteor benzene engine and converted it to a diesel Continental AVDS-1790-2A engine,
called the Shot-Kal in the IDF.
This tank commander’s

pocket book Was issued in
1964, three years before
the first actual encounter
with the tank. Notice the
lack of details about the
T-54 in comparison to the
Jordanian Centurion tank.
Characteristics:
• Crew: 4
• Weight: 36 tons
• Maximum speed:
46 km/h
• Operational range:
360 km
• Width: 3.28 meters
Armament:
• 100-mm gun + 35
shells
• A 7.62-mm coaxial
machine gun
• A 7.62-mm hull
machine gun
• A 12.7 anti-air machine
gun + 600 bullets

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Another important alternative was the United States. Traditionally, since 1948, the
U.S. had refused to supply advanced weaponry to Israel, even though it was deeply
involved in shaping the Middle Eastern balance of power and occasionally allowed
selling of WW2 surplus. In 1964, the U.S. stand changed, and a few hundred M48
Patton tanks were supplied to Israel. It soon became clear that Israel could become
an important partner in the region during the Cold War—the Americans wanted
Israeli cooperation, but were trying to avoid an escalation in the region or direct
confrontation with the Soviets. America didn’t want a weakened Israel, but she also
didn’t want her to be all that strong, and although diplomatic ties were not idle at the
time, an awkward situation developed: For every tank (and other weaponry) that was
supplied to Syria or Egypt by the Soviets, Israel’s claim for tanks became stronger.
Eventually, a codependency evolved between the two countries, with Israel giving
Uncle Sam vital intelligence on Soviet activity and weaponry and supporting its
interests in the region, while in return, some of Israel’s vital diplomatic and military
needs were met. From the beginning of the 1970s, the Americans supplied the IDF
with a variety of their weapons, which included 136 M60 Patton tanks in 1972, which
were renamed Magach 6 Alef by the IDF.
An alleged third optional tank supplier was France, though it did not want to be
perceived as a supporter of Israel. A few days before the Six Day War, the de Gaulle
administration imposed a weapons embargo on Israel that included active defense
contracts between the countries. As such, France was no longer an option.
Even if Israel had been allowed to buy any weapon system it wanted, building the
future army still meant mastering the “short-blanket” syndrome: The IDF defined the
air force as its top priority and the Armored Corps as its second, but preferring one
goal meant neglecting another. The arms race with Egypt and Syria included every
aspect of armament—naval, land and air , anti-air, artillery, combat engineering,
intelligence, communication systems, infantry mobility , and what not. The Soviets were
increasing their influence in the region by supplying weapons and military guidance
and training in abundance. Even with U.S. support, Israel could not afford or match the
combined enemy threat one for one—it was clear that an IDF tank would need to
destroy at least two enemy tanks in every skirmish.
In addition to the impossible ongoing arms race, the IDF was forced to deal with
routine security issues. In a matter of weeks after the war , the Sinai front became
active again, including Egyptian commando raids, and sniper and artillery fire. On the
Jordanian front, PLO terrorists infiltrated the Israeli border and tried to sabotage
border settlements. Those incidents were the prologue to the ar W of Attrition, a harsh
daily struggle of perseverance and aggression that soon spread to the Syrian and
Lebanese fronts as well.
Using the captured equipment became an unavoidable approach, and it seemed like
a magical fast-rate and low-cost solution to many problems. Those cheap and
available resources were almost within the IDF’s grasp, and it seemed that all they
required was a little bit of research and minor adjustments. In fact, it turned out to
be no easy task at all. Understanding how it all worked, arranging spare parts and
ammunition, and offering proper maintenance, all posed a true reverse engineering
challenge. This was a dual process: While generals and staff officers planned the
future, stimulated by budget problems and their own imaginings, mechanics and
engineers such as Arkadi examined the reality. The determination of the technical
crews was vital in making the General Staff’s wishes come true.

West Bank, 1967: a Jordanian Centurion tank
being inspected by enthusiastic post war IDF
Soldiers. (KKL-JNF, Alex Stergmeister)
Bethlehem, 1967: Captured Jordanian Centurion tanks

awaiting transport to the IDF workshops and storage
facilities. (KKL-JNF, Matha Helwig)

The captured tanks were examined thoroughly, but not all were deemed desirable or
fitting. Most of the 860 captured tanks were not reusable or were seen as obsolete
by the IDF, but some seemed very promising. For those reasons and others, the most
attractive tanks captured were naturally of the kind already in service. The first of these
were 42 Centurion (Mk. 2 and 3) tanks that were sent to the active Centurion/Shot
conversion line. Another example were the Sherman tanks, which were used as armored
bases for various support vehicles, and for spare parts.
Using the ex-Jordanian M48 Patton tanks was not as easy. Originally, the same tanks
were partly the reason that the IDF received M48 Pattons in the first place—the Jewish
country was allowed to have Pattons after Jordan received her own. Now Israel was in
a difficult position: In order to use them, the IDF needed special conversion kits, spare
parts and communication systems, and later on diesel engines, too. These were all
American-made. Buying these parts meant asking for the Americans’ authorization to
use the tanks, which they originally provided with the intent of balancing Israeli military
capabilities and the rate of armament accumulation in the Middle East. Israel feared a
refusal. After a formal decision to introduce them in December 1967, it took about ten
more months to put them into service, and a couple more years to convert them to
Magach 3 tanks. During that time, Israel tried unsuccessfully to find alternative suppliers
for the items they needed and to manufacture some parts locally. Eventually, 108 tanks
were introduced into service.
The bigger dilemma concerned the Soviet T-54/5 tanks. Reverse engineering took a
considerable amount of time and resources and it did not guarantee success. Spare
parts were a problem: Some parts could be taken from damaged vehicles and reused
to fix functioning ones through the process of “cannibalization,” but that was just a
temporary and partial solution; manufacturing parts locally was expensive, and engines
or transmissions could not be reproduced. It was not yet clear whether the necessary
parts could be acquired on the international market in the middle of the Cold War.
Additional problems included the supply or local production of ammunition, establishing
special training programs for the unique equipment and preventing false identification of
the previously enemy equipment by IDF soldiers, which potentially could lead to friendly
fire. The first step to answering the different aspects of this dilemma was a thorough
examination of the items in question.
Sinai, 1967: An
Israeli mechanical
inspection team
checking one of the
captured T-54/5s,
which has clear
damage from the
fighting. (Aharon
Shatz)

Golan Heights, near Quneitra, June 1967: Notice the bloated fuel tank on the tank’s right
side—it looks like the tank was hit from the flank. The tank is clearly Syrian, according to the
name of the shahid (fallen soldier) inscribed on the turret’s side. (Moshe Milner, GPO)
Golan Heights, near the village of Banias, June 1967: This is one of twenty Syrian T-54/5 tanks
that was captured in the Six Day War. The majority of the T-54/5 tanks in the Syrian army
were called back from the front during the first days of the war to defend Damascus, and
avoided fighting the IDF. (Ram Lahover, GPO)

The IDF tried to recruit knowledgeable mechanics and technicians from among the
Soviet Jews who had immigrated to Israel, but none had any experience with the T-54/5.
Technical manuals or parts catalogues were not found on the battlefields. The tank was
an enigma. Immediately after the war, two T-54/5 tanks were moved to the Armored
Corps workshop and taken apart piece by piece. Every part was examined, sketched,
cataloged, cleaned and put back in place. IDF mechanics started a slow process of
mastering the foreign technology and learning how to mold it to IDF needs and abilities.
Three sub-models were defined in the process: the T-54, the T-54 with gun stabilization
(allowing precise fire during movement), and the T-55. It turned out that some of the
same model tanks were manufactured by different factories and were not identical,
which made identifying the parts even harder. None of the tanks had been heavily used
before they were captured, and on average had done 500 to 1,200 kilometers, according
to the tanks’ odometers.
Sinai, July 1967: An

Egyptian T-54 loaded
on a tank transporter
and transferred to
storage facilities. The
tank is functioning
and in perfect
condition. (Ami
Sahmir, GPO)
Sinai, June 1967: An

Egyptian T-55 that
appears to be in
perfect condition.
Written on the license
plate: of the Army ‫الجيش‬
١٧٢٠ ‫ د‬D 1720.
(Yossi Newmark,
MM collection)

Sinai, 1967: A T-54
stuck in the mud.
Many of the tanks
captured in the
war needed to be
extricated, either
because they
were damaged or
found in similar
situations. In some
cases, recently
captured enemy
vehicles were used
to recover others.
(Yossi Newmark,
MM collection)
Golan Heights, June 1967: Soldiers of

the 45th Armored Brigade inspecting
a captured Syrian T-54 and removing
the standard wood saw from the tank;
clearly, this item is redundant in Middle
Eastern battlefields, and apparently, not
much had been changed after the Soviet
manufacturing line. The inscription on
the turret’s side mentions a name of a
Syrian shahid (fallen soldier) from the
1948 war with Israel. (YLA, Yitzhak Arad
collection)

A Learning Curve
It was obvious from the start that the tank was very different from anything else the
IDF knew and used. It was as if it had a unique mentality, a different character. It was
clear that a lot of ingenuity and sophistication had been invested in the tank’s planning.
Some parts and systems were much more durable and efficient then their Western
counterparts, the tracks and automotive systems in particular. Other systems were
redundant or unusable in Middle Eastern battlefields, such as heating systems and a
saw for cutting logs. However reliable, almost every system was harder to operate or to
maintain. If a large-bodied crew member needed to drive the tank, it was no less than an
ordeal. The physical requirements for the tank driver were so rigid that they made the
IDF adopt a special Russian word for describing the driver—mujik, which meant a Soviet
peasant but was used in the IDF for a short, thin and strong-bodied soldier.
In addition, introducing the T-54/5 tanks into active service involved a very complicated,
formal procedure. It needed to be approved by the Ministry of Defense, and it needed a
budget, advanced planning, and a reasoned decision by the IDF’s Chief of the General
Staff. Most of all, it needed someone high-ranking and tenacious enough to make it
all happen—a patron. In the case of the T-54/5, this was General Israel Tal (Talik), the
commander of the Armored Corps and one of the most valued officers of the General
Staff who much later became the father of the Merkava tank project and the IDF and
Ministry of Defense’s tank expert.
Talik loved the idea. A short time after the war, he met with a few Ordnance Corps
officers (one of whom was Arkadi), to discuss the future of the captured tanks. “Those
tanks are ours,” he insisted, while demanding more and more details on their potential.
Talik understood that further research was needed, and so, he asked Arkadi to lead an
ordinance research team in analyzing the exact potential and possibilities. During that
meeting, the tank received the name “Tiran,” which means tyrant in Hebrew, also hinting
at the Soviet Communist government of those days. Tiran quickly became the new name
for all local and enemy T-54/5s. A few months later, in a General Staff meeting, Talik
said to his fellow generals, “I think this could be one of our best tanks, if only we could
convert it to IDF specs.”
Over the next few months, IDF staff officers would consider the different aspects of
putting them into service: Whether to use them in a special brigade or as reserve tanks;
what the actual number and combat potential of the tanks were; how to supply the
tanks with ammunition and spare parts; and other important dilemmas.
Truth be told, most of it landed up being empty talk.
The IDF needed time to understand what to do with the tanks, and how to do it—and it
took almost two years for the bastard tank to be evaluated.

POTENTIAL,
DEFICIENCIES AND
MODIFICATIONS
T
here was no question about it: The T-54/5 tanks had serious potential. They were
already in IDF possession, they were one of the enemies’ most important weapon
systems, and available, too, at a time of need. They were, however, unsuitable for
the IDF’s needs and plans. The IDF needed standardized engine types and gun calibers
and there were too many tank models as it was—was another truly necessary? The many
pros and cons were evident, and weighing them wasn’t easy.
Soviet human engineering design was a problem. The absence of a turret floor in T-54
models and loading with the left hand (in all T models) made the loader’s life somewhat
difficult. The tank’s shock absorbing system was minimal, operating the gears, brakes
and steering was difficult, the interior hull and turret fittings were uncomfortable and
maintenance was a nightmare. Though some parts were extremely durable, a “simple”
task such as replacing an engine took more than a day’s work, some 10 hours more than
for Shot or Magach tanks.
Another problem was the tank gun’s vertical laying system, the angle of which was
higher than in Western tanks. This had
two practical implications: The first was
additional exposure and vulnerability
during combat, especially while
fighting on an incline. The second was
that it needed different fighting ramps
than the standard IDF type.
Sketches of Tiran tank firing positions

from a Tiran 5 training manual, 1970
(IDFA). Fighting ramps were an
essential component of defensive tank
warfare. During combat, the tank needs
to use the terrain’s topographic features
to its advantage. A tank ramp offered
an elevated position and optional cover
while holding a defensive line. In the
case of the Tiran, the ramp’s firing
position would be designed to hide
most of the hull and expose as little of
the turret as possible. The ramp was
slightly different from those required by
Western tanks.

All these characteristics were evidence of different combat tactics, and they were
extremely different from the Israeli ones. The Soviet method was based on bulk and
quantity. If one tank, ten tanks or even a hundred were hit – it did not have any major
effect on the big picture. Those tanks would be towed back, fixed and reused within
time, while many others were still fighting. Crew comfort was no more than a pleasant
luxury, and field maintenance was not worth spending resources on during battle.
The IDF’s combat tactics were based on Western concepts: The crew was one of the most
important components in tank warfare, and therefore should be relatively comfortable,
thus enabling extended combat time and maximum utilization of human resources. In
addition, every single tank was considered important, and the ability to fix a damaged
tank quickly during combat was crucial.
For these reasons, the Soviet tanks could not be introduced into service without
improving some of their built-in disadvantages.
On the other hand, some of the Soviet technology offered clear advantages. The tanks’
night vision systems were much better than the IDF Xenon Infrared searchlights, enabling
a clear advantage in night combat. A few mounted Soviet mine trawl systems and dozer
blades (BTUs) were also captured, while the old IDF combat engineering equipment
turned out to be dysfunctional. The tank’s exhaust smoke system (T-55 models), which
enabled the tank to be camouflaged in a thick cloud of diesel fumes, was new to the
IDF, and acquiring it was quite an achievement. Another advantage, discovered in mid-
1969, was that these tanks were the most suitable for transferring by landing ships, due
to their small proportions. This potential turned out to be very significant for the IDF in
planning for the next war.
T-54 (PT-54)
T-54 (BTU)
Hypothetically, when using these tanks, the IDF could exploit ammunition, spare
parts and fuel caches on enemy land—this was not possible with any of the Western
tanks. These tanks could also be disguised as Egyptian, Syrian or Iraqi tanks, and
used for special operations. By mastering the Soviet technology, Israel could capture
and use additional tanks in future conflicts. The same technology could also be
useful to Israel’s weapons industry, to improve overall fighting abilities (such as bullet
penetration and armor protection) and for acquiring additional knowledge of the
enemy.

A simple technical comparison to IDF tanks proved that the Soviet tanks had similar
abilities, but with two-thirds the weight. Their hull contained less fuel and ammo than Shot
or Magach tanks, requiring more frequent restocking and refueling, but their operational
range was similar, and the Soviet Christie caterpillar track system’s performance was no
match for any other tank used by the IDF. The tanks were smaller and therefore harder
to hit, but when hit, the impact was deadlier. The tanks armor was considered good,
but a 100-mm gun had less firepower than the IDF required. Overall survivability was
estimated to be lower or equal to that of Western tanks.
Magach 6 Magach 3
Sherman M51 Shot Kal Alef T-55 T-54
M60 Patton M48 Patton
Main Gun Caliber
(mm)
105 105 105 105 100 100
Main Armament
59
Ammunition
55 72 Magach 6A1 59 43 33/4
– 63
Weight (tons) 39 52-54 42-46 48 35-36 35-36
500-700
Operational
Including
Road ~240 480 500 500-464 440 (T-54A)
Range
external rear
fuel tanks
Field ~150 240 ~250 260 ~390 290 (T-54A)
H W L H W L H W L H W L H W L
Specifications
Length, Width,
Height (meters)
3.02 2.99 6.1 3.01 3.38 ~9.8 3.26 3.63 9.25 3.1 3.65 9.3 2.7-2.4 3.27 9
After several technical reviews and a thorough examination of every tank, the IDF
estimated that some 140 tanks were reusable. This included parts for reproduction and
cannibalization. The end goal was to replace the engine with a Western engine and the
gun with a 105-mm Sharir, but both were expensive, leaving no reason to invest serious
capital in fixing an unsuitable tank. As such, the initial plan was based on a temporary
model that would either be used for a short period or upgraded to IDF specs in the
future.
In the 1968 international tank market (and without considering any diplomatic aspects),
the fiscal advantage of using the tanks in this configuration was clear. In 1967-1968, the
IDF General Staff estimated that preparing one Tiran tank would cost 35,000 Israeli
pounds (about 10,000 dollars at the time). However, the price of another Centurion
tank was 440,000 Israeli pounds and of an M48A3 Patton—582,000 Israeli pounds.
Potentially, incorporating all 146 Tiran tanks was like purchasing a company of Shots
or two platoons of Magach 3s. The estimated service time was maximum ten years.
From the beginning, the tank was designated to be removed from service after all the
Sherman tanks were replaced with first-line tanks. It would be used as a second-line tank,
equivalent to the old Sherman M50 or M51. Two crucial problems remained unsolved:
one, the supply of 100-mm ammunition, and two, spare engines and transmissions. Talik,
the Armored Corps commander, knew that incorporating the tank in this way was not
optimal, but still believed it to be a good resolution for the time being: “If we need to go
to war with a hundred tanks and at the end of the first day we are left with 70, it would
still be a serious tank unit.”
Modifications—many modifications—were necessary. Arkadi’s mechanics started to
design a prototype for the T-to-Tiran conversion line and enriched their understanding of
the tank. In the following years, some 1,000 tank parts would be reproduced by the IDF
and civilian industries, stockpiles of replacement parts would be collected from all the
Soviet tanks (including T-34s, Stalin IS-3Ms and others), technical instruction manuals
would be produced, and many mechanics and technicians would be trained for the
maintenance array.
Converting the T to the Tiran was a complex mission: These were small tanks to begin
with, there was no room for installing large Western systems, and the conversion line was
restricted to small, relatively cheap changes. Every tank needed to contain more fuel and

ammo, and made easier to handle. The actual conversion was finished in 1970, although
additional changes were added from time to time. The main modifications included:
• The PKT (7.62-mm) and DShK (12.7-mm) machine guns were

replaced with standard IDF .30 caliber Browning M1919. The hull
machine gun was eliminated.
• The Soviet communication system was replaced with an American-
made VHF system.
• Fuel capacity was increased (from 817 to 965 liters) and some of
the fuel tanks were modified.
• Main gun ammo supply was increased and additional ammo racks
were installed (from 33 to 44 in the T-54 and from 43 to 59 in the
T-55).
• Light ammo supply was increased by 60 percent and more hand
grenades were added.
• A nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) protection system was
installed.
• The engine compartment heating system was removed.
• The tank was fitted with standard IDF equipment, lubricants and
as many standard replacement parts as possible. The original tool
kits were duplicated.
The first official test of the tank was at a weapon display at the end of 1967. This was
in the very beginning of the introduction process, when the tanks were in their original
(Soviet) configuration. The audience included the one-eyed Minister of Defense Moshe
Dayan and an entourage of generals and government officials, including the Chief of the
General Staff Yitzhak Rabin, and his future replacement and current deputy, Haim Bar-
Lev, the Armored Corps commander, Israel Tal (Talik), and others. They were invited to
have a first glimpse of the newly acquired tank, the surprise gift the IDF had received
from the enemy’s first line of defense. They were given binoculars to watch the tanks
closely as they maneuvered in the sands and performed target practice.
Expectations were high, and it was a show to remember.
The displayed tanks missed the targets by hundreds of meters, even after compensations
were made. The second round of fire also failed, and one shot even hit the nearby
Mediterranean Sea—a long way from the designated targets. The problem, as it later
turned out, was that they were using the wrong kind of ammunition. The display proved
that the IDF was not well-acquainted with the tank. From that point on, Dayan became
one of the biggest opposers of incorporating the tank: In his mind, the tank simply could
not hit. However, Arkadi and Talik continued to push forward, and so did others.

Nitzanim training ground, 1967: A live display of newly acquired
T-54/5 tanks for the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.
This picture was taken after the first shots had missed the
targets. Standing on the left and wearing an Armored Corps
black beret is General Israel (Talik) Tal. (Yo’el Gonen)
Nitzanim training ground, 1967: A live display of

newly acquired T-54/5 tanks for the General Staff and
the Ministry of Defense. Sitting right to left: Minster
of Defense Moshe Dayan, Chief of the General Staff
Yitzhak Rabin, and Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Haim Bar-Lev. The honorable audience used binoculars
to closely watch the tanks hitting the targets, but the
tanks missed them by hundreds of meters due to the
wrong ammunition. (Yo’el Gonen)

PICTURES FROM THE
CONVERSION LINE
(1968 - 1973)
In
April 1974, while introducing hundreds of newly-captured Tiran
tanks to the IDF (from the Yom Kippur War), the Ordnance Corps
nominated the T-54/5 to Tiran conversion project for the Israel
Defense Prize, which was presented annually by Israel’s president for
exceptional defense-related achievements and developments. The Tiran
project was not chosen in 1974, or in the two subsequent applications.
However, thanks to these submissions, the introduction process was
well documented and photographed. These are the pictures.

A V-55 V-12 580 hp
Water-cooled diesel engine—before and after conversion. Reproducing the Soviet engine was
not possible and this was initially considered a serious handicap in introducing the tanks. Luckily,
the Eastern Bloc used the same engine types for other purposes, too. Israel was able to purchase
these engines from Romania, where they were being used for agricultural purposes. (YLA, Tiran Sh
Medium Battle Tank Development Project, April 1974)

The loader and commander hatches were modified to a fully opening position or left with
the original 90 degrees, and special handles were added to open the hatch from both
inside and out. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium Battle Tank Development Project, April 1974)

One of the T-54/5
ammunition racks that
is also used as a fuel
tank. The diesel fuel
was stored in the spaces
between the shells.
This was one aspect
of the Soviet design’s
sophistication—allowing
for better use of the
tank’s small turret.
(YLA, Tiran Sh Medium
Battle Tank Development
Project, April 1974)
An NBC (nuclear-
biological-chemical)
protection system was
installed in the hull.
(YLA, Tiran Sh Medium

An adaptor sleeve for the 105-mm Sharir
gun: The sleeve was connected to the
original breechblock and the Sharir gun
was screwed to the sleeve. The conversion
process started in 1972 and was part of a
standardization process of ammunition and
engine types in the IDF tank fleet. (YLA,
Tiran Sh Medium Battle Tank Development
The 105-mm Sharir gun attached to the

original T-54/5 breechblock. The main
adjustment needed for the breechblock
was to replace the mechanical firing pin
with an electrical pin. In addition, an
emergency manual electrical generator
was installed, in case the normal electrical
system failed. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium
Battle Tank Development Project, April
1974)

Gunner’s telescope, turret controls, Tiran 4/5 tool kits. Part of the
azimuth indicator and manual turret introduction process was to duplicate the
control. The Tiran was the only tank in the tank’s original tools. Some of the tank’s
IDF in which the gunner and commander parts, tools and lubricants were replaced
were on the left side of the turret and with standard IDF equipment. (YLA,
the loader on the right. Loading with the Tiran Sh Medium Battle Tank Development
left arm is much more difficult for most Project, April 1974)
soldiers, and the turret space was also
considerably smaller than in Magach or
Shot tanks. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium Battle
Tank Development Project, April 1974)

Mechanical maintenance being performed
on the Tiran 4/5s before the Sharir
conversion. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium Battle
Tank Development Project, April 1974)

MINE SWEEPING,
THE “BONUS” AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
AT
the beginning of 1968, Captain Yaakov Lapidot, a young Sherman tank
company commander, was summoned to Talik’s office. Lapidot was given a
unique assignment: He was ordered to develop close working relations with
Arkadi and his technical crew, lead the introduction process of the Tiran to the Armored
Corps, and examine all other captured vehicles. Although six years later Lapidot would
command a Tiran tank brigade, and a Tiran division eleven years later, at that point he
did not know a thing about the tank.
As a young officer with such great responsibility, he initially thought that anything was
possible. He was ordered to make the Tiran suitable for the Armored Corps, as similar
as possible to Shot or Magach tanks. In one of their first meetings, he insisted that the
Tiran should contain all the gear and ammunition of a (much larger) Magach 3, but he
soon realized that if all that gear was installed, there would be no room left for a crew
to operate the tank. It was the first lesson he learned: In Soviet tanks, everything was
different.
Lapidot gradually developed a strange affection for the tank, the kind of fondness only
tank soldiers or mechanics could develop. He got into the Soviet way of thinking and
realized that the tanks were actually excellent—when combined with the proper combat
tactics.
Over the next two years, he and Arkadi examined every possible aspect of the tank,
every nut and bolt. Arkadi and his crew would come up with technical solutions for
different problems and needs, and Lapidot would present the tank fighter’s point of
view. Adjustments and modifications were made on a daily basis, then quickly tried out
and either approved or remodified. They made thousands of modifications in total.
While the introduction process was in motion, the IDF needed to decide what to do
with the tank. The solution had to integrate the problematic aspects of the tank (slow
introduction process, lack of spare engines, transmissions and ammunition, and the need
for a different training course and a different maintenance array) and use its advantages.
An initial idea, determined by Chief of the General Staff Rabin in September 1967, was
to establish a special Tiran tank brigade. However, within a couple of months, the IDF
realized that it was simply too complicated to become a reality in 1968.
In addition to the brigade idea, Talik had an alternative in mind, one that would immediately
serve the IDF’s needs. He suggested assigning the tanks to the inferior reserve tank

units, armored battalions (gashap) of the central and northern commands. The tanks
would be organized into a couple of companies and used during war as a reserve force,
if ever needed. As he put it, they would become a “bonus,” a small, optional addition to
the first- and second-line tanks, and nothing more. Talik’s suggestion allowed the IDF to
conduct additional experiments on the tank and to better understand how it operated,
while spending valuable resources on other important projects and maximizing the tank
force that was ready and at hand.
The Tiran was also implemented for clearing mines. One of the obvious conclusions
from the Six Day War was that most of the IDF combat engineering equipment was
obsolete or dysfunctional. On paper, the IDF had a special company with eight Sherman
Crab tanks (equipped with a mine-clearing flail) and twelve Sherman dozer tanks. As
soon as war broke out, it turned out that 19 of the 20 combat engineering tanks were
dysfunctional. The IDF tried to use civilian Caterpillar D4 tractors as replacements, but
they were too slow for the fast progress of tanks and M3 half-tracks. One could say
that during the Six Day War, the IDF chose to disregard land mines as an obstacle—and
they made it through, thanks to a combination of good luck, stupidity and good timing.
Clearly, however such a combination was most unlikely to reoccur.
Mid-1960s: Vehicles of the 606 Combat Engineering Company,

Sherman crab tanks and dozers tanks. Almost all these vehicles were
dysfunctional in the Six Day War. (YLA, Avner Gagin collection)
Mid-1960s: A Sherman Crab

tank stuck in the mud. The
tank’s flail system consisted of
heavy chains ending in large
steel balls that rotate rapidly
to blow up mines in front of
the tank. The tank was never
actually used by the IDF in
combat. (YLA, Avner Gagin
collection)

A Tiran 4 equipped with a Soviet mine roller device and connected in the rear to a Wagon
34. The wagon contained explosive charges or Bongalore torpedoes tied in a long chain. The
tank would use the front mine roller device to clear a path in a mine field, while the chain
of explosive charges would be gradually dropped off the wagon, and detonated, thereby
widening the mine-free path. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium Battle Tank Development Project, April
1974)
A Tiran 4 equipped with

a mounted Soviet dozer
blade devise. From mid-
1968 until September
1969, Tiran tanks with
these devices were used
for combat engineering
by Battalion 606. (YLA,
Tiran Sh Medium Battle
Tank Development Project,
April 1974)

Testing the Soviet mine trawl
systems mounted on the
Tiran tanks. These kits were
duplicated by the IDF and
adapted to Shot and Magach
tanks. (YLA, Tiran Sh Medium
During the war, the IDF also noticed that the Egyptian combat engineering equipment
was much better, specifically the mounted mine trawl and dozer blade (BTU) devices
that were used by the T-54/5 tanks. From the start, using those devices was an appealing
concept, and the routine security reality in Sinai increased their value.
Land mines quickly became one of the daily challenges along the southern border. At
night, Egyptian commando units would raid the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and
plant mines on roads and alongside Israeli fortifications. The IDF needed an immediate
solution for those mines, and the Tiran tanks were it. The first converted Tirans were
assigned in mid-1968 to clear mines from Sinai roads. Over time, the IDF would duplicate
and fit those devices to all the other tanks in service, but for then, a few Tiran tanks were
“promoted” to mine-clearing tractors.
After a few months in office, Lapidot’s new job became more interesting. He started
to check the mobility of the tank in every kind of terrain, mud or sand, hard rocks
or soft dirt roads. The Tiran track system did not break loose. As a former Sherman
officer who was used to fixing the track frequently, Lapidot was amazed. He also
shot at a variety of targets and realized that the firing system and main gun were
extremely precise. These superb performances came with physical hardship and pain,

and a day’s training would end with bruises, extreme tiredness and blunt descriptions
of the tank designer’s mother’s profession. That said, Lapidot was generally pleased
and excited.
Some of the more interesting aspects of Lapidot’s job were not related to the work of a
tank officer, but to that of a tank ambassador. The IDF gave access to the Soviet military
equipment to some of its Western friends and allies. This was part of the diplomatic
discourse between countries, and one that could potentially lead to the swapping of
intelligence, technology and perhaps more. As the leading “Soviet tank officer,” Lapidot
traveled with four T-55 tanks to the U.K. to aid with British military experiments on
the recently developed Chobham armor plates. Another time, Lapidot and his soldiers
helped American technical crews to test American weaponry such as the M551 Sheridan
tank and the MGM-51 Shillelagh anti-tank guided missiles. A few years later, Swedish
military representatives also came to examine the tanks, fearing Soviet aggression. Other
countries were showing an interest in the tanks too, and the IDF was happy to develop
its reputation by showing off prime Soviet technology.
In the 1968 Independence Day parade, Lapidot got the chance to show the world a part
of his extremely secret occupation. It was a huge celebration of fortitude and patriotism

after the 1967 victory: The biggest military
parade the country has ever seen, marched
through Jerusalem along the Old City walls. It
was a location of deep national importance, as
in the previous 19 years and in accordance with
the ceasefire agreement with Jordan, Israel
had not been allowed to conduct big parades
in its capital. Now Israel was marching through
the streets of Jerusalem with 432 military
vehicles carrying every kind of mobilized
weapon system and 5,000 soldiers, while
300 fighter jets flew the skies in a massive
flyover. Lapidot’s part in the parade was to
prepare and command the captured vehicles
column, which included Jordanian Pattons,
Syrian and Egyptian T-54/5s, PT-76 light
tanks, Stalin IS-3Ms, SU-100 tank destroyers
and ZSU-57-2 SPAAGs, all in their original
combat colors. All the soldiers operating the
equipment, some of whom had participated
in the first Tiran mechanical maintenance
course, were given special training for these
peculiar vehicles. While Arkadi was behind the
scenes, making sure all the tanks were working
properly, Lapidot led the column from one of
the captured tanks and saluted Prime Minister
Eshkol and Chief of the General Staff Bar-Lev
in the reviewing stand.
November 1968: The 11th anniversary for the

Kadesh Campaign, declared by the IDF as the
Armored Corps Day. The outer circle in the tank
display includes tanks and combat vehicles in
IDF service: M3 halftracks, jeeps, Shot tanks,
Magach 3s, AMX-13s, Sherman M51 tanks and
a Sherman ARV. The 11 in the middle include
enemy vehicles. (Baruch “Pinko” Harel)
1. T-34-based command tank

2. Jordanian Lynx armored vehicle
3. T-54/5
4. T-34
5. Jordanian Centurion Mk.3
6. SU-100
7. Jordanian M113 APC
8. BTR-152
9. Stalin IS-3M
10. ISU 152 command tank
11. Al-Walid or BTR-40
12. T-54/5
13. Syrian PzKpfw (Panzerkampfwagen) IV
14. Jordanian Patton M48
15. Egyptian PT-76
16. Jordanian ammunition carrier
17. Egyptian Sherman M4A2
18. ZSU-57-2 SPAAG

12
11
3
2
10
17
8 18

May 1968: Preparation for the 1968
Independence Day parade in Jerusalem.
All captured tanks were painted in their
original colors. Notice the ZSU-57-2 and SU-
100 on the right. (Yosef Pasternak)

Jerusalem, May 1968: An Egyptian T-54/5 marching in the Independence Day parade.
(Photo Aviv, KKL-JNF)
Jerusalem, May 1968: An “Israeli” ZSU-57-2 in Egyptian combat colors marching in the
Independence Day parade. (KKL-JNF)
At some point, about a year after the war, the sweet taste of the 1967 victory gradually
started to become bitter with the taste of the War of Attrition. The Suez Canal had
become a harsh front, and casualties and injured soldiers were frequently being reported
on the front pages of newspapers. Israeli fortifications were receiving generous doses
of Egyptian artillery fire on a daily basis, and commando raids and sniper fire were also
frequent. This was all happening under the boiling hot desert sun of Sinai, with miles and
miles of pale sand dunes between military bases and fortifications. It seemed as if the
Egyptians had the upper hand, and they were showing initiative by wearing down Israeli
fortifications with artillery as they pleased.
Attrition, however, meant absorbing and attacking, and the IDF did both. Gradually the
level of violence and daring rose, and sometimes a false feeling of retaliation relieved the
constant insecurity and tension. Though Israeli artillery capabilities were inferior, the IDF
found creative ways to strike back. In addition to routine security activity on the canal,

which was aimed at preventing any Egyptian achievement on its eastern bank, Israel
returned artillery fire and aerial bombardments. They targeted not only military bases
and fortifications, but also important infrastructure as well as civilian cities near the canal
(such as Suez, Ismailia and Port Said). In one case, the IDF succeeded in annihilating
the Egyptian Chief of General Staff Abdul Munim Riad with rocket fire. The air force
gradually struck harder and deeper. Frequent air-to-air combat opened the Egyptian
skies, and the IDF pilots flew them as if they were their own.
At the end of 1968, enemy heat rose considerably and compelled Israel to evolve its
strategy. Israel now attempted to suppress the fighting on the canal by causing the
Egyptians to spread their forces to other fronts. Isolated targets in the Egyptian
hinterland were picked out for commando raids and aerial bombings. The first raids
were conducted by small squadrons of elite commando on electrical transformers and
bridges 600 kilometers south of Cairo. Commando raids were also executed in Jordan
and Lebanon. The raids were successful and improved morale but did not affect the fire
from across the canal. Next, remote military bases were targeted and the escalation
continued. It was slowly realized that any impact on the Egyptian army would require
striking harder.
The IDF started to use its raiding experience for more advanced and sophisticated
tactical planning. The new tactics were not limited to land or sky, but combined. As
such, this was a time of experimentation and cooperation, of joint (air, naval, land and
intelligence) operations—and for some reason the Tiran tanks played a part in it.
Operation Raviv—September 1969

In the midst of the War of Attrition, the General Staff initiated a special plan to conduct
an armored raid on a few remote Egyptian army bases along the west coast of the Gulf
of Suez. The raid (first called Operation Balash) was renamed Operation Raviv (Drizzle).
Operation Raviv was a revolutionary plan that was extremely complex to execute, needed
close cooperation between land, air and sea forces, and was not based on any combat
experience or tested abilities. Specifically, it involved loading tanks on a landing ship and
disembarking in enemy turf.
From June 1967, the IDF became very occupied with developing methods to cross water
obstacles in order to subdue its enemies. Every land maneuver on the Egyptian front
had to deal with either the Suez Canal, the Bitter Lakes, or the Red or Mediterranean
Seas. However, the soldiers in the field, armored and navy alike, were not experienced
in loading tanks onto landing ships. In the eyes of the average tank commander, water
was just a corrosion catalyst and unrelated to armored warfare. The mere concept
seemed strange: They imagined that fighting on Middle East battlefields would be like
participating in heroic battles such as El-Alamein or Stalingrad, no one thought of the
Normandy landings. The conquerors of Sinai and the Golan heights did not use the seas,
they used nothing but the tracks of the tank to advance, standing tall and proud in the
turret.
In this context, the Tiran tanks proved to be very useful. They were the best suited for
the job, the lightest tanks in service, short and narrow in size—perfect for the tight space
available on landing ships. However, they were not chosen only for their advantages, but
also for their deficiencies. The tank was different and cheap, and therefore expendable—
it was better if a captured Soviet tank were to rust or sink to the bottom of the sea than
one of the Magach or Shot tanks. Moreover, using this kind of tank opened the possibility
of leaving it in enemy territory after completing the raid—a huge tactical advantage if the
raiding party needed to extracted immediately. Another advantage was the widespread
use of T-54/5 tanks by the Egyptian army: Using the same tanks in Egyptian combat
colors would surprise the enemy and give the raiding force a heck of an advantage.
It was well known that some of the captured Soviet vehicles had a clear advantage in
this kind of warfare. The T-54/5 was able to cross shallow water obstacles (The T-54/5
could also cross deep-water obstacles with added snorkel devices, but this was never
attempted by the IDF) and the BTR-50 and PT-76 were amphibious. Initially, these
abilities were examined by Lapidot and Arkadi as part of the introduction process, but
for a large-scale operation, this wasn’t enough. A special unit was needed, one that
would master all water-related obstacles, and so the Department for Water Transport
of tanks and armored vehicles was born. Over four years, this unit would lead the field
experiments on a variety of bridges, pontoon ferries, flotation devices and amphibious

tank carriers. However, the first task of this new unit was to train a special task force for
Operation Raviv while developing the right combat techniques to accomplish its goals.
After figuring out the optimal alternative, the plan was to use six T-55 tanks and three
BTR-50s, and to land north of the Ras Abu-Darag military base. Then, the force would
move south while destroying five military bases and naval and aerial radars, as well as
guard posts along the way. Two preconditions for initiating the raid were set: one, to
conduct a reconnaissance patrol and an examination of the designated landing and
disembarking spots in Egypt (Operation Small Raviv in mid-August) and two, to destroy
2 Egyptian Torpedo boats in the Gulf of Suez that could endanger the landing ships
(Operation Escort, executed by the naval commando the day before Operation Raviv).
The raid was planned to receive close air support and had an immediate evacuation
backup team if necessary.
Operation Raviv battle chart (IDFA). The raiding party left Ras Sedr in western Sinai on
the night of July 8 at 23:30. It sailed to the west coast of the Gulf of Suez and raided
along the Egyptian coastline, hitting every possible target on the way, with close
cooperation and air support. The forces left Africa at 12:20 the following day, after
spending some 10 hours in enemy land. Operation Raviv was a success.

Training commenced in June 1969, and it was nothing like any tank soldier had ever
known or could have imagined. The training was planned in advance specifically for
every raiding vehicle, while using current aerial photographs of every destination and
current intelligence on enemy presence. According to the plan, the tanks would block
the roads to the designated bases and destroy enemy armored vehicles or other serious
threats, while commandos on BTR-50s would raid the inner bases and annihilate as
many enemy soldiers as possible without stepping down from the vehicles. The raid was
designed to be fast and to cause mayhem—absolute clearing of enemy presence from
destinations was not necessary.
During training, they discovered a lot about their previously untested abilities. Tank
soldiers learned how to use the Soviet night-vision systems for night combat. This
technique had not been practiced by the Armored Corps until that point. Landing-ship
crews found out that they could use coral reefs to load tanks, thus opening up more
possibilities for an unplanned withdrawal if needed. Joint training and practicing using
a stopwatch enabled them to shorten to a minimum the time required for loading and
Extracted Images
from Operation Raviv
footage. Notice that the
Tiran tanks and BTR-50
APCs are painted in the
Egyptian yellowish-
white combat color.
disembarking tanks. However, the most important lesson was that joint operations were
possible—the navy could work together with the Armored Corps—water and steel were
a good combination after all.
The raiding party included a special, handpicked crew, composed of elite commandos,
tank soldiers and others. Lapidot, the most knowledgeable Tiran tank commander at the
time, was chosen to command the tanks in the operation.3 All vehicles were painted in
the Egyptian yellowish-white combat color and their registration plates were switched
to Arabic number plates like the number plates on the Egyptian army vehicles in that
3) As it happened, three of that raiding party would become commanders of the Tiran
tank division in the future: Lapidot, Baruch (Pinko) Harel—the commander of the raiding
party, and Ya’ir Nafshi—one of the BTR-50 commanders.

sector. The party was equipped with plenty of ammunition and explosives, enough to
cause real mayhem and even destroy the raiding tanks if necessary. The operation was
set for the night of the 8th of July.
Twenty minutes before the operation, Avraham Adan, the Armored Corps commander,
briefed the raiding party personally, and forgetting that most of that party were elite
infantry and from other special units, he said: “This raiding party is an armored force,
and the momentum of an armored force must be maintained. Only in this way, we shall
achieve the best possible outcome.” The Chief of the General staff Bar-Lev was also
there. He was worried that enemy tanks would intervene, and the raiding force would be
compromised by more than it could handle.
The operation began, with Bar-Lev carefully following its progress from a special war
room established near Ras Sedr in western Sinai. He was concerned that the Egyptians
would find out about the raid before the raiding party had even landed: What if the
plan was missing something and the soldiers would find themselves fighting a harder
battle than expected? However, as time
passed, things went mostly according
to plan—well and quietly. Close to noon,
about ten hours after the operation
started, Bar-Lev gave the order to stop
the operation and bring the soldiers
back—their achievements so far had
been excellent and sufficient.
The results were better than expected:
There were approximately 100 Egyptian
casualties, some 70 vehicles damaged, a
naval and an aerial radar were destroyed,
and 18 small guard posts, and a battalion-
sized base and a brigade-sized base
were raided and damaged. Meanwhile,
the air force destroyed a couple of SA-2
anti-air missile batteries in addition to
the 2 torpedo boats destroyed by the
navy in operation Escort. IDF casualties
amounted to 4: 3
naval commandoes
were killed while
destroying the
torpedo boats and
a Skyhawk pilot
and plane were
shot down. One
member of the
raiding unit was
injured.
As it happened,
there were
two, sweeter
developments:
one—Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s heart
attack a day after Operation Raviv, considered by some optimists as directly related to
the operation’s results, and two—the firing of Ahmad Ismail Ali, the Commander-in-Chief
of the Egyptian Army and Fouad Mohamed Abou Zikry, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy.
Successful as the operation was, it did not achieve a reduction of fire from across the
canal. The War of Attrition went on for almost a year after that, violence and aggression
increased and so did the number of casualties on both sides. However, it gave the IDF a
moral boost, a firm understanding of what could be done in a combined operation, and
moreover, it proved that the Tiran tanks were reliable.
Now it was clear what needed to be done: The low-grade second-line bastard tank was
perfect for amphibious warfare.

THE 274TH BRIGADE
A TIRAN BRIGADE
UP
until mid-1969, the IDF gained firm knowledge of and experience in using the
Tiran tanks, and so, the time was ripe to finally decide: Were they garbage, or
were they useful? This decision was taken by Chief of the General Staff Bar-
Lev at the end of June, after the conversion line was planned and ready, and the tank’s
potential was clear: “If we have 140 pieces of these, we should build a brigade,” he said.
This was an odd decision—the tanks were still regarded as second-line tanks, and the
shortage of ammunition and spare engines had not yet been solved. Building such a
brigade meant spending relatively more resources on those tanks for the unique training
and maintenance they required than on any other in service. Even if the 100-mm gun
were to be replaced with a standard 105-mm Sharir, thus solving the ammo problem,
they would still be second-line. However, the wheels had started turning for the bastard
tank, and the brigade idea was developed.
It was exactly one day after Operation Raviv when Bar-Lev’s decision was reevaluated. On
that day, a command to establish the Tiran Brigade was issued, defining the new brigade
as a special armored landing brigade. The IDF had never had such a unit. The engineers
and planners of that decision most probably did not realize its true meaning: Treating
one special operation’s success as a strategy meant giving the brigade complete air and
naval coverage, intelligence and other resources, just as it had been given in Operation
Raviv for it to fulfill its defined tasks. By this definition, the same tank brigade that had a
clear lack of ammunition and spare engines would become a top-of-the-line tactical task
force. Moreover, according to this plan, extremely valuable resources would be issued
to the Tiran Brigade during wartime when confronting an enemy in an unforeseeable
scenario. This definition also designated the Tiran tanks to the Sinai front, the most
probable battleground for their abilities. At the time, it all looked very promising: The IDF
had just developed a special tactic, a combat-tested ability, for the next skirmish against
its strongest enemy.

It was not just about supplying air and naval support. Everything about the brigade was
different. While most armored brigades included 70-100 tanks, this one would include
146. Other brigades were planned to be under the command of the same tank-model
divisions, and benefited from a unified maintenance and logistical array. This one was an
independent brigade, under direct command of the General Staff, with a division-scale
maintenance and logistical array of its own. On top of all that, all these abilities were
being invested in a reserve instead of a regular brigade, meaning lower operative skills
and performances—i.e., abnormality at its best.
THE FATHERS OF THE TIRAN
Yaakov Lapidot: The officer responsible

for the introduction of the Tiran tanks to
the Armored Corps and commander of
the Tiran tanks in Operation Raviv. After
Arkadi Timor: The IDF expert on the Yom Kippur War, he was appointed
Soviet tanks, the head of the Tiran tank commander of a Tiran Brigade and later
department in the Ordnance Corps. (MM) commanded the 440th Tiran Division.
(Yaakov Lapidot)
Yo’el Gonen: Head of the Department

for Water Transport in the Armored
Corps and a Tiran battalion commander.
The commander of the 274th Brigade in
Gideon Altshuler: Established and
the Yom Kippur War. Later on, he was
commanded the 274th Tiran Brigade
appointed the commander of the 440th
1969-1973. (Altshuler family)
Tiran Division. (Yo’el Gonen)
The conversion line started to work at full speed, and so did the personnel recruitment
process. The commander of this new brigade was Gideon Altshuler. He was the right man
for the job, with connections everywhere, and he knew exactly how to take advantage of
the system for his brigade’s needs. Drafting proved harder than for other brigades. Not

all personnel were mujiks, and on paper, large-bodied and tall soldiers were assigned
to crews of the spatially limited tank. Official IDF policy for such problems was that
the overweight should improve their diet and the tall should bend more, not exactly a
foolproof policy.
Converting the tanks also took more time than originally estimated. At first, in order
to preserve the better tanks in good condition for wartime, the brigade primarily used
the Tiran 4s and not the Tiran 5s. However, step by step, this extraordinary unit came
together and became operative. Right from the start, before there was an actual brigade,
the unit was given its first operational assignment: to establish two on-call tank units,
one in Sharm El Sheikh in Sinai, and the other in the southern city of Eilat. These units
were to be on call for special landing-related needs.
Map of the Israeli-Egyptian Coast Lines

1. Eilat: A reserve Tiran company (11 tanks) ready to be loaded onto a landing ship
within 12 hours. Eilat and Sharm El Sheikh were the naval bases for the landing ships
in the Sinai sector.
2. Sharm El Sheikh: A reserve tank company (crews and tanks) ready either to be
loaded onto landing ships or to fight in Sinai. Sharm El Sheikh became the primary
training facility for the Tiran Brigade, enabling training near desert, sea and
mountain terrain.
3. The Suez Canal.
4. Designated landing area in IDF plans.

From this point on, the brigade was an official part of the IDF’s order of battle. However,
it was not yet clear how to use its abilities properly. The “steel and water” strategy still
needed planning and rethinking, and more research and development were required. As
in Operation Raviv, the Department for Water Transport was one of the units responsible
for practicing that strategy, and what better unit to practice it with then the new Tiran
Brigade. And so it happened that the Tiran tanks took a significant part in most water
obstacle-related experiments.
The possibilities were endless and so were the creativity and imagination invested in this.
Like a good game of chess, if you use the right strategy to move the pawns, victory is
yours. However, unlike in chess, new pawns could be added and the game rules could be
changed. If tanks needed to raid Cairo, and crossing the Canal was not a good enough
way to get them there, why not take over an enemy port and unload entire tank brigades
from cargo ships. And if that wasn’t enough, the landing ships could also get involved.
Reality and fantasy were inseparable in those days, an important component of every
R&D process, but here the margins of error had a particularly high price, and it wasn’t
financial.
The department began testing the realistic probability that the ambitious plan would
work. Plenty of questions needed answers: Was a tank able to cross a newly developed
bridge laid over the Suez Canal, or would it sink? Which beaches were suitable for
landing? How many tanks could be loaded on a bridge or a raft, and what was the
optimal bridge size? The department’s people learned every aspect of these issues: deep
or shallow waters, wave height and length, tides, soil density and the slant of the beach.
A major part of this involved coordinating between the naval, combat engineering and
armored units and defining the exact details of the new combat tactics, and then testing
them, and retesting them. This was the starting point for the Suez Canal crossing in the
Yom Kippur War. The department also helped train a special amphibious unit based
on the BTR-50s and PT-76 light tanks called the White Bear, which was to establish a
bridgehead on the enemy’s coast before the Tiran tanks landed.
The key concept was to maximize the impact, size, firepower and readiness of the
armored response. The Tiran seemed promising, because according to every calculation,
smaller tanks meant more firepower, although they also involved more logistics. In the
southern Suez arena alone, the IDF was able to land 48 Tiran tanks and 25 APCs with
7 landing ships in a single round, and the entire Tiran Brigade in a couple of hours. This
may seem like a relatively small task force, but for an armored blow to the Egyptian
flank, it was sufficient. On top of that, the IDF added the 21 APCs and light tanks of the
White Bear amphibious unit, and additional tanks could cross with pontoon ferries or
other flotation devices. Tanks were even trained to shoot at enemy targets on beaches
while sailing on pontoon ferries.
A Tiran tank boarding a pontoon

ferry; in the background, a BTR-50 of
the White Bear unit. (Yo’el Gonen)

1969: Tank No. 109278 during water obstacle crossing training, most probably near the
Sea of Galilee. The officer directing the tank is Yo’el Gonen, the future commander of the
274th Tiran Brigade. Gonen was one of the experts on armored water obstacle crossings,
and served simultaneously as head of the Department for Water Transport and as a Tiran
battalion commander. (Yo’el Gonen)
Sinai: A Tiran
tank boarding
a pontoon
ferry. The tank
was loaded in
reverse for fast
redeployment in
a combat-ready
position. Notice
the Soviet mine
trawl system on
the right: This
was dismantled
from the tank
to its left and
could easily
be remounted.
(Amnon Tishler)

Joint Tiran and pontoon ferry training. This photograph demonstrates the complexity of the
training: The tanks were operated by the Armored Corps, the pontoon ferry by naval combat
engineering, and the escorting boat by the navy. This kind of joint training became common
after the Six Day War, particular in regard to the Tiran tanks. (Amnon Tishler)
Tiran and pontoon ferry training, most probably in Sinai. The tank is not combat ready and
perhaps after a long training session. (Amnon Tishler)

Alongside the preparations for the future was the deadly present. From Operation Raviv
to the ceasefire agreement in August 1970, “attrition” was a polite way to describe the
gruesome reality. While Operation Raviv was underway, the air force executed Operation
Boxer in order to destroy the SA-2 (also called C-75) SAM batteries in Egypt. After
annihilating the main Egyptian anti-air defense array, the skies opened for any Israeli
plans, in-land bombardments and air-to-air combat fights in the Cairo skies. Commando
raids on both sides became more frequent, while soldiers on the canal’s banks tuned
their ears to the unique sound of an artillery shell just fired from their enemy’s cannon,
knowing that within seconds or minutes it would land on them, shelter or no shelter.
Blood, steel fragments and explosives were mixed daily, reaping more sacrifices. And in
1970, the attrition spread from the southern front to almost every border.
The captured tanks played a very small part in that period of attrition. At the beginning
of 1970, the IDF considered invading a tank base in Syria with Tiran tank drivers in
order to steal a few additional tanks, but this crazy idea was canceled minutes before
execution. Another amphibious raid in the Bitter Lake was attempted in mid-1970 by
the White Bear unit. However, the vehicles sank in the mud on the lake’s banks, and
after extracting them, the operation was concluded. The main objective of the 274th
Tiran Brigade was to establish itself as fast as possible and to rapidly train tank crews to
board and disembark landing ships. An escalation was thought to be imminent, and the
Tiran Brigade would be needed. The first full-scale training exercise for the Tiran Brigade
was set for September 1970—exactly one year after the very start, incredibly fast for a
reserve brigade.
Despite all negative predictions, there was no escalation, but instead, a tense ceasefire
that came with a couple of its own surprises. One was another heart attack that ended
the glorious life of Israel’s prime nemesis, Gamal Abdel Nasser. His replacement, Anwar
Sadat, followed a similar approach to Israel. Less than a year after being appointed,
he declared his willingness to sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers in a ruthless and
savage battle to retrieve Sinai.
Another surprise was a direct outcome of Operation Boxer. Sometimes the total
destruction of a known threat leads to the fast rebuilding of a deadlier one. After
annihilating the Egyptian SA-2 array, Egypt pressured the USSR to expand its military
aid and supply SA-3 batteries, which reestablished Egyptian air control. As a result, Israel
lost the skies and some of the impact of its well-cultivated military ability. The IDF could
not accept this new disability: An effective air force was far too important to all future
planning. Though there was no immediate solution for the full extent of the problem, a
partial solution was to use long-range artillery to destroy some of the SA-3 batteries,
and thus to create a gap in the air shield in which the Israeli fighter planes and bombers
could maneuver. This raised a different problem: There was no long-range artillery in
the IDF to begin with, partly because the majority of the budget was invested in buying
additional aircraft and tanks.
The long-term solution was to order M107 (175-mm) self-propelled artillery guns from
the U.S., which started to arrive in 1971. In the meantime, an available substitute was to
use captured Soviet-made M-46 (130-mm) towed field guns and Tiran tanks instead. At
the time, the captured Soviet artillery had the longest firing range in IDF service and
captured ammunition was available, which made this both effective and cheap.
The more interesting element was the Tiran tanks. Using tanks to implement indirect
shooting techniques was not foreign to the IDF. In the mid-1960s, Israel was involved
in a border dispute over the Jordan River’s water sources (called the War over Water),
during which Israeli tanks shot indirect fire at Syrian tanks and engineering equipment
from distances as long as 11 kilometers, while a realistic maximal direct firing range was
2 to 3 kilometers. Seemingly unrelated to that, during the War of Attrition, the IDF also
transformed four captured Stalin tanks to stationary artillery in the northern Suez Canal
fortifications.
This turned out to be a much more complex challenge. In order to create affective fire
against a large SA-3 missile battery, 27 tanks had to shoot simultaneously from pre-set
firing positions using additional artillery and air support. The maximum range of the
tank (D-10 100-mm gun) was 16 kilometers. This range was achieved while shooting at a
45-degree angle. The technique was very hard to develop and needed the cooperation
of artillery officers, aerial firing corrections and meticulous inspection of the ammunition
and gun barrels—shooting with even a minor deviation meant missing the target. For

more than a year, one of the brigade’s battalions stationed in Sinai was trained for the
task, while alternatively it could have been used to block an Egyptian attack on Sinai. In
1972, the tanks were replaced with M107 SPGs, a much better tool with a longer range
and better accuracy. Like many other preexisting plans for war, this plan was never
actually executed. As for the Tiran tanks, it was pretty clear from the start that they were
not a perfect fit for the job, and that their future lays elsewhere.
Tank No. 109724 exiting a

landing ship: The flag on
the left marks the chosen
disembarking point. Choosing
the correct spot is very
important for both tanks and
ships, because once the landing
ship had reached the beach,
changing the location could
take hours. (Amnon Tishler)

Seven Tiran tanks on a
60-meter landing ship.
Landing-ship training became
a significant part of training for
the Tiran tanks crews. Notice
that all personnel are wearing
life jackets—non-standard
equipment for tank soldiers.
(Amnon Tishler)

A Tiran tank equipped with a mounted mine trawl
device exiting the Bat Sheva landing ship. This ship was
purchased after the Six Day War and was capable of
transporting 18 Tiran tanks and 22 APCs. (Mike Eldar)

WATER AND STEEL
- PICTURES OF TIRAN
TRAINING FOR
AMPHIBIOUS
WARFARE
T
hese pictures show the IDF’s efforts to develop a tactical flank maneuver task
force in the Gulf of Suez, also called Green Light. For six years (1967-1973), the
IDF developed different methods for crossing water obstacles and introduced the
Armored Corps to a new field. The Tiran tanks were to be a part of this task force, which
would cross the Gulf of Suez, move north, and attack the Egyptian flank near the city of
Suez, south of where most of the fighting was planned to occur. Notice that all the tanks
are equipped with an 105-mm Sharir gun, which dates the pictures after 1972, the year
the conversion process began.
An M113 Zelda APC after disembarking from

the Bat Sheva landing ship, the biggest of
its kind in IDF service. (Mike Eldar)

Two BTR-50s and two Tiran tanks boarding the Bat Sheva.
The light vehicles were loaded to the upper platform (notice
that the ramp is down), and the tanks to the ship’s hull. All the
vehicles are facing forward for fast redeployment in a combat-
ready position. (Mike Eldar)

Tiran tanks and a
60-meter landing
ship. This ship
could carry eight
Tiran tanks. (Mike
Eldar)

Tiran tanks and the Bat Sheva. Here you
have two types of beaches for landing
in the Gulf of Suez—coral and sand. Until
Operation Raviv, coral beaches were
considered dangerous for landing tanks.
However, training proved them to be an
option, which opened up new possibilities
and improved planning. (Mike Eldar)

Two Tiran tanks, two BTR-50s and a PT-
76 light tank waiting to be loaded onto a
landing ship. Notice that the tank soldiers
are facing the rear—loading was done in
reverse. (Mike Eldar)
A Tiran 5 entering one of the landing ships

near Sharm El-Sheikh. (Mike Eldar)

A 60-meter landing ship, a
Tiran tank and a PT-76 light
tank. During training, the
IDF tried all the possible
combinations of loading
different kinds of vehicles
onto the ships, primarily
Tiran and BTR-50 but also
Magach and Shot tanks,
M3 halftracks, mobilized
artillery and others. (Mike
Eldar)

A Patton-based bridge tank and two Tiran tanks on
a pontoon ferry. For a mission such as Green Light,
combat engineering equipment was also necessary
and its use was practiced in trainings. The soldier
on the pontoon is directing the bridge tank to
board. (Mike Eldar)
A large-scale training exercise: Five landing

ships and a pontoon ferry unloading Tiran tanks
simultaneously. Disembarking was planned after
conquering the beach by the White Bear unit,
equipped with BTR-50 and PT-76, which are also
evident in the photograph. (Mike Eldar)

The southeastern Sinai
coast: During training,
the tanks also practiced
disembarking in shallow
waters, which sometimes
lead to water leaking into
the driver’s compartment.
(Mike Eldar)

PLANS FOR
AN ODD FUTURE
By
the end of 1971, the Tiran Brigade was operational and functioning. Four
battalions were well established, one stationed in Sharm El Sheikh and three
in the south of Israel. As a reserve unit, the brigade was mostly inactive—the
tanks were kept in storage facilities and only a handful of tank crews were in active
service, training and doing guard duty in Sinai. This dormant level of activity was shared
by the bulk of the Israeli army. In the early 1970s, most of the immediate security threats
did not require tanks but rather patrol vehicles and terror specialists. Israel slowly
lowered its guard, and some of the border posts were left unmanned, the same posts
designed to block the Egyptians on the banks of the canal. War was sure to break out,
even though Israel believed that the Egyptians would not initiate it unless they were
equipped with long-range tactical ballistic missiles and advanced fighter planes. Israel
also believed that Syria would never engage in war with Israel without Egypt, and thus,
the perception was that war was safely in the distance on both fronts.
However quiet the fronts were, the Tiran preserved its unique status and continued its
irregular activity. In the beginning of 1972, the IDF decided to upgrade the tank’s gun to
a 105-mm Sharir. Of the two main deficiencies that remained problematic (the shortage
of spare engines and ammunition), this was the easiest and cheapest to fix. The Sharir
conversion had eliminated the gunner’s night-vision sight. At that time, this system did
not seem very important because no other IDF tank had such sights. The overall lack of
night-vision systems would later turn out to be a major disadvantage for the IDF during
the Yom Kippur War on both the Syrian and Egyptian fronts.
Still, at that point both the ammo and engine shortage problems were partly solved
by purchasing from satellite countries of the Eastern Bloc such as Romania. The same

(V-55 V-12 580 hp) engine was being used in a variety of Soviet-made machinery, and
this allowed Israel to buy “agricultural equipment” without raising suspicion. Now, this
upgrade seemingly offered standardization and a small improvement of the tank’s
firepower. The problem was that the improved tank was still considered second-line, and
many were of the opinion that investing additional resources in such a tank was wasteful.
It was well known that the future of the IDF was in Magach and Shot tanks, or in others,
and the Tiran tanks were not intended for prolonged service. The same question of
investing resources in old or semi-suitable equipment was very common in the IDF, and
would remain relevant in every decision regarding the Tiran tanks in the future. However,
in 1972, other benefits were gained from the bastard, ones that were unrelated to regular
tank combat, and not necessarily obvious or foreseeable.
While the tanks were gradually being modified, the IDF established a regular service
company to train the reserve soldiers in tank warfare and the new gunnery techniques.
The regular Tiran company helped in joint training with the navy and improved emergency
readiness in Sinai. On the navy’s part, landing-ship captains were trained in tank and
APC driving. In addition, a special combat engineering battalion was established, one
that specialized in water obstacles. From the end of 1972, this kind of training became
more frequent and closely followed the main attack plans for wartime.
The two main offensive plans involving Tiran tanks were Red Light and Swamp Cat. Red
Light followed Operation Raviv’s tactics. The plan was to land infantry and tanks (Tiran
and others) on the western bank of the Gulf of Suez, forcing the Egyptians to split their

force in order to deal with the new threat from the south. The alternative, Swamp Cat,
was the southern command’s main offensive plan and it involved crossing the Suez
Canal with three tank divisions that would charge the bulk of the Egyptian army in a
direct confrontation. The Tiran units also appeared in other defense plans, which were
needed if the Egyptians initiated the war. In that case, the relative advantage of some of
the Tiran tanks was that one of the brigade’s battalions was stationed in Sinai and could
be deployed relatively fast. All plans were subject to changes and reevaluation during
that tense period, but the idea of a large-scale tank raid remained important, and was
seen as having a royal flush in the next match with Egypt.
A Foreign Tank for a Foreign Assignment

Aside from local disputes and intrigues, the Tiran tank also proved valuable for a special
training operation involving strategical ties between Israel and the Kurdish Peshmerga
militia in northern Iraq. In the mid-1960s, Israel began to support and train the Peshmerga
militia in its fight against Iraq. This was a clear case of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”
and part of an Israeli attempt to form alliances with non-Arab partners in the Middle
East and Africa. The majority of the weapons supplied to the
Kurds were Soviet made, captured in Israel’s wars, and similar
to the Iraqi arsenal, thus hiding Israeli (and also Iranian and later
American) involvement in the region. Israeli support proved to
be very important in the fight against the common Iraqi enemy.
With guidance, training and weapons shipments, the Kurdish
guerrilla raids became deadlier and more affective.
At some point, Israeli military advisors developed a plan to train
the Kurds on T-34 tanks for a special mega-operation, in which
the Peshmerga would overtake a company of Iraqi T-34 tanks.
Giving tanks to mountain militia soldiers was not easy. The
Kurds were excellent snipers when using old (Zbrojovka Brno)
vz. 24 rifles, but operating heavy machinery in open battle was a
whole different ballgame. This involved meticulous planning and
the approval of Iran, Israel’s main partner in the region. At that
time, the Kurds did not have any knowledge of tank warfare,
and Israel did not possess any T-34s in operational condition.
However, operating a T-54/5 (100-mm) was not very different,
and the remote Tiran training facility in Sharm El Sheikh was an
optimal place for training them in secret.
In November 1972, before training began, Gideon Altshuler,
the 274th Tiran Brigade commander, travelled to northern Iraq
to select the right Peshmerga soldiers to be trained in Israel,
approximately 60 soldiers in total. This was not a regular task for
a tank brigade commander, and involved an escort of Mossad
agents and a Kurdish disguise. The next task was to compose
an Israeli team of Arabic/Kurdish speakers who also needed to
know by heart how to operate a Tiran. This team translated all
the technical data and training manuals into Arabic. This would
not be the last time the IDF issued training manuals on Soviet
tanks in Arabic.
Training started, and the instructors did their best to adjust and
teach the combat techniques to the Kurds in a special Kurdish/
Arabic technical language that evolved during training. The
Kurds were highly motivated but were not actual soldiers. When
instructed to wash dishes or clean the toilets, they claimed
this was not a task fitting for a self-respecting male Kurd and
stubbornly refused. However, after a threat of ending the course
and some creative persuasion, they backed down and the course
continued as planned, with reasonable hygiene and a lemony
scent. After several weeks of intense training, this unique course
ended in a successful tank company display before several
IDF generals and the head of the Mossad. Further training was
planned to continue in northern Iraq, but that never happened:

The ambitious plan was never executed and Israel’s involvement in the region ended
abruptly. It would take some 20 more years before Israel’s involvement in northern Iraq
would be revealed in part to the Israeli public.
From the very birth of the Tiran Brigade in September 1969, its existence was hidden
by a thick cloud of secrecy. Altshuler made sure that whenever tanks were transferred
from storage facilities to maintenance or training, they would be covered by canvas
and the brigade’s soldiers were instructed to keep details of their exact military service
secret. After three years, in October 1972, the IDF finally presented the converted Tiran
tank to the public. Journalists were invited to a special weapon’s display to witness
the “new” Israeli Soviet tank shooting and maneuvering. At the time, the new Sharir
105-mm gun addition was still secret. Showing the tank to the public was an obvious
show of technological and military capabilities and fortitude, a frequent component
of propaganda during wartime. However, in the Tiran’s case, it is not clear why it was
considered such a big secret to begin with. The Egyptians and Syrians knew exactly
how many tanks were left behind in the war, Israel had already shown the world the
tanks driving in the Independence Day parade in 1968, and they had given the Egyptians
Preparations for the

1973 Independence Day
parade in Jerusalem:
This was the first time
Tiran 4/5 Sharir tanks
were shown to the
public. (Shlomo Harel)

another, closer demonstration a year later in Operation Raviv. Apparently, the reason
was related to the secrecy of the special tactical maneuvers planned (Red Light or
others), involving both Tiran tanks and landing ships. However, there is no doubt that
Egypt knew of these abilities and their potential, especially after bombing one of the
Israeli landing ships in the Gulf of Eilat in February 1970. In any case, secrecy always
made military projects seem more important, and so it remained.
October 1972: Pictures of a special tank show for journalists, introducing the “new” Soviet/Israeli tanks.
This was the first official occasion that the Tiran was presented as a combat-ready part of the IDF
Armored Corps. At that time, the Sharir conversion was still secret. (Moshe Milner, GPO)

The winds of war started to blow again in April 1973, after intelligence indicated the
possibility of war breaking out in May, raising the IDF’s state of alert. The IDF revised
its military plans, most of which did not take into proper consideration that Israel had
lost most of its aerial maneuverability and was clearly inferior in both artillery and anti-
air weaponry. Israel’s tactic was still based on the lessons of the previous war and its
weaponry, while at the same time, the two main advantages of the IDF—the Armored
Corps and air force—were being targeted by Egypt and Syria and their Soviet advisors.
After gaining Sinai in the Six Day War, the national appetite had grown. Israel was now
thinking of taking the Morgan oil field on the west bank of the Gulf of Suez. In the eyes
of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, this could potentially change Israel’s dependence on
the Persian Gulf for its oil supply or be an excellent bargaining chip for the next post-war
round of diplomacy. Could Israel actually use the enemy’s resources as its own? Reality
and euphoria gave different answers.
This new goal was added to Red Light, the only relevant plan that included operating
on the west side of the Gulf of Suez. The new name for this special maneuver was Green
Light, and for its execution, the IDF started to establish a new division (the 440th Division,
the future Tiran Division), which was made responsible for carrying it out. Green Light
also included the additional possibility of using the task force to immediately attack
northward, toward the Suez Canal, and charge the Egyptian southern flank. The Tiran
tank brigade was not the only unit assigned to this mission, there were others: armored,
infantry, navy and air force.
However, this task force was partly paradoxical: The small IDF was not likely to pull off
such a mission while conducting another large-scale maneuver during war time. Green
Light required a special force (tanks, infantry and others) to be kept in reserve, waiting
for a “green light” to go ahead. And although, during wartime, keeping a considerable
force in reserve for different purposes is important, it could also become an unnecessary
burden. Those soldiers could also be valuable for engaging an effective attack or defense,
especially if war broke out on two fronts. Could Green Light take place? Allegedly,
according to the generals at the time—yes. However, in the retrospective view of modern
historians…doubtfully.
The threat of an Egyptian attack was taken lightly. The assumption was that they would
be blocked just like before, and that Israel would have the upper hand. The IDF also
assumed that if the war was initiated by the enemy, there would be enough time to
organize a proper response. After May 1973 went by, and war had not in fact erupted, it
seemed as if a small boy or an over enthusiastic general had cried wolf, which manifested
in the mass recruit of reserve soldiers and preparations. Again, war seemed improbable
and perhaps far in the distance.
In the tense atmosphere of May 1973, the Tiran was scheduled for another public
appearance in the Independence Day parade, celebrating 25 years for the Jewish state.
During the preparations, there were loud arguments about the Tiran’s ability to maneuver
through the narrow streets of Jerusalem. The tank had gained a bad reputation for
its difficult steering, gear changing and breaking, which could occasionally outmatch
experienced tank drivers. Nevertheless, the tank, in its 105-mm configuration, shiny after
being anointed with diesel fuel, drove through the capital’s streets alongside the new
Patton M60 tank. One Tiran tank did break down during the parade, but it could not ruin
the day’s boost of patriotism and trust in the state’s security.
A few weeks after the parade, a special and long training session started, involving the
majority of military units that would participate in Green Light. This training session
concluded some three years of preparations and army buildup and was intended to
demonstrate as closely as possible the beginning of the tactical maneuver in the Gulf of
Suez. Three basic abilities were tested and practiced: using landing ships and pontoon
ferries to mobilize tanks to enemy shores; conquering an enemy shore with the White
Bear amphibious unit; and a battalion-scale infantry and armored attack after landing.
The training session finished with a big and successful exercise near Sharm El Sheikh
before the IDF General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and others. After the drill ended,
Chief of the General Staff David Dado Elazar congratulated Altshuler personally for the
good show and excellent job on building the brigade. Altshuler was reassigned, and
another officer was given command over the combat-ready brigade. His name was Yoel
Gonen, one of the Tiran battalion commanders, a former commander of the Department
for Water Transport, and the brother of the commander of the southern command. He

knew the Tiran tanks perfectly, he was familiar with the brigade’s staff and soldiers and
was a tough, uncompromising tank officer. The brigade could not have been in better
hands.
Summer was at its end, and the new Hebrew year was approaching. The IDF could see
clearly that additional Syrian units were being deployed near the northern border, and
that at the same time, Egypt was preparing for a large-scale exercise in eastern Egypt.
Precautions were taken, but less than before: Crying wolf again would not be taken
seriously. The alarming news of field soldiers who noticed the enemy’s readiness did
not turn on enough flashing red lights. This was not considered the right time for war
by Israeli intelligence: That reality simply did not fit their well-based theory, later called
“The Conception” in a public inquiry. At that time, in September 1973, 120 of the 146
Tiran tanks were operational. This was slightly more than one-twentieth of the IDF’s
tank fleet. Except for one non-operational tank company with 11 tanks, all the Tiran tanks
were converted to the Sharir gun. The brigade was relatively ready, the tanks were in
storage, the soldiers trained and prepared for fast reserve drafting, and the brigade’s
headquarters and battalions were ready and in the hands of experienced commanders.
October came fast, and so did Yom Kippur—the most sacred of Jewish holy days: a day
of repent, remorse and reconciliation.
On that day, the 6th of October,
All hell broke loose,
War.
Sinai, 1973: Tiran tanks

transported by a pontoon
ferry. The pontoon ferry was
composed of several Unifloat
pontoons (that were filled
with Styrofoam) connected
together, with several engines,
control cabins and a ramp.
The ferry was operated
by a special naval combat
engineering unit. (Mike Eldar)

Sinai, 1973: Tiran tanks being unloaded from a pontoon ferry on the beach of Sharm El Sheikh during
the May-August training session. (Mike Eldar)

Sinai, 1973: In this
photograph, the
tanks are practicing
firing from the sea
at targets on the
beach while sailing.
This technique
was examined for
conquering the beach
before the landing
ships unloaded the
main tank force, in
Operation Green
Light. (Mike Eldar)
Sinai, 1973: All

aboard! Tiran tanks
boarding the Bat
Sheva landing ship
during the May-
August training
session. (Altshuler
family)

Sinai, 1973: A Tiran
tank, desert and sand.
(Altshuler family)

Sinai: Tank training.
(Altshuler family)
Sharm El Sheikh: Avraham

(Bren) Adan, Armored Corps
Commander (left), observing a
Tiran tank disembarking from a
landing ship. (YLA)

About the author:
Ma’or Levy
was a Merkava Mk.2 tank commander in
the IDF. During his mandatory service, he
began to research the stories and secrets
of the Israeli Armored Corps. Now, as a
doctoral student of Israeli military history
at the Hebrew University, he researches the
service of captured tanks in the IDF. Ma’or
also worked in the Yad La’shiryon Armored
Corps Museum and Memorial Site as the
manager of the library and data center. This
is his second book in English, published as
part of Abteilung 502’s Captured Vehicles
in IDF Service series. The previous book is
entitled T-34 and the IDF: The Untold Story
(2018). In addition, he has coedited two
books in Hebrew: a heritage book about the
7th Armored Brigade and a book about the
Israeli Military Police. Ma’or lives in Modi’in,
is married to Inbal and has three children:
Yehonatan, Itamar and Gid’on Ori.

T-54/5 to IDF
Tiran 4/5:
The Birth of
In the Six Day War, some 860 enemy tanks were captured
a Bastard Tank by the IDF, including some 280 T-54/5 tanks. Within a few
years, 146 of them were introduced into service as Tiran 4/5. This book tells their
story, a story of the only army that introduced a great number of enemy tanks into
prolonged service. The Tiran tank did not really suit the IDF’s needs. It was in many
ways a bastard tank. However, the IDF creatively tried to take advantage of all that
it had to offer. It was used like no other tank—as a low-grade “bonus” reserve tank
unit for wartime, as a mine-clearing tank, as a unique tool for special operations, and
as an artillery cannon designated for destroying SA-3 anti-air missile batteries. After
many alterations, the tanks were eventually incorporated in a Tiran 4/5 brigade, as
part of a special tactical task force designed to conduct an armored maneuver in the
Egyptian flank.
Abteilung 502 and Desert Eagle Publishing presents the Captured Vehicles in IDF
Service Series. A new series for those who build models, love tanks and like history.
The series focuses on the widespread and unique use the IDF made of tanks and
armored vehicles captured in Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbors. The series is
based on academic research, official IDF documentation, and interviews conducted
with soldiers and officers who used these vehicles in real time.
Vol.1 Review
T-34 Tank and the IDF: the Untold Story
“What really got my attention was the line
right below the title: “Captured Vehicles in IDF
Series, Volume 1.” Think of all the serious hard-
ware the IDF captured, some they put into ser-
vice, others they took out to the desert and
shot full of holes to find out the best way of
shooting them full of holes.”
“…I picked up a copy as soon as they came in
and was immediately impressed. This is a high
quality and well-researched book with out-
standing color and black and white photos,
most I had never seen before… Even though
I’m not a big T-34 fan, I found this book ex-
cellent and full of useful information and I got
some inspiration for several future projects. I’m
also very excited about what the future vol-
umes will cover.”
Glen Broman
(5.10.2018 - http://lastcavalry.com)

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T-54/5

TO IDF TIRAN 4/5:

Author: Ma’or Levy

An Unplanned Treasure at the End of the Six Day War 8

“This Might Be One of Our Best” 18

Potential, Deficiencies and Modifications 29

Pictures from the Conversion Line (1968-1973) 34

Mine Sweeping, the “Bonus” and Special Operations 41

The 274th Brigade—a Tiran Brigade 54

Water and Steel— pictures of Tiran Training for Amphibious Warfare 64

Plans for an Odd Future 74

THEREFORE, WHEN IN CHARIOT FIGHTING, MORE THAN TEN CHARIOTS ARE

6 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 7

8 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 9

Sinai, June 1967:

Sinai, June 1967:

10 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

June 1967: An Egyptian

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 11

June 1967: A Czechoslovak-built

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T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 13

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T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 15

16 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 17

18 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

Sinai, June 1967:

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 19

Identification page from a tank

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This tank commander’s

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22 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

Bethlehem, 1967: Captured Jordanian Centurion tanks

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 23

24 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 25

Sinai, July 1967: An

Sinai, June 1967: An

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Golan Heights, June 1967: Soldiers of

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 27

28 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

Sketches of Tiran tank firing positions

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 29

30 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

Field ~150 240 ~250 260 ~390 290 (T-54A)

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 31

• The PKT (7.62-mm) and DShK (12.7-mm) machine guns were

32 T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5

Nitzanim training ground, 1967: A live display of

T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 33

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T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 35

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T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 37

The 105-mm Sharir gun attached to the

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T-54/5 TO IDF TIRAN 4/5 39

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