FOURTH QUARTER FORECAST

Oct. 13, 2010

This analysis may not be forwarded or republished without express permission from STRATFOR.
For permission, please submit a request to PR@stratfor.com.

STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com
Fourth Quarter Forecast
2010
The U.S. preparation to disengage from
Iraq and Afghanistan will remain the
international system’s center of gravity in
the fourth quarter. This includes the United
States and Iran working together in Iraq.
In recent weeks, there have been signs
that Washington and Tehran are reaching a
sort of compromise, or at least removing
their strongest objections, to allow or encourage the Iraqi factions to settle their differences and end
the political stalemate that has held since the March elections. The United States is still a long way
from leaving Iraq completely, but both Washington and Tehran want to see U.S. forces largely out of
Iraq. With Washington focusing more on Afghanistan, there is room for tacit understandings on the
Iraq issue.

In Afghanistan, things are not as clear-cut (not that they are simple in Iraq). Though the current party
line from U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration is that the strategy needs to be given time to
work, the review of the efficacy of current efforts due at the end of the year is already being prepared.
Amid the reviews and assessments, it is growing increasingly clear that in Afghanistan, there is no real
“victory” to be had, and the question is just how much needs to be accomplished before U.S. forces
can withdraw. The biggest complication for the United States in Afghanistan is Pakistan. Islamabad has
shown Washington what it can do if pushed, briefly shutting down the single most important U.S.
supply line into Afghanistan from Sept. 30 to Oct. 10. Pakistan has always been a concern in the
Afghanistan campaign; geography has left Washington heavily dependent on Pakistan for supply
routes into Afghanistan, yet the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is no more substantial than
the ink line on a map, and the fight clearly crosses borders. The supply line is not the only leverage
Pakistan has; it also holds the intelligence flow and relationships with the Taliban that are so vital to
Washington’s exit strategy planning. The United States will be forced once again this quarter to
balance the reality that Pakistan is both a necessary ally in the war in Afghanistan and a battlefield in
its own right.

The acceleration of U.S. preparations to pull out of its two long-running conflicts, and Washington’s
brief introversion and protectionist rhetoric that will surround the November elections, will shape two
other global trends this quarter. Russia will strengthen its influence over former Soviet republics
Belarus, Ukraine and the Central Asian “Stans” while reaching into Moldova and the Baltics to extend
its influence along the European frontier. Moscow sees a limited time for its efforts to integrate and
consolidate its position — not only because the United States’ focus on the Middle East and South Asia
is decreasing but also because of Russia’s next elections. Russia’s increasing focus on the Baltics will
test Moscow’s ties with Germany and Poland, while the attention on Moldova will trigger Central
European states like Romania to turn more actively toward the United States, but it is not clear how
much attention, at least in this quarter, Washington can spare.

Where U.S. distraction and the sense of a closing window of opportunity will clash the most is in
Washington’s relations with China. China is often the focus of U.S. domestic politics, particularly during
times of economic trouble, and the upcoming election is no different. China’s yuan policy is the most
obvious target, but while Washington is unlikely to carry out any action that will fundamentally harm
economic ties with Beijing, the political perception of actions could have a more immediate impact. As
Beijing manages U.S. economic pressures and rhetoric, it also fears that Washington is starting to
break free from its conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan enough to set its sights on the Asia-Pacific region.
Like Russia, China is seeking to expand and consolidate its influence globally, especially in its near
abroad. In accelerating these actions, it is raising tensions not only with its smaller Southeast Asian

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

neighbors, but also with U.S. allies like Japan and India. Much like the Central Europeans, the
Southeast Asian states will be looking to the United States to counterbalance China.

At the center remains the United States. Major powers like Russia and China, which have been
watching closely the U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, once again see their opportunities to
expand their influence diminishing — due to not only U.S. actions but also their own domestic political
deadlines. In this quarter, Washington will be both preoccupied with the Congressional elections and
seeking ways to compromise enough to get out of its long-running wars. The election distraction gives
China and Russia a brief opening, and neither is likely to pass up the opportunity to accelerate and
consolidate its influence in its near abroad.

Global Trends
Global Trend: The U.S.-Iranian Struggle in Iraq

Washington and Tehran continue to challenge one another over the future of Iraq, and ultimately over
the balance of power in the Middle East. This sparring will continue in the fourth quarter, with one
rather significant exception: Washington and Tehran are likely to reach a preliminary agreement on
the factional balance in Baghdad, with a new power-sharing government for Iraq emerging. Though
this sets the stage for a broader understanding between the United States and Iran, significant
movement toward a regional balance of power will remain a work in progress. But the U.S.-Iranian
competition is also spreading beyond Iraq. Washington is working with Saudi Arabia and other Arab
allies to try and wean Syria from Iranian influence and further isolate Tehran regionally. This centers
on Lebanon, and thus also requires Israeli cooperation. It has also drawn the United States back into
its position as the broker of Middle East peace talks, but substantial progress is unlikely in this quarter.

Global Trend: The War in Afghanistan

While anxiety and tensions appear to be mounting within the U.S. administration about the efficacy of
the counterinsurgency-focused strategy being pursued in Afghanistan, no major strategic shift is likely
to occur before the strategy review being prepared for the end of the year is completed. Tactical
evolutions and shifts can be expected as each side adapts to the other, but with the U.S.-led campaign
now focusing its efforts in southwest Afghanistan, operations there can be expected to largely continue
apace despite the winter months ahead.

Global Trend: The Russian Resurgence

Russia will continue in the fourth quarter to consolidate gains made in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus
and Kyrgyzstan. Russian actions in the Central Asian states, and the deployment of additional Russian
troops to the region, will be complicated by elections in Kyrgyzstan, security crackdowns and the
potential return of Islamist militancy in Tajikistan, and U.S. maneuvering related to the war in
Afghanistan.

Moscow will also assert itself in Moldova and the Baltics to prepare the ground for the future expansion
of Russian influence there. The elections in Latvia in October, in which a pro-Russian party gained the
second-highest number of parliamentary seats, and Moldova in November represent opportunities for
Russian influence to increase. Russia’s resurgence in Moldova and the Baltics will begin rippling
through the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, leading those states to reach out to the United States
or European heavyweights for support. Russia’s maneuverings will also test the limits of the Berlin-
Moscow axis as Russia looks for a way to balance its resurgence plans with its need to maintain its
relationship with Germany. Moscow’s long history with Berlin gives it a firm understanding of what
Germany needs as well as how to leverage the European power for its own purposes, and although
some strains will show, neither country is willing to abandon their association.

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

Germany wants to show Russia that it is a reliable security partner so that it can tell its fellow
members of the European Union that it can control, or at least manage, Moscow — and Berlin has
chosen the Moldovan breakaway republic of Transdniestria as the testing ground for potential
cooperation. The question is how much cooperation Berlin wants or even really expects from Moscow.
With its sights on reinforcing its leadership in Europe, Berlin will not look for a break in its ties with
Russia, but it will back off from pitching the Russian-proposed European Security Treaty to its fellow
EU member states if Moscow does not give it something it can claim as a success on Transdniestria.

Global Trend: U.S.-Chinese Tensions

Friction will continue between China and the United States over economic policies, Washington’s
strengthening ties with allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region and Beijing’s increasing
assertiveness in its periphery. However, the two countries will prevent their relationship from
fundamentally breaking down this quarter. Washington will threaten to take actions on the yuan,
either with its own tools (such as a U.S. Treasury Department report on currency manipulation) or
through international channels (such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade
Organization), but will refrain from doing anything against the yuan that has a direct, immediate and
tangible effect on trade in the fourth quarter. Instead it will reserve concrete retaliatory action for
disputes on specific goods on a case-by-case basis.

The Global Economy

The vast stimulus packages that countries launched during the economic crisis are starting to be
scaled back and phased out. There is no sudden cut in public spending, but the pump priming is not
sustainable indefinitely. There are signs of growth, albeit uneven, around the world, and while it is far
from spectacular and strong concerns remain that the apparent recovery will not last long, there is a
tenuous stability globally. Two areas where this could become unhinged in the quarter are Europe and
U.S.-China relations. Europe is shifting its attention from Greece and Spain to Ireland and Portugal,
countries that will prove less cantankerous politically and thus easier for Germany and the Europeans
to manage. If the regional management falls short, however, there is a small chance that Europe could
fall back into financial crisis — something that would ripple outward. We do not foresee this
happening, however, and expect the combined effects of European Central Bank operations and the
reassurance of the 440 billion euro ($615 billion) European Financial Stability Fund to make the fourth
quarter far less dramatic than the second quarter.

Although Washington appears more ready to take measures against China regarding the yuan, in this
quarter it will not carry out measures that do anything much more than require additional talks, at
least in the near term. Should the White House suddenly feel pressured to take more concrete action
that fundamentally affects trade, the system could come unhinged quickly. While that is highly unlikely
at the moment, there is growing pressure inside Washington for more substantial action against China.

Former Soviet Union

Regional Trend: The Kremlin Wars

The battle inside the Kremlin will intensify

in the fourth quarter as the tandem of
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin begins to
purge high-level Russian figures and the
campaign season leading up to the 2011
legislative and 2012 presidential elections
starts. Such political reorganizations tend
to become dangerous for those in charge,
4

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

but Putin and Medvedev know it is the only way to make the government more secure and effective as
the country modernizes at home and resurges abroad.

South Asia
Regional Trend: A Destabilizing
Pakistan

Islamabad will continue working with

Washington in the counterinsurgency
offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda-led
transnational jihadists, but tensions have
become evident (for example, in the
temporary disruption of U.S. supply lines
through Pakistan to Afghanistan). Recovery
from the massive floods that took place in
the third quarter will consume most of the Pakistani state’s focus in the fourth quarter. The aftermath
of the flooding and U.S. military activity in Pakistani territory are bringing tensions between Pakistan’s
civilian and military leadership to a head. The Pakistani military will face a major test as it attempts to
manage militants, deflect public displeasure at U.S. cross-border operations and avoid becoming the
scapegoat for the slow or failing relief efforts in flood-stricken areas.

Pakistani relations with India are unlikely to improve and could worsen in the fourth quarter. Pakistan-
based transnational Islamist militants have several opportunities for attacks; for example, they could
exploit the unrest in Kashmir to fuel anger against India and make the environment more amenable to
attacks. This threat shapes India’s behavior. New Delhi is also raising concerns about increased
Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan, and will use the perception of a Chinese threat to work
more closely with the United States in hopes of influencing Washington’s policy on issues like Pakistan
and its militant links. Such dialogue will be highlighted during U.S. President Barack Obama’s planned
November visit to India. It is unlikely that Beijing will expand its footprint in Pakistan so significantly
that India feels sufficiently threatened to take action, but India’s awareness of the Chinese moves
could further complicate Washington’s already difficult task of balancing between the two competing
South Asian states.

Middle East
Regional Trend: Turkey’s Resurgence

Domestically, the Justice and Development

Party government will focus on
consolidating the gains it made with the
referendum on constitutional changes
approved in September. Externally, Ankara
will continue working on repairing and
improving ties with the United States. The
unilateral cease-fire declared by the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebel group
will last at least one more month, though minor clashes could occur. Whether this cease-fire will last
longer will depend on the government’s talks with Kurdish elements in Turkey and in Iraq (to get their
support against the PKK) and intensified back-channel negotiations with PKK leadership. Such talks
would deprive the Turkish army and its allies in Turkey’s judiciary of their best tool to undermine the
ruling party’s clout: the national security issue. The military has long claimed it is the institution best
equipped to deal with the PKK threat, and there is a chance the military will take action to disrupt or
complicate the talks between the government and the Kurdish rebels.

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

Regional Trend: Egypt in Transition

With the Egyptian parliamentary election nearing, opposition forces will try to challenge Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak’s regime by gaining publicity. But the real political contest in Egypt will not be
played out in these parliamentary elections, in which Mubarak's National Democratic Party will emerge
victorious. The bigger competition is playing out between Mubarak and his allies and the army’s top
brass over a presidential succession plan. Under Mubarak’s succession plan, the president would run
for another term, then hand power to Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman (who likely would
become vice president). At a later point, Suleiman would hand control to Mubarak’s son, Gamal. The
preparations toward this end will continue this quarter, and may include quiet and careful attempts by
the president to stem army opposition to his succession plans. Nonetheless, the Egyptian army’s
growing clout in politics is a trend that will transcend the quarter and is one that the ailing president
will unlikely be able to reverse.

East Asia
Regional Trend: China’s Assertive
Foreign Policy

China will continue showing a strong sense

of purpose in pursuing its interests in its
periphery. These issues include China’s
relations with Japan, in which tensions that
recently spiked will be containable but not
eradicable this quarter, and Beijing’s
attempts to tighten bonds and undermine U.S. overtures in Southeast Asia. China will also continue
building its relationship with Pakistan and make inroads into other South Asian states, such as Nepal.
China’s expanding regional influence is generating resistance among China’s neighbors, especially
Japan and India. The fourth quarter will see the beginnings of greater coordination between those
neighbors, and with the United States, on this issue.

Regional Trend: China’s Domestic Economy

China will announce economic plans that target slightly slower growth rates in the coming years,
based on its expectations of global conditions and desire to continue with structural reforms (in real
estate regulation, energy efficiency, regional development and other areas). It will also look to its
political future, especially the transition of power in 2012. However, Beijing will continue its active
fiscal stimulus and relatively loose monetary policies amid concerns of slowing growth too quickly, with
the intention of carrying out those structural reforms in a way that will limit the associated negative
effects on growth and social stability.

Regional Trend: North Korea’s Leadership

The Korean Peninsula has calmed some since the ChonAn incident and its aftermath, and Pyongyang
has made clear progress in its long-anticipated leadership transition, with Kim Jong Un, the youngest
son of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, moved into top positions and making public appearances. The
fourth quarter will see more such appearances by the new heir apparent as he begins to build his
public image and the elder Kim manages the various elite interests in North Korea to build support for
his son. Pyongyang will push in this quarter for multilateral talks, but in typical North Korean fashion,
this could be presaged by provocations. China and Russia will continue pressing for negotiations, and
the United States, South Korea and Japan will shift to doing the same, seeking to reduce tensions.

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

Sub-Saharan Africa
Regional Trend: Nigerian Politics

The quarter will be dominated by the

political wrangling that typically
accompanies the competition for the ruling
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
nominations, which are tantamount to
winning the general elections. Dates for
the PDP primaries have yet to be set (after
being delayed from October), but that fact
will have no bearing on the intensity of the fight to come, particularly over the presidential nomination.
There will be a struggle within the PDP over support from the delegates as President Goodluck
Jonathan battles against the northern candidates that pose the biggest challenge to his election. One
of these northern opponents will rise to the forefront by the end of the quarter and turn the
competition into a two-man race. The internal party struggle, however, will be complemented by
negotiations beyond the PDP’s official structure, as militant forces such as the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) will enter the picture. The faction led by Henry Okah,
members of which carried out the Oct. 1 bombings in Abuja, will require particular attention, though
the MEND commanders who bought into the federal government amnesty program will also have to be
appeased. Nigeria will not see a sustained militant campaign this quarter, but there will still be an
increased level of unrest in the Niger Delta, as well as in other parts of the country, as militants’
political patrons use their proxies to intimidate and undermine their political opponents.

Regional Trend: Sudan’s Referendum

Preparations for the referendum on Southern Sudanese independence will be the primary focus for
both the north and the south this quarter. Khartoum does not want the vote to be held and will seek
ways to either postpone the referendum or discredit the eventual outcome before it occurs, while also
preparing for a military confrontation by stationing troops in the border regions and supporting proxies
opposed to the Southern Sudanese government. This does not mean Khartoum wants a war to break
out; rather, it will use its military as a reminder that it is ready for such a scenario. The south,
meanwhile, will show that it is prepared to go back to war, but will also seek to develop economic ties
with other countries to somewhat diversify its economy away from oil. Meanwhile, both sides will
simultaneously lay the groundwork for new negotiations on a revenue-sharing agreement for crude oil
pumped in Southern Sudan, as the south has no other option but to use northern pipelines to export
it.

Regional Trend: The Conflict in Somalia

High levels of violence between Islamist insurgents and African Union (AU) Mission in
Somalia/Transitional Federal Government forces will continue, but neither side will be able to tip the
scales enough to achieve a strategic victory. The number of AU peacekeepers sent to Somalia will also
increase, but the deployment will not be as large as seen during the Ethiopian occupation from 2006-
2009. Anything more substantial than a few thousand extra troops, such as the 20,000 total that the
Ugandan government has been pushing for in the months following the al Shabaab suicide blasts in
Kampala, will have to wait until the following quarter if it is to ever come to fruition.

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

Europe
Regional Trend: The Franco-German
Tandem and Central Europe

Germany will continue using the economic

crisis to impose its vision for more
stringent European economic requirements
on its neighbors. This will manifest in
ongoing efforts to reform enforcement
mechanisms for eurozone rules on budget
deficits and government debt. Berlin wants
to make enforcement of the rules
automatic, thus forcing essentially all members of the European Union to adopt constitutional “debt
breaks” akin to what Berlin passed in 2009. Paris is opposed to the automatic mechanisms, as it wants
the process to require more political input from national legislatures. This division will continue to
strain the Franco-German relationship, though we do not foresee a serious break in fourth quarter.

A key issue that the two are already cooperating on is the debate on the European Union’s next budget
period (2014-2020), which is set to intensify in the fourth quarter. The budget debate will pit Central
and Eastern European member states against the Berlin-Paris axis. This is just one in a long list of
disputes between the EU periphery (essentially Central and Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden) and core (France, Germany and Belgium) — a dynamic that is
expected to grow in the fourth quarter.

Central Europeans, including the Baltic States, will continue attempting to re-engage the United States
in the region, particularly via ballistic missile defense and military cooperation. They will also push for
the November NATO summit in Lisbon to reaffirm the collective security component of the NATO pact.
This will annoy France and Germany, which want Russia to be included as a partner. However, the
Central Europeans will also be making contingency plans, looking to use new forums — such as the
Visegrad Four alliance of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which traditionally has
been a political grouping — for security matters. There are many obstacles to greater Central
European unity, starting with the countries’ historical lack of cooperation and Poland’s desire for a seat
at the table with Germany and France, which limits Warsaw’s ability to lead Central Europe.

Latin America
Regional Trend: Venezuela’s Growing
Vulnerabilities

Venezuela’s economic troubles will grow

more severe, threatening key elements of
the state. Though the government lacks
any good options to reverse this trend, it
will be able to exploit these troubles to
tighten its grip over the country through
the empowerment of local communal
councils and the increased deployment of militia forces. After losing its two-thirds legislative majority,
the ruling party now has an imperative to push through as much legislation as it can to expand the
executive branch’s powers before the legislative session concludes at the end of the year and more
opposition lawmakers are seated in January.

But Venezuela’s problems are not only internal. In the coming quarter, Venezuela will become more
concerned about what appears to be a gradual shift in Cuba’s orientation toward the United States. No
8

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

definitive moves in the U.S.-Cuban relationship should be expected in the next quarter, but Cuba may
attempt to leverage its heavy influence in Venezuela to attract Washington’s interest.

Venezuela’s vulnerabilities have led to increased cooperation with Colombia in the political, economic
and even security realms. Unwilling to risk Colombia pursuing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels on Venezuelan soil, Venezuela appears to have
taken steps to flush a number of these rebels across the border into Colombia, contributing in part to
Colombia’s latest military successes against the FARC. Tepid cooperation between Bogota and Caracas
may continue through much of the quarter, but this developing rapprochement is on shaky ground.
Venezuela will cooperate enough to keep the Colombian military at bay, but will also need to be
cautious in trying to avoid a FARC backlash, even if the group’s power appears to be waning.

The more vulnerable Venezuela becomes, the harder-pressed it will be to find an external ally willing
to provide the economic and political capital needed to sustain the regime. Venezuela will look
primarily to China for this lifeline. China is growing more assertive in pursuing its commercial interests
abroad and will entrench itself more deeply in the Venezuelan oil sector, but Beijing remains cautious
against presenting too strong a challenge to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Regional Trend: Brazil’s Rise

Brazil will have a presidential runoff election Oct. 31, but the country’s attention is primarily occupied
with its currency crisis. The real’s steady appreciation is exacerbated by Brazil’s increasingly
competitive relationship with China and by short-term injections of capital from Petroleo Brasileiro’s
capitalization plan for developing the offshore pre-salt oil deposits. There are no easy solutions to
Brazil’s currency problems, and even short-term interventions will be made with extreme caution for
fear of reviving Brazil’s past chronic inflation issues. Brazil’s currency crisis will remain the new
government’s largest concern far beyond this quarter.

Externally, Brazil will continue its military modernization plan and will play a more proactive role, albeit
primarily rhetorical, in regional issues, such as Colombian-Venezuelan relations and Argentina’s
ongoing dispute with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Brazil can use these
issues to assert its own authority in the South Atlantic. Brazil will maintain a close relationship with
Iran and Turkey to build a stake in more distant foreign policy issues, but will not play a decisive role
in Middle Eastern matters.

Regional Trend: Growing Divisions in Mexico’s Cartel Wars

Cartel violence will persist across Mexico and cartel activity will continue spreading farther south into
Central America, but the coming quarter will see a more defined balance of power emerge among the
drug-trafficking organizations within Mexico. Under this balance, the Sinaloa Federation and its allies
will benefit from the high-profile arrests and operational losses of its rivals (Los Zetas, the Beltran
Leyva Organization, and others). Though the Mexican government remains gridlocked on most issues,
Mexican President Felipe Calderon also understands the limits of the state’s war against the cartels and
faces a pressing need to stem the record levels of violence before the 2012 national elections. A
political exit strategy from the war will begin to take shape. The strategy is likely to favor dominant
cartels and potential negotiating partners like Sinaloa. As Sinaloa’s rivals continue to lose key leaders
and operational capability, these groups will rely more on improvised explosive devices, kidnappings
for ransom and extortion tactics and will diversify their criminal activities in an attempt to remain
relevant on the Mexican drug trafficking scene.

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

STRATFOR is the world leader in global intelligence. Our team of experts collects and analyzes
intelligence from every part of the world -- offering unparalleled insights through our exclusively
published analyses and forecasts. Whether it is on political, economic or military developments,
STRATFOR not only provides its members with a better understanding of current issues and events,
but invaluable assessments of what lies ahead.

Renowned author George Friedman founded STRATFOR in 1996. Most recently, he authored the
international bestseller, The Next 100 Years. Dr. Friedman is supported by a team of professionals with
widespread experience, many of whom are internationally recognized in their own right. Although its
headquarters are in Austin, Texas, STRATFOR’s staff is widely distributed throughout the world.

“Barron’s has consistently found STRATFOR’s insights informative and largely on the money-as has the
company’s large client base, which ranges from corporations to media outlets and government
agencies.” -- Barron’s

What We Offer
On a daily basis, STRATFOR members are made aware of what really matters on an international
scale. At the heart of STRATFOR’s service lies a series of analyses which are written without bias or
political preferences. We assume our readers not only want international news, but insight into the
developments behind it.

In addition to analyses, STRATFOR members also receive access to an endless supply of SITREPS
(situational reports), our heavily vetted vehicle for providing breaking geopolitical news. To complete
the STRATFOR service, we publish an ongoing series of geopolitical monographs and assessments
which offer rigorous forecasts of future world developments.

The STRATFOR Difference

STRATFOR members quickly come to realize the difference between intelligence and journalism. We
are not the purveyors of gossip or trivia. We never forget the need to explain why any event or issue
has significance and we use global intelligence not quotes.

STRATFOR also provides corporate and institutional memberships for multi-users. Our intelligence
professionals provide Executive Briefings for corporate events and board of directors meetings and
routinely appear as speakers at conferences. For more information on corporate or institutional
services please contact sales@stratfor.com

10

© 2010 STRATFOR Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com