G.R. Nos.

162335 & 162605 March 6, 2012
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M.
MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARYANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V.
MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R.
MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M.
BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L.
MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON
SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR.
and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney- in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by
TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
The Manotoks raised the following grounds in their motion
for reconsideration with motion for oral arguments:
1. It is unjust and oppressive to deprive the Manotoks of
property they have long held and acquired from the State,
on consideration fully paid and received, and under
registered title issued by the State itself, on nothing more
than the assumed failure of the State’s agents to inscribe
a ministerial "approval" on the transaction deeds.
2. The annulment of Friar Land sales, simply because
physical evidence of the Secretary’s ministerial approval
can no longer be found, may void transactions involving
thousands of hectares of land, and affect possibly millions
of people to whom the lands may have since been
parceled out, sold and resold.
3. The Manotoks were given no due notice of the issue of
reversion, which this case on appeal did not include, and
which was thrust upon the Manotoks only in the final
resolution disposing of the appeal.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar are the motions for reconsideration separately filed
by the Manotoks, Barques and Manahans of our Decision
promulgated on August 24, 2010, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
It would be error for the Honorable Court to let this matter
go without a serious and full re-examination. This can be
accomplished, among others, by allowing this motion for
reconsideration to be heard on oral argument, to try to
permit all pertinent considerations to be aired before the
Court and taken into account.

WHEREFORE, the petitions filed by the Manotoks under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, as well as the petition-in-intervention of the
Manahans, are DENIED. The petition for reconstitution of
title filed by the Barques is likewise DENIED. TCT No. RT-
22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et
al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque and
Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B.
Manahan, are all hereby declared NULL and VOID. The
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City
are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles. The Court
hereby DECLARES that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate,
Quezon City legally belongs to the NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of
REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office
of the Solicitor General.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
4. These G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 were an appeal
from administrative reconstitution proceedings before LRA
Reconstitution officer Benjamin Bustos. But the Resolution
dated 18 December 2008 which finally reversed the CA’s
rulings, affirmed the denial by Bustos of the application for
administrative reconstitution of the Barques’ purported
transfer certificate of title, and terminated the appeal
introduced a new "case" on the Manotok property. It
ordered evidence-taking at the CA, on which the Supreme
Court proposed itself to decide, in the first instance, an
alleged ownership controversy over the Manotok property.
5. The Manotoks objected to the "remand" on jurisdictional
and due process grounds. The original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is vested by
law on the regional trial courts.
6. The Honorable Court erred in proceeding to judgment
divesting the Manotoks of their title to Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate, without a trial in the courts of original and
exclusive jurisdiction, and in disregard of process which
the law accords to all owners-in-possession.

7. The Honorable Court erred in concluding that the
Manotoks, despite being owners in possession under a
registered title, may be compelled to produce the deeds by
which the Government had transferred the property to
them, and "failing" which can be divested of their
ownership in favor of the Government, even if the latter
has not demanded a reversion or brought suit for that
purpose.
8. The Honorable Court erred in imposing on the
Manotoks, contrary to Art. 541 of the Civil Code, the
obligation to prove their ownership of the subject property,
and in awarding their title to the Government who has not
even sued to contest that ownership.
9. The Honorable Court erred in finding that Sale
Certificate No. 1054, which Severino Manotok acquired by
assignment in 1923, was not approved by the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and in finding that a Sale Certificate without
the Secretary’s approval is void.
10. The Honorable Court erred in concluding that the
Manotoks had no valid Deed of Conveyance of Lot 823
from the Government The original of Deed of Conveyance
No. 29204 gave the register of deeds the authority to issue
the transfer certificate of title in the name of the buyer
Severino Manotok, which is required by law to be filed with
and retained in the custody of the register of deeds.We
presume that the copy thereof actually transmitted to and
received by the register of deeds did contain the
Secretary’s signature because he in fact issued the TCT.
And we rely on this presumption because the document
itself can no longer be found.
11. Assuming arguendo that the original Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 the register of deeds received did
not bear the Department Secretary’s signature, DENR
Memorandum Order No. 16-05 dated October 27, 2005
cured the defect. To deny the Manotoks the benefit of
ratification under said MO, on the erroneous interpretation
that it covered only those found in the records of the "field
offices" of the DENR and LMB, would be discriminatory.
The Department Secretary’s (assumed) failure to affix his
signature on the deed of conveyance could not defeat the
Manotoks’ right to the lot after they had fully paid for it.
Republic Act No. 9443 must be applied, mutatis mutandis,
to the Manotoks and the Piedad Estate.
12. The Honorable Court erred in denying their right to be
informed of the CA’s report and be heard thereon prior to
judgment, as basic requirements of due process.
The Barques anchor their motion for reconsideration on
the following:
I
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR
RECONSTITUTION FILED BY RESPONDENTS HEIRS
OF BARQUE WITHOUT STATING THE GROUNDS FOR
SUCH DENIAL.
II
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN INSTANTLY DECLARING IN THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION THAT
ALONG WITH FELICITAS B. MANAHAN’S TITLE,
RESPONDENTS HEIRS OF BARQUE’S TITLE TCT NO.
210177 IS LIKEWISE NULL AND VOID, WITHOUT
STATING A CLEAR AND DEFINITE BASIS THEREFOR.
III
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 210177 IN THE NAME OF HOMER L.
BARQUE NULL AND VOID.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ FACTUAL
FINDINGS, ADOPTED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT IN THE DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2010,
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
V
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS IN
THE DECISION DATED 24 AUGUST 2010 ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As to the Manahans, they seek a partial reconsideration
and to allow further reception of evidence, stating the
following grounds:
I. As the original of Sale Certificate No. 511 could not be
found in the files of the LMB or the DENR-NCR at the time
of the hearings before the Commissioners, the existence
of the certificate was proven by secondary evidence. The
Commissioners erred in ignoring secondary evidence of
the contents of Sale Certificate No. 511 because of mere
doubt and suspicion as to its authenticity and in the
absence of contradicting evidence.
II. The OSG which has been tasked by the Honorable
Court to obtain documents from the LMB and DENR-NCR
relative to the conveyance of Lot 823, Piedad Estate,
furnished intevenors with a certified true copy of Sale
Certificate No. 511 which it obtained from the DENR-NCR
on September 11, 2010, together with the explanation of
DENR-NCR why the document is available only now.
(Certified true copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 and Sworn
Explanation of Evelyn G. Celzo attached as Annexes "I"
and "II".
III. When Valentin Manahan offered to purchase Lot 823,
Piedad Estate, being the "actual settler and occupant" who
under the law enjoyed preference to buy the lot, his status
as "actual settler and occupant" must have been verified
by the Bureau of Public Lands because the presumption is
that official duty has been regularly performed. The
administrative determination of the status of Valentin
Manahan as "actual settler and occupant" can not now be
reviewed after the lapse of about eight (8) decades when
parties, witnesses, documents and other evidence are
hardly or no longer available.
IV. Abundant evidence was submitted by intervenors that
they and their predecessors-in-interest occupied and
possessed Lot 823 up to 1948 when they were
dispossessed by armed men. It was error for the
Commissioners to ignore the evidence of the intervenors,
there being no contradicting proof.
V. The Commissioners committed palpable error in not
according evidentiary value to the Investigation Report of
Evelyn dela Rosa because it is allegedly "practically a
replica or summation of Felicitas B. Manahan’s allegations
embodied in her petition." Examination of the dates of the
documents will show that the Investigation Report
preceded the Petition. The Petition, therefore, is based on
the Investigation Report, and not the other way around.
VI. The pronouncement of the Commissioners that Sale
Certificate No. 511 is stale is incorrect. Intervenors made
continuing efforts to secure a deed of conveyance based
on Sale Certificate No. 511. Defense of staleness or
laches belongs to the party against whom the claim is
asserted; it is only that party who can raise it. It can also
be waived, as in this case when the LMB which had the
sole authority under Act No. 1120 to convey friar lands,
issued to intervenor Felicitas B. Manahan Deed of
Conveyance No. V-2000-22.
VII. The requirement of Act No. 1120 that a deed of
conveyance of friar land must be signed by the Secretary
of Interior was dispensed with pursuant to law and
Presidential issuances which have the force of law.
VIII. Deeds of conveyance lacking the signature of the
Department Secretary were ratified by President Joseph
Estrada and DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor.
The motions are bereft of merit.
Upon the theory that this Court had no power to cancel
their certificate of title over Lot 823, Piedad Estate in the
resolution of the present controversy, the Manotoks
contend that our Resolution of December 18, 2008
terminated the appeal from the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) administrative reconstitution proceedings by
reversing the CA’s rulings and affirming the denial by LRA
Reconstitution Officer Benjamin M. Bustos of the
application for administrative reconstitution of the Barques’
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177. The appeal
having been terminated, the Manotoks argued that the
remand to the CA for evidence-taking had introduced a
new "case" in which this Court will decide, in the first
instance, an "alleged" ownership issue over the property.
Such action is legally infirm since the law has vested
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving
title to real property on the trial courts.
The argument is untenable.
In our December 18, 2008 Resolution, we set aside the
December 12, 2005 Decision rendered by the First
Division and recalled the entry of judgment. We ruled that
neither the CA nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the
Manotok title, a relief sought by the Barques in the
administrative reconstitution proceedings. The Court En
Banc proceeded with the reevaluation of the cases on a
pro hac vice basis. During the oral arguments, there were
controversial factual matters which emerged as the parties
fully ventilated their respective claims, in the course of
which the Barques’ claim of ownership was found to be
exceedingly weak. Indeed, both the LRA and CA erred in
ruling that the Barques had the right to seek reconstitution
of their purported title. Reevaluation of the evidence on
record likewise indicated that the Manotoks’ claim to title is
just as flawed as that of the Barques. Following the
approach in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.1 also
involving a Friar Land, Republic v. Court of Appeals2 and
Manotok Realty Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation,3 the majority resolved to remand this case
for reception of evidence on the parties’ competing claims
of ownership over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Given the
contentious factual issues, it was necessary for this Court
to resolve the same for the complete determination of the
present controversy involving a huge tract of friar land. It
was thus not the first time the Court had actually resorted
to referring a factual matter pending before it to the CA.
Maintaining their objection to the order for reception of
evidence on remand, the Manotoks argue that as owners
in possession, they had no further duty to defend their title
pursuant to Article 541 of the Civil Code which states that:
"[a] possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and
he cannot be obliged to show or prove it." But such
presumption is prima facie, and therefore it prevails until
the contrary is proved.4 In the light of serious flaws in the
title of Severino Manotok which were brought to light
during the reconstitution proceedings, the Court deemed it
proper to give all the parties full opportunity to adduce
further evidence, and in particular, for the Manotoks to
prove their presumed just title over the property also
claimed by the Barques and the Manahans. As it turned
out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence a valid alienation from the
Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of
ownership in favor of the Government was but the logical
consequence of such finding.
We have ruled that the existence of Sale Certificate No.
1054 in the records of the DENR-LMB was not duly
established. No officer of the DENR-NCR or LMB having
official custody of sale certificates covering friar lands
testified as to the issuance and authenticity of Exh. 10
submitted by the Manotoks. And even assuming that Exh.
10 was actually sourced from the DENR-LMB, there was
no showing that it was duly issued by the Director of
Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (DENR). On this point, the Manotoks
hinted that the LMB’s certifying the document (Exh. 10) at
the Manotoks’ request was a deliberate fraud in order to
give them either a false document, the usual unsigned
copy of the signed original, or a fake copy.
The Manotoks further assert that this would imply that the
LMB either did not produce the genuine article, or could
not produce it. This could only mean that the document
which the NBI "found" to be fake or spurious, if this Court
accepts that finding, was "planted evidence"or evidence
inserted in the LMB files to discredit the Manotok title.
Nonetheless, the Manotoks insist there were independent
evidence which supposedly established the prior existence
of Sale Certificate No. 1054. These documents are: (a)
photocopy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054
dated 1929; (b) official receipt of payment for said certified
copy; (c) photocopies of the other assignment deeds
dated 1923; (d) official receipts of installment payments on
Lot 823 issued to Severino Manotok; (e) file copies in the
National Archives of the Deed of Conveyance No. 29204;
and (f) the notarial registers in which the said Deed of
Conveyance, as well as the assignment documents, were
entered.
The contentions have no merit, and at best speculative. As
this Court categorically ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country
Club, Inc.,5 "approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for its
validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the
sale null and void ab initio." In that case, the majority
declared that no valid titles can be issued on the basis of
the sale or assignment made in favor of petitioner’s father
due to the absence of signature of the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of the Interior, and the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources in the Sale Certificate and
Assignment of Sale Certificate. Applying the Alonso ruling
to these cases, we thus held that no legal right over the
subject friar land can be recognized in favor of the
Manotoks under the assignment documents in the
absence of the certificate of sale duly signed by the
Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
That a valid certificate of sale was issued to Severino
Manotok’s assignors cannot simply be presumed from the
execution of assignment documents in his favor. Neither
can it be deduced from the alleged issuance of the half-
torn TCT No. 22813, itself a doubtful document as its
authenticity was not established, much less the veracity of
its recitals because the name of the registered owner and
date of issuance do not appear at all. The Manotoks until
now has not offered any explanation as to such condition
of the alleged title of Severino Manotok; they assert that it
is the Register of Deeds himself "who should be in a
position to explain that condition of the TCT in his
custody." But then, no Register of Deeds had testified and
attested to the fact that the original of TCT No. 22813 was
under his/her custody, nor that said certificate of title in the
name of Severino Manotok existed in the files of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan or Quezon City. The
Manotoks consistently evaded having to explain the
circumstances as to how and where TCT No. 22813 came
about. Instead, they urge this Court to validate their
alleged title on the basis of the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. Such stance
hardly satisfies the standard of clear and convincing
evidence in these cases. Even the existence of the official
receipts showing payment of the price to the land by
Severino Manotok does not prove that the land was legally
conveyed to him without any contract of sale having been
executed by the government in his favor. Neither did the
alleged issuance of TCT No. 22183 in his favor vest
ownership upon him over the land nor did it validate the
alleged purchase of Lot 283, which is null and void. The
absence of the Secretary’s approval in Certificate of Sale
No. 1054 made the supposed sale null and void ab initio.6
purchase and alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 of the
Manahans. The relevant portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the cross- examination of said
witness during the hearing before the CA are herein
quoted:
ATTY. SAN JUAN:
How about this part concerning Valentin Manahan having
applied for the purchase of the land? Did you get this from
the neighbors or from Felicitas Manahan?
xxxx
WITNESS:
No, sir. Only the Records Section, sir, that Valentin
Manahan applied, sir.
ATTY. SAN JUAN:

In the light of the foregoing, the claim of the Barques who, You did not see Valentin Manahan’s application but only
just like the Manahans, were unable to produce an the Records Section saw it?
authentic and genuine sale certificate, must likewise fail.
The Decision discussed extensively the findings of the CA WITNESS:
that the Barques’ documentary evidence were either
spurious or irregularly procured, which even buttressed Yes, sir.
the earlier findings mentioned in the December 18, 2008
Resolution. The CA’s findings and recommendations with ATTY. SAN JUAN:
respect to the claims of all parties, have been fully
adopted by this Court, as evident in our disquisitions on Did they tell you that they saw the application?
the indispensable requirement of a validly issued
Certificate of Sale over Lot 823, Piedad Estate. WITNESS:

As to the motion of the Manahans to admit an alleged I did not go further, sir.
certified true copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 dated June
23, 1913 in the name of Valentin Manahan which, as xxxx
alleged in the attached Sworn Explanation of Evelyn G.
Celzo, the latter hadinadvertently failed to attach to her ATTY. SAN JUAN:
Investigation Report forwarded to the CENRO, this Court
cannot grant said motion. And this report of yours says that Valentin Manahan was
issued Sale Certificate No. 511 after completing the
This belatedly submitted copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 payment of the price of P2,140?
was not among those official documents which the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) offered as evidence, as in WITNESS:
fact no copy thereof can be found in the records of either
the DENR-NCR or LMB. Moreover, the sudden Yes, sir.
emergence of this unauthenticated document is
suspicious, considering that Celzo who testified, as ATTY. SAN JUAN:
witness for both the OSG and the Manahans, categorically
admitted that she never actually saw the application to
You also got this from the records of the LMB, is that And it was only after he applied for the purchase of the lot
correct? sometime after the survey of 1939 that he was issued sale
certificate No. 511?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
I am not aware of the issuance of sale certificate. I am
ATTY. SAN JUAN: aware only of the deed of assignment, Sir.

You actually saw the sale certificate that was issued to x x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Valentin Manahan after he paid the price of P2,140?
In view of the above admission, Celzo’s explanation that
WITNESS: the copy of Sale Certificate No. 511 signed by the Director
of Lands and Secretary of the Interior was originally
No, sir. I did not go further. attached to her Investigation Report, cannot be given
credence. Even her testimony regarding the conduct of
ATTY. SAN JUAN: her investigation of Lot 823, Piedad Estate and the
Investigation Report she submitted thereafter, failed to
You did not see the sale certificate? impress the CA on the validity of the Manahans’ claim.
Indeed, records showed that Celzo’s findings in her report
WITNESS: were merely based on what Felicitas Manahan told her
about the alleged occupation and possession by Valentin
Yes, Sir, but I asked only. Manahan of the subject land.

ATTY. SAN JUAN: In their Offer of Additional Evidence, the Manahans

submitted a photocopy of a letter dated December 21,
Who did you ask? 2010 allegedly sent by Atty. Allan V. Barcena (OIC,
Director) to their counsel, Atty. Romeo C. dela Cruz, which
WITNESS: reads:

The records officer, sir. This has reference to your letter dated August 20, 2010
addressed to the Secretary of the Department of
ATTY. SAN JUAN: Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) requesting
that Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued on
Whose name you can no longer recall, correct? October 30, 2000 over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate in
favor of Felicitas B. Manahan be ratified or confirmed for
WITNESS: reasons stated therein. The Office of the DENR Secretary
in turn referred the letter to us for appropriate action.
I can no longer recall, sir.
Records of this Office on Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate,
ATTY. SAN JUAN: show that the Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022
covering said lot in favor of Felicitas Manahan was issued
And the information to you was the Sale Certificate No. by then Director of the Land Management Bureau (LMB),
511 was issued after the price was fully paid? now Undersecretary Ernesto D. Adobo, Jr., on October 30,
2000. The Deed was issued based on General
WITNESS: Memorandum Order (GMO) No. 1 issued by then
Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. of the Department of Natural
Yes, sir. Resources on January 17, 1977, which authorized the
Director of Lands, now Director of LMB, to approve
ATTY. SAN JUAN: contracts of sale and deeds of conveyance affecting Friar
Lands.

It is stressed that the confirmation of the Deed by this
office is only as to the execution and issuance based on
the authority of LMB Director under GMO No. 1. This is
without prejudice to the final decision of the Supreme
Court as to its validity in the case of "Severino Manotok IV,
et al. versus Heirs of Homer L, Barque" (G.R. No. 162335
& 162605).
Please be guided accordingly.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
However, in the absence of a valid certificate of sale duly
signed by the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture and
Natural Resources, such alleged confirmation of the
execution and issuance by the DENR-LMB of Deed of
Conveyance No V-00022 in favor of Felicitas Manahan on
October 30, 2000 is still insufficient to prove the
Manahans’ claim over the subject land.
In a Supplemental Manifestation dated November 18,
2010, the Manotoks submitted an affidavit
supposedlyexecuted on November 11, 2010 by former
DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor("Defensor Affidavit")
clarifying that MO 16-05 applies to all Deeds of
Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the
Secretary of Natural Resources, contrary to the CA and
this Court’s statement that said issuance refers only to
those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the
DENR field offices.
By its express terms, however, MO 16-05 covered only
deeds of conveyances and not unsigned certificates of
sale. The explanation of Secretary Defensor stated
theavowed purpose behind the issuance, which is "to
remove doubts or dispel objections as to the validity of all
Torrens transfer certificates of title issued over friar lands"
thereby "ratifying the deeds of conveyance to the friar land
buyers who have fully paid the purchase price, and are
otherwise not shown to have committed any wrong or
illegality in acquiring such lands."
The Manahans propounded the same theory that
contracts of sale over friar lands without the approval of
the Secretary of Natural Resources may be subsequently
ratified, but pointed out that unlike the Manotoks’ Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 (1932), their Deed of Conveyance
No. V-2000-22 (2000) was issued and approved by the
Director of Lands upon prior authority granted by the
Secretary.
In their Consolidated Memorandum dated December 19,
2010, the Manahans reiterated their earlier argument that
the LMB Director himself had the authority to approve
contracts of sale and deeds of conveyance over friar lands
on the basis of General Memorandum Order No. 1 issued
in 1977 by then Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J.
Leido, Jr. delegating such function to the Director of
Lands. This delegated power can also be gleaned from
Sec. 15, Chapter 1, Title XIV of the Administrative Code of
1987 which provides that the Director of Lands shall
"perform such other functions as may be provided by law
or assigned by the Secretary." Moreover, former President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 131 dated
January 20, 1987 reorganizing the LMB and providing that
the LMB Director shall, among others, perform other
functions as may be assigned by the Minister of Natural
Resources.
On the basis of Art. 13179 of the Civil Code, the
Manahans contend that deeds of conveyance not bearing
the signature of the Secretary can also be ratified. Further,
they cite Proclamation No. 172 issued by former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada which declared that there should
be no legal impediment for the LMB to issue such deeds
of conveyance since the applicants/purchasers have
already paid the purchase price of the lot, and as sellers in
good faith, it is the obligation of the Government to deliver
to said applicants/purchasers the friar lands sold free of
any lien or encumbrance whatsoever. Eventually, when
MO 16-05 was issued by Secretary Defensor, all these
deeds of conveyance lacking the signature of the
Secretary of Natural Resources are thus deemed signed
or otherwise ratified. The CA accordingly erred in holding
that MO 16-05 cannot override Act No. 1120 which
requires that a deed of conveyance must be signed by the
Secretary, considering that MO 16-05 is based on law and
presidential issuances, particularly EO 131, which have
the force of law.
Meanwhile, in compliance with our directive, the Solicitor
General filed his Comment on the Defensor Affidavit
submitted by the Manotoks. The Solicitor General
contends that said document is hearsay evidence, hence
inadmissible and without probative value. He points out
that former DENR Secretary Defensor was not presented
as a witness during the hearings at the CA, thus depriving
the parties including the government of the right to cross-
examine him regarding his allegations therein. And even
assuming arguendo that such affidavit is admissible as
evidence, the Solicitor General is of the view that the
Manotoks, Barques and Manahans still cannot benefit
from the remedial effect of MO 16-05 in view of the
decision rendered by this Court which ruled that none of
the parties in this case has established a valid alienation
from the Government of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, and
also because the curative effect of MO 16-05 is intended
only for friar land buyers whose deeds of conveyance lack
the signature of the Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture
and Natural Resources, have fully paid the purchase price
and are otherwise not shown to have committed any
wrong or illegality in acquiring the friar lands. He then
emphasizes that this Court has ruled that it is not only the
deed of conveyance which must be signed by the
Secretary but also the certificate of sale itself. Since none
of the parties has shown a valid disposition to any of them
of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, this Court therefore
correctly held that said friar land is still part of the
patrimonial property of the national government.
The Court is not persuaded by the "ratification theory"
espoused by the Manotoks and Manahans.
The argument that the Director of Lands had delegated
authority to approve contracts of sale and deeds of
conveyances over friar landsignores the consistent ruling
of this Court in controversies involving friar lands. The
aforementioned presidential/executive issuances
notwithstanding, this Court held in Solid State Multi-
Products Corporation v. CA,10 Liao v. Court of Appeals,11
and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club12 that approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (later the Natural
Resources) is indispensable to the validity of sale of friar
land pursuant to Sec. 18 of Act No. 1120 and that the
procedure laid down by said law must be strictly complied
with.
As to the applicability of Art. 1317 of the Civil Code, we
maintain that contracts of sale lacking the approval of the
Secretary fall under the class of void and inexistent
contracts enumerated in Art. 140913 which cannot be
ratified. Section 18 of Act No. 1120 mandated the approval
by the Secretary for a sale of friar land to be valid.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio
disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of Section 18 of
Act No. 1120, and proposed that based on Section 12 of
the same Act, it is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear
the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and
Natural Resources "because it is only when the final
installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale,
the purchase price having been fully paid." It was pointed
out that the majority itself expressly admit that "it is only a
ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the
Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full
payment on the purchase price of the land", citing
jurisprudence to the effect that "notwithstanding the failure
of the government to issue the proper instrument of
conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final
installment of the purchase price, the purchase of the friar
land still acquired ownership.
We are unable to agree with the view that it is only the
Director of Lands who signs the Certificate of Sale.
The official document denominated as "Sale Certificate"
clearly required both the signatures of the Director of
Lands who issued such sale certificate to an applicant
settler/occupant and the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources indicating his
approval of the sale. These forms had been prepared and
issued by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under
the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, consistent
with Act No. 1120 "as may be necessary x x x to carry into
effect all the provisions [thereof] that are to be
administered by or under [his] direction, and for the
conduct of all proceedings arising under such
provisions."14
We reiterate that Section 18 of Act No. 1120, as amended,
is plain and categorical in stating that:
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act
shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.
Section 12 did not mention the requirement of signature or
approval of the Secretary in the sale certificate and deed
of conveyance.
SECTION 12. It shall be the duty of the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands by proper investigation to
ascertain what is the actual value of the parcel of land held
by each settler and occupant, taking into consideration the
location and quality of each holding of land, and any other
circumstances giving [it] value. The basis of valuation shall
likewise be, so far as practicable, such [as] the aggregate
of the values of all the holdings included in each particular
tract shall be equal to the cost to the Government to the
entire tract, including the cost of surveys, administration
and interest upon the purchase money to the time of sale.
When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained,
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said
settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in
detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such
settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at
the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin
of the United States or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, and that upon the payment of the final
installment together with [the] accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the
said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective
in the manner provided in section one hundred and
twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. The Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands shall, in each instance where a
certificate is given to the settler and occupant of any
holding, take his formal receipt showing the delivery of
such certificate, signed by said settler and occupant.
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Section 15
provides for the reservation of title in the Government only
for the purpose of ensuring payment of the purchase price,
which means that the sale was subject only to the
resolutory condition of non-payment, while the second
paragraph states that the purchaser thereby acquires "the
right of possession and purchase" by virtue of a certificate
of sale "signed under the provisions [thereof]." The
certificate of sale evidences the meeting of the minds
between the Government and the applicant regarding the
price, the specific parcel of friar land, and terms of
payment. In Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals,15 we
explained that the non-payment of the full purchase price
is the only recognized resolutory condition in the case of
sale of friar lands. We have also held that it is the
execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the
certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the
purchaser of friar land.16 Where there is no certificate of
sale issued, the purchaser does not acquire any right of
possession and purchase, as implied from Section 15. By
the mandatory language of Section 18, the absence of
approval of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and
Natural Resources in the lease or sale of friar land would
invalidate the sale. These provisions read together
indicate that the approval of the Secretary is required in
both the certificate of sale and deed of conveyance,
although the lack of signature of the Secretary in the latter
may not defeat the rights of the applicant who had fully
paid the purchase price.
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales’ dissent asserted that
case law does not categorically state that the required
"approval" must be in the form of a signature on the
Certificate of Sale, and that there is no statutory basis for
the requirement of the Secretary’s signature on the
Certificate of Sale "apart from a strained deduction of
Section 18."
As already stated, the official forms being used by the
Government for this purpose clearly show that the Director
of Lands signs every certificate of sale issued covering a
specific parcel of friar land in favor of the
applicant/purchaser while the Secretary of Interior/Natural
Resources signs the document indicating that the sale
was approved by him. To approve is to be satisfied with; to
confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing
done by another; to sanction officially.17 The Secretary of
Interior/Natural Resources signs and approves the
Certificate of Sale to confirm and officially sanction the
conveyance of friar lands executed by the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands (later Director of Lands). It is worth
mentioning thatSale Certificate No. 651 in the name of one
Ambrosio Berones dated June 23, 1913,18 also covering
Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate and forming part of the
official documents on file with the DENR-LMB which was
formally offered by the OSG as part of the official records
on file with the DENR and LMB pertaining to Lot 823,
contains the signature of both the Director of Lands and
Secretary of the Interior. The Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 651 dated April 19, 1930 was also signed
by the Director of Lands.19
Following the dissent’s interpretation that the Secretary is
not required to sign the certificate of sale while his
signature in the Deed of Conveyance may also appear
although merely a ministerial act, it would result in the
absurd situation wherein thecertificate of sale and deed of
conveyance both lacked the signature and approval of the
Secretary, and yet the purchaser’s ownership is ratified,
courtesy of DENR Memorandum Order (MO) No. 16-05. It
is also not farfetched that greater chaos will arise from
conflicting claims over friar lands, which could not be
definitively settled until the genuine and official
manifestation of the Secretary’s approval of the sale is
discerned from the records and documents presented.
This state of things is simply not envisioned under the
orderly and proper distribution of friar lands to bona fide
occupants and settlers whom the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands was tasked to identify.20
The existence of a valid certificate of sale therefore must
first be established with clear and convincing evidence
before a purchaser is deemed to have acquired ownership
over a friar land notwithstanding the non-issuance by the
Government, for some reason or another, of a deed of
conveyance after completing the installment payments. In
the absence of such certificate of sale duly signed by the
Secretary, no right can be recognized in favor of the
applicant. Neither would any assignee or transferee
acquire any right over the subject land.
In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,21 the Court
categorically ruled that the absence of approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale
certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale
null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid
titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.22
Justice Carpio, however, opined that the ruling in Alonso
"was superseded with the issuance by then Department of
[Environment] and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary
Michael T. Defensor of DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05." It was argued that the majority had construed a
"limited application" when it declared that the Manotoks
could not benefit from said memorandum order because
the latter refers only to deeds of conveyance "on file with
the records of the DENR field offices".
We disagree with the view that Alonso is no longer
applicable to this controversy after the issuance of DENR
MO No. 16-05 which supposedly cured the defect in the
Manotoks’ title.
First, DENR MO No. 16-05 explicitly makes reference only
to Deeds of Conveyances, not to Sale Certificates by
which, under the express language of Section 15, the
purchaser of friar land acquires the right of possession
and purchase pending final payment and the issuance of
title, such certificate being duly signed under the
provisions of Act No. 1120. Although the whereas clause
of MO No. 16-05 correctly stated that it was only a
ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the
Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full
payment on the purchase price of the land, it must be
stressed that in those instances where the formality of the
Secretary’s approval and signature is dispensed with,
there was a valid certificate of sale issued to the purchaser
or transferor. In this case, there is no indication in the
records that a certificate of sale was actually issued to the
assignors of Severino Manotok, allegedly the original
claimants of Lot 823, Piedad Estate.
Second, it is basic that an administrative issuance like
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 must conform to
and not contravene existing laws. In the interpretation and
construction of the statutes entrusted to them for
implementation, administrative agencies may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
statute it is administering, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat its purpose. In case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail.23
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 cannot supersede
or amend the clear mandate of Section 18, Act No. 1120
as to dispense with the requirement of approval by the
Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural
Resources of every lease or sale of friar lands.
But what is worse, as the dissent suggests, is that MO 16-
05 would apply even to those deeds of conveyances not
found in the records of DENR or its field offices, such as
the Manotoks’ Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 sourced
from the National Archives. It would then cover cases of
claimants who have not been issued any certificate of sale
but were able to produce a deed of conveyance in their
names. The Bureau of Lands was originally charged with
the administration of all laws relative to friar lands,
pursuant to Act No. 2657 and Act No. 2711. Under
Executive Order No. 192,24 the functions and powers
previously held by the Bureau of Lands were absorbed by
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the DENR, while
those functions and powers not absorbed by the LMB
were transferred to the regional field offices.25 As pointed
out by the Solicitor General in the Memorandum submitted
to the CA, since the LMB and DENR-NCR exercise sole
authority over friar lands, they are naturally the "sole
repository of documents and records relative to Lot No.
823 of the Piedad Estate."26
Third, the perceived disquieting effects on titles over friar
lands long held by generations of landowners cannot be
invoked as justification for legitimizing any claim or
acquisition of these lands obtained through fraud or
without strict compliance with the procedure laid down in
Act No. 1120. This Court, in denying with finality the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in Alonso v.
Cebu Country Club, Inc.27 reiterated the settled rule that
"[a]pproval by the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply
be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is
explicit in its mandate."28 Petitioners failed to discharge
their burden of proving their acquisition of title by clear and
convincing evidence, considering the nature of the land
involved.
As consistently held by this Court, friar lands can be
alienated only upon proper compliance with the
requirements of Act No. 1120. The issuance of a valid
certificate of sale is a condition sine qua non for
acquisition of ownership under the Friar Lands Act.
Otherwise, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 would
serve as administrative imprimatur to holders of deeds of
conveyance whose acquisition may have been obtained
through irregularity or fraud.
Contrary to the dissent of Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno that our decision has "created dangers for the
system of property rights in the Philippines", the Court
simply adhered strictly to the letter and spirit of the Friar
Lands Act and jurisprudence interpreting its provisions.
Such imagined scenario of instability and chaos in the
established property regime, suggesting several other
owners of lands formerly comprising the Piedad Estate
who are supposedly similarly situated, remains in the
realm of speculation. Apart from their bare allegations,
petitioners (Manotoks) failed to demonstrate how the
awardees or present owners of around more than 2,000
hectares of land in the Piedad Estate can be embroiled in
legal disputes arising from unsigned certificates of sale.
On the other hand, this Court must take on the task of
scrutinizing even certificates of title held for decades
involving lands of the public domain and those lands which
form part of the Government’s patrimonial property,
whenever necessary in the complete adjudication of the
controversy before it or where apparent irregularities and
anomalies are shown by the evidence on record. There is
nothing sacrosanct about the landholdings in the Piedad
Estate as even prior to the years when Lot 823 could have
been possibly "sold" or disposed by the Bureau of Lands,
there were already reported anomalies in the distribution
of friar lands in general.29
Significantly, subsequent to the promulgation of our
decision in Alonso, Republic Act No. (RA) 9443 was
passed by Congress confirming and declaring, subject to
certain exceptions, the validity of existing TCTs and
reconstituted certificates of title covering the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate situated in Cebu. Alonso involved a friar land
already titled but without a sale certificate, and upon that
ground we declared the registered owner as not having
acquired ownership of the land. RA 9443 validated the
titles "notwithstanding the lack of signatures and/or
approval of the then Secretary of Interior (later Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then
Chief of the Bureau of Public lands (later Director of Public
Lands) in the copies of the duly executed Sale Certificate
and Assignments of Sale Certificates, as the case may be,
now on file with the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City".
The enactment of RA 9443 signifies the legislature’s
recognition of the statutory basis of the Alonso ruling to
the effect that in the absence of signature and/or approval
of the Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources in the
Certificates of Sale on file with the CENRO, the sale is not
valid and the purchaser has not acquired ownership of the
friar land. Indeed, Congress found it imperative to pass a
new law in order to exempt the already titled portions of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the operation of
Section 18. This runs counter to the dissent’s main thesis
that a mere administrative issuance (DENR MO No. 16-
05) would be sufficient to cure the lack of signature and
approval by the Secretary in Certificate of Sale No. 1054
covering Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.
In any event, the Manotoks now seek the application of
RA 9443 to the Piedad Estate, arguing that for said law to
be constitutionally valid, its continued operation must be
interpreted in a manner that does not collide with the equal
protection clause. Considering that the facts in Alonso
from which RA 9443 sprung are similar to those in this
case, it is contended that there is no reason to exclude the
Piedad Estate from the ambit of RA 9443.
Justice Carpio’s dissent concurs with this view, stating that
to limit its application to the Banilad Friar Lands Estate will
result in class legislation. RA 9443 supposedly should be
extended to lands similarly situated, citing the case of
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.30
In the aforesaid case, the Court extended the benefits of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of
other government financing institutions (GFIs) from the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) to the rank-and-file
employees of the BSP. We upheld the position of
petitioner association that the continued operation of
Section 15 (c), Article II of RA 7653 (the New Central Bank
Act), which provides that the compensation and wage
structure of employees whose position fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under RA 6758 (SSL), constitutes "invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the
[BSP]". Thus, as regards the exemption from the SSL, we
declared that there were no characteristics peculiar only to
the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption from the SSL which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied. The distinction made by the law
is superficial, arbitrary and not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between BSP rank-
and-file and the seven other GFIs.31
We are of the opinion that the provisions of RA 9443 may
not be applied to the present case as to cure the lack of
signature of the Director of Lands and approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale
Certificate No. 1054.
The Court has explained the nature of equal protection
guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1 of RA 9443 provides:
Section 1. All existing Transfer Certificates of Title and
Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City
covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate,
notwithstanding the lack of signatures and/or approval of
the then Secretary of the Interior (later Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands (later Director of Public
Lands) in the copies of the duly executed Sale Certificates
and Assignments of Sales Certificates, as the case may
be, now on file with the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, are
hereby confirmed and declared as valid titles and the
registered owners recognized as absolute owners thereof.
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all
respects be entitled to like effect and credit as a decree of
registration, binding the land and quieting the title thereto
and shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the national government and al1 branches
thereof; except when, in a given case involving a
certificate of title or areconstituted certificate of title, there
is clear evidence that such certificate of title or
reconstituted certificate of title was obtained through fraud,
in which case the solicitor general or his duly designated
representative shall institute the necessary judicial
proceeding to cancel the certificate of title or reconstituted
certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through
such fraud.(Emphasis supplied.)
Without ruling on the issue of violation of equal protection
guarantee if the curative effect of RA 9443 is not made
applicable to all titled lands of the Piedad Estate, it is clear
that the Manotoks cannot invoke this law to "confirm" and
validate their alleged title over Lot 823. It must be stressed
that the existence and due issuance of TCT No. 22813 in
the name of Severino Manotok was not established by the
evidence on record. There is likewise no copy of a "duly
executed certificate of sale" "on file" with the DENR
regional office. In the absence of an existing certificate of
title in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the
Manotoks and certificate of sale on file with the
DENR/CENRO, there is nothing to confirm and validate
through the application of RA 9443.
Moreover, RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage
those cases involving certificates of title which were shown
to have been fraudulently or irregularly issued. As the
reconstitution and remand proceedings in these cases
revealed, the Manotoks’ title to the subject friar land, just
like the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The
Court cannot allow them now to invoke the benefit of
confirmation and validation of ownership of friar lands
under duly executed documents, which they never had in
the first place. Strict application by the courts of the
mandatory provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by
the laudable policy behind its enactment -- to ensure that
the lands acquired by the government would go to the
actual occupants and settlers who were given preference
in their distribution.33
The dissent reiterates that the existence of Sale Certificate
No. 1054 was clearly and convincingly established by the
original of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated
May 4, 1923 between M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok
as assignors and Severino Manotok as assignee
(approved by the Director of Lands on June 23, 1923),
which is on file with the LMB, as well as the Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 secured from the National
Archives which is the repository of government and official
documents, the original of Official Receipt No. 675257
dated 20 February 1920 for certified copy of Assignment
of Sale Certificate No. 1054 on Lot 823 and the original of
the Provincial Assessor’s declaration of title in Severino
Manotok’s name for tax purposes on August 9, 1933
assessing him beginning with the year 1933. The dissent
further listed some of those alleged sale certificates,
assignment deeds and deeds of conveyance either signed
by the Director of Lands only or unsigned by both Director
of Lands and Secretary of Interior/Natural Resources,
gathered by the Manotoks from the LMB. It was stressed
that if MO 16-05 is not applied to these huge tracts of land
within and outside Metro Manila, "[H]undreds of
thousands, if not millions, of landowners would surely be
dispossessed of their lands in these areas," "a blow to the
integrity of our Torrens system and the stability of land
titles in this country."
The Court has thoroughly examined the evidence on
record and exhaustively discussed the merits of the
Manotoks’ ownership claim over Lot 823, in the light of
established precedents interpreting the provisions of the
Friar Lands Act. The dissent even accused the majority of
mistakenly denigrating the records of the National
Archives which, under R.A. No. 9470 enacted on May 21,
2007, is mandated to store and preserve "any public
archive transferred to the National Archives" and tasked
with issuing certified true copies or certifications on public
archives and for extracts thereof.
The Friar Lands Act mandated a system of recording all
sale contracts to be implemented by the Director of Lands,
which has come to be known as the Friar Lands Sales
Registry.
SEC. 6. The title, deeds and instruments of conveyance
pertaining to the lands in each province, when executed
and delivered by said grantors to the Government and
placed in the keeping of the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands, as above provided, shall be by him transmitted to
the register of deeds of each province in which any part of
said lands lies, for registration in accordance with law. But
before transmitting the title, deeds, and instruments of
conveyance in this section mentioned to the register of
deeds of each province for registration, the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands shall record all such deeds and
instruments at length in one or more books to be provided
by him for that purpose and retained in the Bureau of
Public Lands, when duly certified by him shall be received
in all courts of the Philippine Islands as sufficient evidence
of the contents of the instrument so recorded whenever it
is not practicable to produce the originals in court. (Section
1, Act No. 1287).
It is thus the primary duty of the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands to record all these deeds and instruments in
sales registry books which shall be retained in the Bureau
of Public Lands. Unfortunately, the LMB failed to produce
the sales registry book in court, which could have clearly
shown the names of claimants, the particular lots and
areas applied for, the sale certificates issued and other
pertinent information on the sale of friar lands within the
Piedad Estate. Witness Teresita J. Reyes, a retired
Assistant Chief of the Records Management Division
(RMD), LMB who was presented by the Manahans,
testified that when the LMB was decentralized, the sales
registry books pertaining to friar lands were supposedly
turned over to the regional offices. These consisted of
copies of the appropriate pages of the sales registry books
in the LMB RMD main office which has an inventory of lots
subject of deeds of conveyance and sales certificates.
However, Reyes said that the sales registry book itself is
no longer with the RMD. On the other hand, the alleged
affidavit of Secretary Defensor dated November 11, 2010
states that MO 16-05 was intended to address situations
when deeds of conveyance lacked the signature of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, or such deeds or
records from which the Secretary’s signature or approval
may be verified were lost or unavailable.
Whether the friar lands registry book is still available in the
LMB or properly turned over to the regional offices
remains unclear. With the statutorily prescribed record-
keeping of sales of friar lands apparently in disarray, it
behooves on the courts to be more judicious in settling
conflicting claims over friar lands. Titles with serious flaws
must still be carefully scrutinized in each case. Thus, we
find that the approach in Alonso remains as the more
rational and prudent course than the wholesale ratification
introduced by MO 16-05.1âwphi1
The prospect of litigants losing friar lands they have
possessed for years or decades had never deterred courts
from upholding the stringent requirements of the law for a
valid acquisition of these lands. The court’s duty is to
apply the law. Petitioners’ concern for other landowners
which may be similarly affected by our ruling is, without
doubt, a legitimate one. The remedy though lies elsewhere
-- in the legislature, as what R.A. 9443 sought to rectify.
WHEREFORE, the present motions for reconsideration
are all hereby DENIED withFINALITY.The motions for oral
arguments and further reception of evidence are likewise G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 18, 2008
DENIED.
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
Let entry of judgment be made in due course. FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA.MAMERTA M.
MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
SO ORDERED. ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAELMARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V.
MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R.
MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M.
BOCANEGRA, CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L.
MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON
SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR.,
and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, Represented by
TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of

registration of land titles have helped stabilize land
ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is
security with facility in dealing with land.1 Its fundamental
purpose is to quiet title to land, to perpetually enjoin any
question in the legality of the title,2 hence, the titles issued
under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system
is imperfect in that it remains susceptible to fraud, either in
the original registration proceedings or in subsequent
transactions.3

These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices

relating to the attempts at registration of the subject
property. Necessarily, they call for the correct application
of entrenched principles in land registration. At the same
time, they afford this Court the opportunity to again defend
the Torrens system against unscrupulous elements who
use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to
exert judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail
in the end.

These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the

Special First Division which had initially ruled on them,
most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12 December
2005.4 They were accepted by the Court en banc in a
Resolution dated 26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties
presented their various contentions before the Court in an
oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the
submission of their respective memoranda. While the
cases were under consideration of the Court en banc, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General was
required,5 and a set of new parties was allowed leave to
intervene.6
The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005
Decision, but are summarized herein for convenience.
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City
Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire
has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of
title on file with that office, which were destroyed as a
consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on
specific property registration controversies have been
dealt with by the Court in a number of cases since then.7
These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the
most contentious of those cases thus far.
Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a
petition8 with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for
administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title)
issued in the name of Homer Barque. They alleged that
the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the
1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques
submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the
Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and
a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.
Learning of the Barques’ petition, Severino M. Manotok IV,
et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. The
Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title
formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title
TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the
name of Severino Manotok, et. al. They further alleged
that the Barque title was spurious.
A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both
the Barques’ and the Manotoks’ titles advert to land
belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated in
the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The
Barque title actually involves two parcels of land as part of
Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, with an aggregate area
of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title
concerns only one parcel of land, but with a similar area of
342,945 square meters.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as
reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied9 the petition for
reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:
xxx
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of
171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively,
covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823
Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs.,
covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of
Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document
as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in
his letter dated February 19, 1997.
xxx
The Barques’ motion for reconsideration was denied by
Atty. Bustos in an Order10 dated 10 February 1998;
hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the
reconstituting officer should not have required the
submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and
should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in the
Manotoks’ title. It observed that:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have
established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT
NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof,
valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly
presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles
lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself
acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No.
210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that
TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on
11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and
boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177
absolutely conform to the technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the
B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No.
31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity,
authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was
established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners.
Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof
should be given due course and the same is mandatory….
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy
of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr.
Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR
whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for
lots situated within the National Capital Region including
the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical
Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is
likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines
Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr.
Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to
Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan
FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and
Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter
dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even
confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. …
.…
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February
1997 that his office has no records or information about
Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the
computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands
indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the
microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been
assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page
79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and
Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly
supported by an Offical Receipt ….
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid
coming as it does from the legal repository and duly
signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary
evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be
simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated
statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his
19 February 1997 letter. …
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was
fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that only the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the Manotok title
as a Torrens title. It thus ruled,11 that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby
ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name
of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after
cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name
of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was opposed by the Barques with a prayer that the
reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied12
the Manotoks’ motion for reconsideration and the Barques’
prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques’
petition for review13 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, while the Manotoks’ petition for
review14 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The
Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately
reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the
condition that the Manotok title should first be cancelled by
a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the
Manotoks argued in their own petition that the LRA erred
in imputing that the Manotok title was spurious and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan
filed a motion for leave to intervene.15 She sought the
dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the
subject property.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision16 in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, denying the Barques’ petition and affirming the
LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 Subsequently, the Special Division of
Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended
Decision18 dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is
hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-
22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby
directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine
and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.19
The Manotoks filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, but this was
denied.20
On the other hand, as to the Manotoks’ petition, CA-G.R.
SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision21 on 29 October 2003 which affirmed
the resolution of the LRA.22 The appellate court held that
the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the
Barques’ petition for reconstitution, since there was as yet
no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title.
The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration of this
ruling.23 As had occurred with the Barques’ petition, the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the
Barques’ motion for reconsideration and on 24 February
2004, promulgated its Amended Decision24 wherein it
held that:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October
2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered
ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to
reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.
Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642,
both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title, the
Manotoks filed separate petitions for review before this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335,
respectively. On 2 August 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335.25
On 12 December 2005, the Court’s First Division rendered
its Decision26 affirming the two decisions of the Court of
Appeals.27 The Manotoks filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Court’s First Division denied in
a Resolution dated 19 April 2006.28 Thereafter, the
Manotoks’ filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second
Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for
Reconsideration attached. The Court denied the same in a
Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further
ordered that entry of judgment be made.29 Thus on 2 May
2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries
of Judgment.30
The Barques filed multiple motions with the Court’s First
Division concerning the execution of the judgment,
including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or
For Execution.31 In response, the Manotoks filed an
Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the
Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral
argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the
Special First Division referred these cases to the Court en
banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc
promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases.32
On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo
Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was
attached their petition in intervention.33 Movants alleged
that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335
and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed
that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was
issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of
the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their
petition the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old
as they were purported to be.34 The Director of the Legal
Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
recommended to the Director of the LMB that:
…steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of
TCT No. RT-22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so
that the land covered may be reverted to the State.35
Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in these cases,
directing the OSG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its
Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were
eventually held on 24 July 2007.
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties,
the intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their
respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts,
these petitions are attended by a few procedural
unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en bancs
move on the Special First Division’s referral for
reevaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment
had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the
prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to
proceed with the reevaluation of these cases on a pro hac
vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in
such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court
had felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and
the Special First Division warranted either affirmation or
modification by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the court sitting en banc." It has been argued that the
2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with
precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone
without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to
undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers,
academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier
ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with
respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land
registration system is too vital to be stymied by such
esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts
which implement that system do not deserve needless
hassle.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out
that this Court before had sanctioned the recall entries of
judgment.36 The power to suspend or even disregard
rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final.37 The militating concern for the Court
en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the
particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens
system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence
on the field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the
Court en banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006,
we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005
Decision of the Court’s First Division, as well as the
Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same
Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As
earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice
basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only
the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
In the context of an administrative reconstitution
proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that
the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title
and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title.
The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the
Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to
cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon
appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of
Appeals initially upheld the LRA’s position, but ultimately,
upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation
of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque
title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered
mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in the
Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court
of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the
Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the
Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of
Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the
Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the
Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known
as the Property Registration Decree, provides that "[a]
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack […
and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law."38 Clearly, the
cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally
from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding
revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have
emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA’s
administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have
original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise
adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its
exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law,
particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of
that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for
annulment of judgments of the regional trial court.39 Still,
the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the
Barques’ and the Manotoks’ petitions, albeit in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction40 over the
ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able
to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of
reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have
statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first
place.
Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as
counsel for the government and its agencies including the
LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on
the validity of a certificate of title. It invokes the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section
19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over
"all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of
real property, or any interest therein x x x." That the RTC
has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over actions seeking
the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our
remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not
thousands of examples in jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the
statutory delineation of "exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC," there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise
jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there
is, we can perhaps assess such law separately from B.P.
Blg. 129.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general
functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as
follows:
SEC. 6. General Functions –
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the
following functions:
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final
judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings
and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the
corresponding certificates of title;
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of
Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal
from decision of, Registers of Deeds;
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court
and personnel of the Court of First Instance throughout the
Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties
and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees
promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all
needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and
consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled
under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the
LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques
are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the
power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No.
6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of
titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such
laws take great care to ensure that a petition for
administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing
Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the
LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next
matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in
ordering, conditional as it may have been, the
administrative reconstitution of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732,
administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the
certificates of titles have been lost due to "flood, fire and
other force majeure." The petitioner in such a case is
required to execute an affidavit, containing the following
averments:
(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property
had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the
names of the parties, and whether the registration of such
deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;
(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's
duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional
alterations or erasures;
(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation
or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its
genuineness or due execution or issuance;
(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at
the time it was lost or destroyed;
(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax
declaration regularly issued by the Assessor's Office; and
(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at
least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for
reconstitution.41
Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6732, further provides:
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or
destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in
the name of the same person in whose favor the
reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the
Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the
matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court,
which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the
cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and
render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and
encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate
of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice
and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the
reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by
virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new
certificate of title has been issued, the procedure
prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of
new liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted
certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed
with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new
liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the
latter, after the issuance thereof.42
Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of
fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as
against the party obtaining the same and all persons
having knowledge thereof.
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or
other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a
reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution
and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a
period of not less than two years but not exceeding five
years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand
pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or
assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in
favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to
criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable
for imprisonment of not less than five years but not
exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than
Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and
perpetual disqualification from holding public office.43
These provisions indubitably establish that the
administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended
for non-controversial cases, or especially where the
subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor
of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is
consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings
are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title,
but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title
whose original has been lost or destroyed may be
reissued to its owner.44
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang
Development Corporation v. Valenzuela,45 which we held
that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions
by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by
duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners."46 That such doctrine was established
for cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its
application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None
of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution
in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the
LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for
reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a
Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless
to void the previous title or to diminish its legal effect. Even
assuming that the previously issued title is obviously
fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be
countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse
lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the
LRA, and it appears from the official records that the
subject property is already covered by an existing Torrens
title in the name of another person, there is nothing further
the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal
of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only
relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on
whether or not there is a previously existing title covering
that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at
that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the
competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an
action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing
title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on
behalf of the Republic.
III
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,47 where in the
course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of
title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case
filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the
appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had
been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead,
owing to the "fatal infirmities" of Molina’s cause of action,
the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by
the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of
Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the
Barques’ petition.
The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had
become necessary because in that case the trial court had
denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively
filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for
reconstitution of Molina’s titles. Had these notices of
appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have
then reviewed the trial court’s decision on appeal, with the
ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of
Molina’s titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying
for either of these alternative results–the more prudent
recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of
appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of
Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the
appellate process and the Court itself by directly annulling
Molina’s titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its
annulment of the Manotok title with that undertaken by the
Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of
Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate
jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed
out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the
Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief, even
while reviewing the LRA’s ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot
be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The
fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the
actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have
effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.
IV
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and
the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious
and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even though
no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial
court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a
necessary consequence following our earlier explanation
of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily
barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title.
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the
Court of Appeals to have ruled definitively on the validity of
the Barques’ claim to title. After all, since neither the LRA
nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of
the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim
was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to
effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would
be best for this Court to test the premises under which the
LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the
Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record
before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to
engage in that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the
Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states
that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900.48 The
Barques assert that they bought the subject property from
a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No.
13900 should have been registered under the name of
Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was
registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc.49 This
detracts from the Barques’ claim that the Manotoks do not
have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a
transfer from a title registered under the name of the
Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the
anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision
plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However,
based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as
to its actual existence in the files of the government.
Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between
the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of
FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing,50 nor did the LMB have a
record of the plan.51 However, a microfilm copy of FLS-
3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and
Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Capital Region (DENR-NCR).52 The
copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section,
which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB
as having emanated from its office.53
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB
stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its
microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National
Capital Region Lands Management Sector.54 The LMB,
however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it was
a forged document.55 To amplify the forged nature of the
document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove
that it did not come from its office.56 In a letter to the
administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded
that "it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into
favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it
is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC
for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators
as envisioned by this office under your administration."57
There are significant differences between the technical
description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as stated in
FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the
Barques, and the technical description provided by the
DENR.58 The DENR-confirmed technical description
reads:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate; on the
SE., by Tuazon Estate; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along
line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot
822, all of Piedad Estate.59
However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are
critical changes with respect to the boundaries named
therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the
subdivision plan would read:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco; on the
SE., by Diez Francisco; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along
line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot
822, all of Piedad Estate."60
The Barques offered no credible explanation for the
discrepancy between the subdivision plan it relies on and
the DENR record. They also do not contradict the finding
of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of
the deed of sale allegedly executed between Setosta and
Barque.61
Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land
Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August 2006, that
Section stated that upon examination it was found out that
the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru
its tie line falls outside Quezon City." This is material,
since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the boundaries
of Quezon City.62 A similar finding was made by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or
directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the Barque title
locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823
of the Piedad Estate.63
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the
Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the
Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque
title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution
should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title,
it is apparent that the Barques’ claim of ownership is
exceedingly weak.
V
In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court
could not turn a blind eye on the evidence and points
raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the
Manotoks’ claim are considerable and disturbing enough.
The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy,
is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration system
of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we
remain silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title,
reflective as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated
to eliminate.
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the
petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo
Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these
cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG
seeking that it initiate cancellation/reversion proceedings
against the Manotok title. That petition was referred by the
OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the
claim of the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of
the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings
be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the
Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April
2000.64
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR
Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a
query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued
to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in
answering that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July
2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not
have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of
Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.65 The chain of transfers
leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT
No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of
said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in
the upper half, to the point that it is not visually discernible
what year the same was issued. More crucially, a
certification was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:
After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it
appears that the documents leading to the issuance of
TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the files of
this Office.66
These findings were twice verified with due diligence and
reconfirmed by the DENR, according to Undersecretary
Dela Peña.67
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting the said
investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates
and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the
purported predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks
Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo
Villanueva–certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In
its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999,
the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that
the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic) purports
to be."68
According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually
forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory
issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant
to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. The
registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en
consulta in 2001.
Also on record69 is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823
of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989, authored by
Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
NCR-North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer,
North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823
had actually been in the possession of a Valentin
Manahan beginning in 1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan
applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued
Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering
Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was issued to Valentin Manahan
as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman
Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by
way of Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23, 1974.
Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau
(LMB), Central Office, it appears that original claimant of
lot 823 was Valentin Manahan.70
All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks’ claim
dissuade us from being simply content in reflexively
dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution
filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further
action.
VI
The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to
the problems apparent in the Manotok title is the fact that
we are not engaged in the review of an original action for
the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of
the questionable title were now properly at issue, the
Court would without hesitancy rule on such question.
Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed
warrants more deliberation.
The conservative approach would be to still affirm the
continuing validity of the Manotok title until the proper case
for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial court.
Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse
for us is to direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate
the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823,
formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the
Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for
cancellation if warranted. However, it is already apparent,
following the evaluation of these cases, that there is
evidence–unrefuted thus far–indicating that the Manotoks’
claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002
decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,71 the subject
property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad
Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the
administrative reconstitution of the title to the property,
leading Alonso to file a complaint for nullification of such
title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property.
Alonso’s complaint was dismissed by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with
this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment
on the validity of Cebu Country Club’s administratively
reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that
Cebu Country Club had not been able to establish a clear
title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive
portion of its decision declared "that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate
of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the
Government of the Philippines."
The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for
reconsideration in Alonso,72 extensively discussed why it
had taken that extraordinary step even though the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
had not participated or intervened in that case before the
lower courts.
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part
of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government holds title
and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property
of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper
compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the
Friar Lands Act.
xxx
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its
acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence in
view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for
both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had
become private property. Both parties failed to do so. As
we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to
prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.
xxx
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully
invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government. Since
respondent failed to present the paper trail of the
property's conversion to private property, the lengthy
possession and occupation of the disputed land by
respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject
property being a friar land, remained part of the
patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of
patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning
decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into
ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do
not run against the State, unless therein expressly
provided, is founded on "the great principle of public
policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids
that the public interests should be prejudiced by the
negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided."
xxx
Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the Government
does not amount to reversion without due process of law
insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed
property is a Friar Land and both parties failed to show
that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of
the State or that it had become private property.73
The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because,
as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar
Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may
be disposed of by the Government only under that law.
Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to
secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not
yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment
of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is
evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that
the Manotoks’ claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an
ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is
in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise
structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence
de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able
to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court
of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel
idea. It has been undertaken before – in Republic v. Court
of Appeals74 and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in
Manotok v. Court of Appeals.75 Our following explanation
in Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original
cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to
resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the
evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an
appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need
not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review
findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are
generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body
that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary
evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a
factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the
former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear
and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly
to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic
Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural
Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or ‘areas
reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process
the validity of such postulates and the respective
measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of
Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and
rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter.
Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant
procedure.

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as
governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2,
Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio,
direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of
fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a
judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can
be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only,
and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the
admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise
mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon
the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In
Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of
the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The
same result can obtain herein.76
The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of
this Court, in receiving and evaluating evidence should be
whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a
valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the
Piedad Estate, which was a Friar
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and
submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the
Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the
Court’s First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is
RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision
dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12
March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the
Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24
June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-
547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this
Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these
remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.

Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide

whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted,
similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in
Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the
respective claims to title by other parties such as the
Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may
submit on their behalf, may have an impact on the correct
determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would
thus be prudent, in assuring the accurate evaluation of the
question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG, to
participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the
proper claimant to the subject property, the Court would
take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final
relief.

For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is

tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its
findings and recommended conclusions within three (3)
months from notice of this Resolution.

To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the

factual record, the Office of the Solicitor General is
directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from
the Land Management Bureau and the
G.R. No. 111732 February 20, 1996
NEW DURAWOOD CO., INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELIX S. CABALLES, as
Judge, RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, WILSON M.
GAW, ORLANDO S. BONGAT , DURAWOOD
CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY CO., INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to
issue a new owner's duplicate of a Torrens certificate of
title if it is shown that the existing owner's copy has not, in
fact and in truth, been lost or destroyed? The Court
resolved this issue in the negative in this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 promulgated on May
31, 1993 and the subsequent Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. The said Rulings dismissed the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed
the "order"3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal4 dated April 16, 1991 in LRC Case No. 91-
924, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) Declaring the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 140486, 15645 and 140485 which
were lost, null and void and of no further force and effect
and in lieu thereof,
(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said
titles be issued to the petitioner giving them the same faith
and credit and carrying over the same terms and
conditions appearing on the originals thereof, upon
payment of the required fees.
SO ORDERED.
By Resolution of the First Division dated November 15,
1995, this case along with several others was transferred
to THIRD DIVISION. After due consultation and
deliberation, the Court assigned the undersigned ponente
to write this Decision.
The Facts
On February 14, 1990, a "Petition for Judicial
Reconstitution of the Lost Owner's Duplicate Certificates
of TCT Nos. 140486; 156454 and 140485"5 was filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal by
petitioner-corporation, "represented by its Branch
Manager, Wilson M. Gaw. . ." Attached to said petition
was an "Affidavit of Loss" dated December 31, 1990 6 of
respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the stockholders of
petitioner-corporation.
Finding the petition "to be sufficient in form and in
substance," respondent Judge set the case for hearing on
March 18, 1991. On April 16, 1991, respondent Judge
issued the questioned order.
Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the
original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file
with the Register of Deeds of Rizal had been cancelled
and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and
200102 had been issued in the name of respondent
Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc.
Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner - after
investigation - found out about the reconstitution
proceeding in the respondent trial court. So, on July 17,
1991, petitioner filed7 suit in the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment of
the assailed order in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by
respondent Judge. It also prayed for the cancellation of
the new certificates (TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and
200102). On May 31, 1993, the respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed Decision and on August
30, 1993, the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the
Supreme Court.
The Issues
Petitioner brought up the following ground as basis for its
petition:
The Court of Appeals gravely abused its authority in not
declaring the order of respondent Judge Caballes in LRC
Case No. 91-924 null and void for want of jurisdiction and
in not declaring that the reconstitution of the owner's
duplicate transfer certificates of title Nos. N-140486, N-
140485 and 156454 was obtained through fraud.
Petitioner argues that a reconstitution proceeding is one in
rem and thus jurisdiction can be acquired only through
publication and notice sent pursuant to Section 13,
Republic Act No. 26. It also alleges that fraud is manifest
(1) from the insufficient allegations of the petition filed
before the trial court, as it (the petition) does not mention
the names of adjoining land owners and interested
persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of loss attached
to the petition.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that in 1990,
these three lots were sold by petitioner to Durawood
Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. but the sale in their
favor could not be registered because "the certificates of
title. . . were lost." They also allege that the applicable law
is Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529,
and not Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and that fraud, in order to
serve as basis for the annulment of a judgment "must be
extrinsic or collateral in character", which is not the case in
the action before the court a quo. They also fault "(t)he
deliberate failure of Dy Quim Pong (petitioner's board
chairman) and his family, who constitute the majority of
the stockholders and directors of (herein petitioner-
corporation), to disclose the whereabouts (of) there (sic)
son, the President and General Manager Francis
Dytiongsee . . . " who allegedly executed the deed of sale
of the lots and who allegedly claimed that the owner's
copies of the TCTs were lost.
In its Reply, petitioner contends that "the very procedure
provided under Sec. 109, PD 1529, which they (private
respondents) insist is the applicable provision of law in the
matter, was not strictly followed . . ." It also argues that the
owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs were all along in the
custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom private respondents
should have sued to compel him to surrender the same in
order that the alleged deed or sale in favor of private
respondent could be registered.
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent Wilson Gaw had
no authority to institute the petition for reconstitution in the
trial court because "(t)he Court of Appeals itself, in its
questioned resolution stated that said board resolution
(authorizing Gaw) was passed without the required
quorum."
From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as
follows:
(1) Which law governs the issuance of new owner's
duplicate certificates of title in lieu of lost ones?
(2) Did the respondent trial court have jurisdiction to order
the issuance of the new owner's duplicate certificates?
(3) Was the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate
certificates of title obtained through fraud?
The First Issue:
Law Governing Issuance of
Lost Owner's Duplicate Titles
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the
following provisions referred to by the parties:
(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26:8
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed
under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall
likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address
is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name
of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the
date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed
by the court,"
(2) Section 109 P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate
certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by
the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon
as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate
is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the
fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person in interest and
registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person
in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing,
direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which
shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all
purposes of this decree.
A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section
109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for
issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title
which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the other hand,
R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of last or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of
Deeds. This is expressly provided for under Section 110 of
P.D. 1529 as follows:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of
Torrens title. - Original copies of certificates of title lost or
destroyed in the offices of Registers of Deeds as well as
liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by
such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26
insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree. The
procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed
of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land
titles due to fire, flood or other force majure as determined
by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority:
Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or
damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total
number in the possession of the Office of the Register of
Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the number
of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less that five
hundred (500).
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial
reconstitution shall be furnished the Register of Deeds of
the place where the land is situated and to the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order
or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of
title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice
of such order or judgment without any appeal having been
filed by any such officials." (As amended by R.A. 6732,
emphasis supplied)
The Second Issue: Jurisdiction
In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.9 this Court ruled:
In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 482
[1991]), on facts analogous to those involved in this case,
this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not
been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.
Consequently the decision may be attacked any time.
In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of
title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the
petitioner's chairman of the board and whose family
controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates
were not in fact "lost or destroyed", there was no necessity
for the petition filed in the trial court for the "issuance of
New Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title: . . ." In fact,
the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the
issuance of new certificates. Hence, the newly issued
duplicates are themselves null and void.
It is obvious that this lapse happened because private
respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the
procedure set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already
stated, governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate
certificates of title.
Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that "due
notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's
duplicate "shall be sent by the owner as by someone in his
behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied).
In this case, while an affidavit or loss was attached to the
petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the
Register of Deeds.
Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by
their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no
other recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec.
107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in
case of the refusal or failure of the holder - in this case,
the petitioner - to surrender the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, is a "petition in court to compel surrender
of the same to the Register of Deeds", and not a petition
for reconstitution.
The Third Issue: Fraud
The respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words,
"confine(d) its discussion" 10 in the assailed Decision only
to the ground of fraud. It ruled that the Rte's decision could
be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is
shown - that is, when the fraudulent acts prevented a party
"from exhibiting fully his side of the case . . .". Hence,
petitioner could not claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it
was duly represented by Gaw in the reconstitution
proceeding.
The appellate court explained that while there may not
have been a quorum during the board meeting of
petitioner-corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution
authorizing Gaw to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed,
this did "not mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc.
cannot be bound by Gaw's action'' because "no howl of
protest, complaint or denial came from (said corporation)",
and that said corporation in fact had taken advantage of
the benefits therefrom. Hence, petitioner is estopped from
questioning Gawls acts. The appellate Court was of the
belief that petitioner-corporation ratified Gaw's "authority"
by acquiescence to his acts. The respondent Court thus
concluded that petitioner-corporation's "claim of being a
victim of extrinsic fraud is baseless."
Be that as it may, in the case before us, whether Gaw was
authorized to file the suit or not is of little significance in
finally resolving this case. Jurisdiction is and remains the
main issue. Since we already concluded earlier that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction, necessarily its
judgment must fall.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed
decision SET ASIDE and REVERSED; the proceedings in
LRC Case No. 91-924 ANNULLED; and the order issued
therein dated April 15, 1991 as well as the reconstituted
Transfer Certificates of Title issued pursuant thereto,
namely, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 in the
name of private respondent declared NULL and VOID.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

We are appalled by this rather novel interpretation of

corporate law. It is clear that, there having been no
quorum present during the meeting in question, the board
of directors could not have validly given Gaw any express
authority to file the petition. Upon the other hand, the
doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply as to Gaw
because, being a mere branch manager, he could not be
looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied
or "apparent" power to file suit for and in behalf of a
corporation 11 . Neither will estoppel prevent the
corporation from questioning Gaw's acts. Precisely, these
acts were hidden from the company and its top officers.
How then can estoppel attach? 12

Suffice it to say then, that by his surreptitious filing of the

petition for reconstitution without authority - express or
implied - of his employer, Gaw enabled respondent
corporation to acquire the certificates of title in a manner
contrary to law.

In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies

of Torrens titles, it is essential - as provided under Sec.
109 of P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) - that the trial court
take steps to assure itself that the petitioner is the
"registered owner or other person in interest". Otherwise,
new owner's duplicate certificates might be issued in favor
of impostors who could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate
or otherwise deal in and with real estate in mockery of the
Torrens system of titling properties.
G.R. No. L-68303 January 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (now Court of Appeals), and PRINCESS EMME
ATIK KIRAM, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, *
ordering the reconstitution of title in favor of private
respondent.
The properties in dispute number three undivided lots [Lot
No. 465-A; Bsd-864, CAD-159, Lot No. 2408-A, Psd-864
(Lot 2457-Cad. 99), and Lot No. 2410-B, Psd-864 (Lot
2461 Cad 99)] altogether consisting of a total of 1,024
hectares of ricelands. They are all located in Tiptipon,
Panamao, Sulu. The title thereto stood allegedly in the
name of Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who died in 1936. The
private respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims
that the original certificate of title (No. P-133) thereto was
destroyed as a consequence of a fire that gutted the office
of the Register of Deeds of Sulu sometime in February,
1974. She likewise alleges that the owner's copy thereof
was lost on account of the same misfortune. On October
18,1979, she went to the then Court of First Instance of
Sulu, Branch I, at Jolo, now Regional Trial Court, the
Honorable Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge, presiding, for
reconstitution.
The then Court of First Instance ruled for the private
respondent, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The Republic
would now have the application dismissed on the grounds
of: (1) lack of proper publication; (2) absence of proof that
Original Certificate of Title No. P-133 was in force and in
effect at the time of its alleged loss; and (3) failure to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26.
The then Court of First Instance granted reconstitution on
the strength, among other things, of. (1) the sheriffs return
of service; (2) certificate of publication in the Official
Gazette; (3) the respective survey plans and technical
descriptions of the properties; and (4) the tax declarations
covering the same. The private respondent likewise
presented a copy of Act No. 3430, "An Act to provide for
the reservation of certain lands of the public domain on the
Island of Sulu, the usufruct thereof to be granted to the
Sultan of Sulu and his heirs," among them, those subject
of the petition, as well as a copy of proclamation No. 1530,
"Reserving for resettlement purposes certain parcels of
land situated in Panamao, Talipao and Tiptipon, Province
of Sulu, Philippines, under the administration and
disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform,"
including the three parcels aforementioned. According to
the private respondent, Sultan Kiram acquired the
properties in question pursuant to these land grants.
The Solicitor General presented in the trial court no
opposition to the application, and based on the evidence
of the private respondent, the assailed order was issued
on June 4, 1980. The Solicitor General appealed to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
which however affirmed in toto, on May 24, 1984, the
order of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
We rule for the Republic.
It is not disputed, to begin with, that the notices (of
hearing) were not posted on the main entrances of the
provincial and municipal halls of the locality in which the
lands are located. Under Section 13, of Republic Act No.
26:
SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition,
filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main of the municipality
or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial
building and of the municipal building at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause
a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall
state, among other things, the number of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons
in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location,
area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear
and file their claim or objections to the petition. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed
by the court.
We have held that such a mode of publication is a
jurisdictional requirement. The failure on the part of the
applicant to comply with it confers no jurisdiction upon the
court. 1
Neither is there any showing that the adjacent owners or
other interested parties were actually notified of the
pending application. This too taints the petition with a
jurisdictional defect. 2
It is not enough that there is publication in the Official
Gazette. Publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is
but one requirement. In addition, Republic Act No. 26
decrees that such a notice be posted "on the main
entrance" of the corresponding provincial capitol and
municipal building, as well as served actually upon the
owners of adjacent lands. Failure to comply with such
requisites will nullify the decree of reconstitution.
It shall be noted that a judicial reconstitution of title
partakes of a land registration proceeding. 3 Thus, notice
of the proceedings must be done in the manner set forth
by the letter of the law.
It is futile for the private respondent, in connection with the
charge that she failed to post the notice at the main
entrance of the municipal building, to invoke the fiction of
"performance of duty." 4 The question that remains
unanswered is whether or not she had in fact complied
with the requirement. The Court notes that all she
presented was a certificate of service prepared by the
sheriff, embodying an order addressed to the Station
Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to post the proper notices
and a certificate of publication in the Official Gazette. The
order, however, of posting forwarded by the sheriff to the
local Station Commander is not proof that the Station
Commander had in fact complied with such an order. The
presumption of "performance of duty" cannot therefore
apply. Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls upon the
applicant to submit proof of that posting. 5 He cannot rely
on the presumption. In this case, fiction must yield to fact.
The Republic cannot be faulted for nursing doubts about
the private respondent's assertions. In the first place, the
private respondent claims that two deeds have been lost,
the original and the duplicate certificates of title. She
furthermore relies on quite doubtful sources as bases for
the reconstitution sought, i.e., certain statutes making
references to the properties. In such a case, the courts are
admonished to take utmost caution that the petition and
the evidence presented to support it can stand judicial
scrutiny. 6
It is not sufficient, as in the case at bar, that the Solicitor
General failed to interpose an opposition to the
application. The court must nonetheless convince itself
that the petitioner's evidence is substantial enough to
warrant reconstitution.
This Court agrees with the Republic that the private
respondent, based on the evidence, has not sufficiently
shown her right to a reconstitution. Neither Act No. 3430
nor Proclamation No. 1530 confers title to any party over
the properties mentioned therein. On the other hand,
Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing A Special
Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates
of Title Lost Or Destroyed," enumerates the sources on
which the reconstituted certificate of title may be based. It
should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list
sources that evidence title or transactions affecting title to
property. 7 When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)] therefore
speaks of "[a]ny other document,"8 it must refer to similar
documents previously enumerated therein. The statutes
relied upon by the private respondent, so we hold, are not
ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to.
Furthermore, they do not contain the specifics required by
Section 12(a) and (b) of the title reconstitution law. 9
We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the
two pieces of legislation earlier adverted to, Act No. 3430
and Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the
petition for reconstitution. The private respondent must
have sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-interest had
in fact availed himself of the benefits of the land grant the
twin statutes confer.
Proclamation No. 1530, moreover, does not specifically
name Sultan Kiram as the owner of the lands reserved for
resettlement. While Act No. 3430 does, this measure was
enacted as far back as 1928. 10 Since then, the properties
could have undergone successive transfers. What is more,
there is no showing that the title certificate sought to be
reconstituted, Original Certificate of Title No. P-133,
stands, in fact, in the name of Sultan Kiram. The fact
therefore that Act No. 3430 grants title to the Sultan (on
the assumption that it does) does not yield the
presumption that Original Certificate of Title No. P-133
refers to one and the same property.
The documents alluded to under Sections 2(f) and 3(f),
finally, must be resorted to in the absence of those
preceding in order. There is no showing here that the
private respondent had in fact sought to secure such prior
documents (except with respect to the owner's duplicate
copy of title, which she claims had been likewise
destroyed) and failed to find them. This endangers doubts,
indeed, about the existence of the alleged title itself.
The tampering of genuine certificates of title itself.
The tamppering of genuine certificates of title and the
issuance of face ones are a widespread malaise that has
seriously threatened the very stability of the Torrens
system. Worse, the courts have been at times unwitting
accomplices in these acts of corruption. In Alabang, supra,
we sounded this admonition:
... We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations
and controversies that have been spawned by the
reckless and hasty grant of such reconsitution of alleged
lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous
purchasers who have been victimized only to find that the
"lands" purchased by them were covered by forged or fake
titles or their areas simply "expanded" through "table
surveys" with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials.
an admonition we find fitting and proper to reiterate here.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated May 24, 1984 and its
Resolution dated August 1, 1984 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Reconstitution of Title is
ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
G.R. No. L-55771 November 15, 1982
TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E.
VALENZUELA, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS
A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F. PASCUAL, ANSELMO F.
PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL, PASCUALA A.
MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, and
CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.
Ramon S. Nievo for private respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme
Court that are directly related to and squarely Identified
with the petition at bar, namely, (1) Director of Lands,
petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents,
Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing,
intervenors, No. L-45168, September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA
238, (2) The Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court of
Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal,
respondents, Greenfield Development Corporation,
intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon
D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102
SCRA 370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel F.
Valenzuela, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 54094, August
30, 1982.
In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention
of the intervenors filed before the Supreme Court at the
stage of the proceedings where trial of the petition for
judicial reconstitution had already been concluded, the
judgment thereon granting the reconstitution had been
promulgated and on appeal by the losing party, the same
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the petition for
certiorari to review said judgment was already submitted
for decision in the Supreme Court. The second case is
Our decision on the merits of the certiorari petition wherein
We ruled, among others, that the judgment of the lower
court granting the petition for judicial reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda.
de Bernal covering two parcels of land located in Barrio
San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Rizal (now Barrio
Cupang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated
as Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 based on a survey
approved July 25, 1911 with an area of 717,523 square
meters and 717,539 square meters, respectively, was null
and void for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Republic Act No. 26. We further held that
TCT No. 42449 was fake and spurious.
In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay
City, Branch XXIX, in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P Land
Registration Case No. 9368, Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela,
presiding, ordering the reconstitution from Decree No.
15170 and the plan and technical descriptions, the alleged
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy over
Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in Barrio
San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null
and void.
The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity
of the same judgment ordering the reconstitution of the
Certificate of Title, original and owner's duplicate copy,
over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same plan, Plan
11-4374, in the name of the said Manuela Aquial,
promulgated in the same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P,
Land Registration Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance
of Pasay City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela,
presiding. The said case at bar was brought by petitioner
Tahanan Development Corporation while the third case
was instituted by Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.
Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided
the questions of law raised therein, the proceedings being
the special civil action of certiorari attacking the jurisdiction
of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition for
review, a more extended discussion of the issues on the
merits is necessary and more appropriate. Thus, We start
by noting that herein petition for review seeks to set aside
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated April
30, 1980 reversing an earlier decision of the same Court
dated November 16, 1979 in C. A.-G.R. No. SP-08680-R
entitled "Tahanan Development Corporation, petitioner,
versus Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents,"
as well as the subsequent resolution dated December 8,
1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, further
seeks the setting aside of the decision rendered by the
latter in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration
Case No. 9368, dated October 5, 1978 in favor of herein
private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and his co-heirs,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby
ordered to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit X,
the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the Court-
the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy,
in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with
residence at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City,
giving the certificate appropriate number which will not
conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of
the prescribed fees. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed
to forward a certified copy of this decision and all
documents necessary for the reconstitution. (Rollo, p. 66).
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977,
private respondent hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals,
claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on
January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution
of lost certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26
docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land
Registration Case No. 9368 in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, presided by respondent
Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, while yet single and up to the time she got
married, was the registered owner of those contiguous
lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in
Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, and more particularly bounded as
follows:
1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. ___),
situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal (Now BO. CUPANG,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Three
Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Six Hundred and
Twenty-Two (375,622) Square Meters. Bounded on the
NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 by Pedro L.
Flores who is in occupation of the same and of which
notice maybe served at his office address at No. 959 C.
Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or at his residence at No.
707 A. Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on the
SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374)
by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private
corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of
which notice may be served to it CIO Constancio B.
Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board at No.
513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong, Rizal:
2). A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan 11-4374, L.R.C. Record
No. ___), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio,
Municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal (Now Bo.
Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Fifty-
Six Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square
Meters. Bounded on the NW., and SW., along lines 1-2-3
(portion of Lot 1, Plan 11-4374) and on the SE., NE., and
NW., along lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-4374),
all by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private
corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of
which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B.
Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No.
513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong, Rizal. The above lots are more particularly
described in herein attached Decree No. 15170 issued on
March 4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description
contained in the corresponding original certificate of title
(original and owner's duplicate copy) issued therefor in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 on file with the Land
Registration Commission; that said lands have not been
included in any cadastral survey;
3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their
predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and
still are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse,
continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described
lands as owners in fee simple since time immemorial,
devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture;
4. That the said original certificate of title, original and
owner's duplicate copies, covering said lands have been
lost or destroyed in the last World War II and diligent
efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said
title was subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any kind
and nature up to the present; that the records of the land
registration case of the same lots have likewise been lost
and destroyed except such records as hereinafter set
forth;
5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales
certificate or any land grant over said lands to any person
or entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or
any lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title
have ever been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her
first and second husbands, Esteban Pascual and Cornelio
Mejia and petitioners herein have not at any time delivered
the Owner's Duplicate copy of subject certificate of title to
any person or entity to secure the payment of or
performance of any obligation whatsoever nor any
transaction entered into by them by which certain deed or
other instruments related to or affecting the subject lands
presented for or pending registration in the office of the
Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila;
6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao,
Quezon City on January 26, 1967 leaning the
aforementioned estate to the herein petitioners as her
heirs, without debts;
7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners
desire in this petition to reconstitute the lost original
certificate of title, Original and Owner's Duplicate copies,
covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein above
described, on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170
issued on March 4, 1914 (Annex "A") and the certification
thereof by the Chief, Docket Division, Land Registration
Commission (Annex "A-1 "); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from
microfilm Reel 560 under Accession No. 385657 on file
with the Bureau of lands (Annex "B "); and certification
thereof (Annex "B-1 "), and the corresponding affidavit of
the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands,
attesting to such fact (Annex "B-2"); (3) Certified Technical
Description of Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan 11-4374, by
the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Annexes
"C" and "C-1 "); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief,
Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record
of any Sales Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant
affecting or embracing the subject lands to any person
(Annex "D "); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes "E", "E-1", "E-
2" and "E-3"); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes "F" and "F-1 ");
(7) Affidavit of adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed
before Notary Public Atty. F.S. Guanco for Quezon City
(Annex "G"); (8) White print copy of Relocation Plan dated
July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer
Restituto L. Beltran who conducted said relocation survey
of Lots Nos. 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the
adjoining owners (Annex " H "). All of which are xerox
copies and made integral parts of this petition but the
originals thereof shall be presented at the hearing.
On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by
the Court and likewise, for its materiality in resolving the
issue of jurisdiction, We quote the material portions
thereof below:

NOTICE OF HEARING
A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed
by petitioners, thru counsel, alleging, among others, that:
(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same
allegations in the Petition for Reconstitution hereinbefore
quoted.)
Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will
be heard before this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor, New
City Hall Building, F.B. Harrison, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
on the 18th day of November, 1977, at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning, at which date, time and place, all interested
parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause, if any
why said petition should not be granted.
Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official
Gazette and in the Newspaper of general circulation in the
Greater Manila Area, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and
likewise posted in the bulletin board of the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City.
Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and
the Bureau of Lands be furnished this Notice and copies of
the petition, together with its annexes.
WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA,
presiding Judge of the Court, this 5th day of October,
1977.
(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE Branch Clerk of Court
The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in
the issues of November 14, 21 and 28 1977 (Exhibits "A",
"B", "B-I", "C", "D", "D-1", "E" and "E-1").Copies of the
same notice were also posted by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio
de Guzman of Pasay City in the Bulletin Board of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located
at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City on
October 5, 1977 (Exhibit "F"). On the same date, copies of
the notice were served to the Office of the Solicitor
General and on November 9, 1977. to his Commissioner
of Land Registration by Deputy Sheriff De Guzman
(Exhibit "F"), together with copies of the petition and its
annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to the adjacent
owners indicated in the Petition and Notice of Hearing,
namely, Pedro L. Flores with address at 959 C. Lerma
Street, Sampaloc, Manila and Constancio B. Maglana as
President and Chairman of the Board of Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation with office and postal address at
513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, are their respective affidavits dated
July 17, 1974 and August 6,1974 (Exhibits "H" and "I").
The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida,
Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
on April 14, 1978 an Opposition to the petition on the
following grounds:
1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case
No. 504-P, Nicolas A. Pascual, et al. claiming to be the
heirs of the late Manuela Aquial, had previously filed a
similar petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost original
certificate of title supposed to have been issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 under Decree No. 15170 in
the name of Manuela Aquial over the same parcels of
land, Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, which previous petition,
docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal,
appears to have been dismissed, Oppositor Director of
Lands hereby reserves his right to present later a certified
copy of the order of dismissal, as he has not yet received
a reply of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance,
Branch XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14, 1978,
duplicate copy hereto attached as Annex "A", requesting
for a certified copy of the order or decision resolving said
Reconstitution Case No. 77, which order or decision may
be a dismissal with prejudice and may thus be a bar to the
filing of the instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based
on the principle of res judicata;
2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the
aforementioned Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo.
San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal were issued Decree No.
15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 and that the
corresponding original certificate of title for said Decree
were registered and issued under the said Decree, the
truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration
Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason,
married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eugenio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, covering a parcel of land
with an area of 422 square meters situated at Bambang;
Pasig, Rizal, and not for Lots 2 and 4 Plan 11-4374 with a
total area of 431,917 square meters situated at Bo. San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal. These facts are evidenced by
the letter dated February 28, 1978 of the Acting Register
of Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978 of the
same Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, and the Report
dated November 11, 1974 of the then Register of Deeds of
Rizal submitted to him as required by the court in the
previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch
XXXVI of this Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox
copies of said letters and report are hereto attached as
ANNEX "B", ANNEX "C" and ANNEX "D", respectively;
3. That from the documents ANNEXES "B", "C", and "D", it
is very clear that no original certificate of title had or has
been issued to Manuela Aquial covering Lots 2 and 4,
Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque,
Rizal; that consequently, no original certificate of title in
the name of Manuela Aquial has been lost; and that
therefore, this instant petition for reconstitution of an
alleged lost original certificate of title has no basis in fact
and in law, there being no title to be reconstituted under
Republic Act No. 26;
4. That the applicants for land registration in Land
Registration Case No. 9368, Decree No. 15170, of the
then Court of Land Registration were Eugenio Tuason,
married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial;
and that the land subject thereof was a parcel of land in
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and not a parcel of land in San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;
5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration
Case No. 9368 issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al.
for a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal could not
have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial for
a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;
6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX "A" of
the petition in this case which is alleged to be a copy of
Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial
is very questionable on the following grounds and points:
(a) ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy not of the original of
Decree No. 15170 or of an authenticated copy thereof but
only of an unauthenticated true copy of said decree as
indicated by the typewritten words 'A true copy:' at the
bottom of the left hand corner of page (2) of said
document;
(b) The said typewritten words 'A true copy:' is not signed
or even initiated by any competent officer of the court of
the Land Registration Commission to give it authenticity;
(c) That ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy of the original of
Decree No. 15170 of an authenticated copy thereof but
only of a true copy is also seen from the first line on top of
the document on page 1 which reads: 'Copy of Decree No.
15170'. An original of a Decree is issued without the words
'Copy of' prefixed before the Decree Number;
(d) ANNEX "A" being a mere xerox copy of an
authenticated 'true copy', it is very questionable why the
true copy which was reproduced by the xerox copy
marked ANNEX "A" bears the written signature of the
Clerk of Court, Enrique Altavas by way of attestation of the
decree. It is well known that a mere true copy of any
document, public or private, does not bear the written
signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the
document. Only the original or duplicate of the document
may bear the written signature of the party or officer
signing or issuing the document;
(e) In ANNEX "A-1" of the petition in the instant case,
alleged to be a certification of Decree No. 15170, what
appears to have been certified by the Chief, Docket
Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the
document (Decree No. 15170) 'is a true and correct
reproduction of a true copy of Decree No. 15170.' Where
is the original or an authentic signed duplicate of Decree
No. 15170?
(f) ANNEX "F", either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the
true copy reproduced by the xerox copy, is an
UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the alleged decree, and
therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26;
7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the
petition, petitioners by themselves and thru their
predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have not been in
the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the
lands subject of their petitions since time immemorial, the
truth of the matter being that their alleged occupation is
only of recent vintage, having declared the lots for taxation
only in 1973, beginning with the year 1970 (ANNEXES
"E", "E-1", "E-2", and "E-3"), and paid the taxes for 1970 to
1973 in lump sum on September 6,1973 (ANNEXES "F "
and "F-11');
8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been
applied for and registered under the Land Registration
Law, Act No. 496, the same being lands of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and
are portions of the adjoining public land as indicated in
Plan II-4374, subject to disposition only under the
pertinent and applicable provisions of the Public Land Act,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;
9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case
have been established and therefore, this Honorable Court
has not acquired jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case
under Republic Act No. 26, for the reason that petitioners
thru counsel have failed to serve notice of the petition in
this case to the owners of the adjoining properties. The
affidavits of the alleged adjoining owners,, Constancio B.
Maglana and Pedro L. Flores submitted by petitioners as
Exhibits " H " and " I " respectively, and which were
executed in 1974 before the petition in the instant case
was filed on November 15, 1977, cannot be validly
admitted as substitute for service of notice of the petition
to the adjoining owners as required under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26; and
10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be
dismissed outright for lack of factual and legal basis, the
Decree No. 15170 involved by petitioners having been
issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio Tuason,
et al. for a different parcel of land located in another barrio
and municipality.
On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the
hearing as indicated in the Notices, the Court re-set the
hearing of the case to February 27, 1978, it appearing that
the Notice of Hearing had not been published in the
Official Gazette as per information relayed to the Court by
the petitioners. Again, the hearing set on February 27,
1978 was re-scheduled to April 14, 1978 in view of the
manifestation of the representative of the Bureau of Lands
that they have not received copy of the petition. Once
more, the latter setting was cancelled and re-set to June 2,
l978 on the ground that the counsel for petitioner informed
the Court that they have just received the Opposition
dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Daniel Florida.
Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the
Opposition alleging, among others, that they had filed a
previous petition docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI,
Makati, Rizal which was voluntarily withdrawn by them on
grounds stated by their counsel in his Motion to Withdraw
without prejudice and granted by the Court in its Order
dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Rizal mentioning that Decree No. 15170
appears in the name of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T.
Changco in Original Certificate of Title No. 724 does not
preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170 issued in the
name of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Case No.
9368 since, assuming the report of the Register of Pasig
to be accurate, it could have been a clerical error or
mistake of the clerk in the office of the Register of Deeds
in typing on the Original Certificate of Title No. 724 the
same Decree No. and the same Registration No. as that
issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that there may be
two decrees bearing the same number but involving
different parcels of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in
the same manner that there may be two or three
certificates of titles bearing the same number but in the
names of different owners covering properties in different
places and issued at different periods of time.
The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its
decision dated October 5, 1978. The court said:
The documents presented by the petitioners to establish
the existence of the prerequisites to reconstitution of the
title in the name of their predecessor-in-interests were
either admitted or not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo J.
Flores in representation of the Director of Lands, except
Exhibits O and P on Plan II-4374 on the alleged ground
that they were reproduced from a microfilm reel and not
from available approved records, as well as Exhibits X, X-
1 and X-2 (Decree No. 15170), on the ground that they
were mere xerox copies not of the original of the Decree
or an authenticated copy thereof.
Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced
the petitioners to seek reconstitution of the title of their
predecessor-in-interests. The original of the Decree was
sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of the
certificate of title. It was in the latter office that it was lost.
The copy left in the Land Registration Commission is
authenticated by the signature of the Clerk of Court of the
Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To limit the
bases of reconstitution to originals of the official
documents is to defeat the purpose of the law. Reason
and the law would not justify private properties to remain
forever with their titles unreconstituted.
The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of
many government records during the last world war and
defeats the purpose of the law on reconstitution. If those
records were not destroyed, there would be no need for
reconstitution. The loss and destruction underscore the
need for reconstitution. Reconstitution or reconstruction
relates to lost original records in the government offices,
Any data available may suffice if the Court is convinced of
the existence of the title being reconstituted. This is in
accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Villa vs. Fabricante, L-5531, June 30, 1953. If the law
allows reconstitution from testimony a fortiori it must allow
reconstitution upon xerox copies of documents
microfilmed in anticipation of possible loss thereof. The
microfilm underscores the existence of the documents, for
without them there would be nothing to microfilm, The
Government has enjoined by Decree the microfilming of
important documents.
By and large, the presence of the signature of the Clerk of
Court of the land registration court on the Decree attests
to its genuineness and authenticity, He is too dead to
falsify the Decree Exhibit X.
Except Exhibit 5 which is a xerox copy of a cancelled
owner's duplicate copy of Certificate of Title No. 724 and
which mentions Decree No. 15170, the oppositor's
documentary evidence are letters of inquiry and replies
thereto. By their very nature, they are too weak as basis to
establish any fact. The writers thereof were not presented
as witnesses to be cross-examined on their contents. The
witness who was presented to Identify the exhibits was not
the receiver nor custodian of said communications. He
admittedly does not know the contents thereof.
Exhibit 5, a supposed cancelled owner's duplicate of the
title of Eugenio Tuason which mentions Decree No. 15170
refers to a 422-square meter lot in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal
which is different from the Decree Exhibit X for the two lots
in Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal having a total area of
431,917 square meters. The existence of the owner's
duplicate copy in the office of the register of deeds without
the original is a suspicious circumstance never explained
by anybody. The mystery goes deeper if we consider that
no other document, private or public, was presented to
support the existence of the original title or the decree
upon which the title was based. Nobody even testified on
the existence of this Exhibit 5 in the office of the register of
deeds.
The Decree Exhibit X enjoys the probative value of an
official document existing in the proper depositary
unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion. The
law reposes probative force upon the official documents
as it presumes fidelity in the discharge of duties of public
officers. The authenticity of the Decree issued in favor of
petitioners' predecessor having been established, the
Decree Exhibit X 'shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto' and 'shall be conclusive upon all persons,
including the Insular Government and all branches
thereof,' and 'incontrovertible' after one year from the
issuance of the Decree (Sec. 30, Act 496).
Reconstitution of destroyed certificates of title is
mandatory (Director vs. Gan Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951).
The bases for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title
are numerous (Secs. 2 and 3, Rep. Act 26). Among them
are:
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration ...
(Sec. 2, Rep. Act 26)
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court,
is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title (Secs. 2, 3, Rep. Act 26).
In the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming
evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their
petition for the reconstitution of the title in the name of
Manuela Aquial, the court has no alternative to granting
the petition. Republic Act 26 provides:
SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the
documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the
property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate
of title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and
that the description, area and boundaries of the property
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost
or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution
shall be issued.
The requirements of Sections 5, 12, and 13 of Republic
Act 26 have been complied with. The Court has no reason
to doubt the credibility of the witnesses for the petitioners,
particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had
occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to,
being parts of their functions and duties in their respective
offices.
The Court discerns nothing from the opposition which Atty.
Florida filed for the Director of Lands except his seal to
protect possible interests of the Government. From the
sparks created by his opposition, the Court saw the crystal
truth.
Copy of the above decision was served the Land
Registration Commission on October 16, 1978.

On November 15, 1978, herein petitioner Tahanan
Development Corporation filed with the Court a quo
verified Petition To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings, alleging that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime in 1971, in the course of its operations,
Oppositor acquired and became the registered owner of
six (6) parcels of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio,
Paranaque, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and aggregating
some sixty (60) hectares in area; xerox copies of the
certificates of title, all of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, covering said parcels of land and issued
in Oppositor's name are attached to and made an integral
part of this Petition as follows:
Annex "A"-T.C.T. No. 324558
Annex "B"-T.C.T. No. 324559
Annex "C"-T.C.T. No. 324560
Annex "D''-T.C.T. No. 324561
Annex "E "-T.C.T. No. 324562
Annex "F"-T.C.T. No. 351775
All of said certificates of title originated from the 'mother
title' ,Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal, issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888
issued in Land Registration Case No. 776, a copy of said
O.C.T. No. 6567 is attached to and made an integral part
of Petition as Annex "A";
3. The aforementioned certificates of title, Annexes "A" to
"F", were later wholly or partly superseded by individual
certificates of title, about one thousand four hundred
(1,400) in all, and also in Oppositor's name, covering the
individual home lots, street lots and other spaces into
which the lands above referred to were subdivided in the
course of the development of what are now known as
Phase I and Phase II of Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village,' and
while ownership of, and registered title to, some of the
home lots have since passed to individual buyers by virtue
of final sales, a considerable number of said certificates of
title still remain in the name of Oppositor;
4. Under date of October 5, 1978, this Honorable Court
rendered a Decision in the above-entitled proceedings,
granting the Petitioners' petition for reconstitution of a lost
certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate, allegedly
issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4,
1914 in Case No. 9368 of the land Registration Court, and
directing the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati
Branch IV:
... to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit K, the
plan and technical descriptions submitted to the court the
certificate of title original and owner's duplicate copy, in
the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with
residence at 307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City,
giving the certificate appropriate number which will not
conflict with other titles already issued upon payment of
the prescribed fees. ...
5. The land supposedly covered by the certificate of title
thus ordered reconstituted appears to consist of two (2)
parcels located in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal,
with an aggregate area of forty three (43) hectares, more
or less, the technical descriptions of which are set forth in
the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration
Case No. 9368 relied upon by Petitioners;
6. Upon a comparison of said technical descriptions with
those set forth in the certificates of title, Annexes "A" to "F"
of the present Petition, it would appear that the land
supposedly covered by the certificate of title ordered
reconstituted overlap and include substantial portions of
Oppositor's lands covered by the titles, Annexes " A " to "
F "; the location and extent of the overlapping, as plotted
on the basis of the respective technical descriptions
referred to, is ,shown on the sketch plan, marked Annex
"H", which is attached to and made an integral part of this
Petition;
7. Oppositor, therefore, has a substantial, material and
proprietary interest in the subject matter of these
proceedings which is directly and adversely affected by
the Decision already referred to;
8. Oppositor, as the owner of lands not only adjacent to,
but in fact overlapped by, the land supposedly covered by
the title sought to be reconstituted, was entitled to
personal notice of the petition for reconstitution; such
requirement of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated by
section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, and the consequence
of failure to comply therewith is that the court never
acquires jurisdiction to entertain and hear the petition or
render valid judgment thereon.
The salient feature of this method (of judicial reconstitution
under Republic Act No. 26) is a petition and a hearing
after two successive insertions in the Official Gazette of
the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature of an
original registration proceedings, personal service of the
notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and occupants
being essential, as well as posting of the notice in main
entrances of the Provincial and Municipal Buildings where
the land lies at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
(Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, p. 272).
9. Oppositor, as such adjoining owner, was not given
notice of the petition for reconstitution; these proceedings
were instituted, set for hearing, were heard and went to
judgment without Oppositor's knowledge; indeed, it was
only on or about November 9, 1978, more than one month
after the date of the Decision allowing and ordering
reconstitution, and only because another adjoining owner
similarly affected saw fit to so inform it, that oppositor first
learned of the existence of the present proceedings;
10. Oppositor was denied due process and deprived of its
day in court through fraud, accident or mistake, consisting
in that Petitioners, knowing or being chargeable with
knowledge that the 'Tahanan Village' is a privately-owned
and operated residential subdivision and that oppositor is
the owner/developer thereof, failed-and to all indications
by deliberate design-to name Oppositor as adjoining
owner or occupant in their petition for reconstitution; and
Petitioners did more than fail to name Oppositor as an
adjoining owner and to serve it notice of these
proceedings, it would appear that they actively concealed
or sought to conceal such fact; in the survey plan, Exhibit
"V", submitted by them to the Court which, by its terms, is
based on a survey made as late as July 712, 1974, the
area where Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village' would lie is
described as public land; and these circumstances directly
led to and produced the results already stated, namely,
that oppositor, never having been notified of the petition
for reconstitution, was not able to oppose the same or to
be heard thereon;
11. The gravity and inexcusable character of Petitioners'
conduct above complained of is made manifest by the fact
that for several years now, the existence of 'Tahanan
Village' as a privately owned and occupied residential
subdivision has been made apparent to all and sundry by
such prominent features as the perimeter fence or wall
separating it from ' adjacent estates, the roads, streets
and constantly increasing volume of home construction
within the subdivision itself, the very visible electrical
lighting and water supply installations, the presence of
private security guards guarding the premises, to mention
only a few; moreover, it has a number of signs of
conspicuous size and location Identifying and advertising it
as a housing development owned and/or managed by
Oppositor; all of said circumstances render it hardly
conceivable that Petitioners, who hold themselves out as
actual possessors of the property involved in these
proceedings (p. 3 Decision), could even innocently
misapprehend the adjoining development ('Tahanan
Village') as ownerless and untenanted;
12. oppositor has good and meritorious grounds to oppose
the petition for reconstitution; one of such grounds-and a
principal one-is that Land Registration Case No. 9368 and
Decree No. 15170 issued therein, which Petitioners invoke
and rely upon, in actual fact refer, not to the lands claimed
by said Petitioners, but to another parcel of land only
some 422 square meters in area and located in Barrio
Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, that by virtue of said Decree,
Original Certificate of Title No. 724 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal was issued in the names of Eugenio
Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and that said land
eventually passed to its present owners, Pedro Tuason, et
al., under the current Transfer Certificate of Title No.
77516 (Rizal) and Agripino Changco, et al., under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 77515 (Rizal) which was later
superseded by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 150102
and 150103;
13. Oppositor is ready, if its present Petition is granted, to
produce persuasive evidence of the facts above averred,
evidence which perforce will also show the proofs, both
oral and documentary, adduced by Petitioners in support
of the petition for reconstitution to be untrustworthy and
wanting in requisite integrity, hence inadequate and
insufficient to warrant grant of the reconstitution sought;
14. The Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution is
not yet final, the Land Registration Commission having
been served with copy thereof on October 16, 1978; the
thirty-day period for finality prescribed in section 110, 2nd
paragraph, of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not yet
expired;
xxx xxx xxx
On the same day, November 15, 1978, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a
Petition To Set Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978,
claiming that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the
petition for reconstitution since they have not been
personally notified of the pendency of the reconstitution
case to which they are entitled under Republic Act No. 26
not only as adjoining owners but as actual possessors
thereof; that granting arguendo that the title subject to be
reconstituted is valid, which it is not, the same cannot
prevail over the earlier titles of Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing under TCT No.
45397 and TCT No. 45398 which are transfers from the
Original Certificate of Title No. 684 in the name of the
Government of the Philippine Islands issued on
September 20, 1913 pursuant to Decree No. 4552 issued
August 27, 1910; and that the overlapping of the area of
the title sought to be reconstituted on the area of the
parcels of land evidenced by the titles of Alabang
Development Corporation and Bagatsing would result in a
case of the same land registered in the name of two
different persons.
The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Extension to File
Record on Appeal on November 16,1978. Respondent
Judge in his Order of November 23, 1978 granted the
Solicitor General's motion, extending the period for appeal
for another thirty days from date of its issuance but did not
pass upon nor resolve the petitions to set aside and re-
open proceedings filed by Tahanan, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, the
Court ruling that:
The oppositor director of Lands, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, was a party in the proceedings
before this Court. Said oppositor had adopted to resort to
appeal as the appropriate remedy. The Court finds it,
therefore, unnecessary to resolve the Petition To Set
Aside Decision and To Re-Open Proceedings filed by
Tahanan Development Corporation and the Petition to Set
Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978 filed by the
Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing.
Copy of the above Order was served on Tahanan thru
counsel on December 12, 1978. On December 14, 1978,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order
of November 23, 1978 alleging that the "shelving" of its
Petition To Set Aside Decision was equivalent to a denial
thereof; that the effect of such "shelving" if maintained up
to the perfection of the appeal of the Director of Lands
would be to deny petitioner recourse both in the court of
the respondent Judge and in the appellate court, because
the respondent Judge would then lose jurisdiction over the
proceedings and petitioner, not yet actually a party to the
proceedings but only seeking to be admitted as such,
could not intervene in the appeal to protect its interest; that
the Petition To Set Aside, the purpose of which was
precisely to effect the admission of petitioner as a party
and to allow it an opportunity to present evidence
opposing the reconstitution, was sufficient in form and
substance to merit resolution and approval; and that
considerations of justice, fairness, due process and
correct procedure dictated :hat the Petition To Set-Aside
be first resolved before allowing The appeal of the Director
of Lands to proceed to perfection.
The Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing and
submitted on December 19, 1978. As of December 21,
1978, when the period for appeal extended in favor of
oppositor Director of Lands was about to expire on
December 23, 1978 and said Director of Lands had not yet
filed a record on appeal, the possibility that once the
record on appeal is filed, the approval thereof with the
consequent perfection of appeal and transfer of jurisdiction
to the appellate court can come at any moment, Since the
Petition To Set Aside and the Motion for Reconsideration
were still pending or awaiting resolution, the same would
be rendered moot and academic and petitioner left without
remedy in both the trial court and the appellate court. To
forestall that eventuality and to preserve recourse in the
matter, petitioner opted to file a Petition for certiorari with
the appellate court without further awaiting resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration, the petition docketed as
CA-G.R. No. SP-08680.
The Director of Lands failed to perfect its appeal with the
Court of Appeals. Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing did not interpose any appeal.
Petitioner in its Petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-
08680) claiming arbitrariness and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge for by-passing
its Petition To Set Aside, and for not acting on its Motion
for Reconsideration after hearing and submission despite
awareness of the fact that the period -)f appeal extended
by the Court was about to lapse and raising the issue of
whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the
reconstitution case despite absence of personal notice to it
as adjoining owner, prayed for preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order for the preservation of the
status quo in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P by prohibiting
and restraining the respondent Judge, and his successors
in office, from scheduling, conducting or otherwise
entertaining, setting in motion, or continuing, all and any
further proceedings and incidents in said case,
particularly, but not limited to, proceedings relative or
leading to the perfection of the final judgment on the
Petition for certiorari or until further orders from the Court
of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to
Tahanan's petition in the Resolution of December 29,
1978. Respondent Judge was likewise ordered to resolve
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. A bond was filed
by petitioner on January 9, 1979 and thereupon a
restraining order was issued "enjoining the respondent
Judge from taking any action in Reconstitution Case No.
504-P which will make him lose jurisdiction over said case
such that he can no longer act on petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, dated December 14, 1978. If any such
action has already been taken, the same shall be set
aside by respondent Judge. "
Under legal compulsion, respondent Judge resolved
Tahanan's Motion for Reconsideration on January 4,
1979. He denied it.
On November 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals decided in
favor of the petitioner, ruling that respondent Judge did not
exercise sound discretion in refusing to re-open the case
below so that Tahanan could protect its property rights
which could possibly be impaired by the reconstitution.
The appellate court granted the Petition for certiorari on
the basis of the following considerations:
1. The PROPERTY must now be of substantial value
because, even at P100.00 per square meter, its more than
43 hectares could be worth some P43 million.
According to TAHANAN (Annex H of its Motion to
Reopen), Lot No. 2 of the PROPERTY overlaps a
substantial part of its own land. Although the exact area of
the overlap has been given, it can be estimated at about
10 hectares, which r-an be worth P10 million. The value of
the land which TAHANAN seeks to protect is such as
should have induced the lower court to reopen the CASE
BELOW to give an opportunity to TAHANAN to prove its
contentions. Denial of reopening, even if technically
possible as a matter of law, would not be equitable.
2. It is more or less of public knowledge that the Land
Registration Commission has been charged with
anomalies. The lower court should have reopened the
CASE BELOW if only to assure itself that Exh. X is not an
anomaly committed by the Commission, a possibility
which TAHANAN might be able to show.
The lower court had already shoved aside the proposition
advanced by the Director of Lands that Exh. X issued in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of
Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco covering a
parcel of 422 sq. m. situated in the Municipality of Pasig.
Respondent Judge concluded that the title allegedly
issued (Exh. 5) was a result of that Decree was only a
photostat and was weak evidence, as the supposed
original could not be found in the office of the Register of
Deeds. But TAHANAN could prove through the Official
Gazette of December 13, 1913 (pp. 198, 200, Rollo) that
in Land Registration Case No. 9368, the applicants were
Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and not
MANUELA Aquial. While Exh. X could be a forgery, the
Official Gazette cannot be spurious. Accidentally, if
respondent Judge found that Exhibit 5 was weak as it was
only a copy, under the same token he should neither have
given credence to Exh. X, which was also merely a xerox
copy.
3. It has been noted that the certification made by the
deceased Enrique Altavas of Exh. X bears no date. That is
an important factor to ascertain; not only for the
determination of the genuineness of his signature, but also
for the determination of the plausible reason why the
certification was made. As a rule, signatures can be
established as genuine by comparison with accepted true
signatures executed around the same date.
4. It has also been further noted that there is no record
that a Torrens title had been issued in the name of
MANUELA as no mention of the number thereof is in the
record. It certainly would be strange if no title had been
issued since 1914. If a title ha-d been issued, the number
thereof should have been mentioned in one document or
other, executed after 1914. For example in the tax
declarations submitted by MANUELA before and after the
war, the number of her title (or the fact that it has been
lost) would have been mentioned.
5. Exh. X was supposed to have been issued to
MANUELA on March 4, 1914 when she was still single.
However, her son, Nicolas A. Pascual, testified in 1977 or
1978 that he was then 67 years old. He must have been
born in 1910 which would belie that MANUELA was still
single in 1914.
6. In a re-opening, TAHANAN may ask for a relocation
survey to the actually made of the property by placing new
monuments. It should be advisable that such a relocation
survey in the presence of the parties be made so that
possible occupants and adjoining owners will have direct
and personal knowledge of the reconstitution proceedings.
7. The appeal by the government will not adequately
protect the rights of TAHANAN and other land owners who
may be affected by the reconstitution. For one thing, the
Government did not introduce its own handwriting expert,
which TAHANAN might do, in order to assail the
authenticity of Exh. X. Ordinarily, whether a signature in a
xerox copy is genuine or forged is difficult to determine.
The Court of Appeals further sustained the right of
Tahanan to be heard in the case below on the basis of
and in accordance with the Resolution of the Supreme
Court of September 25, 1979 in Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-45168, the first case mentioned
at the beginning hereof as one of the three cases recently
decided by Us that are directly related to and squarely
Identified with the petition at bar wherein We admitted the
intervention of the intervenors filed before Us even as of
the time that the petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting reconstitution of the lost and/or
destroyed certificate of title was already submitted for
decision in the Supreme Court. "We are duty-bound to
abide with the rulings of the Supreme Court," said the
appellate court, and it concludes with the dispositive part,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court of November
23, 1978 and January 4, 1979, as well as the Decision of
October 5, 1978, are hereby set aside and respondent
Judge is hereby directed to reopen the CASE BELOW so
that TAHANAN can present its evidence and cross-
examine the witnesses of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 4, 1979 of the CA Decision penned by
Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava, arguing that the decision
being set aside by the appellate court had long become
final and executory; that the lower court had proper
jurisdiction over the reconstitution case; that petitioner's
remedy should not be a petition for certiorari but an
ordinary action for determination of the alleged
overlapping of land areas; and that the Court of Appeals
erroneously applied the Supreme Court resolution in
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45168,
September 25, 1979.
Through a Special Division of Five, respondent Court of
Appeals granted the Pascual's Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed its previous decision of November 16, 1979,
through its Resolution promulgated April 30, 1980. The
petition for certiorari filed by Tahanan was thereby
dismissed and the restraining order issued on January 9,
1979 was ordered dissolved.
With obvious vehemence, Justice Agrava dissented from
the findings of the majority, unequivocally observing that
"the alleged difference between that case (Director of
Lands vs. CA) and the present case (is) pure casuistry
and a failure to abide by decisions of the Supreme Court.
In the instant appeal before Us, petitioner Tahanan
assigns numerous errors committed by the appellate court
but the principal and fundamental issues to be resolved is
whether or not the trial court properly acquired and was
invested with jurisdiction to hear and decide Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P in the light of the strict and mandatory
provisions of Republic Act No. 26. Upon resolving this
pivotal issue, the corollary issue as to respondent Judge's
grave abuse of discretion in denying Tahanan's Petition
To Set Aside Decision and To Re-Open the, Proceedings
of Reconstitution Case No. 504- P as well as to whether
the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the decision of
respondent Judge, will find the correct and appropriate
answers.
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special
procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of
Title lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946
confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First
Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial
reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special
requirements and mode of procedure that must be
followed before the court can properly act, assume and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant
the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution
must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice
of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and
posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to
specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide
specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to
be followed. These sections state as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources
enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d),
3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper
Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his
assigns, or any person having an interest in the property.
The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the
following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of
title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co- owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if
any had been issued, the same had been lost or
destroyed: (c) the location, area and boundaries of the
property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of
the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of
such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of
the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and
of all persons who may have any interest in the property;
(f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any,
affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds
or other instruments affecting the property have been
presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All
the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the
same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f)
or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied
with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken
from a prior certificate of the covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed
under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and of the municipal building at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall
likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address
is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name
of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and an other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the
date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The
petitioner shall at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed
by the court.
As We have earlier quoted in fun the petition for
reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P and
substantially the Notice of Hearing issued by the court
published in the Official Gazette together with the
Certification of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff, it would not
be a difficult task to check and verify whether the strict and
mandatory requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by
therein petitioners Pascuals, now the private respondents
here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for
reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once
apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or
indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of
property adjacent to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be
reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state
or mention that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a
portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure
is that Tahanan was never notified of the petition for
reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
According to petitioner Tahanan, this omission was
deliberate on the part of the Pascuals who actively
concealed or sought to conceal the fact that Tahanan is
the owner, occupant and possessor of property adjacent
to the alleged properties of the Pascuals as well as the
fact that Tahanan is in possession or occupancy of
portions of the land claimed by the Pascuals. Indeed, as
pointed out by petitioner Tahanan, to which We agree, the
Pascuals made it appear in the survey plan, Exhibit "Y",
submitted by them to the Court based on a survey made
as of July 7-12, 1974, that the area where "Tahanan
Village" would he is described as public land.
That the Pascuals deliberately omitted, concealed or
sought to conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner,
occupant and possessor of property adjacent to the
former's alleged property may be deduced by their failure
to comply with the order of Judge Leo Medialdea issued in
the original petition for reconstitution, Case No. 77, dated
July 10, 1974 (the records) of which We ordered
forwarded to the Court) wherein "the petitioners are
hereby required to amend their petition, within ten days
from receipt hereof, by indicating therein the names and
addresses of All boundary owners of the parcels of land in
question as well as the names and addresses of all
persons occupying theme.
In complying with the above order, the Pascuals simply
filed an Amended Petition and although they allegedly
undertook relocation survey on the subject land by which
the supposed adjoining owners and claimants may be
definitely ascertained as well as the-,r actual occupation
and respected addresses, they only included Pedro L.
Flores as the occupant on the NE., NW., and W., along
lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 with address at 959 C. Lerma St.,
Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1
(portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation, c/o Constancio B. Maglana,
President and Chairman of the Board, with address at No.
513, Lafayette St., Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
And as far as Lot 4 is concerned, the Amended Petition
then mentioned the boundary owner on the NW., SW.,
along lines 12-3 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) and on the
SE., NE. and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1, the same Maglana
& Sons Management Corporation as boundary owners.
The amended Petition notwithstanding, the omission of
Tahanan as adjoining owner and even as occupant of
portions of the supposed Pascual property is palpable and
conspicuous.
It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their
Petition for Reconstitution in October, 1977 docketed as
Case No. 504-P, had no intention to notify nor give cause
for notification and knowledge to all adjacent or boundary
owners, particularly Tahanan.
The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual
adjacent boundary owners on all sides and directions of
their Property. They are charged with the obligation to
inquire who their neighbors are in actual possession and
occupancy not only of portions of their own property but
also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation
cannot be ignored or simply brushed aside where the
location or the properties involved is a prime site for land
development, expansion, suitable for residential,
commercial and industrial purposes and where every
square inch of real estate becomes a valuable and
profitable investment. It is of public knowledge in the
community of Paranaque that "Tahanan Village" is a
privately-owned and occupied residential subdivision,
plainly visible to the general public by reason of the
perimeter fence or wan separating it from adjacent
estates, the roads and streets therein and leading thereto,
the numerous home constructions and buildings going on,
the visible electrical, lighting and water supply
installations, the presence of private security guards
thereat and the numerous signs and billboards advertising
the estate as a housing development owned and/or
managed by petitioner Tahanan. It is preposterous to
claim that the area is public land.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that
copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more,
whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the
petition shall be posted on the main entrance of the
municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30
days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as
certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the
Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin board of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located
at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City.
Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the
main entrance of the provincial-building in Pasig, Rizal; it
was not posted at the main entrance of the municipal
building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in
Barrio Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of
Paranaque where Barrio San Dionisio was then
embraced.
Adverting again to the original records of the Petition for
Reconstitution No. 77, We find and note that Judge Leo
Medialdea correctly directed in his order of September 27,
1974 the service of process, thus:
Service of process in this proceedings shall be made as
follows: (a) by publication of a copy of this Order in two (2)
successive issues of the Official Gazette, (b) by posting of
copies of this Order at the entrance of the Provincial
Capitol of Rizal and the Municipal Buildings of Muntinlupa
and Paranaque, Rizal, (e) by furnishing every person
named in the amended petition with copies of this Order
by registered mail, (d) by furnishing Pedro L. Flores and
the Maglana & Sons Management Corporation with copies
of this Order personally, and (e) by furnishing the Director
of Lands, the Commission of the Land Registration
Commission and the Register of Deeds of Rizal with
copies of this Order personally, the publication, posting
and notices shall be made at least thirty (30) days prior to
the date of the hearing, at the expense of the petitioners.
The Deputy Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to
implement the directives herein set forth.
Further proceedings in this original petition show that the
above directives were faithfully and strictly followed.
Nevertheless, this Reconstitution Case No. 77 was
withdrawn by the Pascuals, apparently for the reason that
there having been filed conflicting reports by the Director
of Lands and the Land Registration Commission favorable
to the Pascuals and another submitted by the Register of
Deeds which was adverse to them and the reports could
not be reconciled, the case would only clog the calendar of
the court" pending continued research by the government
offices concerned and availability of certain documentary
evidence of the Pascuals. The Court granted the Motion to
Withdraw in its Order of May 30, 1975.
It is necessary that We quote hereunder the Report of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal submitted in
the Original Reconstitution Case No. 77 as follows:
REPORT
COMES NOW, the undersigned Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully manifests:
1. That on June 4, 1974, the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal has been furnished a copy of the petition in
the above entitled reconstitution case;
2. That on October 8, 1974, the Register of Deeds was
furnished with a copy of the order of the Court dated
September 27, 1974, by way of service of process in the
proceedings;
3. That the property subject of the petition for
reconstitution, known as Lot 2 and Lot 4 of plan II-4374
are situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal (Now as Bo. Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal) containing an area of 375,622 sq.
meters, and 56,295 sq. meters, respectively, was allegedly
covered by Decree No. 15170 issued or, March 4, 1911;
4. That a verification of the records of this office, show that
Decree No. 15170 of the Court of Land Registration in
Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason,
married to Maximina Geronimo and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, under Original Certificate
of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B, and covers a property
situated at Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, with an area of 422 sq.
meters.
The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner,
possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as
claimant or person having an interest, title or claim to a
substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot
2, as well as the failure or omission to post copies of the
Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality
on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and
at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the
acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
This was Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438. It was also stressed in
Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E.
Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982. And
We reiterate it herein, to wit:
In view of these multiple omissions which constitute
noncompliance with the above-cited sections of the Act,
We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with
the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case
because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been
strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'an
interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show
cause if any they have why said petition should not be
granted' is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted
strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and
precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court
granting the motion to amend the original petition provided
all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be
complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite
substantial in nature. As We have pointed above,
respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to
comply with all the requirement for publication and posting
of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
The above rule is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down in
Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al.,
L-17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:
Where a petition for reconstitution would have the
certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and
technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources
may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to
have an interest in the property should be sent a copy of
the notice of the petition at the expense of the petitioner,
pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case
is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and
the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and
executory.
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by
publication is not sufficient but such notice must be
actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition
for reconstitution.
Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court
had not properly acquired nor was it duly invested with
jurisdiction to hear, determine and decide the petition for
reconstitution and accordingly all proceedings conducted
thereon were rendered null and void including the
judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the resolution
of the corollary issues need no extended discussion but
considering the obvious intent to circumvent the ruling of
the Supreme Court laid down in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find
it imperative to make a reiteration of the pertinent
doctrines applicable to the case at bar.
In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of
adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal
from the decision granting reconstitution, the appeal then
in the Supreme Court, in the paramount interest of justice
and as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in
the court below and alleging material and substantial
interest in the property to which title is sought to be
reconstituted, in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-
Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith
xerox copies of its transfer certificates of title of its
properties adjoining and even overlapped by that of the
Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area, the trial
court ought to have admitted said motion. There was
reversible error in refusing to do so. Once more, We must
emphasize the reasons in relaxing the strict application of
the rule abovecited as We did in Director of Lands vs. CA,
et al., 93 SCRA 238, in this wise:
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules
therein promulgated is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper
aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the
strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice,
or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will
lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the
movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open
the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be
gainsaid that if the petition for reconstitution is finally
granted, the chaos and confusion arising from a situation
where the certificates of title of the ovants covering large
areas of land overlap or incroach on properties the title to
which is being sought to be reconstituted by private
respondent, who herself indicates in her Opposition that,
according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping
embraces some 87 hectares only, is certain and
inevitable. The aggregate area of the property claimed by
respondent covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is 1,435,062 sq.
meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly
residential sector of Metro Manila where growth and
development are in rapid progress to meet the demands of
an urbanized, exploding population. Industries, factories,
warehouses, plants, and other commercial infrastructures
are rising and spreading within the area and the owners of
these lands and the valuable improvements thereon will
not simply fold their hands but certainly will seek judicial
protection of their property rights or may even take the law
into their own hands, resulting to multiplicity of suits.
The holding of respondent Court of Appeals that Our
resolution in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238,
allowing intervention is not applicable to the case at bar
because there was no motion to intervene filed before the
Supreme Court by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding
fails to see that the intervention. of Tahanan while the
reconstitution ease was still in the trial court below was
more expedient for the trial court is in a better and more
suitable position to hear and decide the question of
encroachment and overlapping raised by Tahanan in its
Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings,
and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-
examined by the parties and the court, whereas the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost
at the end of the proceedings, there should and there
ought to be no quibbling, much less hesitation or
circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior
courts to abide and conform to the rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court. A well- becoming sense of modesty and a
respectful awareness of its inferior position in the judicial
hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the appellate
court to the end that a well-ordered and disciplined
administration of justice may be preserved and
maintained, We cannot allow, permit or tolerate inferior
courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express
rulings of this Court.
There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court when it denied Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside
Decision and Re-Open Proceedings. While said petition is
not captioned "Motion for Intervention" the allegations of
the petition clearly and succinctly aver Tahanan's legal
interest in the matter in litigation, which interest is
substantial and material, involving as it does the
boundaries, possession and ownership of about 9
hectares of land covered by certificates of title registered
under the Torrens System in Tahanan's name and issued
from the mother title "Original Certificate of Title No. 6567
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued pursuant to
Decree No. 515888, Land Registration Case No. 776
dated September 18, 1930.
Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit Tahanan's
intervention sought in the trial court below, We find also
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge
in not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to
the proceedings, it having been shown positively that it
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in its absence,
without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer
to Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238,
and more recently in Alabang Development Corp. vs. Hon.
Manuel E. Valenzuela, G. R. No. 54094, Aug. 30, 1982,
that. "The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent
multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter in dispute
may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The
evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of
indispensable and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards to other persons
who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment
cannot even be rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties.
Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens
titles issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act
496) and Presidential Decree No. 1529 have been shaken
by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be to
protect the rights and interests of title holders but instead
have favored claimants under the guise of reconstitution
filed after a long lapse of time after the Japanese
occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate
certificates of title issued pursuant to a court decree but
have subsequently been lost or destroyed including the
records of the land registration case on account of the war
and lay claim and title to valuable parcels of land
previously titled and registered under the Torrens
registration system and are even able to dispose these
properties to unsuspecting homelot buyers and
speculating land developers. The courts must be cautious
and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificates of title, both original and duplicate owner's,
based on documents and decrees made to appear
authentic from mere xerox copies and certifications of
officials supposedly signed with the seals of their office
affixed thereon, considering the ease and facility with
which documents are made to appear as official and
authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and verify
carefully all supporting documents, deeds and
certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance or
incident which corroborates or relates to the existence and
loss of the title should be examined.
The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-
interest, Manuela Aquial, had an original certificate of title
to Lots 2 and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to
believe and sustain. There are too many omissions and
blanks, too many failures and unanswered questions that
belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once noted that the
number of the certificate of title issued to and registered in
the name of respondents' mother and predecessor-in-
interest, Manuela Aquial, is unknown. Nowhere in the
voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or mention
the number of said certificate of title. Not even in the tax
declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. "S"
and Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. "S-1 ") and Lot No. 4
(Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. "T" and Tax Declaration
No. 10 188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of the certificate of
title indicated. And there is absolutely no document,
private or official, presented by the Pascuals mentioning
the number of the certificate of title.
There is also no proof as to when the certificate of title
was issued. Assuming that the certificate of title was
issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4,
1914, the date of issue of the certificate of title must be
subsequent thereto. Assuming further that her duplicate
copy was lost in 1944 during the Japanese occupation,
why did she wait until 1974 [when the first petition for
reconstitution was filed which was after thirty (30) years] to
seek reconstitution of her owner's copy.
The survey plan allegedly conducted January 9-29, 1911
and approved July 25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit "O" is
titled "Plan of Property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al.,
Case No. ____, Court of Land Registration. Unperfected
Title No. ____, Bureau of Lands." In the case of Director of
Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, et
al., 102 SCRA 370 which involved the reconstitution of the
certificate of title to Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, Bernal,
petitioner therein, claimed ownership to Lots 1 and 3 by
virtue of a sales patent issued to her by the Government,
which patent, however, We ruled as fictitious. In the
instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her
successors, the Pascuals, as to how they acquired title in
fee simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales patent,
composicion con el estado, or informacion possesoria.
The only allegation of the basis of their ownership is
paragraph 3 of the petition for reconstitution which alleges
"That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their
predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and
still are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse,
continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described
lands as owners in fee simple since time immemorial,
devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture. "
Decree No. 15170 which supposedly decreed Lots 2 and 4
to Manuela Aquial is claimed by the Pascuals to have
been issued in land Registration Case No. 9368. On its
face, the attestation clause of the decree reads:
Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Changco, Associate
Judge of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of
January, A.D. nineteen hundred and fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914, at
8:38 A.M.
Attest:
Seal of the Court (SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS Clerk of the
Court
(SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
A true copy. Clerk of the Court
In the official report submitted to the court by the Register
of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal in the original petition for
reconstitution, No. 77, CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati,
Rizal, marked Exhibit "2", Decree No. 15170 was issued in
Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the name of Eugenio
Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T.
Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian, in whose names
the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal covering a property situated at
Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal with an area of 422 sq.
meters was likewise issued.
The Tuason-Changco decree is dated January 10, 1914
and entered on March 4, 1914 at 8:38 A.M. and the
Certificate of Title No. 724 was issued January 10, 1914.
The attestation clause of the certificate of title reads:
Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge
of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of
January, A.D. nineteen hundred and fourteen.
Entered at Manila, P. I., the 4th day of March, A. D. 1914
at 8:38 A.M.
Attest: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Clerk of the Court.
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, this 7th
day of March, nineteen hundred and fourteen, at 9:15
o'clock in the A.M.
(SGD.) (unintelligible)
Register of Deeds
Comparing the Aquial decree and the Tuason-Changco
title, both appears to have been entered at Manila on the
same day, that is March 4, 1914, and at the same hour,
8:38 A.M. That the Tuason property and that of Aquial
would bear the same decree number (15170), the same
land registration case number (9368), the same land
registration court (Pasig, Rizal), the same presiding judge
(The Honorable Dionisio Chanco) is indeed incredible, if
not incomprehensible.
But contrary to the claim of the Pascuals that the records
of Land Registration Case No. 9368 have been lost,
destroyed or missing, there was presented copies of the
Official Gazette of December 10 and 17, 1913, Volume 11,
Nos. 50 and 51, duly certified by the Librarian of the
Ministry of Justice wherein the Notice of Hearing in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 was published, the applicants
for the registration and confirmation of their title to a parcel
of land situated in Barrio Bambang, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal being Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T.
Tuason (sic). The Notice of Hearing set the date on
December 22, 1913 and "Witness the Honorable Dionisio
Chanco, Associate Judge of the Court this 14th day of
November, in the year 1913.
Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued
Certificate of Title No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170
issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 whereas
Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same
land registration case number, cannot present her owner's
duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims
were lost or destroyed, including the records of Land
Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the
Notice of Hearing therein was shown and exhibited in
copies of the Official Gazette), We find and so hold that it
is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious, if not non-
existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate
No. 724.
At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We find
annotated therein a number of documents registered by
the heirs of Tuason and also the heirs of co-owner
Changco. The deeds or transactions executed on different
dates and registered thereon appear normal and there is
no reason to doubt their authenticity. On the other hand,
no deed, document or transaction had been shown by the
Pascuals relating to or affecting their land from which We
can infer or deduce the existence of the original certificate
of title if one was in truth and in fact issued to Aquial.
The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on the land
but they can only present Exhibits "U", "U-1", "V" and "V-1"
to prove their payment in lump sum of the taxes thereon
for four (4) years only, from 1970 to 1973. They have not
presented proof of tax payment from 1914 to 1969, more
than five (5) decades. All these omissions and failures
cannot but show the spuriousness and falsity of their claim
that they were granted a decree by the Land Registration
Court, that a certificate of title was issued in their name
and that said certificate of title was existing and subsisting
at the time they filed the petition for reconstitution.
We reject the trial court's finding that the absence in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 724, although the owner's duplicate
is on file therein, is suspicious, for it is satisfactorily
explained in the letter of the Acting Register of Deeds
Guillermo San Pedro, Exhibit "4", that.
Original Certificate of Title No. 724 was cancelled on June
24, 1960 and transferred to the heirs by virtue of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased registered
owners. The original copy of OCT No. 724 is no longer
available but the cancelled owner's duplicate copy of OCT
No. 724 is still existing in our files.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, We do not agree with the holding of the trial
court that "in the light of the foregoing impressive and
overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners in
support of their petition for reconstitution of the title in the
name of Manuela Aquial, the Court has no alternative to
granting the petition," the Court having "no reason to
doubt the credibility of the witnesses for the petitioner,
particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had
occasion and reason to know the facts they testified to,
being parts of their functions and duties in their respective
offices.
It is to be noted that the supposedly impressive and
overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners
centered on showing the alleged authenticity and
genuineness of the survey plan denominated Plan II-4374.
The list of petitioner's exhibits is indeed long but the basic,
specific and relevant piece of evidence is Exhibit "O" with
the certification of Roman Mataverde, Chief, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands dated October 27, 1972 that
"Exhibit "O" is a photographic copy of the original plan as
reproduced from the microfilm negative which is on file in
the Bureau of Lands, Manila.
This is the crucial question on which hinges the veracity of
respondents' claim of title and ownership to 431,917 sq.
meters of prime land (Lots 2 and 4) in Paranaque, Rizal is
there such an original survey plan known as Plan II-4374?
The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and stoutly
maintains that there is no such plan and in support
thereof, Exhibit "7" is submitted to the Court, the same
being the official communication of Amante R. Dumag,
Officer-In-Charge, Metro Manila Region, Bureau of Lands,
stating "that Plan II-4374 could not be the basis for any
verification because the original plan thereof is not
subsisting in the files and records of this Bureau."
Enclosed with said communication is the xerox copy of the
letter dated 30 January 1978 of Staff Supervisor Privadi
JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit "7 " further states: "However,
assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical
description, the same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and
Plan 61581, Lot 1, Decree No. N-515888, O.C.T.-6567
Identical to Lot 4762, Cad-299, Paranaque Cadastre."
Exhibit "8" of the Director of Lands is the xerox copy of the
letter referred to above, which for its materiality and
relevance to the vital question hereinbefore stated and
stressed, is reproduced in fun below:
Republic of the Philippines Department of Natural
Resources BUREAU OF LANDS Manila
SUBJECT: Plan 11-4374
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
Parañaque, Rizal
30 January 1978
Mr. Amante Dumag
Officer-in-Charge
Region IV, Metro Manila
Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting
for an authenticated plan of II-4374 Lot I and Lot 3 situated
in Paranaque, Metro Manila, please be informed of the
following:
1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged
after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly
shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical
Reference Section which records were recently turned
over to the Records Division. A perusal of the folder of the
case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17,
1972 Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the records
division certified that his division (Survey Records Section
in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).
2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows
that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor,
issued technical descriptions of Lots I and 3 of II-4374
allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was
submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged
source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns
out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and
the land is the property of Municipality of Liloan, Island of
Pandan, Province of Leyte.
3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5,
1971, Mr. Anselmo an, then Chief of Reconstruction
Section upon request of the interested party, issued
technical descriptions for Lots I and 3 of II-4374. (This
document was submitted to the Court as part of the
petition for reconstitution of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio). As to
how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of
Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy
of the plan is now known. This is not our standard
operating procedure since we always issue technical,
descriptions based on available approved survey records.
4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr.
Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section,
certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame
with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey
number II-4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged
after the war got microfilmed is a mystery. Furthermore, as
to how this frame is pinpointed without the locator card
indeed confound us. We are not now privy to the
testimonies made in Court regarding this microfilm.
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears
114374. For this reason, we caused the preparation of an
enlargement of said microfilm for further examination and
evaluation.
6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement
showed the following significant discrepancies and
deviations from similar survey plans on record:
a) The date of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 and
the signature appearing as the approving official (Director
of Lands) of the alleged Plan II-4374 is not the same
official approving plans during the period. Samples of
surveys and inventoried original survey plans on file in this
Bureau clearly shows that on July 25, 1911 or thereabouts
the Acting Director of Lands and therefore proper
approving official for survey plans was John R. Wilson.
The following original plans (partial list) available in our
records and approved within the month of July 1911 or
thereabouts all bear the signature of Acting Director of 7. II-4110d
Lands John R. Wilson.
385830
Survey No.
July 25, 1911
Accession No.
8. II-4110c
Date of
385829

July 25, 1911

9. II-4110b
Approval
385828
1. I-1817a
July 25, 1911
369826
10. II-4897
July 25, 1911
186222
2. II-4142
July 25, 1911
385736
11. II-41696
July 25, 1911

3. II-4141
July 11, 1911
385735
12. II-4172
July 26, 1911

4. II-4110g
July 5, 1911
385833
13. I-1415
July 25, 1911
379513
5. II-4110j
July 25, 1911
385832
14. II-1410
July 25,1911
446936
6. II-4110e
Aug. 22, 1911
385834
b) Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file)
July 25, 1911 approved on December 19,1911 show the BL Form No. 52
and the format then in use during the period. Likewise, this
plan (marked 0) shows the signature of the Director of
Lands at that time, Chas H. Sleeper. What is being
represented as the signature of Chas H. Sleeper as
Director of Lands on the microfilm of II-4374 appears to be
very far from the genuine signature of Chas H. Sleeper
appearing on original plans on file. Chas H. Sleeper was
the incumbent Director of Lands from November 1, 1905
up to October 15, 1913. However, during his term of office,
the then Assistant Director of Lands in the person of John
R. Wilson had occasion to assume duties as Acting
Director of Lands as evidenced by the above-listed survey
plans mostly approved on July 25, 1911 by Acting Director
of Lands John R. Wilson. Considering the fact that on
various dates within the month of July 1911, specifically
those of July 25, 1911, the original survey plans available
in the file show John R. Wilson as the approving official in
his capacity as Acting Director of Lands, and the
observation that the signature appearing on microfilm II-
4374 is very far from the genuine signature of the
incumbent Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, the
appearance now of the microfilm of II-4374 purportedly
approved on July 25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as
the approving official is highly questionable. For this
reason and the facts stated elsewhere in this
memorandum we cannot certify authenticity of the
microfilm copy of II-4374.
c) The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs
from the standard survey plans approved during the time
(year 1911) in the following respects:
(1) Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L.
Form No., 52 which is on upper left hand corner; the
questionable plan (II-4374) was prepared on B.L. Form
No. 52-A which appears on upper left hand corner and on
upper center which is unusual.
(2) Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor
immediately below the line that shows the date of survey,
followed by the designation (surveyor) and thereunder
Bureau of Lands; the questionable plan, on the other
hand, does not conform with the said format.
(3) Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph "The
original field notes,..." as in the case of the questioned
plan II-4374 but immediately Bureau of Lands" below the
surveyor's name is "Approved: ____date___ followed by
the title and signature of the approving official
7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the
microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be that
of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our
conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and does not
and has never represented any parcel of land properly
surveyed and approved by this Bureau.
8. Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing
purposely to find out how the frame of such microfilm got
in into microfilm Reel No. 560 of this Bureau.
9. Records of the Case show that this was handled by the
late Atty. Pedro Flores in collaboration with Assistant
Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial
Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This pertains to the petition of
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bemal for the reconstitution
of T.C.T. (12/T-79) 42449 (Sales Patent) covering area of
143.5062 hectares. The case is opposed in the sala of
CFI, Seventh Judicial District, Branch XIII of Rizal by the
Director of Lands and Aurora R. Favila, et al. In cases like
this, we take action in close collaboration with the Legal
Division.
10. Enclosed for your ready reference are:
a) Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original
copy was not inventoried as salvaged after the war;
b) Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
c) Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:
1) Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July
1972.
2) Petition for Reconstitution of Title (Filed with the Court)
3) Opposition of the Director of Lands.
4) Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title
filed by the other oppositors.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE
Staff Supervisof for
Technical Plans & Standards
From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is
officially and clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not
among those salvaged after the last World War and
subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and
Hamilton Consultancy; that Plan II-4374 bearing
Accession No. 385637 is not authentic and does not and
has never represented any parcel of land property
surveyed and approved by the Director of Lands; that on
July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the
Survey Records Division, certified that his division has no
copy of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15, 1970, Mr. Angel
Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of
Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data
being Accession No. 195551 which, however, turned out
to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the
land pertaining thereto is the property of the Municipality of
Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.
Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan,
Chief, Survey Reconstruction Section, Bureau of Lands
dated November 24,1971 marked Exhibits "M" and "N"
indicating the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of
Plan II-4374 with Accession No. 385637 cannot be relied
upon because said plan was not among those salvaged
after the last World War. Our ruling in the Bernal case, 102
SCRA 370, 447 that "the technical descriptions cannot
have two accession numbers as sources thereof " stands.
Incidentally, We must point out that the above official
report (marked Exhibit "8") was submitted to the Supreme
Court in the Bernal case as Annex "A" to the Final Report
of Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of
Lands, pp. 425-428, in compliance with Our Resolution of
September 25, 1979, which was accepted and approved
by Us and admitted as evidence of this Court. In the case
at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor Director of
Lands, admitted by the trial court and hence, reviewable
on appeal in the petition at bar, he being a respondent
herein.
The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous
transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must
be respected and protected in order to achieve the "real
purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the
land x x x and once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid
the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70
SCRA 65, 84; Legarda And Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 370, 451).
In summation, We find no factual and legal basis for the
judgment granting the petition for reconstitution in
Reconstitution Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City. Fundamentally, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide said petition
for reconstitution and for this jurisdictional infirmity, its
decision including all proceedings therefrom are null and
void, including the assailed Resolutions of April 30, 1980
and December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXIX, Pasay City in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land
Registration Case No. 9368 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and
December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of Appeals are
likewise declared null and void. Costs against private
respondents.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur with the recommendation that the case be
referred to the NBI for investigation and possible
prosecution.
AQUINO, J., concurring.
I concur in the result. This is a landgrabbing case.
Landgrabbing may be perpetrated by (1) actual and
physical usurpation, (2) expanded survey, (3) fake
Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake Torrens titles,
registration decrees or judgments in land registration
cases.
The Bernal case, to which this Tahanan case is related,
involves the reconstitution of a fictitious Torrens title over
parcels of land existing only on paper and which, when
verified on the ground, covers land already titled in the
names of other persons.
The Bernal case—Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bemal of
102 Sixto Antonio Street, Barrio Rosario, Pasig, Rizal
claimed that her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, bought in
1942 from the Government a tract of land with an area of
186 hectares located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque,
Rizal. Mrs. Sta. Maria allegedly obtained a sales patent
dated September 15, 1942 and Original Certificate of Title
No. 42392 dated September 29, 1942.
The said land was allegedly surveyed in 1911 for Mrs. Sta.
Maria as shown in Plan II-4374. It consisted of four lots,
Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Lots I and 3, with an area of 143
hectares, were supposedly sold by Mrs. Sta. Maria to her
daughter, Mrs. Bemal, for P 10,000 in November, 1943.
The Register of Deeds of Greater Manila issued to Mrs.
Bernal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 for Lots 1
and 3.
In 1970, or more than twenty-six years after the issuance
of that title, Mrs. Bernal filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a petition for the reconstitution of the original
thereof. She averred that her owner's duplicate of that title,
which she first Identified as TCT No. 12 and later as TCT
No. 42449, was not lost.
Judge Pedro A. Revilla denied the petition for
reconstitution. Mrs. Bernal appealed to the Court of
Appeals which in a decision dated October 1, 1976
allowed the reconstitution (Per Crisolito Pascual, J., with
Bautista and Santiago, JJ., concurring).
The case was brought to this Court on petition for review
and by means of a special civil action for certiorari since
the Solicitor General's motion for an extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration was filed one day late in
the Court of Appeals and it was denied.
During the pendency of the case in this Court, or on
December 7 and 28, 1978. Greenfield Development
Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing filed motions for intervention on the
ground that the 143 hectares claimed by Mrs. Bernal
included substantial portions of the lands already
registered in their names.
As an exceptional case and in the interest of expeditious
justice, the interventions were allowed in his Court's
resolution of September 25, 1979. Also in the interest of
justice, although unprecedented, this Court ordered the
chief of the survey division of the Bureau of Lands to
relocate the boundaries of the lots claimed by Mrs. Bemal
and the intervenors and to report on the overlapping and
the improvements in the said areas (93 SCRA 238, 249
and 102 SCRA 421).
In his report of February 25, 1980, the officer-in-charge of
the national capital region of the Bureau of Lands
categorically stated that Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374,
claimed by Mrs. Bernal, do "not actually exist on the
ground" or, as found by the chief of the technical services
section of the same bureau, the said lots "could not be
located in the locality by all technical means" and that the
original copy of Plan II-4374 does not exist.
Consequently, this Court dismissed Mrs. Bernal's petition
for reconstitution (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bemal and CA, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA
370).
This case of the heirs of Manuela Aquial. As already
stated, Mrs. Sta. Maria's alleged 186-hectare land in
Barrio San Dionisio supposedly consisted of Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4 of which Lots 1 and 3, with a total area of 143
hectares, were claimed by her daughter, Mrs. Bemal. That
claim was found to be fictitious in the reconstitution case
already discussed above.
Now, the other two lots, Lots 2 and 4, of Mrs. Sta. Maria's
land were supposedly acquired by Manuela Aquial of 307
15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. She died on January
26,1967.
On October 5, 1977, her legal heirs named Nicolas,
Crisanto, Anselmo, Mamerto, Cirilo and Catalina, all
surnamed Pascual, and Pascuala A. Mejia and Damiana
A. Mejia filed in the Pasay City branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (the Bernal case was filed in the Pasig
branch) a petition for the reconstitution of Decree No.
15170 dated March 4, 1914 issued in Land Registration
Case No. 9368 and the original and owner's duplicate of
the original certificate of title issued pursuant to the said
decree allegedly in the name of Manuela Aquial, covering
the said Lots 2 and 4, with a total area of 43 hectares
located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, formerly Barrio San
Dionisio, Paranaque and described in Plan II-4374, the
same nonexisting plan involved in the 143-hectare land,
Lots 1 and 3 claimed by Mrs. Bemal.
It should be noted that 43 hectares plus 143 hectares
equal 186 hectares, the total area of the land allegedly
surveyed for Mrs. Sta. Maria in 1911 in the fictitious Plan
II-4374. It should be further noted that in the description of
Lots I and 3, as set forth in the Bernal case, Manuela
Aquial is cited as one of the boundary owners.
In the description of Lots 2 and 4 set forth in the petition
for reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, Lots
1 and 3 and the names of Mrs. Sta. Maria and Mrs. Bernal
are not mentioned at all.
The Director of Lands opposed the said petition for
reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial. He
alleged that a prior reconstitution proceeding filed by the
Pascuals was dismissed by the Makati branch of the lower
court; that Decree No. 15170, LRC Case No. 9368, was
issued to Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco for a
422-square meter land in Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal
and that the photostatic copy attached to the petition is a
copy of a fake decree.
After hearing, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in his decision
of October 5, 1978 granted the petition. On November 15,
1978, the Tahanan Development Corporation filed a
petition to set aside the decision and for the reopening of
the proceeding on the ground that Lots 2 and 4, claimed
by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, include substantial
portions of the subdivision lots of the Tahanan Village
covered by transfer certificates of title derived from OCT
No. 6576, Decree No. 515888, LRC Case No. 776.
Also on that same date, November 15, 1978, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a
motion to set aside the decision on the ground that the
land claimed by the Aquial heirs overlaps the lots of
Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation covered
by Torrens titles derived from OCT No. 684, Decree No.
4552 issued on August 27, 1910.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal but did not
perfect his appeal to the Court of Appeals. As the trial
court failed to resolve the petition to set aside filed by the
Tahanan Development Corporation, it filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals which later ordered
Judge Valenzuela to resolve Tahanan's petition. He
denied it in his order of January 4, 1979.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of November 16, 1979
ordered Judge Valenzuela to re-open the case and allow
Tahanan to present its evidence (Per Agrava, J.). The
Pascuals filed a motion for reconsideration. In a resolution
dated April 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals set aside its
decision and dismissed Tahanan's petition for certiorari.
The Tahanan Development Corporation appealed to this
Court.
On the other hand, Bagatsing and Alabang Development
Corporation filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein they assailed Judge Valenzuela's
decision.
This Court in its decision of August 30, 1982 in G.R. No.
54094, Alabang Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge
Valenzuela, et al., using the findings and rulings in the
Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision and
dismissed the petition for reconsideration.
That decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang case rendered
this Tahanan case moot and academic. This case has to
be decided in the same manner as the, Alabang and
Bagatsing case because this Court had already set aside
Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. All that is necessary is to set aside the
above-mentioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1980.
As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be
reconstituted and the land claimed by the heirs of Manuela
Aquial are imaginary or pure fabrications. See J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano, L-33140, October 23,
1978, a5 SCRA 644, where the sisters Manuela and Maria
Aquial unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735 covering the
Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason
mayorazgo.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., I also join the concurrence of
Justice Aquino and the recommendation of Justice Abad
Santos.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur with the recommendation that the case be
referred to the NBI for investigation and possible
prosecution.
AQUINO, J., concurring.
I concur in the result. This is a landgrabbing case.
Landgrabbing may be perpetrated by (1) actual and
physical usurpation, (2) expanded survey, (3) fake
Spanish titles and (4) reconstitution of fake Torrens titles,
registration decrees or judgments in land registration
cases.
The Bernal case, to which this Tahanan case is related,
involves the reconstitution of a fictitious Torrens title over
parcels of land existing only on paper and which, when
verified on the ground, covers land already titled in the
names of other persons.
The Bernal case—Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bemal of
102 Sixto Antonio Street, Barrio Rosario, Pasig, Rizal
claimed that her mother, Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, bought in
1942 from the Government a tract of land with an area of
186 hectares located at Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque,
Rizal. Mrs. Sta. Maria allegedly obtained a sales patent
dated September 15, 1942 and Original Certificate of Title
No. 42392 dated September 29, 1942.
The said land was allegedly surveyed in 1911 for Mrs. Sta.
Maria as shown in Plan II-4374. It consisted of four lots,
Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Lots I and 3, with an area of 143
hectares, were supposedly sold by Mrs. Sta. Maria to her
daughter, Mrs. Bemal, for P 10,000 in November, 1943.
The Register of Deeds of Greater Manila issued to Mrs.
Bernal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 for Lots 1
and 3.
In 1970, or more than twenty-six years after the issuance
of that title, Mrs. Bernal filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a petition for the reconstitution of the original
thereof. She averred that her owner's duplicate of that title,
which she first Identified as TCT No. 12 and later as TCT
No. 42449, was not lost.
Judge Pedro A. Revilla denied the petition for
reconstitution. Mrs. Bernal appealed to the Court of
Appeals which in a decision dated October 1, 1976
allowed the reconstitution (Per Crisolito Pascual, J., with
Bautista and Santiago, JJ., concurring).
The case was brought to this Court on petition for review
and by means of a special civil action for certiorari since
the Solicitor General's motion for an extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration was filed one day late in
the Court of Appeals and it was denied.
During the pendency of the case in this Court, or on
December 7 and 28, 1978. Greenfield Development
Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing filed motions for intervention on the
ground that the 143 hectares claimed by Mrs. Bernal
included substantial portions of the lands already
registered in their names.
As an exceptional case and in the interest of expeditious
justice, the interventions were allowed in his Court's
resolution of September 25, 1979. Also in the interest of
justice, although unprecedented, this Court ordered the
chief of the survey division of the Bureau of Lands to
relocate the boundaries of the lots claimed by Mrs. Bemal
and the intervenors and to report on the overlapping and
the improvements in the said areas (93 SCRA 238, 249
and 102 SCRA 421).
In his report of February 25, 1980, the officer-in-charge of
the national capital region of the Bureau of Lands
categorically stated that Lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374,
claimed by Mrs. Bernal, do "not actually exist on the
ground" or, as found by the chief of the technical services
section of the same bureau, the said lots "could not be
located in the locality by all technical means" and that the
original copy of Plan II-4374 does not exist.
Consequently, this Court dismissed Mrs. Bernal's petition
for reconstitution (Director of Lands vs. Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bemal and CA, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA
370).
This case of the heirs of Manuela Aquial. As already
stated, Mrs. Sta. Maria's alleged 186-hectare land in
Barrio San Dionisio supposedly consisted of Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4 of which Lots 1 and 3, with a total area of 143
hectares, were claimed by her daughter, Mrs. Bemal. That
claim was found to be fictitious in the reconstitution case
already discussed above.
Now, the other two lots, Lots 2 and 4, of Mrs. Sta. Maria's
land were supposedly acquired by Manuela Aquial of 307
15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. She died on January
26,1967.
On October 5, 1977, her legal heirs named Nicolas,
Crisanto, Anselmo, Mamerto, Cirilo and Catalina, all
surnamed Pascual, and Pascuala A. Mejia and Damiana
A. Mejia filed in the Pasay City branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (the Bernal case was filed in the Pasig
branch) a petition for the reconstitution of Decree No.
15170 dated March 4, 1914 issued in Land Registration
Case No. 9368 and the original and owner's duplicate of
the original certificate of title issued pursuant to the said
decree allegedly in the name of Manuela Aquial, covering
the said Lots 2 and 4, with a total area of 43 hectares
located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, formerly Barrio San
Dionisio, Paranaque and described in Plan II-4374, the
same nonexisting plan involved in the 143-hectare land,
Lots 1 and 3 claimed by Mrs. Bemal.
It should be noted that 43 hectares plus 143 hectares
equal 186 hectares, the total area of the land allegedly
surveyed for Mrs. Sta. Maria in 1911 in the fictitious Plan
II-4374. It should be further noted that in the description of
Lots I and 3, as set forth in the Bernal case, Manuela
Aquial is cited as one of the boundary owners.
In the description of Lots 2 and 4 set forth in the petition
for reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, Lots
1 and 3 and the names of Mrs. Sta. Maria and Mrs. Bernal
are not mentioned at all.
The Director of Lands opposed the said petition for
reconstitution filed by the heirs of Manuela Aquial. He
alleged that a prior reconstitution proceeding filed by the
Pascuals was dismissed by the Makati branch of the lower
court; that Decree No. 15170, LRC Case No. 9368, was
issued to Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco for a
422-square meter land in Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal
and that the photostatic copy attached to the petition is a
copy of a fake decree.
After hearing, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela in his decision
of October 5, 1978 granted the petition. On November 15,
1978, the Tahanan Development Corporation filed a
petition to set aside the decision and for the reopening of
the proceeding on the ground that Lots 2 and 4, claimed
by the heirs of Manuela Aquial, include substantial
portions of the subdivision lots of the Tahanan Village
covered by transfer certificates of title derived from OCT
No. 6576, Decree No. 515888, LRC Case No. 776.
Also on that same date, November 15, 1978, Alabang
Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a
motion to set aside the decision on the ground that the
land claimed by the Aquial heirs overlaps the lots of
Bagatsing and Alabang Development Corporation covered
by Torrens titles derived from OCT No. 684, Decree No.
4552 issued on August 27, 1910.
The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal but did not
perfect his appeal to the Court of Appeals. As the trial
court failed to resolve the petition to set aside filed by the
Tahanan Development Corporation, it filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals which later ordered
Judge Valenzuela to resolve Tahanan's petition. He
denied it in his order of January 4, 1979.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of November 16, 1979
ordered Judge Valenzuela to re-open the case and allow
Tahanan to present its evidence (Per Agrava, J.). The
Pascuals filed a motion for reconsideration. In a resolution
dated April 30, 1980, the Court of Appeals set aside its
decision and dismissed Tahanan's petition for certiorari.
The Tahanan Development Corporation appealed to this
Court.
On the other hand, Bagatsing and Alabang Development
Corporation filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition wherein they assailed Judge Valenzuela's
decision.
This Court in its decision of August 30, 1982 in G.R. No.
54094, Alabang Development Corporation, et al. vs. Judge
Valenzuela, et al., using the findings and rulings in the
Bernal case, reversed Judge Valenzuela's decision and
dismissed the petition for reconsideration.
That decision in the Bagatsing and Alabang case rendered
this Tahanan case moot and academic. This case has to
be decided in the same manner as the, Alabang and
Bagatsing case because this Court had already set aside
Judge Valenzuela's decision and dismissed the petition for
reconstitution. All that is necessary is to set aside the
above-mentioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1980.
As in the Bernal case, the decree and title sought to be
reconstituted and the land claimed by the heirs of Manuela
Aquial are imaginary or pure fabrications. See J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano, L-33140, October 23,
1978, a5 SCRA 644, where the sisters Manuela and Maria
Aquial unsuccessfully assailed OCT No. 735 covering the
Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason
mayorazgo.
G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and
AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-52524 April 27, 1981
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX,
PASAY CITY, and LIM SIU LENG, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
These two cases which involve similar facts and raise
Identical questions of law were ordered consolidated by
resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1980. 1
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, in
both cases, is a condominium corporation within the
meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly
registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project
located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which
said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to all
the common and limited common areas. 2
G.R. NO. 52361
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole
proprietorship with business name registered with the
Bureau of Commerce, owned and operated by the
spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is
the assignee of a unit, "Solana", in the Sunset View
Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated, as assignor. 3 The La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated bought the "Solana" unit on installment from
the Tower Builders, Inc. 4 The petitioner, Sunset View
Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of
assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares
Realty, private respondent herein, a complaint dated June
22, 1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 7303-P of the Court
of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXX. The private
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of
action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same
cause. The petitioner filed its opposition thereto. The
motion to dismiss was granted on December 11, 1979 by
the respondent Judge who opined that the private
respondent is, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
4726, a "holder of a separate interest" and consequently,
a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation;
and that "the case should be properly filed with the
Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive
original jurisdiction on controversies arising between
shareholders of the corporation." the motion for
reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari
praying that the said orders be set aside.
G.R. NO. 52524
The petitioner filed its amended complaint dated July 16,
1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 14127 of Branch I of the
City Court of Pasay City for the collection of overdue
accounts on assessments and insurance premiums and
the interest thereon amounting to P6,168 06 as of March
31, 1979 against the private respondent Lim Siu Leng 5 to
whom was assigned on July 11, 1977 a unit called
"Alegria" of the Sunset. View Condominium Project by
Alfonso Uy 6 who had entered into a "Contract to Buy and
Sell" with Tower Builders, Inc. over the said unit on
installment basis. 7
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the amount
sought to be collected is an assessment. The correctness
and validity of which is certain to involve a dispute
between her and the petitioner corporation; that she has
automatically become, as a purchaser of the condominium
unit, a stockholder of the petitioner pursuant to Section 2
of the Condominium Act, Republic Act No. 4726; that the
dispute is intra-corporate and is consequently under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange
Commission as provided in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. 8
The petitioner filed its opposition thereto, alleging that the
private respondent who had not fully paid for the unit was
not the owner thereof, consequently was not the holder of
a separate interest which would make her a stockholder,
and that hence the case was not an intra-corporate
dispute. 9

After the private respondent had filed her answer to the
opposition to the motion to dismiss 10 of the petitioner, the
trial court issued an order dated August 13, 1979 denying
the motion to dismiss. 11 The private respondent's motion
for reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial court in
its Order dated September 19, 1979. 12
The private respondent then appealed pursuant to Section
10 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court to the Court of First
Instance, where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case
No. 7530P. The petitioner filed its "Motion to Dismiss
Appeal" on the ground that the order of the trial court
appealed from is interlocutory. 13
The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective
memorandum on the issue raised before the trial court and
on the disputed order of the trial judge. 14 After the parties
had submitted their respective memoranda on the matter,
the respondent Judge issued an order dated December
14, 1979 in which he directed that "the appeal is hereby
dismissed and d the judgment of the lower court is
reversed. The case is dismissed and the parties are
directed to ventilate their controversy with the Securities &
Exchange Commission. 15 The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in an order dated
January 14, 1980. 16 Hence this petition for certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent Judge.
Issues Common to Both Cases
It is admitted that the private respondents in both cases
have not yet fully paid the purchase price of their units.
The Identical issues raised in both petitions are the
following:
1. Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the
condominium project managed by the petitioner, who has
not yet fully paid the purchase price thereof, automaticaly
a ,stockholder of the petitioner Condominium Corporation
2. Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange
Commission that has jurisdiction over cases for collection
of assessments assessed by the Condominium
Corporation on condominium units the full purchase price
of which has not been paid?
The private respondents in both cases argue that every
purchaser of a condominium unit, regardless of whether or
not he has fully paid the purchase price, is a "holder of a
separate interest" mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4726, otherwise known as "The Condominium Act"
and is automatically a shareholder of the condominium
corporation.
The contention has no merit. Section 5 of the
Condominium Act expressly provides that the
shareholding in the Condominium Corporation will be
conveyed only in a proper case. Said Section 5 provides:
Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment,
office or other space therein, shall include the transfer or
conveyance of the undivided interests in the common
areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
shareholding in the condominium corporation ...
It is clear then that not every purchaser of a condominium
unit is a shareholder of the condominium corporation. The
Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the
determination of when the shareholding will be transferred
to the purchaser of a unit. Thus, Section 4 of said Act
provides:
The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or
to be divided into condominium only if there shall be
recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province or city in
which the property lies and duly annotated in the
corresponding certificate of title of the land ... an enabling
or master deed which shall contain, among others, the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Astatement of the exact nature of the interest acquired
or to be acquired by the purchaser in the separate units
and in the common areas of the condominium project ...
The Amended Master Deeds in these cases, which were
duly registered in the Register of Deeds, and which
contain, by mandate of Section 4, a statement of the exact
nature of the interest acquired by a purchaser of a unit,
provide in Section 6 of Part 1:
(d) Each Unit owner shall, as an essential condition to
such ownership, acquire stockholding in the Condominium
Corporation herein below provided ... 17
The Amended Master Deeds likewise provide in Section 7
(b), thus.
(b) All unit owners shall of necessity become stockholders
of the Condominium Corporation. TOWER shall acquire all
the shares of stock of SUNSET VIEW and shall allocate
the said shares to the units in proportion to the
appurtenant interest in the COMMON AREAS and
LIMITED COMMON AREAS as provided in Section 6 (b)
above. Said shares allocated are mere appurtenances of
each unit, and therefore, the same cannot be transferred,
conveyed, encumbered or otherwise disposed of
separately from the Unit ... 18
It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of the Master
Deeds that the shareholding in the Condominium
Corporation is inseparable from the unit to which it is only
an appurtenant and that only the owner of a unit is a
shareholder in the Condominium Corporation.
Subparagraph (a) of Part 1, Section 6, of the Master
Deeds determines when and under what conditions
ownership of a unit is acquired by a purchaser thus:
(a) The purchaser of a unit shall acquire title or ownership
of such Unit, subject to the terms and conditions of the
instrument conveying the unit to such purchaser and to the
terms and conditions of any subsequent conveyance
under which the purchaser takes title to the Unit, and
subject further to this MASTER DEED ... 19
The instrument conveying the unit "Solana" in G.R. NO.
52361 is the "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated September
13, 1977, Annex "D", while that conveying the unit
"Alegria" in G.R. NO. 52524 is the "Contract to Buy and
Sell" dated May 12, 1976, Annex "C". In both deeds of
conveyance, it is provided:
4. Upon full payment by the BUYER of the total purchase
price and full compliance by the BUYER of an its
obligations herein, the SELLER will convey unto the
BUYER, as soon as practicable after completion of the
construction, full and absolute title in and to the subject
unit, to the shares of stock pertaining thereto and to an
rights and interests in connection therewith ... 20
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be
transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only
upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he
will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently,
even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who
is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment
of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a
purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase
price thereof is not The owner of the unit and
consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium
Corporation.
That only the owner of a unit is a stockholder of the
Condominium Corporation is inferred from Section 10 of
the Condominium Act which reads:
SEC. 10. ... Membership in a condominium corporation,
regardless of whether it is a stock or non-stock
corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the
condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance When a
member or stockholder ceases is to own a unit in the
project in which the condominium corporation owns or
holds the common areas, he shall automatically cease to
be a member or stockholder of the condominium
corporation.
Pursuant to the above statutory provision, ownership of a
unit is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in
the condominium corporation. It follows that a purchaser of
a unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully
paid the full purchase price, is not a shareholder By
necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a
condominium, which entitles the holder to become
automatically a share holder in the condominium
corporation, as provided in Section 2 of the Condominium
Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so
because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the
owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner, he
also ceases automatically to be a shareholder.
The private respondents, therefore, who have not fully
paid the purchase price of their units and are consequently
not owners of their units are not members or shareholders
of the petitioner condominium corporation,
Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders
of the petitioner condominium corporation, the instant case
for collection cannot be a "controversy arising out of
intracorporate or partnership relations between and
among stockholders, members or associates; between
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively" which controversies are under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D.
No. 902- A. The subject matters of the instant cases
according to the allegations of the complaints are under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts: that of G.R. NO.
52361, which is for the collection of P8,335.38 with
interest plus attorney's fees equivalent to the principal or a
total of more than P10,000.00 is under the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance; and that of G.R. NO. 52524,
which is for the collection of P6,168-06 is within the
jurisdiction of the City Court.
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to
resolve the issue raised in G.R. NO. 52524 of whether an
order of the City Court denying a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction can be appealed to the Court
of First Instance.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the respondent
Judge dated December 11, 1979 and January 4, 1980 in
Civil Case No. 7303-P, subject matter of the Petition in
G.R. No. 52361, are set aside and said Judge is ordered
to try the case on the merits. The orders dated December
14, 1979 and January 14, 1980 in Civil Case No. 7530-P,
subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. 52524 are set
aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court a
quo, City Court of Pasay City, for trial on the merits, with
costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164789 August 27, 2009
CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Rule 45 petition the legal issue of
whether an action to rescind a contract to sell a
subdivision lot that the buyer found to be under litigation
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In this petition,1 Christian General Assembly, Inc. (CGA)
prays that we set aside the decision2 issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 75717 that dismissed
its complaint for rescission filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan for lack of jurisdiction, as well as
the CA resolution3 that denied its motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The present controversy traces its roots to the case filed
by CGA against the Spouses Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio
(respondents) for rescission of their Contract to Sell before
the RTC, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan. The facts, drawn
from the records and outlined below, are not in dispute.
On April 30, 1998, CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a
subdivision lot4 (subject property) with the respondents –
the registered owners and developers of a housing
subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision located in
Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the Contract to
Sell, CGA would pay ₱2,373,000.00 for the subject
property on installment basis; they were to pay a down
payment of ₱1,186,500, with the balance payable within
three years on equal monthly amortization payments of
₱46,593.85, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum,
starting June 1998.
On August 5, 2000, the parties mutually agreed to amend
the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from
three to five years, calculated from the date of purchase
and based on the increased total consideration of
₱2,706,600, with equal monthly installments of
₱37,615.00, inclusive of interest at 24% per annum,
starting September 2000.
According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly
installments until its administrative pastor discovered that
the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal
flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property
was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-
G Bsd-04-000829 [OLT]) that the respondents had
acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino
Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were
former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial
(Imperial) whose property in Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan5 had
been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27’s
Operation Land Transfer.6 According to CGA, Imperial
applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under
Republic Act No. 6657,7 which the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) granted in its October 2, 1997 order (DAR
Order). The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the
farm lots previously awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries,
including Lot 2-F previously awarded to Adriano, and Lot
2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison. On appeal, the
Office of the President8 and the CA9 upheld the DAR
Order. Through the Court’s Resolution dated January 19,
2005 in G.R. No. 165650, we affirmed the DAR Order by
denying the petition for review of the appellate decision.
Understandably aggrieved after discovering these
circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the
respondents before the RTC on April 30, 2002.10 CGA
claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the
fact that the subject property was part of a property under
litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible
contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked
the trial court to rescind the contract; order the
respondents to return the amounts already paid; and
award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion
to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case.11 Citing PD No. 95712 and PD No. 1344, the
respondents claimed that the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the
sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to
dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of
contract, not specific performance, and is not among the
actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as
specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344.
On October 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying
the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The RTC held that the
action for rescission of contract and damages due to the
respondents’ fraudulent misrepresentation that they are
the rightful owners of the subject property, free from all
liens and encumbrances, is outside the HLURB’s
jurisdiction.1avvphi1
The respondents countered by filing a petition for certiorari
with the CA. In its October 20, 2003 decision, the CA
found merit in the respondents’ position and set the RTC
order aside; the CA ruled that the HLURB had exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it
involved a contract to sell a subdivision lot based on the
provisions of PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344.
Contending that the CA committed reversible error, the
CGA now comes before the Court asking us to overturn
the CA decision and resolution.
THE PETITION
In its petition, CGA argues that the CA erred -
(1) in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code for breach of
reciprocal obligation, while the petitioner’s action is for the
rescission of a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of
the same Code, which is cognizable by the regular court;
and
(2) in holding that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction
over the petitioner’s action by applying Antipolo Realty
Corp v. National Housing Corporation13 and other cited
cases.
In essence, the main issue we are asked to resolve is
which of the two – the regular court or the HLURB – has
exclusive jurisdiction over CGA’s action for rescission and
damages.
According to CGA, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB, as set forth in PD No. 1344 and PD No. 957, is
limited to cases involving specific performance and does
not cover actions for rescission.
Taking the opposing view, respondents insist that since
CGA’s case involves the sale of a subdivision lot, it falls
under the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find no merit in the petition and consequently affirm
the CA decision.
Development of the HLURB’s jurisdiction
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal
are determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law governing at the time the action was
commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law, not by the parties’ consent or by their waiver in favor
of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the nature of an action.14 Thus, the
determination of whether the CGA’s cause of action falls
under the jurisdiction of the HLURB necessitates a closer
examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction
and authority.
PD No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, was intended to
closely supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision
and condominium businesses in order to curb the growing
number of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators. As one of its
"whereas clauses" states:
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show
cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different
innocent purchasers for value;
Section 3 of PD No. 957 granted the National Housing
Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
real estate trade and business." Thereafter, PD No. 1344
was issued on April 2, 1978 to expand the jurisdiction of
the NHA to include the following:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
Executive Order No. 648 (EO 648), dated February 7,
1981, transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial
functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Section 8 of EO 648
provides:
SECTION 8. Transfer of Functions. -The regulatory
functions of the National Housing Authority pursuant to
Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other
related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission
[Human Settlements Regulatory Commission]. x x x.
Among these regulatory functions are: 1) Regulation of the
real estate trade and business; x x x 11) Hear and decide
cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers,
dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific
performance.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17,
1986, the HSRC was renamed as the HLURB.
Rationale for HLURB’s extensive quasi-judicial powers
The surge in the real estate business in the country
brought with it an increasing number of cases between
subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers on the issue
of the extent of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction. In the
cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising
from contracts between the subdivision developer and the
lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision
developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live
in.15
We explained the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction at length
in Sps. Osea v. Ambrosio,16 where we said:
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency
may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on
the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such
agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344,
"Empowering The National Housing Authority To Issue
Writ Of Execution In The Enforcement Of Its Decision
Under Presidential Decree No. 957," clarifies and spells
out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction
to the HLURB in the following specific terms:
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots
or condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with
quasi-judicial authority must also be determined by
referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, "The Subdivision
And Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree." Section 3
of this statute provides:
x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - The
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business
in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus
lodged in the HLURB is indicated in the second, third and
fourth preambular paragraphs of PD 957 which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show
cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different
innocent purchasers for value;
xxxx
WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative
that the real estate subdivision and condominium
businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that
penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and
manipulations committed in connection therewith.
The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The
intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate
government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties
aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the
enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said
category of real estate may take recourse. The business
of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued
with public interest and welfare, any question arising from
the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the
HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter.
In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power
is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only
by the regular courts.
As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate
claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is
out of step with the fast-changing times. There are
hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the
legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is
exercised by them as an incident of the principal power
entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling
under their particular expertise.
In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed
the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board to award damages although this is an essentially
judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of
justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of
governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the
need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modern
world. [Emphasis supplied.]
Another case – Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA17 –
explained the grant of the HLURB’s expansive quasi-
judicial powers. We said:
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with the
special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that
‘between the power lodged in an administrative body and
a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the
former’.
xxx
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in
the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent
to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the
exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must
commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the
rights of private parties under such contracts, One thrust
of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private
rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by our regular courts. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Subdivision cases under the RTC’s jurisdiction
The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not
mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots
automatically fall under its jurisdiction. As we said in
Roxas v. Court of Appeals: 18
In our view, the mere relationship between the parties, i.e.,
that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision
lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the
HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the
nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D.
1344. On this matter, we have consistently held that the
concerned administrative agency, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has
jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and
statutory obligations.
xxx
Note particularly pars. (b) and (c) as worded, where the
HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to par. (a),
concerning "unsound real estate practices," it would
appear that the logical complainant would be the buyers
and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and
developers or condominium builders and realtors ), and
not vice versa. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development
Corporation v. Villar19 and Suntay v. Gocolay20 that the
HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision
or condominium owners or developers against subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale
behind this can be found in the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No.
1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases cognizable
by the HLURB are those instituted by subdivision or
condomium buyers or owners against the project
developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy
of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the
real estate trade and business.21
Thus, in the cases of Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc.,
[22] and Cadimas v. Carrion,23 we upheld the RTC’s
jurisdiction even if the subject matter was a subdivision lot
since it was the subdivision developer who filed the action
against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell.
The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a
case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted
as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed
against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or
condominium unit. This was what happened in Francel
Realty Corporation v. Sycip,24 where the HLURB took
cognizance of the developer’s claim against the buyer in
order to forestall splitting of causes of action.
Obviously, where it is not clear from the allegations in the
complaint that the property involved is a subdivision lot, as
in Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
Manila,25 the case falls under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts and not the HLURB. Similarly, in Spouses
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,26 we held that the RTC
had jurisdiction over a case where the conflict involved a
subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a number of
subdivision lots but was not himself the subdivision
developer.
The Present Case
In the present case, CGA is unquestionably the buyer of a
subdivision lot from the respondents, who sold the
property in their capacities as owner and developer. As
CGA stated in its complaint:
2.01. Defendants are the registered owners and
developers of a housing subdivision presently known as
Villa Priscilla Subdivision located at Brgy. Cutcut, Pulilan,
Bulacan;
2.02 On or about April 30, 1998, the plaintiff thru its
Administrative Pastor bought from defendants on
installment basis a parcel of land designated at Lot 1,
Block 4 of the said Villa Priscilla Subdivision xxx
xxx
2.04 At the time of the execution of the second Contract to
Sell (Annex "B"), Lot 1, Block 4 of the Villa Priscilla
Subdivision was already covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-127776 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the name of Iluminada T. Soneja, married to Asterio
Soneja (defendant Priscilla T. Ignacio’s sister and brother-
in-law) and the defendants as co-owners, but the latter
represented themselves to be the real and absolute
owners thereof, as in fact it was annotated in the title that
they were empowered to sell the same. Copy of TCT No.
T-127776 is hereto attached and made part hereof as
Annex "C".
2.05 Plaintiff has been religiously paying the agreed
monthly installments until its Administrative Pastor
discovered recently that while apparently clean on its face,
the title covering the subject lot actually suffers from fatal
flaws and defects as it is part of the property involved in
litigation even before the original Contract to Sell (Annex
"A"), which defendants deliberately and fraudulently
concealed from the plaintiff;
2.06 As shown in the technical description of TCT No. T-
127776 (Annex "C"), it covers a portion of consolidated
Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829 (OLT), which were
respectively acquired by defendants from Nicanor Adriano
and Ceferino Sison, former tenants-beneficiaries of
Purificacion S. Imperial, whose property at Cutcut, Pulilan,
Bulacan originally covered by TCT No. 240878 containing
an area of 119,431 square meters was placed under
Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 27;
2.07 Said Purificacion S. Imperial applied for retention of
five (5) hectares of her property at Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan
under Rep, Act No. 6657 and the same was granted by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to cover in
whole or in part farm lots previously awarded to tenants-
beneficiaries, including inter alia Nicanor Adriano’s Lot 2-F
and Ceferino Sison’s Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 (OLT).
xxx
2.08 Said order of October 2, 1997 was affirmed and
declared final and executory, and the case was
considered closed, as in fact there was already an
Implementing Order dated November 10, 1997.
xxx
3.03 As may thus be seen, the defendants deliberately
and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff that fact that
the parcel of land sold to the latter under the Contract to
Sell (Annexes "A" and "B") is part of the property already
under litigation and in fact part of the five-hectare retention
awarded to the original owner, Purificacion S. Imperial.
xxx
3.05 Plaintiff is by law entitled to the rescission of the
Contracts to Sell (Annexes "A" and "B") by restitution of
what has already been paid to date for the subject
property in the total amount of P2,515,899.20, thus formal
demand therefor was made on the defendants thru a letter
dated April 5, 2002, which they received but refused to
acknowledge receipt. Copy of said letter is hereto attached
and made part hereof as Annex "J". 27 [Emphasis
supplied.]
From these allegations, the main thrust of the CGA
complaint is clear – to compel the respondents to refund
the payments already made for the subject property
because the respondents were selling a property that they
apparently did not own. In other words, CGA claims that
since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations
under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property free from all
liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the
contract and get a refund of the payments already made.
This cause of action clearly falls under the actions
contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344,
which reads:
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
xxx
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
We view CGA’s contention – that the CA erred in applying
Article 1191 of the Civil Code as basis for the contract’s
rescission – to be a negligible point. Regardless of
whether the rescission of contract is based on Article 1191
or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what CGA
principally wants is a refund of all payments it already
made to the respondents. This intent, amply articulated in
its complaint, places its action within the ambit of the
HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of
the regular courts. Accordingly, CGA has to file its
complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the October 20, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 75717 dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction the CGA complaint filed with the RTC,
Branch 14 of Malolos, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174584 January 20, 2010
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, Petitioner,
vs.
JACINTO UY, MICHAEL UY, MARILYN O. UY, RICHARD
O. UY, REY IGNACIO DIAZ, JOSE PO and JUANITO
MALTO, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the power of courts to hear criminal
violations of the law that protects subdivision buyers
against developers selling lots before they are issued
licenses to sell and the effect of the subsequent issuance
of such licenses to sales that land developers make before
the issuance of their licenses.
The Facts and the Case
Respondent Jacinto Uy (Uy) is the chairman of Moldex
Realty, Inc. (Moldex); the other respondents are its officers
and directors. Uy entered into a joint venture agreement
with Quintin Bernardo for the inclusion into Moldex’s
residential subdivision project in Bulacan of two parcels of
land, totaling 20,954 square meters, that Bernardo held
under two emancipation patents.1
On June 21, 2001 Moldex applied for a license to sell
subdivision lots in the project mentioned with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)2 but the latter
denied the application for failure to comply with the
requirements.3
On July 2, 2002 petitioner Victoria P. Cabral filed a
criminal complaint4 against respondents Uy, et al. for
violation of Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957,
alleging that she was the registered owner of the lots
subject of Bernardo’s emancipation patents. She said that
prior to the transaction between Bernardo and respondent
Uy, the latter offered to acquire the lots from her but she
refused because of the pending case for cancellation of
the patents that she filed against Bernardo with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
On April 28, 2003 the public prosecutor’s office filed a
criminal information before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City5 in Criminal Case Q-03-116823 against
respondent Uy and the other Moldex officers, namely,
respondents Michael Uy, Marilyn O. Uy, Richard O. Uy,
Rey Ignacio Diaz, Jose Po, and Juanito Malto for selling
subdivision lots to a certain Josefa C. Yanga without a
license from the HLURB.6
Subsequently, however, or on September 17, 2003 the
HLURB issued Moldex the license to sell that it needed.7
Respondents Uy, et al. filed a motion to quash the
information and motion for judicial determination of
probable cause8 claiming that the office of the prosecutor
and the trial court had no jurisdiction over violations of
P.D. 957, such jurisdiction being with the HLURB alone
and, granting that they could take cognizance of the case,
respondents Uy, et al. could not be held criminally liable
because the HLURB subsequently issued them a license
to sell.9
On May 20, 2004 the trial court denied the motions of
respondents Uy, et al.10 On June 15, 2005 it also denied
their motion for reconsideration,11 prompting them to
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90468,
which court granted their prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.12 On June 2, 2006 the latter
court rendered a decision,13 upholding the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the subject case but ordaining its
dismissal, given that the subsequent issuance of a license
to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal
liability. Petitioner Cabral filed a motion for reconsideration
but the appeals court denied14 it, hence, this petition.
Required to comment on the petition, the Office of the
Solicitor General joined the petitioner in asking this Court
to reverse the CA’s decision.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case15 are:
1. Whether or not the office of the public prosecutor and
the trial court have jurisdiction over criminal actions for
violation of P.D. 957; and
2. Whether or not HLURB’s subsequent issuance to
Moldex of a license to sell extinguished respondents Uy,
et al.’s criminal liability for selling subdivision lots prior to
the issuance of such license.
The Court’s Rulings
First. Conformably with what this Court ruled in Sia v.
People,16 the CA correctly upheld the public prosecutor’s
authority to file the criminal information for violation of P.D.
957 and the trial court’s power to hear and adjudicate the
action, the penalty being a ₱20,000.00 fine and
imprisonment of not exceeding 10 years or both such fine
and imprisonment. This penalty brings the offense within
the jurisdiction of that court.
Second. P.D. 957 has been enacted to regulate for the
public good the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums. Its Section 5 prohibits such sale without
the prior issuance of an HLURB license17 and punishes
those who engage in such selling.18 The crime is
regarded as malum prohibitum since P.D. 957 is a special
law designed to protect the welfare of society and ensure
the carrying on of the purposes of civil life.19 It is the
commission of that act as defined by law, not its character
or effect that determines whether or not its provision has
been violated. Malice or criminal intent is immaterial in
such crime.20 In crimes that are mala prohibita, the
forbidden acts might not be inherently immoral. Still they
are punished because the law says they are forbidden.
With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated.211avvphi1
Since the Information in this case sufficiently alleged that
Moldex sold a subdivision lot when it did not yet have a
license to do so, the crime was done. Assuming the
allegations to be true, the subsequent issuance of the
license and the invocation of good faith cannot reach back
to erase the offense and extinguish respondents Uy, et
al.’s criminal liability.
In ruling that respondents’ criminal liability has been
extinguished, the CA relied on Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc.22 But Co Chien is a case
for refund of down payment and nullification of the contract
of sale between the buyer and the developer whose
license was issued only after the execution of the contract.
This Court refused to void the transaction in the case
because the absence of the license was not in itself
sufficient to invalidate the contract. And while there was no
fraud on the part of the developer, the HLURB directed it
to pay an administrative fine of ₱20,000.00 for selling the
lot without the necessary license. This only shows that the
subsequent issuance of a license, as in this case, will not
extinguish the liability of the developer for violation of
Section 5 of P.D. 957.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the June 2, 2006 Decision
and the August 22, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 90468. The Court REINSTATES
the May 20, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116823, which denied
respondents’ omnibus motion to quash and motion for
judicial determination of probable cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name
E & S Delta Village, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
(HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal
justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a
buyer on installment under land purchase agreements
entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree"? This is the major question raised in the instant
Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the
respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in
O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the
respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on
installment basis from petitioner and his co-
owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S
Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as
NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing
Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter
alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making
further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned
by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending,
private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint
(Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo
and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above
NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his
amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots
to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said
property was registered. Private respondent further
alleged that he suspended his payments because of
petitioner's failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to
the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to
him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision
upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with
private respondent and dismissed private respondent's
complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed
the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to
complete the subdivision development and to reinstate
private respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and
as to the other, "it appearing that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 269546 has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo
and Ad(e)lina Relevo . . . , the management of E & S Delta
Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the
complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all
payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal
rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid."
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed
the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having
been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition
for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals
from judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the
President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . "
However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case,
which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half
years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the
said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the
Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in
concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta
Village justified private respondent's non-payment of his
amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land
purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to
the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern
the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent
Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that
P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover
even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from
the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to
remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading
authority on statutory construction stressed:
The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital
part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.
The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law
itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads
away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. . . . In construing statutes the proper course is
to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and
to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the
context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent
policy and objects of the legislature.1 (emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social
justice, the law must favor the weak and the
disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers
and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no
other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over
helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations
and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers", and such intent is nowhere
expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its
inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving
their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show
cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different
innocent purchasers for value;2 (emphasis supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest
and unarguable that the legislative intent must have been
to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957
operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in
existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly
prospective application of the statute will effectively
emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to
exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent
schemes and practices perpetrated under or in connection
with those contracts and transactions which happen to
have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious
prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be
protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the
legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to
remain and continue to be a source of misery for
subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D.
957 as a whole are certain of its provisions, viz., Sections
20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even those
contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's
enactment:
Sec. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer
shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including
water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium
plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in
any form of advertisement, within one year from the date
of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may
be fixed by the Authority.
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision
lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the
effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the
owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium
project to complete compliance with his or its obligations
as provided in the preceding section within two years from
the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed
in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or, developer to comply with the
obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall
constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39
of this Decree.
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or
condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to
buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer,
when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the failure
of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying with the same. Such
buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization interests but excluding
delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal
rate. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive
Secretary, the application of P.D. 957 to the contracts in
question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the
contracts themselves, which expressly provides:
(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to
subdivide, develop and improve the entire area covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the
parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in
accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds
himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules and
regulations respecting the subdivision and development of
lots for residential purposes as may be presently in force
or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the
Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of
the Bureau of Lands, the General Registration Office and
other government agencies. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the
contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had
been properly invoked by private respondent when he
desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to
petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision project
according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. (Such incomplete
development of the subdivision and non-performance of
specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part of
the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings
of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the
respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.)
Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave
due weight to the following matters: although private
respondent started to default on amortization payments
beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he
had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in
payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the
cancellation option available to him under the contract, did
not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but
delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind
to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land purchase
agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions
of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event,
as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded by
the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization
payments incurred by private respondent had been
effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the
latter's tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)

Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's contention that

respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering
the refund of private respondent's payments on Lot 12
although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the
subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted
that the supporting documents submitted substantiating
the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-
payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.

Finally, since petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the

(Executive Secretary's) Decision dated March 10, 1992
was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said
decision had become final and executory, pursuant to
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February
12, 1987, which provides that "(d)ecisions/
resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become
final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof . . . , unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period."

WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of

discretion, the petition is DENIED due course and is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.