PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, respondents
If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.
 Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide –
frustrated because of the timely medical assistance
 The trial court found him guilty
 RTC imposes the penalty of prision correctionial as its
minimum period and a fine
 RTC also recognized the mitigating circumstances of the
case like his incomplete self-defense and voluntary
surrender
 He appealed to CA but CA affirmed RTC’s decision with
modification
 CA imposes the minimum penalty of arresto mayor and
max of prision correctional
 Tugonan filed a petition for probation alleging:
1. He possess all qualification and none of
disqualifications under PD No. 968
2. The CA reduced the penalty
3. The CA took no action in his petition for probation
4. trial court recognized his two mitigating
circumstances
5. the SC during the Santos vs Pano, upheld the right to
probation despite appeal from his conviction
 Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial
of his application for probation on the ground that by
appealing the sentence of the RTC, he waived his right
to make his application.
 Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of
the application shall be deemed a waver of the right to
appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal.
 This case and Santos case are different:
1. In this case, the original sentence of 1 yr was already
probationable
2. In Santos, the penalty only became probationable
after it had been reduced as a result of the appeal
 RTC granted his petition for probation, and set aside the
Probation Officer’s recommendation
“The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an
appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, [private
respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the
amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an obvious misreading of
the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law
refers to the .appeal taken from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court and not that of the
appellate court, since under the law an application for
probation is filed with the trial court which can only
grant the same”
 Petition granted, decision of RTC was set aside
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of
granting the application for probation despite that he had
already appealed from the conviction.
HELD:  by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he
could have then applied for probation, private respondent
waived the right to make his application. 
RTC- they granted because the respondent has not yet
perfected his appeal the to court of appeals. Therefore, he is
still entitled to suspend his sentence and place him under
probation
SC- however ruled that what the law meant was the he has
not yet perfect his appeal in the trial court. Which in case,
was already perfected.
PD NO 986-Probation Law.
Allows probation to be granted even after the accussed
appealed his sentence, so long he has not yet served his
sentence
PD No 1990-Amended 986
Puts a stop to practice of appealing judgments of conviction
even if the sentence is probationable
§4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Since private respondent filed his application for probation on
December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect, 9 it is
covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to appeal," Having appealed from the judgment of the trial
court and having applied for probation only after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was
clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS , respondents.
When the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it.
 Petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
decision of CA
  Petitioner Cecilio was charged with violation of BP
Blg 22 for the reason of insufficiency of funds
 Petitioner argued that no offense was committed
since the check was payable in DOLLARS
 The RTC motion to dismiss is denied. Under bouncing
checks law, FOREIGN CHECKS are within the
coverage of said law.
 Filed for certiorari in the CA wherein he contends
that:
1. the court has no jurisdiction over her foreign bank
2.the payment could not be legally paid in dollars
3. the obligation is null and void
 CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of
said law.
Petitioner argued that the check was drawin against the
dollar account with a foreign bank, therefore not covered by
the bouncing checks law. BUT the law does not distinguish
the currency involved.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, respondents.
General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the
result that the general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the statute's object and
purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except
for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong
to or fall under one specific class.
 Colgate-Palmolive is engaged in the manufacture of
toilet preparations and household remedies
 It had imported from abroad various materials for
use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream
 For every importation, they are to pay 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transpo, and other incidental
cost
 Petitioner filed for refund using Sec 2 of Rep 601 as
basis.
 that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the
cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to
the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer
and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof
of actual importation under the rules and regulations
to be promulgated pursuant to section seven
thereof."
 The Auditor of central bank refused to pass in audit
because accordingly, the term stabilizers flavors
refers only to those for food or food products.
 Petitioner then appealed to SC
 SC granted petition, reversed decision under review
 The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only
to cases where, except for one general term, all the
items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class.
HELD
The auditor applied the general terms ruling. However
this is not to be applied in this case because from the
statute itself, not all of those enumerated belong to one
specific class. Therefore, not necessarily that it should
only pertain those that are for food or food prooducts.
it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814
amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No.
601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to
food for human consumption, was added among the
items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the
basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot
validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and
flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
manufacture of food and food products.
Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer
and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those
used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream,
we are not authorized to make any distinction and must
construe the words in their general sense
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, , petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., respondents.
Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory
construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
 The fiscal filed with the lower court against 16 persons
charging them with squatting, which is penalized by PD
No. 772 which took effect on August 20, 1975.
 SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter
against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging
from six months to one year or a fine of not less than
one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
 Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge
Echaves motu proprio  issued an omnibus order dated
December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on
 the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused
entered the land through "stealth and strategy",
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected
"with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem
generis  the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a
grazing land.
 Ejusdem generis means of the same kind or nature.v
 Thus the fiscal amended the informations
 Lower court denied the motion, It insisted that the
phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not
include agricultural purposes because its preamble does
not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class.
 Fiscal appealed to SC
 We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the
decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-
do individuals. The squating complained of involves
pasture lands in rural areas.
 The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem
generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which
is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance
of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972,
directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9
and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors,
City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers,
"to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and
those built without permits on public and private property."
squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all
over the country;
-No mention of Dept of Agri and was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities  deduced from the deletion of the word "subordinate" before
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS (applied only when the intent is
uncertain) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this
case. Here, the intent is unmistakable. It is intended to apply
only to urban communities, particulary to illegal
constructions.
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR.,
ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms.
ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by
RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
 petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners,
 the administrative complaint filed against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 Respondents argue that the power of preventive
suspension given the Ombudsman under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law."
 Solicitor General and Petitioners claim that the
Ombudsman can ONLY RECOMMEND but he cannot
ORDER the preventive suspension himself.
 the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition,
Supplemental Petition and Supplemental Manifestation,
stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only
to recommend suspension and he has no direct power
to suspend;"
 , petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor
General that the Ombudsman can only suspend
government officials or employees connected with his
office.
 Petition is dismissed, the Ombudsman has the authority
granted by the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to
suspend government officials and employees working on the
offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
"subordinate" and "in his bureau," leaving the phrase to read
"suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation . . . ." The conclusion that can be
and the words "in his bureau" after "officer or employee" is
that the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend all officials and employees under
investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are
employed "in his office" or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative
complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent
therein is deemed to be "in his authority" and he can
proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power
"to recommend the suspension" of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a
punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.
Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"
should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated
When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the
power to recommend the suspension, it refers to suspension
as punitive measure
Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction is made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are mere directory.
 Manolo-Accused is an agent of the Towers Assurance
Corporation
 He issued a check in favor of the complaining witness
 It was dishonored for the reason that the account was
already closed
 Trial court convicted Manolo
 He appealed to CA but CA affirmed judgment of
conviction
 Petitioner contends that CA erred because the basis of
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts
which was NOT signed by the petitioner nor by his
counsel.
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No
agreement (IN NEGATIVE) or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by him and his counsel.
 the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced
 SC reversed judgment of CA, case is hereby re-opened
and remanded to RTC for further reception of evidence
HELD:
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission
of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum,
confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel
to sign the Stipulation of Facts.
PURITA BERSABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, TAN
THAT and ONG PIN TEE, respondents.
Use of word “may” in the statute generally connotes a
permissible thing while the word “shall” is imperative.
 that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed
an ejectment suit against the petitioner. A decision was
rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by
the petitioner to the respondent Court
 the respondent court issued an order “counsels for both
parties are given thirty (30) days from receipt of this
order within which to file their respective memoranda”
 The petitioner then filed a motion ex-parte where they
will submit memorandum from receipt or notice of
submission which was granted. But no notice was
received yet. So no memo was submitted also. Then the
respondent judge issued another order “For failure of
the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal the
same is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
her.”
 Appeal dismissed because of failure of the petitioner to
file her memorandum on time
 Petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of
respondent Judge and to compel said respondent Judge
to decide petitioner's perfected appeal on the basis of
the evidence and records of the case submitted
 “Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed
cases on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided,
That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief
with oral argument if so requested ...”
 The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for
doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the
parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the
latter may so choose to waive submission of the
 memoranda. The Court of First Instance is left with no
alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or
municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not
empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere
failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but
rather it is the Court's mandatory duty to decide the
case on the basis of the available evidence and records
transmitted to it.
 As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a
statute is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion
 Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are
not essential requirements. They may be submitted
and/or made only if so requested.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the mere failure to submit the
memorandum on time would empower the trial court to
dismiss the appeal
 SC set aside as null and void the orders of respondent
judge. SC then directed the respondent court to decide
the civil case.
Jenette Marie B. Crisologo, Petitioner,
vs.
GLOBE TELECOM INC. and Cesar M. Maureal, Vice
President for Human Resources, Respondents.
 Petitioner was an employee of respondent company.
When she was promoted as Director of Corporate Affairs
and Regulatory Matters, she became entitled to an
executive car
 She was separated from the company so the petitioner
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
which later dismissed the complaint.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the NLRC’s dismissal.
 Pending this petition, the respondent also filed a civil
case for recovery of the car. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss but was denied.
 Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. She also filed a motion for the issuance of writ of
prohition to enjoin proceedings in the repelivin case
 Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to declare
defendant in default which was granted by trial court.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the trial court
 The trial court rendered a judgment by default.
Declaring respondent having the right to possession of
the vehicle and order petitioner to pay damages.
 Petition then filed with SC a petition for review on
certiorari
 Petition denied for being the wrong remedy under 1997
rules of civil procedure
 Petitioner filed the present the present motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the filing of said petition is
the proper recourse
 The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper
remedy to assail the default judgment rendered by the
trial court.
 . Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with
the Court of Appeals
 Instead, she came directly to this Court via petition for
review on certiorari, without setting forth substantial
reasons why the ordinary remedies under the law
should be disregarded and the petition entertained
 Petitioner further argues that the petition involved
questions of law, and the Court should have taken
cognizance of the case.
 The issues on the award of damages call for a re-
evaluation of the evidence before the trial court, which
is obviously a question of fact. Cases where an appeal
involved questions of fact, of law, or both fall within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
 It is on this score that the Court is inclined to concur
with petitioner’s argument that even if the remedy
resorted to was wrong, the Court may refer the case to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 56, Section 6,
paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides: "(A)n appeal by certiorari
taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial
Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the
Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action."
This despite the express provision in Section 5(f) of the
same Rule, which provides that an appeal may be
dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of
appeal.
 Both Sections 5(f) and 6 of Rule 57 use the term "may,"
denoting discretion on the part of the Court in
dismissing the appeal or referring the case to the Court
of Appeals. The question of fact involved in the appeal
and substantial ends of justice warrant a referral of this
case to the Court of Appeals for further appropriate
proceedings.
 The court is inclined to concur with petitioner’s
argument that even if that the Court is inclined to
concur with petitioner’s argument that even if the
remedy resorted to was wrong, the Court may refer the
case to the Court of Appeals under Rule 56, Sec.6, Par. 2
of the 1997 rules of civil procedure, as amended, which
provides, “An appeal by certiorari taken to the SC from
the RTC submitting issues of fact MAY be referred to the
CA for decision or appropriate action.” This is despite
the provision in Sec 5 of the same rule, twhich provides
that an appeal may be dismissed when there is error in
the choce or mode of appeal. BOTH Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 57 uses the term “may” denoting DISCRETION on
the court in dismissing the appeal OR referring the case
to the CA.
 WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration
is GRANTED. The petition is reinstated and the case
is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.
LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH)
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND
GUARANTY CORPORATION, EMDEN ENCARNACION and
HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.
The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always
imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of
discretion
 failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one
month
 Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC
 For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its
corporate by-laws
 Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI and the
head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed him
that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two
reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the
period required by the Corporation Code and, second,
there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC
had not received any report on the association's
activities.
 Because of this, it resulted to the registration of the
South Association with HIGC.
 This prompted LGVHAI They questioned the revocation
of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice
and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the
cancellation of COR of the North and South Association.
 HIGC hearing officer granted their prayer for
cancellation.
 South Association then appealed.
 South Association petitioner reiterates its argument that
the word " must" in Section 46 of the Corporation Code
is mandatory.
Whether or not LGVHAI’s failure to file its by-laws within
the period prescribed resulted in the automatic
dissolution of LGVHAI.
HELD
 the Court of Appeals held that under the Corporation
Code, a private corporation commences to have
corporate existence and juridical personality from the
date the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
issues a certificate of incorporation under its official seal.
 The requirement for the filing of by-laws under Section
46 of the Corporation Code within one month from
official notice of the issuance of the certificate of
incorporation presupposes that it is already
incorporated, although it may file its by-laws with its
articles of incorporation. Elucidating on the effect of a
delayed filing of by-laws
 Such suspension or revocation, the same section
provides, should be made upon proper notice and
hearing.
 non-filing of by-laws is only a ground for suspension
or revocation of the certificate of registration of
corporations and, therefore, it may not result in
automatic dissolution of the corporation.
 Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative
act or operates to impose a duty which may be
enforced. 9 It is synonymous with "ought" which
connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. 10 However,
the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not
always imperative.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA
CRUZ, respondents.
A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without
regard to the day of the week on which it begins
 Private respondent mortgages 2 lots to secure
payment of loan
 For failure to pay, PNB foreclosed the mortgaged
property and won the highest bidder
 A final deed of sale was then registered in favour og
PNB and later sold the lots to 3rd persons
 Notice of Sale were published on:
- March 28 ( Friday)
- April 11 ( Friday)
- April 12 (Saturday)
 The rule requires that the notice of auction sale shall
be “published one a week for at least 3 consecutivve
weeks”
  CA reversed the judgment appealed from by
declaring void the auction sale , the deed of sale, and
the consolidation of ownership
 Hence, his petition
 Petition for certiorari and intervention are dismissed

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner complied with the

requirement of weekly publication of notice of extra-judicial
foreclosure

HELD:

 One week consisting of seven consecutive days

 April 11 was already the 1st day of the third week,
where it should have been still in the second week.
 Therefore, not in compliance with the law
 It would have been absurd to exclude March 28,
1969 as reckoning point in line with the third
paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the
purpose of counting the first week of publication as
to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because
this will have the effect of extending the first week
by another day.