Meijer, A. (2014) - Transparency. The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability PDF

Transparency
Oxford Handbooks Online

Transparency
Albert Meijer
The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability
Edited by Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans
Print Publication Date: May 2014

Subject: Political Science, Public Administration, Political Behavior
Online Publication Date: Aug 2014 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.013.0043
Abstract and Keywords
Government transparency is increasing worldwide and political rhetoric assumes a strong

positive relation between transparency and accountability. This chapter opens up the
“black box” of the relation between transparency and accountability by examining the
expanding body of literature on government transparency. Three theoretical relations
between transparency and accountability are identified: transparency facilitates
horizontal accountability; transparency strengthens vertical accountability; and
transparency reduces the need for accountability. The review of studies into the relation
between transparency and accountability show that, under certain conditions and in
certain situations, transparency may contribute to accountability: transparency facilitates
accountability when it actually presents a significant increase in the available
information, when there are actors capable of processing the information, and when
exposure has a direct or indirect impact on the government or public agency.
Keywords: Transparency, accountability, open government, access to information
Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a

regular government.—Jeremy Bentham
Transparency as the New “Religion”

Bentham’s ideas on openness—transparency as the key to the prevention of abuses of
power—have had a strong influence on the development of the modern public sector. The
most important transparency measures, such as opening up archives, public sessions of
representative bodies, and the publication of government documents, can all be traced
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Transparency
back to Bentham’s ideas on openness. These measures have become basic requirements
of democratic governance. The trend towards more open government has not yet ended;
the current attention to transparency builds upon a longer existing discourse on openness
in government. Since the late 1990s, after access to documentation had become
mainstream, the call for the active release of government documents has only gained in
strength (Hood 2006): Transparency is expanding further into new domains.
Government transparency—in the sense of Bentham’s openness—takes various forms

(Heald 2006; Meijer et al. 2012). The minutes of the meetings of popular representatives
are published and people can attend those meetings. Laws and legal regulations are
published so that all people know the law. Government documents are published or
available on request through Freedom of Information Acts. All together, these measures
open up arenas of governmental decision-making to accountability to formal institutions
such as Parliaments and Courts of Audit, but also to horizontal accountability to civil
society organizations, stakeholders, the media, and the people at large. These forms of
transparency potentially alter the accountability landscape in a fundamental manner by
rearranging access to official information.
The increase in transparency is a worldwide phenomenon (see Roberts (2006) for

(p. 508)
an in-depth analysis of this trend). Erkkilä (2012, xiv) speaks of a “transnational

discourse” on transparency. Roberts (2006) emphasizes that the idea of freedom of
information has become to be considered as a hallmark of (democratic) governance and,
therefore, countries all around the world are making an effort to institutionalize
government transparency. Roberts (2010, 925) highlights that established liberal
democracies (such as the UK and Germany), but also new democracies (e.g. South Africa)
and even non-democratic countries (such as China), have adopted freedom of information
laws in the past fifteen years. Worldwide, freedom of government information is on the
rise.
While new technologies facilitate transparency (Margetts 2006; Meijer 2009), the surge
in “active transparency” can be attributed to the desire of political leaders to enhance the
accountability of governments. This was most clearly formulated by the American
President Barack Obama (2009): “Government should be transparent. Transparency
promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their
Government is doing.” Similar statements can be found in the policy intentions of
governments all around the world. Even in authoritarian states such as China, where it is
regarded as a tool to fight corruption, transparency is considered to be crucial in forging
a connection between citizens and government (Roberts 2006, 8; Tan 2012).
Transparency is often even regarded as a self-evident good in society (Etzioni 2010, 389),
and Hood (2006, 3) provocatively argues that “more-transparent-than-thou” has become
the secular equivalent of “holier-than-thou” in debates about modern governance. Indeed,
one could argue that the all-seeing eye of God has been replaced by public eyes: both the
eye of God and the public eyes convey the idea that we are being watched and, therefore,
we should behave.
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Transparency
Political rhetoric assumes a strong relation between transparency and accountability (Fox
2007). The clearest proponent of this argument is, again, President Obama (2009): “A
democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency.” For
academics, this relation is less trivial. A more substantial understanding of the relation
between transparency and accountability requires that we deconstruct these concepts
and analyze the various relations between them. The expectations of the contribution of
transparency to accountability are exceedingly high but our academic understanding of
this relation is limited. This chapter aims to open up the “black box” of the relation
between transparency and accountability. The expanding body of literature on
government transparency is examined and used to shed light on the changing role of
transparency in accountability. The chapter will examine the nature and effectiveness of
the new transparency, its influence on accountability arrangements, and, finally, the
remaining gaps in our knowledge of the relation between transparency and
accountability.
Historical Roots
Transparency is both an old and a new concept. It is new in the sense that it now
primarily refers to publishing government information on websites but it is old in the
sense (p. 509) that the basic idea that watching others influences their behavior has been
around for a long time. Hood (2006, 8) recalls that French revolutionaries embraced the
idea of a transparent society “as one in which there was no space for the sort of social
darkness in which they assumed injustice or unhappiness would breed” and mentions
Rousseau as a key proponent of transparency. Rousseau equated opaqueness with evil
and considered transparency as the way back to the lost state of nature. One could even
understand this as a return to paradise when Adam and Eve were also fully
“transparent.”
The idea that people behave correctly when they are being watched can be traced back to
Bentham’s “panopticon.” A panopticon is a prison in which all inmates are constantly
visible to the guards in the central tower. Their visibility is expected to result in norm
compliance. Although Bentham developed this idea for prisoners, the general argument
that transparency results in better behavior can also be applied to civil servants and
politicians. Bentham regarded transparency as a cornerstone of government since it
would prevent “conspiracy.” In a similar vein, Rousseau argued that civil servants should
operate in full view of the public and that this would be a mechanism to avoid
destabilizing intrigues (Hood 2006, 7).
Not all philosophers in the 18th century argued in favor of transparency. The French
philosopher Jean Bodin defended the secrecy of the imperial policy—the Arcana Imperii—
and stressed that the King’s ability to maintain the integrity of the state would be
undermined by transparency (Roberts 2006, 10). Even though the advocates of
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transparency “won” this intellectual conflict—through the French revolution—the

arguments for—Rousseau’s natural state—and against—Bodin’s integrity of the state—
openness continue to shape the debate about transparency (Roberts 2006).
The history of transparent government starts in the nineteenth century, with European
countries and the US enacting legislation for openness of decisions, treaties, and access
to meetings. Roberts (2006, 10, 11) summarizes:
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Western democracies had achieved what
we might call a level of basic transparency: the rule of law was established, the
process of lawmaking (including the business of taxing and spending) was open to
public view, and the right to speak freely about governmental affairs was
protected.
Sweden was the first to adopt access to information legislation in its 1766 transition from
absolutist to liberal bourgeois rule (Erkkilä 2012, 6). It was not until 1951, however, that
Finland became the second country to enact transparency legislation. Freedom of
information (FOI) legislation gained popularity after the Johnson Administration adopted
this type of legislation in the US in 1966 and the example was followed by a spread of FOI
legislation from the 1970s onwards. Erkkilä (2012, 5) shows how several West European
countries (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, France, Luxembourg) and also New Zealand
adopted information access laws in the 1970s while Austria, Australia, and Canada
followed suit in the 1980s. FOI legislation became really popular after the fall of the
Berlin Wall: 19 European countries between 1992 and 2005. FOI has now become a
standard element of Western-style democracy and this type of legislation is now being
adopted in a wide variety of countries all around the world (Roberts, 2006).
While freedom of information is predominantly about access to information on

(p. 510)
request, a new generation of legislation has more recently been introduced that focuses
on the active publication of government information. President Obama issued the Open
Government Directive in 2009 and this directive requires agencies to take several steps
to embed a culture of transparency into the way they operate (McDermott 2010). This
directive emphasizes that information should be published in a timely fashion, in
accessible formats, and with adequate use of new technologies. Government agencies
should also provide opportunities for citizens to give feedback on, and assess the quality
of, published information. The Open Government Directive is, for now, the last stage of a
development in transparency legislation from passive access to a limited number of
documents through lengthy legal procedures, to proactive access to large quantities of
information in accessible formats. At present, most government agencies in democratic
societies have complex structures and technologies for making their information available
to citizens (Welch and Wong 2001).
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Transparency as an Institutional Information

Relation
When used in political debates, the term “transparency” is often not defined and kept
ambiguous. Scholtes (2012, 341) highlights that the ambiguity of the concept makes it
attractive to politicians, since transparency can be used to underpin a broad variety of
political arguments. She shows how transparency can be connected to democratic value,
administrative control, public accountability, the promotion of market forces, and an
attitude of openness. Transparency can be regarded as an “ideograph” (McGee 1980),
something nobody can be opposed to but that is conceptually empty and can be filled in
different strategic ways.
The academic debate about transparency is hardly less confusing than the political
debate, as many academics do not (precisely) define transparency. General definitions
highlight that something is happening behind “veils” and once these “veils” are removed,
everything is out in the open and can be scrutinized (Davis 1998, 121; Den Boer 1998,
105). Patrick Birkinshaw (2006, 189) puts it as follows: “Transparency is the conduct of
public affairs in the open or otherwise subject to public scrutiny.” Julia Black (1997, 476)
completes the definition by stating what it is not: “[Transparency] is contrasted with
opaque policy measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decisions, what they
are, and who gains and who loses.” Although there is wide agreement on this general
idea, more precise conceptualizations vary considerably. Economists regard transparency
as a precondition for optimal markets, political scientists conceptualize it as a
precondition for political participation, and legal scholars stress that transparency is a
precondition for administrative legality. Debates between scientists from these disciplines
therefore often result in misunderstandings and confusion (Meijer et al. 2012).1
In an effort to reduce this confusion, three basic perspectives on transparency can be

distinguished: transparency as a virtue, a relation, and a system. Transparency is defined
as a virtue of an actor when someone is considered to be transparent when s/he (p. 511) is
open about his or her behavior, intentions, considerations, etc. Similar to certain
definitions of accountability, transparency is then used as a normative concept, as a set of
standards for the evaluation of the behavior of public actors (cf. Bovens 2010, 946). This
type of definition can be found among legal professionals. The former European
Ombudsman, Jacob Söderman (1998) defined the term transparency as follows: “the
process through which public authorities make decisions should be understandable and
open; the decisions themselves should be reasoned; as far as possible, the information on
which the decisions are based should be available to the public.” According to Lord Nolan
(1995, 14) transparency is said to require that “holders of public office should be as open
as possible about all decisions and actions they take.” These definitions emphasize that
an actor should be open but they do not mention to whom the actor should be
transparent.
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Transparency
A second perspective defines transparency as an institutional relation between an actor

and a forum. Cornelia Moser (2001, 3), for example, defines being transparent as “to
open up the working procedures not immediately visible to those not directly involved, in
order to demonstrate the good working of an institution.” Oliver (2004, 2) indicates that
transparency can be described through three elements: an observer; something available
to be observed; and a means or method for observation. This type of definition builds
upon principal–agent theory: a principal requires information about the agent to check
whether the agent sticks to the “contract” (Prat 2006, 92). This type of definition comes
close to Bovens’s (2010) definition of accountability as a mechanism. Transparency is
seen as an institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor is rendered
transparent to another actor (cf. Bovens 2010, 946).
Thirdly, this institutional information relation is not isolated but exists within a system of
these relations. Democratic decision-making in local councils, for example, is made
transparent in similar fashions all across the Netherlands. These councils all have
relations with their citizens and the same sets of (formal and informal) rules apply to
transparency in all cities. This means that one can describe and analyze transparency not
only at the level of specific relations but also at the level of sets of relations in a system.
At this level, the analysis focuses on the rules that guide the behavior of actors in the
system. The criteria of Transparency International (www.transparency.org) refer to
transparency as a system and they qualify governments on the basis of a transparency
index. In debates about good governance, transparency also refers to the system level.
In this chapter, the definition of transparency as an institutional relation provides a basis

for my analysis, since it connects best to the way accountability is defined in this
handbook. Our research team at Utrecht University has developed the following
definition of transparency (see also Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; Meijer et al. 2012; Meijer
2013): Transparency is defined as the availability of information about an actor allowing
other actors to monitor the workings or performance of this actor. The definition consists
of an institutional relation in which an information exchange takes place which relates to
the workings or performance of an actor. Transparency can be realized passively (through
freedom of information requests), pro-actively (through websites or documents), and
through forced access (leaking and whistleblowing); and all of these forms are argued to
contribute to public accountability.2
Transparency and Accountability: Direct,

(p. 512)
Indirect, and Inverse Relations

Although transparency can contribute to a broad range of substantial values such as
democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy, its instrumental value is often connected to
accountability: The availability of relevant information is one of the prerequisites for the
information phase of any accountability process (Bovens 1998; Meijer 2003; Bovens
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2007). Heald (2012, 33) argues that transparency provides rulers with a vehicle to
account to citizens for their stewardship. This basic argument is identical to policy-
makers’ and stakeholders’ arguments for transparency: Transparency facilitates
accountability. This argument is nuanced here by proposing three routes between
transparency and accountability: direct, indirect, and inverse.
Direct Route: Facilitating Horizontal Accountability
The direct route from transparency to accountability highlights that new horizontal forms
of accountability are facilitated by growing transparency. Accountability has broadened in
recent years as citizens and other stakeholders are offered ever more opportunities to
scrutinize an actor’s exploits, to debate results, and to pass judgment. Accountability to
citizens and stakeholders has been labeled “direct” accountability, “stakeholder”
accountability, or, most often, “horizontal” accountability. Horizontal accountability does
not replace the traditional vertical accountability of organizations to the minister and
parliament but serves as an addition (Schillemans 2008; Schillemans 2011). Michels and
Meijer (2008) argue that horizontal accountability forms a logical response to the
accountability gap that results from the horizontalization of government. Horizontal
accountability is characterized by the absence of formal formats for information provision
and debating, and, most importantly, the absence of formal sanctions (Meijer 2007).
Increased transparency has been argued to make a significant contribution to facilitating
this type of accountability by providing citizens, stakeholders, and media with better
access to information (Meijer 2007).
Indirect Route: Strengthening Vertical Accountability
In addition to facilitating horizontal accountability, transparency can also strengthen

vertical accountability by providing signals that something could be wrong. The “fire
alarm” metaphor, often cited in the accountability literature (May 2007), is applicable
here. A fire alarm only rings when there is a fire, doing away with the need to constantly
(p. 513) check if everything is OK, like a “policeman on patrol.” An accountability
arrangement can be used in similar fashion: The accountability forum is warned by a

third party as soon as something untoward is observed in the conduct of a public official
or a public organization (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Citizens or pressure groups
calling a public organization to account have no formal power over this organization but
they can send a signal to vertical accountability forums (Fox 2007). To create a “fire
alarm”, access to raw data is crucial; unpolished information is more likely to contain
clues to anything untoward than information which is carefully prepared for publication.
Access to information enables citizens and other stakeholders to contribute by acting as a
fire alarm for formal accountability forums. Increased transparency gives them the
opportunity to scrutinize the functioning of the public sector and send signals to the
established forums. The theoretical reasoning behind the idea of such strengthened
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accountability is that once enough people scrutinize governmental action, wrongdoing

will always come to light. Or, as they say online, “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow.”
Inverse Relation: Transparency Reduces the Need for Accountability
While the direct and indirect relations suggest a positive relation between transparency
and accountability, some authors highlight that transparency may also diminish the need
for formal accountability mechanisms. Erkkilä (2012, 9 a.f.) argues that the New Public
Management emphasis on performance measurement and transparency merge in the
(reductionist) idea of accountability as providing public information about government
performance. Accountability is reduced to information provision and “public eyes” are
expected to stimulate correct behavior (Meijer 2007). The idea of a debate between actor
and accountability forum about performance disappears since “the numbers tell the full
story” and sanctions do not need to be imposed since transparency is, by itself,
considered to be a sanction since it can be seen as a form of public shaming (or faming).
In this line of argument, transparency is an instrument to ensure that actors conform to
public standards that reduces the need for another instrument, accountability, to achieve
this objective.
The relationships between transparency and accountability are thus classified as

potentially facilitating horizontal accountability and strengthening vertical accountability,
but also potentially reducing the need for accountability. While many authors assume or
test positive relations between transparency and accountability, Hood (2010) highlights
that a friendly relation cannot be assumed. Using evocative terms, Hood categorizes the
relations between these two components as “Siamese twins,” “matching parts,” and an
“awkward couple.” The idea of Siamese twins is that accountability and transparency
cannot be meaningfully distinguished, the idea of matching parts is that they complement
each other, and the idea of an awkward couple is that there may be a tension between the
two. These arguments indicate that there is no ex ante reason (p. 514) to assume that
transparency and accountability are “friends”: we need to evaluate their relation on the
basis of empirical research. We will now zoom in on the relationships between
transparency and accountability and pose the question whether such theoretical links can
be observed in practice. Does transparency indeed facilitate horizontal accountability and
strengthen vertical accountability? Does it reduce the need for accountability?
Lessons from Empirical Research into

Transparency and Accountability
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The academic literature shows that there is not as much impact of transparency on
accountability as one might expect, and that the impacts are not as straightforward as is
often assumed (Fox 2007, 664). Based on international research and some of our research
projects at Utrecht University, we will see what lessons are to be learned on how the
relationship between transparency and accountability pans out in practice.
Lesson 1: Citizen Accountability Through Transparency is Often an

Illusion
Governmental rhetoric portrays transparency as a way of being accountable to citizens.

In the absence of other accountability arrangements, citizen accountability may indeed
play a role. Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) have resulted in effective forms of
accountability in weak states. Roberts (2006, 4) shows how FOIA has helped Thai parents
to call schools to account about their favoring, even corrupt, treatment of the children of
wealthy parents. However, evidence for citizen accountability in states with more
developed accountability arrangements is limited. Even in high profile cases such as
transparency on school performance (Meijer 2007), air quality (Grimmelikhuijsen 2007),
and government corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010), only very few citizens use the
information to call public organizations to account. One could even ask whether this
should be expected since in the internet age transparency often results in an information
overload. Roberts (2010) and Etzioni (2010) highlight that government data requires
substantial handling and interpretation before most citizens can use it, something which
can hardly be expected from them. To put it somewhat crudely, citizens simply have
better things to do than to process large amounts of government data. Put another way,
citizens have created specialist organizations for public accountability, such as
Parliament, the municipal council, the Court of Audit, the Ombudsman, and also the
media (cf. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
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Transparency
Lesson 2: Media Accountability Through Transparency is a

(p. 515)
Reality
Empirical research shows that increased transparency first and foremost facilitates media
transparency (Meijer 2007; O’Neill 2002; Lindstedt and Naurin 2010). The Watergate
Investigation by reporters of the Washington Post is the key example of how transparency
resulted in media accountability (Bernstein and Woodward 1974). This investigation is by
no means an isolated incident; the academic literature presents many examples of media
accountability that is facilitated by (proactive, passive, and forced) transparency. Data-
journalism is an important new form of news production: journalists analyze data sets and
write news stories on the basis of the data. Deuze (2002) already concluded that
journalists spend more and more time online to find their stories, including scrutinizing
public reports. Processing public information can result in various sorts of accountability
processes. Meijer (2007) shows how a Dutch newspaper used passive transparency to
obtain access to information about school performance and how this was used to call
schools to account. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) describe how mass media play a key role
in using the transparency of government expenditure for accountability. And Roberts
(2006, 5) highlights how access to information legislation was used by a Japanese
newspaper to expose the influence of corporate businesses on cabinet affairs.
Lesson 3: Stakeholder Accountability Through Transparency is also a

Reality
In addition to citizens and media, stakeholders, such as interest groups, form an

important potential forum for horizontal accountability. Although quantitative research
into this type of use has not been conducted, there is much anecdotal evidence for this
relation. Both proactive and passive transparency have stimulated horizontal
accountability. Grimmelikhuijsen (2007) analyzes how the Dutch chapter of the NGO
Friends of the Earth uses air quality data to call municipalities to account on their air
quality policy. Roberts (2006, 1–6) mentions a large number of instances in which NGOs
use information to expose government corruption and to push for more integrity in
government in countries such as India. He also recounts how a Ugandan environmental
NGO used transparency to call their government to account for a controversial
agreement about a hydroelectric dam. These NGOs have both the capacity and the desire
to use transparency for accountability, and qualitative research underlines that changes
in the “information playing field” stimulate stakeholder accountability.
Lesson 4: Transparency Enables Fire Alarms for Vertical

(p. 516)
Accountability
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The increased transparency in the public sector via the internet has created a rise in the
numbers of “fire alarms.” Individual citizens play a key role as whistleblowers but this
occurs on the basis of confidential information and is not facilitated through
transparency. Although systematic research is lacking, a review of the transparency
literature indicates that few fire alarms come from individual citizens processing public
information. Again, people need an incentive to scrutinize government and, generally,
most people have better things to do. Some exceptions have been documented. In the
Dutch City of Utrecht, two citizens found out that the municipality of Utrecht only
published online so-called model calculations on air quality not the actual recorded
measurements. In reaction to these efforts, local representatives called the responsible
alderman to account about this issue. While citizen fire alarms are rare, media fire alarms
abound (May 2007; Schillemans 2012). Media accountability through transparency can
also have a strengthening effect on political accountability when journalists can function
as the fire alarm. Again, the Watergate Investigation is the prime example because it
shows how media accountability resulted in political accountability (Bernstein and
Woodward 1974), as did many of the other “gates” later on (e.g. Irangate, Monicagate).3
Lesson 5: Proactive Transparency has Limited Value for

Accountability
When transparency is not enforced, governmental bodies are able to exercise a degree of
discretion and make a strategic choice on which information to disclose. The academic
literature provides many more examples of successful horizontal accountability processes
and fire alarms for vertical accountability processes facilitated by forced or passive
transparency than by pro-active transparency (Roberts 2006). This shows in the
difference in the amount of information released pro-actively, but also in the selection and
in the way the information is presented. Grimmelikhuijsen (2007) shows how two-thirds of
municipalities only show positive information about the local air quality on their websites
and Pasquier and Villeneuve (2007) argue that organizational barriers often result in
distorted or incomplete transparency. Tan (2012) shows how actual transparency in China
is limited because of fragmented bureaucracy and Brandsma et al. (2008) show how the
European Commission does not stand up to its own transparency practices because of the
difficulties of organizing transparency. Hood (2007, 200) highlights how presentational
strategies are used to avoid or limit blame by spin, timing, stage-management, or
argument, and Fox (2007) shows that even mandatory disclosure often does not result in
accessible and reliable reporting. On the basis of a quantitative analysis, Lindstedt and
Naurin (2010) show that agent-controlled transparency is (p. 517) far less effective in
stimulating accountability than non-agent-controlled transparency. All these findings
underpin the conclusion that the value of proactive transparency for accountability is
limited.
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Lesson 6: Third Party Transparency Reduces the Need for

Accountability
While agent-controlled transparency seems to be of limited value, third party

transparency may actually stimulate organizations to be more sensitive to external
demands. The crucial difference here is that actors cannot decide for themselves what
information will be made available to citizens and, as a consequence, information may
also include underperformance, mismanagement, or other forms of falling short of public
standards. Meijer (2007) shows how public schools started to pay more attention to public
standards when the School Inspection Service published its reports online. The research
showed that, even though there was little interest from citizens, media, and stakeholders,
transparency still had an effect on the actions and decisions of school management. Fox
(2007) argues that the imagined counterforce can lead to actual effects when a more
transparent organization starts behaving according to public standards mobilized by the
“power of shame.” Not (media, stakeholder, citizen) accountability itself but mere
transparency as such stimulates organizations to consider external expectations.
Lesson 7: Transparency is Limited to Certain Domains of Government

Activity
Grand narratives about government transparency suggest that there is an overall

increase of government transparency in all policy sectors. Roberts (2006, 18) highlights
however that there are certain “enclaves” within governments in which transparency has
made little headway. He specifically refers to the security sector: “In many countries,
disclosure laws have been carefully tailored to ensure that the security sector survives as
an enclave of secrecy.” He concludes that—partly due to the 9/11 attacks—the proposition
that transparency could be used as a tool for controlling human rights within the security
domain was not carried forward (see also: Blanton 2003). Specified systems of
classification are developed to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information in these
domains of government activity. At the same time, active transparency became
increasingly focused on strengthening control over quasi-markets: Governments
withdrew and started using indirect instruments of disclosure to control public sector
organizations (Meijer and Homburg 2009).
Lesson 8: Transparency and Accountability Reinforce One

(p. 518)
Another
A last lesson to be drawn concerns the specific relationship between transparency and
accountability. While the literature often assumes that transparency only facilitates
accountability, there are clues that they reinforce one another. Grimmelikhuijsen (2007)
shows that the availability of air quality data facilitates new forms of accountability, and
the result of this accountability process often is that there needs to be more transparency.
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Meijer (2007) shows how attention to school performance rose after more transparency
had been created and the resulting push for more accountability also resulted in more
school transparency. Accountability processes often provide information about the limits
of transparency and, therefore, result in a push for more transparency.
These eight empirical lessons offer scant hope for strengthening direct democracy. Or, to
put it bluntly once again—citizens usually have better things to do than to go through all
sorts of transparent government data. And yet there are reasons to see the contribution
of transparency to public accountability in a more positive light. For one, it is not the
number of citizens that counts. As we have seen, all it takes are one or two vigilant
members of the public to strengthen accountability. In addition, transparency is
frequently used by stakeholders and media to call government agencies and politicians to
account. Furthermore, there are interactions between horizontal and vertical
accountability to Parliament. Members of Parliament use the available information from
public organizations, as well as information from intermediaries such as interest groups
and the media. Also the mere idea of information being disclosed in a systematic fashion
can create an open culture (Hood 2006). And lastly, transparency may reduce the need
for accountability when the power of shame mobilizes organizations to behave according
to public standards (Fox 2007).
The review of studies into the relation between transparency and accountability shows
that, under certain conditions and in certain situations, transparency may contribute to
accountability. Therefore, Fox (2007) argues that we should not ask whether transparency
facilitates accountability but under which conditions it does so. The lessons teach us that
transparency facilitates accountability when it actually presents a significant increase in
the available information, when there are actors capable of processing the information,
and when exposure has a direct or indirect impact on the government or public agency.
This raises the question whether these impacts are something to be desired. Does
transparency-facilitated accountability produce benefits for society? This question has
triggered an intense academic debate.
Panacea, Poison, or Pharmacon?

Proponents argue that—in spite of the limitations that we see when it is applied in
practice—transparency disciplines institutions and their office-holders by making (p. 519)
information about their performance more public, deters corruption and poor
performance, and secures a basis for better and more trustworthy performance (O’Neill
2006, 76; Worthy 2010). Proponents argue that transparency can stimulate public
officials to improve their performance or prevent them from being corrupt (Lindstedt and
Naurin 2010). Proponents—many policymakers but also gurus such as David Brin (1998)
and Richard Oliver (2004)—do not close their eyes to potential perverse effects, but
stipulate that governments can avoid these by implementing transparency adequately. In
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the end, lifting the veil will be beneficial to all of us. Karl Popper’s Open Society (1945) is
the guiding idea for proponents of transparency: Openness will, in the end, make for
stronger accountability since government flaws will be exposed and criticized.
The proponents argue that internet transparency gives people better information and
thus contributes to the rationalization of society. The rationalization of society results in
more democratic and more affluent societies. The exposure of the Watergate scandal
prevented further abuses of presidential power through public accountability, disclosure
of information about ENRON forms the basis for restructuring the financial sector, and
transparency of effects of smoking on health conditions facilitated a public debate on
regulatory measures. They will argue that WikiLeaks will help to ensure that
governmental diplomacy serves the interests of the people and not those of a small but
powerful elite. Opponents of transparency are not opposed to democracy but doubt
whether transparency will make these contributions to society. They argue that internet
transparency will result in a loss of societal trust (O’Neill 2002). Building friendly
relations between countries may become difficult in the aftermath of WikiLeaks.
Opponents see perverse effects as an inseparable attribute of internet transparency.

Roberts (2006), for example, highlights the threat to personal privacy through
personalized accountability. He indicates that the growth of data in electronic form may
enable private organizations to use such capabilities to assemble extensive knowledge
about individuals from (widely distributed) public records. The recent publication of the
performance of individual teachers in public schools by the Los Angeles Times seems to
provide evidence for this argument (www.projects.latimes.com/value-added). The
newspaper publishes estimates of the effectiveness of teachers by looking at the
standardized test scores of students. Whereas previous forms of transparency in
education focused on the school, the LA Times now renders transparent the performance
of individual teachers. Bannister and Connolly (2011) identify a range of phenomena that
may make transparency inimical to good governance, such as the (opportunity) cost of
realizing transparency, the avoidance strategies that may evolve in response to it, and the
potential misinterpretations of transparency by the public.
Other opponents argue that transparency may lead to a collective action trap and
opaqueness may, in certain situations, contribute to the common good. Onora O’Neill
(2002, 68) argues that transparency will erode trust: “...trust seemingly has receded as
transparency has advanced” (see also Greiling in this volume). O’Neill argues that a flood
of unsorted information may lead to more uncertainty and will confuse (p. 520)
accountability. This is not an issue to be solved easily because misinformation is directly
connected to transparency. O’Neill (2002, 73) emphasizes that those who know that
everything they say or write is to be made public may “massage the truth.” The fact that
it is often not clear who has asserted, compiled, or endorsed the “supposed information”
makes this even worse. O’Neill argues that transparency gets us lost in a forest of
misinformation and this will eventually produce less trust. She argues that the explosion
of transparency may produce a “culture of suspicion” (see also Fung and Weil 2010).
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Transparency
Roberts (2006, 237) partly agrees with her and emphasizes that the rhetoric of anti-
secrecy advocates may produce detachment of citizens and a cynical attitude towards
government.
Opponents such as O’Neill are not opposed to transparency and openness but regard
trust as the more important goal. If openness produces less trust, secrecy may be better:
“...secrecy and lack of transparency may not be the enemies of trust” (O’Neill 2002, 70).
This places O’Neill’s work in the broader context of building trust in societies and, more
specifically, building more trust in the public sector. Whereas Popper guides the ideas of
the proponents, the work of Robert Putnam (2000) and Francis Fukuyama (1996) guides
the ideas of those critical of increasing transparency. Internet transparency can interfere
with a sense of community and belonging and, therefore, one should be careful in
strengthening it. This debate is quite similar to the classic Friedrich–Finer debate about
accountability in the US in the 1940s where Finer emphasized the need for exposure
while Friedrich argued against the undue concentration on external scrutiny (Mulgan
2000). One can imagine that Finer would be on the side of the proponents of
transparency and Friedrich on the side of its opponents.
Much of the debate revolves around the relation between transparency and government
legitimacy or trust. Supporters of transparency, such as Brin (1998) and Oliver (2004), see
it as beneficial to all. After all, only those who have something to hide have reason to
object to transparency. At the other end, Bovens (2003) warns against the dark side of
transparency and its potential to drag government through the mud time and time again.
Empirical research shows that when it comes to facilitating horizontal accountability
through transparency, supplying people with policy information on air quality can have a
positive effect on trust in the municipal government (Grimmelikhuijsen 2007; Tolbert and
Mossberger 2006). Therefore, transparency can contribute to the government’s
legitimacy but the tone of the disclosed information is an important factor here. In case of
strengthened vertical accountability as a fire alarm, as when whistle-blowers report foul
play, transparency is more likely to have a detrimental effect on governmental legitimacy.
One could say that the proponents see transparency as a panacea—or multivitamin
(Scholtes 2012, 335)—for all kinds of ills, while opponents see it as a poison that kills
many good things in society. Intense as the debate may be, slowly there seems to be
emerging a consensus that transparency may have both its upsides and its downsides.
Etzioni (2010) is not opposed to transparency but argues that it is overvalued and Heald
(2003) explicitly conceptualizes transparency as a trade-off between the “value of
sunlight” and the “danger of over-exposure.” The normative debate becomes more
(p. 521) meaningful when it focuses on the forms and levels of transparency. Dror (1999)
conceptualizes transparency as a pharmacon: It heals in correct doses and kills when the
doses are too high. This conceptualization is helpful in taking the debate from a war in
the trenches to a constructive underpinning of emerging practices.
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In sum, this chapter has shown that transparency is certainly not a miracle instrument for
accountability. The assumption that citizens find government so interesting and important
that they want to scrutinize its records simply does not hold true. At the same time,
transparency does open up the playing field of accountability by giving more prominent
roles to the media and stakeholders. This may result in a reduction of public trust but also
may also help to curb corruption and agency drift. The challenge for democratic societies
is to develop levels and forms of transparency that strengthen checks and balances and
stimulate engagement but do not result in cynicism and a turning away from public
affairs. Further research is needed to understand different responses to this challenge
and identify conditions that stimulate favorable outcomes.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Maarten Hillebrandt, Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen, Danielle
Fictorie, and the editors for their comments on draft versions of this chapter.
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Notes:
(1) . While most definitions focus on what transparency is, a more complete
understanding can be obtained by exploring what it is not. Some authors contrast
transparency with secrecy (Pozen 2010). In this line of argument, a lack of transparency
is the result of intentional actions to limit transparency. Roberts (2006) indicates that the
US Government is intentionally limiting transparency on the basis of the argument of
national security. Pozen adds that this secrecy may take a shallow form (i.e., known
unknowns) but also a deep form (i.e., unknown unknowns). The latter form of secrecy
refers, for example, to documents that have not been registered. But a lack of
transparency does not only result from intentional actions; it may also result from a lack
of capacity or simply the fact that a need for transparency has not been recognized. The
impact of the internet on these different forms of opaqueness may expected to be
different; the internet will basically change the capacity to produce transparency and,
therefore, primarily influence non-intentional opaqueness.
(2) . Leaking is often ignored but plays an important role in transparency (Piotrowski
2007; Bok 1982). Roberts (2006, 73) convincingly argues that leaking became a crucial
source of transparency during the Bush Administration.
(3) . One can question whether media always act as fire alarms for vertical accountability
forums or whether they construct their own accountability processes and force political
actors to react. See Schillemans (2012) for a broader reflection on the role of the media in
these accountability processes.
Albert Meijer
Albert Meijer works as an associate professor at the Utrecht School of Governance of

Utrecht University.
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Transparency

Oxford Handbooks Online

Print Publication Date: May 2014

Abstract and Keywords

Government transparency is increasing worldwide and political rhetoric assumes a strong

Keywords: Transparency, accountability, open government, access to information

Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a

Transparency as the New “Religion”

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Government transparency—in the sense of Bentham’s openness—takes various forms

The increase in transparency is a worldwide phenomenon (see Roberts (2006) for

an in-depth analysis of this trend). Erkkilä (2012, xiv) speaks of a “transnational

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

transparency “won” this intellectual conflict—through the French revolution—the

While freedom of information is predominantly about access to information on

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Transparency as an Institutional Information

In an effort to reduce this confusion, three basic perspectives on transparency can be

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

A second perspective defines transparency as an institutional relation between an actor

In this chapter, the definition of transparency as an institutional relation provides a basis

Transparency and Accountability: Direct,

Indirect, and Inverse Relations

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Direct Route: Facilitating Horizontal Accountability

Indirect Route: Strengthening Vertical Accountability

In addition to facilitating horizontal accountability, transparency can also strengthen

arrangement can be used in similar fashion: The accountability forum is warned by a

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

accountability is that once enough people scrutinize governmental action, wrongdoing

Inverse Relation: Transparency Reduces the Need for Accountability

The relationships between transparency and accountability are thus classified as

Lessons from Empirical Research into

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Lesson 1: Citizen Accountability Through Transparency is Often an

Governmental rhetoric portrays transparency as a way of being accountable to citizens.

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Lesson 2: Media Accountability Through Transparency is a

Lesson 3: Stakeholder Accountability Through Transparency is also a

In addition to citizens and media, stakeholders, such as interest groups, form an

Lesson 4: Transparency Enables Fire Alarms for Vertical

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Lesson 5: Proactive Transparency has Limited Value for

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Lesson 6: Third Party Transparency Reduces the Need for

While agent-controlled transparency seems to be of limited value, third party

Lesson 7: Transparency is Limited to Certain Domains of Government

Grand narratives about government transparency suggest that there is an overall

Lesson 8: Transparency and Accountability Reinforce One

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Panacea, Poison, or Pharmacon?

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Opponents see perverse effects as an inseparable attribute of internet transparency.

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Birkinshaw, P. J. 2006. “Freedom of Information and Openness. Fundamental Human

Black, J. 1997. Transparent Policy Measures. Oxford Dictionary of Economics. Oxford:

Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 02 June 2018

Bovens, M. A. P. 1998. The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in

Bovens, M. A. P. 2003. De Digitale Republiek. Democratie en Rechtsstaat in de

Bovens, M. A. P. 2007. “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual

Bovens, M. A. P. 2010. “Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as