VII.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE & PETITION

TOPIC: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment.
CASES:
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, February 10, 1936 3
Primicias v. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948 4
Mutuc v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970 6
Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970 7
New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, June 30, 1971 9
National Press Club v. Comelec, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992 10
Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992 13
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996 15

TOPIC: Tests in free speech cases

The dangerous tendency test
CASES:
Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957 17
Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925) 19

The balancing of interests test

CASES:
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 US 382 (1950) 20
Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales, G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979 21

The clear and present danger test

CASES:
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919) 24
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 25
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, supra 26
Gonzales v. Comelec, supra 27
Navarro v. Villegas, supra 29
Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983 30
Ruiz v. Gordon, G.R. No. L-65695, December 19, 1983 33

TOPIC: Speech against official conduct, public figures and subjects of legitimate public
interest
CASES:
U.S. v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918 35
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) 36
Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales, supra 37
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011 40

TOPIC: Free speech and libel/defamation suits

CASES:
MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da’wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003 48
GMA v. Bustos, G.R. No. 146848, October 17, 2006 49
Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999 51
Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical, G.R. No. 141994, January 17, 2005 53
 2

TOPIC: Free speech and the right to privacy

CASE: Ayer Production v. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988
55

TOPIC: Free speech and the Cybercrime Law

CASE: Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014
57

TOPIC: Regulation of speech: must be content-neutral

CASE: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra
61

TOPIC: Art and Obscenity

CASES:
People v. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, August 8, 1955 62
People v. Padan, G.R. No. L-7295, June 28, 1957 63
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 65
Gonzales v. Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985 67
Pita v. CA, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989 69

TOPIC: Freedom of the press

CASES:
In Re Sotto, G.R. No. 14576, September 6, 1918 70
In Re Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037-SC, April 6, 1995 (read also the dissent of J. Puno) 72

TOPIC: Right to Assemble and Petition the Government

CASE: Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006 74

TOPIC: Regulation of right to assemble, tests: (1) auspices test; and (2) purpose test
CASES:
Evangelista v. Earnshaw, G.R. No. 36453, September 28, 1932 77
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) 79
 3

GROSJEAN V. AMERICAN PRESS CO

[297 U.S. 233. February 10, 1936]
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment

FACTS:
Nine publishers of newspapers in the State of Louisiana sought to prevent the
enforcement of the act of the legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23 which imposed upon
printed and publishing companies having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week to
pay a license tax of two percent of the gross receipts of such business.

The appellees assailed that constitutionality of the act on the ground that it abridged the
freedom of the press under the First Amendment of the Constitution. They averred that the
taxes were intended to have the effect of curtailing the circulation of newspapers and the
amount of revenue realized from advertising thereby destroying both advertising and circulation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax imposed curtailed the right of the publishers to freedom from
censorship or prior restraint.

RULING: YES. The tax imposed curtailed the right of the parties and the people to liberty of the
press which accordingly signifies “principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or [from] censorship."

The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. The constitutional provision was meant
to preclude the national government and to preclude the states from adopting any form of
previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation.

In the case at bar, it can be inferred that in the guise of a tax, the act of the legislature
tends to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the
government and the people. Further, the form in which the tax is imposed is, in itself,
suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured alone
by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are carried, with
the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group
of newspapers.
 4

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
[G.R. No. L-1800. January 27, 1948.]
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties
filed a petition for mandamus to compel Manila city mayor Valeriano Fugoso to issue a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, for the purpose of
petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent refused
to grant such permit. The Court urgently issued a writ of mandamus.

The reason by the respondent for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially
on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered
tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order."

ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal of the Mayor to issue permit is acceptable.

HELD: NO. The request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and
it was for a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given
any consideration. Petition for mandamus is granted, and Mayor was ordered to issue the
permit.

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out
of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils
to enact ordinances for the purpose.
 5

The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative
Code is the legislative body of the City.

Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and 1119. Section 844 of
the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section 1262
of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly."

There is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City
regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the
provisions of said section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street
or public places may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public
places. Said provision is susceptible of two constructions:
(1) is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and

(2) that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor,
subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
The Court held that it cannot construe the ordinance as conferring upon the Mayor
power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to
prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or
processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations.

As the Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and
other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised
Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but
cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of
Manila), the Municipal Board cannot grant the Mayor a power which it does not have.

Besides, as the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are
executive, and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the
faithful performance and execution of the laws and ordinances" (Revised Administrative Code),
the legislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably
the exercise of the fundamental personal right of the citizens in the streets and other public
places, cannot be delegated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him
 6

unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its
impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented.

The Court ruled that the provisions of the said ordinance are construe to mean that it
does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion,
in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or
procession may pass or the meeting may be held.

MUTUC V. COMELEC
[G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970]
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment

FACTS:
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting
forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram
sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to
freedom of speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to
petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary
injunction. The justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."  It was its contention
that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and
therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It
prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Commission imposed censorship on petitioner abridging the
free speech.

RULING: YES, Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor
obeisance to such a cardinal precept. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits
an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against
which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by
the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by
himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
 7

perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court
were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a
previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution
in express terms assures. 

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. It has been the constant
holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order
issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing,
stood on solid footing. WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political
taped jingles.

NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. L-31687 | February 26, 1970
TOPIC: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment

FACTS:

On February 24, 1970, Nelson Navarro (petitioner), acting in behalf of the Movement of
a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to Antonio J. Villegas (respondent), the Mayor of the
City of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda on February 26, 1970 from 4-11 PM,
which is a weekday.

On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that,
they have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda
for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happened from the past
week. He further appraised that a public rally at Plaza Miranda poses a clearer and more
imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed
 8

as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of
preventing such disorder.

On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken
Garden near Intramuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark. The
petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground that it violates the petitioner’s
right to peaceable assembly and petition the government for redress of grievances.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor violated petitioner’s freedom from censorship or prior
restraint.

RULING:

NO. Civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society. In
Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court held that respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure
convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.

In this case, the Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not
cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further
offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration
sought to be held this afternoon. However, due to the events prior to that, it has become more
dangerous to the detriment of the public that every time that such assemblies are announced,
the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and
employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted.
Hence, Mayor Villegas possesses reasonable discretion to deny the application, especially
when it poses a danger to the public.

CASTRO and FERNANDO, JJ., dissenting:

Two members of the Court, Castro and Fernando, find themselves unable to concur with
their brethren and would vote to grant the petition. The right to freedom of assembly while not
unlimited is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. If respondent Mayor
premised his refusal to grant the permit as sought by petitioner on a clear showing that he was
so empowered under the criteria supplied by Primicias W. Fugoso, then this petition should not
prosper as petitioner himself did invoke such authority. The grounds for his refusal are however,
set forth thus in his letter of February 24, 1970 addressed to petitioner: "In the greater interest of
the general public, and in order not to unduly disturb the life of the community, this Office,
guided by a lesson gained from the events of the past few weeks, has temporarily adopted the
policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during
week days.” They do not, in the opinion of the above two justices, meet the standard of
 9

the Primicias ruling. Under the circumstances, the effect is one of prior restraint of a

constitutional right. This is not allowable. An excerpt from a 1969 American Supreme Court
decision is persuasive. Thus: "For in deciding whether or not to withhold a permit, the members
of the Commission were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience.' This ordinance as it was written,
therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30
years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional." This is without prejudice to a more extended opinion being written
later.

NEW YORK TIMES VS. U.S

403 US 713, June 30, 1971
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment

FACTS:
In 1967, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara commissioned a secret
government study on American involvement in Vietnam. When completed in 1968, the project
comprised 47 volumes containing more than 7,000 pages. The work was labeled classified, and
only 15 copies were made. In early 1971 Daniel Ellsberg, a RAND Corporation employee who
had worked on the project, secretly made copies of the documents and passed them to
reporters for the New York Times. On June 13, 1971, after several months of review, the Times
began to publish these so-called “Pentagon Papers.” After the first three installments were
published, the Nixon administration, citing national security concerns, obtained a restraining
order barring further publication of the Papers. When the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the order, the Times made an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court, which agreed
to hear the case the next day (June 26). The Court issued its opinions on June 30; in all, the
entire legal process had taken only 15 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the effort to prevent the publication of the “classified information” is
constitutional.

RULING: No, it is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court allowed Times to continue publication.
In a 6-3 decision, the Court dissolved the restraining order and allowed the Times to continue
with publication. Citing Bantam Books v. Sullivan (1963), Near v. Minnesota (1931), and
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971), the three-paragraph per curiam lead opinion
noted that “any system of prior restraints comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity” and “the Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” In this case, the government had failed to
carry that burden.
 10

On one extreme, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that “only a free and unrestrained press
can effectively expose deception in government” and rejected any prior restraints on the press.
Black stated that the purpose of the freedom of the press is to serve the people and to preserve
the right to censure the government. The First Amendment abolished the government’s ability to
censor the press in order to ensure that the people have access to information that is free from
government bias and to allow people to hold open public debates. The rights protected in First
Amendment triumph over the government’s interest in security or civil obedience.

Justice Byron R. White, although specifically rejecting the idea that “in no circumstances
would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about
government plans or operations,” refused to grant censorship authority to the executive branch
without the authorization of Congress. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., referring to Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s clear and present danger test, concluded that prior censorship would be
permissible in certain circumstances, but the vague, nonspecific claims of harm to national
security made in this case were insufficient to justify prior restraint. Justice William O. Douglas
generally agreed with Justice Black and also argued that the legislation the government used to
support its case, the Espionage Act of 1917, did not support the government’s case. He noted
that secrecy in government is undemocratic, as is the government’s attempt to kept relevant
information out of the public debate surrounding the Vietnam War. Justices Potter Stewart and
Thurgood Marshall argued separately that in the absence of specific guidance by Congress, the
Court should not grant the executive broad censorship power.

Dissenting Opinion:

Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Harlan II — each filed separate
opinions. They contended that the case had been resolved far too quickly to consider and
resolve fully the critically important legal issues at stake, especially the needs and prerogatives
of the executive. Justice Burger in his dissent argued that the First Amendment is not absolute
in all cases: there are exceptions to the First Amendment, and these exceptions should be
debated in the court system. In Near v. Minnesota, the Court outlined three exceptions to the
First Amendment protection of freedom of the press: if the publication is obscene, would
jeopardize national security in wartime, or threatens to incite violence and/or the overthrow the
government. Here, the Court found that none of these exceptions applied.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC, SUPRA

G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992 (read also the concurrence of J. Davide and the dissent of J.
Cruz)
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment.

FACTS:
 11

Petitioners argued that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out
for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content,
namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues

Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio
and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section
11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:

b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time
for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section
90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign period.”

ISSUE: Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional

HELD: Yes. Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid.

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution)
has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., “during the election period.”

It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom of speech

and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity
and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who
shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy.

Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not
the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities.
 12

In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26
of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that “the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

  The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative

provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of the
Constitution.

For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time
that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.
Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets
and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution and
Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into
operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity, and
equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot
be gainsaid.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz:

But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on
the dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash
as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the
impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same time
good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly
brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private
mail is screened during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or
classified matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example,
a person is prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely
make and bolster the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a person’s right to express
his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the censorship be in the
form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition
 13

of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of copies per issue or
allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the
reading tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.

I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any

system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the
contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its
undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and
clean elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal
intent to suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient
instruments for the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these
facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove
them from the protection of the Constitution.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Davide:

The constitutional issue raised in these cases must be decided in the light of the
provisions of our own Constitution and not on orthodox principles or classical definitions of
certain rights which have, in the course of time and as a result of the interplay of societal forces
requiring the balancing of interests and values, been unchained from their absolutist moorings.
This provision, Section 11(b), understood in the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, is a reasonable regulation enacted to accomplish the desired objectives and
purposes earlier mentioned. It neither constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of
expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely provides the rules as to the manner, time and
place for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes reference to Sections 90 and 92 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on "COMELEC time" and "COMELEC space." Obviously then, the
airing and printing of a candidate's political advertisements can be done — and is even
encouraged to be done — during the "COMELEC time" and within the "COMELEC space." This
authority of the COMELEC is no longer purely statutory. It is now constitutional pursuant to the
clear mandate of Section 4 of Article IX-C.

This Court ruled against the background of such facilities accorded by the law for all
candidates, rich and poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the
sanctity of the ballot against desecration and the equality or chances among the candidates, the
restriction on the freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual prescribed in
par. F of Sec. 12 is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of his freedom of
expression itself.

Hence, consistent without opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs. Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec [35 SCRA 28], this slight limitation of the freedom of expression of the
individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F Sec. 12, it only one of the many
devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and present danger of the perversion or
prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
fears and apprehensions of petitioner concerning his liberty of expression in these two cases,
applying the less stringent balancing -of-interests criterion, are far outweighed by the all
 14

important substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot and to render
more meaningful and real the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.

ADIONG v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992.]
Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment

FACTS:

On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

"SEC. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: (a)
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or
printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14)
inches in length Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof."

"SEC. 21(f) Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

It is unlawful: (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the
candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house
or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size."

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate assails the COMELEC's Resolution
insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
moving vehicles. He said such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 11(a) of RA No. 6646. The petitioner also believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to
suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on
cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is
running in May 1992 elections. On Feb. 22, he states that he has not received any notice from
any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec
Poster Areas."

ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition stated in Section 15 and 21 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2347 valid?
 15

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"
places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC
becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:

". . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of
law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The
three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted
have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on
its authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of
the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as
found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that
the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law." (Mutuc v. Commission
on Elections, supra)

Hence, portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections
providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in par. (f) of Section 21 hereof" is declared NULL and VOID.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. CA
[G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996]
Topic: Elements: (1) freedom from censorship or prior restraint; and (2) freedom from
punishment

FACTS:

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television

program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13
every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law."

Petitioner pursued two courses of action against the respondent Board to the Office of
the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. The Office of the President reversed
the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be
publicly telecast.
 16

Petitioner also filed against the respondent Board alleging that the latter acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In
their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court granted the petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration
was denied. The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the
respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,"
and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit
for the exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series “indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” PD No. 1986 gives the Board the power to
screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board
has the power to "approve, delete… and/or prohibit the… exhibition and/or television broadcast
of... television programs..." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of
violence or of a wrong or crime."

Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious
programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation will contravene
Section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board may prohibit the broadcast of television religious programs
submitted by the petitioner.

RULING: No, the Board may not prohibit the broadcast of television religious programs
submitted by the petitioner. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by
the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of
public health, public morals, or public welfare.

Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
 17

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioner’s TV series for
"attacking" either religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will
show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were
not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under Section
3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes
with its right to free exercise of religion.

It is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover,
Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship
of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack
against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by
PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the life of a reality already on ground.

CABANSAG V. FERNANDEZ
[G.R. No. L-8974 -0020 - October 18, 1957]
Topic: Test in Free Speech Cases (The Dangerous Tendency Test)

FACTS:
Cabansag filed an ejectment complaint against Fernandez, et. al. in 1947. Defendants
filed their answer on January 31, 1947, motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947. A Motion of
plaintiff's counsel, set the case for hearing in July 1947. The meeting was postponed to August
1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947.
The court set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to December
10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was
scheduled for January 24, 1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the
case was continued to October 4, 1949.

On October 4, 1949, the court ordered the stenographers who took down the notes
during the previous hearings to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their fees, and
the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said notes had been submitted.
Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe their notes, the hearing was set
for March 17, 1950. Several postponements and partial hearings happened since then. From
December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the court or any of
the contending parties in the case.
 18

When Magsaysay became the president, Cabansag wrote to Presidential Complaints

and Action Commission (created by Magsaysay through EO No. 1) regarding his complaint in
the delay of the disposition of his case. The Secretary of Justice acted on the matter. The Judge
of the First Instance of Pangasinan wrote the Secretary of Justice informing him that under
provisions of Act No. 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers
are not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are
not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that
said stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction.

In September 1954, Atty. Fernandez, the counsel for the defendants then filed a motion
to declare Cabansag in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter
to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the
careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-
charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because of certain
contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading. The trial court found Cabansag and his
lawyers guilty of contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writing in the letter in question to the PCAC tend directly or indirectly
to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in its administration of
justice.

RULING: NO, the writing in the letter in question to the PCAC did not tend directly or indirectly
to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade or embarrass it in its administration of
justice.

Appellants believe otherwise, for they contend that in sending the letter in question to the
PCAC, they did nothing but to exercise their right to petition the government for redress of their
grievance as guaranteed by our constitution. The Court is confronted with a clash of two
fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the
judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and
reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us.

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of
similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of
expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and present danger" rule
and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The "dangerous tendency" rule has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends and
the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline
cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not
absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the
courts against contempt.
 19

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.

Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the PCAC
which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see that it was far
from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of
those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he
did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his case.

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of
the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the
Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag.
While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper
had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone
would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle
the court or undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.

GITLOW V. NEW YORK

268 US 652 (1925)
Topic: Tests in free speech cases (The Dangerous Tendency Test)

FACTS:
Defendant was indicted for the statutory crime of criminal anarchy and advocacy of
criminal anarchy. This indictment contained two counts. The first charged the Defendant had
advocated, advised, and taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and
overturning organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings
therein set forth entitled, “The Left Wing Manifesto.” The Second count charged Defendant with
printing, publishing, and knowingly circulating a paper called “The Revolutionary Age.” This
second paper also called for a violent overthrow of the government. Defendant admitted that he
signed a card subscribing to the Manifesto and program of the left wing, that he went to different
parts of the state to speak to branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of the left wing
and advocate their adoption. He also stated that he knows of the Manifesto’s publication and is
responsible for its circulation.
 20

ISSUE: Does the First Amendment prevent a state from punishing political speech that directly
advocates the government's violent overthrow?

RULING: Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that
New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the
Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could
punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications.
Despite the small scale of Gitlow’s actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too
insignificant to have an impact.

The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's
Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and
established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal
government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states.

In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and
present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow’s call to action was abstract and would not
resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient
imminence to warrant punishing the speech

AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION V. DOUDS

[339 US 382 (1950)]
Topic: The balancing of interests test

FACTS:
Petitioners appealed the validity of Section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 which imposes certain restrictions on,
and denies the benefits of certain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act to, any labor
organization the officers of which have not filed with the National Labor Relations Board the so-
called "non-Commmist" affidavits prescribed by § 9(h).

Section 9 (h) sought to prevent political strikes and other kinds of direct action designed
to burden and interrupt the free flow of commerce instigated by Communists thereby exerting
pressures on unions to deny office to Communists and others identified therein,

The unions contended that the necessary effect of § 9(h) is to make it impossible for
persons who cannot sign the oath to be officers of labor unions. They urge that such a statute
violates fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment: the right of union officers to
hold what political views they choose and to associate with what political groups they will, and
the right of unions to choose their officers without interference from government thereby
violating their right of speech and freedom of expression.
 21

Further, petitioner averred that this Court must find that political strikes create a clear
and present danger to the security of the Nation or of widespread industrial strife in order to
sustain § 9(h) similarly misconceives the purpose that phrase was intended to serve.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (h) of the act obstructs the right of the petitioners to freedom
of speech and expression.

RULING: No. Nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from acting in time to prevent
potential injury to the national economy from becoming a reality.
Based on relevant jurisprudence, when particular conduct is regulated in the interest of
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,
the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. In essence, the problem is one
of weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and
assembly against the congressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct
which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others
identified by § 9(h) pose continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union
leadership.

In the case at bar, in enacting § 9(h), Congress had as its objective the protection of
interstate commerce from direct interference, not any intent to disturb or proscribe beliefs as
such. Its manifest purpose was to bring within the terms of the statute only those persons whose
beliefs strongly indicate a will to engage in political strikes and other forms of direct action when,
as officers, they direct union activities. The congressional purpose is therefore served if we
construe the clause "that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any
organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods" to apply to persons and organizations who
believe in violent overthrow of the Government as it presently exists under the Constitution as
an objective, not merely a prophecy. It is to those persons that § 9(h) is intended to apply, and
only to them. We hold, therefore, that the belief identified in § 9(h) is a belief in the objective of
overthrow by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods of the Government of the United
States as it now exists under the Constitution and laws thereof.

LAGUNZAD V. SOTTO VDA. DE GONZALES

[G.R. No. L-32066. August 6, 1979.]
Topic 1: Speech against official conduct, public figures and subjects of legitimate public interest
Topic 2: The Balancing of Interests Test

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled
"The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his "MML Productions." It was based mainly on
the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
 22

Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which petitioner had purchased from
Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00

The book narrates the events in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was then a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental, during the elections. Governor Rafael (Liberal Party) and his men were tried
and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is
portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.

Nelly Amante, half-sister of Padilla, objected to the filming of the movie and the
"exploitation" of his life. They objected to many portions thereof despite the petitioner's
explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., based on his book
"The Long Dark Night in Negros." Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private
respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.
Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in
the picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to meet
the scheduled target date of the premiere showing.

After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to
P20,000.00, petitioner and private respondent executed a "Licensing Agreement"

Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because
of private respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the
life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole
picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio,
television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture."

Petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so
not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent. A premiere showing was
held at the Hollywood Theatre, Manila, and the movie was shown in different theaters all over
the country. Petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement.
Private respondent instituted the present suit against him.

Petitioner contended that:

(1) The episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public
figure;
(2) Private respondent has no property right over those incidents;
 23

(3) that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed
the same only because private respondent threatened him with unfounded and harassing action
which would have delayed production…

Petitioner demanded the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being
without any valid cause. Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering Lagunzad to pay the plaintiff.
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been denied by the Court,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a public figure has no right to privacy.
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s consent in signing the Licensing Agreement was obtained by
duress.
3. Whether or not the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of
expression, and that the Licensing Agreement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech
and of the press.
4. Whether or not the right to privacy (as invoked through Licensing Agreement) is a limitation to
freedom of expression.

HELD:

1. NO.
Being a public figure ip so facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or
she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the lm because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla
Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased
heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the
members of his family.

In Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased
person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."

2. NO.
As held in Martinez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, it is necessary to distinguish
between real duress and the motive which is present when one gives his consent reluctantly. A
contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires,
or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference between a contract
wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he looks
 24

for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement wherein one of the
contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he makes a
choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing Agreement has the
force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner should
comply with it in good faith.

3. NO.
The Court ruled that the Licensing Agreement does not infringes on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press. The right of freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without
limitations.

4. YES
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-
of-interests test." The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

SCHENCK v. UNITED STATES.

Argued January 9,10,1919.-Decided March 3, 1919
TOPIC: The Clear and Present Danger Test

FACTS:

This is an indictment in three counts. The first charges a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act of June 15, to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United
States, and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when the
United States was at wax with the German Empire, to-wit, that the defendants willfully conspired
to have printed and circulated to men who had been called and accepted for military service
under the Act of May 18, 1917, a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such
insubordination and obstruction.

The document in question upon its first printed side recited the first section of the Thirteenth
Amendment, said that the idea embodied in it was violated by the Conscription Act and that a
 25

conscript is little better than convict. In impassioned language it intimated that conscription was
despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall
Street's chosen few. It said "Do not submit to intimidation," but in form at least confined itself to
peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal of the act. It stated reasons for alleging that
any one violated the Constitution when he refused to recognize "your right to assert your
opposition to the draft," and went on" It described the arguments on the other side as coming
from cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press, and even silent consent to the
conscription law as helping to support an infamous conspiracy. But it is said, suppose that that
was the tendency of this circular, it is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. Two
of the strongest expressions are said to be quoted respectively from well-known public men. It
well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to
previous restraints.

ISSUE: Whether or not the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.

RULING: We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that
was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It
does not even protect a man from an injunction against

uttering words that may have all the effect of force. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual

obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect
might be enforced. The statute of 1917 in S4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual
obstruction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it
is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success, alone warrants making
the act a crime. Goldman v. United States, 245 U. S. 474, 477. Indeed that case might be said
to dispose of the present contention if the precedent covers all media concludendi. But as the
right to free speech was not referred to specially, we have thought fit to add a few words. It was
not argued that a conspiracy to obstruct the draft was nio within uie words of the Act of 1917.
words are "obstruct the recruiting o.r enlistment service," and it might be suggested that they
refer only to making it hard to get volunteers. Recruiting heretofore usually having been
accomplished by getting volunteers the word is apt to call up that method only in our minds. But
recruiting is gaining fresh supplies for the forces, as well by draft as otherwise. It is put as an
alternative to enlistment or voluntary enrollment in this act. The fact that the Act of 1917 was
enlarged by the amending Act of May 16, 1918, c. 75, 40 Stat. 553, of course, does not affect
the present indictment and would not, even if the former act had been repealed. Judgments
affirmed.
 26

BRANDENBURG V. OHIO
395 U.S. 444 (1969)
TOPIC: The clear and present danger test

FACTS:

The record shows that the appellant, a leader of the Ku Klux Klan group, telephoned an
announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come to a Ku
Klux Klan "rally" to be held at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation of the organizers,
the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events. Portions of the films
were later broadcast on the local station and on a national network.

One film showed 12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms. They were
gathered around a large wooden cross, which they burned. No one was present other than the
participants and the newsmen who made the film. Most of the words uttered during the scene
were incomprehensible when the film was projected, but scattered phrases could be understood
that were derogatory of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews. Another scene on the same film
showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making a speech stating that if the Caucasian race is
continuously suppressed, they will take some “revengeance”.

The second film showed six hooded figures one of whom, later identified as the
appellant, repeated a speech very similar to that recorded on the first film. The reference to the
possibility of "revengeance" was omitted, and one sentence was added: "Personally, I believe
the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel." Though some of the figures
in the films carried weapons, the speaker did not.

The appellant was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for advocating
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform and for voluntarily
assembling in order to teach the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. The appellant challenged the
constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act is unconstitutional for punishing mere
advocacy and forbidding assembly when there is no clear and present danger of imminent
lawless action.

RULING: YES. In Whitney v. California, the Court sustained the constitutionality of California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act, which bears similar text to the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute on
the ground that "advocating" violent means to effect political and economic change involves
such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it. However this ruling has
already been discredited by later decisions. These later decisions have fashioned the principle
that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.
 27

A statute must be able to draw the distinction between moral propriety or moral
necessity for a resort to force and violence, and preparing a group for violent actions, as this
would impermissibly intrude upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Hence, statutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of
speech, must observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to
imminent lawless action.

In this case, the Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained since it purports to
punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others
merely to advocate the described type of action.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. CA, SUPRA

Topic: The Clear and Present Danger Test

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent
Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board for Moving Pictures and
Television which x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television

program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13
every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.

Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner

submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes
of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or
not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not an attack against other religion constitute a valid ground for infringement
of religious freedom

RULING: No, it does not constitute a valid ground for infringement of religious freedom. The
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is bound to prevent. It is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. The evidence
shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” other religions,
especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
 28

public viewing under Sec. 3 (c) of PD1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondent failed to apply the clear and
present danger test. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by
the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion
that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is
no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot
be justified by hypothetical fears but only by showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on the ground.

GONZALES VS. CA, SUPRA

G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969
Topic: The clear and present danger test

FACTS:

Petitioners so alleged in this action, which they entitled Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a proceeding that should have been started in the
Court of First Instance, but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness
and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. Petitioners challenged the validity of two new
sections now included in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act No. 4880, which was
approved and took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.

The terms "candidate" and "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" are likewise
defined. The former according to Act No. 4880 "refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate." "Election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" refers "to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote
the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office." Then the acts were specified. There is
a proviso that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be
considered as part of an election campaign. There is the further proviso that nothing stated in
the Act "shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he
supports."

Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in
the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila
to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other
hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
co- petitioner. It is their claim that "the enforcement of said Republic Act No. 4880 in question
 29

[would] prejudice [their] basic rights . . ., such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of
assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law,
guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the freedom of expression may be limited.

HELD: Yes, freedom of expression may be limited. It is not absolute.

From the language of the specified constitutional provision, it would appear that the right
is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and
of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition. How is it to be limited then?

This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez; of two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction. Thus: "These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the
'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented." It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be public established."

The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the "dangerous tendency" rule
and explained it thus: "If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a
right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present is
explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence." For him the apprehended evil must be "relatively
serious." For "[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would
be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black
would go further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely serious." Only thus
may there be a realization of the ideal envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise
of the freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those extreme borders where
thought merges into action." It received its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The
question in every case is whether the words used in such circumstances and of such a nature
 30

as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to
point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance
questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and
immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.

NAVARRO vs. VILLEGAS.

[G.R. No. L-31687. February 26, 1970.]
The Clear and Present Danger Test

FACTS:

Navarro requested for a permit to hold a meeting at Plaza Miranda in the afternoon of 26
February 1970. The Mayor of Manila, Villegas, instead offered the Sunken Gardens, as an
alternative to Plaza Miranda, as the site of the demonstration. Mayor Villegas has not denied
nor absolutely refused the permit sought by Navarro. Navarro filed the petition for mandamus.
The Court, after considering the pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued a Resolution
without prejudice to a more extended opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the public places to be
used for assembly after considering the effect of danger of such assembly.

RULING: Yes. As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso (80 Phil. 75), the Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in
order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.

The Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies
at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause
unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered
Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to
be held in the afternoon of 26 February 1970. Experiences in connection with present
assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving the Mayor's appraisal
that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner
has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.
 31

Consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed
in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general
detriment of the public. Civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered
society. Navarro has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant their
application for permit unconditionally.

Hence, petition is dismissed.

REYES V. BAGATSING
[G.R. No. L-65366. November 9, 1983]
Topic: The Clear and Present Danger Test

FACTS:

Petitioner, retired Justice Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit
from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00
in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States
Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short
program would be held. During the course of the oral argument, it was stated that after the
delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the
International Conference for General Disbarment, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign
Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador.
The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There
was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march
and rally."

It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of
such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to
police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit
at this time and at the place applied for. “To be more specific, reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt
any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend.”
Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police
authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or
any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public
may be ensured."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may deny the issuance of permit in this case.

RULING: No, the Mayor may not deny the issuance of permit in this case.
 32

There was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that could justify the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press,
may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right
people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent.

All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. Every case, therefore, there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects
of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise
of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.

If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if
the march would end at another park. As previously mentioned though, there would be a short
program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United States Embassy
at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the
resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a
signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations The second paragraph of the Article
22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the
Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it
should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present
 33

danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of
its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point
would be the Embassy.

This Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory injunction allowing the
proposed march and rally scheduled for the next day. That conclusion was inevitable ill the
absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest.
There was no justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech
and peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The participants to such assembly, composed primarily of those
in attendance at the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. proceeding through Roxas
Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the same street. To repeat, it is
settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual
or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to
an equal protection question. There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then,
only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here
respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the
relevant circumstances, still the assumption — especially so where the assembly is scheduled
for a specific public — place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The
exercise of such a right is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.

RUIZ V. GORDON
[G.R. No. L-65695 - December 19, 1983]
Topic: The Clear and Present Danger Test

FACTS:
In November 19 1983, Ruiz personally delivered to Gordon a letter application to hold a
prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on December 4,1983 from 1:00 P.M. until in the
early evening, as well as a parade/march. Even before the request, Gordon had repeatedly
announced in his regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday
 34

morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the
request of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.

The request was approved In November 23, 1983 with the conditions that: 1. The
parade/march and rally will be peaceful and orderly; 2. Your organization will be responsible for
any loss or damage to government property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; 3. The
parade/march shall proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave., and Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal
Ave., thence to the Rizal Triangle. Please coordinate with the Integrated National Police for
appropriate traffic assistance.

In November 25, 1983, Ruiz filed a mandamus against Gordon in relation to the
Constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly. At its next session then of November 27,
the Court, in the light of the above manifestation, resolved to grant such plea for dismissal. From
petitioner came, on December 1, 1983, a motion dated November 29 to withdraw petition. Then
the next day, December 2, 1983, the answer of respondent Gordon came reiterating what was
set forth in his manifestation. The reason for the delay of such pleading, the due date the
service had been served on petitioner being December 1, 1983, was obviously the distance
between Manila and Olongapo City. It was not served until November 30. At any rate, no
prejudice was caused either party as in the meanwhile, the Court had acted on the very day the
manifestation was submitted. That was on December 1, 1983.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to free speech is violated.

RULING: No, the petitioner’s right to free speech is not violated.

There is relevance to a recital of such facts. It appears that the guidelines set forth in the
extended opinion in the aforesaid J.B.L. Reyes decision as to the role of the judiciary in petitions
for permits to hold peaceable assembles may have to be supplemented. This is how the J.B.L.
Reyes opinion reads on this point: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or
to its grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on
the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by
 35

Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must
be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between
this resolution and that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made
clear in the original resolution of October 25, 1983.

As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could
have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or
not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly
should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit.
Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on
the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public official
concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable,
should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and
effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a
denial or modification of a request for a permit.

Lately, several petitions of this character have been filed with this court. It could be due
to the lack of knowledge of the guidelines set forth in the extended opinion. Steps have been
taken to send the Regional Trial judges copies thereof. In the future, therefore, without
precluding the filing of petitions directly with this Court, the interest of justice and of public
convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial court level.

While, therefore, this petition should be dismissed, the Court deems it best to set forth
the above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of
constitutional rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater
assurance that the factual background on which is dependent the determination of whether or
not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied.
 36

US V. BUSTOS
[G.R. No. L-12592. March 8, 1918]
Topic: Speech against official conduct, public figures, and subjects of legitimate public interest

FACTS:
In 1915, the citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled and petitioned through the
law office of Crossfield and O’Brien charging Roman Punsalan, the justice of Peace of
Macabebe, and Masantol, Pampanga of malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The
justice of peace filed a motion to reopen the trial and witnesses elaborated that the justice of
peace was a victim of prosecution and that the charges against him were political in nature.

Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on
October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:

“That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe,

Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent
to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing
which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the
peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the following:

That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe,
on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office
which he holds, is found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral
and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy of the office…”

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants (Bustos et al) are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan

RULING: No. The Supreme court found that the appellants are entitled to the rules of qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guarantees in our Bill of Rights. Instead of punishing
citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them
for their good citizenship.

Article 3, Section 4, 1987 Constitution provides that “No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”

What is qualified privilege: It can be lost by proof of malice. “A communication made

bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contains criminal matter which without privilege could be slanderous
and actionable (Harrision v. Rush). Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The
 37

privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate (like
lack of self-control) terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural
and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error
would not take the case put of privilege.

ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA
[403 U.S. 29 (1971)]
Topic: Speech against official conduct, public figures and subjects of legitimate public interest

FACTS:
Petitioner was a distributor of nudist magazines in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
The police, under the command of Captain Ferguson, arrested him at his home on charges of
selling obscene material in violation under the city's obscenity laws.

A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use
the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. Instead, the reporters of the local
news broadcast characterized petitioner and his business associates as "smut distributors" and
"girlie-book peddlers". Eventually, a jury acquitted petitioner in state court of the criminal
obscenity charges.

From what happened, petitioner sued Metromedia, Inc. for libel. However, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the fact that plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded decisive
importance to the guarantees of the First Amendment which allowed recovery of damages when
a publication arose from a bad motive or malice with reckless indifference to the truth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guarantees of the First Amendment on the state libel laws applied
not only on “public official” but also to private individual.

RULING:
Yes. First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives not so much from whether
the plaintiff is a "public official," "public figure," or "private individual," as it derives from the
question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general
interest. 

According to relevant jurisprudence, the First Amendment extends to myriad matters of

public interest. The constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing
broadly on issues of responsible government. Accordingly, “Our citizenry has a legitimate and
substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in
uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the
case of 'public officials.
 38

In the case at bar, police arrest of a person for distributing allegedly obscene magazines
clearly constitutes an issue of public or general interest. The community has a vital interest in
the proper enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area such as obscenity, where a
number of highly important values are potentially in conflict: the public has an interest both in
seeing that the criminal law is adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not used
unconstitutionally to suppress free expression. Whether the person involved is a famous large-
scale magazine distributor or a "private" businessman running a corner newsstand has no
relevance in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue. We honor the
commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment.

NOTE: If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because, in some sense, the individual did
not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the
public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.

LAGUNZAD V. SOTTO VDA. DE GONZALES

[G.R. No. L-32066. August 6, 1979.]
Topic 1: Speech against official conduct, public figures and subjects of legitimate public interest
Topic 2: The Balancing of Interests Test

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled
"The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his "MML Productions." It was based mainly on
the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which petitioner had purchased from
Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00

The book narrates the events in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was then a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party (minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental, during the elections. Governor Rafael (Liberal Party) and his men were tried
and convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is
portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.

Nelly Amante, half-sister of Padilla, objected to the filming of the movie and the
"exploitation" of his life. They objected to many portions thereof despite the petitioner's
explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., based on his book
"The Long Dark Night in Negros." Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private
 39

respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.
Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in
the picture to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to meet
the scheduled target date of the premiere showing.

After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to
P20,000.00, petitioner and private respondent executed a "Licensing Agreement"

Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because
of private respondent's demand, through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the
life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole
picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio,
television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture."

Petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so
not pursuant to their Agreement but just to placate private respondent.

A premiere showing was held at the Hollywood Theatre, Manila, and the movie was
shown in different theaters all over the country.

Petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement. Private
respondent instituted the present suit against him.

Petitioner contended that:

(1) The episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a public
figure;
(2) Private respondent has no property right over those incidents;
(3) that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed
the same only because private respondent threatened him with unfounded and harassing action
which would have delayed production…

Petitioner demanded the Licensing Agreement be declared null and void for being without any
valid cause.

Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering Lagunzad to pay the plaintiff. Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment. Reconsideration having been denied by the Court, petitioner filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a public figure has no right to privacy.
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s consent in signing the Licensing Agreement was obtained by
duress.
 40

3. Whether or not the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of
expression, and that the Licensing Agreement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech
and of the press.
4. Whether or not the right to privacy (as invoked through Licensing Agreement) is a limitation to
freedom of expression.

HELD:

1. NO.
Being a public figure ip so facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or
she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the lm because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla
Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased
heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the
members of his family.

In Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased
person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."

2. NO.
As held in Martinez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, it is necessary to distinguish
between real duress and the motive which is present when one gives his consent reluctantly. A
contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires,
or even against his better judgment. In legal effect, there is no difference between a contract
wherein one of the contracting parties exchanges one condition for another because he looks
for greater profit or gain by reason of such change, and an agreement wherein one of the
contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either case, he makes a
choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The Licensing Agreement has the
force of law between the contracting parties and since its provisions are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner should
comply with it in good faith.

3. NO.
The Court ruled that the Licensing Agreement does not infringes on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press. The right of freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without
limitations.
 41

4. YES
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-
of-interests test." The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

FACTS:

On July 19, 2010, counsel for the Malaya Lolas, filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of
plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other
arguments, that: In the first place it is highly improper for this honorable court’s judgement to
plagirize at least three sources-an article published in 2009 in hte Yale Law Journal of
International Law, A book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005 and an article
published in 2006 in the case Western Reserve Journal of International Law--and make it
appear that these sources support the Judgement’s arguments for dissmissing the instant
petition when in truth, the plagirized sources even make a strong case for the petitions
claims.They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. The statement was likewise posted
at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010
and at said college’s website.

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams (one of the plagirized
authors) made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.On August 11,
 42

2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines
College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
(Chief Justice Corona).

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the
Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.
The Court went on to state that: While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical
to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive
of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and
undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court
to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity
according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Thus, the Court directed Attys of the UP Law Faculty Statement to
show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points: (a) Respondents’
alleged noble intentions(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo
committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when
others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"(d) Freedom of expression(e) Academic
freedom

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom
as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the
Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

RULING:

No, applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other
bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this
case. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. It would do well
for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,
lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in
other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
 43

professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable
to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined
with the fact that they are lawyers.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take
"constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if
the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published
and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the
Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media
attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is
respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty. In this regard, the Court finds that there was
indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when
respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or
pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that
this appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary
proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were
for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in
jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. Thus, the 35 respondents named in the
Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their
lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who
showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward
account of how he came to sign the Statement. As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation
that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the
disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings.

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the
signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not,
the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect
accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty
Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the
Statement’s persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons
who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their
own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly
speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case. Further, in our assessment,
 44

the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from the beginning
submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead,
submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. In sum, the
Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. In due consideration of Dean
Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under
Canon 10. Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing
on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious. In relation to bar
discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio that:Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers.

All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners,
are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no
exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35

respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his
duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings.
However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without
the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC are denied for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
 45

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars satisfactory and therefore see no need to
admonish or warn them for supposed use of disrespectful language in their statement
commenting on a public issue involving the official conduct of a member of this Court.

First. The matter of Justice Mariano del Castillo’s reported misuse and non-attribution of sources
in his ponencia in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is an issue of public concern. These unfolding
events generated an all-important public issue affecting no less than the integrity of this Court’s
decision-making – its core constitutional function – thus inexorably inviting public comment.
Along with other sectors, the law faculty of the University of the Philippines (UP), underscoring
the seriousness of the issue, and calling for the adoption of individual and institutional remedial
measures. This is prime political speech critical of conduct of public officials and institution,
delivered in public forum. Under the scheme of our constitutional values, this species of speech
enjoys the highest protection,rooted on the deeply-held notion that "the interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs."

Second. In testing whether speech critical of judges and judicial processes falls outside the
ambit of constitutionally protected expression, spilling into the territory of sanctionable
utterances, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. Under this analytical
framework, an utterance is constitutionally protected unless "the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance [is] ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’" It
appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn are (1)
the slurring of this Court’s dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial independence vis-à-vis
the resolution of the plagiarism complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. Thus, the UP law
faculty statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly sanctioned for proffering no
useful social value, solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very existence.

Third. The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members
is valid only if the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately scrutinized to
isolate and highlight perceived offensive phrases and words. This approach defies common
sense and departs from this Court’s established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the
judiciary. We can do no less to the statement of the members of the UP law faculty, who, after
all, were impelled by nothing but their sense of professional obligation to "speak out on a matter
of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."Supreme Court Justices, as public
officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to no greater immunity from
criticism than other public officials and institutions.

Fourth. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciary’s partner in a
perpetual intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions. It
serves the interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to
the academics’ criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law faculty’s call for the Court to "ensur[e]
that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
 46

credible and beyond question," the majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and
brands their constitutionally protected speech as "unbecoming of lawyers and law professors."
The Constitution, logic, common sense and a humble awareness of this Court’s role in the
larger project of dispensing justice in a democracy revolt against such response.Accordingly, I
vote to consider respondents’ explanation in their common and individual Compliance as
satisfactory and to consider this matter closed and terminated.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

The effect and intent of the "Restoring Integrity" Statement must be examined in the context of
what this Court has done to contribute to the controversy as well as the reception by the public
of the pronouncements of this Court on the plagiarism charges A few days after the Malaya
Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office informed the media
that the Chief Justice had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism charges against Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion.

The negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot be attributed solely to
the UP Law Faculty. The respondents herein, who were not parties to any pending case at the
time, forwarded the "Restoring Integrity" Statement as a public expression of the faculty’s stand
regarding the plagiarism issue. Such an open communication of ideas from the citizenry is an
everyday occurrence - Yet only members of the UP Law Faculty were deemed to be the cause
for the majority’s trepidation that the Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence was being
undermined. The Show Cause Order went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members
responsible for threatening the independence of the judiciary.The central argumentation in the
Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the proceeding. The allegation and
conclusion that the faculty members purportedly "undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity, and
competence," make it clear that the true nature of the action is one for indirect contempt. The
Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the
respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly
demonstrated that the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the
Order states: "The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay
ahead." Page four (4) makes the conclusion that: "The publication of a statement…was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of misplaced vigilance."

The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be
exercised solely towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed
carefully against the substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom.
In this critical balancing act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness
and clarity of reasoning, and must not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of
temper.Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to
 47

respect it, both as an important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for
vindication of felt injustice. Judicial legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual
integrity in decision-making rightly generates public acceptance of such decisions, which makes
them truly binding.

Thus, faced with the duty of balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has
now been expressly recognized in the international arena, against this Court’s desire to
preserve its exalted role in society by disciplining for offensive language, this Court must
examine whether it has already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference with the
basic rights of individuals. The realm of public opinion is where the academe, especially our
schools and universities, plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. In this regard,
the law school has a special place.

The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure by
the legal academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial decisions rise up to the
definition of just and well-reasoned decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms
of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. The legal academe is the preserver of the noble
standards of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. It must itself demonstrate strength and
independence and not be punished when doing so. I dissent from the Majority Decision
admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a warning to the thirty-five faculty
members in connection with the "Restoring Integrity" Statement.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

SEPARATE OPINION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In their Compliance, 35 of the respondents, excluding Professors Owen J. Lynch and Raul V.
Vasquez, take common defense that the statements contained in Restoring Integrity were mere
expressions of their opinion, dispensed in accordance with their duties as members of the bar
and as professors of law. They aver that they acted with the purest intentions, guided by their
duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the Court, and deny that it was their intention to malign
the Court as an institution for its decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Respondents affirm
their loyalty and respect for the Court and claim that as professors of law, they have a special
interest in guarding against plagiarism and misrepresentation to ensure intellectual honesty
among their students.

After a careful study of the respondents’ submissions, I respectfully submit that the above
submissions are SATISFACTORY in view of respondents’ claim of good faith and the fact that a
re-examination of the Statement indeed admits of such claim. Indeed, the general wording of
the Statement and its ending paragraphs lend support to respondents’ averments that the
Statement was prompted by the sincere and honest desire to protect the integrity and credibility
of the Judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Given such submissions, I am willing to afford
respondents the benefit of the doubt as to their intentions concerning the forceful language
 48

employed in certain portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement. This is especially so

considering that the subject statements present no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent as to take it out of the protective mantle of the freedom
of speech and expression under the Bill of Rights. However, given the fact that some isolated
portions of the statement were arguably disrespectful, respondents should be reminded to be
more circumspect in their future statements.

As regards Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his explanation is sufficient to exonerate
him from the charge of violation of Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. While it appears that Dean Leonen mistakenly relied on hearsay
information that Justice Mendoza had authorized him to indicate Justice Mendoza as a
signatory to the Statement, still, Dean Leonen’s lapses appear more the result of
overzealousness rather than bad faith or a deliberate intent to do falsehood or to mislead the
Court. That he acted upon the wrong information given to him, though telling of some degree of
carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence that is tantamount to bad faith. Hence, there
being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there is no ground to find him liable under Canon 10
and Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Similarly, there is no
cogent reason to hold him liable for violation of Rule 10.03 as it likewise does not appear that
Dean Leonen violated any rule of procedure or misused any procedural rule to defeat the ends
of justice. The submission of the Statement to the Court, it should be noted, was ad hoc.I
therefore vote to NOTE and CONSIDER the explanations submitted by respondents in their
Compliance/s SATISFACTORY with a REMINDER that they be more circumspect in their future
statements considering that the Court also has its own sensibilities.I also vote to consider this
administrative matter CLOSED and TERMINATED.

MVRS PUBLICATIONS V. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL

G.R. No. 135306 | January 28, 2003
TOPIC: Free speech and libel/defamation suits
 49

FACTS:

The Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., filed a class action suit against
MVRS Publications, Inc., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar,
a daily tabloid, whichreads:

"ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay
hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay.
Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw
ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims for alluding that the pig was the God of the Muslims. Such article was published not
only out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the
Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals
and human relations. In their defense, the MVRS Publications Inc. contended that the article
was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to
cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their
cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically
identified. The CA reversed the decision and opined that it was clear from the disputed article
that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has an actionable cause against the respondent.

RULING:

NO. Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which
tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of
anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which
others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an

identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a
particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all
 50

impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press,
under the Bill of Rights. 

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that where the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly
disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which
they belong to in order for the case to prosper. Moreover, respondents can scarcely claim to
having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.

GMA VS. BUSTOS

G.R. No. 146848, October 17, 2006
Topic: Free speech and libel/ defamation suits

FACTS:

In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission

(PRC) conducted the physicians’ licensure examinations. Out of the total two thousand eight
hundred thirty-five (2,835) examinees who took the examinations, nine hundred forty-one (941)
failed. On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful
examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the
board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in
the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated the
results of the examinations. As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the
filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and
narrated the news coverage for the ten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7
Headline News.
The text of the news report, as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which GMA Network,
Inc. aired and televised on February 10, 1988, runs:
“Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure Examinations today asked the
Manila [RTC] to compel the [PRC] and the Medical Board of Examiners to recheck the August
1987 test papers. The petitioners [examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to also ask for
a special raffling of the case considering that the next physicians examinations have been
scheduled for February [1988] …. They said that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and
capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and
for all.”
 51

ISSUE: Whether or not the televised news report in question on the filing of the petition for
mandamus against the respondents is libelous.

RULING: No, it is not libelous. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which finds that the telecast of February 10, 1988 aired over Channel 7 by [petitioner] Rey
Vidal as a straight news report of the acts and conduct of the members of the Medical Board of
Examiners who are public officers, devoid of comment or remarks, and thus privileged, and
recognized under the 1987 Constitution. The trial court adopts the ruling [in Cuenco] to support
its finding of fact that the disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations
in the said Petition for Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the same falls within the
protected ambit of privileged communication.

The Supreme Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair
and true report, a simple narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances
surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for mandamus before the
court, and made without malice. Thus, the Court find the petitioners entitled to the protection
and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
It follows that they too cannot be held liable for damages sought by the respondents, who,
during the period material, were holding public office.

Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or

condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person.
Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact)may be taken for granted
in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice, is a term used to indicate the
fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty,
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or
defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
as to the truth or falsity thereof.

In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation aired in
its Channel 7 in the February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was basically a narration of the
contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is borne by the records of the case
and was likewise the finding of the trial court.

BORJAL VS CA
G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999
 52

Topic: Free speech and libel/defamation suits

FACTS:

Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines
Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At
the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still
is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on
the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant and journalist by
profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then
Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Industrial Policy.

Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC)
against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column
as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. 6 In
turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to
protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for
character assassination.

Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a
criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a
Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of
Justice and later by the Office of the President.

On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for
damages based on libel subject of the instant case. In their answer, petitioners interposed
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

HELD: No, there are no sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel. In order to
maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that
he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in
the case at bar.

We hold otherwise. These conclusions are at variance with the evidence at hand. The
questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the
organizer of the conference. The first of the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May
1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the
person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of
the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of
seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his 9 June 1989 column petitioner Borjal
 53

wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal
organizers are not specified". Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of the
conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not
as a conference organizer. The printout and tentative program of the conference were devoid of
any indication of Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article entitled "Who
Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative
program only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and
not as organizer.

Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself
unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the
identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent
himself; when he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had
private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the
Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore
clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case falls.

The third, fourth, fifth and sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question
of whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author
from liability.

The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his
articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code
which state

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the
exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private
communications" nor "fair and true report . . . without any comments or remarks." But this is
incorrect.

A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly

privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the
author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution
which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
 54

good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and
true report without any comments or remarks."

Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art.
354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are
neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in
United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of
public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express
recognition in the statute punishing libels.

Note: The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL

[G.R. No. 141994. January 17, 2005.]
Free Speech and libel/defamation of suits

FACTS:

Exposé is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Rima and Jun Alegre. Exposé
is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI).

On Dec. 14 & 15, 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian
College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were
defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of AMEC's College of Medicine, filed a complaint
for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a
reputable learning institution and with the supposed exposés transmitted malicious imputations,
and as such, destroyed plaintiffs' reputation. Plaintiffs included FBNI as defendant for allegedly
failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 55

Respondents filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true.
They claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the "goings-on
in AMEC, which is an institution imbued with public interest."

FBNI filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied. On 14 Dec. 1992, the RTC found FBNI and
Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se. It
rejected the broadcasters' claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting
because it had no factual basis. The trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The trial court ruled that Rima's only participation
was when he agreed with Alegre's exposé.

CA upheld the trial court's ruling that the questioned broadcasts are libelous per se and that
FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to overcome the legal presumption of malice and that they are
liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the broadcasts are libelous and does not fall within the bounds of
freedom of speech, expression, and of the press.

RULING: Yes. There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to
AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima and
Alegre's remarks such as "greed for money on the part of AMEC's administrators"; "AMEC is a
dumping ground, garbage of . . . moral and physical misfits"; and AMEC students who graduate
"will be liabilities rather than assets" of the society are libelous per se. In whole, the broadcasts
suggest that AMEC is a money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers
abound.

A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.

Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show
adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the
students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have
presented the public issues "free from inaccurate and misleading information." Hearing the
students' alleged complaints a month before the exposé, they had sufficient time to verify their
sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of
the students' alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported
irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded
comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving
AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral reportage applies where the
defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a party to that
controversy makes the defamatory statement. The comments of Rima and Alegre were not
backed up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se.
 56

Hence, the Court affirms the decision of the CA with modification as to damages and
attorney’s fee.

AYER PRODUCTION V. CAPULONG

[G.R. No. 82380. April 29, 1988]
Topic: Free speech and the right to privacy

FACTS:

Petitioner Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,
petitioner Ayer Productions, envisioned for commercial viewing and Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue).
Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Juban who suggested that they
consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie
Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies
consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

Petitioner McElroy informed respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion
picture enclosing a synopsis of it. The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-
enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in
a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4)
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background.

Respondent Enrile replied that "he would not and will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing,
distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal
or visual) should not be made to him or any member of his family, much less to any matter
purely personal to them.’ It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film
the projected motion picture.

Respondent filed a complaint seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie
"The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series
without respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right
of privacy. The trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the
application for preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the
mini-series film would not involve the private life of respondent nor that of his family and that a
preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to privacy of respondent was violated in this case.
 57

RULING: No, the right to privacy of respondent was not violated in this case.

The freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce
motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television.

The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not
an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from
him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of
privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The
interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted
publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which
are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied
in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be
reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four
Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion
upon private respondent's "right of privacy."

In this case, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is of
international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this
country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The
subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does
not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of respondent. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile but it is
compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

The extent of the intrusion upon the life of respondent that would be entailed by the
production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character.
The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be
generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
historical account. Respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four
Day Revolution" any part of the private life of respondent or that of any member of his family.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton
have referred to as a "public figure”. A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their right to privacy. They had sought publicity and consented to it, and so
could not complaint when they received it. Their personalities and their affairs are already
 58

public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a
privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate
matters of public interest. There was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to
matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.

Respondent is a "public figure" precisely because of his participation as a

principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986.
Because his participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by respondent would be grossly
unhistorical. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen. Respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. He
continues to be a "public figure."

DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

[G.R. No. 203335 - February 11, 2014]
Topic: Free Speech and the Cybercrime Law

FACTS:
The Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 aims to regulate
access to and use of the cyberspace. This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions
and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of
persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. The
government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening
and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of
course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime

law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These
provisions are:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
 59

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and
362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned provisions of the Cybercrime Law violate the
constitutional right on freedom of speech.

RULING: No, not all aforementioned provisions of the Cybercrime Law violate the constitutional
right on freedom of speech.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access that calls for the application
of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It
simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without
right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like
the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorism effect or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because
they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing
socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since
 60

Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to
intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.

The charge of invalidity of Computer-related Identity Theft based on the overbreadth

doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed
freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition,
use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire another’s personal data.
On the provision on declaring unsolicited commercial communications or spams as
illegal, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the
"efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have
already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as
nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has
the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients
always have the option to delete or not to read them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited
ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded
the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

In relation to cyber libel, the Court ruled that free speech is not absolute. It is subject to
certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law. The Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel
is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already
punishes it.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine
must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must view these statements of the Court on the
inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only
insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving
free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional
right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
 61

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial"
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights
under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on
protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of
communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses
of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of
the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social
media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively
enforce the law.

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the
internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct
and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one
netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an
altogether new defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that
should be considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the
cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel
destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy
relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social
or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the
original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who
simply receive the post and react to it.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom
of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such
as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in
relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications,
and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
 62

Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on

Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been
consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own
neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
In relation to Sec. 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data, the content of
the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a
restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are
protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as
illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial
warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to
do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. Not only does Section 19
preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally
evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the
cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in
relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests
mentioned above. The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative
of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC, SUPRA

Topic: Regulation of Speech: must be content neutral

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act
No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay.”
 63

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUE: Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation

RULING: Yes. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content
is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

PEOPLE V. GO PIN
[G.R. No. L-7491 August 8, 1955]
Topic: Art and Obscenity

FACTS:
Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged with a violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation
center which were allegedly indecent and/or immoral.

After viewing the films, the trial court noted only a slight degree of obscenity, indecency
and immorality in them, it sentenced the appellant to 6 months and 1 day of prision
correctional and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs. He is now appealing from the decision.

Go Pin did not deny his guilt but he claimed that under the circumstances surrounding
the case, particularly the slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality noted by the
 64

court in the films, the prison sentence should be eliminated from the penalty imposed. His
counsel contended that paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of
that kind are not offensive because they are made and presented for the sake of art.

ISSUE: Whether or not Go Pin was guilty of slight degree of obscenity, indecency and
immorality.

RULING: Yes, Go Pin was guilty of slight degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality.

The penalty imposed by the trial court is within the range provided by Article 201 of the
Revised Code. We are satisfied that in imposing the penalty the trial court made use of its
sound discretion, and we find no reason for modifying the said sentence. The Solicitor General
in his brief even urges that we recommend to the proper authorities that deportation
proceedings be instituted against appellant as an undesirable alien. The trial court could have
done this but did not do so, believing perhaps that it was warranted. We repeat that we do not
feel justified in interfering with the discretion of the trial court in the imposition of the sentence in
this case.

In the case at bar, the pictures in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather
for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were
being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and
profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition;
and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance
fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who
generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather
people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for
excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist
and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.

PEOPLE V. PADAN
[G.R. No. L-7295. June 28, 1957.]
Topic: Art and Obscenity

FACTS:
Marina Padan, Jose, Cosme, and Ernesto were charged with a violation of Art. 201 of
the Revised Penal Code. In 1953, in Manila, the accused exhibited inside a building immoral
scenes and acts. Jose, the manager and Ernesto, as ticket collector and or exhibitor hired their
co-accused Marina and Cosme to performed sexual intercourse in the presence of many
spectators, thereby exhibiting or performing highly immoral and indecent acts or shows thereat.
 65

Ernesto collected tickets. There were about 105 customers. Jose, the manager of the
show, was at the door to attend the customers; and ordered that an army steel bed be placed at
the center of the floor, covered with an army blanket and provided with a pillow.

Fajardo asked the crowd to select among two girls present who was to be one of the
principal actors. The spectators choose Marina, the subject of popular approval. Fajardo
selected Cosme to be her partner. Thereafter, Cosme and Marina proceeded to disrobe while
standing around the bed. When completely naked, they turned around to exhibit their bodies to
the spectators. Then they indulged in lascivious acts, consisting of petting, kissing, and touching
the private parts of each other. When sufficiently aroused, they lay on the bed and proceeded to
consummate the act of coitus in three different positions which we deem unnecessary to
describe. The witnesses who testified when asked about their reaction to what they saw, frankly
admitted that they were excited beyond description.

Then the police who were among the spectators and provided with a search warrant
made the raid, arrested the four defendants, and took pictures of Marina and Cosme still naked
and of the army bed, which pictures were presented as exhibits during the trial.

They were all found guilty. The four accused appealed in the decision. Appellants
Espinosa and Reyes failed to file their briefs within the period and their appeal was dismissed
and the decision as to them became final and executory. Marina, because of her former plea of
guilty, only seeks modification of penalty.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not, the appellants are entitled for modification of their penalties.

2.) Whether or not the exhibition/ performance/ show/ act of the accused has an element of art
and expression.
HELD:

1.) NO. The Court ruled that the penalty imposed fits the crime, considering its seriousness.

The Court says that “this is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction…have been
called upon to take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of this kind.

The Court have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still or moving
pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to
morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of
pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux
vivants.
2.) NO.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have
no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and
unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it
 66

does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the youth
of the land. Because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her
plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.

MILLER v. CALIFORNIA
No. 70-73. Argued January 18-19, 1972-Reargued November 7

FACTS:

This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography" cases being reviewed by the Court in a

re-examination of standards enunciated in earlier cases involving the intractable obscenity
problem." Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated
books, euphemistically called "adult" material. After a jury trial, he was convicted of violating
California Penal Code § 311.2 (a), a misdemeanor, by knowingly distributing obscene
matter,and the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Orange,
summarily affirmed the judgment without opinion. Appellant's conviction was specifically based
on his conduct in causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an
envelope addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The envelope was opened by
the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not requested the brochures; they
complained to the police. The brochures advertise four books entitled "Intercourse," "Man-
Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography," and a film
entitled "Marital Intercourse." While the brochures contain some descriptive printed material,
primarily they consist of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in
groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently
displayed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the Obscene materials is is protected under the freedom of
speech guarantee

RULING: No, this much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of
such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.' A state
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be:
 67

(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, quoting Roth v. United States,
supra, at 489; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States. That
must await their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible, however,

to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation under part (b) of
the standard announced in this opinion, supra: (a) Patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or

simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory

functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit
by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public

accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be exhibited or sold without limit in such
public places. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual
conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment
protection. Paradoxically, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN indicates that suppression of unprotected
obscene material is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting adults, as in this case, and
to juveniles, although he gives no indication of how the division between protected and
nonprotected materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for
regulation of commercial exposure to consenting adults only. We are satisfied that these
specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and
commercial activities may bring prosecution.

The dissenting Justices sound the alarm of repression. But, in our view, to equate the free
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom. It is a "misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free
press .... The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people," But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter. There is no evidence, empirical or historical, that
the stern 19th century American censorship of public distribution and display of material relating
to sex, in any way limited or affected expression of serious literary, political, or scientific ideas.
We do not see the harsh hand of censorship of ideas-good or bad, sound or unsoundand
"repression" of political liberty lurking in every state regulation of commercial exploitation of
human interest in sex. These doleful anticipations assume that courts cannot distinguish
commerce in ideas, protected by the First Amendment, from commercial exploitation of obscene
material.

In sum, we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment; (b) hold that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to the specific
 68

safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the material is "utterly without redeeming
social value"; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary
community standards,not "national standards.
 69

GONZALES V. KATIGBAK
G.R. No. L-69500 | July 22, 1985
TOPIC: Art and Obscenity

FACTS:

The petitioner was Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, the President of the Malaya Films, under
which the film Kapit sa Patalim was produced. In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, a permit to exhibit the film under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted.

A motion for reconsideration was filed on the ground that classification of the film "For
Adults Only" was without basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic
expression. The Board then released its decision, stating that there were “certain vital
deficiencies” in their application which warrants the withholding of the issuance of their permit.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Board has the power to order the petitioner to change and delete
some scenes of the film due to obscenity.
2. Whether or not the film should be categorized as “For Adults Only”

RULING:

1. NO.

Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. There is
no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a
distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. In Reyes v.
Bagatsing, the Court held that press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.  This is
not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be
a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press.
If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated. It is however, except in exceptional
circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny that
equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the
purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship.

In thise case, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It
can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general
patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to
 70

abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The
power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its
validity.

2. NO.

The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the
clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that
what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be
evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element
cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement
of its being well-nigh inevitable.

The basic postulate, wherefore, is that where the movies, theatrical productions radio
scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as
they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned,
is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. 

 The law, however, frowns on obscenity and rightly so. There is, however, some difficulty
in determining what is obscene. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is
not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.

However, where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance.
This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television
reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid
viewers of the programs therein shown. In

In this case, the Board’s perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive. However, the Court could not reach enough votes to determine that there was grave
abuse of discretion in classifying the film as such.
 71

PITA VS. CA
[G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989]
Topic: Art and Obscenity

FACTS:
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as well as its prohibition
against deprivation of property without due process of law.
On December 1 and 3, 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
The plaintiff, Pita, filed a case against the defendant Mayor Bagatsing. defendant Mayor
Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials but claimed that
the said materials were voluntarily surrendered by the vendors to the police authorities, and that
the said confiscation and seizure was (sic) undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960. Defendant
pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign, the materials confiscated belonged to the
magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered their reading materials, and
that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Appellate Court also
dismissed the appeal, upon the grounds, among others, that freedom of the press is not without
restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive
to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of
obscene publications. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the materials seized are “obscene” and pose a clear and present danger
of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action

RULING: No, the materials seized are not considered “obscene”. The Court laid down the test,
in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may
fall. Another test is that, when it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not
been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. Undoubtedly,
 72

"immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection.
In free expression cases, the Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the
right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But,
in the instant case, the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would
justify adverse action lies on the authorities. There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. It is essential
for the validity of previous restraint or censorship that the authority does not rely solely on his
own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require.
As the Court so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political
speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to
demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger. The Court is not convinced that the private
respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

IN RE SOTTO
G.R. No. 14576, September 6, 1918
Topic: Freedom of the press

FACTS:

A contempt case was filed against Atty Vicente Sotto, author of the Press Freedom Law
(and also a senator) after he issued a written statement in connection with the SC decision in
the case of Angel Parazo (where Parazo was imprisoned for 30 days after his refusal to divulge
his source in the news the he published), saying that the SC erroneously interpreted the law and
its members are incompetent, the only remedy to put an end to such evil is to change the
members of the SC. “The Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary”.

Sotto was granted 10 day extension even if he filed his answer late. Case was set for
hearing then postponed but Sotto did not appear so the case was submitted for decision.
According to Sotto, under section 13, Article VIII of the Consti (SC powers), SC has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the SC can only impose fines and
imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of
the Chief Executive."

He also alleges that his statement was his exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, with no intention of offending any of the majority of the
honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo
case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.'
 73

ISSUE: Whether or not Sotto be held in contempt.

HELD: Yes, Sotto is guilty of contempt. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; because if well-founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the
respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that
our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as
proponent of the original bill, which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case
be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the
court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended
by both Houses of Congress, and the clause “unless the Court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the interest of the State” was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed
by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of
the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.

The respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo
case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven
to seven, as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
But, the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice.

It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be
protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen
should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice Holmes in US v. Sullens, “[t]he
administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally
sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative
rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws,
from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid
impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its
constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a
last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence
as an unprejudiced tribunal.”
 74

IN RE EMIL P. JURADO
[A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC. April 6, 1995.]
Freedom of the Press

FACTS:

Jurado is a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the
Manila Standard. His column is entitled Opinion. He had been writing about alleged
improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months. Other journalists had also
been making reports or comments on the same subject. Chief Justice took an extraordinary step
and issued A.O. No. 11-93, "Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of
Corruption in the Judiciary”.

The event that directly gave rise to the proceeding at bar was Jurado’s column entitled,
"Who will judge the Justices?" referring among other things to ". . . (a) report that six justices,
their spouses, children and grandchildren (36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong some
time last year — and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were
paid by a public utility firm . . . and that the trip . . . was arranged by the travel agency patronized
by this public utility firm."

The column was made amidst rumors that a SC decision favorable to the public utility firm
appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. What may be called the
seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by the Court in the case of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. where the
the Court was sharply divided.

A letter and affidavit by PLDT addressed to the Chief Justice denying such alleged trip of
the Justices and their families to HK. The court also received a letter from Ad Hoc Committee
stating that despite multiple attempts to invite Jurado, the latter did not respond to such
invitation. Jurado filed his comment explaining that he had not snubbed the invitation of the Ad
Hoc Committee, it being in fact his desire to cooperate in any investigation on corruption in the
judiciary as this was what his columns have always wanted to provoke. The SC issued a
resolution ordering the matter dealt with the letter and affidavit of PLDT be docketed and acted
upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Atty. Jurado specified are true.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jurado’s act, as a journalist, falls within the principles of press freedom
to justify his published writings.

RULING:

No. In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), the Court underscored the importance
both of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are fundamental
and equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced against and
accommodated with one and the other. There, the Court stressed the importance of the public
 75

interest in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice.

. . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which
that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges
their independence is a free press.' (Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-
356 [1946]).

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms: 'The
Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in
this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in
its true sense.As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for
the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted
for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the
court.' (In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930])."

The Freedom of Speech and of the Press must not be abused. Art. 19 of the Civil Code lays
down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise. The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of "abuse of rights," "one of the most dominant
principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law." It parallels too "the
supreme norms of justice which the law develops" and which are expressed in three familiar
Latin maxims: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere (to live
honorably, not to injure others, and to render to every man his due). Freedom of expression, the
right of speech and of the press is among the most zealously protected rights in the
Constitution. But every person exercising it is obliged "to act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith." The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not
be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths — this would not be "to observe honesty and good
faith"; it may not be used to insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute — this would not be "to act with justice" or "give everyone his due."

The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and
for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need
to be accommodated one to the other. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the
truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private
reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth thereof. It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other
person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication
 76

of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. Hence, the
Court declares Atty. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine.

BAYAN V. ERMITA
[G.R. No. 169838. April 25, 2006]
Topic: Regulation of right to assemble must be content-neutral

FACTS:

A rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing
injuries to several of their members. Some other time, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-
sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

Petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced. B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides: A written permit shall
be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom
park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or
influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. They further argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the
right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition
for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as
illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor
 77

without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present
danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza submitted in his comment that the petition should be
dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit
independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present
danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the
lives of other people; that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of
rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. No. 880 is constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, B.P. No. 880 is constitutional.

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides: No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the
other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the

government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for
purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights
are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of
Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with
hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out
of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils
to enact ordinances for the purpose.
 78

Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no
previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a
"clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.

B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v.
Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and
manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are
the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content
based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. Not every
expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march,
parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it
does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the
exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear
and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is,
likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to
the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the
clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent
standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic
Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the
parties in their arguments.

B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner
of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not
the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid
because it is subject to the constitutionally sound "clear and present danger" standard.
 79

EVANGELISTA V. EARNSHAW
[G.R. No. 36453 - September 28, 1932]
Topic: Regulation on Right to Assemble, tests: (1) Auspices Test and (2) Purpose Test

FACTS:
The Evangelista alleges that he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine
Islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands and the
redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and woman in its ranks. On March
2, 1931, by means of a letter to the Earnshaw, the mayor of Manila, the plaintiff requested the
necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon
of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga,
Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the Governor-General a
message from the laboring class.

On March 3, 1931, the Earnshaw denied the petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief
of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city,
because he had revoked their permits and licenses; that consequently, the Communist Party
has not been able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th day of March,
1931. In refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the
city, Evangelista contended that Earnshaw deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional
right. Evangelista further prays "that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant
compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist
Party in Manila.

Earnshaw in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of
the above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of
the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal
association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the
proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws

ISSUE: Whether or not Earnshaw violated the constitutional right of the Communist Party to
assemble.

RULING:
No, Earnshaw did not violate the constitutional right of the Communist Party to
assemble.

By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist
Party of the Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid
association in different parts of the City of Manila, in which seditious speeches were made
urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in order
to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up enmity against the insular and
 80

local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of the laborers and as tools
of the capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the said laborers.

The communists further insisted that it was the duty of the laborers to bring the
government into their hands and to run it by themselves and for themselves, like the laboring
class in Russia; that when the laborers were united, neither the Constabulary nor the United
States Army nor the imperialist Governor-General could stop them when they rose up as one
body in order to free themselves from slavery by the capitalists; that America was cunning and a
coward, as evidenced by the fact that when she entered the World War, her enemies were
already weak; that the Constabulary and the police were the ones who made trouble for the
laborers because they were the agents of the American imperialists in the Islands and they were
used as instruments by the American Imperialist Government; that united together, the laborers
could down the American Imperialist Government; and other terms and expression of similar
tenor and import.

It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the
constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches
uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above
stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb
and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.

Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident
that he cannot expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or
parades in the manner herein described. But be that as it may, it must be considered that the
respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to
provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as
was done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the
power granted him by law — "To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes
and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such
licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is
carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest."

At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of
People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said:

. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures
designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and
the laws, and the existence of the State. (Citing III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.
S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887.)
 81

DE JONGE V. OREGON
299 US 353 (1937)
Topic: Regulation of right to assemble, tests: (1) auspices test; and (2) purpose test

FACTS:
The Supreme Court decide on this case that the U.S. 14 th Amendments due process
clause applies to freedom to assemble.

On July 27, 1934, at a meeting held by the Communist Party, Dirk De Jonge addressed
the audience regarding jail conditions in the county and a maritime strike in progress in
Portland. While the meeting was in progress, police raided it. De Jonge was arrested and
charged with violating the State's criminal syndicalism statute. The law defines criminal
syndicalism as "the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage or any unlawful
acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or
revolution." After being convicted, De Jonge moved for an acquittal, arguing that the evidence
was insufficient to warrant his conviction. Disagreeing, the State Supreme Court distinguished
that the indictment did not charge De Jonge with criminal syndicalism, but rather that he
presided at, conducted and assisted in conducting an assemblage of persons, organization,
society and group called by the Communist Party, which was unlawfully teaching and
advocating in Multnomah county the doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.

ISSUE: Whether or not he right to assemble by the petitioners was violated

RULING:
Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The right
of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.

As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552: "The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." The First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by
Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one
that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all civil and political institutions, — principles which the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.

These rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to
violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that
 82

abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the
365*365 abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of
safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the
Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.

It follows from these considerations that, consistently with the Federal Constitution,
peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the
meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If
the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged
in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy
or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting
them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

We are not called upon to review the findings of the state court as to the objectives of
the Communist Party. Notwithstanding those objectives, the defendant still enjoyed his personal
right of free speech and to take part in a peaceable assembly having a lawful purpose, although
366*366 called by that Party. The defendant was none the less entitled to discuss the public
issues of the day and thus in a lawful manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek
redress of alleged grievances. That was of the essence of his guaranteed personal liberty.

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