Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics

Author(s): Christine Hasenmueller

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 3, Critical Interpretation
(Spring, 1978), pp. 289-301
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 CHRISTINE
Panofsky, Iconography,and
THERE HAS BEEN little active experimenta-
tion with extending the methods and con-
cepts of structuralism and semiology to the
subject matter of art history. Reluctance has
'stemmed from several factors: implicit ac-
ceptance of history as a mode of explana-
tion, the tendency among art historians to
distinguish investigations of form from in-
terpretations of content or meaning, and
the fact that art history- almost by defini-
tion - accords a special place in civilization
to art, especially to Western art of the classi-
cal tradition. The classical bias built into
the terminology and methods of the disci-
pline is diametrically opposed to the struc-
turalist assumption of the essential equiva-
lence of "primitive" and "civilized" think-
ing. Finally, art history in the United States
has been characterized by a strong value on
concrete data and conclusions and a corre-
sponding suspicion of attempts to deduce
intangibles.1
Nevertheless, in recent years, there have
been some interesting attempts to discern
parallels between structuralism and art his-
tory.2 The work of Erwin Panofsky, espe-
cially, has been considered "semiotic" in
character. Argan recently found it so clearly
so that he labelled Panofsky the "Saussure"
of art history.3 Two works have attracted
most of the inquiry into Panofsky's work as
an incipient "semiotic": Gothic Architecture
and Scholasticism and "Iconography and
Iconology: An Introduction to the Study
of Renaissance Art." 4 The latter essay is
a detailed attempt to discern strata of mean-
CIRISTINE HASENMUELLER is associate professor
department of fine arts at Vanderbilt University.
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HASENMUELLER
Semiotics
ing, elucidate interpretive processes that
constitute various levels of understanding,
and present a taxonomy to specify relation-
ships between meaning in art and a "history
of meaning." For a generation it has stood
as the primary statement of the "iconologi-
cal method" in art history, and as the stand-
ard definition of the concepts iconography
and iconology. Within art history, Panof-
sky's work has been appreciated chiefly at
face value as an authoritative definition of
concepts and methods. There has been little
systematic attempt to assess the implications
of his contributions to implicit notions of
"meaning," and to "history" as a mode of
ordering information about art.
Most attempts to analyze Panofsky's work
from the perspective of semiotics proceed
from a wish to establish a foundation in
extant art historical studies of meaning for
a semiotic of art.5 They inevitably empha-
size the correspondences between Panofsky's
thinking and the conceptual vocabulary of
semiology, and minimize - or ignore - the
fact that his concepts are highly integrated
with the art historical theory of which they
are a part.
Panofsky's concepts iconography and ico-
nology certainly subsume brilliant defini-
tions that clarify practice, and bear striking
resemblances to some ideas typical of semi-
ology. But to assess whether Panofsky's sys-
tem is, as Argan suggested, a "semiotic of
art" we must begin with an examination of
the logic of the essay itself and of its place
in a largely implicit and still obscure body
of art historical theory. Comparison of the
in the resulting redefinitions with recent explica-
tions of the notions of "sign" and "symbol"
 290
will reveal fundamental distinctions be-
tween Panofsky's method and semiology.
The comparison has broad implications for
both fields. The very proposal of a "semi-
otic of art" has a "cathartic" effect- to use
Barthes's term - for historians, forcing re-
assessment of the role of history in explain-
ing art.6 Conversely, the test of adapting
semiological concepts and methods to paint-
ing underlines some limitations on semiol-
ogy deriving from long association of its
conceptual language with linguistic and lit-
erary material. It poses, from another angle,
Sperber's question as to whether the notion
of sign is adequate to all forms of meaning.7
Panofsky distinguished three levels of
meaning in Renaissance art.8 He presented
them through an analogy with three phrases
of the interpretation of an instance of com-
municative behavior - a man tipping his
hat. Primary or natural meaning, the first
phase, he subdivided into recognition of
factual meaning, and empathetic appre-
hension of expressional meaning. Identifi-
cation of visual data with objects known
from experience was factual, while sensitiv-
ity to psychological nuances of these facts
consisted in understanding of expressional
meaning.
Recognition of the act as a greeting pre-
supposed a shared cultural context, and a
second phase of interpretation that Panof-
sky labelled secondary or conventional.
While he considered both these strata of
meaning to be phenomenal, he recognized
a difference between the two at the level
of interpretive processes. Where primary
meaning was sensible, Panofsky defined sec-
ondary meaning as intelligible.9 Clearly the
intelligent interpretation of conventional
meaning based on shared knowledge of the
systematic association of the gesture with its
message implies a notion of meaning that is
in a general way "semiotic." Although Pa-
nofsky did not use the concept "sign," he
set up, at this point in his argument, a
thoroughly parallel association of a "signify-
ing" gesture and a "signified" message of
greeting.
The third level, which Panofsky called
intrinsic meaning, is somewhat different,
and its relationship to semiotic notions of
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HASENMUELLER
meaning are nowhere near so obvious.
Panofsky set it apart from the first two
levels of meaning, by stating that intrinsic
meaning was "essential" where natural and
conventional meaning were "phenomenal."
A social act like tipping a hat conveyed,
in Panofsky's view, fragments of informa-
tion about the character and philosophical
orientation of the actor. Though these atti-
tudes were not reconstructable on this evi-
dence, they were nevertheless indicated
"symptomatically."
Three analogous levels of meaning in
art become the objects of pre-iconographic,
iconographic, and iconological interpreta-
tion. Pre-iconograpiLic description was the
recognition of "pure forms." In the hat ex-
ample, primary meaning meant direct asso-
ciation of a new visual experience with
memory; with art there was an additional
step in recognition of the motif in art as a
representation of the world of experience.10
In effect, then, pre-iconographic description
consisted in acceptance of form in art as a
carrier of primary or natural meaning.
Iconography was the intellectual inter-
pretation of secondary or conventional sub-
ject matter analogous to the second level of
interpretation of social acts. Recognition
that form may refer to "themes and con-
cepts" as well as visual experiences presup-
posed both a correct pre-iconographic de-
scription and knowledge of the literary
sources. Panofsky's definition of image as
a conventional association of motif and
literary content is easily seen as parallel to
the concept "sign." An image was defined
by its explicit duality: it constituted the
point of intersection between reference in
art to nature and reference to literature. It
is very difficult to decide what kind of lin-
guistic signa are most closely paralleled by
this relationship. Not only are there many
alternative taxonomies for the linguistic
phenomena, but even within one taxon-
omy, the fit of categories to the "signifier/
signified" relationship Panofsky described is
ambiguous. Edmund Leach, for instance,
labels as signs those signa in which signifier/
signified are related as the part to the
whole." Certainly to the extent that natu-
ralistic representations for Panofsky "mean"
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
by becoming an extension - part - of the
naturalistic phenomena represented, they
approximate this designation. However, as-
sociation of signifier/signified by planned
resemblance, as in a map or portrait, Leach
assigned to icons, which in turn are a va-
riety of symbol - and as such, contrasted to
signs. Panofsky's concepts do not admit
of a consistent and unambiguous "transla-
tion" into Leach's or other specific semiotic
terminology.
Significantly, Panofsky included only cer-
tain aspects of the capacity of elements in
art to refer to external ideas in his defini-
tion of image. It follows that only certain
operations of the interpretation of these
references consist in iconography. Interpre-
tation of images is concerned with conscious
shaping of references to "themes and con-
cepts"- further defined as "stories and alle-
gories." Iconography is, then, the analysis
of systematic associations of motif and liter-
ary content.
Panofsky defined the third phase, iconol-
ogy, as: "ascertaining those underlying prin-
ciples which reveal the basic attitude of a
nation, a period, a class, a religious or philo-
sophical persuasion- unconsciously quali-
fied by one personality and condensed in
one work." 12 It involved a level of mean-
ing analogous to the "essential" meaning of
social acts. These "underlying principles"
cannot be reconstructed on the basis of
their partial manifestation in a single work,
but nevertheless are presumably analyzable.
The principles that are the ultimate ob-
ject of iconology played a role in every step
of the creative process - even such factors as
choice of media. They presumably affected
representation of nature and influenced ico-
nography. The data are thus not discrete.
Panofsky drew fundamental distinctions,
however, between the methods of iconology
and the methods appropriate to more con-
crete levels of meaning. He viewed iconog-
raphy and pre-iconographic interpretation
as descriptive processes, and iconology, by
contrast, as a matter of synthesis. There is
a certain defensiveness detectable at this
point in his argument: Panofsky was deeply
aware of the contrast between the "descrip-
tive and classificatory" character he ascribed
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291
to the first two levels of his analysis, and the
inherently interpretive and subjective char-
acter of analysis that went beyond this. He
alluded to the "danger" that iconology
would behave like astrology, i.e., become
hopelessly unscientific, and apologetically
remarked that the faculty needed for icono-
logical insight might best be described by
"the rather discredited term 'synthetic in-
tuition.' "13 He well knew the difficulties
of verifying the conclusions of investigation
that transcended empirical data, and of de-
fending them in an age when humanistic
studies felt increasingly compelled to model
themselves on the sciences.
The terminology Panofsky used in dis-
tinguishing iconology from iconography in-
directly supports the analogy between ico-
nography and general characteristics of
signs. In stating that iconology was inter-
pretation that went beyond the articulate
he implied that the subject of iconography
was articulate.14 Panofsky was quite explicit
about the unconscious character of intrinsic
meaning: by contrast, the object of iconog-
raphy was consciously used conventional
codes. Finally, Panofsky identified the ob-
ject of iconology with what Cassirer called
"symbolical values." 15 He contrasted, then,
meaning which was articulate, conscious,
and decodable through literary keys to
meaning that was essential, unconscious, and
accessible only to subjective understanding.
The systematic, conventional meaning ar-
ticulated in images behaves much like the
messages conveyed through the conscious
use of language as a code. And the notion
image has many characteristics of typical
definitions of the concept "sign." The prob-
lem lies, however, not in assimilating ico-
nography to the comparatively concrete
levels of semiological investigation, but in
assessing the relationship between iconology
and extensions of the linguistic model to a
more abstract interpretation of "deep"
meaning. The development of semiological
methods in the literatures has led to wide
agreement that there is a high degree of con-
tinuity of the data and methods applicable
between relatively concrete levels of sign
function and what might be called, to bor-
row Panofsky's term, "essential" meaning.
 292
Panofsky himself, as we have seen, drew sev-
eral kinds of distinctions between these
levels of analysis. The question must be,
then, whether his distinctions are substan-
tive. First, can the notion of "sign" usefully
be extended from iconography to Panofsky's
levels 1 and 3; second, did Panofsky intend
such a continuity? The first question con-
cerns the limits of a "semiotic of art." The
second concerns the relationship between
Panofsky's conceptual vocabulary and that
of semiotics. Panofsky indeed tried to estab-
lish a continuity of his own among his three
levels. The epistemological problems he
encountered are significant not only for the
interpretation of his work, but for any at-
tempt to forge a "semiotic of art." Exami-
nation of the object and methods of each
phase of the investigation will provide a
basis for deciding whether it consists in a
sequence of discrete procedures or parts of
a unified - and essentially semiological-
inquiry.
The notion of pre-iconographic meaning
presupposed a substratum of naturalism in
painting. Panofsky restricted his considera-
tion to Renaissance art, where represen-
tation of nature is the normal modality
of artistic communication. Correct pre-
iconographical description was the founda-
tion of understanding: the work of art be-
comes "sensible" as an indirect part of the
nature that it represents.
Where the artist and the interpreter are
not part of the same cultural/historical
group, representational conventions are not
part of a shared tacit knowledge: it is neces-
sary for the interpreter to understand and
bracket characteristics of representation
typical of the time and place a work of art
was made in order for this "identity" be-
tween the representation and nature to oc-
cur.16 Panofsky stated that pre-iconographic
description must be guided by the "correc-
tive principle" of the history of style. This
cautionary procedure indicates two signifi-
cant assumptions that underlie the argu-
ment. At this level, motifs "mean" nature.
And, meaning is "decoded" by recognizing
the systematic relationship between motifs
and nature so that the latter may be in-
cluded in our interpretation of the former.
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HASENMUELLER
"Style" was seen, by implication, as a
changing set of representational conven-
tions that mediate the relationship between
motif and nature. To be sure, Panofsky
broadly allowed at a later point in his argu-
ment, that iconological meaning may infuse
all aspects of a work of art, including style.
But style remained primarily a factor that
conditions interpretation rather than a locus
of meaning.
"Iconographic meaning" was systematic
and arbitrary. Its interpretation involved
the "decoding" of images - units much like
signs; iconography is, in effect, the analysis
of a particular "sign-function" within the
spectrum of artistic meaning. It is con-
cerned with the meaning of conventional
vocabularies of images defined by their refer-
ence to literary sources. The effect is to sup-
port a concept of the "meaning" of art that
may be satisfactorily stated by establishing
the source of the artistic image in literature.
As was the case with pre-iconographic mean-
ing, form in art was seen to signify through
reference to a range of phenomena outside
the work of art. Just as form was "sensible"
as the indirect reflection of visual data of the
lived world, it is "intelligible" as a reformu-
lation of literary content.
The "meaning" and "referents" of art are
closely related, but not necessarily identical.
If they are equated, as often happens in
practice - and there is little in Panofsky's
definitions to discourage this inference -
then art becomes, willy-nilly, a fundamen-
tally lexical phenomenon. Motifs and
images might seem "sign-like" in terms of
their relationships to external units of
meaning. But the "sign system" thus defined
is secondary and incomplete. It is a "lexi-
con" without its own "syntax." Either its
"systematic" character is a mere reflection
of the patterns formed by its referents, or its
capacity to generate independent state-
ments is outside the interpretive power of
Panofsky's analysis.
To return to the basic analogy: iconog-
raphy was compared to our recognition of
the tipping of a man's hat as a greeting. In
the same way, Panofsky suggested, we recog-
nize that a picture of thirteen men seated
around a table represents the Last Supper.17
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
The two interpretive acts are certainly par-
allel in that a greater degree of culturally
shared knowledge is necessary to conclude
that the tipped hat conveys greeting, and
that the picture refers to a particular supper
than to recognize the visual data as result-
ing from, respectively, a man's gesture and a
representation of thirteen men eating. The
kind of knowledge that allows our recogni-
tion of the Last Supper differs, however,
from that which allows interpretation of
the greeting in three important ways.
First, acts and situations are distinguish-
alle from representations of acts and situa-
tions by the fact of representation alone.
Interpretation of the latter must consider
not only the parallels between representa-
tion and represented, but also the differ-
ences of structure and function. Panofsky's
essay did not emphasize this, but an exten-
sion of his example makes the point clear.
Our interpretation of a representation of
gestures of greeting - such as the gestures
of the men with their hats in Courbet's The
Encounter - is doubtless parallel to our in-
terpretation of the observed acts them-
selves.18 That is, our recognition that the
picture shows men making gestures of greet-
ing is based on our ability to recognize ac-
tual gestures as greetings. The representa-
tion, however, is not a greeting -and does
not function like or "mean" the same
thing
as the greetings depicted.19 Even where
art directly represents communicative acts,
then, the meaning effects of representation
and represented are related but not
congru-
ent. The conclusion that the
representation
"means" what is represented- or means the
same thing as what is represented - is mani-
festly unsatisfactory. Ironically it is the
meaning expressed by representing-per-
haps the dimension of meaning most intrin-
sic to art -that is minimized or excluded
if Panofsky's analogy is taken too
literally.
Second, where the meaning of the con-
ventional gesture is generic, the
meaning of
the majority of conventional themes in
painting depends on their specific associa-
tion with literary events. A distinction
drawn in Leach's taxonomy of communica-
tion events is helpful. The
relationship be-
tween the gesture of tipping a hat and its
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293
meaning is that of a sign: the message bear-
ing entity has a fixed, conventional, denota-
tive association with its message.20 The rela-
tionship between a representation of the
Last Supper and its referent is specific-
singular. The relationship of message bear-
ing entity and message approximates the
"separately defined denotation" that char-
acterizes Leach's definition of a symbol. He
follows Mulder and Hervey in defining
symbols as "signa dependent on a separate
(occasional) definition for their correct
interpretation." 21
Both signs and symbols in Leach's termi-
nology, are signa - that is, they are variants
of a general type of "communication dyad"
composed of a message-bearing entity (com-
pare: "signifier") and a message (compare:
"signified") associated by arbitrary human
choice. Both sign and symbol share the gen-
eral characteristics often associated with the
term "sign" when that term is used in its
more general sense. There is no barrier,
then, to considering Leach's signs and sym-
bols as proper objects of semiotics broadly
defined as the "science of signs." Leach's
very definition of symbol does not, as
Sperber's does, pose the question of the
validity of semiotic investigation of the
symbolic.22 However, the distinctions Leach
draws between the two kinds of signa do
suggest some limitations on semiotic analy-
sis of symbols. He emphasizes that "sign
relationships are mainly metonymic, while
symbol relationships are arbitrary assertions
of similarity and therefore mainly meta-
23 Signs are always part of sets
phoric...."
and convey information only when com-
bined with others of this set or context. The
meaningfulness of signs, therefore, is a func-
tion of their patterned contiguity to other
signs of the same set. The metonymic (or
syntagmatic, to use the parallel term pre-
ferred by Levi-Strauss and de Saussure) rela-
tionships of sequences of signs both identify
the set and actualize the meaning potential
of individual signs. Symbols, by contrast,
relate two elements (message-bearing entity
and message) drawn from differing realms,
and associated uniquely.24 Meaning is not
dependent on patterned relationships to
other symbols of the same kind. Symbolic re-
 294
lationships thus are mainly metaphoric (or
in de Saussure's parallel term, paradigmatic).
Leach makes it clear that the same entities
may be defined as signs or as symbols depend-
ing on context or function, and that signs
and symbols normally occur in combina-
tion. Still, the distinction is significant for
the method of interpretation applied. The
uniqueness of symbols means that they can-
not be "decoded" simply by identifying the
"code" (set of signs) and bringing to bear
knowledge of the lexicon and syntactic
structure adequate to "read" the statement
in question. Symbols typically occur in con-
trastive relationships, but do not require
the context of a patterned metonymy (e.g.,
a syntax) in order to convey meaning. Sym-
bolic meaning depends on metaphoric asser-
tion of identity between signifier and signi-
fied: interpretation depends on specification
of this identity.
Leach's enterprise bears comparison to
Panofsky's. He adapted some structuralist
assumptions (e.g., that behavior may be
understood as fundamentally communica-
tive), and a terminology from semiotics to
the description and analysis of behavior.
Panofsky viewed art as fundamentally com-
municative, and attempted to forge a
method for the analysis of levels of meaning
conveyed by artistic form. He arrived at a
set of concepts that approximate, in limited
ways, the conceptual vocabulary of semi-
otics. In both cases, the ultimate object of
understanding is non-verbal, and the model
for understanding it rests at key points on
methods for analysis of verbal materials.
Both face, in very different ways, the prob-
lem of co-ordinating verbal and non-verbal
modes of expressing meaning.
- the
Secondary or conventional meaning
object of iconography - has much in com-
mon with Leach's notion of the symbol.
The linkage between motif and convention-
ally recognized referent in the image is
essentially that of meaning-bearing entity
and message in Leach's symbol. This is
most clear in the method by which images
are to be understood. The image associates
a motif, which is an element from the "con-
text" of representation of nature, with a
theme or story drawn from the "context" of
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HASENMUELLER
literature. The result is a unit of a "meta-
phoric" character. Significantly, it is to be
deciphered not by looking at its place in the
patterned relationships of similar units in
the work of art, but by discovering the par-
ticular basis of the association of the two
elements.
A third distinction between iconography
and interpretation of a gesture of greeting
lies in the fact that Panofsky specifically
identified iconography as the description of
"themes and concepts transmitted through
25 In ico-
literary sources." distinguishing
nography from iconology, he obliquely ad-
mitted the epistemological advantages of
this "literariness." There was to be, lamen-
tably, no "text" for iconology.26 Without
such concrete evidence, the investigator was
thrown back upon "synthetic intuition." In
practice, the explication of "meaning" in
art is often equated to the correct identifica-
tion of the "texts" of images. Iconography
thus concerned identification of paradig-
matic relationships between art and litera-
ture. Patterned relationships among images
-metonymy- were not systematically con-
sidered.
The conviction that iconographical mean-
ing is fundamentally literary is paradoxical
with regard to the question of the "proto-
semiotic" character of Panofsky's investiga-
tion. On one hand, support of identity be-
tween art and literature may be read as
license to extend semiological investigations
of literature to art. One might hope to
arrive at a "semiotic of art" by the device
of annexing art to literature. On the other
hand, such an extreme extension of the
principle of "ut pictura poesis" would ob-
viate a specific "semiotic of art." The extent
of efforts to explain away some problemati-
cal differences between art and literature,
however, tends to suggest that a fundamen-
tal identity between art and literature is
widely assumed. Painting presents its com-
ponents simultaneously rather than sequen-
tially. This is awkward for models adapted
to description of narrative - semiological
and otherwise! There is, however, a con-
siderable literature that tends to minimize
this characteristic of painting and rational-
ize modes of analysis that are based on time
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
sequence. The fact that motifs in painting
refer to episodes in literature itself invites
consideration of painting as a partial or
secondary reflection of a temporal art.
Much Western painting of the later Middle
Ages and Renaissance clearly attempts to
suggest the episodic sequence of literature
through inclusion of references to more
than one phase in an action or by juxta-
position of separate representations of se-
quential episodes. Another widespread view
attempts to infuse sequentiality into paint-
ing by specifying the order in which formal
arrangement dictates that the eye shall ex-
perience images. It is widely supposed that
the formal order of painting often, presum-
ably by the artist's design, directs the move-
ment of the eye to create a sequence of im-
pressions. Ideas like these have eased the
approach from semiology of narrative to
semiology of the literary aspects of art. The
result has been concentration on these as-
pects of art and correspondent slowness to
define a semiology of purely visual elements.
Additional factors have reinforced this
iconographic focus on the literary aspects of
art. The attempt to discover literary sources
is document-oriented, and therefore con-
forms to preference for quasi-empirical
problems and methods. And, where the
question of the particular meaning of a
given work of art is a fundamentally syn-
chronic issue, the meaning of isolated ele-
ments is adaptable to diachronic answers.
Panofsky noted that images in art have
their own history, often digressing from the
history of the literary imagery upon which
they are ultimately based.27 This history of
images or "types" considered in isolation is
parallel to etymology. It is a limited form
of diachronic investigation that elaborates a
lexicon without encountering the problems
of interpreting the function of those ele-
ments in relation to each other. Such a
"history" has the advantage of avoiding de-
pendence on highly subjective interpreta-
tions, but its conclusions are strictly limited
in scale. Much iconography, in practice,
poses questions that are "etymological"
rather than interpretive of meaning.
The apparent simplicity of "metonymic"
(syntagmatic) structures formed by images
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295
ally them with the units Leach called sym-
bols.28 The reasons for Panofsky's de-
emphasis of these relations, however, are
best sought in the implicit theory of art
history. Relationships among forms in art
are traditionally conceived as an element of
style, constrained by the exigencies of repre-
sentation where this is relevant. The tend-
ency not to assign the relationships among
images a major role in the expression of
meaning may reflect the assumption that
these relationships are controlled by factors
external to problems of iconographic mean-
ing, and are, to that degree, "meaning
neutral."
If illusionistic painting is a representa-
tion of the appearance of nature in accord-
ance with certain stylistic conventions, then
most of the configuration of motifs is "dic-
tated" by the order of nature, the optical
conditions of its apprehension, and the
technical conventions of its representation.
Often it is just those formal relationships
that seem to contradict what might be ex-
pected from a "naturalistic" representation
that are recognized as significant. Typically
it is details that seem anomalous that elicit
explanation in terms of the artist's symbolic
intent - or his technical limitations.
Iconography, then, has a generally "semi-
otic" character, but there are two problems
with considering iconography a "semiotic
of art." First, the semiotic functions as-
cribed to the units in question are very
limited. Images are parallel to the signa
Leach called symbols. They are uniquely
defined, and patterned relationship with
like units is of relatively small importance
in interpretation. Models from semiotics
which emphasize patterned metonymy may
not be applicable. Second, iconography is
concerned with only a narrow dimension
of the meaning of art. Much of its appeal
as a method is based on the epistemological
advantages of this limitation to literary
content.
As a stratum of the meaning of art, ico-
nology is a paradox. Panofsky made it
dependent upon and continuous with the
first two levels, yet contrasted the nature of
the meaning at stake and the method
needed to discover it with the objects and
 296
methods of the previous phases of analysis.
It is both correspondent to the other two
categories and a way of begging the ques-
tion of categories.
The distinction between iconography and
iconology is largely methodological. Panof-
sky considered iconography, like ethnogra-
phy and other studies characterized by the
suffix, to be fundamentally descriptive.29
The method proposed responds to a value
on objectivity, and the concept "icono-
graphic meaning" may even be seen as sec-
ondary to the method and the criteria that
define it. Iconology, by contrast, is Panof-
sky's name for analysis of meaning that
transcends the limits of this kind of inves-
tigation. It is iconography stripped of the
"restrictions" he found especially evident
in America, and taken out of the narrow
isolation imposed by these methodological
criteria.30
The cautions Panofsky set forth for ico-
nology reveal his awareness of the criticism
to which it would be subject. He stated the
danger that it might become like astrology
rather than like scientific pursuits designed
by the "ology" suffix denoting analysis
rather than mere description. He pro-
foundly recognized that not all of that
which humanists wish to understand is in-
vestigatable in accordance with the "scien-
tific" criteria of investigation and verifiabil-
ity that tend to be readily accepted in our
intellectual climate. Where iconography is
restricted to that which is "knowable" given
certain criteria of method, iconology is de-
fined by the intuitive capacity of the mind
to pose and attempt to solve problems that
defy these limits.
"Synthetic intuition," indeed, is not so
much a method as a human capacity: it is
not an investigative process but a dimen-
sion of mind. The object of this thinking
is, correspondingly, not a delimited kind
of data but "principles which underlie the
choice and presentation of motifs as well
as the production and interpretation of
images, stories, and allegories, and which
give meaning even to formal arrangements
and technical procedures employed." 31
Though it is possible to assess the relation-
ship between iconography and semiotics by
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HASENMUELLER
comparison of explicitly defined terms, it is
not easy to specify precisely what is done in
iconology, much less the relationship of this
to semiology.
The parallels between iconology and
semiology concern not method and concepts
but assumptions. Panofsky assumed that
"symbolical values" infuse cultural products
including art and literature. The suggestion
that iconology utilize the "corrective prin-
ciple" of comparing results to the conclu-
sions of similar analyses of literature pre-
supposes their ultimate homogeneity.32
The assumption of such an underlying
unity allies Panofsky with the structuralists
and semio!ogists, but even more directly,
with Geistesgeschichte, the school of art his-
torical thinking out of which his ideas de-
veloped. This unity of the arts was formerly
explained as the result of a determining
force. Panofsky sought to transcend the diffi-
culties of speculative, essentialist attempts
to derive historical order from a single cau-
sality. His insistence on the dependence of
each phase of interpretation on the last
mitigates the deductive character of the
analysis, as does his de-emphasis of causal-
ity. It is by no means easy to replace the
causal "spirits" Popper called on us to re-
ject with something more logically defen-
sible.33 One response has been retreat into
small-scale enterprises that are relatively
easy to co-ordinate with more or less em-
pirical criteria of investigation. Panofsky's
great strength is shown in his refusal to
retreat into narrow documentary studies -
to avoid the sins of historicism by the dis-
appointing expedient of avoiding the prob-
lems that led to its discredited conclusions.
The general assumption that there is
meaning beyond iconography parallels
semiotics. It does not follow from this
alone, however, that Panofsky's approach is
a semiotic - even an unfinished one. Panof-
sky's reasons for defining iconology as he
did stem less from hypotheses about the
nature of this level of meaning than from
his deep and ultimately classical humanism.
He profoundly understood the power of a
generally empirical epistemology to influ-
ence humanistic research. The fact that he
thought the humanistic character of art his-
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
tory needed to be stated indicates that he felt
it had been questioned and perhaps com-
promised.34 He certainly appreciated the
necessity to attach art historical research
firmly to concrete documents and observa-
tions, and few scholars have contributed so
much to this. But he also envisioned the
tragic result that would follow attempts to
subordinate a humalnistic concern for mean-
ing to implicit and often naive notions of
the criteria for "scientific" validity. An un-
defined, uncritical popularity of the ideal
of "scientific" truth could - and did - lead
to avoidance of problems that were inher-
ently inimical to concrete modes of investi-
gation. Such curtailing of the scope of hu-
manistic inquiry in order to accommodate
it to these unspoken values could not make
art history a science, but it could well sap
its vitality as a humanistic discipline.
Panofsky shared with semiotics both a
concern for "deep" meaning in cultural
products, and a conviction that it is acces-
sible to analysis. Are we to conclude from
this that Panofsky's approach is a nascent
semiotic which possesses the essentials
though it perhaps lacks some refinements?
Further consideration of three factors - the
nature of the ultimate subject of the analy-
sis, the role of historicity in the explanatory
structure offered, and the consistency of the
notion of sign will support the conclusion
that the "semiotic" character of Panofsky's
approach is ephemeral.
Panofsky summarized the method, object,
and necessary capacities or conditions of
iconology in a chart.35 Here the question of
whether Weltanschauung or mind was the
ultimate subject was most clearly addressed.
Though the ways in which the "essential
tendencies of the human mind" express
themselves change under varying historical
conditions, there was no implication that
mind itself was conceived as mutable. More-
over, the essential tendencies of mind and
the patterns of expression were not the ob-
jects of knowledge in Panofsky's table but
the prerequisites of iconological research.
The familiarity with these essential ten-
dencies that is the basis of synthetic intui-
tion was not arrived at through research,
but "given": it was a capacity rather than
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297
a method or a conclusion. The intuitive
notion of mind involved is revealed by the
absence of any formulation of its structure
or functioning assumed to be reflected in the
nature of intrinsic meaning. The lack of a
model linking these things clearly differen-
tiates Panofsky's approach from most semio-
logical inquiry.
The issue of the historicity of Panofsky's
method provides another avenue to its dis-
tinction from semiotics. Both iconographv
and iconology are integral parts of a form
of history. Iconography is a "philology" of
images; the descriptive, factual aspect of the
process of understanding the past. Relative
closeness to documents and concrete obser-
vations meant that iconography was more
easily defended in an empirical intellectual
climate.
Iconology sought to state the underlying
principles that shape the expression of an
age. As such it is a variant of the "history
of ideas." Certain ambiguities, however,
support questioning as to whether it is
necessarily a historical concept. This has
vast implications for the congruence of
Panofsky's concepts with semiology. In
Panofsky's table, three kinds of historical
knowledge are given as conditions of cor-
rect analysis at each level -not as goals.
This may engender questions as to whether
Panofsky's approach is "history" at all-
that is, whether he might not be closer to
an essentially synchronic, semiotic approach
to art than hitherto suspected. If "history"
in Panofsky's chart is effectively a support
to the investigation of meaning rather than
a form of explanation, then the whole sys-
tem becomes much easier to co-ordinate with
semiological and structuralist approaches.
The table is, however, somewhat mislead-
ing. Each level is a cycle rather than a
sequence, as Panofsky stated at another
point in the argument.36 He recognized that
a "history of style" could only be built up
through analysis of the styles of individual
works, and that it sounded like a vicious
circle to use a history thus derived to classify
and explain the style of subsequent works.
However, he distinguished individual ob-
servations of new data from the "sense"
made by analysis of ranges of data. This
 298
"circulus methodicus" characterized the re-
lationships between a "history of images"
and individual iconographical problems,
and between history of "cultural symptoms"
and the "essential meaning" of specific
works. Since the object and the starting as-
sumptions of each level are interdependent,
the object of each level is not necessarily the
goal of the investigation. The histories (of
style, types, and cultural symptoms, respec-
tively) with which one ostensibly begins
analysis at each level (pre-iconographic, ico-
nographic, and iconological) are in turn the
products of historical analyses of works of
art.
At all three levels, analysis is focussed on
the characteristics which enable integration
of each new object of analysis into a histori-
cal "sense." Diachronic ordering is not inci-
dental, it is essential.
There is another large scale distinction
between Panofsky's approach and a "semi-
otic of art": consistency of the model. Semi-
ology is characterized by the assumption
that communication is more homogeneous
than previously suspected. "Meaning" is
approached as a continuum whose levels are
transformations of each other, and by ex-
tension, amenable to analogous analytical
methods and descriptive models. Panofsky's
typology of meaning is quite different. He
made a sharp distinction between levels of
meaning, precisely in the matter of the
methods to which they were accessible.
It might perhaps be argued that Panofsky
did pursue the ideal of a homogeneous in-
vestigation of meaning, but stopped short
of solution of certain logical problems. By
basing iconology on correct iconography
and suggesting certain controls, he certainly
hoped to mitigate the epistemological prob-
lems of iconology. It does not follow that
he implied the essential homogeneity of all
three levels of meaning. There is no con-
tinuity of method, model, or the key notion
of "sign." The "linguistic" character of
Panofsky's whole system is very limited. The
sporadic appearance of "sign-like" units
does not support attempts to extend that
notion to other parts of the analysis.
There is little in Panofsky's definition of
intrinsic meaning to suggest application of
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HASENMUELLER
linguistic models. The essential tendencies
of the human mind that are the basis of
synthetic intuition constitute a conceptual
modality rather than a code. Interpretation
does not involve correct association of sig-
nifier and signified. The object of iconology
is close indeed to Sperber's notion of the
symbolic, which he expressly contrasted
with the semiotic. In entirely different
language, Panofsky distinguished between
meaning expressed in codes and meaning
arising from conceptual ordering- the cen-
tral issue of Sperber's critique of Levi-
Strauss. At root it is a question of whether
all meaning can lbe reduced to linguistic
models.
It is inevitalle that attempts to extend
semiotics to non-linguistic phenomena shall
present new problems and severe tests. And,
as Paul Bouissac has pointed out, one im-
portant way to define and work through the
external resistance and internal questioning
that face a fledgling discipline is to confront
the new program with previous debates of
a similar nature.37 These texts are impor-
tant not only as a source of the "genealogy"
of the new discipline, but also for the very
epistemological, theoretical, and methodo-
logical problems that led them to formulate
the problems differently than in the new
program of semiotics. Many linguists, he
remarks, seem unaware of the tradition -
a humanistic tradition - which has per-
mitted the definition of the problems they
are trying to solve. They tend to proceed
independently, or to view ideas parallel to
their own in earlier generations as "proto-
semiotic." The central point of his review
is that semiotics cannot afford to overlook
previous debates on the issues the discipline
has claimed either by ignorance, or by chau-
vinistically regarding them as "naive" or
"incipient" forms of response to issues for-
mulated meaningfully only in semiotics.
From this perspective, the question here
is whether Panofsky's "semiotic of art" was
as yet naive, or whether the discrepancies
between his ideas and those of contemporary
semiotics arise at least in part from the
failure of semiotics fully to encounter or
resolve the problems that shaped his en-
quiry. The application of the tools of semi-
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
otic analysis of linguistic phenomena to
complex humanistic dimensions of meaning
is subject to the same generalized, often un-
defined values of our intellectual milieu
that so profoundly structured Panofsky's
approach. A consistent vocabulary and
method based squarely on the most concrete
dimensions of language codes conveys a
sense of greater homogeneity than Panof-
sky achieved. But the question is still open
as to whether aspects of semiotics that tran-
scend the analysis of codes and venture into
what Sperber called the "symbolic" have
really transcended the epistemological sta-
tus of "synthetic intuition."
1I have discussed the concept of "style" in con-
temporary American art history as an index of these
values in: Christine Hasenmueller McCorkel, "Sense
and Sensibility: An Epistemological Approach to A
Philosophy of Art History," Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, XXXIV, No. 1 (Fall, 1975), 35-50.
2 See, for example: Sheldon Nodelman, "Structural
Analysis in Art and Anthropology," in Jacques Ehr-
mann, ed., Structuralism (Garden City, New York,
1970), pp. 79-93; originally published as a volume of
Yale French Studies, 1966. For a consideration of
Panofsky's concepts see: Hubert Damisch, "Semiotics
and Iconography," Times Literary Supplement (Octo-
ber 12, 1973), 1221ff. Meyer Schapiro's Words and
Pictures, Approaches to Semiotics, 11, Thomas A.
Sebeok, ed. (The Hague, 1973), is virtually alone in
the attempt to develop elements of a semiotic of
visual form.
3Giulio Carlo Argan, "Ideology and Iconology,"
trans. Rebecca West, Critical Inquiry, 2:2 (Winter,
1975), 299 and 303. Originally published in Italian
in Storia dell'arte.
4 Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism is most re-
cently published by Meridian Books (Cleveland,
1957). "Iconography and Iconology," first appeared
as the Introduction to his Studies in Iconology:
Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance
(New York, 1939); a slight revision titled "Iconog-
raphy and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study
of Renaissance Art" appears in his Meaning in the
Visual Arts (Garden City, New York, 1955).
5 Paul Bouissac has sLated the
point succinctly in
a recent review of Alain Bey, Theories du signe et du
sens titled: "The Golden Legend of Semiotics,"
Semiotica, 17:4, 371-84. He observed that new disci-
plines tend to seek a "genealogy" in prior statements
of key principles, and that: "The result is generally
a gratifying fallacy in as much as the texts which are
recovered or unearthed for this purpose receive their
relevancy precisely from the point of view which
they are assumed to have generated, and not the re-
verse" (p. 371).
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299
8 Roland Barthes, "Les sciences humaines et
l'oeuvre de Levi-Strauss," Annales: economies -so-
cietes-civilisations, XIX (November-December 1964),
1085-86; quoted in H. Stuart Hughes, The Ob-
structed Path, Torchbook edition (New York, 1969),
p. 285.
7 Dan
Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism, Cambridge
Studies in Social Anthropology, trans. Alice L. Mor-
ton (Cambridge, 1975), a revised version of the
French text published by Hermann (Paris, 1974).
8 It is
important that his essays were presented as
an approach to Renaissance art, and accordingly sub-
titled. Panofsky's further work in iconography and
iconology concerns mostly Renaissance material. The
approach is conceived, then, as a tool for analysis of
an art that balances naturalism and idealism in
largely narra ive representation of predominantly
literary subjects. The question of how art can "mean"
when it does not fit this model does not arise. It is
also important that much iconographical work on
Panofsky's pattern involves the painting of the
Netherlands in the fifteenth century. Northern art
is, in Worringer's classic characterization, "literary":
it is more focussed than even contemporary Italian
art on meaning conveyed by motifs that refer directly
to literature.
9 Of course, from
many points of view, notably that
of Gestalt psychology, it could be argued that the
processes Panofsky distinguished are actually con-
tinuous. The immediate concern here, however, is
not the validity of these distinctions, but their role
in Panofsky's theory, and their implications for a
rapprochement with semiotics.
10 There is an important distinction between
repre-
sentation as an image of the world of experience and
as an image of a perceptual/mental interpretation of
the data of experience. The metaphor Panofsky uses
tends to depict art as equivalent to the actualities
which are the basis of experience. It is not clear
whether this discrepancy has been simply missed,
dismissed as not pertinent, or resulted from the
character of the metaphor and is hence extraneous
to inferences about Panofsky's notion of the psycho-
logical mechanism in question.
1 Culture and Communication: The Logic by
Which Symbols are Connected, Themes in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge, 1976), p. 12ff.
12 "Iconography and
Iconology," p. 30.
13
Ibid., p. 38. It is also interesting that his remark
on the "limitations placed on iconography especially
in this country," (p. 32) did not appear in the earlier
version of the text. See Panofsky, Studies in Iconol-
ogy, Torchbook edition (New York, 1962). It seems,
then, a response to the intensification of empirical
bias in the American intellectual environment by the
mid 1950s.
' Ibid., p. 31.
15 Ibid.
16The
relationship between the world as seen by
the investigator and the world seen by the investiga-
tor indirectly through the work of art is not as simple
as Panofsky's analogy makes it appear. See foot-
note 10.
17
"Iconography and Iconology," pp. 35ff.
 300
's The Encounter, 1854, Musee Fabre,
Montpellier.
Only this detail of the meaning of Courbet's picture
is adduced here.
19 Ernst Gombrich has elaborated this point in
his well-known essay "Meditations on a Hobbyhorse
or the Roots of Artistic Form," reprinted in Medita-
tions on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the
Theory of Art, 2nd ed. (New York, 1971). He used
the metaphor of the relationship between a hobby-
horse and the horse it represents to elaborate the
idea that representations do not simply imitate what
they represent, but constitute a substitute that is
significantly different in function. Representation
and represented must be linked by sufficient evidence
of "likeness" in form and function to be placed in
the same class. In the case of the hobbyhorse, both
the toy and the horse are "horses" and are "ridable."
But the relationship is also characterized by differ-
ences: almost every aspect of the real horse is screened
out except for the minimal visual details to establish
"identity" and the accommodatability of both to
different specifications of the concept "riding." Simi-
larly, motifs in painting are identified with their sub-
jects by the conventions of illusionism, but also lis-
tinct from them in function. Interpretation of mean-
ing, it follows, should consider both the identity of
representation and subject, and the distinction.
Panofsky's system describes the psychological mecha-
nism for recognition of the first, but not the second.
In effect, then, Panofsky's concepts reduce the mean-
ing of art to the metaphoric (or paradigmatic) asso-
ciation between representation and represented. His
analytical system does not explicitly include recogni-
tion of the change in context implied in the act of
representation, nor does it provide for analysis of the
function of motifs in this context.
20 For a
summary sta:ement of Leach's taxonomy,
see Culture and Communication, pp. 12ff. Based on
the system of Mulder and Hervey, and ultimately
Jakobson, the vocabulary adapts linguistic concepts
of the nature and systematic functioning of com-
munication events to the analysis of non-linguistic
communicative behavior. Since it applies semiotic
concepts to behavior, it is a particularly valuable
formulation of these concepts for any consideration
of their applicability to works of art. Panofsky's con-
cepts would stand in somewhat different relationship
to other uses of the same terms. These differences
are technical, however. Leach's formulation has been
chosen because it detaches these terms from linguistic
and narrative material.
21
J. W. F. Mulder and S. G. J. Hervey, Theory of
the Linguistic Sign, Janua Linguarum: Series Minor
136 (The Hague, 1972), pp. 13-17, quoted in Leach,
Culture and Communication, p. 13.
Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism, see pp. 12ff. for
statement of problem. He argues that there is a cog-
nitive level of meaning - which he calls "the sym-
bolic"- that is not analyzable in terms of sign func-
tions, and hence inaccessible to semiotics.
23
Leach, Culture and Communication, p. 15. The
concept is elaborated on p. 12, and pp. 14-16.
24 The distinction between
sign and symbol is quite
clear so far as it concerns the relationship between
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HASENMUE L ER
signifier and signified that characterizes each. And,
it emerges in the course of the discussion that the
relationships among signs are highly structured and
essential to the actualization of the meaning poten-
tial of individual signs. Relationships among symbols
are not characterized by such highly developed sys-
tems. Since signs are used in combination with signs
from the same context, the kind of signifier/signified
relationship is constant and insignificant once the
system has been recognized and its conventions
"bracketed." The same is not true of symbols, whose
signifier/signified association is uniquely defined. In
the case of signs, recognition of the "context" from
which they are drawn (i.e., recognition of the system
which they express) implies bracketing of the pat-
terned signifier/signified relationship, and interpre-
tation of the meaning of signs in such a sequence
assumes application of knowledge of the systematic
relationships that characterize that "context" or sys-
tem. There is a connection between the signifier/
signified relationship within the structure of signa
and the patterned relationships among signa that
characterize the subtypes sign and symbol. Much of
this connection is not explicitly expressed in Leach,
and where specific aspects of signs or symbols are
isolated for discussion, it is not always entirely clear
whether the metaphoric or metonymic qualities ana-
lyzed are characteristic of the internal structure or
the external relationships of the signa in question.
25
"Iconography and Iconology," p. 36.
26Ibid., p. 38.
27"Iconography and Iconology," pp. 36-38. In
Panofsky's own iconographical work, investigation
typically treats each image as a separate problem with
comparatively little discussion of the implications of
their interrelations. His approach gives us no method
or vocabulary for the description or analysis of these
"metonymic" patterns within the work of art. This
omission need not, however, lead to the conclusion
that Panofsky excluded such observations absolutely
from his approach. Certain kinds of structured rela-
tions among images, such as narrative sequence, axial
sequence, and spatial devices for juxtapositions that
transcend illusionistic verity have certainly been
widely observed and incorporated into conclusions.
It may be simply that the significance of relationships
that tie together, for example, the voussoir reliefs
that frame Rogier's Mary Altarpiece, or the images
distributed along the center axis of Jan van Eyck's
Arnolfini Wedding have seemed so obvious to Panof-
sky and others that no "method" has seemed necessary
to their correct interpretation. In examples like these,
the relationship among images is certainly both sim-
ple and prominent. There remain, however, two
problems: correct inierpretation of more subtle struc-
ture, and the logical importance of the kind and
extent of structures images may form to evaluation
of image as a semiotic concept.
2s Though not, of course, with what Sperber called
"the symbolic."
29
"Iconography and Iconology," p. 31.
30Ibid.,
p. 32.
31Ibid., p. 38.
32
Ibid., p. 39.
Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics
33Ernst Gombrich, "The Logic of Vanity Fair:
Alternatives to Historicism in the Study of Fashions,
Style, and Taste," in The Philosophy of Karl Popper,
ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Library of Living Philoso-
phers, Vol. XIV (La Salle, Ill., 1974), 11:925-957,
p. 926.
-' See his "Art History as a Humanistic Discipline,"
in his Meaning in the Visual Arts (Garden City,
N. Y., 1955). As a humanist of the classical tradition
- whose notion of the "symbolic" came from the
Neo-Kantian approach of Cassirer rather than from
anthropological or linguistic formulations - Panofsky
301
is a descendant of an intellectual tradition hard to
correlate with Levi-Strauss. He is a likely candidate,
in fact, for that group Levi-Strauss denounced as
retreating into "history as the last refuge of transcen-
dental humanism." (Savage Mind [Chicago, 1966],
p. 262), quoted in H. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed
Path, p. 284.
3 "Iconography and Iconology," pp. 40-44.
3 Studies in
Iconology, "Introduction," p. 11,
note 3.
3 "The Golden Legend of Semiotics," pp. 371-373.

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