Rule 39 1-14

tuballa heirs vs cabrera

f:

Tuballa occupied lot 5697 since time immemorial

Tuballa invested time, resources, and effort to convert the public land into private ownership.

then, the employees Cabrera Enterprises intruded into the subject land without Tuballa's consent.

tuballa filed an action Recovery of Possession of a parcel of sugar land.

RTC rendered a decision ordering cabrera ent. to vacate lot. 6597 (not 5697)

ca affirmed. it became final and executory

tuballa noticed the typo and filed a manifestation before the rtc regarding such

rtc mentioned that it had no power to correct a ca decision. shouldve filed the manifestation before ca

hence, to sc

H:

-A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.

-The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be modified in any respect are (1)
the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and (3) void judgments.

-this case falls under the exception of clerical

-sc modified the decision

Heirs of jbl reyes vs ca

One final word. It was bad enough that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the lease contract
must be judicially rescinded before respondent MMB, Inc. may be evicted from the premises. It was
worse that the Court of Appeals immediately enforced its decision pending appeal restoring
respondent in possession of the leased premises and worst, appointed a special sheriff to carry out
the writ of execution. In the first place, we emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals has no
authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. Discretionary
execution under Rule 39, Section 2 (a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing. A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed
pending appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must be remanded to the lower court,
where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry. In other words, before its finality,
66 

the judgment cannot be executed. There can be no discretionary execution of a decision of the Court
of Appeals. In the second place, even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded
upon good reasons. The court must state in a special order the "good reasons" justifying the
issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior
67 

circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if
the decision is reversed. Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature
68 

execution of judgment, such as "deterioration of commodities subject of litigation" and "the

69 

deteriorating condition of the vessel, M/V 'Valiant' . . . left to rot at the pier and without a crew to
guard it". In this case, the good reasons given by the Court of Appeals to support the discretionary
70 

execution of its decision are (1) that respondent would be deprived of income from its business
endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are
clogged with cases and it may take some time before the decision in the case may attain its finality;
and (3) that petitioners acted with bad faith and malice. None of the cited reasons is "good" enough.
71 

According to jurisprudence, respondent's precarious financial condition is not a compelling

circumstance warranting immediate execution. The assertion that "it is of public knowledge" that the
72 

Supreme Court is clogged with cases that may take time to decide mocks the integrity and derides
the competence of this Court.  The remark erodes and undermines the people's trust and confidence
1âwphi1

in the judiciary, ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts. This is an assault on the
Supreme Court that borders on contempt; we cannot permit such attack to pass without sanction.
This we cannot countenance. Litigants, lawyers and judges share the responsibility of unclogging the
dockets of the judiciary. No lower court justice or judge may deride, chastise or chide the Supreme
73 

Court even speaking "with due respect" in his ponencia. In fact, it is the duty of lower courts to obey
the decisions of the Supreme Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy
of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." "There
74 

is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings" so spoke
Justice J. B. L. Reyes. We echo this golden nugget of advice. If a judge of a lower court cannot do
75 

so in conscience, he has no alternative but to yield his judicial robe and resign. More, it has been
76 

held that urgency resulting from years of delay in the disposal of a case is not a good reason for
premature execution of the decision. Bad faith and malice are not indicated simply because
77 

petitioners insisted on their rights and exhausted judicial remedies. On the contrary, good faith is
always presumed. In the third place, on September 14, 1998, petitioners elevated the decision of
78 

the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court by petition for review. By the mere fact of the filing of the
79 

petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of
judgment therein, and, hence, no premature execution could be had. The Court of Appeals adopted
80 

its resolution granting execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998, after the petition for review
was already filed in the Supreme Court. It thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the
81 

Supreme Court. Worst of all, the Court of Appeals has no authority to appoint a special

sheriff. It appointed an employee of the mailing section, who was not even bonded as required
82 

by law. Such display of keen interest in the immediate execution of its decision coupled with the
83 

exercise of excessive authority by illegally appointing a "special sheriff' makes the concerned
members of the Court of Appeals liable to disciplinary action and the imposition of appropriate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court declares VOID the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September
18, 1998 in CA-G. R. SP No. 47158 and SP No. 47720, and the writ of execution dated September
21, 1998, issued pursuant thereto. Petitioners are acquitted of the charge of contempt of court.
The Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 21, 1998, in CA-
G. R. SP No. 47158 and SP No. 47720, and REINSTATES the decision of the Regional Trial Court,

Katon vs palanca
[T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when
the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles,
Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v.
Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan,
136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of
Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even
if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v.
Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement
thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been
declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established
by the evidence."

Globe telecom vs florendo-flores

Where there is conflict between the dispositive portion of the

decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls
irrespective of what appears in the body.14 While the body of the
decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the
manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive
portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets
conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations.15 Hence, for the Court of
Appeals to have affirmed the assailed judgment is to adopt and
uphold the NLRC finding of abandonment and its award of full back
wages to respondent as an "act of grace" from petitioners

Waste management vs jancom

Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for
in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof,
with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct
the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a
writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty, compellable by
mandamus.47

There are instances, however, when an error may be committed in the course of execution
proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances call for correction by a superior
court, as where:

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court;

5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective
in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid
or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. 48 (Emphasis and Underscoring
supplied)

That a writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially to every
essential particular thereof,49 it is settled. It may not thus vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce,50 nor go beyond its terms. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which
gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity

Writ of exec was not in harmony w/ judgment = tc cannot issue a writ of exec

Writ of exec varied the judgmet

Lu v siapno

We agree with the Court Administrator that respondent Judge

Siapno is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he rendered
judgment providing, in the dispositive portion, for its immediate
execution. It should be noted that the Regional Trial Court, while
affirming the judgment of the respondent Judge, nevertheless
deleted that portion of the decision providing for immediate
execution. Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of
judgment in the decision itself.17 Section 21 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure likewise provides that the decision of the
regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if immediately
executory, there must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing
called for that purpose. In an ejectment case, the adverse party is
entitled to notice before execution can be ordered.18 In disregarding
the rules and settled jurisprudence, respondent Judge showed gross
ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of
malicious intent, however, cannot completely free respondent Judge
from liability. When the law is elementary, so elementary not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff must be held responsible. The
issuance of the writ of execution and its subsequent implementation
without motion and hearing and at the time the copy of the
judgment has not yet been received by defendant's counsel, was
precipitate and against all sense of fair play. Lu's counsel received
the MTC-decision on September 13, 1995 and filed a notice of
appeal on the same day. However, the writ of execution was issued
by Clerk of Court Corpuz on September 11, 1995 and was
implemented by Sheriff Lopez on said date. Clearly, there was a
violation of the rules of procedure. Even in the Rule on Summary
Procedure, a judgment must first be given to the losing party before
it can be executed

Lao vs king
List
Exec must conform to the decision

Perlas vs ramolete
Facts:
On June 1976, a Cimarron PUJ owned by Nelia Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, was travelling
from Cebu City to Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu, the Cimarron PUJ collided with a
private jeep owned by the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent Primitiva Palmes) who
was then driving the private jeep. The impact of the collision was such that the private jeep was flung
away to a distance of about thirty (30) feet and then fell on its right side pinning down Calixto
Palmes. He died as a result of cardio-respiratory arrest due to a crushed chest. The accident also
caused physical injuries on the part of 2-year-old Adeudatus Borbon.

Private respondents Primitiva and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of Adeudatus) filed a
complaint against Cosme and Nelia before the then Cebu CFI claiming actual, moral, nominal and
exemplary damages as a result of the accident. The claim of Borbon, Sr. was excluded from the
complaint due to jurisdiction.

The CFI ruled in favor of Primitiva, ordering common carrier Nelia to pay her damages and
attorney’s fees. The judgment of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of execution
was issued, which however, returned unsatisfied, prompting the court  to summon and examine
Nelia. She declared that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a third-party liability insurance policy
issued by petitioner Perla.

Palmes then filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued against
the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor. Respondent Judge then
issued an Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability
insurance policy. Petitioner filed for MR and quashal of the writ of garnishment on the ground that
Perla was not a party to the case and that jurisdiction over its person had never been acquired by the
trial court by service of summons or by any process. The trial court denied
petitioner’s motion.An Order for issuance of an alias writ of garnishment was subsequently issued.
More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this
Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering
garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the
judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez. The Petition should have been dismissed forthwith for having been
filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not appear on the record, was nonetheless
entertained.
 
Issue:
W/N there is GADALEJ on the part of the respondent judge

W/N there insurance policy may be subject to garnishment

 
Held:
1. No. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction on the
part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor’s third-party
liability insurance.
2. Yes. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or
credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by
the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is,
through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby
becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a person
having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver
the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit.
In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the
garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need
not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully
to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits
belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment.
Rule 39, Section 15 and Rule 57, Section 7(e) of the ROC themselves do not require that the garnishee
be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable.

In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner Perla when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-party
liability insurance policy it had issued in favor of judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez. Perla cannot
successfully evade liability thereon by such a contention.
In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of paying the injured
third party to whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the liability of the
insured to the injured third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured to the injured third person
is not necessary in order that the obligation of the insurer may arise. From the moment that the
insured became liable to the third person, the insured acquired an interest in the insurance contract,
which interest may be garnished like any other credit.

A separate action is not necessary to establish petitioner’s liability.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time and for
lack of merit. Judgment AFFIRMED.

Only need to give notice of garnishment to garnishee to bind them

exception: when the garnishee has interest in the case itself.

Solco v provido xxxxxxxxxx

Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious
reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to
enforce the judgment,27 upon motion within five years from the date of its entry, or after the lapse of
such time and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, by an independent action. 28 Either party
can move for the execution of the decision so long as the decision or any part of it is in favor of the
moving party. The rule on execution of final judgments does not make the filing of the motion for
execution exclusive to the prevailing party.29

In the instant case, the Villaruels moved to quash the writ of execution because it allegedly varied
the terms of the judgment. They claimed that the writ directed the sheriff to execute the decision only
as against them, contrary to the dispostive portion of the decision which likewise ordered Solco to
pay the balance of the purchase price. This contention is untenable. Although the portion of the
decision ordering Solco to pay the balance of the contract price was not categorically expressed in
the dispositive portion of the writ of execution, the same was explicitly reiterated in the body of the
writ. Villaruels’ remedy was not to move for the quashal of the writ of execution but to move for its
modification to include the portion of the decision which ordered Solco to pay the balance of the
contract price.

Reburiano vs ca

Corp was being sued. Corp changed its articles of incorporation(parang na-dissolve) after writ of
exec) argues that corp no personality anymore hence cannot sue or be sued. SC: does not fall under
any of the exemptions, to wit:

First. The question is whether the order of the trial court denying petitioners' Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution is appealable. As a general rule, no appeal lies from such an order, otherwise litigation will
become interminable. There are exceptions, but this case does not fall within any of such
exceptions.

In Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held:  9

 Certain, it is. . . . that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be
contested and prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom: otherwise, cases
would be interminable, and there would be negation of the overmastering need to
end litigations.

There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course
of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare
though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where —

1. the writ of execution varies the judgment;

2. there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;

3. execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4. it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the
court;

5. the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or,

6. it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment
debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations or justice and equity dictate that

there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a
higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error
or certiorari) or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

Saligumba vs palonog xxxxx

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five
years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended
to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. 13 An action for revival of judgment is a
new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property
case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not
the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered.14 Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory

Original case diff. from revival of action

Rev. of action = what is being questioned is won you have the right to revive the action

Pnb vs Bondoc xxxx

Section 6 of Rule 39 states:

 SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitation, a
judgment may be enforced by action.

Section 6, abovequoted, makes no distinction as to the kind of judgment which may be revived by
ordinary independent action. Such being so, proposition that a revived judgment cannot any more be
enforced by action under said section has no justification. When the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.

A judgment rendered on a complaint for the revival of a previous judgment is a new judgment and
the rights of the plaintiff rest on the new judgment not on the previous one. Precisely, the purpose of
the revival of a judgment is to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of
revival. 1 The rule seeks to protect judgment creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in
order to evade attachment or execution, cunningly conceal their assets and wait until the statute of
limitations sets in.

Section 6 aforementioned requires that the judgment sought to be revived is not bared by
prescription. Under Article 1144(3) of the New Civil Code the right to enforce a judgment prescribes
in ten years counted from the date said judgment becomes final. 2

Maricalum mining co. vs nlrc

Finally, we reject the contention of Maricalum that NLRC-Bacolod has no jurisdiction over an action for
revival of judgment. In Aldeguer v. Gemelo 11 we held:

The action in the present case is an original action, and not a mere incident of the primitive suit or a
mere auxiliary and supplementary remedy. It is a new and independent action for the recovery of a
debt evidenced by the original judgment. In other words, it is an action based on a judgment, or what
is called in English an  action upon a judgment. The American doctrine is uniform in the sense that
whereas the remedy of  scire facias, which is a mere incident of the original suit, must be instituted in
the court where said suit was brought (34 C.J. 664-615; 23 Cyc., 1444-1445; 2 Freeman on
Judgments, 2272-2273; 1 Black on Judgments, 578), an action upon a judgment must be brought
either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or
defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions
in general.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The owner of a judgment may . . . use his judgment as a cause of action, and bring suit thereon
in the same court or any court of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute such suit to final judgment.
(Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind., 443; Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind., 529; Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind., 577.
(Becknell et al. v. Becknell, 110 Ind., 47).

xxx xxx xxx

An action on a judgment may be brought in the court which rendered it, or in any other court having
jurisdiction. Thus the action may be brought in an inferior court on a judgment obtained in a superior
one; and, conversely, an action lies in a superior court upon a judgment rendered in an inferior one. It
was formerly thought that such an action was a local one, and must be brought in the county where
the records remained; but it is now held that the action may be brought in any county in which
jurisdiction of defendant's person can be obtained. (Emphasis supplied).
Prescinding from the above decision, private respondent Saludar properly instituted his action for
revival in the NLRC which rendered the judgment sought to be revived. It is well established that
regular courts are bereft of jurisdiction to entertain disputes involving employer-employee relationship

Infante vs aran builders

Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper venue of the present
action for revival of judgment

 the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for
revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted
rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of
the place where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the
category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be filed with the court of
the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

Rule 39 15 -30

Xxxxxxx

Naguiat vs ca

Bangkok vs se

Camacho vs ca