Chapter I   -   General Concepts
Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party
1. Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564 (APPLE)
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style SERGIO F.
NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its members, LEONARDO T.
GALANG, et al., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
DOCTRINE:
"tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed
by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.
FACTS:
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force
Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark
Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat
was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated
("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.
Respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxi drivers. However,
AAFES was dissolved as a result of the US military bases phase-out. AAFES’
drivers were officially terminated on November 26, 1991. During the
negotiations between AAFES Taxi Drivers Association and CFTI regarding
separation benefits, it was agreed that separated drivers will be given
P500/year of service. Other drivers accepted the amount, but respondents
refused to accept it.
         
Respondents, through National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a
labor organization, filed a complaint against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing
business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-
Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service
Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo
Castillo as President," for payment of separation pay due to
termination/phase-out. Said complaint was later amended to include
additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI
with Antolin T.
respondent.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that they were regular employees of
Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for employment
were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat
Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI, and that the former thence
managed, controlled and supervised their employment. They averred
further that they were entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily
earnings of US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a month.
Petitioners claimed that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26,
1991, was due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity"
resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases
agreement. They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union,
through its President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had blanket
authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi
driver-employees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every year of
service.
LA: individual complainants are regular workers of CFTI, ordered the latter
to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian
consideration.
Rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was forced to close business due to
"great financial losses and lost business opportunity" since, at the time it
ceased operations, CFTI was profitably earning and the cessation of its
business was due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base.
Allowing respondents exemption from its obligation to pay separation pay
would be inhuman to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation to
an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot down by force
majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the least
NLRC: modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to
the private respondents.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not S. Naguiat is solidarily liable for corporate tort because he
actively engaged in CFTI's management or operation -Yes.
RULING:
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate
liability insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine whether there was
corporate tort. Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of
"corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given
or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a
legal duty.  Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant
separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with
this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was
actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be
held personally liable.
Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
In MAM Realty Development v. NLRC:
director / officer may still be held solidarily liable with a corporation by a specific
provision of law
1. WON there was corporate tort. YES
2. TORT - violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed
by law; breach of legal duty
CFTI president solidarily liable
Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated
from joint and several liabilities in the payment of separation pay to
individual respondents.
In A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC, family-owned corporation filed
application for clearance to cease operations. Backwages were computed;
however, none of the motions for execution could be implemented for
failure to find leviable assets. LA granted union's prayer that officers and
agents be personally held liable for payment of backwages. NLRC however
said that officers of a corporation are not personally liable for official acts
unless they exceeded scope of authority. SC however reversed NLRC and
upheld LA, saying that if the policy of the law were otherwise, the employer
can have ways for evading payment of backwages.
Applying the ruling in A. C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an
"employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly
and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed
employees. Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat
Enterprises were "close family corporations" owned by the Naguiat family.
Liability of Petitioner- Corporations and Their Respective Officers
Naguiat Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled
employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As
adverted to earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon
the court in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises
and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for
payment of separation pay.
Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to an
employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the
workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which
are directly related to the principal business of the employer. Independent
contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise independent employment,
contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods without
being subject to control of their employer except as to the result of their
work.
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis to
hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor. On the contrary, petitioners
submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for employment with
CFTI, and social security remittances and payroll of Naguiat Enterprises
showing that none of the individual respondents were its employees.
Moreover, in the contract between CFTI and AAFES, the former, as
concessionaire, agreed to purchase from AAFES for a certain amount within
a specified period a fleet of vehicles to be "kept on the road" by CFTI,
pursuant to their concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became
the owner of the taxicabs, which became the principal investment and asset
of the company.

Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It
appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as
an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business.
They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a
stockholder and director of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing
and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A closer scrutiny
and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the matter: that
Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and determining their
employment terms, was rather carrying out his responsibilities as president
of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate corporation does not
appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI VP not personally liable [A. Naguiat]:
-It was not shown that he acted in the capacity of a GM
-No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management,
operation of business                            to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and
co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, the individual
respondents their separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of
service, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the
judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat
are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of separation pay to individual
respondents.
2. Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA, 217 SCRA 16 (EDWARD)
ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account
of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account
Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the
signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical
demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the
signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of
BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene
Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No
effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the
father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable
provision of law.
RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent
what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson
on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued
check based on ff inquiries:
§   SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
§   Bank said signature belonged to EB
§   EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and
the III.
 
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1.  there is a legal right or duty
2.  exercised in bad faith
3.  for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally
seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to
find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded
There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad
faith in the filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in
the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they
cannot be held liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
3. PNB vs. CA, 83 SCRA 237 (ERICA)
G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978
Lessons Applicable: Liability for Torts (Corporate Law)
FACTS:
 PNB executed its bond w/ Rita Gueco Tapnio as principal, in
favor of the PNB to guarantee the payment of Tapnio's account
with PNB.
 Indemnity Agreement w/ 12% int. and 15% atty. fees
 Sept 18 1957:  PNB sent a letter of demand for Tapnio to pay
the reduced amount of 2,379.91
 PNB demanded both oral and written but to no avail
 Tapnio mortgaged to the bank her lease agreement w/ Jacobo
Tuazon for her unused export sugar quota at P2.80 per picular
or a total of P2,800 which was more than the value of the bond
 PNB insisted on raising it to P3.00 per picular so Tuazon
rejected the offer
ISSUE: W/N PNB should be liable for tort
HELD: YES. affirmed.
 While Tapnio had the ultimate authority of approving or
disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was
mortgaged to the bank, it certainly CANNOT escape its
responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of
Tapnio and Tuazon, that the degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving
or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota
 Art. 21 of the Civil Code: any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
4. Deywalt vs. La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos, G.R. No.
13505, 39 Phil. 587 (EVAN)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Geo W. Daywalt
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:  La Corporacion De Los Padres Agustinos Recoletos,
et al.
DOCTRINE:
There are 2 kinds of damages:
(1)    Ordinary damages- recoverable as naturally and generally would result
from a breach. It goes according to the usual course of things. It is not
needed to be contemplated in the contract.
(2)    Special damages- remote and speculative in nature, could not be
reasonably be expected to foresee. It must be subject of the contract in
such a sense as to become an express or implied term of the engagement.
FACTS:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself
to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They
agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencia’s title to the
land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title
issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out
that the property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she
initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the
whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an
amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an
 action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the
entire tract to Daywalt.
Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a
religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property
sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the
representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy
over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the
influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts
with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire tract. Due to
this, Teodorica Endencia, delivered the said title to La Corporacion
Recoletos for safekeeding, until its delivery was ordered by the decree of
the Supreme Court in 1914.
Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it
unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her
contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery of the
Torrens title. Daywalt’s claim for damages against the Recoletos was for the
huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because of
the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with
a big Milling enterprise for the sale of the property and its conversion into a
sugar mill.
ISSUE: Whether or not Recoletos is liable to Daywalt as to the damages for the
use and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of
cattle thereon during the period stated- YES but only to the value of its
ordinary use.
Whether or not Recoletos is liable to Daywalt as to the damages in the ground
that said corporation, for its own selfish purposes, unlawfully induced
Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the
sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the
Torrens title- NO
RATIO:
1.       Trial court favored the plaintiff but lowered defendant’s liability from the
claimed P24,000 to P2,497. Plaintiff based its P24,000 claim on the fact that
the 1,248 hectare subject land was said to be improperly used by the
defendant as a grazing field for its 1000 head of cattles, and that the rate for
grazing would be 40 cents per head monthly or 4,800 pesos annually.
However court held that it is very improbably for a 1,248 hectare land to be
a sufficient grazing field for a 1,000 head of cattles, and that it was found
that after the recovery of the land, the plaintiff rented it to the defendant
for 50 centavos per hectare annually.
2.       Determination of the second issue requires a consideration of two points.
The first is whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of
land makes himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond the value of
the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him
in the effort to resist an action for specific performance. The second is
whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover under this head
are too remote and speculative to be the subject of recovery.
In the case of Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, it was held that that a person who is a stranger
to contract may, by an unjustifiable interference in the performance
thereof, render himself liable for the damages consequent upon non-
performance. However, it boils down to the intent of the interference.
Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in
cases of interference with contract relations. If a party enters into contract
to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful climate, and a
third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under
contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie. But if the
advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the indirect
purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the
intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.
To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan
Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract cold not
be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried
into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was,
therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive.
Also, the stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot
become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the
contract than the party in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to
determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the
liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from
Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special
damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the
subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt,
neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising
 Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event
render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract.
If the defendant would want to cover himself from damages that are beyond
the normal value of use and occupation of the land, it should have indicated
a claim to such damages through a provision in the contract.
5. Silva vs. Peralta, 110 Phil 57 (MARK)
Plaintiff: Spouses Saturnino and Elenita Silva
Defendant: Esther Peralta - Representing herself as Mrs. Silva
FACTS: Esther Peralta, herein defendant, was sued by herein plaintiffs Spouses
Silva for representing herself as plaintiff Saturnino Silva`s wife. Esther
peralta contended that Saturnino Silva seduced her in making love to and
inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife and later
on abandoned her. Esther also claimed that there is no proof that the
existence of a valid marriage between Saturnino and Elenita was adequately
driven home to Esther before this case was instituted. Moreover, Esther
contended that Saturnino Silva has an undissolved marriage to an Australian
woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from her and that Esther had to
support the child because Silva abandoned her before it was born. Esther
filed a support case in Manila, in order to prosecute the same however she
was not allowed to collect support from Saturnino. Esther also claimed for
damages against Saturnino Silva on account of the amounts she was
compelled to spend for the maintenance of their child. The Trial court
found Elenita Silva's claim for damages not adequately proved, and have
not found in the record any justification to depart from that finding.
Spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva prayed for reconsideration
claiming that —
(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther
Peralta's unauthorized use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva";
(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is
unwarranted by the facts and the law.
ISSUE: WON damages should be awarded to Esther
HELD: YES. It is clear that Esther Peralta would not have consented to the
liaison had there been no concealment of Silva's previous marriage, or that
the birth of the child was a direct result of this connection. That Esther had
to support the child because Silva abandoned her before it was born is
likewise patent upon the record, and we can not see how said appellant can
be excused from liability therefor.
Silva's seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his
illegitimate child were likewise the direct cause for the filling of the support
case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee had to quit her
employment in Davao. While the case could have been filed in Davao, we do
not believe that this error in selecting a more favorable venue (due to her
unfamiliarity with the technicalities of the law) should be allowed to
neutralized the appellant Silva's responsibility as the primary causative
factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee.
The court also ruled that the very fact that the child was not allowed to
collect support from the father (appellant therein) merely emphasizes the
account of his birth and rearing, which, in turn, was a direct consequence of
appellant's tortious conduct. Since Esther Peralta had expressly that she had
to support the child,and had prayed for such relief "as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises", there is no reason why her expenses for the
child's maintenance should not be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
6. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732, Dec. 14, 2006
(MUSTANG)
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. and Admer Pajarillo vs. Lauro Tangco, et.al
G.R. No. 165732, 14 December 2006
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS: On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went
to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch in Quezon City to renew her time
deposit.  Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding
permit to carry the same outside of her residence, approached Pajarillo,
security guard of Ecology Bank to deposit the firearm for safekeeping,
suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Evangeline’s husband, Lauro, together with his six minor children filed with
the RTC of QC a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved
their right to file a separate civil action on the said criminal case.  Pajarillo
was subsequently convicted of homicide in 19 January 2000 by the RTC and
the CA upheld the decision with modification on the penalty on 31 July
2000.
On 14 January 1998, respondents filed with the RTC of Marikina City a
complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline
and against Safeguard Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
its security guard.  The respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.
The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of Lauro Tangco et. al.
ordering Pajarillo and Safeguard Security agency Inc. ,jointly and severally,
to pay:
a.    ₱157,430.00 as actual damages;
b.    ₱50,000 as death indemnity;
c.    ₱1million pesos as moral damages;
d.    ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e.    ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense; giving no weight to
his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
incident given that Pajarillo had not made any such reports to the head
office and the police authorities.   Pajarillo should have exercised proper
prudence and necessary care in ascertaining the matter instead of shooting
her instantly. The RTC likewise found Safeguard to be jointly and severally
liable with Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by simply showing that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision as contemplated under the law.  It includes the duty to see to it
that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
The CA modified that decision of the RTC saying that Safeguard Security
Agency Inc. is only subsidiarily liable.
the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil
liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since
Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory
judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one
solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the
offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a
pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the
defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and
supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities
based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their
employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
ISSUES:
1.    Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline
2.    Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held solidarily
liable for the damages awarded to respondents in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.
RATIO:
1.    Yes.Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in
going to the bank was to renew her time deposit. [  On the other hand,
Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the
same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance
of about one meter or one arms length he stepped backward, loaded the
chamber of his gun and shot her. It is however unimaginable that petitioner
Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already
pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the
trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on
his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However,
such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to
the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about
10 meters away from the bank [28] and saw her talking to a man thereat; that
she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the
bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do
not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the
bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is
no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the banks
branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the
police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside
the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really
had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10
meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a
back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that
aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there
were guards manning the entrance door.
 
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank
and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner
Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline
approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and
petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as
a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;[  that
the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not
the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; that the fear
that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline
Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.
2.    Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or
omission of an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-
delicts cases, in order to overcome this presumption, the employer must
prove that there was no negligence on his part in the supervision of his
employees.
It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers
are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and
service records. Thus, due diligence on the supervision and operation  of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case,
Safeguard Security committed negligence in identifying the qualifications
and ability of its agents.
7. Lamis vs. Ong, G. R. No. 148923, August 11, 2005 (SIGRID)
Facts:
 Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan),
petitioner, was the security agency providing security services at the
Manila Chinese Cemetery. The visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. Sandigan instructed the security guards not to allow any one to
enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
 On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner, was the
guard assigned at the south gate of the cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. slot.
 Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer, with a PSM 679
plate, driven by David Y. Ong, herein respondent, arrived at the south
gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car and continued doing so, but
Lamis did not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the gate and
informed respondent that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter
the cemetery. Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car,
trying to enter the cemetery. This irked Lamis. He closed the gate and
took a shot gun entrusted to him by one of the roving guards.
 About thirty minutes thereafter, respondents car returned at full
speed toward the closed gate where Lamis was standing. He fired a
warning shot but respondent did not stop his car. Lamis fired another
warning shot. Respondent then alighted from his car. Seeing it was
closed, he got inside the car, but before he could do so, Lamis shot
him, hitting his right arm, left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive
 to the Chinese General Hospital where he was examined and treated.
Thereafter, the hospital guard reported the incident to the police who
immediately conducted an investigation.
 Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own investigation but did not turn
over to the police the firearm used by Lamis.
 Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother the amount spent for his
medical expenses. Meanwhile, he was given another job but he
absented from work without leave. Thus, he was suspended and
eventually dismissed from the service.
 Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for frustrated homicide
against Lamis. And later, respondent also filed a complaint for damages
against both petitioners which rendered Vicente Lamis and Sandigan
Protective & Investigation Agency, Inc. are ordered to pay jointly and
solidarily P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, and costs of suit. CA Affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the court correctly awarded damages in favor of respondent.
Ruling:
(a) petitioner Lamis did not act in self-defense, and
(b) petitioner Sandigan failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its security guards.
petitioners maintain that there is no legal basis for the trial courts award of
damages.
As earlier stated, the trial court found that Lamis act of shooting the
respondent was deliberate and intentional, hence, both petitioners are
jointly and solidarily liable to respondent for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that Whoever by an act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. The obligation imposed by this Article is demandable
not only for ones own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible.  Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer
of petitioner Lamis, is likewise liable for damages caused by the latter.
Sandigan already paid the medical expenses (or actual damages) incurred by
respondent. The Court find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding
to respondent moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00, exemplary
damages of P300,000.00 and attorneys fee in the amount of P50,000.00.
These amounts are quite excessive. We have held that although the trial
court is given the discretion to determine the amount of such damages, the
appellate court may modify or change the amount awarded when it is
inordinate, as in this case.
It bears stressing that the award of moral damages is meant to compensate
the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused by the defendants wrongful
acts. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.
Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,
neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no
hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar facts. Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount,
with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive.  We hold that an award to respondent of P30,000.00, instead of
P500,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
The award of exemplary damages should be reduced from P300,000.00 to
P25,000.00. Such damages are imposed not to enrich the claimant and
impoverish the defendant but to serve as a deterrent against, or as a
negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.
Finally, an award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is deemed sufficient
considering that the suit involved is merely for damages. Attorneys fee may
be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party, as in
the present case.
Petition Denied.
8. Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98 (YANA)
Petitioners: PEDRO ELCANO (father) and PATRICIA ELCANO (mother), in
their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased vs.
Respondents: REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor.
DOCTRINE: A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the victim do not recover damages on both scores
LAW APPLICABLE: Civil Code ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
BARREDO, J:
FACTS: Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named
Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with
who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to
dismiss was filed by the defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon
City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed
upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal
of Reginald in the criminal case.
HELD: No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal
of Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the
proof required in a criminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty
in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the
basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As
such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
9. Virata vs. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472 (APPLE)CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS
VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA,
ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR,
CAVITE, respondents.
Fernandez, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by
Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the
same negligent act.
FACTS:
On September 24, 1975 Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney
driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa.
Borilla is the employer of Ochoa.
An action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against
Maximo Borilla with the CFI of Rizal in Pasay. Atty. Julio Francisco, the
private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages against the driver on his criminal liability. However, he filed a
motion to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action and
thereafter, actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the
damages.
On June 29, 1976, the heirs of Arsenio Virata reserved their right to institute
a separate civil action; and on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata,
petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the CFI of Cavite for
damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is
another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same
parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the CFI of Rizal a
decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla
on the ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on
January 31, 1977, the CFI of Cavite granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-
134 for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for
the damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria
Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that
bumped Arsenio Virata.
RULING:
Yes, Petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act.
Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said
criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages
against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-
delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-
134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought
to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission
punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different
sources of obligation.
Concepts:
Article 2177, though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law; while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana'
or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar
to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.
Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds 'the spirit that
given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and,
in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit
of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress', to
borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. to 359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault
covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty and acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of
Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law.
10. Andamo vs. CA 191 SCRA 195 (EDWARD)
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990]
TOPIC: Concept of Quasi-Delict, Scope, “Intentional” Acts
NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite
a.     Land is adjacent to the land of private respondent
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.,(MOLLSI) a
religious corporation.
2. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
a.     This allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
                               i. caused a young man to drown,
                              ii. damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
                             iii. washed away costly fences,
                             iv. endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction.
3. Andamo spouses instituted a criminal action before the RTC of
Cavite against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers
and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means
of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code
4. Andamos filed another action against MOLLSI, this time a civil case
for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
before the same court.
a. MOLLSI filed an answer and opposed to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
b. TC issued an order suspending further hearings in
the civil case until after judgment in the criminal case.
5. Andamo spouses appealed the order to the IAC
a. IAC affimed the order
b. MR denied
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
HELD: YES. IAC DECISION REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TC ordered to proceed
with the civil case independently of the criminal case.
1.     the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.
a.     All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
                                 i. damages suffered by the plaintiff,
                                ii. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
                               iii. the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
2.     In the present case: the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between
the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may
be the basis for the recovery of damages.
3. Samson vs. Dionisio:
a. the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
ruling that: "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or
dike, stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a
river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of
the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake,
shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
b. Applying in the present case: the alleged presence of damage to
the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between
the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
4.     adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not
to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
a.     An owner may build structures in his own land but such must be all
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
b.     If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
5.     Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence,
thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
a. "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent.
b. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary.
6.     The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, which states:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
a. Report of the Code Commission: "the foregoing provision though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain ...
7. Castillo vs. Court of Appeals: a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
a. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
b. The acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability
would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
8. Azucena vs. Potenciano:  "(t)he civil action is entirely independent
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17,
1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to
proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
11. Dulay vs. CA, April 31, 1995 (ERICA)
FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action
for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela.
Private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD
claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the
one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176
applies only to quasi- offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the
complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary
liability.
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against
the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
Respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion
to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. Petitioner
appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but Court Appeals Eight Division
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: NO. Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration
of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case
is inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot
be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb
the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is
beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been
established that the instant action is not ex- delicto, petitioners may
proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee
(Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial
court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
12. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 327 (EVAN)
PETITIONERS: M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams
RESPONDENTS: Aurora I. Rarang and IAC
DOCTRINE:
Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is showing of bad faith.
Although in this case there was no bad faith, the negligence of the respondents
cannot be deemed part of their official duties. Such act or omission was
ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was a
TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the PR.
FACTS:
Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner
Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in
Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora Rarang was
assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
M.H. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the publication of
the so-called “Plan of the Day” (POD) published daily by the US Naval Base
Station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of
the regular features of the POD was the “action line inquiry” (NAVSTA
ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the Office of the
Admin Asst intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding
Officer on matters they feel should be brought to his attention for
correction or investigation.
On February 3, 1978, the POD under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published
and mentioned a certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to her division and to
the Office of the Provost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that
Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like
food and cigarettes. The Private Respondents was the only one who was
named “Auring” in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result thereof,
she was investigated by her superior. Pertinent part of the said publication
is quoted below:
            “I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress
are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from
Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming
such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
mention ‘Auring’ who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the
Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore,
 ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this
malpractice?”
The PR commenced an ACTION FOR DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against
M.H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the
article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR. The
IAC (now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with modifications as to the
amount of damages awarded.
Defendants argue that the claimed tortious act was done in the performance of
their office and thus they should be covered by the principle of state
immunity from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams)
who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still
covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. Does the grant of
rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover
immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?
HELD:
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith
(Chavez v. Sandiganbayan). It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt.
Williams as commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the
chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too
much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
However, in this particular case, the records show that the offensive
publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and that he
approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by
a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that,
“Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7),
Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation.” Indeed, the imputation of theft
contained in the POD was a defamation against the character and
reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of
the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name
“Auring” if the article will be published. The petitioners, however, were
NEGLIGENT because under their direction, they issued the publication
without deleting the said name. Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and
CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which
ridiculed the PR. As a result of petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched
reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
especially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone,
in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused the
Private Respondent.
13. Manila Railroad vs. Compania Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875 (MARK)
Facts: Two locomotive boilers owned by The Manila Railroad Company
arrived at Manila via the Steamship Alicante owned by Compañia
Trasatlantica de Barcelona. The equipment of the ship for discharging heavy
cargo was not sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, so the Steamship
Company had to procure assistance from The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company (hereafter called the Atlantic Company). The service to be
performed by the Atlantic Company consisted in bringing its oating crane
alongside the Alicante, lifting the boilers out of the ship's hold, and
transferring them to a barge which would be placed ready to receive them.
While the boiler was being hoisted, it was not properly done as the rivet
near the head of the boiler was caught under the edge of the hatch. The
weight on the crane was thus increased by a strain estimated at fifteen tons
with the result that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell to the
bottom of the ship's hold. The boiler was badly damaged that it had to be
reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned to
Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by reason of the cost of repairs,
expenses, and loss of the use of the boiler proved to be P22,343.29; and as
to the amount of the damage so resulting there is practically no dispute. To
recover these damages the present action was instituted by the Railroad
Company against the Steamship Company who in turn caused the Atlantic
Company to be brought in as a co-defendant, and insisted that whatever
liability existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an
independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers and
had become responsible for such damage as had been done. The judge of
the Court of First Instance gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
Atlantic Company, but absolved the Steamship Company from the
complaint.
Issue:
Is the Atlantic Company directly liable to the plaintiff ,as the trial court held?
Ruling:
The accident is to be attributed to the failure of Leyden (foreman) to
exercise the degree of care which an ordinarily competent and prudent
person would have exhibited under the circumstances which then
confronted him. This conclusion of fact cannot be refuted; and, indeed, no
attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this ruling of the trial
court.
It will be observed that a contractual relation existed between the Railroad
Company and the Steamship Company; and the duties of the latter with
respect to the carrying and delivery of the boilers are to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of that contract. A contractual
relation also existed between the Steamship Company and the Atlantic
Company; and the duties owing by the latter to the former with respect to
the lifting and the transferring of the boilers are likewise to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of the contract between these
parties. On the other hand, no contractual relation existed directly between
the Railroad Company and the Atlantic Company.
Under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the
Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done to the boiler
while it was being discharged from the ship under articles 1103 and 1104 of
the Civil Code, for the consequences of the omission of the care necessary
to the proper performance of its obligation. The contract to transport and
deliver at the port of Manila a locomotive boiler, which was received by it in
proper condition, is not complied with by delivery at the port of destination
of a mass of iron the utility of which had been destroyed.
The Steamship Company cannot escape liability by reason of the fact that it
employed a competent independent contractor to discharge the boilers..
     Atlantic Company claimed that it was not liable, because it had
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family and proper care in
the selection of Leyden.  Said argument was not tenable, because said
defense was not applicable to negligence arising in the course of the
performance of a contractual obligation. The same can be said with respect
to the liability of Atlantic Company upon its contract with the Steamship
Company.  There was a distinction between negligence in the performance
of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence considered as
an independent source of obligation (culpa aquiliana). Atlantic Company
was liable to the Steamship Company for the damage brought upon the
latter by the failure of Atlantic Company to use due care in discharging the
boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by the negligence
of an employee who was qualified for the work, duly chose with due care.
     Since there was no contract between the Railroad Company and Atlantic
Company, Railroad Company can had no right of action to recover damages
from Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation
of the contract.  The rights of Manila Railroad can only be made effective
through the Steamship Company with whom the contract of affreightment
was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must, therefore, be
reversed not only with respect to the judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff directly against the Atlantic Company but also with respect to the
absolution of the Steamship Company and the further failure of the court to
enter judgment in favor of the latter against the Atlantic Company. The
Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to
pay to the Manila Railroad Company the sum of twenty two thousand three
hundred forty three pesos and twenty nine centavos (P22,343.29), with
interest from May 11, 1914, until paid; and when this judgment is satis ed,
the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to
recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Paci c Company, against
whom judgment is to this end hereby rendered in favor of the Compañia
Trasatlantica de Barcelona. No express adjudication of costs of either
instance will be made. So ordered.
14. Gashem Shoolent Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115 (MUSTANG)
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student
taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent
Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her.  On the condition that they
would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage
after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilou’s parents to secure
their approval of marriage.  In August 1987, he forced her to live with him,
which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he
would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained
injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their
marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living
in Bacolod.
 Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC.  Baksh denied the
accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he
discovered her stealing his money and passport.  The RTC ruled in favor of
Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1.    Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
(NO)
HELD
         The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not
an actionable wrong.
               This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.             Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:           Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).
            It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic
regard for the private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment.  From the beginning, obviously, he was not at
all moved by good faith and an honest motive.  Thus, his profession of love
and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life partner.  His was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would
be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.  Petitioner clearly violated the
Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women.  It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil
Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the
performance of his obligations.
            No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
            She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner.  Pari delicto means in
equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
               Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.
15. Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 (SIGRID)
Facts:
 In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m.
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home  he
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-
and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening,
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing
in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic.
 The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb)
in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been
driven home by petitioner Armando U.
 Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
  Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries
was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
 Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
 Trial Court rendered in favor of Dionisio ordering to pay 15,000.00
for hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures;
1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff brought about
the accident in controversy and which is the result of the negligence
of the defendants; 10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected
and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a
marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety,
social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling of economic
insecurity, and the untold sorrows and frustration in life
experienced; 10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of
defendants to settle amicably this case for a smaller amount; and
4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees
 CA Affirmed with modification
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought by respondent’s own negligence.
Ruling:
No. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate
cause of the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked.
 The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner
Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
 The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the
risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the
defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk,
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this
category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk
in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy
traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an
automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the
injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
 The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported
into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith, but it is still a matter of
debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law
because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines, we
have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law
doctrine of contributory negligence. Thus, the court in this case
stated that it does not believe so that the general concept of Last
Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. Article 2179 on
contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics
but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party
and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should
be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the
fundamental law that a man must. respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Thus, the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because the court thinks that
it is not applicable in our jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by
reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of
expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is
entitled to by 20% of such amount.
16. Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.,  58 SCRA 771, Aug.
30, 1974 (YANA)
PETITIONER: JOVITO N. QUISABA, vs.
RESPONDENT: STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD, INC., (SIMVP) et al.,
respondents.
CASTRO, J:
FACTS: Quisaba was an internal auditor of SIMVP for 18 years. On January
1973, SIMVP VP Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for the
company's plant, but Quisaba refused saying that such task is inconsistent
with his position. The next day, Hyde informed Quisaba of his temporary
relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out the instructions given.
Hyde warned him that failure to comply would be considered a ground for
his dismissal.
Quisaba filed a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages,
termination pay and attorney's fees against SIMVP and its VP Robert Hyde.
Quisaba was NOT asking for back wages nor reinstatement. Quisaba alleged
that due to SIMVP’s acts, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social
humiliation.
SIMVP moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the CFI, asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC. Quisaba opposed
this, and he informed the court that an NLRC representative said that NLRC
has no jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of employee-
employer relationship. Nonetheless, CFI granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint involves an employee-employer relation.
ISSUE:Who has jurisdiction over the case? CFI or NLRC
HELD: CFI has jurisdiction
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute matters
involving employee-employer relations as Quisaba’s dismissal was the
severance of a pre-existing employee-employer relation, his complaint is
grounded NOT on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the
consequent effects of such dismissal.
The right of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused
with the manner in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the
complaint alleges, then the respondents violated Article 1701 of the Civil
Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against
the other, and wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, or good customs or public policy, the sanction for which,
by way of moral damages, is provided in Art 2219 no 10.
The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil and NOT labor dispute;
it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba’s rights as a member of
society, and does not involve an employer-employee relation within the
meaning of Section 2(1) of Presidential Decree No. 21. The complaint is thus
properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by
the court a quo for further proceedings.
The rule in Quisaba is to the effect that: Where the employee does not seek
reinstatement or expressly or impliedly accepts the employer’s right to
terminate the contract of employment but questions the manner in which
said right was exercised and predicates thereon his claim for moral and
exemplary damages, the claim is one for tort under the Civil Code and not
one arising from employer-employee relation under the Labor Code even if
he also demands in the action therefore payment of termination pay which
undeniably derives from their prior employer-employee relation.
Consequently, the action, being civil in nature, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice. The claim for termination pay
here was regarded as purely incidental to the main cause of action and as
such was not allowed to affect the essentially civil nature of the latter and
thereby also avoided a multiplicity of suits.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of September 18, 1973 is set aside, and this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings in
accordance with law. Costs against the private respondents.
17. Gatchalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 (APPLE)
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
CA and ARSENIO DELIM, respondents
Feliciano, J.
DOCTRINE:
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be expressed in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly
and clearly evidence intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
FACTS:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames"
mini-bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang.
While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was
heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, and
fell into a ditch. The passengers, including petitioner were injured and
confined in the Bethany Hospital, petitioner was found to have sustained
physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
On 14 July 1973, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited the injured
passengers and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses.
She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation
expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left,
she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit, which stated, among other things:
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ
Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met an accident at
Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through
the National Highway No. 3;
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the
accident due to mechanical defect and went off the road and
turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing
physical injuries to us;
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or
civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the
said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated
upon our injuries.
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the CFI action
extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in
the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left
her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the
forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her
part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from
her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award of:
P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for
the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead;
P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Respondent argued that the accident was due to force majeure and that
petitioner had already been paid and waived any right to institute any
action against him and his driver when Gatchalian signed the joint affidavit.
CFI:Dismissed the case. Ruled that when Gatchalian signed the joint affidavit,
she relinquished any right of action against respondent and driver of the
mini-bus.
CA:Reversed decision. There had been a valid waiver but affirmed dismissal of
the case, thus denying petitioner’s claim for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gatchalian is entitled to damages
RULING:
Yes, the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a
waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances
under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to
be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects
of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days,
when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented
to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness
but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
entirety.

Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether
petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit she signed and
whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.
As to whether or not respondent successfully proved he exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the mishap involving the mini-bus:
Since what is involve is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers, a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, thus,
SC must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the
common carrier. For waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary
to law, morals, public policy or good customs.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be
to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the
law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable.  To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or
physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the
carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty
was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible
to avoid.
A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its
passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. In case of death or injuries
to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was
at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. The
standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is
considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence.
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that
respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law.
Curiously, respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the
court a quo, to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite
extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from
liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But
allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to
substantiate his defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier
from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of
force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient
cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also
that it was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in
the occurrence of the injury will defeat the defense of force majeure.
In her direct examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the
vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly
heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried
out, "What happened?” The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is only
normal" and did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus.
Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping
sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only
mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to
determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so
frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Thus, The obvious
continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety
of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus
after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm
from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.
As to the amount of damages claimed by the petitioner:
At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She
could not be said to have in fact los tany employment after and by reason of
the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation
or conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of
his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is
suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable.
Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
 condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face
of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation
of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the
common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which
petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including
the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of
P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
    WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as
well as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La Union dated 4
December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby
ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian the following sums: 1)
P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic
surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00
as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate
amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from
the promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof. Costs against
private respondent.
18. Perez vs. Pumar, 2 Phil. 682 (EDWARD)
VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-1299          November 16, 1903
VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General de Tabacos, defendant-
appellant.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Vicente Filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint against the
defendant herein to determine the amount due to the plaintiff, at the
customary rate of compensation for interpreting in these island, for
rendering services in the tabacalera company.
In the complaint it was alleged that the defendant rendered the services of the
plaintiff to act as interpreter between former and the military authorities;
not just for the latter but also between the defendant and the colonel
commanding the local garrison and with various officer residing in the area,
to the end that such services might be punctually rendered, the agent,
Pomar, assured him that the Tabacalera Company always generously repaid
services rendered it, and that he therefore did not trouble himself about his
inability to devote the necessary amount of time to his business, the
defendant going so far as to make him flattering promises of employment
with the company, which he did not accept; that these statements were
made in the absence of witnesses and that therefore his only proof as to the
same was Mr. Pomar’s word as a gentleman;
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on September 25, 1902 asking
for the dismissal of the complaint with the cost to the plaintiff, the
defendant denied the allegation and stated that it is wholly untrue, the
defendant also stated that the plaintiff acted as interpreter of his own free
will, without being requested to do so by the defendant and without any
offer of payment or compensation; that therefore there existed no legal
relation whatever between the company and the plaintiff, and the
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Contract is formed between Perez and Pomar and payment
must be given?
YES!
HELD:
The judgment is rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar the payment to the
plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos, from which will be deducted the
sum of 50 pesos is made as to the costs of this instance.
RULINGS:
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the moment that
one or more persons consent to be bound, with respect to another or
others, to deliver some thing or to render some service. Article 1255
 provides that the contracting parties may establish such covenants, terms,
and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals or public policy. Whether the service was solicited or offered,
the fact remains that Perez rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it
does not appear that he did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the
defendant, having accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just
compensation therefor, by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des
implicitly established.
It must be also considered that there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the
rendition of the services This gives rise to the obligation upon the person
benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral
obligation to render services as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the
other to pay for the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088,
1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code). The supreme court of Spain in its decision
of February 12, 1889, holds, among other things, “that not only is there an
express and tacit consent which produces real contract but there is also a
presumptive consent which is the basis of quasi contracts, this giving rise to
the multiple juridical relations which result in obligations for the delivery of
a thing or the rendition of a service.
19. Republic vs. de los Angeles, G. R. No. L-26112 (ERICA)
20. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542 (EVAN)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: C.S. Gilchrrist
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:  E.A. Cuddy, Jose Fernandez Espejo and
Mariano Zaldarriaga
DOCTRINE:
Knowledge of the identity of the injured party is not necessary to be liable
for a tortious act.
FACTS:
Cuddy is the owner of a cinematographic film “Zigomar.” He leased it under
a rental contract to the plaintiff Gilchrist, the owner of a cinematograph
theater in Iloilo, for a specified period of time or for a number of days
beginning May 26.
In violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over
the same film under another rental contract, to the defendants Espejo and
Zaldarriaga. The arrangement between Cuddy and the appellants Espejo
and Zaldarriaga for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of
May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would include and
extend beyond May 26.
Gilchrist filed for injunction.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI - produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting
the film in question in their theater during the period specified in the
contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga  should be liable for
damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist- YES
RULING:
Yes. Espejo argues that at the time of contracting their lease of the film with
Cuddy, they had no knowledge about the identity of Gilchrist being the
original renter of the film in the original contract. Although the defendants
did not, at the time their contract was made, know the identity of the
plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the
existence of a contract in favor of someone In the case at bar the only
motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of
the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their
theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not
relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and
causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that
they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless
they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they did not
know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission,
causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the
chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge
is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage
suffered.
One who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other
person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the
person having the prior and better right.