100 American Anthropologist
tiation he attempts simply because other
men-and the public at large-have used
the term “primitive” loosely.
The history of anthropology could doubt-
less be written in the history of the usage of
the word “primitive.” The search for the de-
fining characteristics of the primitive has
been part and parcel of the anthropological
endeavor from its beginning. That search
has been complicated by factors that, from a
scientific point of view, may be regarded as
extraneous: by the attempt to define a Euro-
pean self-image, and to justify European
domination, by the evaluation of the primi-
tive as either “noble” or racially “inferior.”
Over the last century anthropological usage
itself has evolved from unexamined accep-
tance to inconsistent euphemism and now to
proposed rejection. It may in a certain sense
be true that our intellectual problems with
the term relate to “the demise of the evolu-
tionary school” (Mednick). But it is worth
noting that, although Boas attacked both
nineteenth-century evolutionism and racial
determinism, he still entitled his major work
The Mind of Primitive Man and attempted
to define certain distinguishing “Traits of
Primitive Culture.” It is only in the context
of the non-Western world’s rejection of Eu-
ropean dominion and of historical changes
in the reality that the concept has attempted
to describe that it has come under serious
attack.
One may sympathize with the public rela-
tions reasons that opponents of the term ex-
plicitly advance for its rejection. But one
doubts that the identity problems of the post-
colonial world-whether those of non-
Western peoples, or of Western Europeans,
or of anthropology itself-will be solved ei-
ther by playing with words or by abandon-
ing what has for so long been a core prob-
lem of anthropological concern. As long as
the development of human culture in time
(whether we call that development historical
or evolutionary) remains a subject of
human inquiry, the concept of the primitive
will be central to that study. To reject it is
both scientifically and psychologically self-
delusory. To insist on clarity of definition
(now that we have clarified somewhat the
nineteenth-century confusion of race and
culture) may contribute both to scientific
understanding and to self-identification. Had
(71, 19691
this volume been less polemically motivated,
it might have contributed more to both pro-
cesses. As it is, it is a rather mixed bag, not
without value, but rather more incidentally
illuminating of an enduring anthropological
hangup than systematically definitive of “the
concept of the primitive.”
ETHNOLOGY
American Kinship: A Cultural Account.
DAVIDM. SCHNEIDER. Anthropology Of
Modern Societies Series. Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, 1968. x +
117 pp. $5.50
(cloth), $2.50 (paper).
Reviewed by ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE
University of Pennsylvania
Relatively few anthropologists have an
opportunity to see their ethnography re-
viewed in print by one of the natives whom
they describe; perhaps fewer have the mis-
fortune to be reviewed by a fellow native
who is also a fellow informant and a fel-
low anthropologist. (I count myself as one
of Schneider’s informants, even though I
was not interviewed by him or one of his
staff, because he had no doubt read my own
exercise on the componential analysis of
American kinship terms.) Thus Schneider is
in triple jeopardy, and I shaIl do my best to
be fair even as I attack his book from all
angles.
Actually it is a very good book in many
ways. Schneider has been collecting material
on the culture of American kinship, and
thinking hard about it, for years, and in this
work he presents a summary description of
what he regards as its basic premises. He is
explicitly concerned with culture as a system
of symbols (I prefer to call it a system of
cognitive structures), and he presents the
system simply and straightforwardly (and
again and again, for the writing is somewhat
repetitive). The nature of the cultural symbol
is discussed at some length; it is not what
people say or do but is derivable analytically
from what they say and do; it is not what
people think, at least consciously and ration-
ally; it presumably exists somewhere in the
mind in a place where other archetypal con-
structs, like values and world view, are
stored for the most part safe from full con-
 Book Reviews
sciousness and immune to criticism. The
symbol structure of the kinship system is
presented in LBvi-Straussian terms as a set
of contradictions and resolutions whose in-
terrelationships explain not only the distinc-
tions expressed in the kinship terminology
but also a wide range of rules-and non-
rules-of behavior in kin relationships.
Schneider eschews componential analysis as
an unduly narrowing frame of reference for
his purpose, which it would be if he used no
other procedure, and he explicitly disavows
concern in this work with the question of
actual vs. ideal behavior (apart from the
recognition of variation as a product of
rule). Perhaps the most illuminating contri-
bution of the analysis is the recognition that
for remote consanguines and for relatives by
marriage (both the consanguines of spouse
and the spouses of consanguines) the rule
explicitly requires the individual to decide
for himself whether a person who can be lo-
cated in the genealogy is to be considered a
relative at all and whether or not a kinship
term will be used in referring to or address-
ing him if he is or even if he is not. The
choice is to be based on the realities of the
actual social relationship between the par-
ties. (I have been following this rule myself
for years but always thought that there must
be another, more normative, rule and that I
had been too lazy to learn it.)
So far so good. But as a native, even
though I have learned something, I find that
there are some features of the analysis that
just don’t seem right. So I shall play infor-
mant for a while and attempt to correct
some of the anthropologist’s preliminary,
slightly skewed, formulations. Then I shall
raise some questions about what the exis-
tence of these differences of opinion imply
about the substance and method of cultural
and social anthropology.
The core of the thesis is that the central
symbol of American kinship is sexual inter-
course. Between husband and wife, genital
to genital, coitus represents the resolution of
a fundamental contradiction in American
culture; that between nature and law, which
is a resolution of the contradiction between
nature and reason, which is a resolution of
the fundamental contradiction, between man
and nature. Marital coitus is both natural
and lawful; it generates children who love
101
and are loved, nonsexually, by their parents,
and with whom an indissoluble relationship
in nature-heredity or “blood”-exists. A
marriage with children thus represents both
the unity of differences and the differentia-
tion of unity. And it produces “the family”
and the category of “relatives,” who are all,
consanguine and affinal alike, united by the
bonds of that lawful love (of which marital
coitus is both symbol and expression) that is
defined by Schneider as “diffuse, enduring
solidarity,” Schematically, the structure
might be represented as in Fig. 1 .
Nature man
Nature
t law
Coitus
/ \
Relationships
Relationships
by marriage (including
by blood
marriage itself)
Family
love
FIGURE
1.
Now this is a way to analyze the symbolic
structure. But it depends upon several asser-
tions which the anthropologist presents as
“ethnographic facts” but whose general va-
lidity for Americans this informant would
question. The most questionable “fact” is
the statement that in American culture the
relationship between spouses is conceived to
be a relationship in law and conduct and
(even though their coitus is natural) not a
kin relationship in nature in any way com-
parable to the blood relationship. Thus mar-
riage is a matter of rule rather than of sub-
stance and is classed with in-law relation-
ships. My impression is that, to the contrary,
on the conceptual level at which Schneider
is describing American culture, marriage,
with or without children, is conceived to
102 American Anthrupologist
be a relationship of a unique kind, not a
blood relationship nor yet an in-law relation-
ship. (Schneider’s informant said as much
by replying to the question, “Is your hus-
band a relative?” with the terse “A lover,
yes. A relative, no.”) It is, furthermore, a
relationship in both law and nature, the nat-
ural aspect being sexual love.
But the symbol of sexual love as a natural
tie, as substantial in marriage as blood is in
descent, is not just the concept of proper
marital coitus. The symbol of marriage also
contains an important archetypal construct
of love that, although sexual, is different
from simple coitus, as well as from diffuse,
enduring solidarity, or their sum, and this
book does not mention it at all. This con-
struct is love in the sense of an elemental
force of nature, an intense attraction both
physical and spiritual that irresistibly draws
two people together. Metaphors like “fall in
love and get married,” and others more ex-
plicit, compare this force to other natural
forces like magnetism and Bravity when no
obstacle intervenes; where there is trouble,
the comparison is to more violent natural
energies like storm and fire. This kind of
love is very clearly distinguished from other
kinds in American culture, and the distinc-
tion is so constantly and conventionally
made that one may not hear it even when
listening to it. Consider two stock pieces of
television dialogue:
Two females speaking:
“Have you ever been in love?’
“Yes, dozens of times.”
“No, I mean really in love.”
Male and female speaking:
“I suppose you’ve met a lot of girls.”
“Yes, but I’ve never loved anyone be-
fore.”
For many Americans the kind of love im-
plied in such well-worn exchanges is re-
garded as the true basis for marriage. It also
permits a wide variety of interesting and
dramatic conflicts in human relations. Such
a love may happen in inconvenient circum-
stances, and in that case the force of nature
may take precedence-with or without wed-
lock-over considerations of class, age, race,
marital status, and even blood relationship;
if too long frustrated, this force of nature
[71, 19691
turns uncanny and wrecks havoc with many
lives, as Emily Bronte (who presents the
archetype very well) classically states in
Wuthering Heights. People often judge the
worth of their marriages by the quality of
love it retains. People who do not “find the
right person,” or lose this kind of love, are
expected to be unhappy and may legiti-
mately refuse to marry; those who do not
experience it may understandably feel inade-
quate or guilty or envious of others more
fortunate or simply “run around.” But, al-
though it is realized that not everyone will
be successful, ideally the couple eventually
find each other, overcome their difficulties,
and have a happy and profoundly satisfying
marriage.
This construct of love certainly is related
to old notions of romantic love-and even
older Greek notions of sexual fate, as in
Phaedra and Oedipus-but it has an aston-
ishing durability in American popular cul-
ture, where it has been tied to the notion of
marriage, and in various transformations it
survives as a symbol even in intellectually
hostile territory. For women, the phrasing of
the symbol tends perhaps to be more roman-
tic than for men, and men probably talk
much less about it. But for both sexes the
construct is invested with enormous emo-
tional value; direct discussion of it is apt to
be uncomfortable in some situations, and it
is often deplored as a source of unrealistic
aspiration, a relic of Victorian or even medi-
eval romantic ideology. But it is as a cul-
tural symbol, not a finding of scientific psy-
chology or a norm of experience, that we
are discussing it here and, as Schneider very
properly points out, such symbols, valid or
not as representations of “reality,” do not
depend upon rational conscious thought for
their maintenance.
There is also an important problem about
cousins that is ignored in the book. As with
the concept of love, so the concept of cousin
marriage is confusing and mildly embarrass-
ing or amusing to some informants.
Schneider implies in the paradigm that
cousin marriage is prohibited (“Husband
and wife are not blood relations to each
other” [p. 471, and “There should be no
sexual intercourse between blood relatives”
[p. 601). Actually first cousin marriage (and
of course more remote cousin marriage) is
 Book Reviews
not rare and is legal, at least in some states,
even when it raises eyebrows, and I know of
several cases of cousin marriage-that are ac-
cepted by the law and the “relatives.”
In the same vein, ”kissing cousins” are
defined as remote consanguines whom one
may kiss ceremonially (but not sexually) on
the rare occasions of meeting, as at funerals,
weddings, and family picnics. “Here the kiss
is the sign that no matter how distant, such
persons are nevertheless relatives and there-
fore are entitled to that sign of being rela-
tives, the kiss: [p. 701. This no doubt is the
testimony of his informants, but to most of
the people I know a kissing cousin is a
cousin remote enough to flirt with, date, and
even marry. A few people say a kissing
cousin is not a relative at all but a friend
with whom one flirts.
The ambiguous status of kissing cousins
and cousin marriage is structurally impor-
tant because the category “cousin” is the bin
containing all those consanguineal relatives
with whom alone marriage is convention-
ally, legally, religiously, and morally possi-
ble. (American subcultures of course differ
in detail. Wasps and Jews permit first cousin
marriage, but Catholics require [and can
secure] dispensation for marriages of first
and second cousins. Some states permit and
@hers prohibit first cousin marriage. Occa-
sionally uncle-niece and aunt-nephew mar-
riages occur, and the Catholic church can
provide dispensation for them. But as far as
I am aware no American subculture ex-.
cludes all cousin marriage.) The unique sit-
uation of the cousin in the relationship sys-
tem is further revealed in English kinship
terminology. Paradoxically, sex is not speci-
fied in the cousin term alone, although the
possibility of marriage exists between cous-
ins. The reason is simple. From one stand-
point, it is the sex of the speaker that deter-
mines the marriageability of a particular
cousin, and sex of speaker is nowhere used
as a dimension in the English terminological
system. To differentiate cousins terminologi-
cally by their own sex, on the other hand,
would obscure the fact of marriageability or
nonmarriageability just as much as leaving
sex unspecified (and English does not auto-
matically decline nouns by gender). The
simplest terminological system differentiat-
ing marriageable from unmarriageable cous-
103
ins would require two terms for same-sex
and opposite-sex pairs, again introducing an
additional dimension for purposes that are
satisfied adequately by visual inspection.
These observations about cousins lead to
questions about other distinctions in the ter-
minological system that may be structurally
related to the possihility of cousin marriage,
including the uncertainty rule about “re-
mote” kin and the provision of the numeri-
cal prefixes to indicate the genealogical dis-
tance of cousins. Similarly, the ambivalence
about the pfopriety of cousin marriage may
be psychodynamic in origin, or it may have
something to do with the logical structure of
the archetype (such marriages combine in
one sex those persons whom the distinc-
tion between consanguine and affinal rela-
tives so carefully separates into two). One
wonders whether there is in consequence of
this ambivalence a process taking place now
that. moves toward the exclusion of cousin
marriage as nonrespectable, even if legal;
one wonders whether cousin marriage is not
in fact the hinge on which the whole system
swings.
But the question of most relevance here,
of course, is the significance of cousin mar-
riage in the symbol system. Schneider cer-
tainly knows that cousin marriage occurs,
but he has excluded it from the symbol, pre-
sumably because it is “out of line.” In view
of the ethnographic facts just cited, and my
own feeling as a native, I would guess that
cousin marriage is symbolically very irnpor-
tant precisely because it is coming to be re-
garded as vaguely incestuous. In cousin mar-
riage the blood tie reinforces, or intensifies,
the concept of sexual love as an elemental
force. I must refer again to that old text-
book of love and kinship, Wuthering
Heights, in this case for analogy. The
thwarted but death-surmounting love of
Cathy and Heathcliff cannot be fulfilled in
marriage because (as Miss Bronte repeatedly
implies) they were probably half-siblings by
blood and in any case were brought up as
adoptive or foster siblings. But she describes
without much affect cousin marriage be-
tween the Earnshaws and the Lintons. In
America, marriage between half-siblings is
hardly thinkable; it is the image of cousin
marriage instead that has the quality of
slightly uncanny closeness. And it is perhaps
104 American Anthropologist
just this that has impelled Schneider’s infor-
mants to mislead him in denying that “kiss-
ing cousins” are sexual objects or that
cousin marriage exists at all.
All of these problems are related to a
three-fold classification of kin relationships
at the beginning of the book: by nature only
(illegitimately) ; by law only (marriage and
in-law relationships) ; and by nature and law
(consanguineal or “blood” relationships). I
don’t think this classification represents the
system properly, and, indeed, I believe it
makes a correct analysis impossible.
Striving to retain a LBvi-Straussian flavor,
and using Schneider’s model as a starting
point, I would set it up as follows. The fun-
damental contradictions in American culture
are between freedom and constraint and be-
tween nature and law. The happy marriage,
the central symbol of kinship in American
culture, resolves these contradictions, for it
is entered into by free choice and, being
based on true love, is a relationship in na-
ture (surely there are other natural biologi-
cal relationships recognized in American
kinship besides blood!), yet it entails con-
straint and is defined and enforced by law;
unnatural marriages (as in racial miscegena-
tion) are prohibited by law until they are re-
defined as natural; and if a legal marriage
has had no natural substance, or has lost it,
it can be terminated by annulment or di-
vorce, or the parties liberated by separation
from the natural, but not legal, entailments
of the relationship (i.e., from bed and
board). The happy marriage ideally, but
not necessarily, generates two logically op-
posed sets of relationships: blood, or de-
scent, relationships, which are obligatory re-
lationships in nature, enforced by law, and
yet the product of free choice in marriage;
and affinal and other by-law relationships,
which are sanctioned by law, obligatory, and
constrained by the fact of marriage, and yet
not inherent in nature and operable only by
free choice. The ultimate resolution of these
second-order antimonies is provided symbol-
ically by the concepts of “the happy family”
and “love” in the diffuse sense (and struc-
turally by cousin marriage), as shown sche-
matically in Fig. 2.
Now let me put on my anthropology hat.
How is it that Schneider can, despite his
[71, 19691
heedom : constraint
Nlllwm : law
Mamage
Relationships by Relationships entailed by
blood the fact of marriage
Family
b V 0
FIGURE2.
ofthand claim to authority (“Nothing which
I say in this book is inconsistent with what I
know”), be in serious disagreement with a
reasonably well-informed informant?-in-
deed, with an irate native who feels that
Schneider has made many ethnographic er-
rors and has deeply misconstrued the sym-
bol structure of American kinship? My
comments can of course be dismissed simply
as “another variant,” as is done with Good-
enough’s (see his and Schneider’s papers in
the AA’s 1965 symposium on formal seman-
tic analysis 67 (5, pt. 2) : 259-308). And I
can reply in kind that Schneider’s sample is
small, urban, and biased, and his schema is
merely a Chicago variant on the main
theme. But the problem lies deeper than the
“Two Crows denies this” phenomenon. As
Goodenough and Schneider agree, if an in-
formant feels uneasy with a formulation,
there’s probably something skewed or in-
complete about it.
The first level of the problem is the spe-
cial awkwardness of the anthropologist in
addressing himself to his own culture. It is
hard enough to get things right in a strange
place; paradoxically, it may be even harder
back home. An American anthropologist ap-
proaching America as if it were a Pacific Is-
land may throw away half his intuitive
knowledge in the interest of being “objec-
tive.” He may unconsciously suppress things
he knows and let his informants reserve
 Book Reviews
their real feelings and pass off in their place
copybook propriety (as in the cousin mat-
ter). He may be led to emphasize one
concept which sounds mildly bizarre out
of context as a diversion for another which
is conflictful, even in context (as in placing
a grotesquely Puritanical image of sexuality
as a kind of screen in front of the concept
of love). He may generously attribute forms
familiar and estimable in his own subculture
to other groups in the population to whom
they are alien: he may, in an effort to avoid
being provincial, mix together two or more
incompatible variants; or, sin of sins, he
may unconsciously be ethnocentric about
other subcultures to a degree he would not
permit in himself abroad. One may be un-
able to recognize the important areas of de-
fense and avoidance in informants because
they have been built into one’s own protocol
of investigation, informal as well as formal.
It is difficult to avoid a Nacirema pose and,
while Schneider does try to avoid this trap,
there is a slight but persistent flavor of pro-
fessor confronting na’ive class (e.g., “In
American culture, the definition of what
makes a persona male or female is the kind
of genital organs he has” [p. 411, “The fun-
damental thing which defines a relative by
blood is, of course, blood” [p. 251, “What,
then, d o the cultural constructs depicting the
facts of sexual intercourse symbolize? They
symbolize diffuse, enduring solidarity” [p.
1161). Occasionally the effort to impress the
reader with the arbitrariness of the Ameri-
can definition of sexuality reaches a high
level of archness (e.g., “Of all of the forms
of sexuality of which human beings are ca-
pable, only one is legitimate and proper ac-
cording to the standards of American cul-
ture, and that is heterosexual relations, geni-
tal to genital, between man and wife. All
other forms are improper and held to be
morally wrong” [p. 1081). And the impres-
sion of an anthropologist reporting on a pre-
viously undiscovered tribe is reinforced by
continuous failure to mention most of the
available cultural, let alone sociological,
treatments of American kinship, such as
Francis Hsu’s and the various accounts in
community and national character studies.
The original Nacirema device of confronta-
tion was to denude description of connota-
105
tion to the point where the phenomenon was
no longer recognizable in cultural terms,
and Schneider does not go quite so far. But
a little way to Nacirema is a long way to ov-
ersimplification.
The more serious problem-and one
which applies both to domestic and foreign
ethnography-is the empirical validation of
ideal-type ethnographic models. (All ethno-
graphic, as opposed to sociological, models
are ideal-type models, but it is still necessary
to provide ways of answering the question,
“HOWgood is this ethnography?”) By em-
pirical validation I mean the demonstration
that the culture of specified classes of infor-
mants in specified contexts of utterance ac-
tually approximates the proposed ideal type
more closely than alternate ones. Ideal-type
models of culture also have another kind of
validity: their internal coherence and ele-
gance. But coherence and elegance d o not
guarantee the best fit with data; or, more
precisely, they guarantee only a best fit with
certain kinds of data, namely those that con-
firm the chosen internally coherent and ele-
gant model. Furthermore, the choice of rele-
vant data depends in part upon certain arbi-
trary preferences for type of model-in this
case, a particular Livi-Straussian one which
assumes at the outset that in America mar-
riage is to be construed as a kind of affinal
relationship. Without going into arguments
about the merits of survey research, o r rais-
ing the issue of structural versus psychologi-
cal reality, o r of emics and etics, one must
ask what are the criteria by which some
classes of utterances are chosen as informa-
tive and others are ignored (a question, by
the way, that Schneider critically asks of
Goodenough). In the background of this
book, one seems to hear utterances, based
largely on defensive and narrow interpreta-
tions of religious and legal tradition, by
sober informants reckoning their genealogies
and speaking in a context of formal inquiry
about what is proper and moral or in serious
and responsible soliloquy on ideal kin be-
havior. Forgotten are Sapir’s cautions on
distinguishing between culture genuine and
spurious. Left out are equally culture-reveal-
ing utterances that may be made by the
same, or different, people at different times
and in different places, such as dormitories,
106 American Anthropologist
bars, and bedrooms, reflecting common be-
lief on such matters as the loss of freedom
in marriage, sexuality in children, hostility
among relatives, and the differences among
coitus and love and diffuse, enduring soli-
darity. Thus, granting the worth of describ-
ing culture as a system of cognitive struc-
tures or symbols and the necessity of con-
structing ideal-type systems for this purpose,
there remain certain issues of sampling by
class of utterances, as well as by class of
speaker, which cannot be begged without
opening the door to any number of alterna-
tive systems, which are equally elegant and
equally valid and which differ either because
they are based on a different sampling of
types of people and types of statements or
because a different initial frame was chosen
or both. Does this study of American kin-
ship equally well represent Wasps, Negroes,
American Indians, Jews, Puerto Ricans,
Poles, etc.? Does it represent young college
students and their grandparents? Is Schneid-
er’s model or my model correct, or are they
both correct in one way or another for dif-
ferent subgroups of the population and/or
for different contexts of utterance? To what
extent does his scheme base itself on reli-
gious and legal definitions, on answers in
personal genealogical interviews, on popular
literature, on bull-sessions and worldly wis-
dom? Do all American groups maintain this
symbol system? And if not, which ones?
How about the others? One cannot know,
and no procedures are indicated in this work
for finding out. Schneider insists that his
model of the symbol system is universally
valid for Americans (“at one level, that of
the distinctive features, there is no variance,”
p. 112). The introduction only advises that
the author collected interviews from 53 mid-
dle-class white families in Chicago with vari-
ous religious affiliations and ethnic origins,
has read a lot and lived in America himself
for many years, and knows nothing that dis-
agrees with his conclusions.
But perhaps some of these questions may
find answers in the promised subsequent
publications. Schneider has embarked on a
major study of American kinship, and the
fact that this early essay can bring into
focus so many fundamental issues augurs
well for the productiveness of the whole en-
terprise.
[71, 19691
Social Structure and Social Life of the
Tlingit in Alaska. R. L. OLSON.Anthro-
pological Records, 26. Berkeley & Los
Anseles, University of California Press,
1967. x + 123 pp., bibliography. nap.
(paper).
Reviewed by PETERSTONE
Chicago, Illinolis
In the preface of this monograph, Olson
states that “the following materials were se-
cured during a series of visits, each in the
summer season, in the years 1933, 1934,
1949, and 1954” (p. v). The published re-
sults of this extended fieldwork are aptly de-
scribed by their author as materials, for they
are just that. In large part this monograph
consists of only slightly edited field notes on
Tlingit culture history. “Except for the nec-
essary changes to conform to fair English,
most of the materials I offer are verbatim
accounts and statements” (p. vi). These
materials, however, are neither graced by an
introduction nor a conclusion-nor are
there any chapters as such.
OIson has employed unnumbered head-
ings to subdivide his data into twelve major
sections: “Tribes, Towns, and Households”
(pp. 1-17), “Personal Quarrels” (pp.
17-19), “Marriage and Divorce” (pp.
19-23), “The Clans and Clan Legends” (pp.
23-37), “Clan Emblems and Other Clan
Property” (pp. 37-47), “Caste, Rank, and
Classes” (pp. 47-55), “The Ownership of
Territory” (pp. 55-58), “Potlatches” (pp.
58-69), “Feuds, Raids, and Wars” (pp: 69-
82), “The History of the Tantakwan” (p. 82-
102), “Incidents in the History of the Klwak-
kwan” (pp. 103-1 l o ) , and “Religion, Sha-
manism, and Totemism” (pp. 110-123).
These twelve sections are sandwiched be-
tween a brief three-page preface (pp. v-vii)
and an even briefer bibliography.
The order that these sections create is not
always readily apparent. For example, the
first section, “Tribes, Towns, and House-
holds,” is further divided into two subsec-
tions: “The Tribes” (pp. 2-4), and “The
Town and the Household” (pp. 5-17).
These are certainly straightforward head-
ings, but the materials found under them are
a rather mixed lot. For some unexplained
reason all of the clans and houses of the
Sanyakwan (a southern tribe) are presented