BP-22 DEFENSES

Lao vs. CA

Ruling: The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be
actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness
require – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.

San Mateo vs. PP, G.R. 200090, 03/06/2013

Ruling: It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including return
receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of
receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor (Svendsen v. People, G.R. No. 175381, February
26, 2008).

The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in
the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused (Alferez v. People, G.R. No.
182301, January 31, 2011).

The Court held that it was possible that the drawee bank sent the accused a notice of dishonor, but the
prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that the accused actually received it.
It was also possible that the accused was trying to flee from the complainant by staying in different
addresses. But speculations and possibilities cannot take the place of proof. The conviction must rest on
proof beyond reasonable doubt (King vs. People, 1999).

Alferez vs. PP and Pingping Go, GR. 182301

Ruling: In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the
registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts for registered letters and
return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as
proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the
registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said
notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the drawee of the check. The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of
the requisite notice of dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking days within which to
settle his account constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.

Chua vs. PP, GR. 196853, 07/13/2015

Ruling: It is likewise significant to note that aside from the absence of a date, the signature of Chua
appearing on the questioned November 30, 1993 demand letter is not accompanied by any word or
phrase indicating that he affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof. Indeed, "conviction
must rest upon the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense."45 In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accord the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 any weight and credence. Consequently, it cannot be used to support Chua’s guilt of
the offenses charged.
Ting v. Court of Appeals

Ruling: Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be
properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.

Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly
authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that “[a] registered
article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in
which case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on the proper space and then affix
legibly his own signature below it.” In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that the demand
letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on.
From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the
demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being
insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the
presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.the registry receipt as
evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners
or of their authorized agent remains a mystery

Magno vs. CA; Idos vs. CA

Personal note: this is with regard to the statement of our client that she is not really the borrower but
only an agent who guarantees payment of the borrower to the lender

Ruling: the rubber checks were simply issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract returnable
to the drawer upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of lease. The drawer did not benefit
from the deposit since the checks were used only as a deposit to serve as security for the faithful
performance of the drawer’s obligation as a lessee of an equipment (Magno vs. CA)

the subject check was issued for the mere purpose of evidencing the private complainant’s share or
interest in a partnership he entered into with the drawer of the check. The check was simply meant to
show the drawer’s commitment that when the receivables of the partnership are collected and goods
are sold and only when such collection and sale were realized, would the drawer give to the private
complainant the net amount due him representing his interest in the partnership; it did not involve a
debt of or any amount due and payable by the drawer (Idos vs. CA).

People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401 , October 1, 1998

In addition (just in case): since we are not presenting our client anymore

Ruling: It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness stand to affirm the
averments in his affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in considering the same as
hearsay evidence and in not giving probative weight to such affidavits.