EJUSDEM GENERIS

Canons of statutory construction are rules of construction for

the interpretation of statute law Canons give common sense
guidance to courts in interpreting the meaning of statutes.
Proponents of the use of canons argue that the canons
constrain judges and limit the ability of the courts to legislate
from the bench in US. Rules of construction or statutory
construction is the process of determining how the provisions
of the general law relate to a specific legal case, and
distinguishes the rules of statutory interpretation from other
rules or aids for the interpretation of law in common law
jurisdictions. Rules of construction has also been defined as
"the drawing in inference by the act of reason, as to the intent
of an instrument, from given circumstances, upon principles
deduced from men's general motives, conduct and action.

There are are certain general principles of interpretation

which has been applied by the courts from time to time. And
one of them viz. Construction Ejusdem Generis has been
explained herein below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which
means "of the same kind," it is used to interpret loosely written
statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things
and then refers to them in general, the general statements
only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically
listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors,
motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles"
would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based
transportation. The term Ejusdem Generis in other words
means words of a similar class. The rule is that where
particular words have a common characteristic (i.e. of a class)
any general words that follow should be construed as referring
generally to that class; no wider construction should be
afforded.

Construction Ejusdem Generis

According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. it is a canon of statutory construction,
where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, the general words will be construed as
applying only to things of the same general class as those
enumerated.

The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind.

Normally, general words should be given their natural
meaning like all other words unless the context requires
otherwise. But when a general word follows specific words of a
distinct category, the general word may be given a restricted
meaning of the same category. The general expression takes
it's meaning from the preceding particular expressions
because the legislature by using the particular words of a
distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect. This
principle is limited in its application to general word following
less general word only. If the specific words do not belong to a
distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if a
general word follows only one particular word, that single
particular word does not constitute a distinct genus and,
therefore, Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a
case. Exceptional stray instances are, however, available
where one word genus has been created by the courts and the
general word following such a genus given a restricted
meaning. If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, the
general word following these particular words is construed as
embracing a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is
not a universal application. If the context of legislation rules
out the applicability of this rule, it has no part to play in the
interpretation of general words. The basis of the principle of
Ejusdem Generis is that if the legislature intended general
words to be used in unrestricted sense, it would not have
bothered to use particular words at all.

It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's

Rule, dating back to Archbishop of Canterbury's Case in
1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides that when general
words follow specific words in a statute, the general words are
read to embrace only objects similar to those objects of the
specific words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the
specific and general words by using the class indicated by the
specific words to extend the scope of the statute with the
general words to include additional terms or objects within the
class. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is
important to keep in mind that it is not applied in a vacuum,
and disputes cannot be resolved by merely tying the issue to
the procrustean bed of Ejusdem Generis. In fact, there are
several conditions that have been identified for the doctrine to
apply, but none more important than the identification of the
class. There are five conditions that have been identified:
(1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;
(2) The members of the enumeration suggest a class;
(3) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) A general reference supplementing the enumeration,
usually following it; and
(5) There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general
term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.

Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key

to unlocking the true value of the doctrine is to ensure that the

identified class has some objective relationship to the aim of

the statute. In other words, the basis for determining, which
among various semantically correct definitions of the class
should be given effect is found in the purpose and subject of
the statute as revealed in the legislative intent.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great
caution, because, it implies a departure from the natural
meaning of words, in order to give them a meaning on a
supposed intention of the legislature. The rule must be
controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be
construed so as to carry out the object sought to be
accomplished. The rule requires that the specific words are all
of one genus, in which case, the general words may be
presumed to be restricted to that genus.

For example, the words 'or otherwise' are generally used as

ancillary to the specific proposition which precedes them.

In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, the validity

of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act,
1952 was impugned. One of the tenures was known as
Bhomichar tenure and it was contended that its holders were
not jagirdars. It was held: We agree with the petitioners that a
jagir can be created only by a grant, and that if it is
established that Bhomichara tenure is not held under a grant,
it cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion
on the ground put forward that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31-A
of the Constitution should be read Ejusdem Generis with 'other
similar grants', because, the true scope of the rule of 'Ejusdem
Generis' is that words of a general nature following specific
and particular words should be
construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as
those specified and not its reverse, that specific words which
precede are controlled by the general words which follow.

In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the question was

whether the appellant was entitled under Section 6(4)(a) of the
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to requisition, as for a
public purpose, premises for housing a member of a foreign
consulate. The sub-section provided that the State Government
may requisition for the purpose of a State or any other public
purpose . . .. The High Court held that the words 'any other
purpose' should be read' Ejusdem Generis' with the purpose of
the State that accommodation for a member of the foreign
consulate staff is a 'purpose of the Union' and hence the State
Government was not entitled to requisition. Allowing the
appeal, the Supreme Court held: With great respect, we are
constrained to say that the 'Ejusdem Generis' rule of
construction, which found favour in the court below for
reaching the result that the words 'any other public purpose'
are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of
the State, has scarcely any application. Apart from the fact
that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and
general or comprehensive words should receive their full and
natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their
intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus,
which must comprise more than one species, before the rule
can be applied.

In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State, the petitioner was the

widow of a tenant of certain premises and she had vacated
from such premises. Finding the premises vacant, the
respondent requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)(a) of
the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, for the public purpose
of housing a government servant. One of the contentions of the
petitioner was that under the Explanation to the sub-section
there would be deemed to be a vacancy when the tenant
'ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy,
eviction or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his
interest in the premises or otherwise', and that the words 'or
otherwise' should be construed as Ejusdem Generis with the
words immediately preceding them. It was held:

the rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the

petitioner can possibly have no application. The legislature,
when it used the words 'or otherwise', apparently intended to
cover other cases which may not come within the meaning of
the preceding clauses, for example, a case where the tenant's
occupation has ceased as a result of trespass by a third party.
The legislature intended to cover all possible cases of vacancy
occurring due to any reasons whatsoever. Hence, far from
using those words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding clauses
of the explanation, the legislature used those words in an all-
inclusive sense. The rule of Ejusdem Generis is intended to be
applied where general words have been used following
particular and specific words of the same nature on the
established rule of construction that the legislature presumed
to use the general words in a restricted sense that is to say, as
belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific
words.

Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general

import only where the context of the whole scheme of
legislation requires it. But where the context and the object
and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted
meaning be attached to words of general import, it becomes
the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and
ordinary meaning.

In Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation,

Poona , the respondent levied a tax of Rs. 2 per day as license
fee on the appellants, who were lessees of a cinema house. The
levy was under Section 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay District
Municipal Act, 1901, which provides that the municipality
could levy 'any other tax to the nature and object of which the
approval of the Governor shall have been obtained'. It was
contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is unconstitutional in that the
legislature had completely abdicated its-functions and
delegated the power to the municipality to determine the
nature of the tax to be imposed. The contention was rejected
by the Supreme Court and one of the reasons given for the
decision is: Although the rule of construction based on the
principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot be invoked in this case,
for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking, belong to the same
genus, they do indicate, to our mind, the kind and nature of tax
which the municipalities are authorized to impose.

In Kochunni v. State of Madras, it was observed: The rule of

Ejusdem Generis is that when general words follow particular
and specific words of the same nature, the general words must
be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified.
But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific
words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an
inviolable rule of law, but is only a permissible inference in the
absence of an indication to the contrary.

In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, the respondent issued a

notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
for the acquisition of the appellant's land. The notification
directed that action under Section 17(2)(c) of the Act shall be
taken on the ground of urgency and that the provisions of
Section 5-A shall not apply in regard to the acquisition. The
appellant contended that though Section 17(2)(c) read by itself
covers a very large field, that provision should be given a
narrower meaning because of the provisions of Section 17(2)
(a) and (b). It was held: The Ejusdem Generis rule is not a rule
of law but is merely a rule of construction to aid the courts to
find out the true intention of the legislature. If a given
provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is
clear, there is no occasion to call in aid that rule. Ejusdem
Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
thus: 'As a rule, where in a statute there are general words
following particular and specific words, the general words
must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified,
although this, as a rule of construction, must be applied with
caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be
construed in accordance with the intention of Parliament. For
the Ejusdem Generis rule to apply, the specific words must
constitute a category, class or genus, then only things which
belong to that category, class or genus fall within the general
words'.

The Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Electricity

Board v. Harishanker, has laid down the following five
essential elements of this rule:
(1) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;
(2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
(3) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) the general terms follow the enumeration; and
(5) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. If the
legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series
should be read Ejusdem Generis, so be it, the rule is helpful.
But if not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfill the
purpose of the statute. The rule like many other rules of
statutory interpretation is a useful servant but a bad master.

In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the interpretation of

Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948
which said: 'State Government may requisition for the purpose
of State or any other public purpose , was' involved. It was
contended that under the provision the appellant was entitled
to requisition premises for housing a member of the foreign
consulate. The High Court held that the expression any other
public purpose should be read Ejusdem Generis with purpose
of state, and providing accommodation to a member of the
foreign consulate being a purpose of the Union and not of the
State, the State Government had no authority to requisition.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error in
applying the principle of Ejusdem Generis. The general
expression any other public purpose follows only a single
expression for the purpose of a State which is not a distinct
genus. In the absence of a genus the rule has no application.
Further, the intention of the legislature is quite clear by the
words used in the enactment. By giving the words their natural
meaning it is apparent that the expression any other public
purpose includes providing accommodation to a member of a
foreign consulate.
In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal , the
respondent raised a question of his seniority in service and
filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying
that suitable directions may be given to the appellant Board.
The appellant contended that it was not 'State' as defined in
Article 12 and that therefore no direction could be given to it.
The High Court rejected the appellant's contention. In the
Supreme Court the appellant relied on certain decisions46 in
which 'other authorities' in the Article were read Ejusdem
Generis with 'State'.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held:

In our opinion the High Court [in these cases] fell into an error
in applying the principle of Ejusdem Generis when interpreting
the expression 'other authorities' in Article 12 of the
Constitution, as they overlooked the basic principle of
interpretation that, to invoke the application of Ejusdem
Generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category
running through the bodies already named. Craies summarizes
the principle as follows: 'The Ejusdem Generis rule is one to be
applied with caution and not pushed too far.. .. To invoke the
application of the Ejusdem Generis rule there must be a
distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not
to different objects of a widely differing character but to
something, which can be called a class or kind of objects.
Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of
a single species does not constitute a genus'. Maxwell
explained the principles by saying, 'But the general word
which follows particular and specific words of the same nature
as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be
restricted to the same genus as those words . . .. Unless there
is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of
the Ejusdem Generis doctrine.'

In the Old English case of Evans v. Cross the words 'other

devices' had to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the Road
Traffic Act, 1930 which defined a 'traffic sign' to include 'all
signals, warning sign posts, direction posts, signs, or other
devices'. Applying the rule of Ejusdem Generis the Court held
that a painted white line on a road could not be called a traffic
sign because devices are things, which a painted line on road
is not. Similarly, in re Latham Deceased, the words 'or other
person' in the expression 'trustee, guardian, committee or
other person' in Section 8 (4) of the Finance Act, 1894 was
'interpreted Ejusdem Generis to mean a person in a similar
position to a trustee etc. and as such a person who was
beneficially interested could not be included within it.

Where the preceding words do not belong to a distinct genus,

the rule of Ejusdem Generis does not apply.

For instance, in N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corporation, the

words 'or otherwise' had to be interpreted in the definition of a
'workman' as any person who has entered into a work under a
contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of
manual labour, clerical work or otherwise: The court refused
to apply the principle of Ejusdem Generis saying the preceding
words manual labour' and 'clerical work' did not form a
distinct category to be called a gems.

In Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay the petitioner, the widow

of a tenant of a certain premises, was not residing in it at the
time. The respondent requisitioned the premises under Section
6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 for
providing accommodation to a government servant. The
petitioner challenged the requisition on the ground that the
premises was not vacant within the meaning of the explanation
attached to the section according to which a vacancy will exist
when the tenant 'ceases to be in occupation upon termination
of his tenancy, eviction or assignment or transfer in any other
manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise: According
to her the expression or otherwise should be construed
Ejusdem Generis with the expressions preceding it. The
Supreme Court held that the rule has no application in the
present instance because the expressions preceding the words
or otherwise are not species of the same nature, and therefore,
do not belong to any identifiable genus. Assigning the natural
meaning to the words used in the enactment it is clear that the
expression or otherwise is intended to include all cases not
covered -by
the preceding expressions. This interpretation is quite
consistent with the object of the legislation.

In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India through the

Fruit Products Order, 1955, issued under Section 3 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955, it was made obligatory that
the peonage of fruit juice in fruit syrup should be twenty-five.
The appellant argued that the order did not apply to its
product Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit juices
because clause 2 (d) (v) of the Order includes squashes,
crushes, cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and ready-to-
serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices
or fruit pulp and that the expression any other beverages
containing fruit juices or fruit pulp
should be construed Ejusdem Generis. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention and held that the rule had no
application here because the things mentioned before the
general expression any other beverages containing fruit juices
or fruit pulp did not fall under a determinable genus. Further,
the context makes it clear that all beverages containing fruit
juice are intended to be included.

In M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union

of India, the Supreme Court observed that the expressions
'bleaching, mercerizing, dyeing, printing, water-proofing,
rubberising, shrink-proofing, organdie processing, which
precede the expression 'or any other process' in Section 2 (f)
(v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 contemplate
processes which import a change of a lasting character to the
fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric
or otherwise. 'Any other process' in the section must share one
or the other of these incidents. The expression is used in the
context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended
meaning and the expression 'unprocessed' in the exempting
notification draws its meaning from that context.

In Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd.,

interpretation of the words 'or other proceeding' in the phrase
'a claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising
from contract' appearing in . Section 69 of the Partnership Act,
1932 was involved. The Supreme Court did not apply the
principle of Ejusdem Generis because the preceding words /a
claim of set off did not constitute a genus. The court also
observed that interpretation Ejusdem Generis or Noscitur a
Sociis need not always be made when words showing
particular classes are followed by general words. Before the
general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus
constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the
general words can and are intended to be restricted.

In Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd v/s Madhya Pradesh

Electricity Board interpretation of the words 'any other
relevant factors' was involved. The Electricity Board has been
empowered under Section 49 (3) of the Electricity Supply Act,
1948 to fix deposit tariff for the supply of electricity to any
person having regard to the geographical position of any area,
the nature of the supply and the purpose for which the supply
is required and any other relevant factors'. The Supreme Court
did not apply the Ejusdem Generis principle because the
preceding words did not belong to a distinct category.

In M. Kumar v/s Bharat Earth Movers Limited, the

Supreme court observed that to invoke the application of the
Ejusdem Generis rule there must be' a distinct genus or
category. The specific words must apply not to different
objects of the widely different character but to something
which can be called a class or kind of object; where this is
lacking, the rule will not apply and mention of single specie
will not constitute a genus.

Conclusion
EJUSDEM GENERIS is (a) In an enumeration of different
subjects in an Act, general words following specific words may
be construed with reference to the antecedent matters, and
the construction may be narrowed down by treating them as
applying to things of the same kind as those previously
mentioned, unless of course, there is something to show that a
wider sense was intended. (b) If the particular words exhaust
the whole genus, then the general- words are construed as
embracing a larger genus.

This is a rule of language employed by the courts when a

situation arises that may not have been foreseen when the
statute was being drafted. It will bring within the meaning of
the statute things that are of the same class or genus as those
mentioned within the statute itself. Thus, if specific items are
listed, plus a general term (for example, houses, offices, rooms
or other places), the general term of other places will include
things only of the same class as the specific list, in this case
indoor places.

General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their

usual sense. General words, even when they follow specific
words, should ordinarily be taken in their general sense,
unless a more reasonable interpretation requires them to be
used in a sense limited to things Ejusdem Generis with those
specifically mentioned. If, however, the particular words
exhaust the whole genus, the general words must be
understood to refer to some larger genus.

The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis is only part of a wider

principle of construction, namely, that, where reasonably
possible, some significance and meaning should be attributed
to each and every word and phrase in a written document.
That being the object of the doctrine, it is difficult to see what
difference it can make whether the word 'other' is or is not
used, provided-and this is essential-that the examples which
have been given are referable to a clearly ascertainable genus.

End Notes:
1.Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 879, 884
(Iowa 2002) (citing Shatzer v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 639 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Iowa 2001)); accord Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of
Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2005); Black?s Law
Dictionary 535; Singer § 47:17, at 272-81.
2.Id. at 285
3.United States v. Weadon, 145 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1998)
4.Id. at 287; see Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d
907, 912-13 (doctrine inapplicable when there is no
inconsistency between the general and specific language).
5.Singer § 47:18, at 289
6.[1955] 2 SCR 303
7.AIR 1955 SC 810
8.AIR 1957 SC 521
9.AIR 1959 SC 586
10.AIR 1960 SC 1080
11.AIR 1971 SC 1033
12.3rd Ed., Vol. 36, p. 397, para 599
13.AIR 1979 SC 65
14.Quasi v. Quasi, (1979) 3 All ER
15.AIR 1955 SC 810
16.AIR B1967 SC 1857
17.(1938) 1 KB 694
18.(1961) 3 W.L.R. 1154
19.1943 AC 166
20.AIR 1957 SC 521
21.AIR 1965 SC 1167
22.AIR 1989 SC 1019
23.AIR 1964 SC 1882
24.AIR 1969 SC 788
25.AIR 1999 Karn. 343