POLICE POWER

Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila. Yes the ordinance is valid..
The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The increase in
the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. recisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being
devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable. The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. Note that
not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only.
Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to
be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. It must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.

Morfe vs. Mutuc No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is
constitutional. It is within the State’s police power, and is not violative of due process and liberty. It
is also not a violation of guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, and is not against the
non-incrimination clause. Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the
public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office
must indeed be a public trust. The State’s inherent police power enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. In here, the reasonableness of the law makes
the prohibition valid and within the ambit of police power.

Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to
strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.

Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,
respondent. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police
power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus
present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the
users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found
by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem
lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which
bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 78164)

Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.

Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical
Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board
of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section 1
which states “The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to
all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely
to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.”

Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of
the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote important interest
and needs -- in other words, the public order -- of the general community. An important
component of that public order is health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical
schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of
abode and is therefore unconstitutional

Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The court further ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power and thus constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit
the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy,
must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC, as represented by the NIA vs. CA and FRANCISCO DIAZ Issue: Whether or not
prescription or laches bars the respondent’s right to just compensation.

Held: The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is nothing
inequitable in giving due course to respondent’s claim for compensation. Both equity and the law
direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare. No one questions NIA’s authority to exercise the
delegated power of eminent domain. However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless.
NIA cannot exercise the power with wanton disregard for property rights. One basic limitation
on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that, “private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale and the 1993 filing of
the complaint does not bar the claim for compensation. This Court reiterated the long-standing
rule “that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first
acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.”

Examples from Jurisprudence:

(1) The imposition of an aerial easement of right-of-way
was held to be taking. The exercise of the power of
eminent domain does not always result in the taking or
appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it
may also result in the imposition of a burden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss of title
or possession. [NPC v. Gutierrez (1991)]
(2) May include trespass without actual eviction of the
owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which
the property was intended. [Ayala de Roxas v. City of
Manila (1907)]
(3) A municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which
would impair the view of the plaza from the highway
was likewise considered taking. [People v. Fajardo
(1958)]

DUE PROCESS

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Facts: Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage
or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila violates the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Held: Yes.The ordinance violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.