Jerusalem Issue Briefs-The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation

‫| |עברית‬Français|Deutsch|English-UK

Home| About the |Researchers| Support |

Useful Site Contact DailySearch
| | |
Center the Center Links Map Us Alert
Home » Jerusalem Issue Briefs » The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation
by  Dr. Shimon Shapira
Published May 2010

Vol. 10, No. 2    23 May 2010 

 
 

The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation 

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira 

 

John Brennan, President Barack Obama's advisor for homeland

security and counterterrorism, recently stated that the
administration was looking for ways to build up "moderate
elements" within Hizbullah. The fact that Hizbullah is part of the
Iranian security apparatus did not seem to affect his analysis of
the organization.

Immediately following the establishment of the Islamic Republic

in 1979, Iran undertook a strategic decision to export the
Islamic Revolution to the Arab and Islamic expanse. In Iran a
special apparatus was formed to set up and support Islamic
movements throughout the Islamic and Arab world that were
prepared to adopt Iran's model of Islamic rule. Lebanon was
the first target selected, given its unsettled political condition
and its large Shiite population which had maintained links with
Iran for many years.

Hizbullah is not a national Lebanese movement, as has been

frequently claimed in the West. Hizbullah's leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, and his men are not loyal to the president of
Lebanon or to the government of Lebanon, but rather to
Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Nasrallah's deputy, Sheikh
Naim Qassem, admitted to the Iranian Arabic-language
television station al-Qawathar in March 2007 that Hizbullah
requires permission from Iran's supreme leadership for its
operations.

In the words of U.S. Defense Secretary William Gates, one

should view Hizbullah's military force - which extends far
beyond the military force of any other political movement in the
world, as well as beyond the force of many sovereign states - as
the long arm of Iran.

During a public appearance in Washington, John Brennan, President

Barack Obama's advisor for homeland security and counterterrorism,

http://jcpa.org/...Page.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3983&TTL=The_Fantasy_of_Hizbullah_Moderation[12/19/2010 10:24:45 AM]

Jerusalem Issue Briefs-The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation

revealed that the administration was looking for ways to build up

"moderate elements" within Hizbullah which, he explained, had
evolved from being a "purely terrorist organization" to becoming a
part of the Lebanese political system. That Hizbullah was part of the
Iranian security apparatus did not seem to bother Brennan or affect
his analysis of the organization's motives. 

It was not the first time he had made this observation. Writing in July
2008, Brennan suggested it was possible to increase Hizbullah's
"stake in Lebanon's struggling democratic process." While
acknowledging Iran's material support for Hizbullah, he clearly played
down the Iranian role in the operational decisions made by the
organization's leaders. For Brennan, Hizbullah was an authentically
Lebanese organization whose assimilation into Lebanon's political
system should be encouraged by Washington. 1 Moreover he
observed that as Hizbullah became a "vested player in the Lebanese
political system," there had been "a marked reduction in terrorist
attacks carried out by the organization." The key factor in any
presentation of Hizbullah as a potentially more moderate organization
seeking to integrate itself as another Lebanese political party was to
downgrade Iran's role in Hizbullah decision-making. 

Brennan was not alone in not fully grasping Iran's pivotal role for
Hizbullah. A major 2009 study by the Rand Corporation on Iran
suggested that Hizbullah was "taking great pains to distance itself
from Iranian patronage."2  

Even Israeli experts and politicians at times have seen Hizbullah as

primarily influenced by the Lebanese internal scene. A variation on
this theme is the notion that Hizbullah owed its origins and growth
over the years to the Israeli presence on Lebanese soil. For example,
in an interview marking a decade since the Israeli retreat from
Lebanon, Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated: "Hizbullah was
nonexistent when we went in; it was our stay there that established
it. Hizbullah got stronger not as a result of our exit from Lebanon but
as a result of our stay in Lebanon." 3 With this statement, Barak
reinforced the erroneous argument purporting that Hizbullah was
established in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  
 

The Birth of Hizbullah 

The historical facts are totally different. Immediately following the

establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran undertook a
strategic decision to export the Islamic Revolution to the Arab and
Islamic expanse. For this purpose, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
appointed Ayatollah Ali Montazeri to create the "second revolution."
In Iran a special apparatus was formed, staffed by Montazeri's men,
whose job was to set up and support Islamic movements throughout
the Islamic and Arab world that were prepared to adopt Iran's model
of Islamic rule.4  

Lebanon was the first target selected, given its unsettled political
condition and its large Shiite population which had maintained links
with Iran for many years. During the 1970s Lebanon had become the
crucible for the senior Iranian revolutionary leadership. There its
leaders took refuge and trained with weapons. Khomeini's tape-
recorded messages were also produced in Lebanon and then
disseminated throughout Iran to spread the imam's doctrine.5  

http://jcpa.org/...Page.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3983&TTL=The_Fantasy_of_Hizbullah_Moderation[12/19/2010 10:24:45 AM]

Jerusalem Issue Briefs-The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation

The Iranian drive to take over the Amal movement, the dominant
Shiite movement in Lebanon prior to 1982, was unsuccessful. Amal
refused to accept the principle of Vali-e Faqih , a fundamental
principle of the Islamic Republic that mandated religious and political
fealty to the Iranian leader. Amal refused because it viewed itself
first and foremost as a Lebanese movement loyal to the Lebanese
Read More state. The Iranians sought a new Shiite movement that would be
loyal to Iran. 
Top Issue
Briefs After Iran failed in its attempt to take over Amal, Tehran made a
Lebanon’s decision to establish a Shiite movement that would constitute an
Ayatollah alternative to Amal and would faithfully represent Iranian aspirations
Fadlallah in Lebanon. The task of setting up the new movement was entrusted
and the to the Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, prior
Mercaz Ha- to the First Lebanon War in summer 1982.6 Mohtashemi formed the
Rav Yeshiva "Lebanon Council" which included representatives of pro-Iranian Subscribe
Attack in Shiite movements. He headed that body until the consolidation of all
Jerusalem the Lebanese Shiite movements that opposed and/or had split off Your email here
Israel’s War from Amal, and then founded Hizbullah.7  
to Halt  Daily Alert
Palestinian Iran exploited the governmental vacuum that was created following  Jerusalem Issue Brief
Rocket the Lebanon War in 1982, and sent to Lebanon a task force of some  Post Holocaust Anti-
Attacks 1,500 Revolutionary Guard instructors and fighters. Their job was to Semitism
International train and advise those who were the first to join Hizbullah and assist  Changing Jewish
Law Israeli in the formation of the new movement's institutions, whose nucleus Communities
Security had been established in Baalbek. Hizbullah's second leader, Abbas
Jerusalem ME Moussawi, took part in the first Revolutionary Guard course in GO

Diplomacy Lebanon.   Our Fellows' Books

U.S. Middle
East Policy There is no doubt that the First Lebanon War, as well as the entry of
EU Middle the multinational force with the participation of American, British,
East Policy French, and Italian military contingents, served as a glaring target for La Shoah
Radical Hizbullah and accelerated its military empowerment. Furthermore, the - Freddy Eytan-
Islam\Iran prolonged Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon (1982-2000)
Jerusalem greased the wheels of Hizbullah's Islamic revolution and led to its Publications List
Viewpoints military, political, and social build-up. The Lebanese state failed to Show Publications
Jerusalem impose its governmental authority on the Shiites in southern By Year
Issue Briefs Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Beirut. The monopoly on
By Author
Audio Archive the use of force, a major constituent of state sovereignty, was
Video Archive expropriated by Hizbullah from the Lebanese government.  
Institute for Search Articles
Keywords
Global Jewish The Hizbullah militia under the authority of Hassan Nasrallah is
Affairs Global inordinately more powerful than the Lebanese army under the
Law Forum command of the Lebanese president, and the system of civil Topic
Institute for institutions built by Hizbullah provides more effective answers to the All
All
Contemporary needs of the population than those supplied by the Lebanese
Affairs government. Indeed, in 2002 the monthly salary of a worker in the Date
Jerusalem Hizbullah civilian apparatus ranged between $600 and $800, while Anytime
Anytime
Center the salary of Lebanese government workers did not exceed $500 a
Projects and month. 8  
On-Line   Send to a friend
Publications Print page
Major Hizbullah and the Failure of the Lebanese State 
Jerusalem
Center Hizbullah is not a national Lebanese movement, as has been
Studies Books frequently claimed in the West, although it is represented in the
by JCPA Lebanese parliament by virtue of a special dispensation granted by
Fellows Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1992.9 The movement has
Israel's Early been represented in the Lebanese government since 2005, following
Diplomatic the departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Nasrallah acts as the
Struggles personal emissary of Khamenei in Lebanon. He and his men are not

http://jcpa.org/...Page.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3983&TTL=The_Fantasy_of_Hizbullah_Moderation[12/19/2010 10:24:45 AM]

Jerusalem Issue Briefs-The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation

Israel loyal to the president of Lebanon or to the government of Lebanon,

Research but rather to the Iranian leader who is the Marja-e Taqlid (source of
Subject Index emulation), the Vali-e Faqih who has the ultimate say within the
organization.  

This loyalty is not purely religious, and it is totally different from the
authority exercised by the pope in the Vatican. This involves political
subordination in every shape and form. Indeed, in March 2007,
Nasrallah's deputy, Sheikh Naim Qassem, admitted to the Iranian
Arabic-language television station al-Qawathar that Hizbullah requires
permission from Iran's supreme leadership for its operations.10  

For this reason, one should view Hizbullah's military force - which
extends far beyond the military force of any other political movement
in the world, as well as beyond the force of many sovereign states -
as the long arm of Iran, in the words of U.S. Defense Secretary
William Gates. Since 2006, and the strengthening of the strategic pact
between Iran and Syria that intensified the military empowerment of
Hizbullah, it appears that the Syrian president as well regards
Hizbullah as his long arm. The growth of this Iranian and Syrian
proxy on the soil of a failed Lebanese state that has forfeited its
sovereignty makes Hizbullah the real ruler of Lebanon. It is just a
matter of time for the process to mature into a Hizbullah decision to
translate its demographic power into political currency and establish
the Islamic Republic of Lebanon. 
 

The Danger of Misreading Hizbullah 

Misreading Hizbullah can lead to policy errors. In 2000 it was

popularly thought that if Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern
Lebanon, then Hizbullah would lose its motivation to keep fighting
and would dissolve into a political party that would disarm. Yet it was
precisely after the Israeli pullout when Hizbullah began its massive
build-up of rockets, including long-range Iranian rockets that were
ultimately used in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. 

Some analysts have also tried to identify moderate trends in Hizbullah

by drawing a false distinction between its "military wing" and its
"political wing." This differentiation between different wings of
Hizbullah was advanced by the British government in early 2009. As
Middle East expert Tony Badran has astutely observed, this is a false
distinction. 11 As he notes, Nasrallah's deputy, Naim Qassem, told the
Los Angeles Times last year that Hizbullah's leadership controls both
the social welfare work of the organization as well as its jihadi
activities: "The same leadership that directs the parliamentary and
government work also leads jihad actions." In other words, Hizbullah
is a highly centralized organization.12 Hizbullah's own analysis of itself
contradicts what Brennan has been writing and stating in recent
years.  

Today, saying that Hizbullah has moderate elements that have moved
away from terrorism can lead the political echelons in the West to
ignore how Hizbullah is serving its Iranian sponsors by directly
threatening Israel's civilian population. On May 20, 2010, Hizbullah
military sources boasted to the Kuwaiti daily al-Rai that Israel will be
bombarded with 15 tons of explosives a day if a future war breaks
out.13 Hizbullah clearly does not care about the implications of its
military build-up for the people of Lebanon, because it only seeks to
serve the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

http://jcpa.org/...Page.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3983&TTL=The_Fantasy_of_Hizbullah_Moderation[12/19/2010 10:24:45 AM]

Jerusalem Issue Briefs-The Fantasy of Hizbullah Moderation

*    *    * 

Notes 

1. John Brennan, "The Conundrum of Iran: Strengthening Moderates

without Acquiescing to Belligerence," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science , 618, July 2008.

2. Frederick Wherey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring

the Reach and Limitation of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Rand,
2009). See also Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, "Disarming
Hezbollah," Foreign Affairs website, January 11, 2010.

3. Yediot Ahronot [Hebrew], May 7, 2010. Barak told Newsweek on

July 18, 2006: "When we entered Lebanon...there was no Hezbollah.
We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the
south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah." Quoted by
Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 33.

4. Shimon Shapira, Hizbullah between Iran and Lebanon (Hakibbutz

Hameuhad, 2000), p. 90.

5. For information about the Iranians who operated in Lebanon, see

the first chapter in the important compendium, H.E. Chehabi, ed.,
Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (Oxford:
Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B.Tauris, 2006).

6. Manal Lutfi, "Syria: Between Tehran and Hizbullah," Asharq al-

Awsat , June 16, 2008.

7. Shapira, op. cit., pp. 134-139.

8. Dima Danawi, Hizbullah's Pulse: Into the Dilemma of the al-Shahid

and Jihad al-Bina Foundations (Beirut: 2002), p. 50, n. 30.

9. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi,

2005), p. 191.

10. http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e0407.pdf.

11. Tony Badran, "Hezbollah is Not the IRA," Now Lebanon , February
2, 2010.

12. This point is made in Michael Young, "A Foolish Quest in

Hezbollahland," Now Lebanon , May 21, 2010.

13. "Hizbullah Sources: Israel Will Be Bombarded with 15 Tons of

Explosives a Day in Case of War," Naharnet, May 20, 2010,
http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/getstory?
openform &C57030D6D391B08DC2257727004D2935. 

*    *    * 

Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at

the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

|  Privacy Policy |  Site Map  |  Home  |

JCPA, Beit Milken, 13 Tel Hai St., Jerusalem 92107, Israel, Tel: 972-2-5619281 Fax: 972-2-5619112,
jcpa@netvision.net.il
Copyright © 2010 JCPA. All Rights Reserved. Created by Catom web design

http://jcpa.org/...Page.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=3983&TTL=The_Fantasy_of_Hizbullah_Moderation[12/19/2010 10:24:45 AM]