PROBLEM SET 2

1. From the payoff bi-matrix of the Problem no. 1 from problem set 1 (Ann and Beth). Find best
responses and pure Nash equilibria.
2. Consider the Problem 2 from the Problem set 1. Is there a strict dominant-strategy
equilibrium?
3. Solve the following normal form game using dominance method:
Player 2
L C R
T 3, 2 1, 6 3, 2
Player 1 M 5, 1 4, 3 3, 2
B 2, 4 5, 4 1, 4
4. Fine the NE for the following simultaneous game
Player B
Left Middle Right
Top 7, 17 21, 21 14, 11
Player A Middle 10, 5 14, 4 4, 3
Bottom 4, 4 7, 3 10, 25

5. Assume Ann has four moves, A1, A2, A3, A4, and Beth has three B1, B2, and B3. The payoff
bi-matrix of this non-zero-sum two-person game is
B1 B2 B3
A1 1, 3 2, 2 1, 2
A2 2, 3 2, 3 2, 1
A3 1, 1 1, 2 3, 2
A4 1, 2 3, 1 2, 3

Find the Nash equilibrium by the best response method.

6. Find the Nash equilibria of the following normal form game:

Player 2
Save Use Delay
Save 5, 5 -2, 10 0, 0
Player 1 Use 3, 2 1, -1 0, 0
Delay 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
7. The following table illustrates the money payoffs associated with a two-person
simultaneous-play game:

Column
Left Right
Row Up 1,16 4, 6
Down 2, 20 3, 40

Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for this game. What are the players expected
payoffs in this equilibrium?

8. Consider the following game:

B
Left Right
A Up 2, 1 -1, 4
Down 0, 3 3, 2

Show that this game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Find the unique mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium to this game.

9. Solve problem 3 from problem set 1.

10. Solve problem 4 of problem set 1.

Student
Work and ask for help Slack and fish for hints
Prof Help 2, 1 -1, 4
Ignore mail 0, 3 3, 2

11. Consider problem 5 of problem set 1 and answer these questions:

a) Does it have a unique NE? Why not?
b) Assume that exiting at the end of this quarter is a dominated strategy for both the
players. Find the mixed strategy equilibrium from the resulting matrix.