Pierre Judd B.

Alvizo
Civil Procedure M3
April 8, 2020

Civil Procedure Case Assignment no.3

1. Briboneria v. CA, GR 101682, 1992

a. Facts:
i. Petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for
Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent
Gertrudes B. Mag-isa who was able to acquire private respondent’s house
and lot allegedly through an unauthorized sale effected by his wife.

ii. In due time, private respondent Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer.

iii. After issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on Mag-isa,
through her counsel, a request for admission dated September 13, 1988.

iv. On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo
their Answer to Request for Admission, alleging that most if not all the
matters subject of petitioner’s request for admission had been admitted,
denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that
the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either
irrelevant or improper.

v. On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment,

claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private
respondent is beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that
the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents
are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of
the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court.

vi. The trial court denied the motion. The Motion for Reconsideration,
however, was granted.

vii. The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order but it
was denied, hence, this petition.

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the petitioner’s contentions are correct (NO)
1. A cursory reading of the petitioner’s complaint and his request for
admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court,
that “the material matters and documents set forth in the request
for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which
private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer.”
 2. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or
reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but
should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents
described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense

3. Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the

request for admission must be served directly upon the party;
otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be
deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant
document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of
fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request
for admission.

4. In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission
was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her
counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,
therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and
documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to
file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request

2. Yu v. magpayo 44 SCRA 163

a. Facts:
i. Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from
defendant Magpayo the sum of P2, 800, which represented an unpaid
balance of the purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant.

ii. The defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he alleged
that the engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the same amount
for the repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the
balance due on the price of the engine and counterclaimed for damages and
attorneys' fees.

iii. The Court disallowed the defenses and ordered the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs.

iv. Defendant Magpayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a virtual
reproduction of his original defenses in the City Court.

v. The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court
scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered
plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel
refused to comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court
to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The
court asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for
the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and stuck to his demand that
he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.

vi. This prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground of failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute, hence this appeal.
 b. Issue and Ruling:
i. WON the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to
prosecute (NO)
1. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law.
The defendant was not able to support his special defenses
2. The answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, and pleaded special defences hence the plaintiff had
every right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward
with evidence in support of his special defences. Judicial admissions
do not require proof

3. Superlines v Victor GR L-64250 1983

a. Facts:
i. Bus No. 3008 of the Pantranco South Express, Inc., driven by Rogelio
Dillomas, collided with Bus No. 331 of the Superlines Transportation Co., Inc,
then driven by Erlito Lorca along the highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon
resulting in the instantaneous death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a
passenger in the Pantranco bus.
ii. Superlines instituted an action for damage before the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver
of said Pantranco Bus No. 3008

iii. Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the Pantranco bus
driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that there was want of
diligence on the part of Pantranco in the selection and supervision of its
driver

iv. Private respondents Timotea T. Moralde, widow of the deceased Cayetano

P. Moralde, Sr., and her children filed a complaint for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver Rogelio
Dillomas

v. The cause of action was based on quasi-delict while that against Pantranco,
on culpa-contractual

vi. Petitioners Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of pendency of another action. Referring to the civil case
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch

vii. Respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss finding that the
two cases involved different parties as well as different cause of action

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the Gumaca case should be consolidated with the Cavite case (YES)
1. There is, however, the more pragmatic solution to the controversy
at bar; and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite
case
 2. Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as
the convenience of the parties for which rules on procedure and
venue were formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather
than the Gumaca court, which serves as the more suitable forum for
the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties
concerned

3. To require private respondents who are all residents of Kawit,

Cavite, to litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would
unnecessarily expose them to considerable expenses

4. On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants

transportation companies if they were required to plead their
causes in Cavite, for such venue would not expose them to expenses
which they are not already liable to incur in connection with the
Gumaca case

5. The objection interposed by Superlines that it has offices in

Atimonan, Quezon, should not detract from the overall convenience
afforded by the consolidation of cases in the Cavite Court. For apart
from the fact that petitioner and its driver are represented by the
same counsel with offices located in Manila, defendants
transportation companies can readily avail of their facilities for
conveying their witnesses to the place of trial

6. The whole purpose and object of the procedure is to make the

powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.
7. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the
powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice.

4. PNB v Phil Leather 105 Phil 400

a. Facts:
i. Defendant Philippine Leather Co., Inc. applied for a commercial letter of
credit in the sum of $14,814.80 under the terms and conditions set forth in
an application filed by the defendants in favor of the Turner Tanning
Machinery Co. to cover the full invoice value of certain machineries and
accessories.

ii. Plaintiff approved the application subject to 30% deposit and the joint and
several signatures of Mr. Tinoco and Mrs. Basa which conditions were
complied with.

iii. Plaintiffs later issued a letter of credit in favor of the Turner Tanning
Machinery Company. Turner Tanning Machinery Co. drew upon the letter of
credit the sum of $14,549.17.

iv. Upon arrival in the Philippines of the machineries and their accessories
imported by the defendant under trust receipt, the plaintiff presented to the
defendants for payment the draft drawn by the Turner.
 v. After the draft had matured, the plaintiff made numerous demands upon
the defendants to pay the amount of the draft and the charges due thereon
but the defendants failed and refused to pay.

vi. Defendant then applied for a commercial letter of credit in the sum of
$2,587.50 in favor of Bay state Chemical Co., to pay for the importation of
color dye.

vii. Plaintiff approved the application subject also to 30% deposit and joint and
several signatures of Mr. Tinoco and Mrs. Basa which conditions were
complied with. Bay State drew upon the letter of credit the sum of
$2,482.40. This draft was presented by the plaintiff to the defendants for
payment but the defendants failed and refused to pay.

viii. Because of failure and refusal of the defendants to pay, the plaintiff
delivered the documents of the shipment to the Luzon Brokerage Co., and
requested it to claim and store the shipment in its bonded warehouse.

ix. The plaintiff prays that after hearing judgment be rendered ordering the
defendants to pay the obligations. Plaintiff further prays that pending
hearing and judgment, a writ of attachment be issued commanding the
sheriff of Manila to levy upon attachment on the properties of the
defendants as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment.

x. Defendants, in their answer, admit the plaintiff’s averments except as to the

correctness of the amounts due on the two drafts.

xi. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since the
defendants had admitted the material averments of its complaint except as
to the correctness of the amounts due, the defendant’s answer did not
tender a genuine issue.

xii. Court granted the plaintiff’s motion and ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the
CA subsequently certified this case to SC for the reason that only questions
of law are raised

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment (YES)
1. As the affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the Manager of the
Special Assets Department of the plaintiff, in charge of all
outstanding accounts of its debtors, attached to the motion for
summary judgment, furnishes the Court with the payments made by
the defendants on their account and the amount due from them,
which they failed to oppose by counter-affidavits, the plaintiff is
entitled to summary judgment.

5. Apelario v Chavez 3 SCRA 226

a. Facts:
 i. Gregorio Apelario filed a complaint against Ines Chavez & Company, Ltd., a
limited partnership, and its general partner, Ines Chavez. It was therein
averred, in substance, that on or about October 28, 1958, the defendant
partnership had purchased on credit from plaintiff ten sets of axle
assemblies for the sum of P2,400.00 (par. 3); that on December 6, 1958,
defendant delivered in payment to the plaintiff two postdated cash checks
for P1,200.00 each, drawn against the Philippine Bank of Commerce (par. 4);
that when the checks were presented for payment, they were dishonored
for lack of funds, whereupon the defendant took back the checks and
replaced them with two other checks, also postdated, for the same amount
as before (par. 5); that these checks were also dishonored (par. 6); that the
plaintiff, on February 23, 1959, demanded payment in cash, but defendant
refused to pay

ii. Because of such malicious and willful refusal, plaintiff had to engage the
services of counsel for an agreed fee of P750.00 (par. 8); that defendant was
about to remove and dispose of its properties with intent to defraud the
plaintiff, wherefore a writ of attachment became necessary (par. 9); and
prayer was made for judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
for the sum of P2,400.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint,
and for P750.00 attorney’s fees, with expenses and costs. Plaintiff also
moved and duly obtained a writ of attachment.

iii. Defendants obtained the lifting of the attachment by filing a counterbond on

April 14, 1959; and on May 7, 1959, they filed an answer admitting the
allegations of paragraphs 1 to 6 of the complaint; admitting that plaintiff had
demanded payment of P2,400, but pleaded that "defendants could not pay
the plaintiff, because they have so many accounts receivables which have
not yet been paid to them, of which fact the defendant, was duly informed
by the plaintiff and thereby requested to wait a while."

iv. Defendants further averred having no knowledge or information of the

allegations of paragraph 8 of the complaint concerning the attorneys’ fees;
denied having performed any act of removal or disposal of its property,
branding plaintiff’s allegations in paragraph 9 to be false and malicious; and
prayed for dismissal of the complaint.

v. Upon motion of the plaintiff, and over the objection of defendants, the trial
court rendered judgment on the pleadings, sentencing defendants to pay
P2,400, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint; and P500
attorney’s fees. Hence this appeal.
b. Issue and Ruling:
i. WON the lower court erred to have rendered judgment on the pleadings,
because the answer raised material issues (NO)
1. As pointed out in the judgment complained of, the defendants-
appellants had admitted all the material allegations of the complaint
concerning the existence of the debt and its non-payment. The
pleaded excuse, that they had requested plaintiff to, wait because
appellants’ many accounts receivable had not yet been collected, is
clearly no defense, for a debtor cannot delay payment due just to
 suit its convenience, and the creditor is not an underwriter of his
debtor’s business unless so stipulated.

2. The denial of the averment concerning the stipulated fees of

plaintiff’s attorney tendered no genuine issue, for even without such
allegations, it was discretionary in the court to allow reasonable
attorneys’ fees by way of damages, if it found just and equitable to
allow their recovery (Civ. Code, Art. 2208).

3. In this case, allowance of such fees was justified since defendant

admitted having issued to the creditor checks without funds, not
once but twice. It is well to note that the P750 attorney’s fees
claimed by plaintiff were reduced P500 only. Nor does the denial of
the complaint’s averments concerning the fraudulent removal and
disposition of defendant’s property constitute a bar to a judgment
or the pleadings, since the defendant neither claimed nor asked for
any damages on account of the issuance and levy of the writ of
attachment.

6. Lati v. Valmores 94 Phil 709

a. Facts:
i. Vicente Yu filed a suit against Emilio Mapayo to recover the sum of P 2,800
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine
Engine sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the City Court of Davao

ii. The answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended
that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the defendant had been
forced to spend P2, 800 for repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed
to waive the balance due on the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for
damages and attorneys' fees

iii. The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and ordered the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs. Defendant Mapayo
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao. When, after several
continuances, the case was called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the
defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled
the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to
present his evidence. However, the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to
present evidence, either oral or documentary, when required by the Court.
The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the plaintiff’s counsel is correct when it refused to comply the order of
the trial court to present evidence and demanded that he would introduce
evidence only in rebuttal (YES)
1. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every
right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with
evidence in support of his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised
Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant
 2. Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not
require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown
to have been made through palpable mistake

3. Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal

of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to law. The court
below is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendant for the sum of P2, 800.00.

7. Galicia v Polo 179 SCRA 371

a. Facts:
i. A complaint for forcible entry was filed in the Municipal Court of Almagro,
Samar, alleging that Amancio Palajos is the owner and in actual possession
of a parcel of land located at Bacjao, Almagro, Samar which he acquired by
way of donation from his father, Juan Palajos. It is further alleged that
defendants (petitioners herein) forcibly entered the northeastern portion of
the said property

ii. The trial of the case was set several times but was postponed at the instance
of defendants (petitioners herein). For the fifth time, neither the defendants
nor counsel appeared. Accordingly, the court granted a trial ex parte on
motion of plaintiff’s counsel

iii. The municipal trial court rendered judgment ordering defendants Policarpio
Galicia, Perfecto Galicia, Victorio Galicia, Julian Galicia and Eduarda Galicia
to restore to plaintiff Amancio Palajos the portion of land and ordering the
defendants to pay to plaintiff a monthly rental in the amount of FIFTY PESOS
(P 50.00) on the premises in question for its use and occupation

iv. For failure of the defendants to pay the rentals adjudged in the forcible
entry case, a writ of execution was issued and after levy, the deputy sheriff
of Calbayog City, on August 4, 1976, sold at public auction the real property
owned by petitioners' deceased father adjoining the land subject of the
forcible entry case

v. Over 14 months after the execution sale, petitioners filed a complaint for
Ownership and Damages against herein respondents in the Court of First
Instance of Samar alleging that they are co-owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land (subject of the auction sale) which they inherited from their
deceased father, Pedro Galicia

vi. The complaint further alleged that pursuant to forcible entry case,
respondents were able to take possession of the land in question as said
case was heard ex-parte; and that a decision was rendered in respondents'
favor and said decision was executed

vii. In their Answer, respondents (defendants below) countered that they were
able to take possession of the land described in the complaint by virtue of
the decision and later, execution of the decision in the forcible entry case,
 which, by petitioners' (plaintiffs below) averment in their complaint is an
admission of an existing judgment that would constitute res judicata; that
they are the lawful owners of the disputed land the same having been
subjected to levy and execution in 1975 thru a sale in favor of respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Juan Palajos

viii. At the pre-trial, counsel for private respondents file a motion for summary
judgment which was granted by respondent judge.Defendants' (private
respondents herein) motion for summary judgment was filed alleging that
no genuine issue exists in the case at bar after the pre-trial was conducted
and admission of facts were had while plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed
their opposition to the motion for summary judgment alleging among
others, that genuine issues exist

ix. The court rendered the summary judgment dismissing petitioners'

complaint, the pertinent portion of which reads: As demonstrated by the
parties, there is no question that the land in dispute is that parcel described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, a portion of which was a subject in a
forcible entry case before the Municipal Trial Court of Almagro Samar
(Exhibit 1, 2 and 3) with the defendants now as successors-in-interest of the
plaintiff, and most of the herein plaintiffs as defendants.

x. The pleadings also show that upon the death of the primitive owner, Pedro
Galicia, the plaintiffs as children and grandchildren possessed and owned
this land pro-indiviso, until the possession of said portion was transferred to
the defendants when the decision in that forcible entry case was executed in
1976 (Exhibit 7) such being the case, therefore, with respect to this portion
of the land in dispute, the possession is settled, which would constitute as a
bar to this action.

xi. With respect to the other portion of the land in dispute, the plaintiffs admit
that possession was transferred to the defendant by virtue of a sale
executed by the sheriff; the one year period having elapsed without
exercising their right of redemption, as a result a final deed of sale was
issued. The legality of the sale not having been assailed by them, for all
intents and purposes, ownersip on this land has been vested on the
defendants as heirs of Juan Palajos.

b. Issue and Ruling

i. WON the trial court erred when it decided the civil case by summary
judgment (NO)
1. There is no reason to disturb the summary judgment rendered by
respondent judge

2. The Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of summary judgment if

the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law
3. Summary judgment "is a device for weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is 'to
separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from
what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a
suitor to the burden of trial.' The test, therefore, of a motion for
summary judgment is-whether the pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits
in support of the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing
papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no
defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious"

4. In addition, summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in

the present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions
wherein there exists no serious controversy. The procedure may be
availed of not only by claimants, but also by defending parties who
may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for summary
judgment assumes that scrutinizing the facts will disclose that the
issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they
are so patently unsubstantial as not to be genuine issues, or that
there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or where the facts
appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits

5. The disputed property is the same parcel of land, which adjoins

private respondents' lot which was the subject of the forcible entry
case and from which petitioners were ordered to vacate. When
petitioners (then defendants), failed to satisfy the rentals adjudged
in the forcible entry case, said adjoining parcel of land was sold at
public auction to Juan Palajos (respondents' predecessor-in-interest)
as the higher bidder in the execution sale to satisfy the monetary
judgment rendered therein. The property so described in
petitioners' complaint squarely fits what has been levied upon and
sold at public auction (Rollo, p. 30), the owners of which are now
private respondents upon the demise of their predecessor-in-
interest

6. There is thus no question that issue of ownership of the disputed

land subject of the present petition has long been foreclosed in the
forcible entry case which culminated in the public auction sale of the
parcel of land now sought to be recovered. Having failed to redeem
the property sold at the public auction sale within the reglementary
period of twelve (12) months, petitioners cannot now claim that
they still own said property

7. Petitioners' complaint for Ownership and Damages is but a belated

and disguised attempt to revive a judgment debtors' right of
redemption which has long expired. There being no issue as to any
material fact raised in the pleadings, summary judgment may be
rendered.
8. Pajarito v Seneris 87 SCRA 275
a. Facts:
i. Joselito Aizon being the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus owned and
operated by FELIPE AIZON was involved in a vehicular accident. MYRNA
PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both passengers on board the
said Isuzu passenger bus died. Thus, Joselito Aizon was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City with Double Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence

ii. Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said
plea, the court rendered judgment convicting him of the offense charged
and sentencing him "to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de San
Luis the amount of P12, 000.00

iii. After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was
issued against Joselito Aizon for the indemnity of P12, 000.00, but the same
was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency

iv. Whereupon, petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna Pajarito
de San Luis, filed with the court a motion for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ
of Execution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon,
employer of Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information

v. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to wit: (1) That he is not
the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been sold
already to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has
not been executed because the full price has not yet been paid; and (2) That
in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to
satisfy the judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned

vi. The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the
ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito, was not a party in the
aforesaid criminal case

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the
award was made, or in a separate civil action (YES)
1. The subsidiary civil liability may be enforced in the same criminal
case where the award was made

2. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally

liable for a felony is also civilly liable. As a consequence, the
institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the
civil action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil
action or reservation of the latter on the part of the complainant
3. Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised
Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary liable for the
employee's civil liability in a criminal action when:
a. The employer is engaged in any kind of industry;
b. The employee committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties; and
c. He is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability

4. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only

after conviction of the employee in the criminal case

5. A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant employee to pay

an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant
and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action
for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability.

6. The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same
way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil
liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal
negligence.

7. The decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon

the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but
also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer
cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. That is why
the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal
Code). To allow an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the
criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.". The employer is in substance and
in effect a party to the criminal case, considering the subsidiary
liability imposed upon him by law.

8. Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the
registered operator of the bus but only claims now that he sold the
bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no important
purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent
action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only
prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased
victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the proceeding
for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded
as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its
process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in
the execution
 9. The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the
owner and operator of the in fated bus as he sold it already to Isaac
Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that could be
litigated and resolved in the same criminal case. In support of his
opposition to the motion of the complainant, served upon him, for
the purpose of the enforcement of his subsidiary liability Felipe
Aizon may adduce all the evidence necessary for that purpose.
Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability
may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because
the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the
case itself. This would certainly facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of the contending parties.

9. Imson v CA 239 SCRA 58

a. Facts:
i. This case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Toyota
Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered under the names of private
respondents FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding
Farm Corporation. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally
wrecked his car

ii. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint for Damages against private
respondents as registered owners of the truck; truck driver; the beneficial
owners and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corporation

iii. Defendants driver and beneficial owners failed to answer and were declared
in default. however, petitioner and defendant insurer, entered into a
compromise agreement

iv. In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial court dismissed the
Complaint for Damages against Western Guaranty Corporation. A copy of
the Order of dismissal was received by private respondent Holiday Hills
Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation.

v. Nearly (18) months later, said private respondent moved to dismiss the case
against all the other defendants. It argued that since they are all
indispensable parties under a common cause of action, the dismissal of the
case against defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit
against all of them. The trial court denied the motion

vi. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, as it ruled: that in a common
cause of action where all the defendants are indispensable parties, the
court's power to act is integral and cannot be split, such that it cannot
relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the insurer is an indispensable party (NO)
1. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
 intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there
cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable

2. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in

the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced
by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court.
He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit
complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation

3. It is true that all of petitioner's claims in Civil Case No. 248-R is

premised on the wrong committed by defendant truck driver.
Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit.
The other defendants, however, cannot be categorized as
indispensable parties. They are merely proper parties to the case

4. Proper parties have been described as parties whose presence is

necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in
their absence without affecting them. It is easy to see that if any of
them had not been impleaded as defendant, the case would still
proceed without prejudicing the party not impleaded. Thus, if
petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty Corporation, the omission
would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other
defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose
its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
The insurer, clearly, is not an indispensable party in Civil Case No.
248-R

10. Habaluyas v Japson 138 SCRA 46

a. Facts:
i. Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the
Second Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted
the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of
respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be
extended (YES)
1. SINCE, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the
filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment

2. The Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better

served if the ruling in the original decision IN THE CASE OF GIBS VS
CFI were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The
reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to
 appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure
which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the
Rules

3. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a

pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for
review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments
above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of cases, a strict
but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for
the guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the
rules on this point, as follows:
a. Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution (May 30, 1986), the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court
of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested.
b. In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record
on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of
thirty (30) days. If the court denies the motion for extension,
the appeal must be taken within the original period,
inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for
appeal. The trial court may grant said motion after the
expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed
within the original period

4. All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were

granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

11. Belamide v CA, 90 SCRA 175

a. Facts:
i. Land was acquired during the marriage (second marriage) of Vicente
Montoya to Jose Velardo and the acquisition was made during the first
marriage of Vicente Montoya to Martin Montoya

ii. CFI ruled that the fact that Susana Velardo Belamide sold a portion of the
land in question to the Municipality of Silang, Cavite (for widening of the
street) on May 1933 without the intervention of, or opposition from,
Hilarion Montoya who died on December 2, 1955, coupled with the fact that
Susana Velardo Belamide has possession of the property since the death of
her mother Vicenta Montoya in 1931 after she sold the same to the herein
applicants on July 20, 195, convince the Court that said property was
acquired during the coverture of Jose Velardo and Vicenta Montoya.
Consequently, upon the death of Jose Velardo in 1888, the one-half (½)
undivided portion of the property passed by inheritance to Susana Velardo
 Belamide and the other one-half (½) undivided portion went to Vicenta
Montoya as her share of the conjugal estate

iii. Upon the death of the latter on February 28, 1931, her undivided one half
(½) share of the property should be divided equally between Susana Velardo
Belamide and Hilarion Montoya, that is, each is entitled to one- fourth (1/4)
undivided share. Hence, Susana Velardo Belamide's share is three-fourths
(3/4) while Hilarion Montoya's share passed by inheritance to his children,
the herein oppositor

iv. For this reason, the sale made by Susana Velardo Belamide in favor of the
applicants is null and void only with respect to the one-fourth (1/4)
undivided portion of the property (the share of the herein oppositors) who
did not consent to the sale)

v. CA affirmed the amended decision of CFI of Cavite. It adjudicated the land in

favor of the applicants ((3/4) undivided share belongs to the applicants,
(1/4) to the oppositors). From the amended decision rendered after the new
trial, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals

vi. CA denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners as well as a

Motion for a New Trial. The ground for the Motion for New Trial was that
Exhibit 8 of the oppositors (private respondents herein) which was allegedly
relied upon by both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals is a
falsified document

vii. According to tie official records of the Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite, the
name of the father of Hilarion Montoya in the marriage column is in blank.
But according to Exhibit 8, the name of the father of Hilarion Montoya is
Martin Montoya. Thus, whIle the official record of the civil registrar shows
that oppositors' father, Hilarion, had an unknown father, thru falsification,
Hilarion father was made to appear in Exhibit 8 as Martin Montoya. The
latter falsely became husband of Vicente Montoya, thereby enabling private
respondents to inherit 1/4 of the land in dispute from Vicente Montoya

viii. Petitioners alleged that the denial of the Motion for New Trial is in grave
abuse of discretion, and their allegation that the Court of First Instance, as a
land registration court, has no jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
Vicente Montoya and partition the property by adjudicating 1/4 pro-indiviso
to private respondents as children of Hilarion Montoya, allegedly an
unacknowledged natural child of Vicenta Montoya, and that as a
consequence, the Court of Appeals, likewise, is without jurisdiction, or acted
in grave abuse of discretion, in affirming the decision of the lower court.
Hence, petitioners came to this Court with the present petition.

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the CA erred in denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial (NO)
1. New trial cannot be obtained on ground that court relied on falsified
evidence where movants could have presented the alleged genuine
document that respondent’s father is unknown during trial
 2. There can be no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals in
denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial. The document alleged to
be falsified was presented in the trial in the lower court. Petitioners
should have attacked the same as falsified with competent
evidence, which could have been presented, if they had exercised
due diligence in obtaining said evidence, to the Motion for New
Trial. It is, therefore, not newly discovered evidence that could
justify a new trial

3. The new evidence would neither change the result as found by the
decision. It might prove that Hilarion Montoya was registered at
birth without his father having been given, but from the testimony
of Marcelino Belamide, one of the applicants, Vicente Montoya was
married twice, although he did not know the first husband. Likewise,
in the opposition of private respondents, it is there alleged that the
land originally belonged to the spouses Martin Montoya and Vicente
Montoya. This allegation was never contradicted.

4. The document sought to be presented by petitioners, as stated in

their Motion for New Trial in the Court of Appeals, cannot effectively
destroy this allegation, first, because the marriage between Martin
Montoya and Vicenta Montoya could have taken place after the
birth of Hilarion Montoya who was thus legitimized, and second,
Martin Montoya and Vicente Montoya evidently lived together as
husband and wife, and are, therefore, presumed to have been
legally married (Section 5, par. [bb] Rule 131, Rules of Court).

12. Valdez v. Jugo, 74 Phil 49

a. Facts:
i. Valdez filed his motion for new trial on November 22, 1941, and set it for
hearing almost one month thereafter, i. e., on December 20, 1941

ii. Valdez argued that such delayed hearing was because he wanted to have
time to study the transcript of the testimony of witnesses and find out
reasons in support of the grounds alleged in his motion

iii. Unquestionably, therefore, he filed his motion without knowing whether the
grounds therefor were or were not good, and wanted to delay the
proceedings to gain time for study

iv. Again, asked as to why, when he was already in Manila and the Manila
courts were already open, he failed to inquire as to the result of his motion
for new trial, he candidly answered that he was not interested in speeding
up the proceedings because he was the defeated party but the court denied
the relief prayed for by Valdez

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the filing of Petitioner’s motion interrupts the period for appeal (NO)
1. There was a deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings.
Petitioner's motion for new trial did not and could not interrupt the
 period for appeal, it having failed to state in detail as required by the
rules, the reasons in support of the grounds alleged therein

2. Under Rule 37, section 2, third paragraph, it is now required to

"point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment
which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to
law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or conclusions."

3. In the instant case, the motion fails to make the specification thus
required, it will be treated as a motion pro-forma intended merely
to delay the proceedings, and as such, it shall be stricken out as
offensive to the new rules.

13. Estrada v Domingo, 28 SCRA 890

a. Facts:
i. In the local elections in San Juan, Rizal held on November 14, 1967,
candidates for Mayor were then incumbent Mayor Nicanor Ibuna,
Nacionalista Party official candidate; respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo,
Liberal Party official candidate; petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
independent; and Enrique Lenon, also independent. On December 31, 1967,
the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Braulio Sto. Domingo as
elected Mayor with 7,926 votes as against Joseph Ejercito Estrada with
7,882, or a plurality of 44 votes

ii. Estrada lodged an election protest, and respondent Sto. Domingo counter-
protested, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal which later set aside
Domingo’s proclamation and instead proclaimed Estrada as the winner

iii. Sto. Domingo's counsel was served with copy of the decision on October 30,
1968

iv. At 1:45 p.m. on November 4, 1968, the last day of the five-day period to
appeal statutorily fixed by Section 178, Revised Election Code, Sto. Domingo
filed a motion to reconsider the decision. Copy of the motion was sent to
Estrada's counsel by registered special delivery mail and with notice that the
motion would be heard on the following Saturday, November 9, 1968 at
8:30 a.m. Attached to the motion was registry receipt 17713. Sto. Domingo
therein averred that the trial judge erred (1) in reviewing and annulling the
decisions of the other branches of the same court on the exclusion of voters;
(2) in rejecting "Boyong" and "Dr. Boyong" votes; (3) in rejecting protestee's
(private respondent's) evidence on the tampering of ballots after revision;
and (4) in appreciating certain ballots

v. Came the morning of November 9, 1968. Sto. Domingo and his counsel
appeared in court. Absent were Estrada and his counsel, both of whom until
then had not received copy of the motion. For lack of proof that Estrada had
received notice of the motion for reconsideration of November 4, 1968, the
hearing thereof was reset
 vi. Estrada, who got wind of what took place in the trial court that morning
filed an "omnibus motion" alleging that Sto. Domingo's motion for
reconsideration was not legally sanctioned, flimsy and frivolous, a mere
scrap of paper, and intended for delay. He prayed that motion be stricken
out and that the judgment be immediately executed as it had become final
and executory

vii. The judge was ready to rule on the motions. Sto. Domingo demurred,
pleaded that his memorandum and opposition to the omnibus motion be
first considered; that in the event of an adverse resolution he be allowed at
least five (5) days from receipt to enable him to procure extraordinary relief
from the Court of Appeals. The judge thereupon declared that he would
promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, 1968, a Saturday

viii. Allegedly informed that resolution on his reconsideration motion would be

adverse to him, Sto. Domingo's counsel sought the judge in the morning of
November 23, 1968, asked the latter to give him a copy of the order before
the close of office hours on that day. The judge declined, instead he stated
that the order would be read and released in open court the following
Monday, November 25, 1968

ix. The parties secured their copies of the order at 10:15 a.m. The dispositive
portion of the order reads: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, it is the opinion of the Court that the reconsideration of
its decision dated October 29, 1968 is not in order as the same had already
become final and executory."

x. It developed that some two hours earlier, at 8:04 a.m. on November 25, Sto.
Domingo's counsel lodged with the Court of Appeals a three-pronged double
spaced 15-page petition with Annexes A to J for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction

xi. Upon the other hand, with equal dispatch, Estrada tried to fend off Sto.
Domingo's move when he filed with the Court of Appeals, although
belatedly, at 10:43 a.m., a 5-page opposition to the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus attaching thereto his oath of office

xii. herein respondent Sto. Domingo avers that petitioner Estrada and his men,
many of whom were armed, were reportedly poised to forcibly execute the
order enforcing the judgment as yet to be issued in the morning of
November 25. Said respondent told the Court of Appeals that a restraining
order was a necessity to forestall impending bloodshed

xiii. The thrust of Sto. Domingo's petition before the Court of Appeals is that
therein respondent Judge Andres Reyes did not resolve his motion for
reconsideration on the merits; that accordingly mandamus should issue to
compel him so to do; and that in the event the resolution be adverse, the
judge be directed to give due course to his cautionary notice of appeal.

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the motion for reconsideration was proper (NO)
1. Even granting for the sake of argument that the aggrieved party can
file a motion for reconsideration, the instant motion filed by Braulio
Sto. Domingo is pro forma and therefore, did not suspend the
running of the period of appeal. In short, the motion for
reconsideration merely makes reference to the contents of the
memorandum filed by other parties which had already been
considered by the Court before rendering its decision

2. Even granting for the sake of argument again, that the instant
motion for reconsideration was not pro forma, still the Court
believes that the filing of the said motion was fatally defective, and
such being so, the motion is but a mere scrap of paper which did not
stop the running of the period for appeal (lacked an affidavit)

3. Not only this. The failure of the protestee to comply with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 37, Section 4, Rule 15 and Section 8,
Rule 3 ... is likewise fatal. A copy of the motion for reconsideration
was not served on the protestants three (3) days before the date set
for hearing. The record shows that the protestant received the copy
of the motion for reconsideration of the protestee only on
November 13, 1968 or four (4) days after the said motion was set for
hearing by the movant on November 9, 1968

4. To be sure, Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution, and Section 1, Rule

36, Rules of Court which require express findings of fact in a
decision, both have no application to the questioned order. Here
involved is not a decision on the merits but a mere order upon a
motion to reconsider. The judge could simply dish out a routine
capsule-form order "Denied for lack of merit" or "Motion for
reconsideration denied". And yet, that kind of order would serve to
immunize the judge against an unlawful neglect-of-duty charge. But
the judge did not merely content himself with a perfunctory order.
He wrote a reasoned out five-page resolution.

5. For these reasons, it is difficult to hew to the Court of Appeals' view

that the judge so unlawfully neglected his duty to rule on the merits
of the motion for reconsideration. It bears repeating that the judge
did more than what was expected; that instead of mechanically
writing "Denied for lack of merit", he examined the arguments set
forth in said motion and explained as cogently as he could why it
should not be granted. His order meets the rigid standards expected
of his judicial position.

6. As we look back at the facts, we discern a pattern of delay on the

part of private respondent. Recited by petitioner Estrada are the
following which took place in the trial court. If any meaning is to be
attached to the events in the lower courts, it is that private
respondent has, in ingeniouly chiseled language, so skillfully taken
advantage of judicial procedure to stave off the day of reckoning
 when petitioner would replace him as Mayor of San Juan, Rizal. The
pattern of delay is patent.

7. For the reasons given the judgement of the Court of Appeals

promulgated on February 13, 1969 is hereby set aside; and the
judgement of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Election Case No.
10545 entitled "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus Braulio
Sto. Domingo, Protestee", declaring Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the
duly elected Mayor for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Rizal in the elections held on November 14, 1967 with a plurality of
192 votes, with costs against protestee, is hereby declared final and
executory

14. David v. Fernandez 176 SCRA 608

a. Facts:
i. A gravel and sand truck driven by petitioner Jesus B. Pasion and owned and
operated by his co-petitioners, Spouses Carlos David and Teresita David, hit
Paulino Mananghaya in front of Mantrade Building resulting in his death

ii. Mananghaya spouse, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of her minor
children Noel, Nolly and Joy, (hereinafter private respondents) filed before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan an action for damages

iii. For failure to file their answer despite service of summons, petitioners as
defendants in said Civil Case No. 1136-B were declared in default. Private
respondents as plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte,
after which a decision was rendered on April 10, 1981 1 ordering petitioners
to pay private respondents jointly and severally

iv. Consequently, some personal properties of the spouses David were levied
upon and sold at public auction. Petitioners thus filed on the same day a
motion for reconsideration of the June 5, 1981 Order and a motion to quash
the writ of execution

v. petitioners were allowed to file their Answer with Counterclaim for damages
against private respondents, who countered with a Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaim and Reply to Answer. The latter's motion to dismiss was
denied by the lower court.

vi. Hence this petition seeking to annul and set aside the two aforementioned
Orders of respondent judge, namely: the Order dated June 8, 1982 which
required the return of the properties of the petitioners levied upon in
execution or, in the event that this could not be done, for petitioners to go
after private respondents' bond in case of a favorable judgment

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
issued the Order directing that in the event return of the personal properties
of Petitioners Spouses could not be done by Private Respondents (NO)
 1. We rule for the petitioners. Although the Court is aware of private
respondents' sad plight, having suffered the untimely loss of the
alleged sole breadwinner of the family, nevertheless, the Court must
go by the precepts of substantive as well as procedural law in
resolving the controversy at bar for to do otherwise would be
tantamount to pre-empting the lower court in its judgment in Civil
Case No. 1136-B wherein a new trial had been ordered as a result of
the granting of petitioners' motion for new trial therein.

2. As provided under Section 5 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of

Court: "If a new trial be granted in accordance with the provisions of
its rule, the original judgment shall be vacated, and the action shall
stand for trial de novo but the recorded evidence taken upon the
former trial so far as the same is material and competent to
establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking
the same."

3. The law is unmistakably clear that once a new trial is granted under
aforesaid Rule, the original judgment is vacated. The phrase "to
vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void.7

4. As petitioners' motion for new trial was subsequently granted by the

respondent court, this resulted in the nullification of its judgment by
default dated April 10, 1981 against petitioners in said civil case,
including all the consequential effects thereof, to wit: the Writ of
Execution, the corresponding levy on the personal properties of
petitioners and the public auction sale.

5. Considering that the motion for restitution was filed while the
subject civil case was still undergoing trial, a stage wherein the rights
and obligations of the parties have not yet begin determined, it
would be unfairly enriching the private respondents, even
temporarily, if they are allowed to keep possession of the proceeds
of the sale of petitioners' personal properties in the amount of
P12,000.00. As Civil Case No. 1136-B then stood, there has yet been
no adjudication of rights and obligations between the parties

6. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED to return to petitioners

Spouses Carlos David and Teresita David the proceeds of the public
auction sale of their personal properties in the sum of P12,000.00

15. Francisco v Puno 108 SCRA 427

a. Facts:
i. Lagar filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages
alleging that her father caused the land in question titled in his name alone
as "widower", after her mother's death, in spite of the property being
conjugal, and then sold it to the predecessor in interest of petitioners from
whom they bought the same

ii. Petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial. The respondent was declared in
default upon motion of Lagarand a judgment was rendered finding the
 evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged and therefore
dismissing the complaint

iii. A copy of the decision was served on February 15, 1980 at Lagar’s counsel

iv. Lagar filed, thru a new counsel, a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration claiming that she had newly discovered evidence that could
prove her cause of action. Said motion was signed and sworn to by private
respondent herself together with her counsel.The judge denied the same
having been filed out of time.

v. Not satisfied, Lagar once again filed, thru another new counsel, a petition for
relief, purportedly under Rule 38 claiming thatshe did not actually learn of
the decision of January 8, until she received a copy thereof on March 17,
1980 and that she was not informed of the contents of the motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration on February 15, 1980 when she was made to
sign it

vi. Respondent judge ruled that it is the date when respondent Lagar actually
learned of the decision from which she seeks relief that should be
considered in computing the period of 60 days prescribed under Sec. 3, Rule
38 of the Rules of Court for purposes of determining the timeliness of the
said petition for relief.

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the petition for relief was proper (NO)
1. Where another remedy is available, as, in fact, private respondent
had filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging
practically the same main ground of the petition for relief under
discussion, which was denied, what respondent should have done
was to take to a higher court such denial. A party who has filed a
timely motion for new trial cannot file a petition for relief after his
motion has been denied. These two remedies are exclusive of each
other. It is only in appropriate cases where a party aggrieved by a
judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial that a
petition for relief can be filed

2. The petition for relief of private respondent was filed out of time. SC
held that the period should not be computed only from March 17,
1980 when she claims self-servingly that she first knew of the
judgment becauseshe signed and even swore to the truth of the
allegations in her motion for new trial filed by Atty. Mapaye on
February 16, 1980 or a month earlier

3. SC held that notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party

for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that notice to the
party, when he is represented by a counsel of record, is not valid is
applicable here in the reverse for the very same reason that it is the
lawyer who is supposed to know the next procedural steps or what
ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection of the rights
of the client, and not the latter.
 4. Respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of private respondent's petition for relief and, therefore, all his
actuations in connection therewith are null and void.

16. Gordulan v Gordulan, 3 SCRA 205

a. Facts:
i. a suit for the recovery of land, the defendant therein, Cesareo Gordulan,
although duly summoned, failed to file his answer in due time. Upon motion
of the plaintiff, the defendant was declared in default

ii. After reception of evidence for the plaintiff, the lower court rendered
judgment against defendant (now appellant). Availing himself of the
provisions of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the defendant Cesareo Gordulan
sought to set the judgment aside, claiming that he had good and valid
defenses against plaintiff's complaint and that it was excusable negligence
on his part that his counsel failed to file an answer

iii. His petition having been denied, the defendant interposed this appeal

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the appeal has merit (NO)
1. The questioned order should not be disturbed. Section 2 and 3 of
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are explicit, and require not only a
sworn statement of the facts constituting petitioner's good and
substantial defense, but likewise a showing that the failure to file an
answer was by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence

2. While appellant's petition for relief contains a recital of facts, duly

sworn to by him, that the lot in dispute is owned in common by the
plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares, nothing is, however,
offered to show that there was fraud, mistake, accident or excusable
negligence in the failure of the lawyer to timely join issues with the
plaintiff.

3. Considering that the negligence of Atty. Antero Tomas, as counsel

for the defendant, in failing to file his answer to the complaint
within the reglementary period is not excusable and, therefore, not
a ground for relief

4. Rule 38 is a special remedy and the requirements therein set forth

are considered as conditions sine qua non to the proper allowance
of relief.

5. Neither is it arguable that defendant should not be held to suffer for

his counsel's shortcomings, for a client is bound by the acts, even by
the mistakes and negligence, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. Of course, the door is open for him to seek
redress against the erring lawyer for the wrong suffered
17. Arcilla v Arcilla 138 SCRA 560
a. Facts:
i. Petitioner was among the several defendants in an action for Annulment of
Sale with Damages filed by herein private respondents before the CFI of
Cebu

ii. Defendants, including petitioner were declared in default for failure to

appear. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The court ordered
the deed of sale as null and void and declaring the 8 children of Seguna
Arcilla (including defendant Laureano) as co-owners

iii. Copy of the decision was sent to and received by defendants’ counsel of
record on November 8, 1976

iv. On March 25, 1977, herein petitioner Laureano filed a motion to lift order of
default and set aside the decision dated October 27, 1976 which was denied
by respondent Judge in his order dated April 12, 1997

v. Petitioner filed a petition for Relief from Judgment on April 16, 1977 saying
that he knew only of the October 27, 1976 decision on March 24, 1997. He
seeks to set aside and lift the effects of the said decision on mistake and/or
excusable neglect for their failure to inquire from their lawyer

vi. Respondent Judge issued the assailed order denying petitioner’s Petition for
Relief premised on the opposition of the plaintiff (herein respondents) that
the contention of the respondents that they only came to know of the
decision on March 24, 1997 cannot be given weight because notice to the
counsel is deemed notice to the client

b. Issue and Ruling:

i. WON the Petition for Relief was filed out of time (YES)
1. In an order for petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be
entertained, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has
faithfully complied with the provisions of Rule 38

2. In assailing the lower court’s dismissal of his petition for relief being
filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to show that
the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified
in sec. 3, rule 38 (within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside and not more
than 6 months after such judgment or order was entered or such
proceeding was taken, accompanied by affidavits showing fraud,
accident mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts
constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense)

3. He has failed to do so, instead he argues on the merits of his petition

for relied, without first showing that the same was filed on time in
the court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should be
dismissed
4. The SC agrees with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief
was filed late. We note that the decision set to be set aside was
rendered on October 27, 1976. Petitioner, through counsel, received
a copy of the said decision on November 8, 1976, and he filed his
petition for relief of judgment only on April 18, 1977

5. Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same
appears verified and accompanied by an affidavit of merit, the
allegations of facts made therein do not prove either fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence not show a valid defense
in favor of the party seeking relief. The general allegation made
therein to the effect that “petitioner has a good and valid defense
considering that the late Segunda de Arcilla voluntarily and willingly
executed the document of sale” is not sufficient compliance with the
rules.