Pierre Judd B.

Alvizo
Civil Procedure M3
March 16, 2020

Civil Procedure Case Reports

 Calo v. Ajax
o Facts
 Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax International 1200 ft. of John Shaw
wire rope, the transaction was evidenced by a Charge Order
 When the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the same was found short of
300 ft. Calo then wrote two letters to Ajax asking for either completion of delivery or
account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope
 A complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides
who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant
Ajax International. Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of
execution issued, against plaintiff Calo
 Calo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against ajax
asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery or that she be relieved from
paying P855.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees,
damages and expenses of litigation
 Instead of filing an answer, ajax moved for the dismissal of the Civil Case on the
ground that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in the civil
case already decided in the Municipal Court of Manila
 The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the case on the ground
that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the MTC
o Issue and Ruling
 WON Calo's claim is a compulsory counter claim that should be filed in the MTC
 NO, it need not be filed in the MTC
 Counterclaims that are beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC are not
compulsory and are not waived by the failure to set up before the MTC
 The rules allow such counterclaims to be set-up only for the defendant
to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the court
find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount
exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the
complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit
 However, any counterclaim set-up in excess of the court’s jurisdiction is
waived. Failure of the defendant to set-up such claim does not bar him from
filing a separate civil action on the same claim before the RTC
 
 Agustin v. Bacalan
o Facts
 Agustin filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Bacalan due to
non-payment of rentals before the City Court of Cebu
 In his answer, Bacalan included a counterclaim alleging that the action was
maliciously filed and that he suffered actual and moral damages
  The City Court dismissed the counterclaim and ordered the defendant to vacate
the premises in question and to pay the plaintiff the unpaid back rentals and
attorney's fees
 Bacalan appealed and the CFI of Cebu reversed the decision and ordered the
plaintiff Agustin to pay
 Agustin filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu to nullify the decision on the
ground that it grants relief of P16,000, beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court of
Cebu (10,000 limit), and grants P10,000 moral damages although the subject matter of
the suit is purely contractual where moral damages are not recoverable
o Issue and Ruling
 WON moral damages may be awarded in ejectment cases where the only
recoverable damages are the compensation for use of the premises and the measure
of damages being the fair rental value of the property
 YES, a defending party may set up a claim for money or any other relief
which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim. And the court
may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary damages as prayed for
 The counter claim is one of moral damages and not as damages for the
unlawful detention of property, it must be upheld. However, the amount
thereof is another matter
 WON the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award a counterclaim in an
amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin
 NO, it is well-settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine a set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction
 A counterclaim beyond the court's jurisdiction may only be pleaded by
way of defense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken
plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief
 The amount of judgment obtained on appeal cannot exceed the
jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the
jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over
the same by its decisions or otherwise
 WON the decision of the CFI is null and void
 YES, but in part only.
 It is a well-settled rule that when court transcends the limits prescribed
for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications
will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise
 The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment
in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the
extent of P16,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the
excess is null and void and of no effect
 Consequently, the decision over the main action, in the case at bar,
must stand, best remembering that a counterclaim, by its very nature, is a cause
of action separate and independent from the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant
 
 
 Ballecer v. Bernardo
o Facts
  Ballecer instituted a Civil Case against respondent Jose Bernardo before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover damages allegedly caused by him in
consequence of the destruction and demolition of a portion of a wall of the
petitioners, along the common boundary line of their lot and that of Bernardo, as well
as to recover possession of a portion of petitioners’ aforementioned lot, which was
allegedly encroached upon by the wall subsequently erected by Bernardo in place of
the one he had destroyed
 Bernardo filed his answer denying petitioners’ averments, and alleging, in turn,
that the demolition and destruction made by him had taken place within the
boundary of his own property
 By way of counterclaim, Bernardo set up two (2) causes of action, namely: (1)
that petitioners were the parties who had encroached upon and occupied a portion of
Bernardo’s property, without his consent and against his will, and (2) that petitioners’
complaint is premature, uncalled for, capricious and without any justifiable cause, for
which reason Bernardo prayed that they be sentenced to vacate his aforementioned
portion of land allegedly encroached upon them and to turn it over to him, and to pay
damages
 On the last day of the reglementary period to answer counterclaim, petitioners
filed an ex parte urgent motion for extension of time therefor, but the motion was
denied and ordered stricken off the record. Then the court declared petitioners in
default as to the counterclaim and ordered Bernardo to present his evidence thereon
before the Deputy Clerk of Court which Bernardo did. On June 20, the court rendered
a decision in favor of Jose Bernardo
o Issue and Ruling
 WON the lower court has gravely abused its discretion in declaring the
petitioners in default and in rendering judgment against them on Bernardo’s
counterclaim after an ex parte hearing
 YES, the lower court gravely abused its discretion
 To begin with, a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the
counterclaim had been filed within the reglementary period and plausible
reasons were given in support thereof; counsel for petitioners had been unable
to contact them owing to a typhoon that had just hit Manila, and the flood and
inclement weather that had followed
 What is more, Bernardo’s counterclaim was predicated upon allegations
of fact which are inconsistent with and, hence, controverted by, the allegations
in petitioners’ complaint. In this connection, it should be noted that Bernardo
had, according to the complaint, encroached upon petitioners’ property,
whereas, Bernardo maintained the exact opposite in his counterclaim — not
only that petitioners’ allegation was not true, but, also, that they were the ones
encroaching upon the property of Bernardo
 Certainly, this contention, of Bernardo cannot be decided without
passing upon the truth of the allegations in the complaint, which petitioners are
entitled to prove, whether they had answered Bernardo’s counterclaim or not
 In other words, the issues raised in the counterclaim were inseparable
from those posed in the complaint, and so it was not absolutely necessary for
the petitioners to file an answer to the counterclaim
 
 
 Gojo v. Goyala
o Facts
 Appellee Goyala sold to Gojo a parcel of agricultural land by a “Deed of Pacto
de Retro Sale”, the repurchase to be made within one year, as stated in the deed. The
deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in addition to the purchase
price
 10 years after the execution of said document, Gojo filed a case with the CFI
against Goyala by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. Gojo
alleged that the period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become
consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in the
Registry of Property, it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to that effect
 Goyala filed an answer to the petition, alleging that they had obtained a cash
loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that to guarantee
payment, Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on the parcel of land
in question. Hence, although the deed was executed in the form of a pacto de retro
sale, the true intention of the parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure
payment
 Goyala further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but
petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. By way of
counterclaim, Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the document
of mortgage be declared so, and not a pacto de retro sale.
 Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named
defendant, Antonina, had died, prompting the TC to issue an order requiring counsel
for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint substituting Antonina with one of
her successors in interest as party defendants
 Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that
notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a copy of the said TC
order, said appellant failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint required
of him. Appellant opposed the motion but the TC dismissed the complaint
 Goyala filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said appellee’s
counterclaim, which was granted by the TC. TC then rendered a favorable judgment
on appellee’s counterclaim, declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable
mortgage and ordering Gojo to receive the P810 and to restore possession to the
defendants and allowing them to redeem the same
 Gojo appealed to the CA, which upon finding that the said appeal involves
purely questions of law, certified the same to the SC
o Issue and Ruling
 WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s
counterclaim
 YES, the TC erred in declaring Gojo in default
 Gojo contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in
default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within
the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an
independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations
 It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a
compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because
the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the
allegations of the complaint
  While it is true that under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be
dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of
the court, said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one, as
in this case, the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does
dismiss such action for recovery, but will be allowed to continue until final
judgment is entered
 Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the
manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person
 An order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of
parties is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to
the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance,
would similarly be void
 It was further held that the continuance of a proceeding during the
pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly
substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction
 
 Salita v. Magtolis
o Facts
 Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married but they separated in fact in
1988 and subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita's
psychological incapacity. The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City
 Therein it is alleged that petitioner came to realize that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same
became manifest only thereafter, that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his
job
 Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of
particulars. She argued that the "assertion in the Bill of Particulars is a statement of
legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of “ultimate facts”
as required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be
inferred . . . ."
 The court ruled that the questioned Bill of Particulars is adequate and issued an
order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
She filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
o Issue and Ruling
 WON the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient
definiteness or particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial
 YES, a complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause or causes of action
 Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected
evidence will support." As stated by private respondent, "the term does not
refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established." It refers to "the facts which the
 evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts.
 A motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while
not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A
motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of
the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by
other means
 We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of
Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action,
and to require more details from private respondent would be to ask for
information on evidentiary matters
 Petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private respondent’s
cause of action against her thus “. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession “that of a
newly qualified Doctor of Medicine” upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job
 On the basis of the allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already
prepare her responsive pleading or for trial
 
 Benguet Electric v. NLRC
o Facts
 Cosalan was a manager at Benguet Electric
 He received an audit report from the Commission on Audit (COA) informing him
of irregular cash advances and allowances
 In response Cosalan implemented the remedial measures recommended by
COA
 Unhappy with the mismanagement of Cosalan the Benguet Electric Board
adopted a series of resolutions which ousted Cosalan from his position as manager
 Cosalan went to the NLRC to challenge the board resolution where the labor
arbiter awarded Cosalan with reinstatement and moral damages from the Benguet
Electric Board
 Benguet Electric Board filed an appeal but through a private letter carrier
o Issue and Ruling
 WON transmission thorugh a private letter carrier instead of the Philippine post
office is valid method of filing a pleading
 NO, it is not a recognized mode of filing pleadings
 The board gave the pleading to the courier on May 1 and the NLRC
received it on May 4, but the deadline for the filing was on May 2
 Date of delivery to the private courier is not considered the date of filing
 In such cases the date of actual receipt by the NLRC and not date of
delivery to the private courier is deemed the date of filing
 Hence, the Board lost its right to appeal for failing to do so in the
required time
 
 Adamson v. Adamson
o Facts
  Adamson University (AU) was granted the ability to increase tuition by 10
percent by the ministry of education
 Adamon University Faculty Association (AUFEA) filed a complaint because AU
did not use the increased funds to increase the salary of its faculty
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
 The case was brought up to the NLRC which reversed the decision and ordered
the remittance of 60 percent of said funds
 AU filed a motion for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
 It filed for reconsideration for the denial because the service of the NLRC
decision was given to a security guard of the building of AU's old counsel who was
appointed to the SC
o Issue and Ruling
 WON service was sufficiently compliant with requirement of the law
 NO, service was not compliant with what was required by law
 Section 4 Rule 13 holds that service to the Atty. can be done by leaving
it at the office with the clerk or person in charge otherwise the service is not
effective
 In this case, the guard who received it was neither the clerk or the one
managing the office
 Furthermore, even if the old counsel failed to formally withdraw his
appearance, the NLRC should have taken judicial notice of the counsel's new
position in the SC which had appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC decisions
 
 Solar v. Ricaforte
o Facts
 Solar Team Entertainment (Solar) filed a motion to expunge Team Image
Entertainment Incorporated's (TIE) answer in a recovery of possession complaint filed
by Solar.
 Solar then moved to declared TIE in default, alleging that TIE did not personally
serve them a copy of the answer even though the counsel of Solar was only 200
meters away from them and that the post office was 10 times farther
 RTC Judge Ricaforte denied Solar's motion and held that the rules of court give
trial courts discretion to consider whether the answer was filed or not
o Issue and Ruling
 WON there was grave abuse of discretion when Ricaforte denied the motion to
expunge
 NO, there was no grave abuse of discretion by judge Ricaforte
 The rule states that personal service is mandatory when practicable and
that other modes are merely an exception to that general rule
 The motion to expunge was prima facie meritorious but the denial is still
proper, but for reasons from that held by the lower court
 The rules took effect on july 1, 1997 while the answer was filed only on
august 8, 1997; TIE's counsel might not have been aware of the rule's
ramifications
 
 Valmonte v. CA
o Facts
  Spouses Valmonte are residents of Washington, USA. Private respondent
Dimalanta (petitioner wife’s sister) filed a complaint for partition of real property
before the RTC
 Dimalanta averred that the complaints may be served with summons at Manila
where defendant husband holds office as a lawyer and where he can be found. This
was made on the basis of a letter previously sent by petitioner wife to Dimalanta in
which the former referred Dimalanta’s counsel to her husband as the party to whom
all communications intended for her should be sent
 Service was made upon petitioner husband. Petitioner husband accepted the
summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his
wife on the ground that he was not authorized to accept in her behalf
 Petitioner husband filed his answer with counterclaim but Petitioner wife did
not file her answer. Dimalanta moved to declare her in default. Petitioner husband
entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondent’s motion
 The RTC denied the motion. The CA reversed the decision and granted the
motion
o Issue and Ruling
 WON petitioner's wife was validly served with summons
 NO, she did not validly receive her summons
 As petitioner wife is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. To be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either
 By personal service
 By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of
the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or
 In any other manner which the court may deem sufficient
 The last mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country
where the defendant resides
 The service of summons on petitioner husband and counsel CANNOT be
considered a valid service of summons on petitioner wife
 Service of summons on petitioner husband was not made upon the
order of the court as required by Rule 14, Sec. 17 and certainly was not a mode
deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner wife in default for her failure to file
an answer
 As provided in Sec. 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in
writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
setting forth the grounds for the application
 Petitioner wife was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must
be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident
defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is
 fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty
(60) days from notice
 Service of summons in the manner provided in Sec. 17 is not for the
purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements
of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging
to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so
minded
 
 Citizen Surety v. Herrera
o Facts
 Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of
Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of promissory notes
in favor Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively
 As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity
Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses and a REM over
a parcel of land
 The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes compelling Citizens to pay. The
Dacanays failed to reimburse Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case to recover the unsatisfied
balance
 At Citizen’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by
publication in the Philippines Herald but despite such publication and deposit of copy
with the Manila post office, Dacanay did not appear within 60 days from the last
publication
 Citizen sought for defendants Dacanay to be declared in default, but Judge
Herrera eventually dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants
not having appeared.
o Issue and Ruling
 WON summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire
jurisdiction
 NO, the summons was not sufficient
 In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within
the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court
 In other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the
due process clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over
said defendants
 The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or
personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause
them to be attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be valid
 Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the
decision of the respondent Judge should be set aside and held pending in the
archives until petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendant’s
person or properties
 
 Kawasaki v. Amores
o Facts
 Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha (Kabushiki) is corporation organized under the law of
Japan. It appears to have incurred obligations to several creditors amongst which are
defendants, also foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of Japan
 Its creditors demanded payment from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines when Sharp Kabushiki
defaulted in paying Sharp & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief against Kabushiki’s creditors alleging that the former is a separate
and distinct corporation
 Extraterritorial service of summons was resorted to because the defendants are
non-residents, without business addresses in the Philippines but in Japan
 Kawasaki Port Services are creditors of Kabushiki, with business addresses in
Japan, they filed their special appearances to question the court’s jurisdiction over
their persons
 Kawasaki contended that Sharp Co.’s action does not refer to its personal status;
that the action does not have for subject matter property contemplated in Section 17
of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be
excluded from any interest or property in the Philippines; that no property of the
defendants has been attached; that the action is in personam; and that the action
does not fall within any of the four cases mentioned in Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court
 Sharp Co. countered that the action refers to its status because the basic issue
presented to the lower court for determination is its status as a corporation which has
a personality that is separate, distinct and independent from the personality of
another corporation, Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha of Japan and the action before the lower
court is an action quasi in rem as the remedies raised in the complaint affect the
personal status of the plaintiff as a separate, distinct and independent corporation
and relates to the properties of the plaintiff in the Philippines
o Issue and Ruling
 WON the complaint is an action in rem that extraterritorial service of summons
to Kawasaki et al conferred jurisdiction to the court
 NO, the complaint is not an action in rem hence the extra-terrestrial
service of summons did not confer jurisdiction to the courts
 In the case at bar, the court held that monetary obligation was the issue
in this case which does not, in any way, refer to status, rights and obligations.
The complaint is purely an action for injunction, which is a personal action as
well as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem
 As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on
Kawasaki et al, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on
the court. In an action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the
processes of the Regional Trial Court
 Extra-territorial service of summons will not confer on the court
jurisdiction or Power to compel them to obey its orders. Considering that extra-
territorial service of summons on the petitioners was improper, the same was
null and void.
 
  
 Cariaga v. Malaya
o Facts
 Ana Almonte Cariaga, in behalf of her minor daughter Carolina Cariaga-Soon,
the defendants in this case, had initiated an action for the annulment of the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, Cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of
Title, and Recovery of Real Property with damages with the CFI
 All the defendants in that case had filed their answer with counterclaim save for
the petitioners herein, Jose Cariaga Jr. and Marieta Cariaga-Celis, who were both
residing abroad and were not served with summons
 Upon motion of the plaintiff, the lower court granted them leave to effect extra-
territorial service of summons upon the defendants. Accordingly, summons with
copies of the complaint were served to the defendants by registered mail abroad
(Guam and U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at the instance of plaintiffs
 Defendant filed a motion to set aside the said summons and to declare the
service of summons abroad by registered mail as null and void, it being allegedly
irregular and unauthorized under the provisions of the Rules of Court, but was denied
by the Court
o Issue and Ruling
 WON the extra-territorial service of summons by registered mail upon
defendants complied with the Rules of Court
 YES, Petitioners’ argument holds no water. There is no question that the
requirement of due process has been met
 Under Section 17 (Now Section 15), extraterritorial service of summons
is proper:
 When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
 When the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent
 When the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or
in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located
in the Philippines; and
 When defendant non-resident's property has been attached
within the Philippines
 In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines in three ways
 By personal service;
 By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of
the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; and
 In any other manner which the court may deem sufficient
 The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially
complied with in this case.
 
 
 Dial Corp. v. Soriano
o Facts
  Petitioners are foreign corporations organized and existing under the laws of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia, and are not domiciled in the
Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents, place of business, or property in the
Philippines; they are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in business here
 Respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. (IVO) is a Philippine
corporation which through its president, Dominador Monteverde, had entered into
several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners
 IVO repudiated Monteverde's contracts on the grounds that they were mere
"paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly
intended by the parties; that the Board of Directors removed Dominador Monteverde
as president replacing him with Rodrigo Monteverde, and disowned Dominador
Monteverde's allegedly illegal and unauthorized acts; that the defendants have
allegedly "harassed" IVO to comply with Dominador's contracts and to come to a
settlement with them
 IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages against the foreign coconut oil
buyers
 On motion of IVO, respondent Judge authorized it to effect extraterritorial
service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines corporation.
Petitioners were served with summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier
service
 Petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground
that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over them but the Court denied their motion
o Issue and Ruling
 WON the extraterritorial service of summons was proper
 NO, the extraterritorial service of summons was not proper
 Only in four (4) instances is extraterritorial service of summons proper,
namely
 When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;
 When the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent;
 When the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in
the Philippines; and
 When the defendant non-resident's property has been attached
within the Philippines
 The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the
plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or
claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The action is purely an
action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO
("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the
defendants, and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for
such "harassment
 It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an
action in rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in remedies is an
action against the thing itself, instead of against the person
  As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the
defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the
court
 Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire
jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident
defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is
that jurisdiction in personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money
judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state which renders
the judgment
 Even if the foreign petitioners can be considered as such “foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license may be
sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunal on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws”, the Corporation
Code did not repeal the rules requiring proper service of summons to such
corporations as provided in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 128 of the
Corporation Code
 
 BPI v. Far East Molasses
o Facts
 Petitioner BPI filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against
respondent with the CFI which later ruled in favor of BPI. Respondent FEMC received a
copy of the, but instead of filing a notice of appeal, FEMC filed, a motion for
reconsideration. The motion, however, did not contain any notice of hearing
 To cure the defect of lack of notice of hearing, counsel for respondent mailed by
ordinary mail a Manifestation and Motion incorporating therein the omitted notice of
hearing, claiming that said notice "was inadvertently omitted from the said Motion for
Reconsideration
 The Manifestation and Motion was received by the court only on August 7. BPI
however claimed that it never received a copy of said pleading and that such was
doubtful since the messenger of FEMC’s lawyer, could not even state the name of the
Post Office where he supposedly mailed it
 Petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment on the ground that it had
already become final since the motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of
the period to appeal, because it did not contain any notice of hearing. The trial court
granted the motion
 FEMC filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining with the Court of Appeals which then set aside the decision of
the trail court while BPI filed a motion for reconsideration which was later denied
o Issue and Ruling
 WON FEMC’s Motion for Reconsideration interrupted the running of the period
of appeal
 NO, The Motion for Reconsideration filed by FEMC which incorporated
its Manifestation DID NOT interrupted the running of the period of appeal
 The unrippled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a motion that does not
contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a
motion for it does not comply with the rules and hence, the clerk has no right to
receive it
  The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court on Motions is mandatory. Accordingly, the absence of a notice of
hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of
the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency
 This requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to a motion for
reconsideration. Without such notice, the motion is pro forma. And a pro forma
motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to
appeal
 
 WON the Manifestation and Motion containing the notice of hearing sent by FEMC
cured the defect of its Motion for Reconsideration
 NO, the Manifestation and Motion did not cure the lack of notice of hearing
 There is no showing that petitioner was furnished with a copy of the notice; on
the contrary, petitioner denied having received one. That none at all was
furnished to petitioner is indisputably confirmed by the failure of the affidavit of
the messenger of private respondent's counsel to state the contrary
 Personal service of a copy could have been easily done since the office of
counsel for petitioner is located at Juan Luna St., Manila, while that of counsel
for private respondent is located at Makati, Metro Manila
 The so called notice incorporated in the Manifestation and Motion is not the
notice required by law. It is a notice of the Clerk of Court and not to counsel for
the petitioner. Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court expressly and
unequivocally requires that the notice "shall be directed to the parties
concerned." It did not then cure the fatal defect of the motion for
reconsideration
 The copy of the manifestation and motion for the trial court was sent by
ordinary mail. No credible justification has been offered by private respondent
as to why it was not sent by registered mail. Section 5 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court on service by registered or ordinary mail requires service by registered
mail where registry service exists. Otherwise stated, service by ordinary mail is
allowed only in instances where no registry service exists
 Private respondent fails to indicate that no registry service was available at the
Post Office where it was mailed. to all legal intents and purposes, the
manifestation and motion must be deemed to have been filed on the day that it
was received by the court, on August 7. Having been filed clearly beyond the
period to appeal, it did not operate to cure the defect of the motion for
reconsideration. It cannot be given a retroactive effect
 The commencement of the period to appeal should not be reckoned from the
latest date any of the parties received a copy of the decision, but from the
respective dates each of the parties received a copy of the decision. Therefore,
each party has a different period within which to appeal, unless, of course, all of
them received their copies on the same date and none filed a motion for
reconsideration
 WON “Last Day to Appeal" And "Perfection of The Appeal” mean the same thing.
 NO, “the Last Day to Appeal" And "Perfection of The Appeal” mean the different
things
 Section 23 of the Interim Rules of Court and the decisions referred to, contrary
again to the perception of the respondent Court of Appeals, do not interpret the
 phrase "last day to appeal by any party," but rather refer to the perfection of
the appeal
 There is a whale of a difference between last day to appeal and perfection of
the appeal. The last day to appeal is the fifteenth day from receipt by a party of
a copy of the decision. However, that appeal is not considered perfected until
the expiration of the period to appeal by the other party in the case. The
distinction assumes importance only in cases involving execution of judgment
pending appeal