Brinas vs People G.R. No.

L-30309 November 25, 1983

FACTS: Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Quezon for his 55-year
old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for
Barrio Lusacan. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her
granddaughter among the passengers. At Hondagua, Victor Millan took over as engineman,
Clemente Briñas as conductor, and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon
approaching Barrio Lagalag at about 8:00 p.m, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted
'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Because of that, the old woman walked towards the left front door facing
the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other.
When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result
the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more
before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the
passengers who disembarked thereat. The accused wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated
the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws,
regulations and ordinances, that although there were passengers on board the passenger coach,
they failed to provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the necessary precautions for the
safety of passengers and to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their
instantaneous death.

CFI Decision: CFI of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for double
homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan.
For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes Buencamino and on the
ground of reasonable doubt in the case of defendant Victor Millan the court hereby acquits them
of the crime charged in the information and their bail bonds declared cancelled. As to the
responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case, this will be the subject of court
determination in another proceeding.

CA Decision: Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the
heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages
against the Manila Railroad Company.

Issues: WON (1) the CA gravely erred in convicting petitioner-appellant under the facts as found
by said court; (2) the CA erred in including the payment of death indemnity by the petitioner-
appellant, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, after the heirs of the deceased
have already commenced a separate civil action for damages against the railroad company.

Ruling: (1) No. There is no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from those findings.

It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant
was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted
"Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child
stumbled and they were seen no more. It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the
next flag stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. The negligence of petitioner-
appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause
of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most
contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

(2) No. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced is culpa contractual, not an act or
omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's arguments and from the title of
the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-
appellant Briñas Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct
sources of obligation. A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the
criminal action for double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to
file an independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila
Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of
the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity
in the judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant. It is well-settled that when death
occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items of damages may be
recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death indemnity is
increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for
the death of EmelitaGesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

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As this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, CA G.R. No. 7059-R, June 3, 1953: 'The proximate cause
of the injury is not necessarily the immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury.
It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is to be charged with the
disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act
the injury (sic) that it can reasonably be said that but for the act the injury could not have
occurred, such negligent act is the proximate cause of the injury, and whoever is responsible
therefore is liable for damages resulting therefrom. One who negligently creates a dangerous
condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the
act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible intervenes to precipitate the
loss.
 Phil National Railways vs Vizcara G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012

FACTS: On May 14, 2004, at about 3AM, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a
passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions, namely,
CresencioVizcara (Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel),
Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and Joel Vizcara (Joel). While crossing the railroad track in
Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then being operated by respondent
Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision
resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other
hand, Dominador and Joel sustained serious physical injuries. At the time of the accident, there
was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen"
signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop" signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage
was partly blocked by another signboard.

RTC Decision: RTC rendered its Decision ruling in favor of the respondents. The respondents
alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the
victims of the accident was the petitioners’ gross negligence in not providing adequate safety
measures to prevent injury to persons and properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track
of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting
equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching
train. They concluded their complaint with a prayer for actual, moral and compensatory
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

CA Decision: CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners. It
concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to install sufficient safety
devices in the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause
of the accident. Nonetheless, in order to conform with established jurisprudence, it modified the
monetary awards to the victims and the heirs of those who perished due to the collision.

Issues: WON (1) CA erred in finding that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence
of the petitioners; (2) CA erred in holding that the doctrine of last clear chance finds no
application in the instant case; (3) CA erred in finding negligence on the part of the petitioners or
erred in not finding at the least, contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.

Ruling: (1) The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's
act or omission constituting fault or negligence. It states: Article 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Both RTC and CA ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into
consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the
petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in
order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the "Stop,
Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert
the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a
dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in
working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.  Having established the fact
of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages.

(2) The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.

The CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the instant case.
The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with
the consequences arising there from. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence
of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the
latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. The proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that
motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and
passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate
incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for
their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine
of last clear chance cannot be applied.

(3) There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for
his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they
were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the
jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three
to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track, Reynaldo, the
driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to
proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision did
not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the truck they
were trailing was able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent
them from proceeding or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching
peril. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the
impending danger. He proceeded to cross the track and, all of a sudden, his jeepney was rammed
by the train being operated by the petitioners. Even then, the circumstances before the collision
negate the imputation of contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. What clearly
appears is that the accident would not have happened had the petitioners installed reliable and
adequate safety devices along the crossing to ensure the safety of all those who may utilize the
same.
 AF vs CA G.R. No. 188961 October 13, 2009

FACTS: Respondent alleged that he went on a pilgrimage with a group of Filipinos to selected
countries in Europe. According to respondent: (1) AF’s agent in Paris failed to inform him of the
need to secure a transit visa for Moscow, as a result of which he was denied entry to Moscow
and was subjected to humiliating interrogation by the police; (2) another AF agent (a certain Ms.
Soeyesol) rudely denied his request to contact his travel companions to inform them that he was
being sent back to Paris from Moscow with a police escort; Ms. Soeyesol even reported him as a
security threat which resulted in his being subjected to further interrogation by the police in Paris
and Rome, and worse, also lifted his flight coupons for the rest of his trip; (3) AF agents in Rome
refused to honor his confirmed flight to Paris; (4) upon reaching Paris for his connecting flight to
Manila, he found out that the AF agents did not check in his baggage and since he had to retrieve
his bags at the baggage area, he missed his connecting flight; (5) he had to shoulder his extended
stay in Paris for AF’s failure to make good its representation that he would be given a
complimentary motel pass and (6) he was given a computer print-out of his flight reservation for
Manila but when he went to the airport, he was told that the flight was overbooked. It was only
when he made a scene that the AF agent boarded him on an AF flight to Hongkong and placed
him on a connecting Philippine Airlines flight to Manila.

RTC Decision: RTC found that AF breached its contract of carriage and that it was liable to pay
damages and attorney’s fees to respondent.

CA Decision: CA affirmed the RTC decision with modifications. The CA ruled that it was
respondent (as passenger), and not AF, who was responsible for having the correct travel
documents. However, the appellate court stated that this fact did not absolve AF from liability
for damages. The CA agreed with the findings of fact of the RTC that AF’s agents and
representatives repeatedly subjected respondent to very poor service, verbal abuse and abject
lack of respect and consideration. As such, AF was guilty of bad faith for which respondent
ought to be compensated.

Issue: WON respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees, the same entails a resort to
the parties’ respective evidence

Ruling: We deny the petition.

Preliminarily, on the issue pertaining to whether or not respondent was entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees, the same entails a resort to the parties’ respective evidence. Thus, AF is clearly
asking us to consider a question of fact.

Time and again, we have held that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, save for certain exceptions, none of
which are present in this case.

Both the RTC and the CA have competently ruled on the issue of respondent’s entitlement to
damages and attorney’s fees as they properly laid down both the factual and legal bases for their
respective decisions. We see no reason to disturb their findings.
The above liabilities of AF shall earn legal interest pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella,5 citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
CA.61avvphi1

Pursuant to this ruling, the legal interest is 6% p.a. and it shall be reckoned from April 25, 2007
when the RTC rendered its judgment, not from the time of respondent’s extrajudicial demand.
This must be so as it was at the time the RTC rendered its judgment that the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained. Then, from the time this decision
becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% p.a. until full satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 90151 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to PAY legal interest of 6% p.a. from
the date of promulgation of the decision dated April 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Makati City and 12% p.a. from the time the decision of this Court attains finality, on
all sums awarded until their full satisfaction.

Costs against petitioner.

-----------------------------------------------------------

When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
 PhilAm vs Heung-a Shipping G.R No. 188701 and 187812 July 23, 2014

FACTS: Novartis Consumer Health Philippines, Inc. (NOVARTIS) imported from

Jinsuk Trading Co. Ltd. (JINSUK) in South Korea, 19 pallets of 200 rolls of Ovaltine
Power 18 Glaminated plastic packaging material. In order to ship the goods to the
Philippines, JINSUK engaged the services of Protop Shipping Corporation (PROTOP), a
freight forwarder likewise based in South Korea, to forward the goods to their
consignee, NOVARTIS. Based on Bill of Lading issued by PROTOP, the cargo was
on freight prepaid basis and on "shipper’s load and count" which means that the "container
[was] packed with cargo by one shipper where the quantity, description and condition of the
cargo is the sole responsibility of the shipper." Likewise stated in thebill of lading is the name
Sagawa Express Phils., Inc., (SAGAWA) designated as the entity in the Philippines which
will obtain the delivery contract. PROTOP shipped the cargo through Dongnama Shipping Co.
Ltd. (DONGNAMA) which in turn loaded the same on M/V Heung-A Bangkok V-019 owned
and operated by Heung-A Shipping Corporation, (HEUNG-A). Wallem Philippines Shipping,
Inc. (WALLEM) is the ship agent of HEUNG-A in the Philippines. NOVARTIS insured the
shipment with Philam Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAM, now Chartis Philippines Insurance,
Inc.) under All Risk Marine Open Insurance Policy against all loss, damage, liability, or
expense before, during transit and even after the discharge of the shipment from the
carrying vessel until its complete delivery to the consignee’s premises. The shipment
reached NOVARTIS’ premises and was thereupon inspected by the company’s Senior
Laboratory Technician.

Upon initial inspection, Caparoso found the container van locked with its load intact. After
opening the same, she inspected its contents and discovered that the boxes of the shipment were
wet and damp. The boxes on one side of the van were in disarray while others were opened or
damaged due to the dampness. Caparoso further observed that parts of the container van were
damaged and rusty. There were also water droplets on the walls and the floor was wet. Since the
damaged packaging materials might contaminate the product they were meant to hold, Caparoso
rejected the entire shipment.

Renato Layug and Mario Chin, duly certified adjusters of the Manila Adjusters and Surveyors
Company were forthwith hailed to inspect and conduct a survey of the shipment. Their
Certificate of Survey dated January 17, 2001 yielded results similar to the observations of
Caparoso, thus: The sea van panels/sidings and roofing were noted with varying degrees of
indentations and partly corroded/rusty. Internally, water bead clung along the roofs from rear to
front section. The mid section dented/sagged with affected area was noted with minutes hole
evidently due to thinning/corroded rusty metal plates. The shipment was noted with several
palletized cartons already in collapsed condition due to wetting. The van’s entire floor length
was also observed wet.

All 17 pallets of the 184 cartons/rolls contained in the sea van were found wet/water damaged.
Sixteen (16) cartons/rolls supposedly contained in 2 pallets were unaccounted for although the
surveyors remarked that this may be due to short shipment by the supplier considering that the
sea van was fully loaded and can no longer accommodate the said unaccounted items. The
survey report further stated that the "wetting sustained by the shipment may have reasonably be
attributed to the water seepage that gain entry into the sea van container damage roofs (minutes
hole) during transit period.

Samples from the wet packing materials/boxes were submitted to the chemist of Precision
Analytical Services, Inc. (PRECISION), Virgin Hernandez (Hernandez), and per Laboratory
Report No. 042-07 dated January 16, 2001, the cause of wetting in the carton boxes and kraft
paper/lining materials as well as the aluminum foil laminated plastic packaging material, was salt
water.

RTC Decision: RTC ruled that the damage to the shipment occurred on board the vessel while in
transit from Korea to the Philippines. ATI and STEPHANIE were exonerated from any liability.
SAGAWA was likewise adjudged not liable for the loss/damage to the shipment by virtue of the
phrase "Shipper’s Load and Count" reflected in the bill of lading issued by PROTOP. Since the
container van was packed under the sole responsibility of the shipper in Korea, SAGAWA,
which is based in the Philippines, had no chance to check if the contents were in good condition
or not. The RTC concluded that SAGAWA cannot be expected to observe the diligence or care
required of a carrier or ship agent. SAGAWA, ATI and STEPHANIE’s counterclaims for
attorney’s fees were granted and PHILAM was ordered to pay the same for having been filed a
‘shotgun case’ against them.

CA Decision: CA agreed with the RTC that PROTOP, HEUNG-A and WALLEM are liable for
the damaged shipment. The fact that HEUNG-A was not a party to the bill of lading did not
negate the existence of a contract of carriage between HEUNG-A and/or WALLEM and
NOVARTIS. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. By
agreeing to transport the goods contained in the sea van providedby DONGNAMA, HEUNG-A
impliedly entered into a contract of carriage with NOVARTIS with whom the goods were
consigned. Hence, it assumed the obligations of a common carrier to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by it. Further the Slot Charter Agreement
did not change HEUNG-A’s character as a common carrier.

Moreover, the proximate cause of the damage was the failure of HEUNG-A to inspect and
examine the actual condition of the sea van before loading it on the vessel. Also, proper
measures in handling and stowage should have been adopted to prevent seepage of sea water into
the sea van. The CA rejected WALLEM and HEUNG-A’s argument that NOVARTIS failed to
comply with Article 366 of the Code of Commerce requiring that a claim must be made against
the carrier within 24 hours from receipt of the merchandise because such provision applies only
to inter-island shipments within the Philippines. The CA limited the liability of PROTOP,
WALLEM and HEUNG-A to US$8,500.00 pursuant to the liability limitation under the COGSA
since the shipper failed to declare the value of the subject cargo in the bill of lading and since
they could not be made answerable for the two (2) unaccounted pallets because the shipment was
on a "shipper’s load, count and seal" basis. The attorney’s fees awarded to SAGAWA, ATI and
STEPHANIE were deleted because it was not shown that PHILAM was motivated by malice and
bad faith in impleading them as defendants.

Issues: WON (1) the shipment sustained damage while in the possession and custody of
HEUNG-A, and (2) if so, whether HEUNG-A’s liability can be limited to US$500 per package
pursuant to the COGSA; (3) Whether or not NOVARTIS/PHILAM failed to file a timely claim
against HEUNG-A and/or WALLEM.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. It must be stressed that the question on whether the subject shipment sustained damaged
while in the possession and custody of HEUNG-A is a factual matter which has already been
determined by the RTC and the CA. The courts a quo were uniform in finding that the goods
inside the container van were damaged by sea water while in transit on board HEUNG-A’s
vessel.

Being a factual question, it is not reviewable in the herein petition filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. It is not the Court’s duty to evaluate and weigh the evidence all over again as
such function is conceded to be within the expertise of the trial court whose findings, when
supported by substantial evidence on record and affirmed by the CA, are regarded with respect,
if not binding effect, by this Court.

The Court finds that the factual findings of the courts a quo are supported by evidence on record.
The uncontested results of the inspection survey conducted by Manila Adjusters Surveyors
Company showed that sea water seeped into the panels/sidings and roofing of the container van.
This was confirmed by the examination conducted by Hernandez, the chemist of PRECISION,
on samples from the cartons, boxes, aluminum foil and laminated plastic packaging materials.
Based on the laboratory examination results, the contents of the van were drenched by sea water,
an element which is highly conspicuous in the high seas. It can thus be reasonably concluded that
negligence occurred while the container van was in transit, in HEUNG-A’s possession, control
and custody as the carrier.

Although the container van had defects, they were not, however, so severe as to accommodate
heavy saturation of sea water. The holes were tiny and the rusty portions did not cause gaps or
tearing. Hence, the van was still in a suitable condition to hold the goods and protect them from
natural weather elements or even the normal flutter of waves in the seas.

The scale of the damage sustained by the cargo inside the van could have been only caused by
large volume of sea water since not a single package inside was spared. Aside from the defective
condition of the van, some other circumstance or occurrence contributed to the damages
sustained by the shipment. Since the presence of sea water is highly concentrated in the high seas
and considering HEUNG-A’s failure to demonstrate how it exercised due diligence in
handling and preserving the container van while in transit, it is liable for the damages
sustained thereby.

As the carrier of the subject shipment, HEUNG-A was bound to exercise extraordinary diligence
in conveying the same and its slot charter agreement with DONGNAMA did not divest it of such
characterization nor relieve it of any accountability for the shipment.

Clearly then, despite its contract of affreightment with DONGNAMA, HEUNG-A remained
responsible as the carrier, hence, answerable for the damages incurred by the goods received for
transportation. "Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of
the goods and the passengers they transport. Thus, common carriers are required to render
service with the greatest skill and foresight and ‘to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristics of the goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the
handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.’"

Here, HEUNG-A failed to rebut this prima facie presumption when it failed to give adequate
explanation as to how the shipment inside the container van was handled, stored and preserved to
forestall or prevent any damage or loss while the same was in its possession, custody and control.

(2) Yes. In case, however, of the shipper’s failure to declare the value of the goods in the bill of
lading, Section 4, paragraph 5 of the COGSA provides:

Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to
or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package
lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such
goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This
declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence, but shall be
conclusive on the carrier.

Hence, when there is a loss/damage to goods covered by contracts of carriage from a foreign port
to a Philippine port and in the absence a shipper’s declaration of the value of the goods in the bill
of lading, as in the present case, the foregoing provisions of the COGSA shall apply. The CA,
therefore, did not err in ruling that HEUNG-A, WALLEM and PROTOP’s liability is limited to
$500 per package or pallet.

(3) No. It was further ruled in Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc., that pursuant
to the foregoing COGSA provision, failure to comply with the notice requirement shall not affect
or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after delivery of the goods.

The consignee, NOV ARTIS, received the subject shipment on January 5, 2001. PHILAM, as the
subrogee of NOVARTIS, filed a claim against PROTOP on June 4, 2001, against WALLEM on
October 12, 2001 and against HEUNG-A on December 11, 2001, or all within the one-year
prescriptive period. Verily then, despite NOVARTIS' failure to comply with the three-day
notice requirement, its subrogee PHILAM is not barred from seeking reimbursement from
PROTOP, HEUNG-A and WALLEM because the demands for payment were timely filed.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated January 30, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89482 is hereby AFFlHMED with MODIFICATION in that the
interest rate on the award of US$8,500.00 shall be six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 Edgar Cokaliong vs UCPB G.R. No. 146018 June 25, 2003

FACTS: Nestor Angelia delivered to the Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong
Shipping Lines), [petitioner] for brevity, cargo consisting of one (1) carton of Christmas décor
and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be transported on board the M/V Tandag on its Voyage No.
T-189 scheduled to depart from Cebu City, on December 12, 1991, for Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
Petitioner issued Bill of Lading No. 58, freight prepaid, covering the cargo. Nestor Angelia was
both the shipper and consignee of the cargo valued, on the face thereof, in the amount of
₱6,500.00. Zosimo Mercado likewise delivered cargo to [petitioner], consisting of two (2)
cartons of plastic toys and Christmas decor, one (1) roll of floor mat and one (1) bundle of
various or assorted goods for transportation thereof from Cebu City to Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
on board the said vessel, and said voyage. Petitioner issued Bill of Lading No. 59 covering the
cargo which, on the face thereof, was valued in the amount of ₱14,000.00. Under the Bill of
Lading, Zosimo Mercado was both the shipper and consignee of the cargo. On December 12,
1991, Feliciana Legaspi insured the cargo, covered by Bill of Lading No. 59, with the UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc., [respondent] for brevity, for the amount of ₱100,000.00 ‘against all
risks’ under Open Policy No. 002/9 1/254 for which she was issued, by [respondent], Marine
Risk Note No. 18409 on said date. She also insured the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 58,
with [respondent], for the amount of ₱50,000.00, under Open Policy No. 002/9 1/254 on the
basis of which [respondent] issued Marine Risk Note No. 18410 on said date. When the vessel
left port, it had thirty-four (34) passengers and assorted cargo on board, including the goods of
Legaspi. After the vessel had passed by the Mandaue-Mactan Bridge, fire ensued in the engine
room and, despite earnest efforts of the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and
destroyed the entire vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the cargoes therein. The Captain
filed the required Marine Protest.

Feliciana Legaspi then filed a claim, with respondent, for the value of the cargo insured under
Marine Risk Note No. 18409 and covered by Bill of Lading No. 59. She submitted, in support of
her claim, a Receipt, dated December 11, 1991, purportedly signed by Zosimo Mercado, and
Order Slips purportedly signed by him for the goods he received from Feliciana Legaspi valued
in the amount of ₱110,056.00. Respondent approved the claim of Feliciana Legaspi and drew
and issued UCPB Check No. 612939, dated March 9, 1992, in the net amount of ₱99,000.00, in
settlement of her claim after which she executed a Subrogation Receipt/Deed, for said amount, in
favor of respondent. She also filed a claim for the value of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading
No. 58. She submitted to [respondent] a Receipt, dated December 11, 1991 and Order Slips,
purportedly signed by Nestor Angelia for the goods he received from Feliciana Legaspi valued at
₱60,338.00. Respondent approved her claim and remitted to Feliciana Legaspi the net amount of
₱49,500.00, after which she signed a Subrogation Receipt/Deed, dated March 9, 1992, in favor
of respondent.
CA Decision: The CA held that petitioner had failed to prove that the fire which consumed the
vessel and its cargo was caused by something other than its negligence in the upkeep,
maintenance and operation of the vessel."Petitioner had paid ₱14,000 to Legaspi Marketing for
the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 59. The CA, however, held that the payment did not
extinguish petitioner’s obligation to respondent, because there was no evidence that Feliciana
Legaspi (the insured) was the owner/proprietor of Legaspi Marketing. The CA also pointed out
the impropriety of treating the claim under Bill of Lading No. 58 -- covering cargo valued
therein at ₱6,500 -- as a setoff against Nestor Angelia’s account with Chester Enterprises, Inc.
Finally, it ruled that respondent "is not bound by the valuation of the cargo under the Bills of
Lading, x x x nor is the value of the cargo under said Bills of Lading conclusive on the
[respondent]. This is so because, in the first place, the goods were insured with the [respondent]
for the total amount of ₱150,000.00, which amount may be considered as the face value of the
goods.

Issues: WON (1) petitioner liable for the loss of the goods; (2) If it is liable, what is the extent of
its liability?

Ruling: The Petition is partly meritorious.

(1) Yes. Petitioner argues that the cause of the loss of the goods, subject of this case, was force
majeure. It adds that its exercise of due diligence was adequately proven by the findings of the
Philippine Coast Guard. The court is not convinced. The uncontroverted findings of the
Philippine Coast Guard show that the M/V Tandag sank due to a fire, which resulted from a
crack in the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank. Fuel spurted out of the crack and dripped to
the heating exhaust manifold, causing the ship to burst into flames. The crack was located on the
side of the fuel oil tank, which had a mere two-inch gap from the engine room walling, thus
precluding constant inspection and care by the crew. Having originated from an unchecked crack
in the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not have been caused by force majeure. Broadly
speaking, force majeure generally applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a
lightning, an earthquake, a tempest or a public enemy. Hence, fire is not considered a natural
disaster or calamity.

"Article 1680 of the Civil Code, which considers fire as an extraordinary fortuitous event refers
to leases or rural lands where a reduction of the rent is allowed when more than one-half of the
fruits have been lost due to such event, considering that the law adopts a protective policy
towards agriculture. “As the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article
1734, supra, Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that in all cases other than those mentioned
in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.”
Where loss of cargo results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their ship
frequently so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss cannot be attributed to force
majeure, but to the negligence of those officials. The law provides that a common carrier is
presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over
the goods it transported. Ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel is the first step in exercising
the required vigilance. Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence showing what measures or
acts it had undertaken to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel. It failed to show when the last
inspection and care of the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank was made, what the normal
practice was for its maintenance, or some other evidence to establish that it had exercised
extraordinary diligence. It merely stated that constant inspection and care were not possible, and
that the last time the vessel was dry-docked was in November 1990. Necessarily, in accordance
with Article 173517 of the Civil Code, we hold petitioner responsible for the loss of the goods
covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59.

(2) Extent of liability

The records show that the Bills of Lading covering the lost goods contain the stipulation that in
case of claim for loss or for damage to the shipped merchandise or property, "the liability of the
common carrier shall not exceed the value of the goods as appearing in the bill of lading." The
attempt by respondent to make light of this stipulation is unconvincing. As it had the consignees’
copies of the Bills of Lading, it could have easily produced those copies, instead of relying on
mere allegations and suppositions. However, it presented mere photocopies thereof to disprove
petitioner’s evidence showing the existence of the above stipulation.

We find no cogent reason to disturb the CA’s finding that Feliciana Legaspi was the owner of the
goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59. Undoubtedly, the goods were merely
consigned to Nestor Angelia and Zosimo Mercado, respectively; thus, Feliciana Legaspi or her
subrogee (respondent) was entitled to the goods or, in case of loss, to compensation therefore.
There is no evidence showing that petitioner paid her for the loss of those goods. It does not even
claim to have paid her. On the other hand, Legaspi Marketing filed with petitioner a claim for the
lost goods under Bill of Lading No. 59, for which the latter subsequently paid ₱14,000. But
nothing in the records convincingly shows that the former was the owner of the goods.
Respondent was, however, able to prove that it was Feliciana Legaspi who owned those goods,
and who was thus entitled to payment for their loss. Hence, the claim for the goods under Bill of
Lading No. 59 cannot be deemed to have been extinguished, because payment was made to a
person who was not entitled thereto. With regard to the claim for the goods that were covered by
Bill of Lading No. 58 and valued at ₱6,500, the parties have not convinced us to disturb the
findings of the CA that compensation could not validly take place. Thus, we uphold the appellate
court’s ruling on this point.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is

MODIFIED in the sense that petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent the sums of ₱14,000 and
₱6,500, which represent the value of the goods stated in Bills of Lading Nos. 59 and 58,
respectively. No costs.
 Bascos vs CA G.R. No. 101089 April 7, 1993

FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short)
entered into a hauling contract 2 with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former
bound itself to haul the latter's 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes Drive, Del Pan,
Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its
obligation, CIPTRADE, through Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita Bascos
(petitioner) to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal worth P156,404.00 from the
Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna at the rate of P50.00 per metric ton. Petitioner failed to
deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency
the amount of the lost goods in accordance with the contract.

RTC Decision: Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering
the latter to pay the former for actual damages with legal interest of 12% per cent per annum, for
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. The "Urgent Motion to Dissolve/Lift preliminary
Attachment" filed by defendant is DENIED for being moot and academic.

CA Decision: CA affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Issues: WON (1) petitioner was a common carrier; and (2) was the hijacking referred to a force
majeure?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. Petitioner is a common carrier. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier
as "(a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public." The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking
is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as
his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted." In this case,
petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her
trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is
required to prove the same.
Regarding the affidavits presented by petitioner to the court, both the trial and appellate courts
have dismissed them as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound by the
appellate court's factual conclusions. Yet, granting that the said evidence were not self-serving,
the same were not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of lease. It must be understood
that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the contracting parties.
Furthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

(2) No. To establish grave and irresistible force, petitioner presented her accusatory affidavit,
Jesus Bascos' affidavit, and Juanito Morden's "Salaysay". However, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have concluded that these affidavits were not enough to overcome the
presumption. Petitioner's affidavit about the hijacking was based on what had been told her by
Juanito Morden. It was not a first-hand account. While it had been admitted in court for lack of
objection on the part of private respondent, the respondent Court had discretion in assigning
weight to such evidence. We are bound by the conclusion of the appellate court. In a petition for
review on certiorari, we are not to determine the probative value of evidence but to resolve
questions of law. Secondly, the affidavit of Jesus Bascos did not dwell on how the hijacking took
place. Thirdly, while the affidavit of Juanito Morden, the truck helper in the hijacked truck, was
presented as evidence in court, he himself was a witness as could be gleaned from the contents of
the petition. Affidavits are not considered the best evidence if the affiants are available as
witnesses. The subsequent filing of the information for carnapping and robbery against the
accused named in said affidavits did not necessarily mean that the contents of the affidavits were
true because they were yet to be determined in the trial of the criminal cases. The presumption
of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. Thus,
contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any evidence to prove her
negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the
presumption conclusive against her. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on
the substantial issues involved. We find no reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to
lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment has been rendered moot and academic by the
decision on the merits.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is our opinion that the petitioner's claim cannot be
sustained. The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 JOSE SON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CEBU AUTOBUS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

[G.R. No. L-6155. April 30, 1954.]

Facts
The plaintiff boarded defendant’s truck in barrio Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, and loaded seven
hogs for his home at Yati, Liloan, Cebu, paying the usual fare and freight. The plaintiff did not
reach his destination safely, because the truck of the defendant fell into a canal at kilometer No.
56, barrio of Macaas, municipality of Catmon, Cebu. He was pinned down or pressed by the
truck on September 18, 1948, and, as a consequence, he suffered complete fractures on his pelvic
bone. Because of the shock and pain he lost his consciousness for sometime. He was brought to
his house at Yati, municipality of Liloan, Cebu, unconscious on board another truck. Later, on
the same day, he was brought in a special wagon to the City of Cebu, and was confined in the
Velez Clinic for fourteen days, from September 18, 1948, to October 2, 1948. On October 2,
1948, the plaintiff went out of the Velez Clinic, but according to Dr. Jacinto Velez, physician and
proprietor of the Velez Clinic, the plaintiff needed 60 days more of treatment and rest before he
could resume his former habitual work, inasmuch as he suffered complete fractures on his pelvic
bone.

RTC Decision

The trial court based its decision in favor of the plaintiff upon the finding that the defendant had
defaulted in its contract of carriage due to the accident, regardless of whether it was caused by a
defect of the engine of the defendant’s truck, by the negligence of its driver, or by the breakage
of the drag-link spring; the evidence showing that the said drag-link spring was not inspected or
examined when the vehicle left Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, for Cebu City. In other words, the
trial court overruled the defense interposed by the defendant that the accident was due to an
event (unexpected breakage of the drag-link spring) which could not be foreseen or which, even
if foreseen, was inevitable. In our opinion, the trial court was correct. Its express finding as to the
cause of the accident in effect blames the defendant for it and logically rejects the defendant’s
theory that the cause emanated from an unforeseen or inevitable event. In essence, the trial court
held that the drag-link spring of the truck in question was defective. In the case of Lazam v.
Smith, 45 Phil., 660, it was already held that an accident cause either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito.
CA Decision

CA affirmed the decision of RTC which is in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue
WON the bus company is liable

Ruling
Yes. The defense of defendant, that the breakage of the drag-link spring could not be foreseen
and if foreseen was inevitable, is untenable. It was already held that an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. As such,
the company must be held liable. The conclusion of the trial court with respect to the amount of
damages sustained by and award in favor of the plaintiff, is being factual, conclusive herein,
since, as herein before noted, the defendant has appealed directly to this Court solely on
questions of law.

Upon the other hand, plaintiff’s claim that the amount of moral damages awarded to him by the
trial court should be raised to P300, cannot be sustained, because no appeal was taken by him
from the decision a quo.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed and it is so ordered with costs against the
defendant-appellant.
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner Vs.CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON
and BENFOL CAMORO,respondents
G.R. No. L-45637
May 31, 1985

Lessons Applicable: Fortuitous Event (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
J e e p n e y w a s d r i v e n b y B e r f o l C a m o r o f r o m D a n a o C i t y t o C e b u C i t y .
I t was Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn
turtle. Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was thrown outof the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his
senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his
left arm, right thigh and on his back.
Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way,he
discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in
Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also
requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for
the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was newly bought and was only
slightly used
RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event

ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event

RULING:
NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.
passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up
passenger jeepney was overloaded
3 passengers in the front seat
14 passengers in the rear
caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of
the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach
their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to
know the correct measures to take when a tireblows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at
all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and byentering
into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far

In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of
the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because
of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take
when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.

It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by
the respondents.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IV appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the City Court of Cebu, Branch I is
REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn interest at 12% per annum and
the attorney's fees are increased to SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn
interests from January 27, 1975.
 FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.CAORONG, and minor childrenYASSER KING
CAORONG, ROSE HEINNI and PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and
represented by their mother PAULIE U. CAORONG, respondents.

G.R. No. 119756 March 18, 1999

FACTS:

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two
Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security
Unit, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a
Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao went to see Diosdado
Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, and informed him about the plot of the Maranaos.
Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would
be taken.

Several days later, Atty. Caorong was on board a bus to Iligan when three Maranaos went on
board the vehicle. The leader of the group ordered the passengers to leave the bus. Atty. Caorong
later went back to get something when he saw that the Maranaos were already pouring gasoline
on the bus and on the driver. Atty. Caorong pleaded for the life of the driver, after which the
driver jumped out of the vehicle.Caorong was shot to death as a result.

RTC dismissed the complaint stating that Fortune was not negligent. Disregarding the
suggestion ofproviding its buses with security guards is not an omission of petitioner’s duty. The
evidence showed that the assailants did not intend to harm the passengers. The death of Atty.
Caorong was an unexpected and unforeseen occurrence beyondpetitioner’s control.

CA REVERSED RTC’s ruling: Fortune is negligent. Despite the tip to Manager Bravo of the
devious plan by several Maranaos, management did not do not take any safety precautions at
all.One available safeguard that could have absolved Fortunefrom liability was frisking of
incoming passengers en route to dangerous areas and bag inspection at the terminals, which
Fortune failed to do. The frisking system is not novel insensitive and dangerous places. Many
companies adopt this measure. Fortune did “absolutely nothing”
ISSUE:

1. W/N Petitioner is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong by failing totakenecessary precautions
to ensure the safety of its passengers;
2. W/N the attack by the Maranaos constituted causo fortuito?

RULING:

1.Petitioner is liable.
Article 1763 holds common carriers liable for the injuries to passengers caused by the wilful act
of other passengers, if its employees failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in
preventing the act.
• Despite the warning by the constabulary officer, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of
its passengers. If petitioner took the necessary precautions, they would have discovered the
weapons and the large quantity of gasoline the malefactors carried with them. A common carrier
is liable for failing to prevent hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting baggages.
• Petitioner is solely liable for Atty. Caorong’s death. There was no contributory negligence on
the part of the victim, since all he did was pleading for the life of the driver. His heroic effort was
neither an act of negligence or recklessness.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent the attack on one of
petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. Seizure of Petitioner’s Bus is not a Case of Force Majeure

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which could not be
foreseen, is inevitable. To be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurence must be render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above
would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its
failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was
warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and,
thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to
the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to
attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event
which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
 Gacal vs. Philippine Airlines
(183 SCRA 189, G.R. No. 55300 March 16, 1990)

Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers of PAL plane at
Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that the flight, were Commander Zapata with
other members of Moro National Liberation Front. They were armed with grenades and pistols.
After take-off, the members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed the pilot to fly directly
to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in Zamboanga airport for refueling,
because the plane did not have enough fuel to make direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began
to taxi at the runaway of Zamboanga airport, it was met by two armored cars of the military. 

An armored car subsequently bumped the stairs leading inside the plane. That commenced the
battle between the military and the hijackers, which led ultimately to the liberation of the plane’s
surviving crew and passengers with the final score of ten passengers and three hijackers dead. 

RTC
The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages
sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure.

Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case fortuito or force majeure, which would exempt an
aircraft from liability for, damages to its passengers and personal belongings that were lost
during the incident? 

Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from liability under Art 1174 of
the civil code, it is necessary that the following elements must occur: (a) the cause of the breach
of obligation must be independent of human will; (b) the event must be unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 

Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners safely from Davao to
Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged buy the MNLF without connection to the
private respondent, hence, independent of will of PAL or its passengers. 

The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation in a normal manner and it
cannot be faulted for negligence on the duty performed by the military. The existence of force
majeure has been established thus exempting PAL from payment of damages.
 Asian Terminals, Inc., Petitioner vs.

Simon Enterprises, Inc., Respondent

GR. No. 177116

FEB 27, 2013

Facts

Simon Enterprise Inc. (Simon) has entered into contract with Contiquincybunge Export
Company (Contiquincybunge) as its consignee of the shipped Soybean Meal. On October 25,
1995 and on November 25, 1995 Contiquincybunge has made a shipment through M/V Sea
Dream and M/V Tern respectively at the Port of Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. For the first
shipment, Contiquincybunge made a shipment of 6,825.144 metric tons of U.S. Soybean Meal
which when the M/V Sea Dream arrived at the Port of Manila the bulk of soybean meal was
received by the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), for shipment to Simon. However, when it reached
its receiver Simon, it was already short by 18.556 metric tons. For the second shipment,
Contiquincybunge made shipment, through M/V Tern, of 3,300.000 metric tons of U.S. Soybean
Meal in Bulk for delivery to Simon at the Port of Manila. The shipment was received by ATI
again for delivery to Simon. However, the shipped cargos were found lacking 199.863 metric
tons.

Simon has filed an action for damages against the unknown owner of the vessels M/V Sea
Dream and M/V Tern, its local agent Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATI
alleging that it suffered the losses through the fault or negligence of the said defendants. The
case of the unknown owner of the vessel M/V Sea Dream has been settled in release and
quitclaim and therefore has been stricken out of the case, leaving M/V Tern, its local agent Inter-
Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATI’s case remaining. The RTC has ruled that the
defendants be solidarily liable for the damages incurred by Simon.

Unsatisfied with the RTC ruling, the owner of the M/V Tern, and Inter-Asia Marine Transport,
Inc. appealed to CA on the issue whether RTC has erred in finding that they did not exercise
extraordinary diligence in the handling of the goods. On the other hand, the petitioner ATI has
also appealed to CA on the issue that the RTC, the court-a-quo, committed serious and reversible
error in holding ATI solidarily liable with co-defendant appellant Inter-Asia Marine Transport,
Inc. contrary to the evidence presented. The CA ruled that the RTC ruling be assailed with
some modifications on the basis that M/V Tern and Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc. have
failed to establish that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods or
exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss as provided in Article 1742 of the Civil
Code. And on ATI’s RTC ruling, it was assailed as well on the basis that the stevedore of the
M/V Tern has witnessed that during the dischargement of the cargo, there has been spillage done
by the stevedores of ATI which is an evidence that ATI has been negligible in handling the
goods.

ATI filed a motion for reconsideration at CA but was denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari
with the sole issue of whether the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the
shipment of the goods to respondent.

The issue involves questions of facts which cannot be entertained by SC for it is not a trier of
facts under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. However, the said rule 45 is not ironclad
and has certain exceptions. The issue raised by ATI was merited to be entertained by SC under
the rule 4, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

Issue

Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding petitioner
ATI solidarily liable with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the shipment of the goods
to respondent.

Ruling

No. The petition for review on certiorari was granted to ATI. The SC agreed to ATI’s claim that
the CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable
with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the shipment of the goods to respondent. The
CA misapprehended the following facts:

First,  petitioner ATI is correct in arguing that the respondent failed to prove that the subject
shipment suffered actual shortage, as there was no competent evidence to prove that it actually
weighed 3,300 metric tons at the port of origin.

Second, as correctly asserted by petitioner ATI, the shortage, if any, may have been due to the
inherent nature of the subject shipment or its packaging since the subject cargo was shipped in
bulk and had a moisture content of 12.5%.

Third, SC agreed with the petitioner ATI that respondent has not proven any negligence on the
part of the former.
 SOUTHERN LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CITY OF ILOILO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-16629             January 31, 1962

Facts:

The City of Iloilo requisitioned for rice from the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC)
in Manila. NARIC, pursuant to the order, shipped 1,726 sacks of rice consigned to the City of
Iloilo on board the SS “General Wright” belonging to the Southern Lines, Inc.

The City of Iloilo received the shipment and paid the total charged amount. However, it was
discovered in the bill of lading that there was shortage equivalent to 41 sacks of rice. The City of
Iloilo filed a complaint against NARIC and the Southern Lines, Inc. for the recovery of the
amount representing the value of the shortage of the shipment of rice. The lower court absolved
NARIC, but held Southern Lines, Inc. liable to pay the shortage. CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision, hence, this petition.

Issues:

(1) W/N Southern Lines is liable for the loss or shortage of the rice shipped;

(2) W/N the action was filed on time.

Ruling:

(1) YES. Under the provisions of Article 361, the defendant-carrier in order to free itself from
liability was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were “by virtue of the
nature or defect of the articles.” Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to
hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by virtue of their
nature, occurred on account of its negligence or because the defendant did not take the
precaution adopted by careful persons.
The contention is untenable, for, if the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his
servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods notwithstanding such
condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom. Petitioner itself
frankly admitted that the strings that tied the bags of rice were broken; some bags were with
holes and plenty of rice were spilled inside the hull of the boat, and that the personnel of the boat
collected no less than 26 sacks of rice which they had distributed among themselves. This
finding, which is binding upon this Court, shows that the shortage resulted from the negligence
of petitioner.

(2) YES. Respondent filed the present action, within a reasonable time after the short delivery in
the shipment of the rice was made. It should be recalled that the present action is one for the
refund of the amount paid in excess, and not for damages or the recovery of the shortage; for
admittedly the respondent had paid the entire value of the 1726 sacks of rice, subject to
subsequent adjustment, as to shortages or losses. The bill of lading does not at all limit the time
for filing an action for the refund of money paid in excess.
 GANZON vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GELACIO E. TUMAMBING
(G.R. No. L-48757, May 30, 1988)

FACTS:

On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to
haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter
LCT "Batman. Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to
Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water. Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to
defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the
same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of the scrap
iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded
P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated
argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing
who sustained injuries.

After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting
Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his
crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the
compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.

Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter alleged that the goods have not been unconditionally placed
under his custody and control to make him liable. The trial court dismissed the case but on
appeal, respondent Court rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court and
ordering Ganzon to pay damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a contract of carriage has been perfected.

HELD:
Yes. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and
control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the
contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary
responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art.
1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or
constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit
still unloaded.

Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by
competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio
Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under
legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of
the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the
cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the
stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was accumulated by the appellant through
separate purchases here and there from private individuals. The fact remains that the order given
by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied by
Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown Tumambing for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor
did not constitute valid authority for Ganzon and his representatives to carry out.