G.R. Nos.
146653-54 February 20, 2006
WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., UNITED
LABORATORIES, INC., and/or JOSE YAO CAMPOS, CARLOS
EJERCITO, ERNESTO SALAZAR, ELIEZER SALAZAR, JOSE
SOLIDUM, JR., Petitioners, 
vs.
RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO
G.R. Nos. 147407-08  February 20, 2006
RICARDO C. SAMANIEGO, Petitioner,  transfer of venue in the NLRC.
vs.
WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and UNITED
LABORATORIES, INC.
FACTS:
Ricardo Samaniego was initially hired by Unilab as a Professional
Service Representative of its marketing arm, Westmont. He was
later promoted as a Senior Business Development Associate, and
was assigned to Isabela as Acting District Manager of Westmont
and Chairman of Unilab Special Projects. He was then transferred
to Metro Manila pending the investigation of his subordinate and
physicians of Region II involved in a sales discount and Rx trade-
off controversy. He was thereafter placed under floating status
and was assigned to perform duties not connected with his
position, like fetching at the airport physicians coming from the
provinces; making deposits in banks; fetching field men and doing
messengerial works. Such transfer resulted in the diminution of
his salary.  LA: rendered a Decision finding that Samaniego was "illegally and
On May 5, 1998, Ricardo C. Samaniego Samaniego then filed with
the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages against Westmont and Unilab, as well as Unilab’s Officer.
Westmont and Unilab filed a motion to dismiss Samaniego’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue and lack of cause of
action. They argued that it should be filed with the NLRC in Manila,
not with the Office of the Labor Arbiter in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, and that the action should be against Westmont,
Samaniego’s employer.  Labor Arbiter in Cagayan, being the place of Samaniego’s work in
LA: denied the MTD citing Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC New
Rules of Procedure. This provision allows the Labor Arbiter to
order a change of venue in meritorious cases
Westmont and Unilab filed with the NLRC an Urgent Petition to
Change or Transfer Venue. On the same date, they filed with the
Office of the Labor Arbiter in Cagayan a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings in view of the pendency of their petition for change or
 
LA: issued an Order directing the parties to submit
their respective position papers and supporting documents within
20 days from notice, after which the case shall be deemed,
submitted for decision.
NLRC: acting on the petition to change venue, directed the Labor
Arbiter to forward to the NLRC the records of the case. The Labor
Arbiter retained the complete duplicate original copies of the
records and set the case for hearing. Westmont and Unilab
repeatedly filed motions for cancellation of the scheduled dates of
hearing on the ground that their petition for change of venue has
remained unresolved. Petitioners however did not submit their
position papers and did not attend hearing, thus the Labor Arbiter
considered the case submitted for Decision based on the records
and the evidence submitted by Samaniego.
unjustly dismissed constructively" and ordering his reinstatement
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
privileges; and payment of his full backwages from the date of his
dismissal from the service up to the date of his actual
reinstatement, as well as per diem differential, profit share, and
actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney’s fees.
Westmont and Unilab appealed to the NLRC who dismissed the
petition for change of venue. They were arguing that it was the
Isabela, who had the jurisdiction, that when the cause of action
arose.
NLRC: declared the decision of the LA was null and void because it
continued to conduct further proceedings despite the pendency of
the appeal-treated Urgent Petition for Change thus denying
Westmont and Unilab of due process.  The permissive rules underlying the provisions on venue are
CA: setting aside the NLRC Resolutions and affirming with
modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. Court concurs with the
ruling of the Executive Labor Arbiter that there was constructive
dismissal committed against Ricardo Samaniego, this Court finds
the award on moral and exemplary damages unconscionable.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in denying their motion to dismiss by
reason of improper venue –NO.
2. Whether or not Samaniego was constructively dismissed by
Westmont and Unilab –NO.
3,Whether or not Westmont and Unilab are denied of due process
–NO.
HELD:
The petition to change or transfer venue filed by herein petitioners
with the NLRC is not the proper remedy to assail the Labor
Arbiter’s order denying their motion to dismiss. Because such
order is merely interlocutory, hence not appealable as provided in
Section 3 of the 1997 NLRC Rules and Procedures.  employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the
proper in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been
rendered.  was unceremoniously transferred from Isabela to Metro Manila;
Assuming that the petition to change or transfer venue is the
proper remedy, still we find that the CA did not err in sustaining
the Labor Arbiter’s Order of denying the motion to dismiss
because under the 1997 NLRC rules and procedure under Section
1, All cases which the Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and
decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having
jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner.
The question of venue essentially relates to the trial and touches
more upon the convenience of the parties, rather than upon the
substance and merits of the case.
intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses
and to promote the end of justice.
This axiom all the more finds applicability in cases involving labor
and management because of the principle, paramount in our
jurisdiction, that the State shall afford to full protection of labor. 
Samaniego’s regular place of assignment was in Isabela when he
was transferred to Metro Manila or when the cause of action arose
clearly, the Appellate Court was correct in Affirming the Labor
Arbiter’s finding that the proper venue is in the RAB No. II at
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. 
2. In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of
proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid
grounds, such as genuine business necessity. The employer must
be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It must not involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If
the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the
dismissal.
Westmont and Unilab failed to discharge such burden. Samaniego
such transfer is economically and emotionally burdensome on his
part. He was constrained to maintain two residences – one for
himself in Metro Manila, and the other for his family in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. He was placed "on floating status" and
was demoted in rank, performing functions no longer supervisory
in nature.

There may also be constructive dismissal if an act of clear
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on
the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forego his continued employment. This was what
happened to Samaniego. Thus, he is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant
the reinstatement of Samaniego. Antagonism caused a severe
strain in the relationship between him and his employer. A more
equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six
[6 months being considered as one [1 whole year), in addition to
his full backwages, allowances and other benefits.
3. It is a settled rule that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative
proceeding, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor
Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to
submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach
all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would
prove their respective claims, in the event that the Labor Arbiter
determines that no formal hearing would be conducted of that
such hearing was not necessary.  Quijano’s reinstatement as Self-Service Attendant. Quimpo asserts
As shown by the records, the Labor Arbiter gave Westmont and
Unilab, not only once, but thrice, the opportunity to submit their
position papers and supporting affidavits and documents. But they
were obstinate. Clearly, they were not denied their right to due
process.  Quimpo asserted that Quijano already received the full satisfaction
ADM. CASE No. 5649  January 27, 2006
DANDY V. QUIJANO, Complainant, 
vs.
GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (Labor Arbiter, NLRC-NCR South),
and ALBERTO R. QUIMPO (Commissioner, NLRC-First
Division),
FACTS:
Dandy Quijano was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug
Corporation. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court (Court) which
promulgated a decision in Quijano’s favor. The Court ordered,
among others, for Quijano’s reinstatement. Mercury’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court in its July 5, 1999
Resolution.
Quijano filed a motion for execution of the final resolution before
Labor Arbiter Bartolabac; but Bartolabac issued an order which
has a tenor different from that of the final judgment. Instead of
reinstatement, Bartolabac awarded backwages and separation
pay. Later on it was found out that the Bartolabac initially
recommended the position of Self-Service Attendant as allegedly,
the position of Warehouseman has been abolished and that
Quijano was not qualified to other vacancies (pharmacists,
pharmacy assistant, cashier, self-service attendant) as he was not a
college graduate, according to Mercury’s appeal.
On the other hand, Commissioner Alberto Quimpo said his
participation was only that of acting on Mercury’s appeal of
that by law, the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
hear and decide all decisions, awards or orders rendered by the
Labor Arbiter. He directed Bartolabac to expedite the proceedings
before it on the issue of Quijano’s reinstatement.
of his monetary award which shows that the Commission has
complied in good faith with the directive to execute the Court’s
final judgment award in favor of Quijano.
Nonetheless, Quijano filed before the IBP a complaint, written in
Filipino, against LA Atty. Geobel Bartolabac and NLRC
Commissioner Alberto Quimpo for violating his constitutional
right to due process in failing to execute the final and executory
judgment of the Court.
The IBP recommended for the dismissal of Quijano’s complaint
against the respondents. Quijano filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied since the matter had
already been endorsed to the Court; the IBP no longer had
jurisdiction over the case.
Court was disappointed with the IBP, falling short of its
expectations. The exoneration of the Respondents was only
contained in two paragraphs with the reasoning that the
respondents’ prior case with the Ombudsman, filed by Quijano,
was also dismissed. SC treated the motion for reconsideration as a
petition for review and acted upon it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in deviating
from the final and executory judgment of the Court –NO.
HELD:
Court asserts that Quijano must be reinstated to his former
position or its equivalent. Mercury’s contention that there was no
substantial equivalent position for Quijano’s reistatement, which
was erroneously upheld by NLRC, is untenable. Mercury operates
nationwide and has numerous branches all over the Philippines.
Quijano occupied a clerk/rank and file position, the Court finds it
highly inconceivable that no other substantially equivalent
position exists to effect his reinstatement.
Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any
latitude to depart from the Court’s ruling. The Decision in G.R. No.
126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended.  It is
incumbent upon the respondents to implement the letter of the
final judgment. They have no discretion on the matters of final
judgment, much less any authority to change the orders of the
Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable
discretionary performance of their functions as labor arbiter and
commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any
discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the
final and executory decision is mandatory.
As ruled in the case of Siy vs. NLRC “Once the case is decided with
finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.
The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory
while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and
to comply with it.”
Further, the Constitution mandates that no person shall be
deprived of life, libery, and property without due process of law.
Employment is considered a property right and cannot be taken
away from the employee without legal proceedings. Respondents
dispossessed Quijano of his source of living by not implementing
his reinstatement.
It is reiterated that the Court wont compel the corporation to
instantly restore the position of warehouseman if it has been
already abolished. Indeed, the Court granted that complainant
could be reinstated to a substantially equivalent or similar
position as a viable alternative for the corporation to carry out.
G.R. No. 108001 March 15, 1996
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, ANGEL G. ROA and MELINDA
MACARAIG, petitioners, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second
Division), LABOR ARBITER EDUARDO J. CARPIO, ILAW AT
BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), ET AL.,
FACTS:
Private respondents, employed by petitioner San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) as mechanics, machinists, and carpenters, were
and still are, bona fide officers and members of private respondent
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa. They were served a Memorandum
from petitioner Angel G. Roa, Vice-President and Manager of SMC's
Business Logistics Division (BLD), to the effect that they had to be
separated from the service effective October 31, 1990 on the
ground of "redundancy or excess personnel." Respondent union, in
behalf of private respondents, opposed the intended dismissal and
asked for a dialogue with management.
A series of dialogues were held between petitioners and private
respondents. Even before the conclusion of said dialogues, the
aforesaid petitioner Angel Roa issued another Memorandum on
October 1, 1990 informing private respondents that they would be
dismissed from work effective as of the close of business hours on
November 2, 1990. Private respondents were in fact purged on the
date aforesaid.
On February 25, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint
against petitioners for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practices,
with a prayer for damages and attorney's fees, with the Arbitration
Branch of respondent National Labor Relations Commission. The
complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Eduardo F. Carpio for
hearing and proper disposition.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, and that Labor Arbiter must defer
consideration of the unfair labor practice complaint until after the
parties have gone through the grievance procedure provided for in
the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent
Labor Arbiter denied this motion in a Resolution, dated September
23, 1991.
The petitioners appealed the denial to respondent Commission on
November 8, 1991. Unimpressed by the grounds therefore.
Commission: dismissed the appeal in its assailed Resolution dated
August 11, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SMC had the management right or prerogative to
effect the discharges on the ground of redundancy, and this
necessarily calls for the interpretation or implementation of
Article III (Job Security) in relation to Article IV (Grievance
Machinery) of the CBA –No.
HELD:
There is no connection whatsoever between SMC's management
prerogative to effect the discharges and the interpretation or
implementation of Articles III and IV of the CBA. The only relevant
provision under Article III that may need interpretation or
implementation is Section 2 which was cited herein. However, as
patiently pointed out by this court, said provision does not come
into play considering that the union never exercised its right to
seek reconsideration of the discharges effected by the company. It
would have been different had the union sought reconsideration.
Such recourse under Section 2 would have been treated as a
grievance under Article IV (Grievance Machinery) of the CBA, thus
calling for the possible interpretation or implementation of the
entire provision on Grievance Machinery as agreed upon by the
parties. This was not the case however. The union brought the
termination dispute directly to the Labor Arbiter rendering
Articles III and IV of the CBA inapplicable for the resolution of this
case.
G.R. NO. 159482 : August 30, 2005
NICASIO P. RODRIGUEZ JR., ANTONIO P. EREÑETA, JUANITO A.
MAGNO, VICTOR C. PINEDA, BITUIN V. SALCEDO, CESAR R. SAN
DIEGO, VICTOR V. TANTOCO and AMADOR C. DE LA
MERCED, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO L. AGUILAR
SR., Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of Philippine
Postal Savings Bank, Inc. (PPSBI) at Liwasang Bonifacio, Manila;
private respondent Antonio L. Aguilar was employed as VP of its
Finance and Administrative Group from February 14, 2000 to
January 31, 2001, and thereafter as Compliance Officer until
September 26, 2001 when his services were terminated.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners with RTC of
Manila alleging that he was illegally dismissed by the petitioners in
an oppressive way; that the cause of his dismissal was his
principled act of exposing anomalies in the bank; that considering
the seriousness of the violations of internal control and bank
policies, there is a need to prohibit petitioners from performing
their functions as members of the Board in their own personal
capacity. He prayed for the award of damages, the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from
dismissing him or in the alternative, to immediately reinstate him,
and the prohibition of the petitioners from performing their
personal and official acts in the bank.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction stating that
jurisdiction over the case lies with the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
CA: agreeing with RTC; the withdrawal of the MR filed by
respondent had not resulted in the finality of the Dismissal Order
dated October 29, 2001, since he had simultaneously amended his
Complaint. This he had every right to do because no responsive
pleading had yet been filed by petitioners. It the Amended
Complaint superseded his original Complaint and mooted the
issue raised in his MR. It further said that the rules on the
amendment of pleadings may be liberally construed to avoid a
multiplicity of suits; and to ensure that the real controversies
between the parties would be presented, their rights determined,
and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.
CA: RTC had jurisdiction over the case, because of the civil nature
of the cause of action; that is, the alleged oppressive manner of
respondent's dismissal that had resulted in damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC have jurisdiction over the case –NO.
Jurisdiction falls with the LA.
HELD:
Under Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, labor arbiters
shall have "original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide:
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations x x x."
Clearly, respondent's claim for damages against petitioners arose
from a prior employer-employee relationship. The averments in
the Complaint indisputably show that his claim for damages was
anchored on and was a consequence of the termination of his
employment with PPSBI.
Indeed, the trial court initially made this observation when it
dismissed motu propio respondent's Complaint. It ruled "that the
manner in which the dismissal was implemented was anti-social,
oppressive and in disregard of procedural due process x x x is but
an incident part and parcel of the main issue which is the alleged
illegal dismissal of respondent." The trial court likewise opined
that the plea of respondent for reinstatement made his case one of
illegal dismissal per se.
The trial court should have dismissed the Amended Complaint.
With regard to claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, jurisprudence has applied the "reasonable connection rule": if
there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim
asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case falls
within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.  SC ruled that
respondent had not asked for reinstatement in his Amended
Complaint. An employee need not seek reinstatement in order to workers and all other claims arising from employer-employee
have a complaint heard by the labor arbiter. relations, including moral and exemplary damages

A comparison of the original and the Amended Complaint reveals Presently, as amended by RA 6715, the jurisdiction of the NLRC
that the allegations and the prayers in both are almost identical, under Article 217 of the Labor Code is comprehensive enough to
except that the prayer for reinstatement and the claim for salary include claims for all forms of damages arising from the employer-
increase and allowances are no longer included in the Amended employee relations.
Complaint. These are telltale signs that the claim of respondent for
damages is intertwined with his separation from his employment,
allegedly without a just cause. Consequently, his claim has a
reasonable causal connection with his employer-employee
relations with the bank.

Under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter has the
jurisdiction to award to a dismissed employee not only the reliefs
provided by the Labor Code, but also moral and other forms of
damages governed by the Civil Code. Although a dismissal from
employment may be a violation not only of the Labor but also of
the Civil Code, an illegally dismissed employee has only a single
cause of action.

Moral damages are recoverable when, for example, the dismissal

was effected without an authorized cause and/or due process - -
for which relief is granted by the Labor Code - - and also when the
dismissal (1) was attended by bad faith or fraud; (2) constituted
an act oppressive to labor; or (3) was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. For any of these, the
obtainable relief is determined by the Civil Code.

On May 1, 1979, Presidential Decree No. 1367 amended the then

existing Article 217 of the Labor Code to the effect that "regional
Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain
claims for moral or other forms of damages." But this limitation of
jurisdiction did not last long, because on May 1, 1980, PD 1691
nullified PD 1367 and restored Article 217 of the Labor Code
almost to its original form. PD 1691 once again vested in the labor
arbiters and the NLRC the jurisdiction over all money claims of