Consertino Santos vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 235058, September 04, 2018.

NATURE: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

FACTS:
 On Oct. 14, 2015, Jennifer Antiquerra Roxas (Jennifer) filed a certificate of candidacy (CoC) for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) for the First District of Pasay City
for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections.
 A few days after Jennifer filed a petition for disqualification against Rosalie Isles Roxas
(Rosalie) before the COMELEC praying that the latter be declared a nuisance candidate
because her CoC was only filed for the sole purpose of causing confusion among the voters by
the similarity of their names. She pointed out that her nickname was “Jenn-Rose” instead of
using her actual nickname which is “Saleng.”
 Respondent also argued that Rosalie’s intent to confuse the voters was apparent by choosing
the name “Roxas Jenn-Rose” to appear in the official ballot even though Jennifer was already
using the “Roxas Jenny” during the previous election.
 The COMELEC granted the petition and declared Rosalie as a nuisance candidate. It found
that: 1) Rosalie suspiciously indicated her name in the ballot to be "Roxas Jenn-Rose," which
was strikingly similar with respondent's name; 2) her nickname did not resemble her real
nickname; and 3) Rosalie was not financially capable of sustaining the rigors of waging a
campaign. COMELEC concluded was that her candidacy was meant to cause confusion
among the voters and that she had no bona fide intention to run for office.
 Rosalie filed a motion for reconsideration (MR). While the MR was still pending, the elections
proceeded and yielded the results showing that Jennifer was not included in the list of duly
elected members because she ranked 7th place.
 On May 20, 2016, respondent filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Consertino C.
Santos (Santos) before the COMELEC praying, that the votes cast for Rosalie, who was
declared a nuisance candidate, be credited to her, and that the proclamation of Santos as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the First District of Pasay be annulled, and that
she be proclaimed as the winning candidate.
 On July 22, 2016, or more than two (2) months after the elections, the COMELEC-En Banc
issued a Resolution denying Rosalie's motion for reconsideration.
 The process server of COMELEC attempted to personally serve the July 22, 2016 resolution to
the counsel of Rosalie on July 27, 2016 and August 18, 2016. However the office of such was
always closed.
 On November 14, 2016, respondent filed a motion for execution. In its November 17, 2016
order, the COMELEC-En Banc considered the July 22, 2016 resolution as served. In its
Certificate of Finality dated February 15, 2017, the COMELEC-En Banc declared its July 22,
2016 resolution final and executory.
 Ricardo, who was not a party in the nuisance case, filed a Manifestation of Grave Concern with
Omnibus Motion to: 1) admit attached strong opposition, 2) to defer issuance of writ of
execution while this motion is pending, 3) to limit the tenor of the writ of execution to a
declaration that respondent is a nuisance candidate, and 4) to immediately set the instant
motion for hearing. Afterwards, he filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Set the Case for
Hearing. On April 4, 2017, the COMELEC En-Banc issued a Writ of Execution to implement
the previous COMELEC resolutions in favor of Jennifer.
 On April 20, 2017, the Special City Board of Canvassers of Pasay City (SCBOC) convened
and counted 13,328 votes for respondent and consequently amended the statement of votes
relevant to the position of members of the SP for the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections. Meanwhile, Ricardo filed the following: 1) a Petition for Annulment of the Illegal
Proceedings of the SCBOC with Extremely Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo ante
Order and Suspension of the Effects of the Illegal Proceedings; and 2) with regard to the
nuisance case, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to a) quash the writ of execution, and b)
to admit the foregoing submission.
  He also filed an Extremely Urgent Manifestation with Motion and a Reiterative Omnibus Motion
requesting for SCBOC to cease and desist from recanvassing the votes. The COMELEC En-
Banc issued its order denying the motions of Ricardo for lack of merit and considering that
there were other actions pending before the COMELEC that would sufficiently address the
issues raised. Then, the COMELEC En-Banc issued another writ of execution annulling the
previous proclamation, amending/correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of Sangguniang Panlungsod Members, and the Proclamation of the newly
elected members. The petitioners were served with a copy of the second writ of execution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC EN BANC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it directed the crediting of the votes received by Rosalie to
the votes received by private respondent Jennifer.
2. Whether or not a separate proceeding to execute a decision declaring a nuisance candidate is
required.
3. Whether or not the votes shall be credited to the legitimate candidate if the decision in the
nuisance case becomes final and executory before the elections.
4. Whether or not the votes of the nuisance candidate are automatically added to the legitimate
candidate in a multi-slot office.

RULING:
1. No.
 The Court consistently declared that the votes cast for the nuisance candidate must be
credited in favor of the legitimate candidate with a similar name to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters, even if the declaration of the nuisance candidate
became final only after the elections.
 A petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate clearly affects the voters' will and
causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are
trying to protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus,
extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the
appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity.
 The declaration of a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate results in the
cancellation of his COC. The law mandates the COMELEC and the courts to give
priority to cases of disqualification to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not
later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. In
many instances, however, proceedings against nuisance candidates remained
pending and undecided until election day and even after canvassing of votes had been
completed.
2. No.
 The court held that No separate proceeding to execute a decision declaring a
nuisance candidate is needed. Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code states that
the COMELEC may declare a person as a nuisance candidate motu proprio or through
a verified petition.
 A cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much less to valid votes.
Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as
he or she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he or she never filed a COC. Thus,
a petition to declare a person a nuisance candidate or a petition for
disqualification of a nuisance candidate is already sufficient to cancel the COC
of the said candidate and to credit the garnered votes to the legitimate candidate
because it is as if the nuisance candidate was never a candidate to be voted for.
 Here, the crediting of the votes of the nuisance candidate to respondent as a legitimate
candidate, whose names are similar, is a necessary consequence of the COMELEC's
declaration that Rosalie is a nuisance candidate. Consequently, the transfer of votes of
the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate can be validly accomplished in the
execution proceedings of the nuisance case
3. No.
  The court held that votes shall be credited to the legitimate candidate regardless
whether the decision in the nuisance case becomes final and executory before or after
the elections.
 A declaration that only decisions or resolutions in nuisance cases that became final
and executory before the election shall result in the crediting of votes in favor of the
legitimate candidate would lead to harsh practices of rival political opponents and
exploitations in the delays in COMELEC.
 While the delays in the resolution of the nuisance cases in the COMELEC exist, it
should not be a valid reason to deprive a legitimate candidate of the votes of the
electorate.
 The better approach would be to allow the crediting of the votes of the nuisance
candidate to the legitimate candidate, who have similar names, regardless whether the
decision or resolution of the COMELEC became final and executory before or after the
elections. In that way, the will of the electorate shall be respected.
 It must be noted that there was delay in the resolution of the nuisance case in the case
at bar. However, the legitimate candidate should not be prejudiced by the COMELEC's
inefficiency and lethargy. The technicalities employed by petitioners should not
frustrate the voter's will to elect respondent as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Pasay. Thus, the votes for the nuisance candidate must be credited in
her favor.
4. No.
 The court held that in a multi-slot office, the votes of the nuisance candidate are not
automatically added to the legitimate candidate.In a multi-slot office, such as
membership of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter may vote for more
than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and nuisance
candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The Court
agrees with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance candidate
should no longer be credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall
receive two votes from one voter.
 To ascertain that the votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of
the legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the
ballots.

WHEREFORE, the November 8, 2017 Writ of Execution of the Commission on Elections-En Banc in
SPA Case No. 15-029 (DC) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
 Romeo Jalosjos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205033. June 18, 2013.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

FACTS:
 On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in People vs. Jalosjos, convicting
petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term.
 On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied prompting him to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City.
 Pending resolution of the same, he filed a certificate of candidacy (CoC) on October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on
May 2013.
 In his CoC, petitioner stated, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered
voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.
 On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification, which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such
denial was affirmed by the RTC of Zamboanga City, in its October 31, 2012 Order which was
immediately final and executory..
 Meanwhile, five petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s Divisions praying for the denial
of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC.Pending resolution, the COMELEC En
Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving “to CANCEL
and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of
Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections” due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already
been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code of 1991”.

RULING:
1. No.
 Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution requiring a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in
matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions.
 It is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi- judicial functions
when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending
petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely
performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s
CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had
already been established by his final conviction.
 In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-
judicial proceedings.
  As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a
previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En
Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
 Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a
registered voter in Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s
Order dated October 31, 2012. In this accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the
voter registration requirement under Section 39(a) of the LGC is already beyond
question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation of his CoC
altogether.
2. No.
 The court held that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains
disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
 The Court observes that the conflict between these provisions of law may be properly
reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for
local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his
sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of
disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
 In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the
privilege to run for elective office.
 In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision ― such as Article 41 in this case ― directly and specifically prohibits the
convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from
petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
 Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of
a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been
expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as
such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.