Santiago vs.

People

Facts:
Four Months after the solemnization of their marriage, Leonilo G.
Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an information for bigamy. Santos, who
had been married to Estela Galang asked petitioner to marry him. Despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry,
she should choose someone who was “without responsibility.” Petitioner,
then, a 43-year-old widow married Santos.
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under
the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also argued
that her second marriage is void due to lack of marriage license.
Eleven years later after the criminal case, Estela Galang introduced
herself that she had met petitioner. Petitioner denied this allegation and
averred that she met Galang only after she married Santos.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Leonila is hereby liable for bigamy although
she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage?
Whether or not the marriage between Leonila and Santos is void due to
lack of marriage license therefore, not bigamous?

Held:
First issue: Yes. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the
first marriage as shown by the totality of the of the following circumstances:
1. When Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him.
2. It was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his
true civil status.
3. Galang, who was the more credible witness compared to petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal
wife of Santos.
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs
with the ruling that she was validly charge with Bigamy.

On the second issue, their marriage is not void. Although no marriage

license was issued, their marriage would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at
least five years before their marriage. Petition denied. This court affirms the
conviction of Bigamy.
Capili v People
G.R. No. 183805

Facts:
Petitioner-accuse was charged with the crime of bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City because accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley
G. Tismo (Private respondent), to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1)

there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig
City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by
petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted
by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Motion to Dismiss the criminal
case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the
RTC which was granted.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated,
among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or
intimately related to the issue in this criminal case case and that the
resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. Aggrieved, private respondent filed an
appeal before the CA. The CA thus reversed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but
the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
Held:
No,

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of
bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has
been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marria ge
has all the essential requisites for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private

respondent was contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo
City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration
of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. The accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

Note: What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage.

Veronico Tenebro vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990.
The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage
with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued
that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due
to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first
marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage
to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug

Justice Vitug pointed out that void ab initio marriages (except those falling
under the principle of psychological incapacity) should be allowed to be used
as a valid defense for bigamy. Void ab initio marriages require no judicial
decree to establish their nullity. It is true that the Revised Penal Code does
not require the first or second marriage to be declared void to avoid a
criminal case of bigamy but this should only be applicable to voidable
marriages – because again, void ab initio marriages really do not need such
judicial decree.

Montañez vs. Cipriano

Facts:
Respondent married Socrates Flores in Lezo, Aklan. During the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano in
San Pedro, Laguna. A petition for annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity declaring the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision becomes final and
executory on Oct. 13, 2003.
Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. Which
alleged, among others that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she
was still married to Socrates.
Respondent through counsel, filed a motion to quash information
alleging her marriage with socrates had already been declared void ab initio
in 2003. Thus, there was no marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the information for bigamy filed against her.

Held:
No. Clearly, the annulment of respondent’s first marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The first marriage is
still subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even if the
accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void.
The point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since
the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Petition granted.
Republic v Tampus
G.R. No. 214243 Mar. 16 2016

Facts:
Respondent in this case married Dante who was a member of the SFP
and was assigned in Jolo. Since Dante was assigned in Jolo in 1975
respondent didn’t hear any news from him. Respondent wishes to remarry
thus she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante presumptively dead
for purposes of remarriage. The RTC approve the petition which led the OSG
representing the Republic to oppose but the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence this petition.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC

Held:

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it

must be shown that the missing spouse has been absent for four consecutive
years and there is a well-founded belief that the missing spouse is dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code there are four requisites for declaration
of presumptive death:

1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years or two
years of the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstance laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3) that the present spouse has a well founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of sentence

The burden of proof rest on the spouse filing for petition to show that
all the requisites under Article 41 of the FC are present.

The well-founded belief in the absentees death requires the present

spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
effort to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active support, not passive one.
Mere absent of the spouse for such period prescribed under the law or lack
of any news or failure to cumminicate will not suffice.

Well-founded belief can only be proven if there is showing of proper and

honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive
or is already dead.

In this case the respondent Nida after making inquiries from friends
and families did not made any further effort in finding her husband. She didn’t
even seek the help of the AFP. She could have inquired from the AFP the
status of his husband since his husband is a member of the AFP. To the
courts mind Nida failed to actively find his husband. Nida’s petition for
declaration for presumptive death cannot be granted.

Domingo vs. CA

Facts:
 Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Robert
Domingo. She alleged that while they were married, Roberto had a previous
marriage with one Emerlinda Dela Paz which marriage is valid and existing.
Out of personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties which
are under possession and administration of Roberto. When she discovered
that her husband was cohabiting with another woman, she further discovered
that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge
and consent. He failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her attorney-in-fact. He is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void, the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superflous and unnecessary.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging
to her exclusively.

Held:
No. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage. But
remarriage is not the case per sé.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity,
albeit the preferability for, and justiciability of, such a declaration, will not
give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only
specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow the
void marriage.
A void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither, the conjugal
partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of
property under the new code will apply.

Castillo v De Leon Castillo

G.R. no. 189607 Apr. 18 2016

Facts:
 On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein
petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and
contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as
they had not secured any license. On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an
action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003,
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City rendered its Decision declaring
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the
Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory.

Issue:

WON there is a need for declaration of nullity of marriage in the first marriage

Held:

No.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in

accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil
Code and no the Family Code.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e.,  there was no
marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is
valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being
nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable
marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no
conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction,
while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5)
"in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage.

Therefore the first marriage of private respondent being solemnized under

the civil code, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before
he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude
that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Vitangcol vs. People

Facts:
Norberto married Alice sometime in 1994. But, she eventually
discovered that Norberto was previously married to Gina M. Gaerlan as
evidenced by a marriage contract in NSO. Alice subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for bigamy against Norberto. However, Norberto revealed to Alice
that he had a “Fake marriage” with his college girlfriend Gina. Despite
Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the
wedding.
 The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of
Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by marriage contact.
Their first marriage was still subsisting.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Norberto Vitangcol and his first
wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him
from the bigamy charge for not having a marriage license.

Held:
No. There is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage
license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to
the marriage as well as by the solemnizing officer. Within the span of 7 years,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring
the first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s
belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

Carino v Carino
G.R. no. 132529 Feb 2 2001

Facts:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2
children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time
with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already
bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after
his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits
of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of
sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee
admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was  solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed
that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to
claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: 
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the
absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is
likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.  Meaning, where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.  For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity.  These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This
is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of
the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation
is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes
salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the
other may not have contributed at all.
 

Carino v Carino
G.R. no. 132529 Feb 2 2001

Facts:
The subject of controversy in this case is death benefits of the
deceased SPO4 Santiago Carino and to which spouse of the deceased will
the benefits go to. During the lifetime of SPO4 Carino he contracted two
marriages. The first marriage is with the petitioner in which he had children.
The second one is with the respondent and no children. When SPO4 Carino
got ill and died, it was respondent who handled the expenses. Then after
petitioner and Respondent filed claims for monetary benefits from different
agencies. Petitioner got a huge amount of monetary benefits. Respondent
then filed a case for collection of money against petitioner. Respondent
admitted that her marriage with the deceased (SPO4 Carino) took place
during the subsistence of the marriage of the deceased and the petitioner.
However Respondent claimed that the first marriage was solemnized without
a valid marriage license hence void ab intio.
Issue:
1) WON the marriage of the respondent with the decease is valid

2) WON respondent has rights over the death benefits of the deceased

Held:

1) There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. 

Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.

2) Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime
of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,   

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through

their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed death benefits are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them.

Marcos vs. Marcos

Facts:
Appellant Wilson Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos. After their marriage,
they resided in a housing unit when he usually resides since she was single.
At the downfall of President Maros, he left the Military and engaged i
different business but it did not prosper. Due to his failure to engage in an
employment, he inflicted violence on his family. Thus, urged his wife to live
with him separately. The court a quo found the appellant to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appelle and their children.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of
all witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of pet ion
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not required for a declaration of psychological
incapacity, but the totality of the evidence petitioner presented does not
show such incapacity to be permanent or incurable and to have existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. In this case, respondent left and
failed to support his family because he lost his job for more than 6 yrs. His
condition is also not incurable because now he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver. At best, the petitioner presented evidence which referred only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring marriage void.

Castillo v Republic
G.R. No. 214064 Feb 6 2017

Facts:
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe
started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former
girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation.
With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in
Bani, Pangasinan. Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious. However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different women. Tired
of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any
communication with him. Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with
another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without any reason,
constitute a severe psychological disorder. In support of her case, Mirasol
presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who,
in her Psychological Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
RTC declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied On appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from
psychological incapacity. Hence this case.

Issue:
whether or Mirasol was able to prove Felipe’s psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
No,
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.

As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate

from a personal interview with the subject himself. The psychologist
evaluated respondent's psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional
family portrait which brought about his personality disorder as painted in the
evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner.
There was no independent witness knowledgeable of Felipe’s upbringing
interviewed by the psychologist or presented before the trial court. 

Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other

reliable evidence was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a
manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable. The court is not persuaded that the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or
clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Based on the
records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated
with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. The court reiterate
that there was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist,
petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on
Felipe's infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their
relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered
self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to allow the nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity.

Noel Buenaventura vs. CA

Facts:
This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he
stated that he and his wife, Isabel Buenaventura, were both psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential essential obligations of marriage.
The lower four found that the petitioner was merely under heavy parental
pressure to marry, and deceived private respondent isabel to marry.
Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband and their son,
Javy as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage work
such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than to
reconcile with his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage
between buenaventura and singh may be declared null and void under art. 36
of the family code, due to the psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Held:
Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and
therefore, a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. psychological incapacity has been defined, as no
less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged ny the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by art. 68
of fc include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage.

Carating-Siayngo v Siayngo
G.R. No. 158896 Oct. 27 2004

Facts:
Judge Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to his wife, Juanita, based on psychological incapacity.  To support
his petition, he alleged that his wife exhibited a domineering and selfish
attitude towards him; was extremely volatile and bellicose, and complained
about anything and everything connected with him; she showed no respect
or regard for the prestige and position of his office as a judge and would yell
and scream at him or throw objects at him within hearing of their
neighbours.  That the incapacity was borne about by the perceived lack of
love and support she received from her own parents since childhood, which
she carried over to the marriage.  Answering, Juanita denied the allegations,
alleging that Manuel merely invented stories about her so he could be freed
to marry his paramour; it was Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations and she supported Manuel in all his endeavors; and she
was raised in a real and happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to
Manuel’s allegations.
To support each other’s positions, both parties presented their own expert
witnesses to disprove psychological incapacity.  Manuel present Dr.
Valentina Tan, who concluded that both Manuel and Juanita had a partner
relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond.
She stated: “The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM
IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita
had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.”
On the other hand, Dr. Eduardo Maaba testified for Juanita.  He found her
capacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
After presentations of witnesses and documentary evidence, the trial court
dismissed the petition.  In so ruling, it stated:
“The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the
constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our
laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such
cases.

On appeal to the CA, the latter reversed the RTC decision.  It found both
parties psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.  Since marital union is a two-way process, an expressive
interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love ,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution, the CA held. Thus Juanita appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
 whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita

Held:
No.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In Republic v. Court of Appeals the court
expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." 

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her
inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies
that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Matudan vs. Republic

Facts:
 Nicolas Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn Matudan were
married and had 4 children.
Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and children lost
contact with her as they had not been seen or heard again.
23 yr later, petitioner filed petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage alleged that the latter was psychologically incapacitated of
fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother. She consistently neglected
and failed to provide petitioner and children necessary emotional care and
support. That she never gave financial support for a period of 6 years.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was able to prove Marilyn’s psychological
incapacity?

Held:
The court denies the petition. Under Art. 36 of the Fc, it must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Thus, the
incapacity must be grave sand serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable, or
even otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Malliion v Alcantara
G.R. No 141528 Oct. 3 2006
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial
court seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court
of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage
with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Held:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by
prior judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of
a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it
pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or
the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore,
having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
The Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR,

Respondent.

FACTS:
 Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she
did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation
of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof.

During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed

husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in
Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain
Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed

Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting
the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to

take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be
feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of
the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract

which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding.
HELD:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court
has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing

may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all
persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation
or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long
as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.Lee v. CA 419 Phil. 392

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the

civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding
civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine

the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial
court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen

Facts:
Elise Quiazon represented by her mother Lourdes Quiazon filed a
petition for letters of Administration in RTC. Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with Filipito. To
prove her filiation, Elise attached her certificate of live birth signed by Eliseo
as her father. In the same petition, Eliseo left his properties to prevent
dissipitation of its value. Elise sought her appointment as administratix of
her father’s estate.
Amelia then opposed the petition by filing a motion to dismiss. She
alleged that Elise had no factual and legal bases to be appointed as
administratix of Eliseo’s estate by the improper venue that it should have
been in Capas, Tarlac not in Las Piñas, City.
Then Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence up to time of Eliseo’s
death.

Issue:
Whether or not Elise has the legal capacity on the right to file a
declaration of nullity on her father’s estate for the proper proceeding in
estate?

Held:
Yes. any interested party may attic the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.
The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. Elise, as
a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage for Eliseo and Amelia for having been contracted
while the marriage between Eliseo and Amelia still exists. And the death of
either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Aquino vs. Delizo

Facts:
Defendant Conchito Delizo at the date of marriage to the plaintiff,
herein petitioner Fernando Aquino concealed the latter the fact that she was
pregnant by another man or about four months after marriage, gave birth to a
child. Defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
 Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the
reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later
date.
In this case, the trial court noted that no birth certificate was
presented that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties.

Issue:
Whether their marriage is voidable on the ground of concealment of
pregnancy prior to marriage?

Held:
No. Plaintiff’s claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the
defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter
was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy 7 months at the time of the
marriage. At this stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat as alleged
by the plaintiff.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and
defendant to had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore
the child could be their own.

Anaya v Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930 Nov. 26 1970

Facts:
On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando
Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint
and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim
was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior
to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his.
Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages. 

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close

relative and having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for
the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the
alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no
intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage
was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative
that was intimated above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage. Aurora appealed. 

Issue:
 Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held:
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity"
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may
detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been
thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. 
SARAO vs GUEVARRA No 4264 May 31, 1940

Plaintiff and appellee: Sarao

Defendant and Appelle: Pilar Guevara
Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of laguna
Ponente: Reyes, A. J
Issue: NO reason in disturbing the decision appealed from Decision
CONFIRMED.FACTS:
1) Appeal from decision of CFI dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for
annulment ofmarriage in the ground of impotency
2) Married: June 3, 1936: Manila
3) Afternoon: plaintiff tried to have carnal knowledge but
defendant asked to waitfor the evening
4 ) N i g h t c a m e: p l a i n t if f a g a in a p p r o a c h e d de f en d a
nt — t h ou g h h e f o u n do r i f ic e o f h er v a g in a s u f f i c ie n t l
y large f or h is organ, she complained of pains ofher private parts and
he notices oozing there from some purulent matter offensive to the smell
5) Upon advice of physician—defendant submitted to operation
(august 7, 1936)and as medical verdict that the uterus and the
ovaries were bound to be effected withtumor—surgically removed with
consent of plaintiff
6) Rendered defendant incapable of procreation but did not
incapacitate her tocopulate
7 ) U n d e r m ar r ia g e l a w : m ar r i a g e m a y b e a n n u l l e d
i f t h e p a rt y, w a s a t t h et i m e o f m a r r i ag e , p h y s i ca l
ly i n c a p a b le o f entering into the married state and suchincapacity
remains incurable
8) Plaintiff wants to construe phrase of physically incapable of entering into
marriedstate into incapacity to procreate
9) US generally held that the meaning on impotency is not the
ability to procreatebut the inability to copulate
10) Defect must be of copulation not reproduction—barrenness will
not invalidatethe marriage
11) Defendant is not impotent in this case—removal of parts
rendered her sterilebut it by no means made her unfit for sexual
intercourse
12) It was due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance (memory of
first unpleasantexperience) that made him give up the idea of again
having carnal knowledge of hereven after she had already been rid of her
disease
13) Contention of fraud: she did not inform him of her disease in
sex organs—but this contention is untenable since fraud is not alleged
in the complaint and has not been proved at the tria
 Tuason vs. CA

Facts:
Private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. Private
respondent alleged that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights,
womanizer and drug addict. He even refused to finance his children for their
tuition fees. Private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save
the conjugal properties from further dissipation. He temporarily left conjugal
home for a cooling off period.
Petitioner filed his opposition and was thereafter scheduled to present
his evidence. Counsel for petitioner moved to suspend. However, petitioner
failed to appear. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
marriage and awarding the custody of common children to respondent. No
appeal was taken.
respondent filed for “motion for dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains and adjudication to plaintiff of the conjugal properties.” On the same
day, petitioner filed for a relief of judgment but the trial court denied.

Issue:
Whether the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the court should
have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene under art. 48 of the fc

Held:
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment,
declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose
of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to
answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should rode the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his
own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Petition denied.
Espiritu v CA
G.R. No. 115640 Mar 15 1995
Facts:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US.  Teresita works as a nurse while
Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh
for a temporary post.  They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind.  After a
year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also
got married.  Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.  In
1990, they decided to separate.  Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but
instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California.  Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left
them with his sister.  When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in
1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his
sister to gain custody of the children. 

Issue:
WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.

Held:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s
welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years
of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling
reasons.  The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child
under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive.  At the time the
judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age.  The
choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered.  It is
evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt.  She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother’s infidelity.  Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show
that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend.  On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime
of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.    

Hence, petition was granted.  Custody of the minors was reinstated to their
father.

Petitioner: Susan Lim-Lua

Respondent: Danilo Lua Ponente: Villarama
Promulgated: Jun 05 2013

FACTS: 1.Sept 3 2003- Susan filed declaration of nullity with her marriage
with Danila - She wanted 500k monthly support for her 2 children 2. March
2004- RTC said that monthly support of 250k/month plus 135k support for
operation on her both eyes. RTC also said that applying Art 203 of the FC. It
should be retroactive from the time of judicial demand. Ergo Resp must pay
250k x 7. 3.Respondent then said that the wife does not need that much
money since she lives in the same house as their children. 4. April 2005-
Court of appeals said that GADLEJ in RTC since there is no evidence to prove
his income. And he should only pay support of 115k per month. Plus back pay
of 2.185Million pesos. 5.Respondent refused to pay the support pendente lite.
Then the trial court granted a writ of execution, but the CA reversed this
decision. They ordered a deduction of 3.428 million from the arrears in the
support. 6.The CA reasoned out that the RTC should not have ignored the
maintenance of 2 cars, payment of tuition, travel expenses, credit card
purchases, and books made by Danilo to support the children and Susan.
7.The CA intended the 115k to be for the sustenance of t he children -
according to the records - Susan had scoliosis - they spend 50k a month for
food - 100k in other expenses - Susan needs clothing, vitamins and medicine
for her illness. - They need 2 drivers - schooling shouldered by husband -
Therapy of 5k a week. 8.The supposed income of millions of the respondent
is based only on allegations and records show that the corporations are
owned by his parents and sibling and not by him. The CA reduced support o
115k

ISSUES 1. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT

GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. (NO) 2. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED
IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS
946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL
SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND
THEIR CHILDREN. (PARTLY GRANTED)

HELD (ONLY FOR ISSUE NUMBER 2) 1.the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
needs of the recipient. 2.Such support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family 3.Upon
receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, the
court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of
judgment or final order. 4.court does not need to delve fully into the merits of
the case before it can settle an application for this relief. 5.Since the amount
of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by
either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.
The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the
support in arrears. 6. HOWEVER the CA should not have allowed all the
expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. 7. the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for
his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed (i.e not to be deducted from
arrears) 8. Of the 3.428M allowed by the CA only 648.102k are allowable
deductions PETITION PARTLY GRANTED.

Mangonan vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Belen Mangonon, in behalf of her minor children, filed a
petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for
support pendente lite with the RTC against her Federico (alleged father) and
Francisco (Federico’s father)
Delgado. It was alleged that seven months after the annulment of Belen and
Federico Delgado, Belen gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. After Federico
totally abandoned them, she eventually remarried and the whole family
migrated to the US (the twins eventually became US citizens). The petition
was filed because of the financial incapacity of Belen to solely provide for
the college education of her two daughters (her second husband allegedly
cannot be compelled to provide support as he has his own children to provide
for), who were, as of the filing of said petition, about to enter college.
Despite demands made to respondent, who was allegedly well off, the same
remained unheeded. Petitioner alleges that the twins are her legitimate
daughters by Federico since they were born within seven months from the
date of annulment of their marriage. However, as Federico failed to sign the
birth certificates of the twins, it was imperative that their status as
legitimate children be judicially declared pursuant to FC Article 173. She also
alleges that under the FC, in case of default on the part of the parents, the
obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children;
hence, Federico or in his default, Francisco (Federico's father) should be
ordered to provide general and education support for the twins. Respondent
claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against him. He said that the
legitimacy of the twins must first be established as he did not sign the birth
certificates of the two. Accordingly, he left for abroad and stayed their within
the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the
twins, and that he only came to know about the birth of the twins when they
were introduced to him 17 years after. He likewise averred that the order of
liability for support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent
such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the
recipient. He maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders of
petitioner and her second husband, the latter having voluntarily assumed the
duties and responsibilities of a natural father. Trial court ordered that the
respondents provide a monthly support pendente lite of P5,000 each for the
education of Rica and Rina to be delivered within the first five days of each
month without need of demand. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision.
CA affirmed TC

Issue:
Whether the twins are entitled to support pendente lite from federico,
or in his financial incapacity, Francisco.

Held:
Yes. Under Art. 50 of Fc, Federico has the obligation to provide
support. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half
of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the
financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with
their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears 43 to be computed from the
time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.