JUDGEMENTS

UNIT – 2

C. K. Daphtary & Ors vs. O. P. Gupta & Ors on 19 March, 1971 AIR SC 1122

FACTS:- This is a petition under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by Shri C. K.
Daphtary and three other advocates bringing to our notice the alleged contempt of this Court
committed by the respondents (1) 0. P. Gupta, (2) Rising Sun Press, Delhi, through its
proprietor, and (3) M/s Kanak Book Depot. Respondent No. 3-Kanak Book Depot-has not
been traced. Respondent No. 1, 0. P. Gupta, appeared in person, and the proprietor of the
Rising Sun Press, Mela Ram, also appeared in person.

It is further stated in the petition that respondent No. 1 "with the deliberate design of bringing
into disrepute and scandalizing this Hon'ble Court, wrote and got printed and published, by
and through Respondent No. 2, a pamphlet which though ostensibly meant for the convenient
use of members of Parliament was actually widely circulated and was made available for sale
at M/s Kanak Book Depot, P. 0. Ramsanehi Ghat, Distt. Barabanki, U. P., Respondent No.
3." It is also stated that "the said pamphlet was, as the petitioners believe, sold or offered for
sale to the public by Respondent No. 3."

The respondent published and circulated a booklet in public purporting to ascribe bias and
dishonesty to Justice Shah while acting in his judicial capacity. Mr C.K. Daphtary, along with
others, filed a petition alleging that the booklet has scandalised the judges who participated in
the decision and brought into contempt the authority of the highest court of the land and thus
weakened the confidence of the people in it.

HELD:- The Supreme Court, in examining the scope of the contempt of court, laid down that
the test in each case is whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the
judge or whether it will interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of
law by the court.

E.M.S. Namboodripad v. T.N. Nambia,

FACTS- The most famous case regarding a court being “scandalized” is that of E.M.S
Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar (1970). Namboodiripad had held a press conference in
November, 1976 and made various critical remarks relating to the judiciary which inter alia
was described by him as "an instrument of oppression" and the Judges as "dominated by class
hatred, class prejudices", "instinctively" favouring the rich against the poor. He also stated
that as part of the ruling classes the judiciary "works against workers, peasants and other
sections of the working classes" and "the law and the system of Judiciary essentially served
the exploiting classes" (emphasis supplied) It was found that these remarks were reported in
the newspapers and thereafter proceedings commenced in the High Court of Kerala. The
appellant Shri Namboodiripad was called upon to show cause why he should not be
committed for contempt. The appellant further claimed that his observations did no more than
give expression to the Marxist Philosophy and what was contained in the programme of the
Communist Party of India. The court found guilty of contempt by the Kerala High Court, the
Chief Minister appealed to the Supreme Court, where a bench led by the Chief Justice of
India, Hidayatullah, upheld the conviction and reduced the fine to a token Rs. 50. The
judgment states, “Judged from the angle of courts and administration of justice, there is not a
semblance of doubt in our minds that the appellant was guilty on contempt of court. Whether
he misunderstood the teachings to Marx and Engels or deliberately distorted them is not too
much purpose. The likely effect of his words must be seen and they have clearly the effect of
lowering the prestige of judges and courts in the eyes of the people. That he did not intend
any such result may be a matter for consideration in the sentence to be imposed on him but
cannot serve as a justification. We uphold the conviction.”

The appeal was against the conviction for contempt of court. The conviction was based on
certain utterances of the appellant, when he was Chief Minister, at a press conference. Mr
Chief Justice Hidayatullah with whom G.K. Mitter and A.N. Ray, JJ. Agreed speaking for the
Supreme Court explained the scope of law relating to contempt and observed:

“The law of contempt stems from the right of the courts to punish by imprisonment or fine to
persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of
justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie
curiae and by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to
them even if committed outside the courts. Formerly, it was regarded as inherent in the
powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of India… There are many kinds of
contempt’s. The chief forms of contempt are insult to judges, attacks or fair comment on
pending proceedings with a tendency to prejudice fair trial obstruction to officers of the
courts, witnesses or the parties along with the process of the court, breach of duty by officer
connected with the Court and scandalising the Judges or the courts. The last form occurs,
generally speaking, when the conduct of a person tends to bring the authority and
administration of laws into disrespect or disregard. This conduct included all acts which bring
the Courts into disrepute or disrespect, or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty or
challenge its authority.”

Mr Chief Justice Hidayatullah further observed:

“The law punishes not only acts which do in fact interfere with the courts and administration
of justice but also those which have that tendency, that is to say likely to produce a particular
result.” The Supreme Court after citing several works and teaching of Marx and Engels
upheld the sentence of contempt of court. It was that judging from the angle of the courts and
administration of justice, there was not assemblage of doubt that the appellant was guilty of
the contempt of court.

UNIT-3

In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584

[Overruled by Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409]

FACTS IN BRIEF: - Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra, the then President of the Bar Council of
India, was accused of abusing a judge of the Allahabad High Court. The said incident
occurred while the Court was in session and the applicant Judge was in the process of hearing
a case in which the contemnor was appearing on behalf of one of the parties. According to the
applicant judge [Justice SK Keshote], the contemnor had started shouting in reply to a
question and had threatened that he would get the judge transferred and even impeached. The
judge further complained that the contemnor had insulted him in open Court. The matter was
referred to the Supreme Court of India for decision.

ARGUMENTS: - Before the Supreme Court, the following was argued by the Contemnor;

That the applicant judge had treated him unfairly and had proceeded to set aside an
order of the lower court without even hearing the arguments.
That he was being ‘roughed’ up by the judge for taking a fearless stand to protect the
freedom of the Bar.
That an investigation must be ordered into the incident to find out whether contempt
had been committed punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution or under Section
16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
That his conduct did not amount to contempt as normally altercations take place
between a Judge and the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on
either side but there being no intention, provisions of contempt were not attracted.
 That the Supreme Court did not have the jurisdiction to punish for an act of contempt
committed in respect of another Court of Record which was invested with identical
and independent power for punishing for contempt of itself.

JUDGMENT: - The Supreme Court rejecting the contention of the contemnor that the Court
could not take cognizance of the contempt committed in respect of another Court held that
being a Court of Record, the Court had the power to punish for contempt of High Courts also.
The Apex Court also did not accept the subsequent unconditional apology of the contemnor
for the reasons; (a) it was a free and frank admission of misdemeanour and (b) as the Court
did not find any sincere regret for his act of disrespect shown to the applicant. Instead, the
apology was concealed in such a garbed language that justified his conduct. Thus the
Supreme Court, exercising its power to do complete justice under Article 142 read with
Article 129, found the contemnor guilty of criminal contempt of court.

FOR COMMON MAN: - The important aspects of the judgment can be summarized as
follows;

 The Supreme Court held that under Articles 129, 215 and 142 of the Constitution, the
Court had the power to take suo moto cognizance of contempt proceedings.
 It also held that Article 129 vested the Supreme Court not only with the power to
punish for contempt of itself but also of lower courts and tribunals in its capacity as
the highest court of the land.

Delhi Judicial Services Association V. State of Gujarat AIR 1991 SC 2176

FACTS- On 25th of September 1989, Inspector S.R. Sharma met Patel, CJM in his chamber
to discuss the case involving Jitu Sport where the Police had failed to submit charge-sheet
within the 90 days period. During the discussion, Sharma invited the CJM to visit the Police
Station to see the papers and said that his visit would mollify the sentiments of the police
officials. At 8.35 PM Sharma sent a police Jeep at Patel’s residence and Patel went to the
police station in the vehicle. When the CJM arrived in Sharma’s chamber in the Police
Station, he was forced to consume liquor which he tried to resist. On this resistance, the CJM
was assaulted, handcuffed and tied with rope by Inspector Sharma and other police personnel.
Later on, he was sent to Hospital for medical examination, in a handcuffed state, and the
police intentionally made him sit in the veranda of Hospital for half an hour, exposing the
CJM in that condition to public gaze. The police asked the press to take photographs of the
CJM while at the hospital. The pictures were published in ‘Jansatta’ on 26th of September
1989.

After the matter reached the apex Court, these police officers, contended the authenticity of
the CJM’s account. To establish the facts, the Supreme Court appointed Justice R.M Sahai,
the senior judge from Allahabad High Court to investigate the matter. He submitted a 140-
page detailed report to the Court that was again contended by these police officials, but the
Supreme Court didn’t find any merit in their objections. Finally, this report and its findings
were accepted by the Supreme Court as authentic, and the case against these police officials
proceeded.

ISSUES-

 Did the arrest made by police amount to arrest?

 Can the Supreme Court intervene in the decision of the subsidiary court can it take the
cognizance where there is contempt?

ISSUES ANSWERED-

 The arrest made by police inspector was not some an ordinary person but a juristic
person, but was the person who had responsibility of rendering the
protection/judgement in the interest of the state. Under article of 136 the Indian
constitution, it has been stated that the arrest who is working for the judiciary would
be amount to contempt of court and would be liable for punishment.
 Under the article 136 of the Indian constitution, the power granted to the Supreme
Court is innumerable, it has to intervene in the proceeding of the high court, where it
thinks there is miscarriage of justice.

JUDGEMENT-

The Supreme Court also found that the District Superintendent of Police had been hand in
glove with Inspector Sharma by giving him a free hand and not taking any action against him
on the complaints of CJM N.L Patel. It also made specific adverse remarks against the then
D.G.P of the state K. Dadabhoy and expressed deep resentment over his indifferent attitude
towards the incident. The Court recommended departmental action by the State government
against the D.G.P.
The Supreme Court convicted Inspector S.R Sharma and sent him to simple imprisonment for
six months along with the DSP, D.K Dhagal, who was pronounced guilty and sent to simple
imprisonment for one month. Other accomplice police officials too were convicted and jailed.

In the end, the Supreme Court noted that it doesn’t approve the CJM’s conduct in visiting the
Police station on the invitation of Inspector Sharma. The honourable court suggested judicial
officers refrain from such visits unless officially important, that too under intimation to the
District and Session Judge.

The Supreme Court in this case also issued strict guidelines to be followed by the Police for
detaining and arresting a judicial officer.

GUIDELINES-

1. If a judicial officer is to be arrested for some offence, it should be done under

intimation to the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be.
2. If facts and circumstances necessitate the immediate arrest of a judicial officer of the
subordinate judiciary, a technical or formal arrest may be affected.
3. The fact of such arrest should be immediately communicated.to the District and
Sessions Judge of the concerned District and the Chief Justice of the High Court.
4. The Judicial Officer so arrested shall not be taken to a police station, without the prior
order or directions of the District & Sessions Judge of the concerned District, if
available.
5. Immediate facilities shall be provided to the Judicial Officer for communication with
his family members, legal advisors and Judicial Officers, including the District &
Sessions Judge.
6. No statement of a Judicial Officer who is under arrest be recorded nor any panchnama
be drawn up nor any medical test be conducted except in the presence of the Legal
Advisor.
7. There should be no handcuffing of a Judicial Officer
 UNIT-4

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45

ISSUE: - The issue for deliberation in the present case was, whether lawyers have a right to
strike and/or give a call for boycotts of Court/s? The Petitioners sought a declaration that
such strikes and/or calls for boycott were illegal.

ARGUMENTS: - The Petitioners submitted that strike as a means for collective bargaining
was recognized only in industrial disputes and lawyers who were officers of the Court could
not use strikes as a means to blackmail the Courts or the clients. They further argued that the
call for strike by lawyers was in effect a call to breach the contract which lawyers have with
their clients. On the other hand, the legal fraternity submitted that lawyers retained the right
to strike in rare cases in order to get their concerns communicated in the event of improper
treatment being given to them.

JUDGMENT: - The Supreme Court declared that lawyers have no right to go on strike or
give a call for boycott, not even on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, could only
be made by giving press statements, TV interviews carrying out of the Court premises
banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour arm bands, peaceful protest
marches outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas or relay facts etc. The
Court, acknowledging the fact that even those lawyers willing to attend the Court could not
attend owing to the strike or boycott, asked the lawyers to boldly refuse to abide by any call
for strike or boycott. The Court also declared that no lawyer could be visited with any
adverse consequence by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any
nature including that of expulsion can be held out in an event of his refuse to attend to the
strike/boycott. The Court also observed that an Advocate is an officer of the Court and enjoys
special status in society. They have obligations and duties to ensure smooth functioning of
the Court and they also owe a duty to their client. Strikes are an interfere with administration
of justice, disrupt Court proceedings and put interest of their clients in jeopardy. Thus the
Court imposed a blanket ban on strikes by lawyers.

Case: P.D. Gupta v. Ram Murti and Anr. AIR 1998 SC 283

Facts: One Srikishan Dass died leaving behind extensive immovable properties. Claims to
the said properties were made by one Vidyawati claiming to be the sister of the deceased, one
Ram Murti and two others who claimed them to be the heir of the deceased.
Later the said properties were purchased by the advocate of Vidyawati knowing them to be
disputed. The advocate thereafter sold the property to a third party and made profit. A
complaint was made against the advocate to the Bar Council of Delhi.

Held: Since the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Delhi could not dispose of the
complaint within a period of one year and therefore the proceedings had been transferred to
the Bar Council of India under Section 36-B of the Advocates Act. The disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India found him guilty of professional misconduct and
suspended him from practice for period of one year.

Shambhuram Yadav vs Hanumandas Khatri (AIR 2001 SC 2509)

Fact: This case under Advocate Act, 1961 is concerned with professional misconduct of an
advocate. In this case, a complaint was filed by the appellant against the respondents-
Advocate before the Bar council of Rajasthan, which was referred to the Disciplinary
Committee by the State Bar Council. The complaint against advocate was that he had written
a letter to his client Mahant Rajagiri stating that his another client had informed him that the
concerned judge accepts bribe to give favourable orders, and so he should send an amount of
Rs. 10,000 /- to get decision in his fever, and in case he can influence the judge himself, there
is no need to send Rs. 10,000 /- to be given to the judge. The content of the letter was
admitted by the respondent Advocate. However, in reply to the complaint letter, he pleaded
that the services of the presiding judge were terminated due to taking illegal gratification, and
that he had followed by norms of professional ethics and brought this fact to the knowledge
of the client to protect the interest of his client, and that the money was not sent by the client
to him. Under such circumstances, he had not committed in professional misconduct. The
State Bar Council came to the conclusion that the respondent Advocate was guilty of
professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for a period of 2 years.

This ORDER was challenged, but the disclosure of BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA enhanced the
punishment and directed that the name of the respondent must be stacked off from the role of
advocates and thus debars him permanently from practice.

The respondent Advocate filed a review petition before it against this decision under Section
44 of the Advocate Act, 1961. The Bar Council of India accepted the review petition and held
that the Advocate is a man of 80 years old and is continuing practice since 1951. During such
a long period of practice, he has never committed any professional ethics with any ill motive.
This is his first mistake. So, the review-petition was allowed and the earlier order was
modified by substituting the punishment of permanently debarring him from practice with
that of remanding him.

JUDGEMENT- On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the earlier order of Bar Council of
India had taken into consideration all the relevant factors for arriving at the conclusion that
the Advocate was totally unfit to be a lawyer having the written such a letter and so the
punishment lesser then permanently debarring him cannot be imposed on guilty respondent.
The Court furthers the held that the power of review does not have empower the Disciplinary
Committee for taking a different view on the same facts of the case. The penalty of
permanent debarment of practice was imposed on the respondent in view of the nature of
misconduct committed by the Advocate respondent, which has been modified in exercise of
review power. It is the duty of Bar Council to adhere to the required standards and on its
failure to take appropriate action against the erring Advocates.

Harishchandra Tiwari vs. Baiju AIR 2002 SC 548

FACT- Appellant was the enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of state of U.P in
May, 1982, and has been practicing since then. Appellant was engaged by Baiju respondent,
in a land acquisition case in which the respondent was claimant for compensation.
Compensation of RS. 8118 /- for acquisition of Land of the said Baiju. Same was deposited
by the state in the court. The appellant applied for releasing the amount and as per the Courts
order withdrew the amount on 2 September 1987 but he did not return it to the client to whom
it was due nor did he informed client about the receipt of the amount.

Long thereafter, when the client got the knowledge of it and after failing the to get amount
written by the Advocate, a complainant was lodged by him with the bar council of state for
initiating suitable disciplinary action against Appellant

On 12 June 1988, appellant filed a reply to the said complaint accepting the Representation of
the respondent by him and withdrawing of money, but adopted a defence that he had returned
the amount to the client after deducting his fees and expenses. In addition to this Appellant on
3 August 1988 filed an affidavit before state bar council bar council in which a compromise
between the appellant and respondent had been arrived was stated. State bar council
disciplinary committee was checked the affidavit with the respondent. The respondent not
only denied the contents but also denied having received any amount from the appellant
Advocate.
Under section 36-B the Act of proceedings stood transferred to the bar council of India. The
disciplinary committee conducted enquiry and came to the conclusion that the affidavit dated
3 August, 1988. Was forged one and that application was fabricated. On this findings the
committee imposed a punishment of suspending the Advocate from practice for a period of 3
years. Against this order that an appeal is made before the Honourable court under Section 38
of advocate Act, 1961.

ISSUE –

What should be the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the delinquent advocate?

JUDGEMENT- the Supreme Court disposed The Appeal and imposed the punishment of
removal of the name of appellant from the roll of the advocate.

SC Bar Association V. U.O.I AIR 1998 SC 605

FACTS : In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, the Supreme Court found the
Contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing criminal contempt of Court for having
interfered with and "obstructing the course of justice by trying to threaten, overawe and
overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening language", While
awarding punishment, keeping in view the gravity of the contumacious conduct of the
contemner, the court also suspended the contemnor from practising as an advocate for a
period of three years from the date of judgement with the consequence that all posts held by
him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith.

Aggrieved by the direction that the "Contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an
Advocate for a period of three years" issued by this Court by invoking powers under Articles
129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary
Secretary, has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

ISSUES: whether the punishment for established contempt of Court committed by an

Advocate can include punishment to debar the concerned advocate from practice by
suspending his licence (sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its powers under Article
129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGEMENT:-

 the jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Article 142 which are supplementary
in nature and are provided to do complete justice in any matter, are independent of the
jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Article 129 which cannot be trammeled in
 any way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advocates Act or
the contempt jurisdiction of the court including of this Court and the contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 being a statute cannot denude, restrict or limit the powers of this
Court to take action for contempt under Article 129.Suspending the licence to practice
of any professional like a lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a
professional is found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specified period,
is not a recognised or accepted punishment which a court of record either under the
common law or under the statutory law can impose, on a contemner, in addition to
any of the other recognised punishments.
 The suspension of an Advocate from practice and his removal from the State roll of
advocates are both punishments specifically provided for under the Advocates Act,
1961, for proven "professional misconduct' of an advocate. While exercising its
contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the only cause or matter before this Court is
regarding commission of contempt of court. There is no cause of professional
misconduct, properly so called, This Court, therefore, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 129 cannot take over the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of
the Bar Council of the State or the Bar Council of India to punish an advocate by
suspending his licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of
'professional misconduct' is recorded in the manner prescribed under the Advocates
Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
 In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of court may also
be guilty of committing "professional misconduct" depending upon the gravity or
nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct
and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures.
The power to punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his
name from the roll of the State bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests
exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while
the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in
the courts.

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh V. State of Gujarat AIR 2006 SC 1367

 FACTS: March 1, 2002: Vadodra (erstwhile Barodra), Gujarat, the ignominious Best
Bakery massacre took place as nearly 1000 rioters swooped on the bakery-cum-
residence owned by late Habibullah Sheikh at 21:00 hours IST and within a matter of
 hours eleven members of the Sheikh family and three bakery employees were either
charred to death or hacked to pieces.
 The defence had argued that only the FIR of March 1, 2002 (of one Raizkhan Amin
Mohammed Pathan) is admissible in the Best Bakery case, while the FIR of March 4,
2002 (of the “star witness” Zaheera Sheikh) was manipulated by the police.
 April 2002: The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in its report of April
2002 had recommended that the case be handed over to the CBI.
 May 19, 2003: Zaheera, her mother Sehrunissa and her brothers Nafitullah and
Nabiullah retracted their statements in court. Zaheera said that she was on the terrace
while the incident took place and couldn’t identify the accused.
 June 27, 2003: All the 21 accused in the Best Bakery carnage were acquitted by a
local court for lack of evidence. Additional Sessions Judge H U Mahida feared the
police may have implicated innocents.
 This was the first verdict in a case relating to the post-Godhra communal violence.
The judgement accepts the argument without even considering the fact that statements
similar in import to the March 4th FIR were made by witnesses before several
agencies and/or organizations well after March 4, 2002, and affirmed, according to
media reports, as recently as February 2003.
 The trial in the case began on May 9, 2003 in a fast track court. Delivering his 24-
page judgment, Mahida said, "It was proved beyond doubt that a violent mob had
attacked the bakery and killed 12 persons. However, there was no legally acceptable
evidence to prove that any of the accused presented before the court had committed
the crime." Nobody from the complainants' side was present in the court premises
when the judgment was pronounced.
 July 5, 2003: Zaheera along with her mother told The Sunday Express that she lied in
court because she feared for her life.
 July 7, 2003: Zaheera said that Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) MLA Madhu Srivastava
and his cousin, Congress councilor Chandrakant Srivastava were behind the threats
and sought re-trail outside Gujarat.
 July 8, 2003: National Human Rights Commission visited Vadodra to check papers in
the Best Bakery case.
 July 31, 2003: NHRC moves Special Leave Petition in Supreme Court asking for a
retrial outside Gujarat.
 April 12, 2004: Supreme Court orders the retrial to be held outside Gujarat in
Maharashtra. The orders were passed by Justice Aoraiswamy Rajin and Justice Arijit
Pasayat.
 September 24, 2004: Charges were framed by Judge Abhay Thipsay.
 October 4, 2004: The re-trial begins. Following the examination of formal prosecution
witnesses in the first weeks, independent eyewitnesses to the Best Bakery massacre
had begun testifying on October 27, 2004.
 Among these were Tufel Ahmed, Raees Khan Pathan and Shehzad Khan, all workers
in the Best Bakery who were eyewitnesses to the night-long attack.
 November 3, 2004: In an affidavit to the High Court, “If we don’t lie as instructed by
Teesta, then these people will get me and my family members killed,” Zaheera said
with regard to Teesta Setalvad.
 She said that after the fast track court had acquitted the 21 accused, two Muslims had
barged into her house and told her that she would have to change her statement in the
interest of the community and thereafter she along with brother were taken to Mumbai
to Teesta Setalvad.
 She however did not divulge the exact date when she was able to flee from Mumbai
but said that Teesta has had her held captive and it was she who had made her sign
legal papers and the matter was taken to Supreme Court against her wishes.
 Since November 9, 2004: Zaheera went into hiding and even skipped the November
17, 2004 hearing at Mumbai court despite summons being issued to her and her
brothers. The silver lining however has come in the form of Zaheera’s cousin-Yasmin
Sheikh who appeared as a witness on the same date and identified 11 of the 21
accused in the Best Bakery case.
 November 29, 2004: Zaheera Sheikh, prime witness in the Best Bakery case, appeared
before the trial court in Mumbai amidst tight police security to give her testimony but
did not depose as the prosecution chose not to examine her.
 Prosecutor Manjula Rao told the designated Judge Abhay Thipsay that she would
examine Zaheera at the end of the trial and not at this stage. Thereafter, Zaheera left
with her police escort and her lawyer Harshad Ponda assured that she would depose as
and when the court summoned her.
 Nov 18, 2004: Zaheera’s brother Nasibullah Sheikh appeared in court only to retract
his earlier statement. He confirmed to the designated judge Abhay Thipsay that
someone had hit him in the head, and he had gone unconscious. And by the time he
 could regain his senses the bakery had been burnt and so he does not recognise the
accused. Something which he had once refuted.
 Jun 17, 2005: The cross-examination of investigating officer P P Kanani. Mr. Kanani,
who took over as investigating officer from Himmatsinh Baria of Panigate Police
Station on March 10, 2002, gave details of the case in a chronological order.
 August 29, 2005: A Supreme Court appointed Committee indicted Zaheera Sheikh,
key witness in the Best Bakery case, as a “liar”. The Committee did not mince any
words in criticizing Zaheera, who has given a series of flip-flop statements.
 The Committee, headed by the Supreme Court Registrar General said in its report,
“She has developed an image of self-condemned liar whose statements alone cannot
safely be accepted.”

ISSUE: the Court refers to a contempt petition alleging that Zahira's press statement (or
statement reported in the press) amounted to contempt of court. Apparently, the gravamen
here is that she gave different versions concerning the statements she made before the trial
court in Gujarat, and subsequently 'disowned' the statement made in this Court and before
bodies like the National Human Rights Commission. People who do not have access to
judicial documentation (called the 'paperbook') do not know the nature of the contempt
petition - that is, the relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act justifying the petition,
the specific grounds, and prior judicial precedents invoked etc.

JUDGEMENT: During the course of hearing, we had asked learned counsel appearing for
Zahira as to whether they would like to be heard on the question of the consequential order, if
any, if the report is accepted and Zahira is found to have committed contempt or to have
deflected the course of justice by unacceptable methods. Learned counsel for Zahira stated
that they would not like to make statements in that regard and would only stress on the report
being not accepted. Zahira has committed contempt of this Court. Zahira is sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay cost of Rs.50, 000/- and in case of
default of payment within two months, she shall suffer further imprisonment of one year;

Rajendra Sail v. M. P. High Court Bar Association AIR 2005 SC 2473

FACTS:- In the murder trial of Shankar Guha Niyogi, a trade union leader, the accused were
found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life except one who was awarded death
sentence. On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court judgment and acquitted the
accused. A news report was published in newspaper 'Hitavada' on 4th July, 1998 under the
caption 'Sail terms High Court decision in Niyogi murder case as rubbish’. That report
was based on the speech delivered by appellant Rajendra Sail in a rally organized to
commemorate the death of Shankar Guha Niyogi and interview given by him soon after the
speech to appellant Ravi Pandey, the correspondent of the newspaper.

The news report stated that a Judge who was on verge of retirement should not have been
entrusted with the responsibility of dealing with such a crucial case. It went further stating
Rajendra Sail as saying that he was a key witness in the murder trial and in spite of engaging
a well-known advocate as public prosecutor nobody could have made much difference when
the judges were already prejudiced and that he had substantial evidence to prove that one of
the judges who decided the matter was bribed. The aforesaid news item led to initiation of
contempt action on an application filed by Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar.

JUDGEMENT:- It was held that while the media can, in the public interest, resort to
reasonable criticism of a judicial act or the judgment of a Court for public good, it should not
cast scurrilous aspersions on, or impute improper motives or personal bias to the judge. Nor
should they scandalize the Court or the judiciary as a whole, or make personal allegations of
lack of ability or integrity against a judge. The judgments of Courts are public documents and
can be commented upon, analysed and criticized, but it has to be in a dignified manner
without attributing motives.

Surendra Nath Mittal v. Daya Nand Swaroop BCI Tr Case No. 12/1990

Facts: In this case the respondent advocate made manipulation in the operative part of the
judgement and decree by adding the words “mai sood” i.e. including interest. The respondent
advocate however denied the allegation and contended that he had not committed any
offence.

Held: The disciplinary committee found the advocate guilty and held that it was the
respondent advocate who had added the words subsequently and that the same amounts to
professional misconduct the committee ordered for his suspension for one year.

It is to be noted that proceedings for contempt and professional misconduct can be carried out
simultaneously.

Case: Suo Motto Enquiry v. Nand Lal Balwani BCI Tr Case No. 68/1999

Facts: The respondent advocate hurled the shoes and shouted slogans in the Supreme Court
of India. Both contempt and proceedings for professional misconduct were initiated against
him.
Held: The Supreme Court found him guilty for contempt of court and awarded him a simple
imprisonment for four months and fine of 2000 Rupees.

Further the DC of BCI also found him guilty of professional misconduct and ordered his
name to be removed from the roll of Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa.

Hikmat Ali khan v. ishwar Prasad arya and others civil appeal no 4240/1986

FACTS: - Ishwar Prasad arya was an advocate practising at badaun in U.P he assaulted his
opponent, radhey shyam in the court-room of munsif as badaun with a knife. After
investigation he was prosecuted for offences u/d section 307 IPC and section 25 of the Arms
Act and he was sentenced for 3 years imprisonment.

The appellant Hikmat Ali khan complained against the advocate and prayed for fresh
inquiry. In the said proceedings, the advocate appeared and files his return statement but
thereafter he did not appear. Hence, the bar council of U.P proceeded ex-parte against him
and the disciplinary committee of the state bar council of U.P debarred for a period of 3
years. The advocate again appealed to the bar council of India and it had set aside the
punishment. Then Hikmat Ali filed appeal to the Supreme Court.

JUDGEMENT: - The Supreme Court held that his conduct was such that his name should be
removed from the state rule of advocate as he was found guilty of an offence attempting to
commit murder and convicted for it and as he was unworthy of remaining in the profession.
The defendant assaulted his opponent with a knife. Prosecuted under Section 307 of IPC and
Section 25 of the Arms Act. Conviction suspended on basis of a letter from the
governor. Supreme Court held that his conduct was such that his name should be
removed from the state role of advocates as he was unworthy of remaining in the
profession after the conviction. (Rule 7A of Chapter III of BCI Rules).

Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh vs. Kurapati Satyanarayana AIR 2003 SC 178

FACTS:- Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh, for short "the State Bar Council", has filed this
appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India in D.C.
Appeal No. 39 of 1997 dated 28th March, 1999 by which the Bar Council of India has set
aside the order passed by the State Council removing the name of Kurapati Satyanarayana,
hereinafter referred to "the Delinquent", from the roll of the State Bar Council as he was
found guilty of grave professional misconduct in the discharge of his duties as an advocate.
O.S. No. 1624 of 1991 was filed by Sri Gutta Nagabhushanam, hereinafter referred to "the
de-facto complainant", on the file of the Additional District Munsif Magistrate, West
Godavari District, Eluru through the delinquent advocate. The Delinquent received a total
sum of Rs. 14,600/- on various dates in the execution proceedings but did not make payment
of the same to the de-facto complainant. he complaint filed by the de-facto complainant along
with the reply filed by the Delinquent and the connected documents were forwarded to the
Bar Council of the Andhra Pradesh in the High Court premises for appropriate action. The
State Bar Council took notice of the complaint filed and issued a notice to the Delinquent.
The Delinquent in spite of the service of notice did not choose to file a counter. The State
Bar Council referred the matter to its Disciplinary Committee.

The State Disciplinary Committee after examining the witnesses produced by the
complainant came to the conclusion that the Delinquent had received a total sum of Rs.
14,600/- belonging and payable to the de-facto complainant on different dates and retained
the same with him. He Delinquent preferred an appeal before the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India agreed
with the finding of fact recorded by the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council that
the Delinquent had failed to make the payment of Rs. 14,600/- received by the Delinquent on
behalf of the complainant in the execution proceedings, but came to the conclusion that the
Delinquent had not committed any professional misconduct though there might have been
some negligence on his part which did not involve any moral turpitude. He Committee is of
the considered view that the appellant from the very beginning never wanted to
misappropriate the decrial amount of the de-facto complainant and the lapse on his part to
return the same was because of his domestic circumstances, as explained.

JUDGEMENT: - Supreme Court held this decision of BCI to be “unfounded and perverse” and
lacking the serious thought which was required to be given to the disciplinary committee of the BCI in
the discharge of quasi-judicial functions while probing into such grave instances. (Rule 23 and 25 of
the BCI Rules- Chapter II). On merits we find that the order of the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India is unsustainable. It is sad that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India, which is the highest body, to monitor the probity of the legal profession in
the country chose to trivialise and treat a very grave professional misconduct on the part of
the Delinquent lightly by saying that the Delinquent did not make the payment to the de-facto
complainant as he had utilised the money for his personal need for treatment and that such
like instances do take place when a person is in trouble. It was neither pleaded nor shown by
the Delinquent that he was in dire financial difficulty which promoted him to utilise the
decrial amount for his treatment which was with him in trust. This is an act of breach of trust.
Re Ajay kumar Pandey A.I.R 1997 SC 260

FACTS:- The alleged contender-Ajay Kumar Pandey, a practising advocate, filed a criminal
complaint against an Advocate Mr. Mahesh Giri and an Additional District Judge, Ms. Saroj
Bala, then posted as VII Additional District Judge, Lucknow, Under Sections 499 and 500
IPC, after first serving them with a notice demanding compensation for defaming him. The
allegations made in that complaint are not relevant for our purpose. That complaint was
dismissed on 16.11.1994. It appears that the alleged contemnor had filed another complaint
on 12.9.1994 Under Sections 500 and 504 IPC against seven advocates namely (1) Shri
Prakash Narayan Awasthi (2) Shri R.P. Misra (3) Shri Vishambhar Singh (4) Shri T.N. Misra
(5) Shri Srikant Verma (6) Shri Pankaj Sinha and (7) Shri N.C. Pradhan, in which it was
alleged that those advocates had made defamatory imputations regarding the relationship
between him and Ms. Saroj Bala, Add l. District Judge. In that complaint an application
giving a list of 31 advocates for being summoned as witnesses was filed. That application
was rejected by the Trial Court. He, therefore, filed Special Leave Petition.

On 15.12.1996 the following order was made by the Bench:-

"In all these petitions, we find that attack in indecent, wild, intemperate and even abusive
language on the named Judges has been made at various places in each one of the petitions.
The petitioner, who is an advocate, has permitted himself the liberty of using such
expressions, which prima facie tend to scandalize the court in relation to judicial matters and
thus have the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. We are inclined to
initiate contempt proceedings against the petitioner, but on his request grant him six weeks’
time to delete all the objectionable expressions used in the petitions and file fresh petitions.
He shall also remove the other defects, as pointed out in the office report when he files the
fresh petitions. If the fresh petitions are filed, the same shall be listed after eight weeks.
Otherwise, these petitions shall be put up for drawing up contempt proceedings against the
petitioner, after eight weeks. that the Court is not allowed the petitioner to submit his
argument and passed an order to remove the all facts from the petition and file the fresh
petitions and also ordered for listing the matter after 8 weeks. Thereafter, the petitioner
mentioned and also tried to give in writing that he is not in a position to remove anything and
file fresh petitions in view of the fact that he wrote only truth and the court is bound to hear
the petitions and decide the same according to the Constitution and contempt of Court Acts
and other laws as challenged by the petitioner but the court without saying anything retired to
its chamber. That the petitioner is not in a position to remove anything and the deliberate
injustice, fraud, cheating etc. had been done by the contemnors for concealing their nefarious
acts and even they had gone to this extent to destroy the judicial records and fabricated some
judicial papers. Noticing this adamant and defiant attitude of Ajay Kumar Pandey, on
20.02.19% the Bench directed that a Rule be issued against him asking him to show cause
why he should not be punished for committing criminal contempt of court for the use of
intemperate language and casting unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and
attributing motives to them while discharging their judicial functions. He was directed to file
his reply within 8 weeks. That is how the contempt proceeding (Contempt Petition Crl. No.
2/96) came too registered against the alleged contemnor in this Court.

JUDGEMENT: - the Supreme Court has held that an advocate using intemperate language
and casting unwarranted aspersion (false report) on various judicial officers is equality of
gross contempt of court for not getting expected results. Court awarded punishment of
sentence to 4 months simple imprisonment and fine Rs.1000. The Special Leave Petition (and
the two other Special Leave Petitions along with some misc. petitions were dismissed by the
Bench both on account of the objectionable language used in the memorandum of those
petitions as also on merits. “No one can be permitted to intimidate or terrorize judges by
making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of
their judicial functions so as to secure order which the litigant ‘wants’… The liberty of
expression cannot be treated as a licence to scandalize the court…”

Ashok Kumar Kapoor vs. Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana, D.C. Appeal No. 18/1999

FACTS: - The contemnor herein Mr Ashok Kumar Kapoor is a lawyer practising in District
Courts at Ludhiana. Learned Single Bench of this Court (R. S. Mongia, J.) issued notice of
motion to the contemnor to show cause as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 be not initiated against him on the basis of letter written by Mrs Rekha Mittal, the
then Additional Senior Sub Judge, Ludhiana. A copy of the complaint of Mrs Rekha Mittal,
which was addressed to the District & Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, was sent to him along with
the notice. This order was passed by the learned Single Judge on August 11, 1994. Smt.
Rekha Mittal further mentioned that the complainant was in the habit of threatening every
judicial officer to get some order in his favour which could not be appreciated by any Court,
the allegations of fraud, and cheating. She also stated that the facts that she had mentioned
could be verified from her Reader and Steno and some other persons, who were present in the
Court and whose names could be disclosed by her, if so desired. On the aforesaid facts, she
prayed that necessary action be taken against Mr Ashok Kapoor, who is member of the Bar,
for his misconduct and misbehaviour with the Court. Pursuant to the notice issued by learned
Single Bench of this Court, Mr Ashok Kapoor appeared and prayed for time to file reply to
the show cause notice.

ISSUE: - whether in the facts and circumstances as are available before us, the respondent
has committed contempt of Court as envisaged under the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971?

JUDGEMENTS:- The contemnor deserves deterrent punishment, yet considering the fact
that he is a lawyer and in fact, an officer of the Court, we deal with him leniently and
sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and pay a fine of
Rs. 2000/-. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for
15 days.

Disciplinary Committee Decision: - held that the appellant with oblique motive had filed
those cases being well aware of the fact that it was not maintainable and was frivolous. An
advocate was taking advantages of his position should not be allowed to mis-utilise of his
position as an advocate to victimize and harass general public including judicial officers.
Found him guilty of professional misconduct and ordered for removal of name from the roll
of State Bar Council under section 35(3) (D) of the advocates Act, 1961.

Smt. Siya Ram V. Sitaram Singh, Sitaram Singh, BCI Tr. Case No. 21/1987

FACTS: - In this instant case the complaint was filed before the disciplinary committee of
the M.P. State Bar Council by Smt.Siya ram Bai against the respondent advocate, Sita Ram
Singh. the complaint was that the advocate was engaged by the complainant for filing the
money suit against the 13 persons and passing the decree in execution proceeding, the decrial
amount was deposited which was withdrawn by the C.C.D by the respondent advocate but it
was not paid to the complainant and he did not furnish the account therefor. It was also
alleged that the advocate had concealed the real facts and avoided to give any information to
the complainant on some pretext or the other.

The respondent advocate said that he had not withdrawn the amount from the C.C.D. In
addition, the complainant alleged that the advocate had not paid the full court fee in civil suit
against the Dhani ram. In his reply the advocate contended that whenever the amount was
withdrawn from the CC.D, it was in the presence of the applicant and had been adjusted as
per record the amount recoverable by the non-applicant from the applicant. He further said
that the amount desired by the applicant had been taken away in the presence of her husband
and from his office. He said that after taking away the amount the applicant, she was required
to pay six hundred rupees to him but she did not pay. The contention of the advocate, that the
amount withdrawn by him from the C.C.D payable to the complaint had been adjusted
towards the court fee and the other expenses with the consent of the complainant was not find
correct. In the opinion of the disciplinary committee the advocate was to show as to how
much amount was withdrawn by him and adjusted towards his fees. he failed to discharged
his burden.

Held: - The advocate withdrew the decretal amounts paid and did not make the payment to
the client, in violation of Rule 27 of the BCI Rules on Professional Ethics. The Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India ordered the advocate to refund the money to the
complainant along with the 10% interest per annum and also ordered suspension of advocate
for a period of one year.

Secretary, Karnataka Khadi Gram Udyog Samyukta Sangha vs. J.S.Kulkarni, BCI Tr.
Case no 63/1990

FACTS: - in this case complainant engaged the respondent advocate , J.S.Kulkarni for filing
the execution proceeding in the court for the execution of the certain decrees obtained in the
civil suit. It was alleged that the advocate file the execution proceeding in the competent
court and he had received the different amounts towards the decretals amounts in different
execution proceeding but he did not pay the whole amount to the compliant. The complainant
was successful in proving that the after having engaged the respondent to represent him in the
execution proceeding arising out of decree against the judgement debtor he recovered but the
whole amount was not paid to the complainant.

HELD: - disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the India held that Rules 23 to 30
stated in the section II of the Chapter II of the Part 5 of the BCI rules specially provide that an
advocate shall keep an account of the client money entrusted to him and the account so
prepared should know the amount received from the client or on his behalf the expenses
incurred for him and debits made on account of fees with respective dates and all other
necessities particulars. Whenever the moneys are received from or an account of a client the
entries should contain a reference as to whether the amount have been received for the fees or
expenses and during the course of the proceeding, an advocate shall, except with the consent
in writing of the client concerned, be liberty to divert any portion of the expenses towards
fees. Where any amount is received or given to him on behalf of his client the fact of such
receipt must be intimated to the client, as early as possible.in view of the above duties of the
client the committee held that the advocate had failed to discharged his duties towards the
client as he neither furnished the accounts of the recovery of the amount from different
judgement debtor nor refunded the said amounts to the client nor proved the claim of settled
or unsettled fees payable by the client to him. The committee held that the advocate guilty of
having committed professional misconduct and ordered that he be suspended from the
practice for a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order. The committee
debarred him from practicing in any court or before any authority or person during the period
of suspension.

Chandra Shekhar Soni v. Bar Council of Rajasthan & Others Civil Appeal no. 258/1977

This case Supreme Court held that no member of the legal profession can do anything which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession. The State bar Council gave the applicant the benefit of doubt on
the first charge that he changed side in a criminal case, holding that through such conduct on
his part was unprofessional; it was not tantamount to professional misconduct. The court held
that the Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India had rightly observed that it failed to
appreciate the distinction drown by the state Bar council as his act in accepting the brief for
the accused after having appeared for the complaint, was country Bar Council of India Rule
33. The Supreme Court concurred with the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India and held that it is not in accordance with professional etiquette for an
advocate while retaining the brief of one party, to accept the brief of other. It is
unprofessional to represent conflicting interest except by express consent given by all
concerned after a full discloser of facts. The applicant would not have appeared expert with
the permission of the learned Magistrate. Counsel’s paramount duty is to the client and where
he finds there is conflict of interested; he should refrain from doing anything which would
harm any interest of his client. A lawyer when entrusted which a brief is expected to follow
the norms of professional ethics and try to protect the interest of client in relation to whom he
occupies a position of trust.

Vijaya Singh VS. Murarila & Others, Civil Appeal No. 1922/1979

FACTS:- In the present case, the appellant is charged with certifying the solvency of a surety
in a bail able offence. Obviously, the accused, who was the client of the appellant, was
entitled to be enlarged on bail because the offence for which he was in custody was
admittedly bail able. Even so, it is a common phenomenon in our country that bail has too,
often become a bogey and an instrument of unjust incarceration. There are some magistrates
who are never satisfied about the solvency of sureties except when the property of the surety
is within their jurisdiction and Revenue officers have attested their worth. This harasses the
poor and leads to corruption. It may, therefore, be quite on the cards that some sympathetic
lawyer who appears for an indigent accused may commiserate and enquire whether the surety
is solvent. If he is satisfied, on sure basis, that the surety is sufficiently solvent, then he may
salvage the freedom of the accused by certifying the solvency of which he has satisfied
himself. It is also possible that the detainee is a close relation or close friend or a poor servant
of his. In that capacity, not as a lawyer, he may know the surety and his solvency or may
offer himself as a surety. The degree of culpability in a lawyer violating Rule 10, chapter 2,
part six depends on the total circumstances and the social milieu. In the present case, the
circumstances are satisfactory and hardly warrant fitting and deserved Punishment.

This Court should not interfere ordinarily with a punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Tribunal except where strong circumstances involving principle are present.

HELD:- The Appellant, a fledging in the legal profession, has been punished by the Tribunal
of the Bar Council for eating the forbidden fruit of dubious professional conduct by
improperly certifying the solvency of a surety for an accused person, his client. Suspension
from practice for one month is the punishment awarded by the trial tribunal and in appeal.
The lawyer is young, the offence is not tainted with turpitude and the surety whose solvency
be certified was found to be good. The most that may be justified is perhaps a public
reprimand since censure has a better deterrent value on the errant brethren in the profession in
some situations than a suspension for a month from professional practice which may pass
unnoticed in the crowd of lawyers and the delinquent himself may be plying his business
except for appearance in Court.